TCREUR_Public/150525.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, May 25, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 101

                            Headlines

A U S T R I A

VOLKSBANKEN-VERBUND: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'


F R A N C E

ALTICE SA: S&P Affirms B+ Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Negative
SOCIETE GENERALE: Fitch Raises Rating on Tier 1 Capital to BB+


G E R M A N Y

BREMER LANDESBANK: Fitch Lowers Viability Rating to 'bb'
DEUTSCHE BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Notes
JOYOU AG: Management Board Opts to File Insolvency Petition
UNICREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Hybrid Notes


G R E E C E

GREECE: Has No Money to Repay to IMF on June 5, Minister Says
GREECE: Moody's Sees Negative Outlook for Banking System


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Moody's Raises Long-Term Deposit Rating to Ba1
DEPFA BANK: Fitch Puts 'B+' Sub. Notes Rating on CreditWatch Neg.


I T A L Y

BANCO POPOLARE: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDR to 'BB', Outlook Stable


L U X E M B O U R G

ALGECO SCOTSMAN: Moody's Lowers CFR to B3, Outlook Stable
BSN MEDICAL: Moody's Affirms B2 CFR, Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

ING GROUP: Fitch Upgrades Rating on Tier 1 Securities to 'BB+'
KBC BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Sub. Debt Securities


R U S S I A

CB TRANSPORTNY: Bank of Russia Revokes Banking License
INTERCAPITAL-BANK: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
MECHEL OAO: Sberbank Mulls Sale of Loans to Debt Investors
PIONEER GROUP: S&P Raises CCR to 'B-' on Improved Liquidity
PROBANK JSC: Bank of Russia Revokes Banking License

VLBANK JSC: Bank of Russia Reveals Details of Financial Standing


S P A I N

GRUPO COOPERATIVO: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'BB-'; Outlook Stable


S W I T Z E R L A N D

CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Notes
UBS GROUP: Fitch Affirms BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Subordinated Notes


T U R K E Y

FINANSBANK AS: Moody's Affirms Ba2 LT Deposit & Unsecured Ratings


U K R A I N E

BROKBUSINESSBANK: Deposit Guarantee Fund Extends Liquidation Term
UKRAINIAN RAILWAYS: S&P Lowers CCR to 'SD' on Missed Payments


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

KM FURNITURE: In Administration; 52 Jobs Affected
KOZEE SLEEPS: In Administration; 180 Jobs at Risk
LLOYDS BANKING: Fitch Raises Rating on Tier 1 Instruments to BB+
NEW LOOK: S&P Affirms 'B' Corporate Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
ROYAL BANK: Fitch Raises Rating on Sub. Upper Tier 2 Debt to BB+

THPA FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB-(sf)'
* UK: Insolvency Profession Rescues 10,400 Insolvent Businesses


X X X X X X X X

* European Banks Still Highly Vulnerable to Failure
* BOND PRICING: For the Week May 18, 2015 to May 22, 2015


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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VOLKSBANKEN-VERBUND: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) and senior debt ratings of Erste Group Bank AG (Erste) to
'BBB+'/'F2'; Raiffeisen Bank International AG (RBI) to 'BBB'/'F3';
UniCredit Bank Austria AG (Bank Austria) to 'BBB+'/'F2'; and
Volksbanken-Verbund (VB-Verbund) to 'BB-'/'B'. VB-Verbund's Long-
term IDR has been placed on Rating Watch Positive (RWP).

VB-Verbund is not a legal entity but a network of cooperative
banks.  Based on Fitch's rating criteria for banking structures
backed by mutual support mechanisms, Fitch has assigned group
ratings but no Viability Ratings (VRs) to VB-Verbund's member
banks.

The rating actions are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced at that
time and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for commercial banks
in the European Union.

As a result, Fitch believes that, in line with its Support Rating
(SR) definition of '5', extraordinary sovereign support, while
possible, can no longer be relied upon for any member of the peer
group.  Fitch has, therefore, downgraded the SRs of Erste, RBI and
VB-Verbund to '5' from '1' and revised their Support Rating Floors
(SRFs) to 'No Floor' from 'A'.  In addition, Fitch has downgraded
Bank Austria's SR to '2' from '1' and revised its SRF to 'No
Floor' from 'A' and subsequently withdrawn the latter because our
support assessment for the bank is now based on institutional
rather than sovereign support; and hence the SRF is no longer
considered by Fitch to be relevant to the agency's coverage.

The revision of Fitch's expectations for state support means the
banks' IDRs are now driven by their standalone creditworthiness as
expressed in the Viability Rating (VR), leading to the downgrade
of the IDRs to the level of their respective VRs.

The rating actions are also part of a periodic peer review of
large Austrian banking groups rated by Fitch.  The VRs have been
affirmed at 'bbb+' (Erste and Bank Austria) and 'bbb' (RBI), while
VB-Verbund's 'bb-' is maintained on RWP.  The affirmation of most
VRs within the 'bbb' range reflects the Austrian banking sector's
generally solid operating environment and adequate flexibility to
deal with recurring challenges in heterogeneous CEE markets,
although significant pressure remains on the VRs of the peers
exposed to Russia and Ukraine.

Erste's Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that its
performance will continue to recover as indicated by its 1Q15
results.  RBI's Negative Outlook primarily reflects the weak and
uncertain economic outlook in Russia, its dominant profit
contributor, the worsening recession in Ukraine and the execution
risk of its deleveraging plan.  Bank Austria's Stable Outlook
reflects our view that, given its solid profit and lower reliance
on Russia and Ukraine, any severe asset quality deterioration in
these countries would only have a moderate effect on the bank.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs, VRs AND SENIOR DEBT

Fitch views Erste, RBI and Bank Austria's management capabilities,
execution and strategic positioning as comparably solid but with
only modest positive VR implications given the recurring
challenges that they face in a large number of diverse markets.
The three banks have similar dual positioning in Austria and CEE.
While this results in broadly comparable risk appetites in our
view, RBI is naturally more exposed to volatile markets due to its
stronger focus on CEE, where about 61% of total credit exposure is
located, compared with 36% at Erste.

In addition to Erste and Bank Austria's leading domestic
franchises, the three banks have solid market shares in several
CEE countries, resulting in a risk diversification which mitigates
the impact of negative developments in single markets.  However, a
strong deterioration of the Russian economy could affect many CEE
countries despite the region's limited economic convergence.

RBI's geographically less diversified profits than those of Bank
Austria somewhat limit the former's flexibility to absorb the
economic slowdown in Russia.  This is a key driver of the one-
notch differential between RBI's VR and those of its larger peers.
This constraint is counterbalanced by RBI's solid and improved
pre-impairment performance, which remains significantly above its
peers'.

RBI's deleveraging should result in more balanced profit
contributions across CEE by reducing the bank's earnings reliance
on Russia.  However, the positive VR implications thereof are
diluted by RBI's decision to exit the Polish market, one of the
largest and most resilient in CEE.  Generally, we view RBI's
company profile as slightly weaker than those of Erste and Bank
Austria due to RBI's less developed retail franchise in stable
mature markets.

Bank Austria's operating performance is more diversified and
currently stronger and more stable than those of its peers.
However, Bank Austria's performance is similarly reliant on Turkey
as on Russia.  RBI's and Bank Austria's exposures to Ukraine are
modest, but the weak and rapidly deteriorating asset quality there
will continue to burden both banks' consolidated performance in
2015.  Erste's exposure to Russia and Ukraine is limited.  The
bank is similarly reliant on its Czech subsidiary's profit
contribution as RBI is on Russia.  However, this is strongly
mitigated by the Czech unit's strong capitalization,
profitability, funding and asset quality.

The peers' recent performance has suffered from large one-off
impairments, adverse legislation (notably in Hungary, although the
issue of legacy FX exposures was largely resolved in 2014),
regulatory charges (including bank levies), currency depreciation
in CEE (especially in Ukraine and Russia in 2014), recurring low
margins and high fixed costs in Austria, high loan impairment
charges (LICs) in weak CEE markets such as Hungary (all), Romania
(particularly Erste, although the bank has significantly cleaned
up its Romanian loan book in the last few years), Ukraine (RBI and
Bank Austria) and Asia (RBI) and subdued loan growth in CEE and
Austria, accentuated by the banks' restructuring and asset clean-
up.

Asset quality remains weak in several CEE markets (notably
Hungary, Croatia and Romania), and is rapidly deteriorating in
Ukraine.  While it remains solid in Russia, Fitch expects LICs to
increase significantly in Russia in the near term.  Fitch views
the three banks' overall non-performing loan (NPL) coverage as
adequate, although it varies substantially by country, especially
at RBI and Bank Austria.

Bank Austria caught up with its peers by significantly increasing
its cash provisioning of NPLs in 2013, but its provisioning in
Ukraine remains materially lower than RBI's despite comparable
operations.  This is, however, sufficiently mitigated by Bank
Austria not having distributed any dividends to its parent for
several years, which helped it to maintain unreserved NPLs/Fitch
Core Capital (FCC) at the lower end of the peer group.  Fitch
believes that further asset quality deterioration in Ukraine
should be manageable for the banks given their coverage ratios and
the size of their exposures.

The three banks have strengthened their local deposit franchises
in CEE and maintain large unencumbered liquidity buffers.  In
addition, Erste and Bank Austria have large Austrian retail
deposit franchises which are particularly resilient and not
subject to FX volatility.  Fitch believes that Bank Austria's and
RBI's higher reliance than Erste's on wholesale funding is
mitigated by their access to contingent funding sources from their
parents.

The three banks' adequate risk-adjusted capitalization is in line
with general market expectations for universal banks, and high
regulatory risk weights in CEE drive their solid leverage ratios.
But their CEE portfolios expose them to FX and RWA volatility and
cumulated internal capital generation was negative at all three
banks in the last two years, putting them at risk of falling
behind their international peers as regulatory and market demands
tighten.

RBI's short-term internal capital generation prospects are weaker
than those of its two larger peers due to its larger exposure to
more vulnerable CEE markets.  Fitch believes that its recently
launched strategic realignment, which foresees a gross RWA
reduction by 20% in the next three years and the sale of its
Polish unit, adequately addresses these challenges.  But its
execution is vulnerable to challenging market conditions.  This
supports the Negative Outlook on RBI's Long-term IDR.

RBI's Short-term IDR was downgraded to 'F3', the lower of two
possible levels corresponding to its Long-term IDR of 'BBB' given
the Negative Outlook on the Long-term IDR.  While Fitch believes
that Raiffeisen Banking Group (RBG) could provide short-term
liquidity support, RBI's Long-term IDR does not factor any uplift
for potential institutional support from its parent because Fitch
believes that RBI is less integrated into RBG than other group
members and because of RBI's relatively large size, which would
make support from the rest of the group more difficult.  RBI is an
important contributor to RBG's profitability, which means that RBG
would likely be weakened in a situation in which RBI would require
support.  At the same time, Fitch believes that RBG's business
model is unlikely to generate major risks on a scale that could
affect RBI's ratings negatively.

VB-Verbund remains an outlier within the peer group.  Its non-
investment grade VR primarily reflects legacy asset quality
weaknesses at Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG (OeVAG, B/Rating
Watch Negative (RWN)/B), VB-Verbund's central institution that is
in wind down.  However, OeVAG has made considerable restructuring
progress, shrinking its higher-risk non-core asset portfolio to
EUR3.6bn or a quarter of its total assets at end-2014 from about
40% at end-2012.  This accelerated deleveraging triggered OeVAG's
large loss in 2014.

OeVAG reached a further major milestone in April 2015 when it
completed the sale of its Romanian subsidiary, which generated
large losses and considerably burdened VB-Verbund's asset quality
and capitalisation in the last five years.

VB-Verbund's next major restructuring milestone in the short-term
is the spin-off (planned for July 2015) of OeVAG from VB-Verbund
as a wind-down entity (to be renamed Immigon) without a banking
license and with substantial remaining higher-risk non-core
assets.  Fitch expects OeVAG to leave VB-Verbund's mutual support
scheme and be deconsolidated from the group in July 2015,
following the remarkable progress achieved since the start of the
restructuring of OeVAG following the part nationalisation in 2012
and the launch of OeVAG's accelerated wind-down strategy in 4Q14
and the concerted approach of the Austrian regulators and
government (which owns 43.3% of OeVAG).  Fitch expects VB-
Verbund's net residual exposure to Immigon to be modest, which
should no longer materially constrain the group's VR.

Beside considerably relieving VB-Verbund's asset quality and
performance and, thus, reducing the vulnerability of the group's
capital, OeVAG's spin-off should enable VB-Verbund's 47 member
banks to concentrate on their restructuring, which includes
merging into eight local cooperative banks and two special
institutions, all of which will predominantly concentrate on
Austrian and small corporate clients.  Therefore, in the medium-
term, VB-Verbund should emerge as a significantly more stable
banking group with the vast majority of its revenues being
generated from lower-risk Austrian retail clients.

The ratings of three local cooperative banks members of VB-Verbund
have been placed on Rating Watch Evolving (RWE).  This reflects
that the three banks' governing bodies have to date voted against
VB-Verbund's restructuring plans.  Fitch understands from VB-
Verbund that, if these banks remain opposed, they could be removed
from the group's joint-liability scheme.  The regulator could
prevent them from joining competing deposit protection schemes,
which could result in a withdrawal of their banking licenses.
However, in our view, the opposition of these three bank (which
account for 2% of VB-Verbund's RWAs) is highly unlikely to derail
the group's restructuring.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs, VRs, AND SENIOR DEBT

Erste's, RBI's and VB-Verbund's IDRs and senior debt ratings are
now sensitive to the same factors that may affect their respective
VRs.  The asset quality and performance challenges in CEE limit
the short-term upside potential on Erste's, Bank Austria's and
RBI's ratings.  Fitch expects the Austrian economy to remain
resilient in the medium term and, as such, to have neutral
implications for all peers' ratings.

Negative pressure on Erste's ratings could result from an
unexpected deterioration in Hungary or Romania.  Conversely,
significantly improving asset quality in these countries could
trigger an upgrade if it leads to a sustainable turnaround locally
and at Erste's consolidated level, and materially reduce Erste's
reliance on its Czech operations.  Improved cost efficiency at the
Austrian savings banks would also help.

RBI's ratings are primary sensitive to the asset quality and
performance implications of the economic deterioration in Russia
and Ukraine.  Therefore, RBI's ratings could be downgraded if the
VR of its Russian subsidiary, ZAO Raiffeisenbank (BBB-
/Negative/bbb-) is downgraded, either because of a deterioration
of its credit profile or as a result of a downgrade of the Russian
sovereign (BBB-/Negative/F3).

RBI's ratings could also be downgraded if the bank fails to
achieve the planned capital strengthening from its strategic
realignment.  In the medium term, positive momentum could result
from achieving the targeted 12% fully-loaded CET1 ratio and from
successfully shifting capital allocation from Russia and Poland to
other CEE markets without negative effects on risk-adjusted group
earnings.

The significantly higher resilience of RBI's and Bank Austria's
Russian operations relative to most local banks in Russia in 2014
largely reflected their focus on lower-risk retail clients and FX
lending to large corporate clients with revenues in matching
currencies.  However, an upgrade of their ratings would be
contingent on a durable stabilization of the Russian and Ukrainian
economies and, thus, is unlikely in the short term.  The influence
of the Russian crisis on both banks' ratings will also depend on
whether their solid positioning will continue to provide relative
insulation or whether it merely delays the impact of the crisis.
Upside potential on Bank Austria's ratings could arise if the bank
increases its earnings contribution from Austria and other stable
markets.  Conversely, negative pressure could arise if the current
combination of strong loan growth and earning pressure in Turkey
persists.

Bank Austria's Long-term IDR is subject to the same sensitivities
as its VR. Its VR is also sensitive to changes in the ratings of
its parent, UniCredit S.p.A. (UC, BBB+/Stable/bbb+), as a
subsidiary's VR will not normally be more than three notches above
its parent's IDR, and within the eurozone the appropriate
difference is narrower.  Therefore, Bank Austria's VR could be
negatively affected by a downgrade of UC's ratings.

In case of a multi-notch downgrade of Bank Austria's VR, the
downside for its Long-term IDR would likely be limited to one
notch (to 'BBB', ie one notch below UC's Long-term IDR), when its
IDRs would be based on institutional support.  This reflects
Fitch's view that UC has a strong propensity to support Bank
Austria (due to the latter's role as holding company for most of
UC's CEE operations) and is able to do so, as indicated by UC's
rating.  Fitch's view on UC's ability to provide support for Bank
Austria also takes into account the size of any likely solvency
support that would be required relative to the capital available
in the rest of the group (Bank Austria accounts for one third of
UC's total RWAs).

Bank Austria's IDR is also sensitive to developments in UC's group
structure and to further integration of UC's subsidiaries.  When a
subsidiary is large compared to its parent, makes a significant
contribution to the group's credit profile and is strongly
integrated, which is the case for Bank Austria within UC, Fitch
could assign a common VR to both entities.

Fitch believes that Bank Austria's intragroup exposure might
increase materially as a result of a stronger integration of
capital and liquidity management, especially in a potential stress
scenario at UC or one of its larger subsidiaries, under a Single
Supervisor Mechanism (SSM).  Bank Austria and UC are now both
regulated by the European Central Bank and Fitch believes the
potential for the bank's parent to upstream excessive liquidity
and/or capital from the subsidiary could increase.

VB-Verbund's VR is primarily sensitive to OeVAG's planned spin-
off, which we expect to strengthen VB-Verbund's capitalization and
risk profile sufficiently to upgrade the VR by up to two notches.
Therefore, we expect to resolve the RWP on VB-Verbund's ratings
when the spin-off is formally completed in July 2015.  However,
the RWP could extend beyond the typical six-month review horizon
if technical, legal and regulatory aspects delay the spin-off.

Fitch does not expect the spin-off to be sufficient for VB-Verbund
to achieve an investment-grade VR in the short term.   This is
because the restructuring of its primary banks will bear
significant execution risk until its planned completion in 2017,
potentially triggering unexpected burdens that may result in a
need for intragroup support at weaker individual banks.  Fitch
believes that VB-Verbund has the potential to achieve a
sustainable VR within the 'bbb' range by the time the local banks'
consolidation process nears completion.  However, the VR is
unlikely to rise above the 'bbb' range in the long term in light
of VB-Verbund's small market share in the generally low-margin
Austrian retail market, which suffers from structural
overcapacity.

Fitch expects to resolve the RWE on the three non-aligned members
of VB-Verbund when we obtain more clarity on whether they will
eventually accept the conditions of the group's restructuring.  If
so, we expect to upgrade them in line with VB-Verbund.  An
exclusion from the mutual support scheme is likely to trigger a
downgrade of their Long-term IDRs into the 'B' category to reflect
these small banks' uncertain viability without the technical
support, franchise and creditor protection associated with their
membership in VB-Verbund.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SRs AND SRFs

The peers' SRs and SRFs reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors
can no longer rely on full extraordinary support from the
sovereign in the event that they become non-viable.  The Austrian
government has, for instance, expressed its reluctance to provide
support by explicitly ruling out since 4Q14 further support to
OeVAG, although the institution will remain exposed to potential
further deterioration of its vulnerable assets during its wind-
down.

In Fitch's view, the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD) and the SRM for eurozone banks are now sufficiently
progressed to provide a framework for resolving banks that is
likely to require senior creditors participating in losses, if
necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving sovereign
support.

BRRD, which was implemented into Austrian legislation with effect
from Jan. 11, 2015, includes minimum loss absorption requirements
before resolution financing or alternative financing (eg,
government stabilization funds) can be used.  Austria is one of
the first EU countries to have implemented the BRRD's bail-in
tool.

The downgrade of Bank Austria's SR to '2' from '1' reflects our
opinion that, although sovereign support is no longer reliable,
extraordinary support from UC would be highly likely should this
be required.

Any upgrade to the SR of Erste, RBI and VB-Verbund and upward
revision to their SRFs would be contingent on a positive change in
the sovereign's propensity to support its banks.  While not
impossible, this is highly unlikely in Fitch's view.

Bank Austria's SR is sensitive to material changes in UC's ability
to support that could be indicated by a change to UC's rating or
could relate to a change in the size of Bank Austria relative to
UC.  It is also sensitive to any negative changes to Fitch's view
of the parent's propensity to provide support.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBSIDIARIES' IDRs AND SRs

Banca Comerciala Romana S.A (BCR) is Erste's 93.6%-owned Romanian
subsidiary, and Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria) EAD is RBI's 100%-owned
Bulgarian subsidiary.  BCR's and Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria)'s IDRs
are notched down once from their parents' as we believe that they
remain strategically important for Erste and RBI, respectively,
despite recent weak performance, particularly in the Romanian
market.

Fitch's view is driven by the importance of CEE for Erste and RBI,
by BCR's and Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria)'s strong integration into
the groups and by the track record of support to date.  At this
rating level, BCR's and Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria)'s IDRs are no
longer constrained by the Romanian and Bulgarian Country Ceilings
of 'BBB+'.

The Negative Outlook on Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria)'s Long-term IDR
mirrors RBI's Outlook.  Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria)'s Short-term IDR
was downgraded to 'F3' from 'F2', in accordance with Fitch's
rating correspondence table between Long-term and Short-term IDRs.
BCR's Short-term IDR was affirmed at 'F2', the higher of the two
possible Short-term IDRs corresponding to its Long-term IDR of
BBB, reflecting available liquidity support from Erste.

BCR's and Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria)'s ratings are sensitive to the
same factors that may affect their respective parents' IDRs.  They
are also sensitive to, respectively, changes in Fitch's view of
Erste's or RBI's commitment to the CEE in general, and to the
Romanian or Bulgarian markets in particular.

The rating actions are:

Erste Group Bank AG
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb+'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'BBB+'/'F2' from 'A'/'F1'
Market-linked securities: downgraded to 'BBB+emr' from 'Aemr'
Lower Tier 2 debt: affirmed at 'BBB'

Erste Finance (Delaware) LLC: USD10bn commercial paper programme,
guaranteed by Erste: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'

Banca Comerciala Romana S.A. (BCR)
Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+';
Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+';
Outlook Stable
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Viability Rating: 'b+' unaffected

Raiffeisen Bank International AG
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F3' from 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'

Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria) EAD
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F3' from 'F2'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Viability Rating: 'b+' unaffected

UniCredit Bank Austria AG
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb+'
Support Rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'; withdrawn
Senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A'

Volksbanken-Verbund
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'A'; placed on RWP
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'F1'
Viability Rating: 'bb-'; maintained on RWP
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'

OeVAG's ratings (B, RWN/B, RWN) are unaffected by today's rating
actions.  The IDRs of VB-Verbund's other member banks listed below
have been downgraded to 'BB-'/RWP/'B' from 'A'/Negative/'F1+', in
line with VB-Verbund's IDRs.  These "group" ratings assigned under
Fitch's rating criteria for banking structures backed by mutual
support mechanisms are sensitive to the same drivers as VB-
Verbund's IDRs:

start:bausparkasse e.Gen. Genossenschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung
Bank fuer Aerzte und Freie Berufe AG
Volksbank, Gewerbe- und Handelsbank Kaernten AG

IMMO-BANK AG
Oesterreichische Apothekerbank eG
SPARDA-BANK AUSTRIA Nord eGen
SPARDA-BANK AUSTRIA Sued eGen
Volksbank Alpenvorland e.Gen.
Volksbank Bad Goisern eingetragene Genossenschaft
Volksbank Bad Hall e.Gen.
Volksbank Donau-Weinland reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Volksbank Eferding - Grieskirchen reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Volksbank Enns - St.Valentin eG
Volksbank Feldkirchen eG
Volksbank Fels am Wagram e.Gen.
Volksbank Kaernten Sued e.Gen.
Volksbank NOe, St.Poelten, Krems Zwettl AG
Volksbank Kufstein-Kitzbuehel eG
Volksbank Landeck eG
Volksbank Linz-Wels-Muehlviertel AG
Volksbank Marchfeld e.Gen.
Volksbank Niederoesterreich Sued eG
Volksbank Oberes Waldviertel reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Volksbank Oberkaernten reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Volksbank Oberndorf reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Volksbank Obersdorf - Wolkersdorf - Deutsch-Wagram e. Gen.
Volksbank Obersteiermark eGen
Volksbank Ost reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Volksbank Oetscherland eG
Volksbank Ried im Innkreis eG
Volksbank Salzburg eG
Volksbank Schaerding, Altheim Braunau
Volksbank Steiermark Mitte AG
Volksbank Steirisches Salzkammergut reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Volksbank Strasswalchen-Voecklamarkt-Mondsee eGen
Volksbank Suedburgenland eG
Volksbank Sued-Oststeiermark e.Gen.
Volksbank Tirol Innsbruck - Schwaz AG
Volksbank Tullnerfeld eG
Volksbank Voecklabruck-Gmunden e.Gen.
Volksbank Vorarlberg e. Gen.
Volksbank Weinviertel e.Gen.
Volksbank Wien-Baden AG
Waldviertler Volksbank Horn reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Spar- und Vorschuss-Verein der Beamtenschaft der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Spar- und Vorschussverein "Graphik" reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Spar- und Vorschussverein der Mitarbeiter der
Niederoesterreichischen Landesbank-Hypothekenbank AG,
reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Spar- und Vorschusskasse der Angestellten der "Wiener Staedtische
Versicherung AG Vienna Insurance Group" e.Gen.
The IDRs of VB-Verbund's following members have been downgraded to
'BB-'/RWP/'B' from 'A'/Negative/'F1+' and withdrawn as a result of
their mergers into other rated members of the group:

Volksbank Laa eGen
Gaertnerbank reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Volksbank fuer den Bezirk Weiz reg.Gen.m.b.H.
Volksbank fuer die Sued- und Weststeiermark eG
Volksbank Almtal e. Gen.; Volksbank Gmuend eingetragene
Genossenschaft; Volksbank Osttirol-Westkaernten eG
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'A'; placed on RWE
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'F1'



===========
F R A N C E
===========


ALTICE SA: S&P Affirms B+ Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed the 'B+'
long-term corporate credit rating on cable and telecommunications
holding company Altice S.A.  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B' issue rating on Altice's
senior secured notes.  The recovery rating on the notes is '5',
indicating S&P's expectation of modest recovery prospects in the
higher half of the 10%-30% range.

The affirmation follows the Altice group's announcement that it
has signed a definitive agreement to acquire 70% of the share
capital in U.S. cable operator Suddenlink from existing
shareholders at an enterprise value of US$9.1 billion.  The
transaction will be funded with about US$7.2 billion of debt at
Suddenlink (including a US$500 million vendor loan from current
private equity owners), reflecting about 7.5x Standard & Poor's-
adjusted leverage for the U.S. subsidiary for 2015 on a pro forma
basis.  The remainder of the acquisition cost will be funded with
cash from Altice S.A.

While this transaction reflects a higher leverage appetite than
Altice has demonstrated for acquisitions in Europe, S&P currently
forecasts that it will be neutral to its updated base-case
leverage forecast for the Altice group in 2015, at about 6x on a
pro forma basis.  This is mainly due S&P's expectation of higher-
than-anticipated merger-related synergies and cost efficiencies at
the French subsidiary Numericable-SFR, which should bolster the
group's EBITDA.  S&P also expects the Suddenlink acquisition to
somewhat strengthen the group's business risk profile by providing
greater diversification away from the still-challenging French
telecoms market; and by adding a relatively attractive asset to
the group's portfolio in a growing and wealthy market.

In S&P's view, Suddenlink's competitive position is supported by
very limited competition for its high-speed broadband offerings
and limited fiber network overlap with other carriers in its areas
of operation.  In addition, broadband penetration in its service
area is below the industry average, which creates potential
further medium-term revenue growth possibilities for Suddenlink
from a greater take-up of its "triple play" (broadband, TV, and
fixed-line telephone) offers.

Having said that, S&P thinks this acquisition could create some
challenges for management at the group level, as it will be
entering a new market with a very different commercial environment
to the European cable markets.  These challenges are heightened as
this acquisition comes during a period when Altice's management is
focusing much of its attention on other substantial recent
acquisitions.

Additionally, if Altice uses Suddenlink as a platform to further
consolidate in the U.S. cable market, the maintenance of its
leverage appetite demonstrated in this transaction may harm the
group's credit metrics such that they are no longer commensurate
with the current rating.

S&P's base-case operating scenario for Altice's pro forma
consolidation of Suddenlink and Portugual Telecom (PT) assumes:

   -- Revenue declines of about 2% in 2015, reflecting continued
      pressure in the French retail division and fierce
      competition on triple and quadruple play bundles in
      Portugal, only somewhat offset by continued revenue
      generating unit growth in the U.S.;

   -- About 3%-4% increase in group EBITDA in 2015 on a pro forma
      basis following the transactions, reflecting the positive
      impact of merger-related synergies and higher margins in
      the U.S.; and

   -- Capital expenditure (capex) at about 17%-18% of sales.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
for 2015 on a pro forma basis:

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 11%-12;
   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 6x;
   -- Adjusted interest coverage of about 3.0x; and
   -- Adjusted free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt of 3%-4%.

The negative outlook continues to reflect the potential for a one-
notch downgrade if the group's leverage sustainably exceeds 6x as
a result of higher-than-expected revenue pressures, or if they
continue to pursue large debt-financed acquisitions--without
meaningful improvement to S&P's assessment of the group's business
risk profile.

S&P may downgrade the group if leverage (taking into account full-
year consolidation of Suddenlink and PT) sustainably exceeds 6x,
or if FOCF to debt erodes to less than 3%.  This may happen, for
example, if the competitive environment in France and Portugal is
much more intense than S&P currently forecasts or if the group is
unable to achieve the cost synergies at its recently acquired
subsidiaries.  In addition, S&P could also lower the rating if
Altice takes advantage of an opportunity for meaningful
consolidation in the U.S. through a largely debt-financed
acquisition.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable over the next 12 months if
Altice's leverage is likely to remain sustainable at or below 6x,
following the successful execution of cost efficiencies, and
slower-than-expected top-line decline in its core assets.


SOCIETE GENERALE: Fitch Raises Rating on Tier 1 Capital to BB+
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Societe Generale's (SG) Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior debt at 'A' and its Short-
term IDR and senior debt at 'F1'.  The Outlook on the Long-term
IDR has been revised to Stable from Negative.  In addition, Fitch
has upgraded SG's Viability Rating (VR) to 'a' from 'a-'.

The rating actions are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for US, Swiss and
European Union commercial banks.

As a result, Fitch believes that, in line with its Support Rating
(SR) definition of '5', extraordinary external support while
possible can no longer be relied upon for SG.  Fitch has,
therefore, downgraded its SR to '5' from '1' and revised its
Support Rating Floor (SRF) to 'No Floor' from 'A'.  Following the
revision of our expectations for state support, the IDRs are now
driven by the bank's standalone creditworthiness as expressed in
the VR, whose upgrade has led to the IDRs being affirmed.

The ratings actions are also part of a periodic portfolio review
of the Global Trading and Universal Banks (GTUBs), which comprise
12 large and globally active banking groups.  A strong rebound in
earnings from securities businesses in 1Q15 is a reminder of the
upside potential banks with leading market shares can enjoy.
However, regulatory headwinds remain strong, with ever higher
capital requirements, costs of continuous infrastructure upgrades
and a focus on conduct risks.

As capital and leverage requirements evolve, GTUBs are reviewing
the balance of their securities operations with other businesses
and adapting their business models to provide the most capital-
efficient platforms for the future.  Fitch expects the GTUBs'
other core businesses, including retail and corporate banking,
wealth and asset management, to perform well as economic growth,
which Fitch expects to be strongest in the US and UK, will
underpin revenue.  However, pressure on revenue generation in a
low interest-rate environment is likely to persist, particularly
in Europe, but low loan impairment charges in domestic markets
should help operating profitability.

The VR upgrade reflects SG's sound execution in improving the
balance of risks in its business model and earnings
diversification.  SG's business model rests on three pillars where
earnings volatility has remained moderate despite current
headwinds.  In particular, performance at its specialized
businesses has more than compensated still modest risk-adjusted
profitability in its international retail banking business.  SG
also delivered sound execution in its global market business,
which despite not having the same global reach as larger GTUB
peers, has delivered satisfactory returns.  Both achievements
allowed the bank to improve its profitability substantially in the
last three years.

The VR upgrade also factors in SG management's focus on
strengthening the bank's balance sheet as it has closed the gap
with most of its European GTUB peers in capital and liquidity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

SG's VR reflects its solid and performing franchises in selected
businesses, including French retail banking, commercial banking,
euro-denominated bond activity and equity derivatives.  SG's
business model generates cross-selling opportunities: the bank
has, for instance, established itself as a leading player in the
euro corporate bond market, where it has natural synergies with
its large French corporate customer base.  Fitch expects more
synergies between the securities services/brokerage business and
global market activities in the long-term.

The VR also factors in a higher impaired loan ratio than peers,
although this largely reflects the bank's policy in its core
markets (mainly France) not to write off impaired loans before
they are fully resolved, which contrasts with a generally swifter
write-off policy at US banks.  Coverage by reserves accounted for
a sound 62% of impaired loans at end-2014, but SG remains
dependent on collateral realization since its unreserved impaired
loans amounted to 25% of its Fitch core capital at end-2014,
although this ratio was lower than the 32% reported at end-2013 as
capital increased substantially.

SG has significant exposure to central and eastern Europe and
Russia, where fairly weak asset quality, although improving in
recent quarters, is a drag on performance.  SG generates sound
returns in the Czech Republic, but we believe it will take time to
generate adequate profitability in the region as a whole because
SG's two other main subsidiaries in the region are based in Russia
and Romania, where the economic and political climates are less
stable.

In Russia, SG posted a EUR117m operating loss in 1Q15 (EUR38m
operating profit in 2014).  While negative contribution from the
Russian business is likely to remain at least in 2015, we expect
SG to continue to manage its Russian operations cautiously, where
lending contracted 9% between end-1Q14 and end-1Q15 (at constant
exchange rate), and that it will not increase its exposure to
Russia.  Apart from Russia, we do not expect any material asset
quality deterioration in SG's strategic markets.

A key positive driver for the VR is management's continued focus
on strengthening its balance sheet in liquidity and capital, which
are sound.  Dependence on short-term wholesale funding has been
reduced to a small 9% of the bank's total liabilities at end-1Q15.
SG reported a 10.1% fully-applied common equity tier 1 capital
ratio and a 3.7% CRDIV leverage ratio at end-1Q15.  Both are in
line with those of similarly-rated European peers.

SG's underlying profitability has improved significantly since
2012 due to cost-cutting and de-risking measures.  The bank
reported a 10% operating return on average equity (ROAE) in 2014,
which compares adequately with peers.  In addition, unlike a
number of its GTUB peers, SG's net profitability has not been
significantly hit by litigation or conduct charges.  Nonetheless,
revenue in the bank's French retail banking business is likely to
remain under pressure, and we believe that control on operating
expenses and higher revenue growth in its foreign and in non-
retail banking businesses will be key to achieving its post-tax
ROE target of 10%.

The Stable Outlook on SG's Long-term IDR reflects our expectations
that the bank will continue to generate adequate risk-adjusted
profitability and report sound capital and liquidity.

RATING SENSITIVITIES- IDRs, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

Negative pressure on the VR could come from significant erosion in
asset quality or if the bank fails to maintain sound capital and
leverage ratios in line with similarly rated peers.  The VR would
also come under pressure if conduct risk leads to a sizeable
unexpected loss materially eroding capitalization.

Following rating action, Fitch does not expect to upgrade SG's VR
in the near term, and any upgrade would be contingent on a
substantial strengthening of the bank's company profile and a
material improvement in asset quality ratios.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND RATING SENSITIVITIES - SR AND SRF

The SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors can no
longer rely on receiving full extraordinary support from the
sovereign in the event that SG becomes non-viable.  In Fitch's
view, the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and
the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) are now sufficiently
progressed to provide a framework for resolving banks that is
likely to require senior creditors participating in losses, if
necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving sovereign
support.  In the EU, BRRD has been effective in member states
since Jan. 1, 2015, including minimum loss absorption requirements
before resolution financing or alternative financing (eg,
government stabilization funds) can be used.  Full application of
BRRD, including the bail-in tool, is required from Jan. 1, 2016.

Any upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks.  While not impossible, this is highly unlikely
in Fitch's view.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER
HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by SG are all
notched down from its VR in accordance with Fitch's assessment of
each instrument's respective non-performance and relative loss
severity risk profiles, which vary considerably.  Their ratings
are primarily sensitive to a change in SG's VR.  They have,
therefore, been upgraded due to the upgrade of SG's VR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUSBIDIARY AND AFFILIATED
COMPANY

The Long-and Short-term IDRs and SR of SG's French specialist car
financing subsidiary Compagnie Generale de Location d'Equipement
and French retail bank Credit du Nord are based on an extremely
high probability of support from SG, if needed.  Compagnie
Generale de Location d'Equipements' and Credit du Nord's Long-and
Short-term IDRs are equalised with those of SG and their Long-term
IDR have the same Outlooks as the parent's.  This is because Fitch
views both entities as core subsidiaries given their importance to
and integration with their parent.  Accordingly, the Outlook on
their respective Long-term IDRs has been revised to Stable from
Negative.

The ratings of Compagnie Generale de Location d'Equipements and
Credit du Nord are therefore sensitive to changes in SG's IDRs and
could also be sensitive to changes in their strategic importance
to the rest of the group.

Societe Generale Acceptance N.V., SG Option Europe and SG
Structured Products Inc. are wholly owned financing subsidiaries
of SG whose debt ratings are aligned with those of SG based on an
extremely high probability of support, if required.  Their ratings
are sensitive to the same factors that might drive a change in
SG's IDR.

The rating actions are:

Societe Generale

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook revised to Stable from
Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'a' from 'a-'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1'
Long-term debt: affirmed at 'A'
Short-term debt: affirmed at 'F1'
Market linked securities: affirmed at 'Aemr'
Lower Tier 2 notes: upgraded to 'A-' from 'BBB+'
Hybrid capital instruments: upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'
Additional Tier 1 capital: upgraded to 'BB+' from 'BB'

Societe Generale Acceptance N.V.

Market-linked guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'Aemr'
Senior guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'A'
Short-term guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'F1'
SG Option Europe
Senior notes: affirmed at 'A'/'F1'
SG Structured Products Inc.
Senior guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'A'
Compagnie Generale de Location d'Equipements
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook revised to Stable from
Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

Credit du Nord

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook revised to Stable from
Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: unaffected at 'bbb+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Long-term debt: affirmed at 'A'
BMTN programme: affirmed at 'A'
EMTN programme: affirmed at 'A'/'F1'
Certificates of deposits: affirmed at 'F1'



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


BREMER LANDESBANK: Fitch Lowers Viability Rating to 'bb'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) and senior unsecured debt ratings of Bayerische Landesbank
(BayernLB), Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg (LBBW), Landesbank Saar
(SaarLB), Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (NORD/LB) and
Bremer Landesbank Kreditanstalt Oldenburg - Girozentrale
(BremerLB) to 'A-'.  Fitch has also downgraded the Short-term IDRs
of BayernLB and LBBW to 'F1' and affirmed those of SaarLB, NORD/LB
and BremerLB at 'F1'.  The Outlook on the Long-term IDRs is
Stable.

Fitch has downgraded HSH Nordbank AG's (HSH) Long-term IDR and
unsecured senior debt ratings to 'BBB-' and its Short-term IDR to
'F3'.

Fitch has affirmed BayernLB's and SaarLB's Viability Ratings (VRs)
at 'bb+' and LBBW's at 'bbb'.  NORD/LB's VR has been downgraded to
'bb+' and BremerLB's VR to 'bb'.  HSH's VR of 'b' remains on
Rating Watch Evolving (RWE).

The rating actions are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for US, Swiss and
European Union commercial banks.

The EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) are now sufficiently progressed
to provide a framework for resolving banks that is likely to
require senior creditors participating in losses, if necessary,
instead of or ahead of a bank receiving sovereign support.  BRRD
was implemented into German legislation with effect from Jan. 1,
2015, including early adoption of the bail-in tool.

As a result, Fitch believes that extraordinary sovereign support
while possible can no longer be relied upon for Landesbanken.
Fitch has, therefore, revised their Support Rating Floors to 'No
Floor' and subsequently withdrawn them because they are no longer
meaningful to our coverage given that Fitch's support assessment
is now based on institutional rather than sovereign support.

The Support Ratings of all banks except HSH have been affirmed at
'1' indicating an extremely high probability of support from their
owners, the respective Laender and savings banks associations.
HSH's Support Rating has been downgraded to '2' from '1'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SR, IDR AND SENIOR DEBT

The SRs of '1' and IDRs of 'A-' reflect Fitch's view of a very
strong likelihood of support from the combination of German
federal states (Laender) the Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe (Sparkassen)
(SFG, A+) and the Sparkassen (savings banks) and Landesbanken-
shared institutional protection fund (Haftungsverbund).

Fitch's institutional support considerations are based on our
assessment that the owners of the Landesbanken, the respective
Laender and regional savings banks, consider their investment as
long-term and strategic.  The strong propensity to support
Landesbanken reflects the banks' increased focus on their
statutory roles, supporting the regional economies, acting as the
states' house banks, and working with the savings banks.

Fitch's view of the creditworthiness of Germany's Laender is
driven by the stability of the solidarity system; the ratings for
Laender covered by Fitch are equalised with those of Germany.  As
a result, those German Laender rated by Fitch have Long-term IDRs
of 'AAA'.

In terms of propensity, we believe that each Landesbank has a
manageable size relative to the size of the respective Land to
ensure that the Land owner would be able to support, absent state
aid or BRRD restrictions.  In addition, failure to provide support
to a failing Landesbank would likely result in considerable damage
to the relevant Land's own reputation and funding costs and would
have a negative effect on the regional economy, including the
savings banks.

However, in Fitch's view support would need to be forthcoming from
both the Laender and the Sparkassen to avoid triggering state aid
considerations and resolution under BRRD if a Landesbank becomes
insolvent.  Therefore, Fitch uses the lower of the two owners'
Long-term IDRs as its starting point for determining a
Landesbank's ratings, which is SFG's 'A+' IDR.  Fitch also
considers SFG's IDR as the appropriate starting point because the
Haftungsverbund would have a pivotal role in a sudden rescue
scenario and would ultimately need the resources of the savings
banks, especially if a Landesbank without a strong savings bank
association owner needs support or if support is needed by more
than one Landesbank.

Fitch notches down Landesbanken's Long-term IDRs twice from SFG's
'A+' IDR to arrive at IDRs of 'A-' for BayernLB, LBBW, SaarLB,
NORD/LB and BremerLB.  One notch is to reflect the role of the
Landesbanken as strategic subsidiaries and service providers to
the Sparkassen.  The other notch reflects the uncertainties around
the resolution process and potential prevention of state owners
being able to support a bank alongside the savings banks under
BRRD.

The 'F1' Short-term IDRs for BayernLB, LBBW, SaarLB, NORD/LB and
BremerLB are at the higher of the two Short-term IDRs that map to
an 'A-' Long-term IDR on our rating scale.  This reflects ample
liquidity at the Sparkassen owners and their strong funding and
liquidity links to the Landesbanken.

Fitch has applied wider notching to HSH because it considers that
weaknesses within its business model burdened by legacy assets and
high guarantee costs make it questionable whether a private
investor would choose to continue to invest in the bank.  HSH's
performance track record has been mixed and, in our view, as
expressed in our 'b' VR, HSH has not demonstrated that it has a
sustainable business model.  This introduces higher risk that
further extraordinary solvency support would be considered as
state aid and that BRRD would restrict support ahead of
resolution.

However, Fitch believes that SFG throughout Germany, and the
Haftungsverbund, along with HSH's state owners, have strong
financial and reputational incentives to ensure that any necessary
resolution would be managed in a way that would ensure no losses
to senior unsecured creditors.  Fitch has, therefore, limited its
additional notching for HSH to three from the 'A-' IDR of
Landesbanken with more sustainable business models.

RATING SENSITVITIES - SR, IDR and SENIOR DEBT

The SRs, IDRs and senior unsecured debt ratings are sensitive to
any change in assumptions around the propensity or ability of the
Landesbanken's owners to provide timely support.  This may be
indicated by a change to SFG's IDRs.  The IDRs are also sensitive
to changes in the owners' strategic commitment to and importance
of the Landesbanken for their respective home regions.

HSH's SR, IDRs and senior unsecured debt ratings could be upgraded
if we change our view of the long-term sustainability of its
business model, which would likely be signalled by a multiple
upgrade of its VR.

A downgrade of other Landesbanken's VRs to 'bb-' or below could
signal weaknesses within their business models.  In this respect,
BremerLB is most at risk given its VR at 'bb' and high sensitivity
to developments in the shipping industry.  If BremerLB's shipping
exposure is hit further, this would likely result not only in a VR
downgrade but also potentially a three- notch downgrade of its
IDR.

A change to Fitch's assessment of the risks of triggering a
resolution process ahead of support for a Landesbank could also
affect the SRs, IDRs and senior unsecured debt ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND RATING SENSITIVITIES - VR

Bayern LB

BayernLB's VR reflects further progress in reducing legacy risks
but at the cost of a significant loss reported for 2014.  In
Fitch's view this poses challenges to restore capitalization to a
solid, sustainable level over the medium term, particularly
considering its obligation to repay outstanding EUR2.3bn of
capital to Bavaria by end-2017.

Fitch believes that BayernLB will return to profit in 2015 thanks
to Germany's benign operating environment.  For 2014, the realised
losses from the sale of MKB Bank Zrt, BayernLB's former Hungarian
subsidiary, in 3Q14 and a loan impairment charge, which Fitch
estimates to be around EUR1.3bn for the previously uncovered
exposure of about EUR2.4bn to Hypo Alpe Adria International (now
HETA), led to a significant pre-tax loss of EUR348m (EUR1.32bn
after tax).  Legacy issues have now been largely resolved although
some tail risk remains; for example the HETA case is still subject
to pending court decisions.  This enables BayernLB to concentrate
on developing its core business, which posted a pre-tax profit of
EUR669m in 2014.

BayernLB's asset quality is solid in its core business, which is
now predominantly domestically driven.  Despite the large one-off
write down of HETA, non-performing loans (NPLs) decreased due to
the sale of MKB and further declines of NPLs in the core business.
However, tail risks exist in BayernLB's large exposure of EUR1.8bn
to Russia at end-2014 (of which 41 % is guaranteed by export
credit agencies).

Despite the sale of its entire ABS portfolio (EUR6.5bn) in 4Q14
risk assets in the restructuring unit still amount to EUR14bn
Bayern LB plans to reduce the restructuring unit exposure to
EUR10bn by end-2015.

The small decline in the bank's 'fully loaded' CET1 ratio to 10.2%
end-December 2014 from 10.4% end-March 2014 was balanced by the
reduction in legacy risks.  BayernLB's strategic flexibility would
benefit from a strengthening of its 'fully loaded' leverage ratio
(end-2014: 3.9%).

Funding and liquidity is sound.  Funding sources are diversified,
including Pfandbriefe and retail deposits, and helped by lower
funding needs due to deleveraging and on-going demand from the
savings banks for investments.

BayernLB's VR is primarily sensitive to a sustained improvement in
underlying earnings and a final successful resolution of the HETA
case, which would bring its restructuring phase close to
completion.  Conversely, the rating may be downgraded if risk
provisioning proves insufficient and further affects profit and
capital or if asset quality deteriorates through a significant
deterioration of Germany's and, particularly, Bavaria's economic
performance, which we consider unlikely.

LBBW

LBBW's 'bbb' VR is negatively affected by continued low earnings
stemming mainly from challenges to enforcing greater efficiency.
However, its VR is the highest among the German Landesbanken,
reflecting the strength of its core commercial banking franchise
in its home region, which has benefited from a solid performance
in the automotive industry and commercial real estate markets, two
of LBBW's key market sectors.  Declining risk-weighted assets
(RWAs) and stable earnings enabled LBBW to repay EUR1bn of silent
participations to its owners.

Asset quality in its core business is sound but constrained by
asset and sector concentration risks.  Fitch views positively that
these risks have been reduced in the last three years particularly
due to lowering loan exposures above EUR1 billion.  Risks in the
non-core business declined further in 2014, mainly through the
sale of a EUR4.7 billion securitization portfolio.  Exposure to
higher-risk sovereigns such as Russia or other more volatile asset
classes is moderate.

LBBW's capitalization is solid.  It reported a 'fully loaded'
CET1-ratio of 13.6% end-2014 and a 'fully loaded' leverage ratio
of 4.1%.

LBBW has some retail funding through its regional branch network
under the brand Baden-Wuerttembergische Bank, but, similar to its
peers, is reliant on wholesale funding, albeit from diversified
sources, including Pfandbriefe.  Fitch believes that strong demand
from associated savings banks in its regions and moderate funding
needs lower its dependence on capital markets.

LBBW's VR is sensitive to negative changes in the economic
environment in Germany but also in developments in Baden
Wurttemberg's key industries.  A sustainable improvement in
profitability would be a positive VR driver.

SaarLB

SaarLB's 'bb+' VR benefits from the bank addressing
capitalization, previously the lowest among peers, by converting
silent partnership shares into core capital.  However,
capitalization is not yet sufficiently strong to be commensurate
with an investment-grade VR.

SaarLB is also developing its franchise with a stronger focus on
Sparkassen and municipal finance than in the past and incremental
improvements in a number of its structural weaknesses such as
asset concentration.

SaarLB's 2014 financial results were driven by sound performance
in its core businesses, but also by positive valuation effects
from interest-rate swaps.  As a result pre-tax profits increased
57% to EUR88m.

Its asset quality has remained robust and loan impairment charges
(LICs) were low in 2014 in its operating segments despite a single
large provision in its special finance portfolio.  Concentration
remains a challenge for SaarLB but Fitch positively views the
bank's efforts to mitigate this with stronger capital and
declining single exposures.

Liquidity is adequate to sustain stresses.  SaarLB's expected
funding needs should be manageable, given a variety of funding
instruments including Pfandbriefe and its capacity to access
smaller insurance companies and pension funds and its strong
access to the savings bank sector.

SaarLB's VR is sensitive to changes in economic factors that drive
its corporate and asset-based financing franchise.  Its renewable
energy segment is fairly large and sensitive to risks from changes
to the legal and regulatory framework that could impact the cost-
effectiveness of related projects and hence could put pressure on
its VR.  A stable business performance in combination with a
further rise in the bank's common equity would benefit its VR.

NORD/LB

The downgrade of NORD/LB's VR to 'bb+' primarily reflects the
bank's weakened capital ratios and continued asset quality
pressure from its large shipping exposure.  Subdued earnings, low
regulatory capital ratios and the lack of foreseeable material and
lasting improvement in the shipping sector have reduced NORD/LB's
resilience to adverse market movements and its managerial
flexibility.  This means its VR is no longer commensurate with the
'bbb' range.

Capital ratios have been burdened by rising RWAs resulting from
the strengthening of the USD.  Its already moderate capitalization
compared with its immediate Landesbanken peers and other European
banks ('fully loaded' CET1-ratio of 8.4% at end-2014) is set to
weaken further in the short-term as the USD gained another 8%
against the EUR in the first four months of 2015.  Furthermore,
despite some profit retention NORD/LB plans to propose a dividend
payment to its owners based on its 2014 results, which is not
conducive to strengthening its capital-generating capacity.

NORD/LB's regulatory capital ratios include a EUR2.2 billion
shortfall deduction to cover unreserved expected losses primarily
in its shipping portfolio, which provides a buffer for the capital
ratio against further increases in LICs.

However, NORD/LB remains challenged by a persistent need for risk
coverage in its shipping portfolio.  Requirements in 2015 could be
lower due to a modest stabilization of charter rates in the
container and tanker segment in the first four months of this
year, but we expect impairments against the shipping portfolio to
continue to burden NORD/LB's financial performance.  The increase
of its total NPLs by EUR1 billion in 2014 was, however, mainly due
to currency effects.

Fitch expects that 2015 results will be hampered by LICs for the
group's fairly high exposure to HETA (EUR380 million) for which it
took a EUR105 million charge in 2014.  Fitch expects an additional
amount to have been booked in the first quarter as enforced by the
regulator.  NORD/LB posted an improved pre-tax profit of EUR276
million in 2014 (2013: EUR140 million), but its persistently low
profitability delays its capacity to complete its planned business
alignment process, specifically reducing its shipping loans.

NORD/LB's wholesale-driven funding profile is robust in light of
access to the liquidity pool of local savings banks but also to
other institutional investors.  Funding needs are expected to
increase in 2015 but remain moderate given its still declining
balance sheet.

NORD/LB's VR is expected to be stable at the current level as long
as it remains profitable and no further additional stress arises
in shipping or its other economically sensitive lending areas such
as commercial real estate.  It is sensitive to foreign exchange
fluctuations and the related impact on its capital.

A material and lasting recovery of shipping markets would be
positive for the VR, as this would help to lower LICs, improve
profits and asset quality and strengthen capital ratios.  A
capital injection by the owners could also be a positive VR
driver.

Bremer LB

The downgrade of BremerLB's VR to 'bb' reflects the bank's
weakening capital base as a result of a materially wider expected
loss shortfall, adverse effects from a stronger USD and the lack
of material recovery in the shipping sector, which hampers its
asset quality.  Fitch believes its business model is becoming
increasingly constrained by the slow restructuring progress of its
shipping portfolio in difficult market conditions.  The length of
the current shipping crisis is jeopardizing the recovery
assumptions that underpin the management of its shipping
portfolio.

BremerLB's low capitalization -- the weakest among peers -- was
further impaired by rising RWAs due to the strengthening of USD as
15% of BremerLB's loan book is denominated in USD.

In 2014, BremerLB's capital ratios slipped further, and it
reported a core CET1 (phased in) ratio of 8%.  Capital measures
planned for 2015 may prove to be insufficient to reverse the
weakening of the regulatory ratios, especially if the shipping
sector fails to recover more broadly.  These measures include
issuance of additional tier 1 capital and a potential carve-out of
non-performing shipping loans through structured transactions.

BremerLB continued deleveraging in 2014 but its portfolio is the
least diversified among Landesbanken.   Its business mix has
become more imbalanced as assets in its corporate segment and
private client business both declined by 13%.  This makes its
asset-based franchise by far the most dominant driver at 44 % of
total assets.

BremerLB's profitability is low due to high LICs on shipping
exposure.  However, Bremer LB remained profitable in 2014,
reporting pre-tax net income of EUR43 million for 2014 (2013:
EUR68 million). Earnings were underpinned by stable net interest
and fee income despite a declining balance sheet, and also by
lower expenses. Measures by management to strengthen internal
financial flexibility and address business risks are positive,
including a dividend waiver by its owners.

Despite the challenges BremerLB has a satisfactory funding and
liquidity base, supported by its relationships with local savings
banks and institutional investors.  Its liquidity profile is
adequate.

BremerLB's VR is sensitive to deterioration of its shipping
portfolio arising from negative developments in the maritime
industry.  Even in a recovering shipping sector, an upgrade is
contingent on the bank achieving broader stability, which is
likely to take time.

HSH

HSH's 'b' VR reflects the bank's weak company profile and legacy
asset quality, with material risk of failure.  In Fitch's view HSH
will no longer be a viable business if the European Commission
(EC) does not approve new state aid in the form of the restoration
of an additional EUR3 billion asset guarantee (taking the total to
EUR10bn) from the States of Hamburg and Schleswig Holstein granted
through HSH Finanzfonds.

The RWE on the VR is driven by the state aid process and will be
resolved once the EC has taken its decision.  However, if the
increase in state aid is finally approved, it would not be
sufficient on its own for Fitch to upgrade HSH's VR.  The amount
of guarantee fees would surpass HSH's recurring earnings capacity,
despite new business.  Consequently, HSH is unlikely to become
strong enough to reach the 'bb' VR category.

However, HSH is seeking discussions with the EC to review not only
the volume of the guarantee but also its terms and conditions.
Adjustments to the terms and conditions which are supportive for
HSH's capital-generating capacity -- although not our base case --
could improve the bank's long term viability.  A transfer of the
legacy assets off the bank's balance sheet or sale of the assets
without depleting capital would also be beneficial for the VR.

The existing guarantee amount and mechanism provides strong asset
protection and supports capitalization through its embedded
capital protection clause.  However, if the full amount of EUR10bn
is not approved by the EC, Fitch believes HSH's solvency would be
threatened.

HSH has reported notable new business during the past three years.
It acquired EUR9.5 billion new assets in 2014 in a highly
competitive market environment.  Fitch believes that this level of
growth could suggest a softening of lending standards as loan
growth in Germany as whole was only around 1%.

HSH reported a net profit of EUR278m for 2014 (2013: EUR518
million loss).  However, we do not consider this as representative
of its sustainable earnings capacity, particularly as net interest
income declined 37%, although allowing for extraordinary effects.
HSH's core bank still reported a net loss of EUR120 million,
burdened by the core shipping exposure and total guarantee
expenses (base and additional fees) of EUR298 million attributable
to this exposure.

The key driver of HSH's improved financial performance has been
the compensation effects of its underlying guarantee.  This led to
a positive swing of LICs of EUR1.062 million, resulting in a
positive EUR576 million net impairment result, compared with a
negative EUR486 million before compensation.

HSH's efforts to lower its cost base are positive.  However,
further staff reductions could also negatively affect staff morale
and potentially the bank's franchise.  In this context, the bank
is challenged by talent retention following the resignation of its
Chief Risk Officer in February 2015 after serving only one term.

HSH's capital benefits from the capital protection clause and
additional buffers within the guarantee mechanism.  Its leverage
ratio of 4.8% is above Landesbanken peers.  However, as with its
northern Landesbanken peers, its capitalization is sensitive to a
depreciation of EUR against USD as USD-denominated assets make up
37% of its customer loan book including financial assets.  A
further significant decline of EUR would erase the current benefit
of the state guarantee on RWAs.

HSH's funding and liquidity position is stable, supported by a
sound placement capacity among a range of investors, including
savings banks HSH reported LCR of 143% at end-2014, higher than
most peers and a net stable funding ratio (NSFR) of 96%.

HSH's VR has limited upside potential as long as the terms and
conditions of its restructuring, primarily the guarantee fees,
remain unchanged.  Fitch believes that a substantial improvement
in the shipping portfolio would free up impairment reserves in its
balance sheet and bolster profits.  This could also lift the VR
but is not our base case scenario.

HSH's VR would primarily be negatively affected if the EC rejects
the full restoration of its guarantee.  In Fitch's view, this
would increase the likelihood of an orderly wind-down.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT:
BayernLB, LBBW, HSH

The three Landesbanken's subordinated debt instruments are notched
down once from the respective obligors' VRs to reflect loss
severity and are sensitive to changes in the VRs.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES:
Bayern LB

The affirmation of BayernLB Capital Trust I's at 'CCC' is based on
Fitch's view that the hybrid instruments will continue to be non-
performing, as BayernLB has not yet reported sufficient
distributable profits based on unconsolidated German GAAP
accounting.  However, the prospectus stipulates that certain
events require Bayern LB to pay dividends irrespective of
distributable profits.  As a result, for 2014, a dividend of USD
4.9m will be paid triggered by the repayments of state aid.  The
rating would be upgraded if these instruments return to performing
status.  A further downgrade would result if BayernLB continued to
report significant losses in its unconsolidated financial
accounts, which Fitch views as unlikely.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - STATE-
GUARANTEED/GRANDFATHERED SECURITIES

The 'AAA' ratings of the six German Landesbanken's state-
guaranteed/grandfathered senior and subordinated debt including
LBBW Dublin Management GmbH's and market linked securities reflect
the credit strength of the guarantors, the German Laender.  All
ratings are sensitive to any changes in Fitch's view of the
creditworthiness of the Laender.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND RATING SENSITIVITIES - SUSBIDIARY AND
AFFILIATED COMPANY - NORD/LB Covered Finance Bank S.A (NORD/LB
CFB)

Fitch has downgraded NORD/LB CFB's Long- and Short-term IDR's and
senior unsecured debt ratings to 'A-' from 'A' following the
downgrade of NORD/LB, its ultimate parent.  NORD/LB CFB's IDR is
based on the extremely high likelihood of support from
Norddeutsche Landesbank Luxembourg S.A. and NORD/LB, the bank's
direct and ultimate owners, respectively.

Fitch considers NORD/LB CFB as core to NORD/LB's business, a view
supported by a declaration of backing (Patronatserklaerungen) for
NORD/LB CFB from NORD/LB Luxembourg S:A and NORD/LB.  Fitch does
not assign a VR to NORD/LB CFB as a result of its strong
integration with NORD/LB.

Any rating action on NORD/LB CFB would most likely be driven by
similar rating action on NORD/LB.  NORD/LB CFB's ratings are also
sensitive to a change in Fitch's view of the propensity of support
from NORD/LB.

The rating actions are:

Bayerische Landesbank

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A+'; withdrawn
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb+
Long- and Short-term senior debt, including programme ratings:
downgraded to 'A-'/'F1' from 'A+'/'F1+'
State-guaranteed/grandfathered senior and subordinated debt:
affirmed at 'AAA'
State-guaranteed/grandfathered market-linked securities: affirmed
at 'AAAemr'
Senior market-linked securities: downgraded to 'A-emr' from 'A+
emr'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB'

BayernLB Capital Trust I

Hybrid capital instruments: affirmed at 'CCC'
Landesbank Baden Wuerttemberg
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A+'; withdrawn
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb'
Long- and Short-term senior debt, including programme ratings:
downgraded
to 'A-'/'F1' from 'A+'/'F1+'
State-guaranteed/grandfathered senior and subordinated debt:
affirmed at 'AAA'/'F1+'
State-guaranteed/grandfathered market-linked securities: affirmed
at 'AAAemr'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'
LBBW Dublin Management GmbH:
Grandfathered Long-term debt affirmed at 'AAA'

Landesbank Saar

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A'; Outlook: Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'; withdrawn
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb+'
Short-term debt: affirmed at 'F1'
State-guaranteed/grandfathered debt: affirmed at 'AAA'

Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'; withdrawn
Viability Rating: downgraded to 'bb+' from 'bbb-'
State-guaranteed/grandfathered senior and subordinated debt
affirmed at 'AAA'
Long- and Short-term senior debt, including programme ratings:
downgraded to 'A-' from 'A' and affirmed at 'F1'

NORD/LB CFB

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating affirmed at '1'
Senior debt: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A'

Bremer Landesbank Kreditanstalt Oldenburg - Girozentrale
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'; withdrawn
Support Rating affirmed at '1'
Viability Rating: downgraded to 'bb' from 'bb+'
State-guaranteed/grandfathered senior debt affirmed at 'AAA'
Long- and Short-term senior debt, including programme ratings:
downgraded to 'A-' from 'A' and affirmed at 'F1'

HSH Nordbank AG

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'A-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F3' from 'F1'
Support Rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'a-'; withdrawn
Viability Rating: 'b' remains on Rating Watch Evolving
Long- and Short-term senior debt, including programme ratings:
downgraded to 'BBB-'/'F3' from 'A-'/'F1'
State-guaranteed/grandfathered senior and subordinated debt:
affirmed at 'AAA'
State-guaranteed/grandfathered market-linked securities: affirmed
at 'AAAemr'
Senior market-linked securities: downgraded to 'BBB-emr' from
'A-emr'
Subordinated debt: 'B-' remains on Rating Watch Evolving


DEUTSCHE BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Deutsche Bank's (DB) Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) and senior debt ratings to 'A' from 'A+' and
its Short-term IDR and debt ratings to 'F1' from 'F1+'.  The
Outlook on the Long-term IDR remains Negative.  At the same time,
the agency has downgraded Postbank's IDR and senior debt ratings
to 'A-' from 'A+'.  Postbank's Short- and Long-term IDRs remain on
Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

The rating actions are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for US, Swiss and
European Union commercial banks.

As a result, Fitch believes that, in line with our Support Rating
(SR) definition of '5', extraordinary external support while
possible can no longer be relied upon for DB.  Fitch has,
therefore, downgraded its SR to '5' from '1' and revised its
Support Rating Floor (SRF) to 'No Floor' from 'A+'.

As a result of the revision to the SRF, the Long-term IDR is now
driven by DB's Viability Rating (VR), which has been affirmed at
'a'.

The ratings actions are also part of a periodic portfolio review
of the Global Trading and Universal Banks (GTUBs), which comprise
12 large and globally active banking groups.  A strong rebound in
earnings from securities businesses in 1Q15 is a reminder of the
upside potential banks with leading market shares can enjoy.
However, regulatory headwinds remain strong, with ever higher
capital requirements, costs of continuous infrastructure upgrades
and a focus on conduct risks.

As capital and leverage requirements evolve, GTUBs are reviewing
the balance of their securities operations with other businesses
and adapting their business models to provide the most capital-
efficient platforms for the future.  Fitch expects the GTUBs'
other core businesses, including retail and corporate banking,
wealth and asset management, to perform well as economic growth,
which we expect to be strongest in the US and UK, will underpin
revenue.  However, pressure on revenue generation in a low
interest-rate environment is likely to persist, particularly in
Europe, but low loan impairment charges in domestic markets should
help operating profitability.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

DB's IDRs, VR and senior debt ratings reflect Fitch's view that
the strategic changes announced in April 2015, including plans to
deconsolidate Postbank and to reduce gross leverage exposure in
its Corporate Banking & Securities (CB&S) division with the aim of
achieving a Basel III Tier 1 leverage ratio of at least 5% by
2020, are a sensible approach to a challenging operating
environment.

In particular, regulatory requirements it faces by remaining a
global universal bank with a leading sales and trading franchise,
will in our view likely increase further.  The high leverage ratio
requirements for businesses that will be held under its
intermediate holding company in the US will be among the most
demanding.  However, given that DB is taking five years to execute
on its plan, Fitch sees a high risk that obstacles may surface to
prevent it achieving its targets.

DB's decision to deconsolidate Postbank and shrink its CB&S
business is on balance neutral for the bank's VR.  Fitch believes
that the shrinkage of DB's C&BS business of net EUR130bn-150bn is
a defensive reaction to market and regulatory headwinds.  Several
other European peers have taken similar steps, but DB plans to
retain a more substantial presence and higher market shares across
global securities markets than its European peers and remains the
only committed European challenger to the global US-based
brokerage houses.

Similarly, Fitch views the divestment of Postbank as neutral,
despite the potential positive medium-term impact on DB's
profitability, capitalization and leverage ratios.  In Fitch's
view, DB's failure to create a more profitable retail banking
franchise in Germany after the acquisition of Postbank in 2011,
which should have helped it to achieve a more balanced business
model, highlights some weaknesses in DB's execution capabilities.
Addressing these weaknesses is key to maintaining the VR at its
current level.

DB's VR reflects the bank's strong, diversified franchise by
product and geography, even after the planned sale of Postbank and
other asset disposals, but also a complex organizational
structure.  DB's 1Q15 results are evidence of the strength of its
franchise.

Fitch considers DB's risk controls sound, which underpin the VR,
as the bank has sizeable exposures to credit and market risk.  The
bank remains exposed to non-core assets, which it is both actively
reducing and allowing to run-off.  Reduction of non-core assets
has slowed, and Fitch expects it will take some years to run down
the remainder.

After the Postbank spin-off, DB will combine an entrenched
franchise in domestic and European corporate banking with a
leading global securities presence, particularly in global fixed
income, and an improving global wealth and asset management
franchise.  DB's retail banking franchise in Germany and Europe
will be focused on higher-end, affluent customers.  However, Fitch
considers DB's fairly large share of earnings from its sales and
trading and markets-driven businesses to be more volatile than
commercial banking earnings, which constrains its VR at the
current level of 'a'.

DB's announced revised strategy, if executed well, should improve
the lagging profitability and efficiency of its core bank in the
medium term.  In addition, while risk-weighted capitalization will
remain broadly unchanged mainly due to increased regulatory
weightings (DB targets a fully-loaded CET1 ratio of 11%; 11.1% at
end-1Q15), progress towards its 5% leverage ratio target should
position DB well, particularly among European GTUB peers.  DB's
risk-weighted capitalization was considerably strengthened during
2014 by a EUR8.5 billion capital increase and issuance of
additional Tier 1 instruments, which is positive for the VR.

Fitch will closely monitor how DB implements its revised EUR3.5
billion cost savings program, particularly since it entails
considerable "costs to achieve" (around EUR5 billion), including
EUR0.8 billion in existing costs from deleveraging in CB&S and
EUR2.5 billion of investments in digitalization and global
transaction banking (GTB) by 2020.

As a result of its revised business strategy, DB's financial
metrics, especially capitalization, leverage and efficiency should
improve in the medium term.  Profitability, excluding transactions
and execution costs ("cost to achieve"), should also improve in
the short-to-medium term, largely as a result of positive
developments at its more stable businesses, Private & Business
Clients (PBC), Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management (DeAWM) and GTB.
By 2017, the divestment of Postbank, which has reported modest but
improving profitability, should also support underlying
profitability in the medium term.  Postbank's low-risk but high-
volume asset base means that it would not achieve returns on a
leverage-based equity allocation in line with the rest of the
group without increasing risk.

DB's profitability will increasingly rely on its CB&S division;
CB&S's balance sheet will shrink but risk density will increase as
a result of management's focus on disposing of activities that
generate considerable leverage exposure but not necessarily risk-
weighted assets.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The Negative Outlook on DB's Long-term IDR reflects Fitch's view
that the implementation of the revised strategy entails
considerable execution risks, not least because DB has a mixed
track record of executing against stated financial targets.
Therefore, Fitch believes there is a high chance that the bank
will not be able to demonstrate sufficient progress on executing
its new strategy in the next one to two years, which would result
in a downgrade of the VR.

Key to maintaining the VR at its current level, in particular, for
2015 as a whole and 1Q16, are improvement in the underlying
operating cost base, a net improvement in the CRDIV leverage ratio
from the end-1Q15 level of 3.5%, and evidence of progress made
with preparing Postbank for sale or IPO by end-2016.

DB's VR factors in our expectation that underlying earnings will
improve during 2015 and reported earnings will improve in 2016.
Failure to improve underlying and reported profitability in line
with these expectations would put pressure on DB's VR, including
any conduct fines or settlement costs whose incremental costs
absorb more than two quarters of earnings.  DB's profitability and
execution qualities have become important rating drivers.

DB's VR is also sensitive to delays in improving the leverage
ratio.  Should DB start lagging its stated leverage ratio target
or if leverage exposure reduction has a more significant impact on
DB's revenue base or franchise than planned, then this would be
negative for the VR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES -SR AND SRF

The SR of '5' and SRF of 'No Floor' reflect Fitch's view that
senior creditors can no longer rely on receiving full
extraordinary support from the sovereign in the event that DB
becomes non-viable.  In Fitch's view, the EU's Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism
(SRM) are now sufficiently progressed to provide a framework for
resolving banks that is likely to require senior creditors
participating in losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a
bank receiving sovereign support.  In the EU, BRRD has been
effective in member states since Jan. 1, 2015, including minimum
loss absorption requirements before resolution financing or
alternative financing (eg, government stabilization funds) can be
used.  Full application of BRRD, including the bail-in tool, is
required from Jan. 1, 2016.

Any upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks.  While not impossible, this is highly unlikely
in Fitch's view.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - DB SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID
SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by DB and its
subsidiaries are all notched down from DB's VR in accordance with
Fitch's assessment of each instrument's respective non-performance
and relative loss severity risk profiles.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - DB's SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID
SECURITIES

The ratings of subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued
by DB and its subsidiaries, excluding Postbank, are primarily
sensitive to a change in its VR.  The securities' ratings are also
sensitive to a change in their notching, which could arise if
Fitch changes its assessment of the probability of their non-
performance relative to the risk captured in the issuer's VR.
This may reflect a change in capital management in the bank or an
unexpected shift in regulatory buffer requirements, for example.

RATING DRIVERS - POSTBANK'S IDRS, SENIOR DEBT AND SR

Postbank's IDRs are rated one notch below DB's to reflect the
initiated sale process and its downgrade today follows that of DB
accordingly.  The RWNs on Postbank's IDRs reflect a low likelihood
in Fitch's view that a new owner would have the ability and
propensity to support Postbank at the current 'A-' rating.

However, given that no sale is planned before 2017, we will likely
continue to factor support from DB into the ratings in the interim
period.  DB owned 96.8% of Postbank at end-1Q15 and plans to
squeeze out the remaining shareholders by end-2015.  In Fitch's
view, there is an extremely high likelihood that DB would support
Postbank if needed as long as it remains the majority owner.

Support is underpinned by a control and profit and loss transfer
agreement between Postbank and DB Finanz-Holding GmbH (the wholly-
owned subsidiary of DB that holds the shares in Postbank).
Postbank's SR also reflects this backing from DB.

If there is an IPO of Postbank, its Long-term IDR would be
downgraded to the level reflecting its own financial strength and
stand-alone creditworthiness.  Following DB's announced intention
to deconsolidate Postbank and unwind its back-office links to the
subsidiary, Fitch will assess Postbank's stand-alone
creditworthiness during the next few months once more information
is available.  At this stage, we expect that the bank's VR would
likely be in the 'bbb' category, based on its overall low risk
profile, stable franchise and funding, as well as modest
profitability and capitalization.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - POSTBANK'S IDRS, SENIOR DEBT AND SR

Postbank's ratings are primarily sensitive to the conclusion of
its sale, at which point its IDRs and senior debt ratings will
reflect the higher of its stand-alone creditworthiness, most
likely indicated in a VR, and the ability and propensity of any
new owner to provide institutional support in case of need.  The
SR could be downgraded to as low as '5' depending on the new owner
and Fitch's assessment of its ability and propensity to provide
support in case of need.

RATING DRIVERS - POSTBANK'S HYBRID SECURITIES

Hybrid capital issued by Postbank's issuing vehicles are all
notched down from DB's VR in accordance with Fitch's assessment of
each instrument's respective non-performance and relative loss
severity risk profiles.  As a result of DB's announcement to
divest Postbank, Fitch has placed Postbank's hybrid instruments on
RWN.  These instruments will be likely be downgraded when Fitch
concludes its review of interim support from DB for Postbank and
again on the sale of Postbank, or possibly before if there are
changes to the control and profit and loss transfer agreement
between Postbank and DB Finanz-Holding GmbH.  They will likely be
notched from Postbank's future VR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - POSTBANK'S HYBRID SECURITIES

The hybrid capital securities issued by Postbank's issuing
vehicles are primarily sensitive to the sale of the bank by DB.
Prior to that, the securities' ratings are also sensitive to a
change in their notching from DB's VR once Fitch concludes its
assessment of support available from DB to Postbank in the interim
period.

Additional notching could arise in the interim period if Fitch
assesses the probability of the securities' non-performance
relative to the risk captured in DB's VR to have increased as a
result of changes to capital management within DB before Postbank
is sold.  These could include, for example, a change to the
control and profit and loss transfer agreement, or an unexpected
shift in regulatory buffer requirements, for example.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - POSTBANK'S LEGACY UNSECURED
GUARANTEED DEBT RATINGS ISSUED BY DSL

The ratings of the legacy guaranteed debt issued by DSL, which was
acquired by Postbank in 1999, reflect the grandfathered deficiency
guarantee on these notes from the Federal Republic of Germany
(AAA/Stable), which relate to its sovereign ownership and policy
role prior to privatization.  The ratings are sensitive to a
change to Germany's IDR or to a change in Fitch's assessment of
the likelihood that Germany will honor the guarantee.

The rating actions are:

Deutsche Bank AG (DB)

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Viability Rating, affirmed at 'a'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A+'
Senior debt, including programme ratings: downgraded to 'A'/'F1'
from 'A+'/'F1+'
Senior market-linked securities: downgraded to 'Aemr' from 'A+emr'
Subordinated market-linked securities: affirmed at 'A-emr'
Subordinated Lower Tier II debt: affirmed at 'A-'
Additional Tier 1 Notes: affirmed at 'BB+'

DBSecurities

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
DBTrust Company Americas
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior debt, including programme ratings: downgraded to 'F1' from
'F1+'

DBTrust Corporation

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior debt, including programme ratings: downgraded to 'A'/'F1'
from 'A+'/'F1+'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'A-'

DBAustralia Ltd.

Commercial paper downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
DBFinancial LLC
Short-term IDR downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Commercial paper: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
DBCapital Funding Trust VII: affirmed at 'BBB-'
DBContingent Capital Trust II: affirmed at 'BBB-'
DBContingent Capital Trust III: affirmed at 'BBB-'
DBContingent Capital Trust IV: affirmed at 'BBB-'
DBContingent Capital Trust V: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Postbank
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A+'; maintained on RWN
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'; maintained on RWN
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior debt, including programme ratings: downgraded to 'A-'/'F1'
from 'A+'/'F1+'; maintained on RWN
Unsecured guaranteed bonds issued by former DSL Bank: affirmed at
'AA''

PB Finance (Delaware); Inc:

Commercial paper: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'; maintained on RWN
Deutsche Postbank Funding Trust I (Germany): 'BBB-' maintained on
RWN
Deutsche Postbank Funding Trust II (Germany 'BBB-' maintained on
RWN
Deutsche Postbank Funding Trust III (Germany): 'BBB-' maintained
on RWN
Deutsche Postbank Funding Trust IV (Germany): 'BBB-' maintained on
RWN
ProSecure Funding Limited Partnership (LP Jersey): 'BBB'
maintained on RWN


JOYOU AG: Management Board Opts to File Insolvency Petition
-----------------------------------------------------------
The management board of Joyou AG on May 21 decided to file an
application for the opening of insolvency proceedings with the
competent local court (Amtsgericht) of Hamburg following the
existing over-indebtedness of the Company.  Due to the necessity
to completely write down the Company's participation in Hong Kong
Zhongyu Sanitary Technology Limited ("Joyou Hong Kong") as well as
existing guarantee obligations of the Company in the aggregate
amount of USD300,000,000 with respect to the credit facility in
the amount of USD300,000,000 granted by creditors to Joyou Hong
Kong, the Company is over-indebted.

By letter as of May 21, the auditors of the Company, Warth & Klein
Grant Thornton AG, have notified the Company that they have
revoked:

   -- the audit opinion as of March 6, 2015, for the Company's
unconsolidated financial statements (Jahresabschluss) for the
fiscal year 2014, as well as

   -- the audit opinion as of March 16, 2015, for the Company's
consolidated financial statements (Konzernabschluss) for the
fiscal year 2014.

The supervisory board of the Company has also removed Jianshe Cai
and Jilin Cai as members of the Company's management board with
immediate effect and is considering taking comprehensive legal
actions against them.


UNICREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Hybrid Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Unicredit Bank AG's (HVB) Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'A-' from 'A+' and the Short-term
IDR to 'F2' from 'F1+'.  Fitch affirmed the Viability Rating (VR)
at 'a-'.  The Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Negative.

At the same time, HVB's Support Rating (SR) has been downgraded to
'3' from '1', and the source of support is now its ultimate
parent, UniCredit SpA (UC, BBB+/Stable), rather than the
sovereign.  As Fitch no longer consider sovereign support the most
likely source of support, we have revised HVB's Support Rating
Floor (SRF) to 'No Floor' from 'A+' and withdrawn it.

The rating actions are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for US, Swiss and
European Union commercial banks.  As a result, Fitch believes that
extraordinary sovereign support while possible can no longer be
relied upon for HVB.  This means that the bank's IDRs are now
driven by its standalone creditworthiness, as expressed in its VR.

The EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD and the
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for eurozone banks are now
sufficiently progressed to provide a framework for resolving banks
that is likely to require senior creditors participating in
losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving
sovereign support.  BRRD was implemented into German legislation
with effect from Jan. 1, 2015, including early adoption of the
bail-in tool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs, VRs AND SENIOR DEBT

HVB's Long- and Short-term IDRs, VR and senior debt ratings
reflect the bank's standalone credit strength, especially its
solid capitalization.  The bank's profile also benefits from its
well-established domestic corporate and investment banking
franchise.  Its strong capitalization compensates for the
intrinsic earnings volatility of these activities.

HVB's strong capitalization has a high influence on its VR.  The
Negative Outlook on HVB's IDR reflects Fitch's expectation that
capital and funding will become more fungible within the UniCredit
group as its largest entities are now subject to direct
supervision by the European Central Bank under the Single
Supervision Mechanism (SSM), which could result in capital
currently held at HVB becoming more easily available to other UC
group entities.  Fitch believes that the SSM, together with the
arrival of the SRM in the eurozone, are likely to result in less
restricted capital movements between legal entities over time.  If
and when this occurs, we expect to assign common VRs to UC and its
main banking subsidiaries to reflect the then close integration
between these entities.

As it is likely that HVB's VR and IDR could converge with UC's
current 'BBB+' IDR as indicated by HVB's Outlook, Fitch downgraded
HVB's Short-terms IDR to 'F2', the lower of two possible Short-
term IDRs for an 'A-' rated bank.

HVB's VR also reflects the bank's implementation of much-needed
initiatives to improve its efficiency, including large-scale
closure of branches which should improve the profitability of its
retail banking activities.  The scale of branch closures is
unprecedented in Germany.  Growing contributions from HVB's
commercial banking, which includes retail banking activities,
could help to balance more volatile earnings from its corporate
and investment banking segment.

Fitch believes that HVB is committed to disciplined pricing of
corporate loans, which partly explains its shrinking customer
portfolio.  Reflecting its German focus, HVB's asset quality,
specifically its loan impairment charges, continue to benefit from
the resilient German economy.  At the same time, HVB has a high
gross impaired loan ratio, including work-out loans, which it has
not reduced as actively as its peers have.  Fitch expects asset
quality to remain stable in the coming quarters.  Some risks
remain, including in the bank's leveraged buyout exposure, project
finance business and ship lending.  Non-strategic assets are being
worked out and the bank continues to reduce its exposure to these
higher-risk asset classes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs, VRs AND SENIOR DEBT

HVB's VR and IDR are primarily sensitive to increasing integration
and capital and funding fungibility with the rest of the UC group,
which we believe is likely under the SSM and SRM.  Under Fitch's
criteria, highly integrated subsidiary banks that account for a
large proportion of the group's consolidated assets and contribute
to the group's overall credit profile are normally assigned common
VRs with their parent.

Currently HVB is limiting its direct funding exposure to group
entities and its funding is managed fairly independently.  It is
likely that Fitch will downgrade HVB's VR and IDR when the agency
believes that further material cross-border transfers of capital
and liquidity to the parent are becoming more likely, for example
as a result of the implementation of UC's resolution plans that
may require a different allocation of equity or of an increase in
intragroup exposures at HVB.

At the same time, if there is sufficient improvement in the credit
profiles of the Italian parent and its other major subsidiaries
over our one-to-two year Outlook horizon, a downgrade of HVB's VR
and IDR could be avoided, as the VRs would converge at the higher
level.  However, this is not Fitch's base case, hence the Negative
Outlook on HVB's Long-term IDR.

Any negative developments in the credit profiles of UC and its
other subsidiaries could result in a downgrade of HVB's VR and
IDR, as a subsidiary's VR will not normally be more than three
notches above the parent's IDR, and within the eurozone the
appropriate difference is narrower.

The VR is also negatively sensitive to a shift in the balance
between HVB's investment and corporate banking activity, which is
not likely in Fitch's view.

RATING DRIVERS & SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATINGS

HVB's SR reflects Fitch's opinion that, although sovereign report
is no longer reliable, there is a moderate likelihood of
extraordinary support from its parent UC should this be required.
This probability of support indicates a Long-term rating floor
based on support of 'BB'.  The SR reflects Fitch's view that UC
has a strong propensity to support HVB, but its ability to provide
support, in its opinion, is constrained by the likely large size
of any solvency support that would be required relative to the
capital available in the rest of the group given that a large
proportion of UC's consolidated equity is in HVB.  Fitch view that
the parent's propensity to support is strong is primarily based on
HVB's role in the UC group, where it acts as the investment
banking hub and on HVB's corporate banking franchise in Europe's
largest economy.

The SR is sensitive to significant changes to the parent's ability
to support HVB that could be indicated by a change to the parent's
rating.  It is also sensitive to any negative changes to Fitch's
view of the parent's propensity to provide support, which we
currently do not expect.  Fitch would likely withdraw HVB's SR if
we decide to assign a common VR to UC and its largest
subsidiaries.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER
HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings of HVB's hybrid capital instruments (issued through
Funding Trusts I and II) are based on the bank's VR.  Under
circumstances where a subsidiary's VR is higher than its parent's
VR, and where Fitch believes the parent would be unlikely to take
actions that materially adversely affect the VR of the subsidiary,
it would be appropriate to notch the rating of the subsidiary's
hybrid securities off its own VR.

These instruments are rated four notches below the VR, two notches
each for loss severity and for incremental non-performance risk.
While Fitch acknowledges that the regulator could demand a
deferral of coupon payment on these profit-linked instruments in
line with the terms and conditions of the instruments, the agency
does not expect such intervention in light of the bank's solid
standalone financial profile.

The ratings actions are:

UniCredit Bank AG

Long-term IDR downgrade to 'A-' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1+'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'a-'
Support Rating Floor revised to 'No Floor' from 'A+'; withdrawn
Support Rating downgraded to '3' from '1'
Senior unsecured certificates of deposit downgraded to 'F2' from
'F1+'
Senior unsecured debt issuance programme downgraded to 'A-' from
'A+'
Senior unsecured debt issuance programme downgraded to 'F2' from
'F1+'
Senior unsecured MTN programme downgraded to 'A-' from 'A+'
Senior unsecured EMTN programme downgraded to 'A-' from 'A+'
Senior unsecured EMTN programme downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1+'
Senior unsecured notes downgraded to 'A-' from 'A+'
Senior unsecured guaranteed notes downgraded to 'A-' from 'A+'
Subordinated notes affirmed at 'BBB+'
HVB Funding Trusts I and II hybrid notes affirmed at 'BB+'



===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: Has No Money to Repay to IMF on June 5, Minister Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Nikos Voutsis, Greece's interior minister,
said Greece cannot make a repayment to the International Monetary
Fund due on June 5 as it does not have the money.

According to BBC, Mr. Voutsis told Greek TV "The four installments
for the IMF in June are EUR1.6 billion, this money will not be
given and is not there to be given".

Greece has to come to a deal with the IMF and EU to secure the
final tranche of its bailout from the institutions, BBC relates.

The finance minister meanwhile told the BBC that progress was
being made.

Yanis Varoufakis, as cited by BBC, said Greece had worked hard to
meet its end of the deal with its lenders, and that now it was up
to the international institutions to reciprocate.

The Greek government, EU and IMF have been locked in negotiations
for four months over economic reforms the IMF and EU say must be
implemented before more money is made available, BBC relays.

Greece's last cash injection from its international creditors was
in August and the final EUR7.2 billion installment from its two
EUR240 billion EU-IMF bailouts is now seen as vital,
BBC recounts.

But first it has to meet the 5 June repayment deadline, BBC
states.  If it fails to come to a deal with its partners, there is
a fear it could default on its loans, according to BBC.

That could push the Greek government towards leaving the single
currency, otherwise known as Grexit BBC says.

Greece has been shut out of bond markets, and with the current
deadlock Athens has been struggling to meet debt obligations and
to pay public sector wages and pensions, BBC discloses.


GREECE: Moody's Sees Negative Outlook for Banking System
--------------------------------------------------------
The outlook for the Greek banking system is negative, primarily
reflecting the acute deterioration in Greek banks' funding and
liquidity, says Moody's Investors Service in a new report
published recently. These pressures are unlikely to ease over the
next 12-18 months and there is a high likelihood of an imposition
of capital controls and a deposit freeze.

Moody's notes that significant deposit outflows of more than EUR30
billion since December 2014 have increased banks' dependence on
central bank funding. In Moody's view, the banks are likely to
remain highly dependent on central bank funding, as ongoing
uncertainty regarding Greece's support program continues to
compromise depositors' confidence. Greek banks do not have access
to the interbank repo market, as foreign banks minimize their
exposure to Greece. Consequently, Moody's estimates that funding
from the European Central Bank and the Emergency Liquidity
Assistance from the Bank of Greece increased to about 32% of total
assets for the system at the end of April 2015 from about 12% at
the end of September 2014.

Greece's pressing financing needs and uncertainty regarding its
support program have also negatively affected economic activity.
Moody's forecasts a lower growth trajectory than previously
anticipated, of 0.5% in 2015 and 1.5% in 2016, with risks to this
forecast skewed to the downside.

Although the formation of new non-performing loans (NPLs) slowed
down in 2014, Moody's expects reported NPLs to increase to about
38%-40% of gross loans by the end of 2015 from 34.2% of gross
loans as of December 2014. This reflects the weak economic
conditions, and increased repayment defaults and loan rescheduling
delays as borrowers hope to benefit from the government's proposed
pro-borrower measures. While loan-loss reserves rose in 2014, they
remain insufficient to cover expected losses, particularly as
banks' ability to foreclose on residential properties remains
constrained.

Moody's considers that Greek banks will likely require additional
capital over the outlook horizon. Following two rounds of
recapitalization in 2013 to 2014, the rating agency estimates that
banks' weighted-average Common Equity Tier 1 ratio increased to
13.7% as of December 2014 from 12.0% in December 2013. However,
about 55% of this capital is in the form of deferred tax assets,
which are lower-quality capital, given that their eligibility to
be converted into deferred tax credits - and ultimately into
tangible assets - is contingent on the Greek government's
creditworthiness. Furthermore, banks' capital base will remain at
risk from very high loan-loss provisions over the outlook period.

Moody's negative outlook on the Greek banking system is consistent
with the negative outlook assigned to the rated Greek banks' long-
term deposit and debt ratings.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ALLIED IRISH: Moody's Raises Long-Term Deposit Rating to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three Irish
banks: Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. (AIB), Bank of Ireland (BoI) and
Hewlett-Packard International Bank Plc (HPIB). The rating agency
initiated the reviews on these banks on March 17, 2015 following
the publication of its new bank rating methodology to reflect both
the new methodology, in particular the introduction of loss given
failure analysis, and revisions in the agency's government support
assumptions.

As a result, Moody's upgraded the long-term deposit ratings of:

  -- Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. (AIB) to Ba1 from Ba2

  -- Bank of Ireland (BoI) to Baa2 from Baa3

  -- Hewlett-Packard International Bank Plc (HPIB) to A3 from
     Baa1

  -- The agency has also upgraded the senior unsecured debt
     ratings of

  -- AIB to Ba2 from Ba3

  -- BoI to Baa2 from Ba1

In addition, following the recent update of the scorecard of the
Irish government reflected in the credit opinion published on May
18, 2015.  Moody's has changed Ireland's Macro Profile for banks
to "Moderate+" from "Moderate" and affirmed the baseline credit
assessments (BCAs) of AIB and BoI. As part of this action, Moody's
also affirmed the BCA of Permanent tsb p.l.c. (PTSB), whose debt
and deposit ratings were not included in this review.

For its own business reasons, Moody's has withdrawn the outlook on
the ratings of AIB's and BoI's junior debt instruments.

Furthermore, Moody's assigned Counterparty Risk Assessments (CR
Assessment) of

  -- Baa3(cr)/P-3(cr) to AIB

  -- Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr) to BoI

  -- A2(cr) on review direction uncertian/P-1(cr) on review for
     downgrade to HPIB

  -- Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr) to KBC Bank Ireland plc (KBCI)

Moody's said that the rating actions follow the implementation of
its new banking methodology and specifically the introduction of
advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis and the agency's
revised assumptions regarding government support.

These rating actions conclude the reviews on the deposit and
issuer ratings initiated on March 17, 2015 for AIB and BoI. The
action also incorporates the impact of the new bank rating
methodology on the BCA, and deposit and debt ratings of HPIB.
However, the BCA of HPIB remains on review with direction
uncertain driven by the review on the rating of its parent company
Hewlett-Packard Company (HP; Baa1, Review for Downgrade) and the
potential for the bank to avoid a failure in the event of the
default of its parent, warranting a BCA higher than that of HP's
senior unsecured rating. Moody's says that these two drivers are
unrelated to the implementation of the new banks rating
methodology. Consequently, HPIB's long-term and short-term deposit
ratings remain on review with direction uncertain in line with its
BCA.

A list of the affected credit ratings is available at
http://is.gd/wWfivt

The new methodology includes a number of elements that Moody's has
developed to help accurately predict bank failures and determine
how each creditor class is likely to be treated when a bank fails
and enters resolution. These new elements capture insights gained
from the crisis and the fundamental shift in the banking industry
and its regulation.

In light of the new bank rating methodology, the actions reflect
the following considerations: (1) the "Moderate+" macro profile of
Ireland; (2) the banks' financial profile and qualitative factors;
(3) Moody's Advanced LGF analysis; and (4) the likelihood of
government support for these institutions.

(1) CHANGE OF MACRO PROFILE FROM "MODERATE" TO "MODERATE+"

Irish banks benefit from a dynamic and open domestic economy with
a very high level of wealth, which counterbalances the country's
relatively small GDP. Moody's has changed Ireland's macro profile
to "Moderate+" from "Moderate" to reflect improvements in banking
supervision and regulation since the crisis, both by the Irish
regulatory authorities and through the implementation of the
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) led by the European Central
Bank (ECB). Susceptibility to event risk remains low, primarily
because of external factors. However, despite the material
deleveraging of the private sector over the past three years, the
stock of private debt remains elevated and will continue to exert
downward pressure on banks' credit fundamentals. Funding
conditions have materially improved. Additionally, even though
Ireland's banking system is highly concentrated, the barriers to
entry are relatively low compared with other European countries.

(2) DIFFERENCES ACROSS IRISH BANKS' CORE FINANCIAL RATIOS

The Irish banks' BCAs, ranging from baa1 to caa1, reflect
differences across the sector's core financial ratios, including
aggregate high problem loan ratios, increasing capital buffers,
improving profitability and manageable liquidity metrics. The
financial factors of most Irish banks are improving on the back of
a positive operating environment. However, legacy asset quality
issues continue to be the main drag to recovery. The BCAs also
reflect differences in product mix, and sector and single-name
concentrations.

(3) PROTECTION OFFERED TO DEPOSITORS, SENIOR AND OTHER CREDITORS
    CAPTURED BY MOODY'S ADVANCED LGF LIABILITY ANALYSIS

Irish banks are subject to the EU Bank Resolution and Recovery
Directive (BRRD), which Moody's considers to be an Operational
Resolution Regime. The upgrade of the long-term deposit ratings of
AIB, BoI and HPIB and senior unsecured ratings of AIB and BoI
stems from the introduction of the rating agency's Loss Given
Failure (LGF) analysis. Banks are increasingly benefiting from
renewed access to the markets and have been able to issue
instruments at different levels of the liability structure. The
rating agency applies its standard assumptions to the three banks,
assuming residual tangible common equity of 3% (8% for HPIB) and
losses post-failure of 8% of tangible banking assets, a 25% run-
off in junior wholesale deposits, a 5% run-off in preferred
deposits, and a 25% probability of deposits being preferred to
senior unsecured debt. Moody's also assumes that the junior
proportion of deposits of these three banks is in line with its
estimated EU-wide average of 26%.

(4) DECLINE IN THE LIKELIHOOD OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

At the same time, Moody's says that the introduction of the BRRD
has demonstrated a reduction in the willingness of EU governments
to bail-out banks, and this has led to a lower likelihood of
government support for Irish banks, in Moody's view. The rating
agency reduced its assumption of government support for AIB and
BoI to "moderate" from "high" for their debt and deposit ratings;
the revised assumption leads to one notch of uplift, from two
notches. Moody's continues to assume a low probability of
government support for HPIB's deposit ratings resulting in no
systemic support uplift.

AIB

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the favorable
operating environment will allow AIB to continue strengthening its
credit fundamentals, but also that a material reduction in the
stock of problem loans will remain the key challenge during in the
outlook period.

BoI

The stable outlook on all BoI's ratings reflects improvements in
capital and profitability, also stemming from the favorable
operating environments in the UK and Ireland. Moody's also expects
a reduction in the stock of problem loans from still high levels.

PTSB

On May 8, Moody's concluded the review process on PTSB's ratings
since the bank increased its capital by EUR400 million and issued
EUR125 million of additional tier 1 securities. As a result, this
rating action only includes the affirmation of the BCA driven by
the change in the macro-profile described above. The stable
outlook on PTSB's long-term deposit rating and senior unsecured
rating incorporates Moody's expectation that potential losses on
asset sales will likely entail some decline in PSTB's capital
level. The outlook also incorporates improvements in profitability
excluding the losses triggered from the above-mentioned asset
sales, and ongoing asset-quality challenges.

HPIB

The ratings of HPIB are on review with direction uncertain. All
The ratings of HPIB's parent Hewlett-Packard Company are on review
for downgrade owing to the company's plan to separate its Personal
Systems businesses (personal computer (PC) and printing) from its
Enterprise businesses through a spin-off to shareholders. Although
HPIB is committed to continue providing funding to customers of
both resulting entities, the fundamental financial strength of the
bank's ultimate parent is still uncertain. In parallel, Moody's is
also HPIB's potential to remain viable in the event of the default
of HP on its senior unsecured debt, and hence retain a BCA above
the senior unsecured rating of its parent company.

Moody's has withdrawn the outlooks on subordinated, junior
subordinated and preference stock ratings of BoI and on
subordinated and junior subordinated of AIB for its own business
reasons. Outlooks are now only assigned to long-term senior debt
and deposit ratings, indicating the direction of any rating
pressures.

As part of the actions, Moody's has assigned CR Assessments to
AIB, BoI, HPIB and KBCI. The CR Assessment, which is not a rating,
reflects an issuer's probability of defaulting on certain bank
operating liabilities, such as covered bonds, derivatives, letters
of credit and other contractual commitments. In assigning the CR
Assessment, Moody's evaluates the issuer's standalone strength and
the likelihood, should the need arise, of affiliate and government
support, as well as the anticipated seniority of counterparty
obligations under Moody's LGF framework. The CR Assessment also
assumes that authorities will likely take steps to preserve the
continuity of a bank's key operations, maintain payment flows, and
avoid contagion if the bank enter a resolution.

In most cases, the starting point for the CR Assessment is one
notch above the bank's Adjusted BCA, to which Moody's then
typically adds the same notches of government support uplift as
applied to deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings. As a result,
the CR Assessment for Irish banks, except for KBCI, is one notch
higher than their senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings,
reflecting Moody's view that authorities are likely to honor the
operating obligations the CR Assessment refers to in order to
preserve a bank's critical functions and reduce potential for
contagion.

The banks' BCAs could be upgraded due to (1) a significant
reduction in the level of non-performing loans, (2) further
improvements in profitability, excluding provision write backs,
and (3) improvements in capital and funding levels.

The banks' BCAs could be downgraded due to (1) an increase in
problem loans, (2) a failure to improve profitability and/or (3) a
deterioration in liquidity and funding.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.


DEPFA BANK: Fitch Puts 'B+' Sub. Notes Rating on CreditWatch Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Ireland-based DEPFA BANK plc's
(DEPFA) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'
and placed it on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

The rating actions are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for US, Swiss and
European Union commercial banks.

The EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) are now sufficiently progressed
to provide a framework for resolving banks that is likely to
require senior creditors participating in losses, if necessary,
instead of or ahead of a bank receiving sovereign support.

Although DEPFA is subject to BRRD, Fitch believes that it will not
be applied to it as long as its orderly wind-down progresses in
line with plans agreed with the European Commission's (EC) state
aid authorities.  However, should state aid be required further to
what has been agreed with the EC, the bank may be required to take
resolution measures including some bail-in of senior creditors.
This risk is reflected in today's downgrade of the IDRs.

The RWN reflects uncertainty about the next steps DEPFA's owner,
FMS Wertmanagement (FMS WM, AAA/Stable) will take with its Irish
subsidiary.  Fitch expects FMS WM to communicate on this during
the next three to six months.  Any plans other than orderly wind-
down under FMS WM's stewardship could pose significant risks for
senior creditors.

FMS WM is controlled by Germany (AAA/Stable) through the Financial
Market Stabilisation Fund (SoFFin).  It took over direct ownership
of DEPFA in December 2014 following the German government's
decision in May 2014 to continue DEPFA's wind-down after attempts
to sell the bank to a suitable buyer did not succeed.  DEPFA has
written no new business and has been effectively in wind-down
since 2009.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

DEPFA's ratings reflect Fitch's view of a high probability that
FMS WM, for as long as it remains DEPFA's owner, and ultimately
Germany, would provide additional extraordinary support to it, if
required, to accompany the orderly resolution of the group.

Fitch's assessment of the high likelihood of state support for
DEPFA is driven by qualitative factors - primarily its ultimate
ownership by Germany and the state aid agreement with the EC
contingent on a sale or, failing that, a wind-down of DEPFA.
Fitch also considers the limited financial incentive of Germany to
force losses on senior creditors due to the very small amount of
unsecured debt available.  Moreover, we expect an improvement of
DEPFA's capitalization following FMS WM's tender offer to
repurchase the bank's outstanding hybrid securities.

DEPFA's ratings take into account Fitch's view that Germany's
propensity to support it in all circumstances is marginally
weakened by its location in Ireland rather than Germany, including
no material relevance for the German economy, financial system or
financing of its public sector.

In resolving the RWN, Fitch will review the timing of the
remaining run-down of DEPFA's balance sheet and details of the
entity's liquidation at the end of its wind-down process.  If
liquidation includes the transfer of assets and possibly
liabilities to external third parties, most likely other banks,
there could be risk of losses for senior creditors.

DEPFA's Short-term IDR of 'F2' is at the higher of two possible
levels that map to a 'BBB' Long-term IDR on Fitch's rating scale.
This reflects the bank's fairly well-matched asset and liability
maturity structure.  It also reflects our view that the
government's incentive for a bail-in of DEPFA's senior unsecured
creditors is especially low in the short-term.  The RWN on the
Short-term IDR factors in the same considerations as the RWN on
the Long-term IDR.

Fitch does not assign a Viability Rating to DEPFA because it is a
wind-down institution whose business model would not be viable
without external support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

DEPFA's ratings are sensitive to any new information which may
affect our assessment of FMS WM's and ultimately Germany's
propensity to ensure that capital and funding needs are met in the
course of the bank's wind-down.  In particular, the maintenance of
a Long-term IDR within the investment grade category is contingent
upon clarity in the next few months, most likely in the form of a
detailed wind-down plan, on FMS WM's strategy to wind down DEPFA.

Fitch may also further downgrade DEPFA's IDRs if it considers that
DEPFA's wind-down plan entails a significant bail-in risk for its
senior creditors, given its recurring operating losses triggered
by its run-down.  The ratings could also be negatively affected by
considerations that may arise if new wind-down plans or any need
for recapitalization prior to completion of the wind-down require
new state aid approval, which could escalate the pace of wind-down
and potentially cause losses that would require burden-sharing by
senior creditors under SRM.

Any rating upgrade would be contingent on a positive change in
Germany's propensity to support DEPFA and ensure senior creditors
are repaid in full.  While not impossible, this is highly unlikely
in Fitch's view.

DEPFA's ratings are also sensitive to any change in Fitch's view
of the support dynamics between Germany, FMS WM and DEPFA, in
particular to significant changes in the relationship between
Germany and FMS WM, although Fitch considers the latter scenario
to be highly unlikely for the foreseeable future.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - DEPFA ACS Bank

The alignment of DEPFA ACS Bank's ratings with those of its parent
reflects the integration of the subsidiary into DEPFA and our
expectation that support from FMS WM would flow through DEPFA to
DEPFA ACS Bank.  It also reflects the reputational risk to the
German government of allowing DEPFA's subsidiary to fail.

DEPFA ACS Bank benefits from a declaration of backing from its
parent, expressing DEPFA's commitment to fulfill DEPFA ACS Bank's
contractual obligations in case of need.  Fitch understands from
FMS WM that it does not intend to modify DEPFA's group structure,
ie that DEPFA ACS Bank will remain fully owned by DEPFA and
continue to be wound down in a similar way to DEPFA.

DEPFA ACS Bank's ratings are sensitive to changes to DEPFA's IDRs
or to any developments that could affect the strength of the
subsidiary's integration into DEPFA.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER
HYBRID SECURITIES

The 'B+' rating of XS0229524128, a performing subordinated lower
Tier 2 debt security issued by DEPFA, reflects material credit
risk if state support is excluded and lack of financial
flexibility for subordinated instruments.  The material short-term
credit risk is driven by potential bail-in of the bank's
subordinated debt holders that would be triggered by any
additional state aid considerations that may arise when FMS WM
details its plans to wind down DEPFA.  The security matures in
December 2015 and is the only performing subordinated debt
instrument that is rated by Fitch.

DEPFA's non-performing hybrid securities (DEPFA Funding II, III
and IV LP) are rated 'C' to reflect the deferral of coupon
payments and the tender offer launched for these securities by FMS
WM in April 2015.  FMS WM has entered into a commitment agreement
with a qualifying majority of holders of these hybrid securities
to purchase them at prices between about 58% and 60% of their
nominal values.  Consequently, according to the first notification
in January 2015, investors that do not tender their securities
will become subject to redemption of the securities at the option
of the issuer or DEPFA at a price between about 57% and 59% of
nominal value.

Although FMS WM has yet to communicate its intentions with regard
to the hybrid securities once the repurchase is completed, we
expect them to be transferred to DEPFA and redeemed.  Payments are
unlikely to be resumed given that DEPFA is in wind-down.

The rating actions are:

DEPFA BANK plc
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'; placed on Rating
Watch Negative
Short-term IDR 'F2' placed on Rating Watch Negative
Support Rating '2' placed on Rating Watch Negative
Support Rating Floor revised to 'BBB' from 'BBB+', placed on
Rating Watch Negative
Debt issuance programme downgraded to 'BBB'/'F2' from 'BBB+'/'F2',
placed on Rating Watch Negative
Senior unsecured debt downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+', placed on
Rating Watch Negative
Market-linked securities downgraded to 'BBBemr' from 'BBB+emr',
placed on Rating Watch Negative
Subordinated notes (lower Tier 2, XS0229524128): 'B+, placed on
Rating Watch Negative

DEPFA ACS Bank
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'; placed on Rating
Watch Negative
Short-term IDR 'F2', placed on Rating Watch Negative
Support Rating '2' placed on Rating Watch Negative
Debt issuance programme downgraded to 'BBB'/'F2' from 'BBB+'/'F2',
placed on Rating Watch Negative
DEPFA Funding II LP hybrid capital instruments (XS0178243332)
affirmed at 'C'
DEPFA Funding III LP hybrid capital instruments (DE000A0E5U85)
affirmed at 'C'
DEPFA Funding IV LP hybrid capital instruments (XS0291655727)
affirmed at 'C'



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I T A L Y
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BANCO POPOLARE: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDR to 'BB', Outlook Stable
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Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) and senior debt ratings of Banco Popolare (Popolare) to 'BB'
from 'BBB', Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) to 'B-' from
'BBB', Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna (BPER) to 'BB' from
'BB+' and Banca Carige (Carige) to 'B' from 'BB'.  At the same
time, the agency has affirmed the Long-term IDR of Banca Popolare
di Milano (BPM) at 'BB+'.  The Outlooks on the Long-term IDRs of
all banks are now Stable.

The rating actions are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for US, Swiss and
European Union commercial banks.

As a result, Fitch believes that, in line with its Support Rating
(SR) definition of '5', extraordinary external support while
possible can no longer be relied upon for these banks.  Fitch has,
therefore, downgraded all their SRs to '5', from '2' for MPS and
Popolare, and from '3' for BPM, Carige and BPER.  Fitch has also
revised the Support Rating Floors (SRF) to 'No Floor' from 'BBB'
for Popolare and MPS, from 'BB+' for BPM and BPER and from 'BB'
for Carige.

As a result of the revision of the SRFs, the Long-term IDRs are
now driven by the banks' standalone creditworthiness as expressed
in their respective Viability Ratings (VRs), which have been
affirmed for Popolare, BPER and MPS, and upgraded for BPM and
Carige.

Asset quality remains an important factor in determining the
banks' VRs which are influenced by varying levels of unreserved
impaired loans in relation to their capitalization.  Strengthened
capitalization has contributed to the VR upgrades for BPM and
Carige and also underpins the ratings of MPS and BPER.  Banks also
generally benefit from expected modest improvements in pre-
impairment operating profitability.  However, profitability
remains a relative weakness for most banks, in particular in view
of the still sizeable amount of loan impairment charges.

The Stable Outlooks reflect that the prospects for these banks'
standalone viability are stable.  Prior to the rating action, the
Negative Outlooks had reflected Fitch's view of the reducing
likelihood of support from the sovereign for these banks' senior
creditors.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

BPM
The upgrade of BPM's VR to 'bb+' from 'b+' reflects the bank's
strengthened capital ratios, an ability to contain unreserved
impaired loans in relation to core capital as well as modestly
recovered profitability on the back of lower impairment charges
(LICs).  These improvements suggest that the bank's weak corporate
governance only acts as a small constraint on the bank's overall
credit profile.

The pending transformation, required by law, of the bank's status
to a limited company from a cooperative should help to further
eradicate factors that had in the past contributed to the bank's
inadequate and convoluted corporate governance.

The bank's capitalization was strengthened in 2014, mainly
following the removal of EUR8.1bn punitive risk weightings,
imposed by the Italian regulator in 2011, and a EUR500m capital
increase.  BPM's regulatory phased-in CET1 ratio at 11.57% at end-
1Q15 ranks among the highest domestically.

Retail customer funding is stable at over 60% of total funding.
The bank's liquidity is ample and debt maturities comfortably
manageable.

BPM's impaired loans increased to 13.65% of gross loans at end-
2014, which is high internationally but average among domestic
peers.  This was the result of the bank's large exposure to the
real estate and construction sectors, although this has reduced
somewhat since end-2011.  A large exposure to export-oriented
companies has enabled new impaired loans to slow down faster at
BPM than for the sector throughout 2014.  Impaired loans coverage
is adequate and stronger relative to most immediate peers.

The combination of sound coverage and strengthened capitalization
resulted in unreserved impaired loans representing just above 50%
of Fitch Core Capital (FCC) at end-2014, which is among the lowest
for rated Italian banks but high by international comparison.

BPM's pre-impairment operating profitability improved in 2014, due
to lower LICs, but the bank's ability to generate earnings is
weaker than that of many other Italian banks and it relies more
than peers on proceeds from its sizeable Italian government bond
portfolio.  Fitch expects the LICs to continue declining in 2015,
which should support a further improvement in operating
profitability.

CARIGE

The upgrade of Carige's VR to 'b' from 'b-' reflects the stronger
capital position that will result following the completion of a
EUR850 million capital increase in 3Q15 in addition to the EUR800
million capital already raised in July 2014, and the disposal of
two insurance subsidiaries.  The asset disposal will free about
EUR450 million in core capital through lower deductions and reduce
risk- weighted assets (RWAs).  Following these transactions,
Carige's FCC and regulatory CET1 ratios should increase to about
12%, from below 8% at end-1Q15.

Fitch also expects capitalization to materially improve in
relation to unreserved impaired loans after these transactions.
While the ratio will still account for over 100% of FCC, it will
be significantly lower than the 260% seen at end-2014.

The VR, IDRs and senior debt ratings also reflect Carige's weak
asset quality and structural profitability.  Gross impaired loans
accounted for a high 26.9% of gross loans at end-2014, and
coverage was just acceptable at 46%, although in line with other
Italian medium-sized banks.

Carige reported an operating loss of EUR578 million (33% of
average equity) in 2014, after posting a EUR790 million operating
loss in 2013, largely driven by high LICs, low net interest income
and securities gains, following a significantly reduced
contribution from its securities portfolio, and high operating
costs.  The bank reported a net loss of EUR45 million in 1Q15.
Operating profitability should, however, be on an improving path.
LICs in 2014 decreased almost 40% yoy to EUR673 million (of which
EUR416 million related to the ECB Asset Quality Review) and we
expect them to continue to decrease throughout 2015.  Fitch also
expects improving pre-impairment performance from a wider net
interest margin and a lower operating cost base.

The RR4 Recovery Rating assigned to Carige's senior unsecured debt
reflects Fitch's expectations of average recoveries in the event
of default.

BPER

BPER's IDRs, VR and senior debt ratings reflect the bank's weak
asset quality with a high level of gross and unreserved impaired
loans, as well as its improved capital position following a
capital increase in 2014, and its adequate pre-impairment
operating profitability.

BPER's asset quality remains the weakest rating factor with
impaired loans at above 20% of gross loans and just acceptable
loan loss reserves by international standards at 47%.  Fitch
expects asset quality to remain a challenge as a rapid reduction
of the stock of impaired loans through recoveries and/or disposals
seems highly unlikely.  However, preliminary indications point to
a stabilization in asset quality deterioration from 4Q14,
supported by the completion of the revision and harmonization of
underwriting standards across the group.

The bank's CET1 ratio at end-1Q15 was adequate at 11.4% but
capital-at-risk remains high with unreserved impaired loans at
above 100%.  Leverage of above 7% compares well with international
peers in the same rating category.

BPER's profitability recovered in 2014 and the bank generates the
bulk of earnings from its core commercial business with negligible
reliance on more volatile items including its securities
portfolio.  The bank's cost/income ratio of around 55% is lower
than most peers' with further room for improvement offered by the
planned reorganization of the group's specialized subsidiaries,
branch closures and staff reduction.

LICs represented a high 96%-98% of pre-impairment operating profit
in 2012-2014 and have been a drag on profitability.  Their
pressure should decline in the coming quarters, due to a slower
rate of formation of new impaired loans, tightened underwriting
standards and the group's focus on recovery and collection of
impaired exposures.

BPER's funding is adequate, supported by a high share of fairly
stable customer sources.  Wholesale funding sources are
sufficiently diversified through covered bonds and securitization
programs.  ECB funding utilization is below 5% of total assets.
Liquidity is also adequate as reflected in unencumbered eligible
assets at 7% of total assets at end-March 2015 and Liquidity
Coverage and Net Stable Funding ratios constantly and comfortably
above the regulatory minimum.

MPS

MPS's IDRs, VR and senior debt ratings reflect the significant
capital raised by the bank in 2014 and to be raised in 2015, and
the progress it has made in improving its pre-impairment operating
profitability.  Nonetheless, MPS's asset quality remains weak, a
factor which Fitch considers to be of higher importance in its
assessment of the bank's VR.

Impaired loans accounted for approximately 30% of gross loans at
end-2014 and place significant pressure on both the bank's
profitability and capitalization.  Fitch expects MPS's asset
quality to continue to deteriorate, albeit at a reduced pace, and
that additional LICs will be incurred as loans season.  The bank
reported a EUR5.3 billion net loss in 2014 after LICs of EUR8.3
billion, nearly 6.5x its pre-impairment operating profit, but a
EUR73 million net profit in 1Q15.  Fitch acknowledges that a large
part (EUR6 billion) of the LICs reported in 2014 is non-recurring
as they reflect adjustments required by the European regulator.

However, Fitch believes that MPS's overall performance will remain
structurally weak in the medium term unless management undertakes
significant actions to reduce the stock of impaired loans through
sales, which, in the absence of a meaningful secondary market for
doubtful loans, are likely to be undertaken below book value, and
to reduce LICs.

Capitalization also remains a weakness despite the EUR5 billion
capital increase received in July 2014 and the additional EUR3
billion to be received in 2Q15.  These amounts may not be
sufficient to stabilize MPS's financial condition, particularly if
asset quality continues to deteriorate.  At end-2014, unreserved
impaired loans accounted for a high 250% of FCC (on a proforma
basis including the EUR3 billion capital increase), which in our
opinion represents a key vulnerability and a limiting factor to
any meaningful turnaround of the bank.

The RR4 Recovery Rating assigned to MPS's senior unsecured debt
reflects Fitch's expectations of average recoveries in the event
of default.

POPOLARE

Popolare's IDRs, VR and senior debt ratings reflect pressure on
capital exerted by both a high level of unreserved impaired loans,
which account for almost 200% of FCC, and weak internal capital
generation.  In Fitch's opinion, these pressures on capital render
the bank highly vulnerable to severe shocks and it is thus a
factor of high importance in determining the bank's ratings.

Gross impaired loans grew during 2014 to EUR19.5 billion,
accounting for a high 24% of gross loans at year-end.  The
combination of rising impaired loans and higher coverage led
Popolare to book EUR3.6 billion of LICs in 2014 (4.5% of gross
loans), which was the main driver of the EUR2.7 billion operating
loss reported in that year.  The net loss reported in 2014 was
EUR1.9 billion, which largely eroded the benefits of the EUR1.5
billion capital raised in April 2014.

A large portion (EUR1.6 million) of the additional LICs booked in
2014 emerged from the ECB Asset Quality Review and is not expected
to recur.  Nonetheless, in Fitch's opinion, Popolare's structural
profitability is weak.  The bank has been reporting operating
losses since 2010 and we expect only a gradual turnaround in
profitability at least until 2016.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT (ALL BANKS)

Improving asset quality ratios and, in particular, a reduction in
the level of unreserved impaired loans to core capital, and
strengthening profitability, which for the lowest rated banks
would be contingent on a clear turnaround in operating
performance, could over time lead to the ratings being upgraded.

Conversely, downgrades could be caused by asset quality failing to
stabilize /continuing to deteriorate significantly and lack of
improvement /further deterioration in profitability.  The ratings
of all banks would also be sensitive to sudden, and currently
unexpected, liquidity pressures.

Popolare's and MPS's Long-term IDRs are also sensitive to Fitch's
assessment of the level of protection offered to the banks' senior
creditors by outstanding loss-absorbing junior instruments and to
the banks' plans to raise junior debt.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED
COMPANY

The ratings of Popolare's subsidiary, Banca Aletti & C. S.p.A.,
have been downgraded in line with the parent's.  Banca Aletti & C.
S.p.A.'s ratings are based on Fitch's view that Popolare would
support it, if needed.  Fitch considers Banca Aletti as a core
subsidiary given its role in the group.

Banca Aletti & C. S.p.A.'s ratings are sensitive to the same
factors that might drive a change in Popolare's IDRs.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT
RATING FLOOR (ALL BANKS)

The SRs and SRFs reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors can no
longer rely on receiving full extraordinary support from the
sovereign in the event that the banks become non-viable.  In
Fitch's view, the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for eurozone
banks are now sufficiently progressed to provide a framework for
resolving banks that is likely to require senior creditors
participating in losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a
bank receiving sovereign support.

In the EU, BRRD has been effective in member states since 1
January 2015, including minimum loss absorption requirements
before resolution financing or alternative financing (eg,
government stabilization funds) can be used.  Full application of
BRRD, including the bail-in tool, is required from Jan. 1, 2016.

Fitch expects BRRD to be implemented into the national legislation
in 2H15 through a legislative process involving the Parliament and
the Ministry of Finance.  Some resolution and pre-resolution tools
are, however, already part of the national legislation for
managing banks in crisis.

Any upgrade to the SRs and upward revision to the SRFs would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks.  While not impossible, this is highly unlikely
in Fitch's view.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER
HYBRID SECURITIES (ALL BANKS)

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued are notched down
from the VRs in accordance with Fitch's assessment of each
instrument's respective non-performance and relative loss severity
risk profiles.  The ratings are primarily sensitive to any change
in the VRs, but also to any change in Fitch's view of non-
performance or loss severity risk relative to the banks'
viability.  They have therefore all been affirmed, with the
exception of those issued by BPM and Carige, which have been
upgraded due to the upgrade of the respective banks' VRs.

The ratings of MPS's Lower Tier 2 and Upper Tier 2 debt reflect a
still high risk of non-performance.  The 'C' ratings of its Tier 1
instruments and preferred securities reflects their non-
performance and Fitch's expectation that the securities are
unlikely to resume coupon payments in the near future, at least
until the bank utilizes state aid and reports net losses.

The 'C' Long-term rating of Popolare's trust preferred securities
reflects their non-performance and Fitch's expectation that the
securities are unlikely to resume coupon payments in the near
future.

Carige's subordinated notes and MPS's Lower Tier 2 subordinated
debt issuance have been assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR5' and
MPS's Upper Tier 2 and preferred stock and Tier 1 notes a Recovery
Rating of 'RR6', reflecting below- average and poor, respectively,
recoveries in case of default.  Recovery Ratings are sensitive to
valuation and availability of unencumbered assets and the amount
of and breakdown between unsecured and secured liabilities.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SENIOR STATE-GUARANTEED
DEBT

The Long-term rating of MPS's state-guaranteed debt is based on
Italy's direct, unconditional and irrevocable guarantee for the
issues, which covers payments of both principal and interest.
Italy's guarantee was issued by the Ministry of Economy and
Finance under Law Decree 6 December 2011, n.201, subsequently
converted into Law 22 December 2011, n. 214.

The ratings reflect Fitch's expectation that Italy will honor the
guarantee provided to the noteholders in a full and timely manner.
The state guarantee ranks pari passu with Italy's other unsecured
and unguaranteed senior obligations.  As a result, the notes'
Long-term ratings are in line with Italy's 'BBB+' Long-term IDR.

The notes' Long-term ratings are sensitive to changes in Italy's
Long-term IDR.  Any downgrade or upgrade of Italy's Long-term IDR
would be reflected by the notes' Long-term ratings.

The rating actions are:

BPM
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bb+' from 'b+'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BB+'
Senior unsecured notes (including EMTN): affirmed at 'BB+'/'B'
Commercial paper: affirmed at 'B'
Subordinated lower tier 2 debt: upgraded to 'BB' from 'B'
Preferred stock and hybrid capital instrument: upgraded to 'B+'
from 'CCC'

CARIGE
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'BB'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'b' from 'b-'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BB'
Senior unsecured notes: Long-term rating downgraded to 'B' from
'BB'; Short-term affirmed at 'B', Recovery Rating of 'RR4'
assigned
Subordinated notes: upgraded to 'B-' from 'CCC', 'RR5' assigned

BPER
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BB+'
Senior unsecured notes (including EMTN): Long-term rating
downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+' Short-term debt rating affirmed at
'B'; Short-term rating on commercial paper programme affirmed at
'B' and withdrawn following the cancellation of the programme
Subordinated notes: affirmed at 'BB-'

MPS:
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'B-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'
VR: affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '2'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BBB'
Debt issuance programme (senior debt): downgraded to 'B-' from
'BBB', Recovery Rating of 'RR4' assigned
Senior unsecured debt: downgraded to 'B-' from 'BBB', Recovery
Rating of 'RR4' assigned
Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'CCC', 'RR5' assigned
Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'CC', 'RR6' assigned
Preferred stock and Tier 1 notes: affirmed at 'C', 'RR6' assigned
State-guaranteed debt (IT0004804362): affirmed at 'BBB+'

Popolare:
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '2'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BBB'
Senior debt (including programme ratings): downgraded to 'BB'/'B'
from 'BBB'/'F3'
Market-linked securities: downgraded to 'BBemr' from 'BBBemr'
Commercial paper: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'
Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB-'
Preferred stock and junior subordinated debt: affirmed at 'B-'
Trust preferred securities (ISIN: XS0255673070): affirmed at 'C'

Banca Aletti & C. S.p.A.:
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'
Support Rating: downgraded to '3' from '2'



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L U X E M B O U R G
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ALGECO SCOTSMAN: Moody's Lowers CFR to B3, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Algeco Scotsman Global
S.A.R.L.'s corporate family rating to B3 from B2. Moody's also
downgraded Algeco Scotsman Global Finance PLC's senior secured
rating to B3 from B2 and senior unsecured rating to Caa2 from
Caa1. The rating outlook is stable.

The rating action reflects Algeco's continued weak financial
performance, further exacerbated by sizeable currency losses in
2014. The 2014 financial losses further weakened the company's
negative shareholders' equity and delayed expected deleveraging.

Algeco's business is inherently cyclical, reflecting variable
demand for modular space, which fills temporary needs in end
markets such as energy and mining, construction, and home-
building. The company's operating performance has suffered over
the past few quarters amid a slowdown in the energy and natural
resources sectors in Australia, weaker than expected recovery in
Europe, and operational difficulties in Brazil. Algeco's
management has been implementing various initiatives to improve
the company's performance, but its profitability remains weak. In
2014, Algeco posted $347 million in pre-tax losses, of which $144
million was related to major currencies depreciating relative to
the US dollar. Contributing to weak results were sizeable
recurring restructuring and impairment charges, reflecting the
company's operational complexity. Algeco's weak earnings have
delayed anticipated deleveraging, with the company's Debt to
EBITDA currently measuring 17x.

Going forward, Moody's anticipates continued pressure on Algeco's
profitability given the continued slowdown in its Australia
business. In addition, Algeco's reliance on the oil and gas
sector, which accounted for 16.5% of its revenues in 2014, makes
the company's vulnerable to a continued activity slowdown in the
sector due to lower oil prices.

Somewhat mitigating these concerns is Algeco's positive cash flows
from operations, reflecting a substantial amount of depreciation
and amortization and other non-cash charges included in its
earnings. In 2014, Algeco's cash flows from operations were $232
million, most of which the company invested in equipment
purchases. Algeco's operating cash flows after net proceeds from
equipment purchases, or its free cash flows, were $34 million in
2014, reflecting significantly reduced capital expenditures due to
the continued slowdown in Australia and Brazil. As other companies
in the equipment leasing sector, Algeco has flexibility with
respect to the timing and magnitude of capital expenditures, which
it can temporarily defer to help offset lower operating cash flows
that occur during periods of economic weakness.

Algeco's ratings could be upgraded if the company makes
sustainable progress toward accumulating capital through improved
profitability and significantly de-levers. The ratings will be
downgraded if operating losses continue, cash flows weaken and
prospects for leverage improvements decline.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Finance
Company Global Rating Methodology published in March 2012.


BSN MEDICAL: Moody's Affirms B2 CFR, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the B2 corporate family rating
and the probability of default rating of B2-PD for BSN Medical
Luxembourg Group Holding S.a.r.l. (BSN or the Group).
Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded the instrument rating on the
EUR721 million equivalent Senior Secured Term Loan B (TLB), EUR50
million Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) and EUR94 million
Capex/Acquisition Facility to B1 from Ba3 and issued new
instrument ratings of B1 on the new EUR360 million Term Loan C
(TLC) and EUR50 million Revolving Credit Facility B (which will
replace the existing RCF). The instrument ratings are assigned at
BSN Medical Luxembourg Finance Holdings S.a.r.l. The outlook on
all ratings, which assume that the Group's refinancing closes as
planned, is stable.

BSN's B2 CFR takes into account (1) high leverage of 7.7x as of
FYE2014 as adjusted by Moody's; (2) Moody's view that growth will
be at least in part driven by debt financed acquisitions,
particularly in emerging markets which are a growth priority for
the Group; (3) exposure to potential pricing pressure from
reimbursement levels, consolidating customer base and regulatory
changes (4) relatively modest absolute size.

These negatives are partially offset by (1) attractive and stable
profitability levels, with normalized EBITDA margins of over 24%
in the past three years, driven by leading market shares in BSN's
niche markets that are deemed to have very limited cyclicality in
demand; (2) product and market diversity and Moody's expectation
of favorable, albeit moderate, growth in underlying demand; (3)
relatively low underlying capex and R&D requirements; and (4) the
ability to generate sustainable positive free cash flows, even in
a scenario of relatively high leverage and interest cost, and,
related to this, a long track record of management operating in a
LBO environment.

The rating action was prompted by the announcement of a
refinancing amendment process by the Group. The Group proposes to
raise a new EUR360 million TLC maturing in 2019, which will run
alongside the existing Senior Secured TLB. The proceeds of the new
loan together with some existing cash on balance sheet will be
applied to pre-pay EUR287 million of EUR462 million of the
Mezzanine Facility (to leave a EUR175 million Second Lien Facility
in place), EUR50 million of TLB Australian Dollar drawings and
EUR31 million of Capex/Acquisition Facility drawings. The
refinancing is designed to save around EUR35 million in interest
expenses per annum. It is intended that the new TLC will be drawn
on 1 September 2014, once Mezzanine Facility non-call provisions
have expired. No dividends will be paid to the shareholders as a
result of the transaction. Moody's estimates that these actions
will result in adjusted leverage of 7.7x based on audited
financial statements for the year ending December 2014. As part of
the refinancing process, the Group is also amending certain terms
in its loan document, including the removal of its Interest Cover,
Cash Flow and Maximum Capex covenants, financial covenant test
levels and certain changes to, inter alia, Permitted Payments and
Permitted Indebtedness.

The Group has a good liquidity position given the presence of a
EUR50 million RCF and a EUR94 million Capex/Acquisition Facility
(both undrawn), which Moody's considers to be adequate to manage
the Group's operational cash requirements. BSN has demonstrated an
ability to generate free cash flow in each of the past three
financial years. At 31 December 2014 the Group's cash balances
were around EUR93 million, having funded the acquisitions of
Sorbion and the majority stake in a manufacturing plant in India
primarily through drawings under the Capex/Acquisition Facility.
Moody's expects the Group to maintain adequate headroom under its
financial covenant at all times and there are no short term debt
maturities. Given high leverage and permitted payment
restrictions, Moody's do not consider that the Group will likely
be able to pay dividends in the ordinary course of business within
the next 12 to 18 months.

The B1 instrument rating on the TLB, TLC and the pari-passu RCF
and Capex/Acquisition Facility is one notch above the CFR and
reflects the shift towards a lower share of contractually
subordinated debt and higher share of Senior Secured debt that
results from the refinancing. The previous Ba3 instrument rating
was weakly positioned within its rating category.

Moody's adjusted leverage of 7.7x is considered to leave limited
flexibility within the current rating category. However, the
stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the dual impact
of the Sorbion acquisition, which became effective on 1 January
2015, and significant strategic investments made in the business
during 2014 will deliver growth and margin uplift in 2015. The
outlook therefore also incorporates Moody's assumption that the
Group will reduce its leverage modestly through EBITDA growth and,
to a lesser extent while its investment programme continues, free
cash generation. While Moody's anticipates that the Group will
continue to make debt funded bolt-on acquisitions, it also assumes
that management will not embark on any transforming acquisitions
or adopt an aggressive financial policy with regard to shareholder
distributions.

Given Moody's adjusted leverage of 7.7x upward rating pressure is
currently unlikely, however could be exerted if there were a
reduction in leverage materially below 6.0x on a sustainable
basis, with FCF/Debt at around 5% or better.

Conversely, downward ratings pressure could develop if there were
increasing margin pressure and with Moody's adjusted leverage not
reducing to below 7.0x as planned, which would likely result from
aggressive debt funded acquisition activity. In addition, the
instrument rating for Senior Secured Facilities could be
downgraded if the remaining contractually subordinated Second Lien
Facilities were to be prepaid to below the EUR175 million proposed
under the refinancing either ahead of, or through further
increases to the Senior Secured Facilities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Medical
Product and Device Industry published in October 2012. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

BSN develops, manufactures and markets wound care, compression
therapy and orthopaedics products. The Group is headquartered in
Hamburg/Germany, employs around 5,675 people and was founded in
2001 as a 50/50 joint venture between Beiersdorf AG and Smith &
Nephew plc. The Group's key markets are in Europe and North
America, however it has an increasingly global footprint, with
production facilities in 13 countries currently and operations in
over 30 countries.

Moody's has also corrected the issuer on the Revolving Credit
Facility and the Capex/Acquisition Facility, both due February 9,
2019, and the Senior Secured Term Loan B due August 9, 2019, from
BSN Medical Luxembourg Group Holding S.a.r.l. to BSN Medical
Luxembourg Finance Holdings S.a.r.l.. The Revolving and
Capex/Acquisition facilities were assigned provisional ratings on
July 4, 2012 and definitive ratings on September 25, 2012.
Facilities B1, B2 and B3 were assigned definitive ratings on
November 8, 2013. Due to an internal administrative error, all of
these ratings were assigned under Boston Luxembourg II S.a.r.l.
(now known as BSN Medical Luxembourg Group Holding S.a.r.l.).



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N E T H E R L A N D S
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ING GROUP: Fitch Upgrades Rating on Tier 1 Securities to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three Dutch banks' Support Ratings
(SRs) to '5' from '1' and revised their Support Rating Floors
(SRFs) to 'No Floor' from 'A+'.  The affected banks are ABN AMRO
Bank NV (ABN AMRO), ING Bank NV (ING Bank), and Rabobank Group
(Rabobank).

At the same time, the agency has downgraded SNS Bank NV's (SNS
Bank) SR to '5' from '2' and revised its SRF to 'No Floor' from
'BBB+'.

The rating actions are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for US, Swiss and
European Union commercial banks.  As a result, Fitch believes
that, in line with our SR definition of '5', extraordinary
external support while possible can no longer be relied upon for
Dutch Banks.

As a result of the revision to the SRFs, the Long-term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) of all banks subject to this review are now
driven by their standalone creditworthiness as expressed by their
respective Viability Ratings (VRs).

ING Bank's Long-term IDR and senior debt ratings have been
downgraded to 'A' from 'A+'.  The Long-term IDR of its parent, ING
Group NV, has been affirmed at 'A' and is now aligned with its
main operating company.  The Outlooks on both Long-term IDRs are
now Stable.  ING Bank's VR has been affirmed at 'a' and Fitch has
published a VR for ING Group NV, also at 'a'.

ABN AMRO's Long-term IDR and senior debt ratings have been
downgraded to 'A' from 'A+'.  The Outlook is Stable.  Its VR has
been affirmed at 'a'.

SNS Bank's Long-term IDR has been downgraded to 'BBB' from BBB+'.
The Outlook is Stable.  SNS Bank's VR has been affirmed at 'bbb'.

Rabobank's other ratings are unaffected by today's rating action.

The ratings actions are also part of a periodic portfolio review
of the Benelux banking groups rated by Fitch.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - ING BANK'S AND ING GROUP'S IDRS, VRS AND
SENIOR DEBT

ING Bank's VR reflects the bank's strong franchise and diverse
business model (mostly in the Benelux), which supports resilient
earnings generation, and its balanced funding profile.  The VR
also factors in the bank's moderate impaired loans and modest
coverage ratios, which result in a higher proportion of unreserved
impaired loans relative to its equity base than similarly rated
peers.

A strong and diverse company profile underpins ING Bank's
resilient operating performance.  While slow growth in the
eurozone as well as general low interest rates are likely to weigh
on performance, reducing loan impairment charges (LICs) and cost
focus will mitigate the pressure.  ING Bank's funding profile is
also supported by its strong franchises in some deposit-rich
jurisdictions, such as Belgium and Germany.  To supplement its
funding, ING Bank also regularly taps the wholesale market, to
which it has ready access.

ING Bank's impaired loans ratio is in line with similarly rated
European peers', and Fitch expects impaired loans to have peaked
in 2014.  Provisions for impaired loans remain low relative to
peers, leaving equity potentially sensitive to collateral values,
although the bank has a track record of LICs exceeding write-offs.
Capitalization is solid and compares adequately with similarly
rated eurozone peers, although lags some more highly rated
northern European banks.

ING Group's VR, and consequently Long-term IDR, are aligned with
those of its core subsidiary ING Bank.  Greater clarity on the
group structure after its insurance divestments, and elimination
of double leverage, particularly drive the ratings.  The notching
on ING Group's implied standalone strength, previously one notch
below that of ING Bank, has been removed.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - ING BANK'S AND ING GROUP'S IDRS, VRS AND
SENIOR DEBT

Downward pressure on ING Bank's VR, while not expected, would most
likely result from a significantly increased risk appetite in
higher-risk markets or sectors, or less prudent liquidity or
capital management.  Capital is also vulnerable to collateral
valuations given the fairly modest reserve coverage of impaired
loans compared with peers.

Given the current high rating, upside potential is limited, and
any upgrade would likely be contingent on the improvements in
profitability being sustained driving solid internal capital
generation, while maintaining a conservative risk appetite and
strong asset quality.

Given that ING Group's VR is aligned with that of ING Bank, it is
sensitive to broadly the same factors as ING Bank's VR.  While not
Fitch's expectation, ING Group's ratings are also sensitive to a
build-up of double leverage at the holding company.  Should ING
Group commence significant senior unsecured issuance in the form
of total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) debt, the gradual build-up
of an additional buffer for the operating bank's senior creditors
could affect the relative positions of creditors of the holding
company and of the operating bank.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - ABN AMRO'S IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

ABN AMRO's VR reflects the bank's strong Dutch franchise,
complemented by its growing international private banking and
energy, commodities and transportation franchises, providing it
with resilient revenue generation.  The VR also takes into account
the bank's continued focus on maintaining a moderate risk profile,
and expected gradual improvements of asset quality.  Reliance on
wholesale funding markets is also factored into the ratings.

ABN AMRO's profitability is in line with that of similarly rated
European peers, although it has been affected by elevated LICs
since 2010.  Fitch expects profitability to improve somewhat in
2015 as continued cost focus and LICs fall as the economy
recovers, mitigating pressures from low interest rates.  The
resilient revenue generation, combined with limited loan growth
and a low dividend payout ratio since 2010, have supported
internal capital generation.  Capitalization compares well with
similarly rated peers, and ABN AMRO also has a significant buffer
of junior debt.

The quality of ABN AMRO's loan book remains resilient, and
performing residential mortgage loans make up the majority of the
portfolio.  Commercial real estate lending has been more severely
affected by the Dutch recession, as evidenced in a materially
higher impaired loans percentage, although this remains manageable
for the bank.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - ABN AMRO'S IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

Downward pressure on ABN AMRO's VR, while not expected, would most
likely result from a material deterioration in the bank's earnings
generation or asset quality, affecting its capital or access
to/cost of wholesale funding.  Given the current high rating,
particularly considering the limited geographical diversification,
upside potential is limited.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SNS BANK'S IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

SNS Bank's VR reflects the bank's company profile, including its
geographical and product concentration and limited franchise -
particularly compared with its larger domestic peers.  Its focus
on Dutch retail mortgage lending, and limited risk appetite
outside this area, will support asset quality.  The separation
from its insurance sister companies should not have a material
impact on the bank's franchise or ratings.

Asset quality is satisfactory, although impaired loans represent a
fairly material proportion of gross loans, particularly for a
predominantly Dutch mortgage lender.  Fitch expects improving
asset quality ratios over time, reducing the bank's capital
sensitivity to collateral values (unreserved impaired loans
represented a significant 40% of equity at end-2014).
Nonetheless, SNS Bank's risk-weighted capital ratios are strong
and leverage is fairly moderate.

SNS Bank is predominately deposit-funded, although the bank still
depends on access to debt markets to fund part of its loan book.
As such, maintaining its focus on liquidity to mitigate
refinancing risks is important.  Fitch believes SNS Bank's smaller
franchise means more competitive pricing in deposits is more
crucial than its larger peers should the bank need to raise
additional funding; however, Fitch expects SNS Bank to maintain
reasonable access to deposits, in case of need.

Earning generation capacity is satisfactory, but reliant on a
single market and dependent on net interest income given its
business model.  Fitch expects operating profitability to be sound
in 2015, but for LICs to continue to dent performance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - SNS BANK'S IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

SNS Bank's ratings incorporate Fitch's expectation of improving
asset quality, maintained strong capitalization, and sound
liquidity stemming from gradually improved leverage from retained
earnings.  As such, there is limited upside potential for SNS
Bank's VR within the constraints of its company profile.

SNS Bank's VR would be sensitive to increased risk appetite,
particularly if that would worsen asset quality and capitalization
in the longer term.  Given that the bank still depends on
wholesale markets to fund part of its loan book, reduced liquidity
buffers or significant shortening of maturities would also be
rating-negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT
RATING FLOOR

The SRs and SRFs reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors can no
longer rely on receiving full extraordinary support from the
sovereign in the event that any of the above mentioned banks
become non-viable.  In Fitch's view, the EU's Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism
(SRM) for eurozone banks are now sufficiently progressed to
provide a framework for resolving banks that is likely to require
senior creditors participating in losses, if necessary, instead of
or ahead of a bank receiving sovereign support.

In the EU, BRRD has been effective in member states since 1
January 2015, including minimum loss absorption requirements
before resolution financing or alternative financing (eg,
government stabilization funds) can be used.  Full application of
BRRD, including the bail-in tool, is required from Jan. 1, 2016.

Any upgrade to the SRs or upward revision to the SRFs would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks.  While not impossible, this is highly unlikely
in Fitch's view.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - ING BANK'S SUBORDINATED
DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The subordinated Tier 2 debt securities issued by ING Bank are
notched down from the bank's VR, in accordance with Fitch's
criteria.  The subordinated debt securities are rated one notch
below the bank's VR to reflect above-average loss severity of this
type of debt.

The implied upgrade of ING Group's VR has led to upgrades of ING
Group's junior debt and hybrid instruments.  The rating of the
preference shares issued by ING Group is rated four notches below
the group's VR.  The notching reflects higher loss severity risk
of these securities compared with average recoveries (two notches)
as well as high risk of non-performance (an additional two
notches).

The rating of the additional Tier 1 instruments issued by ING
Group is rated five notches below the group's VR.  The notching
reflects higher loss severity risk of these securities compared
with average recoveries (two notches) as well as high risk of non-
performance (an additional three notches).

All the above-mentioned debt ratings are hence broadly sensitive
to the same factors as those that would affect their respective
issuers' VR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - ABN AMRO'S SUBORDINATED
DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Upper Tier 2 debt and Tier 1 securities are rated three and four
notches below ABN AMRO's VR, respectively, to reflect higher loss
severity risk of these securities relative to average recoveries
(one and two notches from the VR, respectively) as well as high
risk of non-performance (an additional two notches for each debt
security).  The ratings are broadly sensitive to the same factors
as those that would affect the bank's VR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - ING BANK'S SUBSIDIARIES AND
AFFILIATED COMPANIES

Fitch considers ING Belgium as a core subsidiary of ING Bank.
This opinion is based on Belgium being a home market to ING Bank,
a high level of management and operational integration, ING Bank's
full ownership and the considerable reputation risk for the parent
in the event of a default of ING Belgium.  As a result ING
Belgium's Long-term IDR is equalized with ING Bank's.

Fitch considers ING Bank Slaski as a strategically important
subsidiary of ING Bank, although not core.  Poland is considered a
growth market by ING, although its limited franchise in the rest
of central and eastern Europe (CEE) has resulted in ING Bank
Slaski's Long-term IDR being one notch below ING Bank's.  ING Bank
Slaski's Long-term IDR is sensitive to changes in ING Bank's
propensity and/or ability to support its Polish subsidiary.  While
not expected, any potential support-driven downgrade of ING Bank
Slaski's Long-term IDR would be limited to one notch, at which
point the Long-term IDR would be driven by the bank's 'bbb+' VR.

The ratings of the debt securities issued by Lion Connecticut
Holdings Inc. (a US-based insurance holding company that is part
of ING U.S. Inc., unrated) are aligned with ING Group's senior
debt rating and reflect Fitch's belief that ING Group will meet
its financial obligations arising from the guarantee it has
extended to these securities.  As the securities' ratings are
aligned with ING Group's senior debt rating, changes to this
rating would be reflected in the securities' ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - ABN AMRO'S SUBSIDIARY AND
AFFILIATED COMPANY

ABN AMRO Funding LLC is a US-based funding vehicle fully-owned by
ABN AMRO.  The rating of the US commercial paper (CP) debt
securities issued by the vehicle is aligned with ABN AMRO's Short-
term IDR, based on Fitch's view that there is an extremely high
probability of support from ABN AMRO if required.  This view is
underpinned by ABN AMRO's guarantees on the securities issued by
ABN AMRO Funding LLC.

The rating of the US CP debt is therefore sensitive to changes in
ABN AMRO's Short-term IDR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SNS BANK'S SUBSIDIARY AND
AFFILIATED COMPANY

SNS Reaal's Long-term IDR is aligned with that of its main
operating company SNS Bank.  The agreed sale of SNS Reaal's
insurance operations (subject to conditions), which is expected to
complete in 2H15, will be followed by a transfer of SNS Bank to
the Dutch state.  The latter is expected to remove double leverage
from the holding company, which is currently moderate.  Should the
sale not complete as expected and/or double leverage increase
further above 120%, the Long-term IDR of SNS Reaal may be notched
down from that of SNS Bank.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - RABOBANK'S AFFILIATED
COMPANY

Fitch has downgraded Rabobank's central body, Cooperatieve
Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA's (Rabobank Nederland) SR to
'5' from '1' and revised its SRF to 'No Floor' from 'A+' and
subsequently withdrawn these ratings.

Before the rating action, Fitch had taken the view that its
expected sovereign support for Rabobank in case of need would have
been channelled through its central institution, Rabobank
Nederland, whose SR and SRF were the same as those of Rabobank.
Now that Fitch no longer considers that sovereign support can be
relied upon by the group, it is no longer meaningful to Fitch's
coverage to maintain a SR and a SRF to Rabobank Nederland, hence
the ratings have been withdrawn.  Rabobank Nederland's IDRs are
based on the mutual support mechanism within the group.

The rating actions are:

ING Group
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: published at 'a'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Senior unsecured debt rating affirmed at 'A'/'F1'
Subordinated perpetual preference shares (US456837AC74): upgraded
to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'
Additional Tier 1 securities (US456837AE31, US456837AF06):
upgraded to 'BB+' from 'BB'

ING Bank
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A' from 'A+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'A-'
Senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'A'/'F1' from 'A+'/'F1+'
Short-term senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Commercial paper downgraded to 'A'/'F1' from 'A+'/'F1+'
Market linked notes (XS1144264667, XS1170271479, XS1202919806):
downgraded to 'A(emr)' from 'A+(emr)'
Thai Baht senior unsecured bonds due 2016: 'AAA(tha)' unaffected

ING Bank Slaski
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Viability Rating: 'bbb+' unaffected
ING Belgium
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A' from 'A+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Lion Connecticut Holdings Inc.
Senior unsecured debt securities guaranteed by ING group
(US008117AG88, US008117AH61 and US008117AJ28): affirmed at 'A'

ABN AMRO
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A' from 'A+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Commercial paper: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Long-term senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'A' from 'A+'
Short-term senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'A-'
Non-innovative Tier 1 subordinated debt (XS0246487457): affirmed
at 'BBB-'
Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt (XS0244754254): affirmed at 'BBB'

ABN AMRO Funding USA LLC
Short-term senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'F1' from 'F1+'
SNS Bank
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR downgraded to 'F3' from 'F2'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '2'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BBB+'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb'
Senior debt: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'
Commercial paper: downgraded to 'F3' from 'F2'

SNS REAAL
Long-term IDR: Downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F3' from 'F2'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '2'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BBB+'
Rabobank
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A+'
Rabobank Nederland
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'; withdrawn
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A+'; withdrawn


KBC BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Sub. Debt Securities
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed KBC Bank's and KBC Groep NV's (KBC
Groep) Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and senior debt
ratings at 'A-' with Stable Outlook.

At the same time, the agency has downgraded Belfius Bank SA/NV's
(Belfius) Long-term IDR and senior debt ratings to 'BBB+' from 'A-
' and its Short-term IDR and senior debt ratings to 'F2' from
'F1'.  The Outlook on Belfius is Positive.

Fitch has also affirmed KBC Bank's Viability Rating (VR) at 'a-'
and has published a VR for KBC Groep at 'a-'.  Belfius' VR has
been affirmed at 'bbb+'.

KBC Verzekeringen's and KBC Group Re's Insurer Financial Strength
(IFS) ratings have also been affirmed at 'A-' with Stable
Outlooks.

The rating actions are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for US, Swiss and
European Union commercial banks.

As a result, Fitch believes that, in line with our Support Rating
(SR) definition of '5', extraordinary external support while
possible can no longer be relied upon for KBC Bank, KBC Groep and
Belfius.  Fitch has, therefore, downgraded their SRs to '5' from
'1' and revised their Support Rating Floors (SRFs) to 'No Floor'
from 'A-'.

As a result of the revision to the SRFs, the Long-term IDR of
Belfius is now driven by its standalone creditworthiness, as
expressed in the VR.  KBC Bank's and KBC Groep's IDRs remain
driven by their respective VRs.

The ratings actions are also part of a periodic portfolio review
of seven Benelux banking groups rated by Fitch.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs, VRs AND SENIOR DEBT - KBC BANK AND KBC
GROEP

Asset quality remains KBC Bank's main rating weakness.  The
ratings are, however, underpinned by the bank's strong retail and
corporate franchise in its two key markets, Belgium and the Czech
Republic, its fairly conservative risk appetite, improving
earnings generation, sound capital ratios and robust liquidity.

The asset quality trend reported in the last year to end-March
2015 was positive, with a slight decline in the level of impaired
loans, but KBC Bank's impaired loans-to-gross loans ratio remains
high and compares poorly with similarly rated peers.  Around half
of impaired loans relate to the bank's Irish loan book, for which
loan impairment charges (LICs) are expected to fall.
Nevertheless, the bank's fairly high level of unreserved impaired
loans represents a vulnerability for KBC Bank's credit risk
profile.

KBC Bank's risk appetite is supported by the dominance of the
stable and fairly low-risk Belgian operations, while exposure to
some central and eastern European countries gives rise to
potential earnings and risk volatility.  Earnings generation has
improved to levels comparable with similarly rated peers.
However, the bank could benefit from a longer track record of
resilient and stable profitability.

The VR and IDRs of KBC Groep are equalized with those of KBC Bank,
reflecting the dominance of the bank in the group (around 90% of
KBC Groep's assets), our expectation that double leverage will
reduce and the use of the holding company for capital raising-
purposes, including recent Tier 2 and additional Tier 1
transactions.  Liquidity is managed at bank level.

KEY RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs, VRs AND SENIOR DEBT - KBC BANK
AND KBC GROEP

Fitch does not expect to upgrade KBC Bank's ratings in the near
term in light of the bank's asset quality weaknesses.  In the
medium-term, a significant reduction in impaired assets would be
beneficial to the ratings.  An unexpected rise in loan impairment
charges, weaker capitalization or a deterioration of recurring
profitability could result in a downgrade.

The Short-term ratings are sensitive to the bank maintaining
strong liquidity.  The ratings of KBC Groep are likely to move in
tandem with those of KBC Bank.  If and when state hybrid
instruments are repaid, double leverage beyond 120% could result
in a downgrade of KBC Groep's ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs, VR AND SENIOR DEBT - BELFIUS

Belfius's ratings reflect the improvement in the bank's capital
ratios and liquidity to satisfactory levels, a sound franchise in
retail and public sector banking, providing it with a healthy loan
book, and lower profitability than domestic peers.  The latter is
partly explained by its low-risk low-return business model.

Legacy issues have been reduced in recent years, in particular its
exposure to Belfius's former parent Dexia.  However, some
concentration risk and a large derivative book remain.  Fitch
expects Belfius's risk appetite to benefit from continued de-
risking of legacy exposures as well as improved risk policies and
underwriting standards on new lending.  These expectations
underpin the Positive Outlook on the bank's Long-term IDR.

Fitch expects Belfius's underlying profitability to improve but
losses from further de-risking could continue to represent a drag
on overall profitability.  The bank has consolidated its retail
banking franchise, which combined with its insurance product
offering should support profit generation.  In corporate banking
Belfius remains a challenger.

Improved earnings are also strengthening internal capital
generation, especially since Belfius has not paid a dividend since
it came under state ownership.  While Fitch assumes the bank will
resume dividend payments in the medium-term, capitalization should
improve further through retained earnings and further
deleveraging.

KEY RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs, VR AND SENIOR DEBT - BELFIUS

An upgrade of Belfius' ratings is contingent on continued
successful de-risking of legacy exposures, accompanied by solid
balance sheet metrics and conservative underwriting standards.
The ratings and Outlook are sensitive to a setback in the de-
risking process.  In addition, a deterioration of capitalization
or profitability, or a material disruption to the bank's access to
market funding, would all be negative for the ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT
RATING FLOOR

The SRs and SRFs reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors can no
longer rely on receiving full extraordinary support from the
Belgian sovereign in the event that KBC Bank or Belfius becomes
non-viable.

In Fitch's view, the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) are now
sufficiently progressed to provide a framework for resolving banks
that is likely to require senior creditors participating in
losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving
sovereign support.  In the EU, BRRD has been effective in member
states since Jan. 1, 2015, including minimum loss absorption
requirements before resolution financing or alternative financing
(eg, government stabilization funds) can be used.  Full
application of BRRD, including the bail-in tool, is required from
Jan. 1, 2016.

Any upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the Belgian sovereign's
propensity to support its banks.  While not impossible, this is
highly unlikely in Fitch's view.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER
HYBRID SECURITIES

Belfius's lower Tier 2 securities (XS0286515621, issued by Belfius
Financing Company and guaranteed by Belfius) are notched down once
from the bank's VR, in line with Fitch's rating criteria for such
securities, to reflect the above-average loss severity of this
type of debt.  Their ratings are sensitive to any changes in
Belfius's VR.

Subordinated debt and hybrid securities issued by KBC Bank are
notched down from KBC Bank's VR.  Therefore, their respective
ratings are sensitive to any changes in KBC Bank's VR.

Hybrid securities issued by KBC Bank are rated four notches lower
than KBC Bank's VR (two notches for non-performance and two
notches for relative loss severity).  Subordinated debt issued by
KBC IFIMA N.V is rated one notch lower than KBC Bank's VR (for
relative loss severity).  The ratings of the perpetual hybrid
instrument and the subordinated debt are primarily sensitive to
any changes in KBC Bank's VR.

Subordinated debt issued by KBC Groep is rated one notch lower
than KBC Groep's VR to reflect relative loss severity.  The CRD
IV-compliant undated deeply subordinated additional Tier 1 debt
securities issued by KBC Groep are rated five notches below KBC
Groep's VR.  The notching reflects the notes' higher expected loss
severity relative to senior unsecured creditors (two notches) and
higher non-performance risk (three notches).

The rating of the subordinated and additional Tier 1 debt
securities is broadly sensitive to the same factors as those that
would affect KBC Groep's VR.  In addition, the notes' rating is
sensitive to a build-up of additional double leverage at KBC
Groep.  The additional Tier 1 debt notes' rating is also sensitive
to changes to Fitch's assessment of the probability of the notes'
non-performance risk relative to the risk captured in KBC Groep's
VR.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - BELFIUS BANK SUSBIDIARY

Belfius Financing Company is a wholly-owned financing subsidiary
of Belfius and all its issues are guaranteed by its parent.  The
debt ratings are aligned with Belfius's ratings and are sensitive
to the same factors that might drive a change in the bank's senior
and subordinated debt ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - KBC VERZEKERINGEN

The main rating driver for KBC Verzekeringen is its core strategic
importance within KBC Group.  In addition, the ratings are
supported by the company's solid regulatory solvency ratio, which
reached 334% at end-March 2015, by its strong business position,
especially in Belgium, and by its sound profitability.  The
equalisation of KBC Verzekeringen's IFS rating and IDR reflects
continuing government support for the group by means of hybrid
capital.  The group's 'A-' IDR therefore acts as a cap on KBC
Insurance's IFS rating.

Any changes to KBC Group's ratings could affect KBC
Verzekeringen's ratings.  In addition, if KBC Verzekeringen
becomes less strategically important to KBC Group, prompted by a
significant and sustainable deterioration in its profitability, a
negative new business margin, or a regulatory solvency ratio of
below 150%, this would likely result in a downgrade.  Conversely,
the IFS rating could be upgraded by one notch if the group repays
the Flemish Region hybrid capital while maintaining KBC
Verzekeringen's strong financial profile.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - KBC SUBSIDIARIES AND
AFFILIATED COMPANIES

KBC IFIMA N.V, KBC Financial Products International, Ltd, KBC
North America Finance Corp and KBC Bank Ireland plc are wholly
owned subsidiaries of KBC Bank.  Their debt ratings are aligned
with those of KBC Bank, based on an extremely high probability of
support if required and are sensitive to the same factors that
might drive a change in KBC Bank's IDRs.

Fitch has also affirmed KBC Group Re's IFS rating, the group's
wholly owned core captive reinsurance subsidiary based in
Luxembourg, at 'A-'.  The affirmation reflects KBC Group Re's core
strategic status to KBC Verzekeringen.  Fitch also views
positively its solid standalone financial profile, its cautious
management and the termination of the remaining CDOs.  Any changes
to its parent's rating are likely to have a corresponding impact
on KBC Group Re's ratings.

The rating actions are:

Belfius Bank:

   -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'; Outlook
      Positive
   -- Short-term IDR downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
   -- Viability Rating affirmed at 'bbb+'
   -- Senior debt downgraded to 'BBB+/F2' from 'A-'/'F1'
   -- Support Rating downgraded to '5' from '1'
   -- Support Rating Floor revised to 'No Floor' from 'A-'

Belfius Financing Company:

   -- Senior debt downgraded to 'BBB+ from 'A-'
   -- Commercial paper downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
   -- Subordinated (lower Tier 2) debt XS0286515621affirmed at
      'BBB'

KBC Bank

   -- Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Stable
   -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'
   -- Viability Rating affirmed at 'a-'
   -- Support Rating downgraded to '5' from '1'
   -- Support Rating Floor revised to 'No Floor' from 'A-'
   -- Senior debt affirmed at 'A-/F1'
   -- Commercial paper affirmed at 'F1'
   -- Perpetual subordinated debt securities affirmed at 'BB+'

KBC IFIMA N.V.

   -- Senior debt affirmed at 'A-'
   -- Short term debt affirmed at 'F1'
   -- Subordinated debt affirmed at 'BBB+'
   -- Market linked securities affirmed at 'A-emr'

KBC Financial Products International, Ltd.

   -- Senior debt affirmed at 'A-'
   -- Commercial paper affirmed at 'F1'

KBC North America Finance Corp.

   -- Commercial paper affirmed at 'F1'

KBC Bank Ireland plc

   -- Commercial paper affirmed at 'F1'

KBC Groep

   -- Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Stable
   -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'
   -- Viability Rating published at 'a-'
   -- Support Rating downgraded to '5' from '1'
   -- Support Rating Floor revised to 'No Floor' from 'A-'
   -- Senior debt affirmed at 'A-'/'F1'
   -- Subordinated debt affirmed at 'BBB+'
   -- Undated deeply subordinated securities (BE0002463389)
      affirmed at 'BB'

KBC Verzekeringen N.V.

   -- IFS rating affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Stable
   -- Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Stable

KBC Group Re

   -- IFS rating affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Stable



===========
R U S S I A
===========


CB TRANSPORTNY: Bank of Russia Revokes Banking License
------------------------------------------------------
By its Order No. OD-1105, dated May 20, 2015, the Bank of Russia
revoked the banking license from the Moscow-based credit
institution Commercial Bank Transportny, limited liability
company, of CB Transportny LLC (Registration No. 3174) from
May 20, 2015.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's failure
to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, capital adequacy below 2%, decrease in equity capital
below the minimal amount of the authorized capital established as
of the date of the state registration of the credit institution,
and application of supervisory measures envisaged by the Federal
Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of
Russia)".

CB Transportny LLC implemented high-risk lending policy connected
with placement of funds into low-quality assets.  As a result of
creating provisions adequate to the risks assumed, the credit
institution lost its equity capital.

Besides, during 2014 the credit institution was involved in large
scale dubious operations.

The management and owners of the credit institution did not take
measures to normalize its activities. Due to the poor quality of
assets of the credit institution, it was impossible to perform
financial rehabilitation of CB Transportny with the participation
of the state corporation Deposit Insurance Agency on reasonable
economic terms. In these circumstances, pursuant to Article 20 of
the Federal Law 'On Banks and Banking Activities', the Bank of
Russia revoked the banking license from the credit institution.

By its Order No. OD-1106, dated 20 May 2015, the Bank of Russia
has appointed a provisional administration to CB Transportny LLC
for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under
Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".
In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit
institution's executive bodies are suspended.

CB Transportny is a member of the deposit insurance system. The
revocation of banking license is an insured event envisaged by
Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On Insurance of Household Deposits with
Russian Banks' regarding the bank's obligations on deposits of
households determined in accordance with the legislation.

According to the financial statements, as of May 1, 2015, CB
Transportny ranked 103rd by assets in the Russian banking system.


INTERCAPITAL-BANK: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Due to the ruling of the Arbitration court of the Republic of
Mordovia, dated May 6, 2015, on recognizing insolvent (bankrupt)
the credit institution Commercial Bank Intercapital-Bank, limited
liability company (Bank of Russia Registration No. 2706, date of
registration - February 21, 1994), and appointing a receiver in
compliance with Clause 3 of Article 18927 of the Federal Law "On
the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", the Bank of Russia took a decision
(Order No. OD-1102, dated May 20, 2015) to terminate from May 20,
2015, the activity of the provisional administration Intercapital-
Bank, appointed by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-63, dated January
20, 2015, "On the Appointment of the Provisional Administration to
Manage the Saransk-Based Credit Institution Commercial Bank
Intercapital-Bank, Limited Liability Company, or CB Intercapital-
Bank LLC (the Republic of Mordovia) Due to the Revocation of Its
Banking Licence".


MECHEL OAO: Sberbank Mulls Sale of Loans to Debt Investors
----------------------------------------------------------
Anna Baraulina and Yuliya Fedorinova at Bloomberg News report that
OAO Sberbank, Russia's largest lender, is discussing a sale of
loans take by OAO Mechel to distressed-debt investors as the
companies fail to agree on a restructuring plan.

Maxim Poletaev, first deputy chief executive officer of Sberbank,
said the state-controlled lender has some proposals from Russian
investors for Mechel's debt, Bloomberg relates.

Mechel, controlled by former billionaire Igor Zyuzin, has proposed
several debt restructuring schemes since the start of 2014,
including selling convertible bonds to state-backed lenders and
swapping debt for shares, Bloomberg relates.  It faces court cases
filed by some lenders and has had some assets seized, Bloomberg
discloses.

Mechel said Sberbank held US$1.36 billion, or about 17% of the
company total debt at the end of 2014, Bloomberg notes.

Mechel is close to signing a restructuring with OAO Gazprombank,
Mechel CEO Oleg Korzhov said in April, Bloomberg relays.
Mr. Korzhov, as cited by Bloomberg, said Mechel agreed in
principle to debt restructuring with OAO VTB Bank, Russia's second
biggest lender, while it hasn't struck an accord with the largest,
Sberbank.

Mr. Poletaev said the investors have proposed buying Mechel debt
at a discount, which Sberbank isn't interested, Bloomberg relates.
He didn't name any potential buyers, Bloomberg notes.

Mr. Poletaev said Sberbank hasn't set a goal of selling the debt
or bankrupting Mechel, Bloomberg relays.

According to Bloomberg, the bank is seeking control over key units
as the mining company needs restructuring.

Mechel OAO is a Russian metals and mining group.

                      Going Concern Doubt

Mechel OAO filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
its annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended Dec. 31, 2014.

Ernst & Young LLC expressed substantial doubt about the Company's
ability to continue as a going concern, citing that the Group has
significant debt that it does not have the ability to repay
without its refinancing or restructuring, has not complied with
certain covenants of its major loan agreements with banks and is
dependent upon reaching agreements with its banks to refinance or
restructure its debt obligations.

The Company reported a net loss of $4.36 billion on $6.4 billion
of net revenue in 2014, compared with a net loss of $2.92 billion
on $8.5 billion of net revenue in 2013.

The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2014, showed $6.71 billion
in total assets, $9.36 billion in total liabilities and total
stockholders' deficit of $2.64 billion.


PIONEER GROUP: S&P Raises CCR to 'B-' on Improved Liquidity
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had raised its
long-term corporate credit rating on Russia-based residential real
estate developer Pioneer Group CJSC to 'B-' from 'CCC'.  The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P raised its Russia national scale rating on
the company to 'ruBBB' from 'ruB+'.

S&P also raised its issue ratings on Pioneer's senior unsecured
notes to 'B-' from 'CCC'.  The recovery rating remains at '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average recovery (30%-50%; higher
half of the range) in the event of a payment default.

S&P removed all the ratings from CreditWatch developing, where it
placed them on Jan. 20, 2015.

Pioneer Group has repaid Russian ruble (RUB) 800 million under a
put option on its RUB2 billion (about US$40 million) bond and
subsequently re-issued the same amount.  It has also obtained a
five-year RUB12.4 billion line from Sberbank to finance its
Botanical Garden development project.  As a result, Pioneer has no
material short-term debt, while its undrawn committed lines have
significantly increased.

This improvement indicates that Pioneer is currently less reliant
on presales and market conditions to complete its development
projects.  S&P is are therefore revising its assessment of
Pioneer's liquidity to "less than adequate" from "weak," as
defined in S&P's criteria.  Most of the company's liquidity uses
represent temporary working capital swings, which will materialize
only if demand for comfort-class residential property declines
materially.  Pioneer reported a double-digit increase in presales
of new flats in the first quarter of 2015, signaling sound demand
for high-quality residences in Moscow, despite declining
disposable incomes due to higher inflation.

Pioneer's "vulnerable" business risk profile is, in S&P's opinion,
constrained by the inherent volatility and long operating cycle of
the property development industry and by Russia's high country
risk, due to the lack of administrative transparency and
predictability.  S&P believes that the company has a relatively
modest track record, having completed only about 500,000 square
meters of residential real estate.  This is significantly lower
than Pioneer's peers', such as JSC PIK Group and CJSC SSMO
LenSpetsSMU. In addition, Pioneer is geographically concentrated
in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

S&P considers the company's current expansion plans to be
aggressive and perceive some execution risks associated with this
rapid expansion.  This is particularly given plans to increase
sales and earnings at double-digit rates in the coming years.

S&P views Pioneer's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged"
because S&P expects the company's interest coverage to be lower
than 2x in 2015-2016, as a result of higher interest rates and
debt-funded land acquisitions.  Pioneer has little flexibility in
using external funding because of the extent of its secured bank
financing and a lack of general purpose facilities.  Moreover, S&P
believes the company's capacity to repay debt is constrained by
very high volatility in its cash flow generation.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Pioneer faces no
short-term refinancing risk and should generate sufficient cash
flows from presales over the next 12 months to fund its
construction program.  S&P's view reflects sound demand for
comfort-class apartments in Pioneer's core markets of Moscow and
St. Petersburg.  The outlook also reflects S&P's opinion that
Pioneer should be able to maintain a ratio of debt to EBITDA of
less than 4x and EBITDA to interest of more than 1.5x, despite a
pronounced increase in the effective interest rate.

Upside potential is currently remote.  S&P could take a positive
rating action if Pioneer continued to lengthen its debt maturity
profile, kept its interest coverage close to 3x, and achieved a
material increase in the scale of its operations.

S&P could take a negative rating action if it saw evidence of
deteriorating liquidity, which could arise due to the company's
inability to secure sufficient funds in 2015 to repay maturing
debt, including the RUB2 billion bond due in October 2016.

S&P could also take a negative rating action if debt to EBITDA
increased to more than 4x and EBITDA interest coverage declined to
about 1x, for example, as result of a more aggressive financial
policy or declining earnings.


PROBANK JSC: Bank of Russia Revokes Banking License
---------------------------------------------------
By its Order No. OD-1107, dated May 20, 2015, the Bank of Russia
revoked the banking license from the Moscow-based credit
institution joint-stock company Professional Bank or JSC ProBank
(Registration No. 2471) from 20 May 2015.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the repeated violations within a
year of the requirements of Article 7 (except for Clause 3 of
Article 7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism".

ProBank did not comply with the requirements of the legislation on
anti-money laundering and the financing of terrorism in terms of
timely notification of the authorized body about operations
subject to obligatory control.  Besides, the credit institution
was involved in dubious transit operations.

By its Order No. OD-1108, dated 20 May 2015, the Bank of Russia
has appointed a provisional administration to ProBank for the
period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the Federal
Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under Article
23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".  In
accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit
institution's executive bodies are suspended.

ProBank is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of banking license is an insured event envisaged by
Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On Insurance of Household Deposits with
Russian Banks' regarding the bank's obligations on deposits of
households determined in accordance with the legislation.

According to the financial statements, as of May 1, 2015, ProBank
ranked 414th by assets in the Russian banking system.


VLBANK JSC: Bank of Russia Reveals Details of Financial Standing
----------------------------------------------------------------
During the inspection of financial standing of the credit
institution, the provisional administration of JSC VLBANK
appointed by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-188, dated January 29,
2015, due to the revocation of its banking license, revealed
operations of the bank's former management bearing evidence of
bank assets' diversion by substituting the credit portfolio with
illiquid assets and promissory notes of companies with dubious
solvency totaling roughly RUR1.2 billion.

At the same time, during the period of its actual insolvency the
bank satisfied claims of certain creditors at the expense of other
creditors.

According to the estimate of the provisional administration, the
value assets of VLBANK did not exceed RUR1.7 billion, whereas the
bank's liabilities to its creditors amounted to RUR2.2 billion.

Under these circumstances, on March 19, 2015, the court of
arbitration of Irkutsk Region made a ruling to recognize VLBANK as
insolvent (bankrupt) and initiate bankruptcy proceedings.  The
state corporation Deposit Insurance Agency was approved as a
receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on financial
transactions bearing the evidence of the criminal offence
conducted by the former management and owners of VLBANK to the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for
consideration and procedural decision making.



=========
S P A I N
=========


GRUPO COOPERATIVO: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of Bankia, S.A. to 'BB+' from 'BBB-', and of Banco Mare
Nostrum, S.A. (BMN) and Liberbank, S.A. to 'BB' from 'BB+'.  At
the same time, Banco Popular Espanol S.A. (Popular) and Grupo
Cooperativo Cajamar (GCC) have been downgraded to Long-term IDR
'BB-', from 'BB+' and 'BB', respectively.

The Outlooks are Positive for Bankia and Popular, and Stable for
BMN, Liberbank and GCC.  Prior to the rating action, the Negative
Outlooks had reflected Fitch's view of the reducing likelihood of
support from the sovereign for these banks' senior creditors.

The rating actions are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for US, Swiss and
European Union commercial banks.

As a result, Fitch believes that, in line with its Support Rating
(SR) definition of '5', extraordinary external support while
possible can no longer be relied upon for any of the banks listed
above.  Fitch has, therefore, downgraded their SRs to '5' from '2'
for Bankia and to '5' from '3' for Popular, BMN, Liberbank and GCC
and revised their Support Rating Floors (SRFs) to 'No Floor' from
'BBB-' for Bankia, from 'BB+' for Popular, BMN and Liberbank and
from 'BB' for GCC.

As a result of the revision to the SRFs, these banks' Long-term
IDRs are now driven by their standalone creditworthiness as
expressed in their respective Viability Ratings (VRs), which have
been affirmed at 'bb+' for Bankia, 'bb' for BMN and Liberbank, and
'bb-' for Popular and GCC.

Simultaneously, Fitch has downgraded BFA, Tenedora de Acciones,
S.A.U.'s (BFA, Bankia's holding company) SR to '5' from '3' and
has revised its SRF to 'No Floor' from 'BB'.  BFA's other ratings,
including its VR-driven Long-term IDR at 'BB' with a Positive
Outlook, are unaffected by this rating action.

The rating actions are also part of a periodic portfolio review of
a number of Spanish banking groups rated by Fitch.  The sector
continues to recover, supported by improved macro-economic trends.
GDP grew modestly by 1.4% in 2014 and Fitch expects this to
accelerate to 2.5% in 2015 and 2.3% in 2016.  Better economic
prospects should help temper pressure on banks' asset quality,
which Fitch expects to have peaked during 2014, and, indirectly on
earnings, including through reduced provisioning needs.

However, downside risks for banks remain, for example if
unemployment stays stubbornly high and the property market remains
depressed despite some recent signs of improvement, thus hampering
a more meaningful economic recovery.  Fitch also expects pre-
impairment income from core banking activities to remain subdued
in a low interest rate environment, partially offset by lower
funding costs, that is also still characterized by muted volumes,
despite early signs of recovery.  Funding and liquidity profiles
are generally sound and most banks have enhanced their
capitalization.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

Bankia's IDRs, senior debt ratings and VR reflect a fairly large
although declining problem asset portfolio.  This leaves the
bank's capitalization, although strengthened, still vulnerable to
shocks to asset prices or economic deterioration.

However, Bankia's VR also considers improvements to profitability,
supported by efficiency gains achieved from the execution of
restructuring targets ahead of plan.  However, earnings have so
far significantly relied on interest earned from securities funded
by ECB funds.  Bankia's main challenge is to expand its SME
footprint and rebuild core banking earnings.

The bank's funding and liquidity profile continues to improve,
primarily due to deposit growth and regained debt capital market
access.  But reliance on the ECB for funding will remain high as
it is used to fund a large stock of legacy fixed-income
securities, including those related to the transfer of real estate
assets to Spain's bad bank (SAREB).  Liquidity reserves are
adequate for scheduled debt repayments.

BFA's IDR is notched down once from Bankia's because Fitch
believes that the former's strategy is to gradually reduce its
majority ownership.  Other factors driving BFA's ratings include
potential litigation exposure, a moderate double-leverage ratio
and a manageable debt maturity profile given its stock of
unencumbered assets.

The Positive Outlook on Bankia's Long-term IDR reflects upside
rating potential as the bank continues to reduce the stock of
problem assets and further strengthen capital.  The Outlook on
BFA's Long-term IDR is also Positive, mirroring that of Bankia.

Popular's IDRs, senior debt ratings and VR factor in the bank's
weak asset quality, due to a large exposure to problematic real
estate development assets.  This in turn puts pressure on its
internal capital generation capacity and leaves capital vulnerable
to additional collateral valuation shocks.  The ratings also
reflect Popular's strong SME banking franchise in Spain, which
provides healthy recurrent revenues, and the bank's adequate
funding and liquidity position.

The Positive Outlook on Popular's Long-term IDR reflects upside
rating potential, largely related to a positive reversal in its
asset quality trend.  Fitch expects new non-performing loan (NPL)
entries to decline and loan recoveries and foreclosed asset sales
to accelerate over the next 12 to 18 month, which should ease
pressure on the bank's capital base.

BMN's and Liberbank's IDRs, senior debt ratings and VRs reflect
their strong regional franchises, improved capitalization,
adequate funding and liquidity and progress made in their
restructuring, resulting in efficiency gains.  The ratings also
factor in these banks' still weak but improving asset quality,
with a large proportion of restructured loans at BMN (largely
relating to individuals) and a large legacy portfolio of
problematic assets under an asset protection scheme (APS) at
Liberbank.

The Stable Outlooks on BMN's and Liberbank's Long-term IDRs
reflect Fitch's expectation that their credit profiles are set to
further stabilise, supported by an improved macro-economic
environment.

GCC's IDRs, senior debt ratings and VR reflect its weaker-than-
sector average asset quality metrics and the vulnerability of its
capital base to unreserved problem assets (over 1.5x Fitch Capital
Core (FCC)).  GCC's NPL ratio remains high, but sizeable capital
gains on the sale of assets, including the real estate management
subsidiary, supported the group's additional provisioning efforts
and internal capital generation at end-2014.

The Stable Outlook on GCC's Long-term IDR assumes that the bank
will continue to focus on managing its problem assets, extending
the downward trend seen since end-2013 during which the NPL
reserve coverage ratio has strengthened.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The banks' IDRs and senior debt ratings are sensitive to a change
in their VRs.  The ratings could be upgraded if there is a
sustained reduction in problem assets while preserving capital.
Further consolidation of the positive economic trends in Spain and
better prospects for its property market would help to accelerate
foreclosed asset sales and loan recoveries, ultimately benefitting
the ratings.  At the same time, improvements in core revenue
generation and lower provisioning needs could provide relief to
bottom-line earnings and thus improve their internal capital
generation capacity.

Conversely, these ratings could be downgraded primarily if Fitch
perceives renewed pressures on asset quality and hence on earnings
and capital.  Fitch does not currently factor into its ratings any
potential changes related to the treatment of deferred tax assets.
However, in the event of the removal of the explicit state-
guarantee on the recoverability of a portion of the banks'
deferred tax assets the ratings may come under pressure as this
would, in some cases, affect the banks' capital measures.

BFA's ratings are sensitive to the same considerations that might
drive a change in Bankia's ratings.  In addition, BFA's ratings
could be affected by a change in shareholding, a lower value or
liquidity of its investments and/or by higher debt levels and
double-leverage.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT
RATING FLOOR

The SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors can no
longer rely on receiving full extraordinary support from the
sovereign in the event that any of these banks becomes non-viable.

In Fitch's view, the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) are now
sufficiently progressed to provide a framework for resolving banks
that is likely to require senior creditors participating in
losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving
sovereign support.  In the EU, BRRD has been effective in member
states since Jan. 1, 2015, including minimum loss absorption
requirements before resolution financing or alternative financing
(eg, government stabilization funds) can be used.  Full
application of BRRD, including the bail-in tool, is required from
Jan. 1, 2016.  The Spanish law for the restructuring and
resolution of banks was enacted in 2012.  Fitch expects BRRD to be
transposed into national legislation in the next few months, with
full application from January 2016.

Any upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks.  While not impossible, this is highly unlikely
in Fitch's view.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER
HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by Bankia and by
Popular and its issuing vehicles are all notched down from their
respective VRs in accordance with Fitch's assessment of each
instrument's respective non-performance and relative loss severity
risk profiles, which vary considerably.  They have, therefore,
been affirmed due to the affirmation of both banks' VR.  Their
ratings are primarily sensitive to any change in Bankia's and
Popular's VRs respectively.

Bankia's and Popular's subordinated (lower Tier 2) debt issues are
rated one notch below the respective banks' VRs to reflect the
below-average loss severity of this type of debt compared with
average recoveries.

Popular's preference shares are rated three notches below the
bank's VR to reflect the higher loss severity risk of these
securities (two notches) compared with average recoveries as well
as moderate risk of non-performance relative to its VR (one
notch).  The coupon on these instruments can be paid out of
distributable reserves.

SUSBIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY - KEY RATING DRIVERS AND
SENSITIVITIES

Banco CLM's IDRs and senior debt ratings are aligned with
Liberbank's as Fitch views it as an integral part of Liberbank's
core business.  Banco CLM is highly integrated into the group and
strengthens the bank's franchise in Castilla-La Mancha and
provides geographical diversification to the group.  Banco CLM, a
75%-owned bank subsidiary of Liberbank, is the spun-off banking
business of the failed Caja de Ahorros de Castilla-La Mancha (CCM)
and is fully consolidated into the group's accounts.

Banco CLM's IDRs are sensitive to those of Liberbank and/or to any
change in the level of relative importance of Banco CLM within the
group, which Fitch sees as unlikely.

Banco de Credito Social Cooperativo S.A. (BCC) is the central
institution of GCC and as such its IDRs, SR and SRF mirror those
of the banking group.  At the same time the IDRs of Cajas Rurales
Unidas, SCC (CRU), the largest member of the group, are equalised
with those of GCC.  BCC's and CRU's ratings are sensitive to any
change in the ratings of GCC.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITES - STATE-GUARANTEED DEBT

BFA's state-guaranteed debt issues have been affirmed at 'BBB+',
in line with Spain's Long-term IDR.  State-guaranteed debt issues
are senior unsecured instruments that bear the full guarantee of
Spain.  Consequently, its ratings are the higher of the issuer's
Long-term IDR and Spain's Long-term IDR.

BFA's state-guaranteed debt rating is sensitive to changes to
Spain's sovereign ratings.

The rating actions are:

Bankia:
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Positive
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb+'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '2'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BBB-'
Long-term senior unsecured debt: downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'
Commercial paper: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB'

BFA:
Long-term IDR: unaffected at 'BB'; Outlook Positive
Short-term IDR: unaffected at 'B'
Viability Rating: unaffected at 'bb'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BB'
Long-term senior unsecured debt: unaffected at 'BB'
State-guaranteed debt: unaffected at 'BBB+'

Popular:
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Positive
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb-'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BB+'
Long-term senior unsecured debt programme: downgraded to 'BB-'
from 'BB+'
Short-term senior unsecured debt programme and commercial paper:
affirmed at 'B'
Subordinated lower Tier 2 debt: affirmed at 'B+'
BPE Financiaciones S.A.:
Long-term senior unsecured debt and debt programme (guaranteed by
Popular): downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB+'
Short-term senior unsecured debt programme (guaranteed by
Popular): affirmed at 'B'
BPE Preference International Limited:
Preference shares: affirmed at 'B-'
Popular Capital, S.A.
Preference shares: affirmed at 'B-'

BMN:
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BB+'
Commercial paper Long-term rating: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'
Commercial paper Short-term rating: affirmed at 'B'
Senior unsecured debt Long-term rating: downgraded to 'BB' from
'BB+'
Senior unsecured debt Short-term rating: affirmed at 'B'

Liberbank:
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BB+'

Banco CLM:
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
Senior unsecured debt: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'
GCC (formerly Grupo Cooperativo Cajas Rurales Unidas):
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb-'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BB'

BCC:
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BB'

CRU:
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Senior unsecured Short-term debt: affirmed at 'B'



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Credit Suisse AG's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) and senior debt ratings at 'A', Short-term
IDR and debt ratings at 'F1' and its Viability Rating (VR) at 'a'.
The Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Stable.  At the same time,
Fitch has affirmed the ratings of Credit Suisse's holding company
(Credit Suisse Group AG) and subsidiaries.

The rating affirmations are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for US, Swiss and
European Union commercial banks.

As a result, Fitch believes that, in line with our Support Rating
(SR) definition of '5', extraordinary external support while
possible can no longer be relied upon for Credit Suisse.  Fitch
has, therefore, downgraded its SR to '5' from '1' and revised its
Support Rating Floor (SRF) to 'No Floor' from 'A'.  Credit
Suisse's Long-term IDR is driven by its VR and is therefore not
affected by actions on the bank's SR and SRF.

The ratings actions are also part of a periodic portfolio review
of the Global Trading and Universal Banks (GTUBs), which comprise
12 large and globally active banking groups.  A strong rebound in
earnings from securities businesses in 1Q15 is a reminder of the
upside potential banks with leading market shares can enjoy.
However, regulatory headwinds remain strong, with ever higher
capital requirements, costs of continuous infrastructure upgrades
and a focus on conduct risks.

As capital and leverage requirements evolve, GTUBs are reviewing
the balance of their securities operations with other businesses
and adapting their business models to provide the most capital-
efficient platforms for the future.  Fitch expects the GTUBs'
other core businesses, including retail and corporate banking,
wealth and asset management, to perform well as economic growth,
which Fitch expects to be strongest in the US and UK, will
underpin revenue.  However, pressure on revenue generation in a
low interest-rate environment is likely to persist, particularly
in Europe, but low loan impairment charges in domestic markets
should help operating profitability.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - VR, IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

Credit Suisse's IDRs are driven by the bank's standalone strength
as reflected in its VR.  Credit Suisse's business model and its
capital/leverage position remain key drivers of its VR.

The VR benefits from Credit Suisse's strong and stable franchise
in global wealth management and, to a lesser extent, from its
solid asset management and Swiss domestic and retail banking
franchises.  Credit Suisse is committed to allocating additional
capital to its non-investment banking franchise with the aim of
achieving a balanced split of risk-weighted assets (RWA) between
its investment banking and non-investment banking business
(roughly 60:40 at end-1Q15) which is in our view positive for
Credit Suisse's risk profile and the quality of its earnings base.

Credit Suisse's VR also reflects management's commitment to
maintaining sizeable and global investment banking operations
whose risk positions and earnings base are, in our view, more
volatile than for commercial banks.  In addition, while exposure
to non-core activities (largely from investment banking) was
substantially reduced in 2014 and 1Q15, Credit Suisse remains -
similar to its GTUB peers -- exposed to litigation and conduct
risk.

Credit Suisse's revised leverage ratio targets, including a fully-
loaded Basel III Tier 1 leverage ratio target of 4% by end-2015
(3.6% at end-1Q15) are supportive of its VR.  While its core
capitalization as expressed in its common equity Tier 1 ratio (10%
at end-1Q15) has improved by about 200 basis points in the last
two years (8% at end-2012), it remains at the lower end of its
GTUB peer group.  However, overall capitalzsation benefits from
substantial buffers of subordinated debt, which accounted for
around 8.5% of look-through RWA at end-1Q15 and has largely been
factored into its VR because of regulatory recognition.

Credit Suisse's strategy is transparent and strategic adjustments,
as with the establishment of non-core units, have been clearly
communicated and soundly executed.  The bank's VR reflects our
view that this will remain the case under Credit Suisse's new CEO
who will take office in June.

Fitch views Credit Suisse's overall risk controls and underwriting
standards as sound.  Domestic asset quality has remained strong
despite a slowdown of the Swiss economy.  Investment banking
exposures, which can be sizeable, are adequately controlled and
typically short-term.

Similar to most GTUB peers, Credit Suisse lags its profitability
targets (which include a return on equity of 15%; 10% in 1Q15).
However, the bank has a sound track record in meeting its cost-
cutting targets and additional cost saving measures announced in
April 2015 should support overall profitability.  In addition, the
earnings drag from its non-strategic units should reduce.  For the
remainder of 2015, revenue generation will, in our view, continue
to be challenging, both in wealth management and most investment
banking businesses.  Investment banking revenue in 1Q15 benefited
from improved market conditions and seasonality effects.

Credit Suisse's VR also reflects the bank's diversified funding
and sound liquidity profile.  It factors in our expectation that
the bank will be able to continue running a central liquidity
model despite increasing regulatory demands on legal entity-
specific liquidity requirements.

The Stable Outlook on Credit Suisse's Long-term IDR reflects our
expectation that the bank will achieve its financial targets,
including its revised leverage ratio target, that earnings
volatility in its investment bank will remain moderate and that
any incremental litigation- or conduct-related charges will not
significantly affect capital and leverage ratio build-up.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - VR, IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

Among the GTUBs, we expect Credit Suisse to remain more reliant on
its securities business franchise, which limits upside potential
for its VR.

Downside risk to Credit Suisse's VR is also limited given the
bank's well-defined strategy, overall risk appetite as well as its
sound risk control framework.  In addition, its revised leverage
ratio targets make a substantial increase in its risk appetite
unlikely in the medium-term.

However, one or several of the following developments could put
pressure on Credit Suisse's VR:

   -- Increasing reliance on its strong leveraged loans and
      securitized products business, such as a material increase
      in risk appetite in these businesses, including loosening
      underwriting standards;

   -- Despite its more narrow investment banking franchise, Fitch
      expects investment banking earnings to be adequately
      diversified to generate sufficient profitability in most
      market conditions.  Should earnings or risk volatility in
      the investment bank be higher than expected by Fitch, this
      would be negative for the bank's VR;

   -- Fitch expects Credit Suisse's leverage and capital ratios
      to improve further in 2015 and 2016.  Any significant
      slippage in progressing towards its leverage ratio target
      or a meaningful increase in RWA, eg following a
      recalibration of internal ratings-based models, could be
      VR-negative;

   -- Higher-than-expected litigation or conduct costs leading to
      additional related charges in a given quarter in excess of
      two quarters' pre-tax profit.

Fitch equalizes Credit Suisse's VR and Long-term IDR despite
significant layers of subordinated debt.  However, the same reason
could ultimately lead to a one notch uplift of Credit Suisse's
Long-term IDR relative to its VR if common equity capitalization
improves.  This is largely because Credit Suisse's subordinated
debt layers are a key rating driver of its VR (and considering
them for IDR uplift would effectively be double-counting) but also
because Fitch does not have sufficient visibility on Credit
Suisse's final capital and liability structure until (global)
regulatory requirements regarding debt and legal entity structures
have been finalized.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SR AND SRF

The SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors can no
longer rely on receiving full extraordinary support from the
sovereign in the event that Credit Suisse becomes non-viable.  In
Fitch's view, Swiss legislation and regulation to address the 'too
big to fail' problem for the two big Swiss banks are now
sufficiently progressed to provide a framework for resolving banks
that is likely to require senior creditors participating in
losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving
sovereign support.

Any upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks.  While not impossible, this is highly unlikely
in Fitch's view.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER
HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid securities issued by Credit
Suisse, Credit Suisse Group AG and by various issuing vehicles are
all notched down from the VRs of Credit Suisse or Credit Suisse
Group AG in accordance with Fitch's assessment of each
instrument's respective non-performance and relative loss severity
risk profiles, which vary considerably.

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital ratings are primarily
sensitive to a change in the VRs of Credit Suisse or Credit Suisse
Group AG.  The securities' ratings are also sensitive to a change
in their notching, which could arise if Fitch changes its
assessment of the probability of their non-performance relative to
the risk captured in the issuers' VRs.  This may reflect a change
in capital management in the group or an unexpected shift in
regulatory buffer requirements, for example.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - HOLDING COMPANY

Credit Suisse Group AG's IDRs and VR are equalized with those of
Credit Suisse and reflect its role as the bank holding company and
modest double leverage at end-2014 at holding company level
(around 106% according to Fitch's calculation, well within our
usual notching threshold of 120%).

In 1Q15, Credit Suisse started issuing total loss absorbing
capacity (TLAC) debt out of an entity guaranteed by its holding
company whose terms include an acknowledgement of Swiss resolution
powers including the partial or full write-down and cancellation
of interest and/or principal.  This is in line with the Swiss
regulator's preference for a single-point-of-entry resolution
approach.  Given Fitch's expectation for further significant TLAC
issuance linked to the holding company, the gradual build-up of
this additional buffer for the operating bank's senior creditors
could affect the relative positions of creditors of the holding
company and of the operating bank.

Credit Suisse Group AG's SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that
support from the Swiss authorities for the holding company is
possible, but cannot be relied on, primarily because of the
holding company's low systemic importance on a standalone basis
but also taking into account progress with Swiss legislation and
regulation addressing 'too big to fail' banking groups.  As the
SRF is 'No Floor', the holding company's Long-term IDR is driven
solely by its VR and is therefore primarily sensitive to the same
drivers as Credit Suisse's VR.

TLAC senior notes are rated in line with Credit Suisse Group AG's
Long-term IDR and are therefore primarily sensitive to a change to
the Long-term IDR, in particular increasing double leverage (see
above).

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED
COMPANY

Credit Suisse International (CSI) is a UK-based wholly-owned
subsidiary of Credit Suisse Group AG, and Credit Suisse (USA) Inc.
(CSUSA) is the group's main US-based broker-dealer.  Their IDRs
are equalized with Credit Suisse's and reflect support from their
parent, as we view them as core to the group's strategy in its
investment banking business and integrated into the group's
securities operations.

The IDRs of Credit Suisse New York branch are at the same level as
those of Credit Suisse as the branch is part of the same legal
entity without any country risk restrictions.

CSI is incorporated as an unlimited liability company, which
underpins Fitch's view that there is an extremely high probability
that it would receive support from its parent, if needed.

In 2007, CSUSA's parent companies (Credit Suisse and Credit Suisse
Group AG) issued full, unconditional and several guarantees for
the company's outstanding SEC-registered debt securities, which in
Fitch's opinion demonstrates the important role of the subsidiary
and the extremely high probability that it would be supported, if
needed.

As CSI's and CSUSA's IDRs are equalized with Credit Suisse's, they
are primarily sensitive to changes in the parent's IDR.  The
subsidiaries' IDRs are also sensitive to changes in the parent's
propensity to provide support, which Fitch currently does not
expect.  In addition, while Fitch expects Credit Suisse's legal
entity structure to evolve in the short- to medium-term, we do not
expect Credit Suisse's propensity to support its main subsidiaries
to change as a result.

The rating actions are:

Credit Suisse:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Senior unsecured debt (including programme ratings): affirmed at
'A'/'F1'
Senior market-linked notes: affirmed at 'Aemr'
Subordinated lower Tier 2 notes: affirmed at 'A-'
Subordinated notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'
Tier 1 notes and preferred securities: affirmed at 'BBB-'

Credit Suisse Group AG
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior unsecured debt (including programme ratings): affirmed at
'A'/'F1'
Senior market-linked notes: affirmed at 'Aemr'
Subordinated notes: affirmed at 'A-'
Additional Tier 1 notes: affirmed at 'BB+'
Preferred stock (ISIN XS0148995888): affirmed at 'BBB'
Preferred stock (ISIN XS0112553291 and JPY30bn issue): affirmed at
'BBB-'

Credit Suisse International:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior unsecured debt (including debt issuance and CP programme
ratings): affirmed at 'A'/'F1'
Dated subordinated notes: affirmed at 'A-'
Perpetual subordinated notes: affirmed at 'BBB'

Credit Suisse (USA) Inc.:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior unsecured debt (including programme ratings): affirmed at
'A'
Commercial paper programme: affirmed at 'F1'
Subordinated notes: affirmed at 'A-'

Credit Suisse NY (branch):
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Senior unsecured debt (including programme ratings): affirmed at
'A'
Commercial paper programme: affirmed at 'F1'
Senior market-linked notes: affirmed at 'Aemr'
Credit Suisse Group Funding (Guernsey) Limited
Senior unsecured notes (with TLAC language): affirmed at 'A'/'F1'
Credit Suisse Group (Guernsey) I Limited
Tier 2 contingent notes: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Credit Suisse Group (Guernsey) II Limited
Tier 1 buffer capital perpetual notes: affirmed at 'BB+'
Credit Suisse Group (Guernsey) IV Limited
Tier 2 contingent notes: affirmed at 'BBB-'


UBS GROUP: Fitch Affirms BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Subordinated Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed UBS AG's (UBS) Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) and senior debt ratings at 'A', its Short-term IDR at
'F1' and Viability Rating (VR) at 'a'.  The Outlook on the Long-
term IDR is Stable.  At the same time the agency has affirmed the
ratings of UBS's holding company UBS Group AG and subsidiaries.

The rating affirmations are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for US, Swiss and
European Union commercial banks.

As a result, Fitch believes that, in line with our Support Rating
(SR) definition of '5', extraordinary external support while
possible can no longer be relied upon for UBS.  Fitch has,
therefore, downgraded its SR to '5' from '1' and revised its
Support Rating Floor (SRF) to 'No Floor' from 'A'. UBS's Long-term
IDR is driven by its VR and is therefore not affected by the
actions on the SR and SRF.

The ratings actions are also part of a periodic portfolio review
of the Global Trading and Universal Banks (GTUBs), which comprise
12 large and globally active banking groups.  A strong rebound in
earnings from securities businesses in 1Q15 is a reminder of the
upside potential banks with leading market shares can enjoy.
However, regulatory headwinds remain strong, with ever higher
capital requirements, costs of continuous infrastructure upgrades
and a focus on conduct risks.

As capital and leverage requirements evolve, GTUBs are reviewing
the balance of their securities operations with other businesses
and adapting their business models to provide the most capital-
efficient platforms for the future.  Fitch expects the GTUBs'
other core businesses, including retail and corporate banking,
wealth and asset management, to perform well as economic growth,
which we expect to be strongest in the US and UK, will underpin
revenue.  However, pressure on revenue generation in a low
interest-rate environment is likely to persist, particularly in
Europe, but low loan impairment charges in domestic markets should
help operating profitability.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

UBS's VR and IDRs are based our expectation that the bank's
leading global wealth management and dominant domestic retail and
corporate franchise should enable the bank to generate sound
profitability.  The ratings also reflect adequate underlying
profitability, solid funding and liquidity, strong capitalization
measured in relation to risk-weighted assets (RWA) and our
expectation that the group will improve its leverage ratio
further.  The ratings also factor in remaining material exposure
to conduct and litigation risk and exposure to assets in UBS's
non-core and legacy portfolio.

The Stable Outlook on UBS's Long-term IDR is based on our
expectation that UBS will be able to generate sufficient earnings
to absorb further conduct and litigation costs.

UBS maintains a world-leading wealth management franchise with
CHF2trn invested assets at end-1Q15.  Wealth management businesses
have seen improving performance, and the group's Wealth Management
business division generated CHF856m adjusted pre-tax profit in
1Q15, up 30% yoy.  The group's Wealth Management Americas division
(WMA) increased its contribution to group profit, generating
CHF277m adjusted 1Q15 pre-tax profit.  Fitch expects the group's
wealth management activities, which are complemented by global
asset management, to continue to represent a source of sound
earnings.

UBS's capitalization and funding and liquidity are rating
strengths.  Capital ratios based on RWA are the strongest in UBS's
peer group with a 13.7% fully-applied Basel III common equity Tier
1 (CET1) ratio at end-1Q15.  The group's capitalization based on
unweighted leverage, with a 3.4% fully-applied Basel III leverage
ratio at end-March 2015, is more in line with its European peers'
and weaker than US banks' leverage ratios.  However, Fitch expects
the bank to improve its leverage ratio further as it reduces
leverage exposure and issues further loss-absorbing capital,
including additional tier 1 instruments.  Funding and liquidity
benefit from the bank's global wealth management operations.  The
group's regulatory liquidity coverage averaged 122% in 1Q15, and
the group estimates a stable 106% net stable funding ratio at end-
1Q15.

Despite having resolved various regulatory and legal issues, UBS
remains, in our opinion, exposed to material conduct and
litigation risk.  The bank is subject to various legal disputes
and proceedings including its foreign exchange business, its
cross-border wealth management businesses and the sale of US
residential mortgage-backed securities.  Total reserves for
litigation, regulatory and other matters amounted to CHF2.7bn at
end-1Q15, of which CHF1.1bn related to UBS's Investment Bank
business division.  While the extent of further litigation costs
is hard to predict, UBS's ratings factor in Fitch's assumptions
that the bank's litigation reserves and capitalization, if
required, could absorb sizeable further conduct costs.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs, VIABILITY RATING AND SENIOR DEBT

UBS's VR and IDRs are principally sensitive to the group
continuing the execution of its strategy, which concentrates on
further improving profitability, aided by strong earnings momentum
in its wealth management businesses.  Together with a successful
reduction in tail risks, including conduct and litigation risks,
this would result in a stronger company profile, which could
result in upward momentum for UBS's ratings.  Any rating upgrade
would be contingent on a further reduction in non-core and legacy
portfolio risk exposures and in improving performance further
without any material increase in risk appetite.

Should non-core and legacy portfolio exit costs or conduct and
litigation costs be higher than Fitch's expectations and affect
UBS's capital ratios with no credible plan for restoring these
over a reasonably short period, this could lead to pressure on
UBS's ratings.  Any material restrictions on UBS's ability to
conduct businesses, which could be the result of the US
authorities' decision to revoke the bank's non-prosecution
agreement, would put pressure on the bank's ratings.

Fitch expects UBS to target strong capitalization, to maintain its
strong RWA-based capital ratios and its stressed capital ratio
target, and to strengthen its regulatory leverage ratio.  The
bank's ratings could see upward momentum if the bank manages to
increase its capitalization further, while failure to maintain its
sound targets, which we do not expect given the bank's clear
strategy, would put ratings under pressure.

Fitch equalizes UBS's VR and Long-term IDR despite significant
layers of subordinated debt, which in our opinion is, however, not
sufficient to warrant uplift of UBS's Long-term IDR relative to
its VR.  Fitch also has no sufficient visibility on UBS's final
capital and liability structure until global regulatory
requirements regarding debt and legal entity structures have been
finalized.

UBS's IDR could be upgraded one notch above UBS Group AG's IDR if
debt issued by the holding company provides a sufficient buffer to
senior creditors of the operating company.  This would mean debt
down-streamed from the holding company would have to be
effectively junior to the operating company's senior obligations
to provide effective protection.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SR AND SRF

The SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors can no
longer rely on receiving full extraordinary support from the
sovereign in the event that UBS becomes non-viable.  In Fitch's
view, Swiss legislation and regulation to address the 'too big to
fail' problem for the two big Swiss banks are now sufficiently
progressed to provide a framework for resolving banks that is
likely to require senior creditors participating in losses, if
necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving sovereign
support.

Any upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks.  While not impossible, this is highly unlikely
in Fitch's view.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER
HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other junior and hybrid capital issued by
UBS Group AG, UBS and its affiliates are all notched down from
UBS's or UBS Group's VR in accordance with Fitch's assessment of
each instrument's respective non-performance and relative loss
severity risk profiles, which vary considerably.

The ratings of UBS's and UBS Group AG's subordinated and hybrid
debt issues are primarily sensitive to a change in the respective
VRs.  The securities' ratings are also sensitive to a change in
their notching, which could arise if Fitch changes its assessment
of the probability of their non-performance relative to the risk
captured in the issuers' VRs.  This may reflect a change in
capital management in the group or an unexpected shift in
regulatory buffer requirements, for example.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - HOLDING COMPANY

UBS Group AG's VR and IDRs are equalized with those of UBS, and
reflect UBS Group AG's role as the group's holding company.  Its
reported consolidated total assets at end-2014 were essentially
equal to those reported by UBS.

Fitch expects the holding company to issue an increasing
proportion of debt, including additional Tier 1 (AT1) and other
hybrid instruments and senior debt.  This will result in a debt
buffer building up at the holding company over time.  Fitch do not
expect double leverage at the holding company to exceed 120%, a
level at which we would consider notching the holding company's VR
and Long-term IDR below the bank's ratings.  Fitch expects the
holding company to maintain a prudent liquidity policy, which
should be helped by existing policies in place to manage liquidity
across a large number of legal entities globally.

The equalization of UBS Group AG's VR and IDRs with UBS's also
reflects our view that the Swiss regulator considers the group as
a consolidated entity, the fact that the holding company is
incorporated in the same jurisdiction as its main banking
subsidiary and the large majority stake it holds in UBS.

UBS Group AG's VR and IDRs are sensitive to the same factors as
UBS's.  Its VR and IDRs could be notched down from UBS's ratings
if double leverage at the holding company increases above 120% or
if the role of the holding company changes.  Together with the
creation of separately capitalized subsidiaries, over time further
expected debt issuance by UBS Group AG could change the relative
position of creditors of different group entities, which would be
reflected in different entity ratings, including the holding
company's VR and IDRs.

UBS Group AG's SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that support from
the Swiss authorities for the holding company is possible, but
cannot be relied on, primarily because of the holding company's
low systemic importance.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBSIDIARIES

London-based UBS Limited is a wholly owned subsidiary of UBS whose
issuer and debt ratings are aligned with UBS's because Fitch views
UBS Limited as core to UBS and integrated into its IB activities.
UBS Limited's contractual counterparties continue to benefit from
an irrevocable and unconditional guarantee by UBS, which underpins
Fitch's view that the subsidiary is core to UBS's strategy.

UBS Bank USA (UBSB) is a direct subsidiary of UBS Americas Inc.,
which in turn is wholly owned by UBS.  UBSB's ratings reflect
Fitch's view of its integration and its important role within the
group and its Short-term IDR is therefore equalized with the
ultimate parent's.  Although there is no financial support
agreement or guarantee from UBS, UBSB's '1' SR reflects Fitch's
view of an extremely high probability that UBS would provide
support to UBSB should the need arise.

The ratings of both UBS Limited and UBSB are primarily sensitive
to a change in UBS's VR and IDRs.  In addition, should regulatory
developments, notably in the US and the UK, lead to UBS's
subsidiaries becoming less integrated within UBS, e.g. through
restrictions on intragroup funding flows, then this could lead to
UBS subsidiaries' IDRs no longer being equalized with the parent
bank's IDRs.

The rating actions are:

UBS AG
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A'/'F1'
Senior unsecured market linked securities: affirmed at 'Aemr'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'A-'
Tier 2 subordinated notes (low-trigger loss-absorbing notes):
affirmed at 'BBB+'
Commercial paper: affirmed at 'A'/'F1'

UBS Group AG
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Tier 1 subordinated notes ('high-trigger'): affirmed at 'BB+'
Tier 1 subordinated notes ('low-trigger'): affirmed at 'BB+'

UBS Limited
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
UBS Bank USA
Short term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
UBS Preferred Funding Trust V Preferred Securities: affirmed at
'BBB-'
UBS Capital Securities (Jersey Ltd) Preferred Securities: affirmed
at 'BBB-'



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


FINANSBANK AS: Moody's Affirms Ba2 LT Deposit & Unsecured Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed Finansbank AS's (Turkey) Ba2
long-term deposit and senior unsecured ratings and baseline credit
assessment of b1. The long-term deposit ratings were assigned a
negative outlook. The Ba3 issuer rating of Finans Finansal
Kiralama A.S. (FinansLeasing), its fully-owned subsidiary was also
confirmed.

The rating actions conclude the review initiated on 18 February
2015 and follow the rating action on Finansbank's ultimate parent,
National Bank of Greece S.A. (NBG) (deposits Caa3 negative, BCA
caa3). The confirmation of the BCA of Finansbank, and thus its
deposit ratings, reflects Moody's view that the Turkish subsidiary
continues to maintain a franchise that is well established and
largely independent from that of NBG.

NBG is Finansbank's controlling shareholder with a 99% ownership
stake. For further details on the rating actions on parent bank
NBG, please refer to Moody's press release: paste link here

Furthermore, Moody's assigned a Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR
Assessment) of Ba2(cr)/Not Prime(cr) to Finansbank, following the
rating agency's publication of its revised Banks methodology.

Finansbank:

The confirmation of Finansbank's BCA reflects Moody's view that
despite the ongoing problems at the Greek parent level, its
Turkish subsidiary continues to maintain a well-established,
largely independent franchise from that of NBG, aided by the
bank's granular client-base and domestic funding profile, as well
as its strong operating and regulatory ring-fencing.

The following factors underpin a low correlation between
Finansbank and its parent NBG (1) the track-record of little
correlation between the parent and subsidiary's performance and
risk profiles for the past years; (2) strong regulatory ring-
fencing ensuring full retention of cash income and limited
exposure to the parent; and (3) financial trends (capital,
profitability and funding profile) that are largely in line with
other Turkish peers.

Finansbank maintains solid capital levels, with a Basel III
consolidated capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 16.9% and a Tier 1
ratio of 12.8% at end-2014, better than the peer-group average of
13.8% and 11%, respectively. Current Tier 2 capital from NBG
amounts to a low 3% of Finansbank's balance sheet and would
require regulatory approval before being redeemed.

Moody's considers the bank's earnings streams to be granular, and
its net interest margin -- albeit declining -- compares favourably
with those of its Turkish peers. Although the bank's loan-to-
deposit ratio stood at 123% as end-2014, slightly above the market
average at 121%, Finansbank's dependence on market funding is
moderate at 25% of its total assets. The medium to-long term loan
facilities from International Development Institutions contributes
to a benign refinancing schedule of wholesale funds, compared to
its Turkish peers.

Therefore, despite the recent downgrade of NBG these
considerations support one of Moody's highest BCA differentials
between a subsidiary and parent.

The confirmation of Finansbank's Ba2 long-term deposit and senior
unsecured ratings mirrors the confirmation of bank's standalone
BCA and the maintenance of a two-notch uplift to the deposit
rating from the BCA. This support uplift is based on Moody's
assumption of a high likelihood of government (systemic) support,
in case of need, given Finansbank's systemic importance in Turkey
(Baa3 negative).

The outlook on the deposit and issuer rating is negative,
reflecting the outlook on the parent, NBG. A further downgrade of
the parent bank would imply a close to default condition for the
parent which could increase stress-levels for the whole group.
R Assessment

As part of the actions, Moody's has assigned, a Ba2(cr)/Not
Prime(cr) CR Assessment to Finansbank. The CR Assessment, which is
not a rating, reflects an issuer's probability of defaulting on
certain bank operating liabilities, such as covered bonds,
derivatives, letters of credit and other contractual commitments.
In assigning the CR Assessment, Moody's evaluates the issuer's
standalone strength and the likelihood, should the need arise, of
affiliate and government support, as well as the anticipated
seniority of counterparty obligations. The CR Assessment also
assumes that authorities will likely take steps to preserve the
continuity of a bank's key operations, maintain payment flows, and
avoid contagion should the bank enter a resolution.

FinansLeasing:

FinansLeasing's Ba3 foreign-currency issuer and corporate family
ratings were also confirmed, given the similar rating action on
the immediate parent's ratings. FinansLeasing's ratings are based
on the BCA of b3 and Moody's assumption of a very high probability
of support from its immediate majority shareholder (69%),
Finansbank.

The negative outlook implies limited upward pressure on the
subsidiaries' ratings.

The confirmation reflects Moody's view of the high independence of
the Turkish subsidiaries' franchise. However, the rating agency
also recognises that further deterioration in the parent's
financial fundamentals and downward pressure on the parent's
ratings could lead to group-wide spillover effects that could
ultimately weaken Finansbank's and Finansleasing's franchise
strength.

Therefore, notwithstanding the relative independence of the
Turkish subsidiaries at this stage, further significant downward
pressure on NBG's ratings could negatively impact their standalone
and long-term ratings. In addition, any deterioration of their own
financial fundamentals (regardless of parental connections) would
exert downward pressure on the ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.



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U K R A I N E
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BROKBUSINESSBANK: Deposit Guarantee Fund Extends Liquidation Term
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the Individuals' Deposit Guarantee
Fund has prolonged the term of the liquidation of Brokbusinessbank
for one year -- until June 10, 2016.

The decision was made by the executive directorate of the fund on
May 21, Interfax-Ukraine says, citing a post on the fund's
website.

The National Bank of Ukraine decided to revoke the bank's license
on June 11, 2014, Interfax-Ukraine recounts.

Brokbusinessbank was founded in 1991.


UKRAINIAN RAILWAYS: S&P Lowers CCR to 'SD' on Missed Payments
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term corporate
credit rating on The State Administration of Railways Transport of
Ukraine (Ukrainian Railways) to 'SD' (selective default) from
'CC'.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CC' issue ratings on the
US$500 million senior secured loan participation notes due 2018
and issued by financing vehicle Shortline PLC.

The downgrade follows the announcement by Ukrainian Railways that
it has stopped making principal payments on certain debt
obligations and will aim to restructure them.  At the same time,
the company continues to make interest payments on these
obligations as well as payments on its $500 million loan
participation notes.  S&P therefore views the company as being in
a selective default situation.

S&P continues to view the proposed restructuring of the $500
million loan participation notes as tantamount to default.  In
S&P's view, therefore, the default of Ukrainian Railways on these
obligations is a virtual certainty.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


KM FURNITURE: In Administration; 52 Jobs Affected
-------------------------------------------------
Insider Media reports that a total of 52 jobs have been lost at KM
Furniture Ltd. after it called in administrators.

Howard Smith -- howard.smith@kpmg.co.uk -- and Jonny Marston of
KPMG were appointed joint administrators of the company, which
made educational and contract furniture, on May 20, Insider Media
relates.

The business ceased trading immediately, Insider Media relays.  A
total of 18 roles were retained to assist the administrators and
complete work in progress, Insider Media discloses.

"KM Furniture had been suffering sustained trading issues for a
number of years.  Most recently, the company agreed a company
voluntary arrangement with its creditors, to help effect a
turnaround of the business," Insider Media quotes Mr. Smith as
saying.

"Unfortunately, however, this was not enough to alleviate the
company's cashflow problems, and the company was placed into
administration."

Mr. Smith added that he and Marston are now "actively" seeking a
potential buyer for the business and its assets, Insider Media
notes.

KM Furniture Ltd. is a GBP9 million-turnover furniture
manufacturer in Chesterfield.


KOZEE SLEEPS: In Administration; 180 Jobs at Risk
-------------------------------------------------
Joint Administrators from KPMG have been appointed to Dewsbury-
based bed and mattress manufacturer Kozee Sleep Beds Limited and
its subsidiaries, Restus Beds Limited and Hick Lane Bedding
Limited, in addition to a property investment company within the
group, Hick Lane Properties Limited.

The companies ceased trading shortly after the appointment of
Jonny Marston and Howard Smith of KPMG's Restructuring practice on
May 19, 2015.

While the Joint Administrators assess the business' position and
consider its options for the future, its 180 employees have been
put on notice of potential redundancy and sent home from work.
Jonny Marston, Joint Administrator and Restructuring Partner at
KPMG, said: "Our first priority upon appointment is to assess the
company's financial position and operations with a view to
informing our next steps in fulfilling our statutory duties,
trying to secure continued employment wherever possible and
maximizing the realisations available to creditors."


LLOYDS BANKING: Fitch Raises Rating on Tier 1 Instruments to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Lloyds Banking Group plc's (LBG),
Lloyds Bank plc's (LB), HBOS's and of Bank of Scotland's (BoS)
Long-term IDRs to 'A+' from 'A' and their Viability Ratings (VR)
to 'a' from 'a-'.  The Outlook on the IDRs is Stable.

The rating actions are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for senior creditors
of UK banks, in line with developments at the EU level.

As a result, the Support Ratings (SRs) of LBG, LB and BoS have
been downgraded to '5' from '1' and their Support Rating Floors
(SRF) have been revised downwards to 'No Floor' from 'A'.  HBOS's
SR is not affected as it is driven by institutional support.

Following the revision of its expectation for state support, the
Long-term IDRs of LBG and of its immediate banking subsidiaries
are driven by their standalone creditworthiness as expressed in
their respective VRs.  The Long-term IDRs are notched up once from
their VRs to reflect the substantial protection afforded to bank
and holding company senior creditors by the group's qualifying
junior debt.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - VRs

Fitch assesses the VRs of LBG, LB, HBOS and BOS on a consolidated
basis as they are managed as a group and are highly integrated.
The risks of the subsidiary banks are incorporated into our
assessment of the group and vice versa and the VR is assigned on a
common basis.  Specifically for LBG, holding company double
leverage is fairly low and Fitch considers its failure risk to be
broadly in line with the failure risk of the banking operations in
its main operating subsidiaries.

The common VR has been upgraded to 'a' to reflect the continuing
reduction of legacy assets, which has reduced the bank's exposure
to tail risk.  Its reported impaired loan ratio was a sound 2.8%
at end-1Q15.  It also considers the progress made in improving
efficiency by simplifying systems and processes, as well as the
group's strongly improved capitalization.  Fitch has revised
upwards our assessment of the bank's asset quality, risk appetite
and capitalization since our last review of the bank.

The group's funding profile and liquidity remain healthy.
Operating profitability has risen on the back of higher margins
and low impairment charges.  While the bank's strong UK franchise
and now stable business model means the bank's underlying earnings
capacity is sound, our assessment of earnings is weighed down by
consistently high conduct charges, notably in respect of the mis-
selling of payment protection insurance.

LBG's Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio has improved steadily as a
result of continued deleveraging and now compares well with
similarly rated peers'.  LBG has also issued a fairly large volume
of AT1 securities.  The equity credit these receive does not
influence the level of the group's VRs, and hence feeds into our
'qualifying junior debt' calculation.  Fitch believes that LBG
will be capital-generative from profits from 2015 but that growth
and dividends payments will result in a slightly lower steady
state fully-loaded Basel III CET1 ratio than at present, at around
12%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - VRs

Fitch believes that the high indebtedness of the UK private sector
means that the VRs of domestic retail banks in the UK are
generally capped in the 'a' range.  Therefore an upgrade of the VR
would likely be contingent on a demonstration of exceptionally
strong and stable credit metrics, in particular materially
improved profitability, but also stronger capitalization.

The VR could be downgraded as a result of an increase in risk
appetite through greater lending volumes in more high-risk
segments, a deterioration of the group's capital position or
failure to maintain consistent profitability.  A particularly
sharp deterioration in the UK economy, and in particular the
property market, that results in a material weakening of the
group's asset quality, or increasing legacy charges penalizing
profits for a significantly extended period of time could also be
credit- negative.

A material increase in holding company double leverage could
result in LBG's VR being downgraded.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

The Long-term IDRs and senior debt of LBG, LB, BOS and HBOS are
notched up once from their VRs because we believe that the risk of
default on senior obligations, as measured by the Long-term IDRs,
is lower than the risk of the banks failing, as measured by their
VRs.

This is because of the large buffer of 'qualifying junior debt'
within the group which could be made available to protect senior
obligations from default in case of failure, either under a
resolution process or as part of a private sector solution (ie,
distressed debt exchange) to avoid a resolution action.

Absent such a private sector solution, we would expect a
resolution action being taken on LBG when it is likely to breach
its pillar 1 and pillar 2A CET1 capital requirements.  On a risk-
weighted basis, these are currently around 6.6% of risk weighted
assets (RWA).  Fitch believes that the group would need to meet
its pillar 1 and pillar 2A total capital requirements immediately
after a resolution action.  On a risk weighted basis, these are
currently around 11.8% of RWA.

Given its systemic importance, in Fitch's opinion, LBG would
likely also need to maintain most, if not all, of its combined
buffer requirement.  This means a post resolution action CET1
requirement of around or above 16% of (post recapitalization) RWA
is plausible under a bail-in scenario, dependent on final combined
buffer requirements.  This figure could be lower under a private
sector (ie distressed debt exchange) scenario as part of a broader
rehabilitation plan that averts a resolution action.  Fitch's view
of the regulatory intervention point and post-resolution capital
needs taken together suggest a junior debt buffer of 9%-10% of RWA
could be required to restore viability without hitting senior
creditors.

LBG's qualifying junior debt amounted to around 12.5% of RWA at
end-2014.  While Fitch expects a moderate reduction in this ratio
over time, Fitch expects the buffer to remain substantial and our
ratings assume it will not fall much below 10% of RWA.  Fitch
expects legacy junior debt to be increasingly re-financed up to
the LBG level and then down-streamed in subordinated form in
accordance with the UK's favoured 'single point of entry' holding
company resolution strategy for banking groups such as LBG.

The 'F1' Short-term IDRs of LBG, LB, BOS and HBOS are at the lower
of the two possible Short-term ratings mapped to a Long-term IDR
of 'A+'.  The group's liquidity profile is sound, but not strong
enough to warrant a 'F1+' rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES: IDRs and SENIOR DEBT

LBG and its subsidiaries' Long-term IDRs and Long-term senior debt
ratings are sensitive to a material reduction in the size of the
qualifying junior debt buffer.  Fitch's base case is that the
ratio would need to be in the range of 9%-10% of RWA to be able to
afford protection to senior creditors.

The notching is sensitive to changes in assumptions on the UK
authorities' resolution intervention point, post-resolution
capital needs for large banking groups such as LBG, and the
development of resolution planning more generally.

As the Long-term IDRs and senior debt ratings are notched up from
the group's VRs, they are sensitive to a downgrade of the group's
respective VRs.  As Fitch believes the VRs and Long-term IDRs of
UK banks are likely to be capped in the 'a'/'A' range, an upgrade
of the Long-term IDRs and senior debt ratings, while not
impossible, is unlikely.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES: SR and SRF

The downgrade of LBG, LB and BOS's SRs to '5' and revision of
their SRFs to 'No Floor' reflects Fitch's view that senior
creditors can no longer rely on receiving full extraordinary
support from the UK in the event that these banks fail.

In Fitch's view, the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD) and legislation and regulation in the UK are now
sufficiently progressed to provide a framework for resolving banks
that is likely to require senior creditors participating in
losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving
sovereign support.

In the EU, BRRD has been effective in member states since Jan. 1,
2015, including minimum loss absorption requirements before
resolution financing or alternative financing (eg, government
stabilization funds) can be used.  Full application of BRRD,
including the bail-in tool, is required in the EU from Jan. 1,
2016. In the UK legislation and regulation to allow for the bail-
in of senior creditors have been in place since January 2015.

Any upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks.  While not impossible, this is highly unlikely
in Fitch's view.

HBOS is an intermediate holding company and its SR of '1' has been
affirmed because of the very high probability of institutional
support from LBG.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND HYBRID RATINGS - RATING DRIVERS AND
SENSITIVITIES

The ratings of all banks' subordinated debt and hybrid securities
are notched down from their VRs, reflecting a combination of
Fitch's assessment of their incremental non-performance risk
relative to their VRs (up to three notches) and assumptions around
loss severity (one or two notches).

These features vary considerably by instrument: subordinated debt
is notched down once for loss severity; upper tier two debt is
notched down three times (once for loss severity and twice for
incremental non-performance risk); discretionary tier 1
instruments, including AT1s, are notched down five times (twice
for loss severity and three times for incremental non-performance
risk); other legacy tier 1 instruments are notched down four times
(twice for loss severity and twice for incremental non-performance
risk); lower tier 2 enhanced capital notes (ECNs) are notched down
twice for loss severity and upper tier two ECNs are notched down
three times, two for loss severity and one for incremental non-
performance risk.

The ratings are primarily sensitive to changes in the relevant
VRs.  AT1 and other discretionary tier 1 instruments are also
sensitive to Fitch changing its assessment of the probability of
their non-performance relative to the risk captured in LBG's VR.
This could occur if there is a change in capital management or
flexibility, or an unexpected shift in regulatory buffers.

RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - LB'S GOVERNMENT-GUARANTEED
SENIOR DEBT

The ratings of LB's UK government-guaranteed senior debt is rated
in line with the UK sovereign rating (AA+/Stable) and is sensitive
to changes in that rating

The full list of rating actions is:

LBG
Long-term IDR: upgraded to 'A+' from 'A'; Stable Outlook
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'a' from 'a-'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Senior unsecured EMTN Long-term: upgraded to 'A+' from 'A'
Senior unsecured EMTN Short-term: affirmed at 'F1'
Senior unsecured notes: upgraded to 'A+' from 'A'
Subordinated debt (US53944YAA10): upgraded to 'A-' from 'BBB+'
All other lower Tier 2 subordinated enhanced capital notes:
upgraded to 'BBB+' from 'BBB'
Upper Tier 2 subordinated enhanced capital notes (XS0471770817,
XS473103348, XS0471767276, XS0473106283): upgraded to 'BBB' from
'BBB-'
All other Upper Tier 2 subordinated bonds: upgraded to 'BBB' from
'BBB-'
Subordinated non-innovative Tier 1 discretionary debt: upgraded to
'BB+' from 'BB'
Subordinated alternative Tier 1 instruments: upgraded to 'BB+ from
'BB'

LB
Long-term IDR: upgraded to 'A+' from 'A'; Stable Outlook
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'a' from 'a-'
Support Rating: : downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Senior unsecured Long-term debt: upgraded to 'A+' from 'A'
Commercial paper and senior unsecured Short-term debt: affirmed at
'F1'
Market linked securities: upgraded to 'A+emr' from 'Aemr'
Lower Tier 2: upgraded to 'A-' from 'BBB+'
Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'
Innovative Tier 1 subordinated non-discretionary debt
(US539473AE82, XS0474660676): upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'
Other Innovative Tier 1 subordinated discretionary debt: upgraded
to 'BB+' from 'BB'
Guaranteed senior debt affirmed at 'AA+'

HBOS
Long-term IDR: upgraded to 'A+' from 'A'; Stable Outlook
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'a' from 'a-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior unsecured debt: upgraded to 'A+' from 'A'
Innovative Tier 1 subordinated discretionary debt: upgraded to
'BB+' from 'BB'
Innovative Tier 1 subordinated non-discretionary debt: upgraded to
'BBB-' from 'BB+'
Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'
Lower Tier 2 debt: upgraded to 'A-' from 'BBB+'

BOS
Long-term IDR: upgraded to 'A+' from 'A'; Stable Outlook
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'a' from 'a-'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Senior unsecured debt: upgraded to 'A+' from 'A'
Commercial paper and senior unsecured Short-term debt: affirmed at
'F1'
Lower Tier 2: upgraded to 'A-' from 'BBB+'
Upper Tier 2: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'


NEW LOOK: S&P Affirms 'B' Corporate Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on U.K.-based apparel retailer New Look
Retail Group.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' issue ratings on the
group's senior secured debt instruments.  The recovery rating on
these notes is '3', reflecting S&P's expectation of meaningful
recovery (in the lower half of the 50%-70% range).

New Look and investment holding company Brait SE announced that
the latter will acquire about 90% of New Look for about GBP780
million from funds advised by Apax Partners and Permira.  The
Singh family, who founded New Look, and management will acquire
the remaining 10%.  Brait will fund the transaction using
available debt facilities and cash.  The transaction is expected
to close in June 2015. Apax and Permira have been the owners of
New Look for 11 years.

Due to the upcoming change in the shareholder structure, S&P has
revised its financial policy modifier from "financial sponsorship
(FS)-6" to "neutral."  This means that S&P's financial risk
assessment is no longer capped by the existence of a financial
sponsor.  However, as S&P's key leverage ratios remain broadly
unchanged, its assessment of the financial risk profile remains
unchanged, at "highly leveraged."

S&P continues to assess New Look's business risk profile as "fair"
under its criteria.  This reflects the group's well-established
market position and its strong focus on women's clothing and
accessories.  S&P considers this segment of the market to be
characterized by strong price competition, high seasonality, and
fast-changing fashion trends.  As a result, S&P believes the risk
of having to constantly refresh and adapt the apparel range and
sell off excess stock at large discounts is high.

S&P sees New Look's financial risk as consistent with S&P's
"highly leveraged" category.  S&P continues to forecast its two
core ratios -- funds from operations (FFO) to debt and debt to
EBITDA -- in the highest risk category.  However, in light of the
recent partial prepayments of its payment-in-kind (PIK) notes and
improving operating fundamentals, the ratios have improved.
Without factoring in further prepayments post May 2015, which
would improve S&P's future leverage assessment, it forecasts FFO
to debt approaching 10% by the end of the fiscal year ending
March 31, 2016, with debt to EBITDA ranging between 5.0x and 5.5x.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that New Look should be
able to maintain the necessary earnings capacity and financial
flexibility to sustain its "highly leveraged" debt structure.  In
particular, the group's high level of free cash flow generation of
GBP50 million-GBP70 million a year should enable management to
internally fund additional growth investments while continuing to
prepay its PIK notes.  New Look's adequate liquidity and
sufficient financial covenant headroom should, in S&P's opinion,
allow the group to withstand potential temporary operating
setbacks.  S&P believes that New Look will be able to maintain its
adjusted EBITDA interest coverage ratio at about 2x, equivalent to
reported EBITDA cash interest coverage of about 3x.

S&P would likely consider a positive rating action if New Look's
business operations grew more strongly than S&P currently
forecasts, on the back of a successful expansion strategy
translating into core leverage ratios falling into S&P's
"aggressive" category.  For example, this would occur if reported
EBITDA rose toward GBP250 million, causing FFO to debt to increase
to more than 12% and S&P's calculation of adjusted debt to EBITDA
to fall below 5.0x.

S&P might consider a negative rating action if negative sales
trends, in combination with a decline in New Look's reported
EBITDA margin to below 10%, caused adjusted EBITDA interest
coverage to fall significantly below 2x or FOCF to diminish
considerably.  A negative rating action might also occur should
the new owners of the group demand aggressive shareholder
remuneration or otherwise unexpectedly increase the group's
leverage.  Downside to S&P's current rating could also occur if it
was to assess liquidity as "less than adequate."


ROYAL BANK: Fitch Raises Rating on Sub. Upper Tier 2 Debt to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has today downgraded the Long- and Short-term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) of The Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBSG),
of Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (RBS), of National Westminster Bank
plc (NatWest), of Royal Bank of Scotland International Limited
(RBSIL) and Royal Bank of Scotland NV to 'BBB+'/F2' from 'A/F1'.
The Long and Short-term IDRs of RBSG's US-based broker dealer, RBS
Securities Inc. (RBSSI) have been downgraded to 'BBB+/F2' from
'A-/F1'.  The Outlook on the IDRs is Stable.

The rating actions are in conjunction with Fitch's review of
sovereign support for banks globally, which the agency announced
in March 2014.  In line with its expectations announced in March
last year and communicated regularly since then, Fitch believes
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives have substantially
reduced the likelihood of sovereign support for senior creditors
of UK banks, in line with developments at the EU level.  Following
the revision of our expectation for state support, the IDRs of
RBSG are now driven by the bank's standalone creditworthiness as
expressed in its Viability Rating (VR).

KEY RATING DRIVERS: IDRs, VRs AND SENIOR DEBT - RBSG, RBS AND
NATWEST

RBSG's, RBS's and NatWest's IDRs are driven by their standalone
creditworthiness and are hence equalized with their VRs.  Fitch
assesses their VR on a consolidated basis as they are managed as a
group and they are highly integrated.

The common VRs have been upgraded to 'bbb+' to reflect the
significant progress made in improving both the group's overall
risk profile and its capital position.  The group's organizational
structure is becoming increasingly simpler, with a significantly
moderated geographic footprint, reduced duplications, and improved
IT systems, processes and controls.

Capitalization has a high influence on the VRs.  The group has
generated almost 300bp of capital in the 15 months since end-2013,
largely through the deleveraging of its RBS Capital Resolution
(RCR) division or through the sale/winding down of some of its
capital-intensive investment banking business.

The group's reported ratios (CET1 of 11.5% at end-1Q15) do not yet
reflect the sale of nearly 60% of Citizens Financial Group (CFG)
as they exclude the large non-controlling interest and consolidate
all of CFG's risk-weighted assets (RWAs which represented 20% of
consolidated RWAs at end-1Q15).  Currently the group owns a 41%
stake in CFG, following the sale of a second tranche of shares in
March, but should be able to reach its target of below 35% by
year-end, the proportion at which it will be able to start to
deconsolidate it.  A full exit is targeted by end-2016, which
would release the rest of CFG's RWAs.

However, profitability -- the group's main weakness -- remains
under significant pressure from high restructuring costs (reducing
the scale and scope of its corporate and investment banking
business; separating the Williams and Glynn branches; preparing
for the implementation of a UK ring-fenced bank, and implementing
its transformation and simplification program) and because of
further large conduct and litigation costs (notably US RMBS-
related) the bank faces.  These are likely to continue to generate
large losses in 2015 and/or 2016, dependent on when they occur.

There is a risk that some material charges will be borne before
the capital benefit from exiting CFG will be realized.  However,
Fitch believes that the current capital base (GBP40 billion CET1
at end-1Q15 and around GBP47 billion Fitch Core Capital) and
likely RWA trajectory over 2015 (further de-risking and the sale
of only a small amount more of CFG would make the group's end-2015
target of less than GBP300 billion look achievable versus the
GBP349 billion position at end-1Q15) provides a meaningful
underlying cushion.

In the longer term, RBSG should be able to generate less volatile
and stronger profits.  The group is set to benefit from a more
targeted focus on its strong UK franchise where it has leading
market shares in various areas within the SME, retail and medium-
sized corporate space.  However, in the meantime, the continuing
restructuring of the group weighs on Fitch's overall assessment of
the group's company profile, management and strategy relative to
UK peers.

While the proportion of impaired loans on its balance sheet
remains high compared with UK peers, it has been reducing (6.4%
impaired loan ratio, on a statutory basis, at end-1Q15 versus 9% a
year earlier).  They are also significantly covered by impairment
reserves, reducing the proportion of the bank's capital which is
still at risk from negative asset valuations (net impaired
loans/Fitch Core Capital was around 18% at end-1Q15).

A large portion of its problematic assets are in the Republic of
Ireland extended through its subsidiary, Ulster Bank Ireland
Limited, where residential mortgage loans remain part of its core
activities but are significantly underperforming both in terms of
delinquencies and yield.

The bank now operates with a much more balanced funding profile,
with an improved balance between the maturities of its assets and
liabilities, with a much reduced reliance on wholesale
(particularly short-term) funds, and a large, high-quality
liquidity buffer.

The VR of RBSG is driven by the same factors as those that drive
the VRs of RBS and Natwest, but also takes into account the
absence of holding company double leverage.

RATING SENSITIVITIES: IDRs, VRs AND SENIOR DEBT - RBSG, RBS AND
NATWEST

Fitch considers that the IDRs and VRs are capable of gradual
improvement over the longer term but RSBG faces strong medium-term
challenges, particularly in terms of the uncertainty on the size
and timing or its expected regulatory fines it faces.  If the
fines imposed on the bank are particularly expensive or if any
litigation or reputation impact becomes particularly disruptive,
the ratings of RBSG could be downgraded.

In the longer-term, and reflecting its strong core franchise
across many segments, Fitch sees potential for the VRs of the
group's core operating banks to reach the 'a' category, assuming a
strengthening in revenue generation and stronger control over
costs.  Other key drivers for an upgrade would include further
reduction in risk, greater visibility on its ability to execute
its new core strategy and cost reduction, and the outcome of
overhanging political, litigation and conduct risk.

However, depending on how capital is transmitted within the group
from the holding company, on the level of ultimate double-leverage
at the holding company and on the breakdown of activities
undertaken by the different entities of the group, it is possible
that some rating differentiation between the various group
entities would emerge, both in terms of VR and IDR, over the
medium to longer-term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES: SR and SRF - RBSG, RBS AND
NATWEST

The downgrade of RBSG's, RBS's and Natwest's SRs to '5' from '1'
and revision of their Support Rating Floors (SRF) to 'No Floor'
from 'A' reflects Fitch's view that senior creditors can no longer
rely on receiving full extraordinary support from the UK sovereign
in the event that either RBSG, RBS or NatWest become non-viable.

In Fitch's view, the UK's bank resolution framework is now
sufficiently progressed to provide a framework for resolving banks
that is likely to require senior creditors participating in
losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving
sovereign support.  In the EU, BRRD has been effective in member
states since 1 January 2015, including minimum loss absorption
requirements before resolution financing or alternative financing
(eg, government stabilization funds) can be used.  Full
application of BRRD, including the bail-in tool, is required in
the EU from Jan. 1, 2016.  In the UK, legislation to allow for the
bail-in of senior creditors has been in place since January 2015.

Any upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks.  While not impossible, this is highly unlikely.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - RBS NV, RBSIL AND RBSSI

The IDRs of RBS NV are equalized with RBSG's, reflecting a high
probability that RBSG would support it, if needed.  It is a fairly
small, but wholly owned, integrated subsidiary of the group, akin
to a division, whose default would have serious implications for
the wider group.  Its SR has been downgraded to '2' from '1'
because of the downgrade of RBSG's Long-term IDR.

The IDRs of RBSIL are equalized with RBSG, reflecting a high
probability that RBSG would support it, if needed.  This is
reflected in the assignment of a SR of '2'.  It is a fairly small,
but wholly owned and integrated deposit-gathering subsidiary of
the group, whose default would have serious implications for the
wider group.

The ratings of these subsidiaries are sensitive to a change in
Fitch's assessment of RBSG's propensity to support them (which
Fitch considers unlikely) or to a change in RBSG's IDRs.

The IDRs of RBSSI, RBSG's US broker dealer, are also equalized
with RBSG's IDRs, reflecting the refocused activities at RBSSI
which are viewed as well-aligned with RBSG's strategy, and the
reduced size of the organization which indicates that the ability
to support RBSSI, relative to RBSG's financial resources, would be
manageable.

Although no explicit guarantees or cross default provisions are
present, a default of RBSSI would be viewed as posing significant
reputational risk to RBSG.

The assignment of a SR of '2' to RBSSI reflects Fitch's view that
there is a high propensity of support being extended to RBSSI from
RBSG.

The ratings and Outlook of RBSSI are primarily sensitive to
changes in the ratings and Outlook of RBSG, and therefore, would
be expected to move in step with any changes to RBSG's ratings or
Outlook.  In addition, RBSSI's ratings could be negatively
influenced by a change in Fitch's perception of the likelihood of
support being extended to RBSSI from RBSG.  This could result in
notching between the ratings if Fitch views the propensity to
support as being materially diminished.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND
HYBRID RATINGS

The ratings of all subordinated debt and hybrid securities issued
by RBSG group companies are notched down from the common VR
assigned to individual group companies, reflecting a combination
of Fitch's assessment of their incremental non-performance risk
relative to their VRs (up to three notches) and assumptions around
loss severity (one or two notches).

These features vary considerably by instrument: subordinated debt
with no coupon flexibility is notched down once from the VR for
incremental loss severity; upper tier 2 subordinated debt is
notched down three times (once for loss severity and twice for
incremental non-performance risk); innovative tier 1 and preferred
stock is notched down either four or five times, dependent on
incremental non-performance risk (twice for loss severity and
either two or three times for incremental non-performance risk).

The ratings are primarily sensitive to changes in the VRs of the
issuers or their parents.

The rating of RBS Holdings USA Inc's commercial paper program,
which is equalized with the Short-term IDR of RBSG, reflects the
unconditional guarantee provided by its ultimate parent.  It has
been downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1', in line with the parent's
downgrade, and withdrawn as the program will no longer be used.

LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

RBSG
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A'; Stable Outlook
Senior unsecured debt: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A'
Senior unsecured market linked securities: downgraded to 'BBB+emr'
from 'Aemr'
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
Commercial paper: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bbb+' from 'bbb'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'
Subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'
Innovative, Non-innovative Tier 1 and Preferred stock: upgraded to
'BB-' from 'B+'
USD1.2bn, US780097AH44; GBP200m XS0121856859; USD1bn US780097AE13
and USD300m US7800978790: upgraded to 'BB' from 'BB-'

RBS
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A'; Stable Outlook
Senior unsecured debt: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A'
Senior unsecured market linked securities: downgraded to 'BBB+emr'
from 'Aemr'
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
Commercial paper: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bbb+' from 'bbb'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Subordinated Lower Tier 2 debt upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'
Subordinated Upper Tier 2 debt upgraded to 'BB+' from 'BB'
EUR1bn dated subordinated debt, XS0201065496 upgraded to 'BBB-'
from 'BB+'
National Westminster Bank plc
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A'; Stable Outlook
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
Long-term and Short-term senior unsecured debt: downgraded to
'BBB+/F2' from 'A'/ 'F1'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bbb+' from 'bbb'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '1'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'A'
Subordinated Lower Tier 2 debt: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'
Subordinated Upper Tier 2 debt: upgraded to 'BB+' from 'BB'

RBS NV
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A'; Stable Outlook
Senior unsecured debt: downgraded to 'BBB+'/'F2' from 'A'/'F1'
Senior unsecured market linked securities: downgraded to 'BBB+emr'
from 'Aemr'
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2'
Support Rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'
Subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'

RBS International Ltd
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A'; Stable Outlook
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
Support Rating assigned at '2'
RBS Holding USA Inc
CP programme: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1' and withdrawn
RBS Securities Inc.
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'; Stable Outlook
Short-term IDR downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
Support Rating assigned at '2'


THPA FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB-(sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in THPA Finance Ltd.  S&P's rating on the class A2 notes
remains on CreditWatch negative.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Lowered to 'BB- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' and removed from
      negative outlook its rating on the class B notes; and

   -- Raised to 'BB- (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' and removed from
      negative outlook S&P's rating on the class C notes.

The transaction is a corporate securitization of the operating
business of PD Portco Ltd., the borrower, which closed in April
2001.  The cash flows that support the rated notes issued by THPA
Finance are derived from the operations of a borrowing group that
sits within the securitization group, comprised of PD Teesport
Ltd. (PDT), PD Port Services Ltd. (PDPS), PD Logistics Ltd. (PDL),
and Tees and Hartlepool Pilotage Company Ltd. (TH Pilotage).

PD Teesport owns and operates the port of Tees and Hartlepool; PD
Port Services provides shipping services at ports on the Humber,
Trent, and Ouse rivers and provides dry goods warehousing at
Felixstowe; TH Pilotage provides boarding and landing services to,
and collects pilotage fees as agent on behalf of, self-employed
pilots; and PD Logistics is a non-trading company.  Across the
group, the operations are divided into four major revenue streams,
which are associated with specific borrowers: Bulk Port Operations
(PDT and PDPS); Unitised Port Operations (PDT and PDPS);
Conservancy (PDT and TH Pilotage); and Estate Management (PDT).
The notes are secured by fixed and floating charges over all of
the assets of THPA Finance and of the borrowing group.

"Our ratings address the full and timely payment of interest and
timely payment of principal due on the notes.  We base this
primarily on our ongoing assessment of the underlying business
risk of the borrowers, the integrity of the legal and tax
structure of the transaction, and the robustness of the cash flow
supported by structural enhancements," S&P said.

S&P's rating actions follow its review of THPA Finance's
performance and its meeting with its management.  S&P continues to
view the PD Portco group's business risk profile as
"satisfactory."

PD Portco's performance was largely in line with S&P's
expectations for the fiscal year 2014 and the revenue, EBITDA, and
EBITDA margins considerably improved over previous years: the
company reported revenue of GBP123.3 million, a 5.0% improvement
over 2013; EBITDA, at GBP41.3 million, was 13% higher than in 2013
and the highest for five years; and the EBITDA margin at 33.5% was
above 2013's 31.1%.

With respect to the performance of each business segment:

   -- Port Operations reported strong EBITDA growth of 13.75%
      (GBP14.2 million in fiscal year 2014 compared with GBP12.5
      million in fiscal year 2013), which was primarily due to
      new customer and contract wins in both bulks and unitized
      areas and improvement in utilization of container capacity
      at Tees.

   -- Conservancy & Property registered a flat EBITDA (GBP32.4
      million in fiscal year 2014 from GBP32.3 million in fiscal
      year 2013).

   -- PD Portco incurred significant capital expenditure (capex)
      of GBP28.1 million, including GBP19.0 million maintenance
      and GBP9.1 million development capex in fiscal year 2014
      (compared with maintenance capex of GBP4.6 million and
      development capex of GBP5.5 million in fiscal year 2013).
      The maintenance capex was mainly related to investment in
      the No. 1 Quay repair project at Tees Dock and the plant
      replacement program, while the development capex was
      predominantly related to the refurbishment of port-centric
      warehouses and the intermodal rail terminal project.

In fiscal year 2015, S&P expects PD Portco's revenue growth to
continue, supported by a long-term contract with the U.K. division
of Sahaviriya Steel Industries (SSI UK), which owns and operates a
steel plant on the River Tees, on the one hand, and
diversification and de-risking from SSI UK on the other.  In
particular, S&P expects revenue growth to come from its container
business and the delivery of large projects aimed at increasing
its competitiveness.  Recent investments by PD Portco's customers
are also increasing the attractiveness of Teesside as an area in
which to conduct business.

Portco's covenanted EBITDA debt service coverage ratio (DSCR),
1.54x, was comfortably above the default level (1.25x) and lockup
(1.50x) levels.  However, the borrower remained restricted from
making payments outside of the borrowing group or on subordinated
debt as, due to its significant capex investment in 2014, the
actual net cash DSCR (0.82x) remained below the restricted payment
condition level (1.35x).

The noteholders benefit from first-ranking security rights over
the PD Portco group's cash flow-generating assets, even if the
borrower becomes insolvent, which allows us to "look beyond" the
insolvency of the borrower and base S&P's analysis on a long-term
cash flow analysis in which it projects its business performance
under scenarios corresponding to specific rating levels.

The cash flows we project under each rating scenario in S&P's
analysis are based upon its view of the PD Portco group's business
risk profile.  In addition, they are guided by the parameters
defined in S&P's criteria "Understanding Standard & Poor's Rating
Definitions," published on June 3, 2009.  S&P subsequently applies
its projected cash flows available for debt service at each rating
level in line with the priority of payments.

RATING RATIONALE

S&P's ratings on the class A2 notes reflect the borrower's
business risk profile of "satisfactory," which is in line with
S&P's criteria.

Before taking counterparty considerations into account, S&P
projects that, at rating levels above 'A-', the cash flow
generated by the securitized business, along with the credit
enhancement provided by the liquidity facility, would be
sufficient to meet the interest and principal obligations on the
class A2 notes.  However, S&P do not consider the bank account and
the liquidity facility agreements to be in line with its current
counterparty criteria.  Therefore, S&P's rating on the class A2
notes is currently constrained by the lower of its long-term
issuer credit ratings on the counterparties.

Given this counterparty constraint, S&P's 'A- (sf)' rating on the
class A2 notes remains on CreditWatch negative, reflecting the
counterparty risk associated with the bank account provider,
National Westminster PLC, and the liquidity facility provider,
Lloyds Bank PlC, which S&P reflected in its recent rating actions.
S&P expects to resolve all of the CreditWatch placements following
the resolution of the bank CreditWatch actions.

Neither the class B notes nor the class C notes have the benefit
of liquidity support.  In corporate securitization transactions,
one of S&P's primary assumptions is that the issuer is able to
survive the borrower's insolvency without defaulting -- a primary
consideration in whether S&P can base a rating upon its cash flow
stresses.  To make such an assumption, S&P typically looks for an
appropriately-sized liquidity facility available for the issuer to
make timely payments to the noteholders -- as well as any other
obligations that rank senior in the waterfall to the
notes -- during any workout period following the borrower's
insolvency and the appointment of an administrative receiver.  The
class B and C notes, however, do not have the benefit of the
liquidity facility, which only covers interest and principal on
the class A2 notes.

As a result of the lack of liquidity support, the class B and C
notes do not benefit from the structural enhancements that S&P
typically looks for as mitigating factors to the borrower's
operational risks.  Therefore, the potential ratings uplift for
the class B and class C notes above the creditworthiness of the
borrowing group itself (PD Portco) is constrained.

Moreover, the creditworthiness of the class B and C notes are
equal since neither would be able to survive the borrower's
insolvency above a stress commensurate with a 'BB- (sf)' rating.
S&P has therefore lowered to 'BB- (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' its rating
on the class B notes and raised to 'BB- (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' its
rating on the class C notes.  S&P has removed the negative
outlooks from these ratings.

S&P would lower the business risk profile to "fair" if it was to
become aware of the risk of SSI UK closing down in the near
future.  However, in S&P's view this is now very unlikely.

Given the reliance on SSI UK as a single material customer, as
well as the mature industrial basin around the port and the
relatively small customer goods target market in North England,
S&P do not foresee an increase in the business risk profile score.

RATINGS LIST

THPA Finance Ltd.
GBP305 Million Fixed- And Floating-Rate Asset-Backed Notes

Class                 Rating
            To                     From

Rating Lowered And Negative Outlook Removed

B           BB- (sf)               BB (sf)/Negative

Rating Raised And Negative Outlook Removed

C           BB- (sf)               B+ (sf)/Negative


Rating Kept On CreditWatch Negative

A2          A- (sf)/Watch Neg


* UK: Insolvency Profession Rescues 10,400 Insolvent Businesses
---------------------------------------------------------------
The UK's insolvency profession helped rescue approximately two-in-
five insolvent businesses* in 2013-14, according to research by
ComRes and R3, the insolvency trade body.

The research found that R3 members helped around 6,700 businesses
(41% of formal insolvencies*) continue trading in some way after
entering insolvency, helping to save around 230,000 jobs.
Phillip Sykes, President of R3, says: "There is much more to
insolvency than business or personal finance failure.  As the
economy continues to recover from recession, business recovery and
renewal will be an important part of the economic landscape."
"Insolvency practitioners witness first-hand the human cost of
business failure and will make every effort to protect jobs where
possible.  The sooner insolvency practitioners' advice is sought,
the more chance there is of business and job rescue. The
insolvency profession is increasingly helping businesses outside
of formal insolvency procedures too."

In total, around 10,400 businesses continued operating after
working with the insolvency profession, either benefitting from
support in a formal insolvency or working with the profession to
avoid insolvency.  These businesses employed approximately 540,000
after receiving support.

The profession also provided advice to around 135,000 people about
their personal finances.

Phillip Sykes adds: "The insolvency profession is there to ensure
a balance between creditors and debtors.  Insolvency practitioners
have a responsibility to creditors to make sure they are repaid as
much of their money as possible, and help make sure businesses and
individuals do not get away with reckless or fraudulent racking-up
of debt."

"The next five years could see key changes to the insolvency
landscape.  Household debts are rising again, while the current
climate of creditor forbearance, record low inflation, and record
low interest rates may not last.  Problem debt is a major policy
issue for the new Government; the insolvency profession has a
unique insight into the effects problem debt has -- and,
importantly, how it can be tackled."

The research also found that, last year, the insolvency profession
was set to help individuals repay GBP5 billion in debts to
creditors over the next five years.

There are around 1,750 insolvency practitioners in the UK, with
around 12,000 people employed in various roles within the
insolvency profession.

UK insolvencies peaked in 2009 with 26,000 business insolvencies
and 160,000 personal insolvencies; by 2014, business and personal
insolvencies had fallen to 18,000 and 114,000 respectively.

*Insolvencies where an insolvency practitioner was appointed
(approx. 85% of formal insolvencies)



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* European Banks Still Highly Vulnerable to Failure
---------------------------------------------------
European banks are as vulnerable to failing today as they were in
the run-up to the 2008 global economic crash and subsequent
recession, new research published on May 12, 2015 has found.

In the first study to compare sources of systemic risk in European
banks, economists found banks in southern countries, including
France, Spain and Italy, are highly vulnerable to failure.  Banks
in northern countries appear to be more resilient.

Dr. Nikos Paltalidis, of the University of Portsmouth Business
School, lead the research, which is published in the Journal of
Banking and Finance.

He said: "The results give a vivid picture of financial contagion
and the domino effect in the banking sector.  The risks are still
substantial and a repeat of the last financial crisis is feasible.

"The banking industry has been grappling with ways of measuring
and reducing systemic risk since the collapse of the Lehman
Brothers bank in 2008.  That collapse and subsequent worldwide
recession was the canary in the mine, it showed how fragile the
financial system was, and how quickly economic shocks
reverberated.

"Our findings indicate that despite all the efforts to improve the
resilience of banking, some banks are as vulnerable today as they
were before the last banking crisis, they are just as likely to
fail.

"In case of a financial or economic shock, we found that banks
would experience losses big enough to reduce their capital below
the required regulatory minimum, because the quality of equity on
the biggest European lenders is not sufficient enough to mitigate
systemic crisis."

The researchers modelled a range of inter-connected, dynamic
economic shocks on 170 Eurozone banks in 16 countries, and the
spread of that effect to other countries from 2005-2013.

The researchers used three independent channels of systemic risk -
- the interbank loan market, the sovereign credit risk market and
the asset-backed loan market -- to test which banks were resilient
and to track how shocks spread between domestic and international
banks.

Their models did not take into account any government or central
bank interventions, such as bail-outs.

Dr. Paltalidis said: "In theory, the new capital rules adopted by
'systemically important' banks should be able to endure a 10 per
cent fall in the value of their assets before placing panicky
calls to the central bank.  Also, the euro area banking system
seems to be fundamentally solvent, according to several stress
tests.  However, our study provides ample evidence that this
hypothesis does not hold in practice, indicating that similar to
the pre-2009 period systemic risk is enormously underestimated
once again."

The findings include that although a shock in the interbank loan
market triggers the highest expected losses, a shock in sovereign
debt risk transmits fastest and causes a cascade of losses for
other banks.  The results reveal that a sharp rise in government
borrowing costs would have a destructive ripple effect across the
region's financial institutions.

The speed of contagion and the expected bank failures are markedly
more prominent in the southern euro area banking systems.

In one of the models, France, Spain and Italy appear to be
dramatically more exposed to failing compared to their neighbors,
with France losing EUR73 billion compared to Belgium's EUR6
billion after the same economic shock from the same source.
Dr. Paltalidis said: "The European banking system remains highly
vulnerable and conducive to financial contagion, which implies
that the policies designed to reduce systemic risk are not
necessarily doing the job.  The findings suggest we might need
additional policies to better protect the Eurozone and increase
the resilience of the financial system."


* BOND PRICING: For the Week May 18, 2015 to May 22, 2015
---------------------------------------------------------

Issuer               Coupon   Maturity  Currency   Price
------               ------   --------  --------   -----
Ukreximbank Via Bi    8.38    7/27/2015    USD    75.50
Alcatel-Lucent        4.25     7/1/2018    EUR     3.84
OAS Investments Gm    8.25   10/19/2019    USD    17.00
Heckler & Koch Gmb    9.50    5/15/2018    EUR    74.39
Heta Asset Resolut    4.38    1/24/2017    EUR    59.13
Ukraine Government    9.25    7/24/2017    USD    45.75
Brunswick Rail Fin    6.50    11/1/2017    USD    60.00
Far East Capital L    8.00     5/2/2018    USD    53.50
Metinvest BV          8.75    2/14/2018    USD    60.75
Ukreximbank Via Bi    8.75    1/22/2018    USD    67.13
QGOG Constellation    6.25    11/9/2019    USD    72.76
Alcatel-Lucent        0.13    1/30/2020    EUR     4.59
Avangardco Investm   10.00   10/29/2015    USD    46.98
Oschadbank Via SSB    8.25    3/10/2016    USD    66.00
Metinvest BV         10.25    5/20/2015    USD    68.75
Hellenic Republic     5.00    3/11/2019    EUR    64.25
NBG Finance PLC       4.38    4/30/2019    EUR    63.34
Heta Asset Resolut    4.25   10/31/2016    EUR    59.00
Takko Luxembourg 2    9.88    4/15/2019    EUR    48.50
Ukraine Government    4.95   10/13/2015    EUR    45.00
Privatbank CJSC Vi    9.38    9/23/2015    USD    65.38
Ukraine Government    6.88    9/23/2015    USD    50.75
Ukraine Railways v    9.50    5/21/2018    USD    58.25
Piraeus Group Fina    5.00    3/27/2017    EUR    68.63
Alpha Credit Group    3.38    6/17/2017    EUR    71.21
Oschadbank Via SSB    8.88    3/20/2018    USD    65.00
HSH Nordbank AG/Lu    2.64                 EUR    35.70
Aegon NV              0.39                 EUR    72.91
Tonon Luxembourg S   10.50    5/14/2024    USD    44.50
UKRLANDFARMING PLC   10.88    3/26/2018    USD    53.97
DTEK Finance PLC      7.88     4/4/2018    USD    48.25
Public Power Corp     5.50     5/1/2019    EUR    71.92
Heta Asset Resolut    2.75    5/31/2016    CHF    58.00
Norske Skogindustr    7.00    6/26/2017    EUR    70.02
Norwegian Energy C    6.50     3/6/2018    NOK    59.63
Singulus Technolog    7.75    3/23/2017    EUR    42.25
Nordea Bank AB        0.70                 EUR    74.77
Iona Energy Co UK    12.50    9/27/2018    USD    32.00
Asya Sukuk Co Ltd     7.50    3/28/2023    USD    62.00
Hellenic Railways     4.68   10/29/2015    EUR    70.13
Ukraine Government    7.80   11/28/2022    USD    45.25
EXIM of Ukraine CJ    5.79     2/9/2016    USD    50.06
First Ukrainian In   11.00   12/31/2018    USD    50.82
Public Power Corp     4.75     5/1/2017    EUR    74.00
Bank of New York M    4.55   12/15/2050    EUR    66.50
Peugeot SA            4.45     1/1/2016    EUR    29.37
Indo Energy Financ    6.38    1/24/2023    USD    65.88
WPE International    10.38    9/30/2020    USD     6.25
HSH Nordbank AG       7.25                 USD    43.86
ERB Hellas PLC        4.25    6/26/2018    EUR    63.00
Virgolino de Olive   10.50    1/28/2018    USD     3.66
CHC Helicopter SA     9.38     6/1/2021    USD    65.06
City of Kyiv Via K    9.38    7/11/2016    USD    46.25
OGX Austria GmbH      8.50     6/1/2018    USD     0.29
Banco Espirito San    7.13   11/28/2023    EUR     9.00
Privatbank CJSC Vi   10.88    2/28/2018    USD    60.02
AXA SA                0.54                 EUR    72.47
AXA SA                0.85                 EUR    73.93
Metinvest BV         10.50   11/28/2017    USD    59.65
City of Kiev Ukrai    8.00    11/6/2015    USD    48.00
Paragon Offshore P    6.75    7/15/2022    USD    42.25
Afren PLC             6.63    12/9/2020    USD    44.00
Afren PLC            10.25     4/8/2019    USD    44.00
Yuksel Insaat AS      9.50   11/10/2015    USD    68.75
Athens Urban Trans    4.85    9/19/2016    EUR    68.13
Hellenic Republic     5.80    7/14/2015    JPY    73.88
Oesterreichische V   10.00                 EUR     0.71
Banque Federative     1.02                 EUR    63.13
Far East Capital L    8.75     5/2/2020    USD    44.00
ING Groep NV          0.45                 EUR    71.96
Commercial Bank Pr    5.80     2/9/2016    USD    36.63
Banca delle Marche    0.99     6/1/2017    EUR    49.75
Afren PLC            11.50     2/1/2016    USD    43.00
Hema Bondco II BV     8.50   12/15/2019    EUR    65.96
Paragon Offshore P    7.25    8/15/2024    USD    42.00
Mriya Agro Holding    9.45    4/19/2018    USD    11.01
Ukraine Government    6.58   11/21/2016    USD    45.50
Credit Agricole SA    0.71                 EUR    64.48
OSX 3 Leasing BV     13.00    3/20/2015    USD    59.25
Ukraine Government    6.25    6/17/2016    USD    45.50
Financing of Infra    9.00    12/7/2017    USD    44.00
IMMOFINANZ AG         4.25     3/8/2018    EUR     4.77
Oesterreichische V    0.89   11/28/2016    EUR    50.50
ING Groep NV          0.85                 EUR    73.87
SOITEC                6.75    9/18/2018    EUR     1.60
Bank of New York M    4.26   12/30/2099    EUR    33.00
Ukraine Government    7.95    2/23/2021    USD    45.00
Econocom Group SA/    1.50    1/15/2019    EUR    11.33
Aegon NV              4.16                 NLG    69.93
Depfa Funding II L    6.50                 EUR    60.09
Ekotechnika GmbH      9.75    5/10/2018    EUR    11.25
Etablissements Mau    1.63     7/1/2019    EUR    15.49
CGG SA                1.25     1/1/2019    EUR    27.46
Rothschilds Contin    0.96                 EUR    57.35
Hellenic Republic     2.09    7/25/2057    EUR    16.63
Heta Asset Resolut    0.10    5/31/2016    EUR    58.90
Caixa Terrassa Soc    1.43                 EUR    64.78
Santander Internat    2.00                 USD    48.00
Faurecia              3.25     1/1/2018    EUR    42.76
Phones4u Finance P    9.50     4/1/2018    GBP    31.88
Hellenic Republic     5.20    7/17/2034    EUR    56.75
Depfa Funding III     1.72                 EUR    57.91
Russian Standard B   11.50    1/17/2024    USD    58.00
CNP Assurances        0.53                 EUR    64.99
Norske Skog Holdin    8.00    2/24/2021    EUR    68.13
Air France-KLM        2.03    2/15/2023    EUR    11.46
Codere Finance Lux    8.25    6/15/2015    EUR    63.88
Hellenic Railways     4.03    3/17/2017    EUR    67.63
Danske Bank Oyj       0.73                 EUR    65.08
Hellenic Republic     5.00    8/22/2016    JPY    66.25
Phosphorus Holdco    10.00     4/1/2019    GBP     1.94
Banque Federative     0.83                 EUR    62.98
Transcapitalbank J    7.74    7/18/2017    USD    73.50
Santander Finance     0.62                 EUR    68.28
Ukraine Government    6.75   11/14/2017    USD    45.25
Pescanova SA          5.13    4/20/2017    EUR     3.00
HSBC Bank PLC         0.75                 USD    60.86
BNP Paribas Fortis    2.03                 EUR    74.62
Meyer Burger Techn    4.00    9/24/2020    CHF    68.72
Capital Raising Gm    7.50                 EUR    11.83
Piraeus Group Fina    1.85    7/20/2016    EUR    64.55
NIBC Bank NV          0.67                 EUR    56.13
Sydbank A/S           1.22                 EUR    64.52
Banca delle Marche    1.18    6/15/2016    EUR    47.75
Meyer Burger Techn    5.00    5/24/2017    CHF    71.27
Eurobank Ergasias     1.64     6/8/2017    EUR    45.80
Virgolino de Olive   10.88    1/13/2020    USD    25.50
NTRP Via Interpipe   10.25     8/2/2017    USD    25.38
OGX Austria GmbH      8.38     4/1/2022    USD     0.30
Rothschilds Contin    0.69                 USD    52.39
Hellenic Railways     5.01   12/27/2017    EUR    68.75
ESFIL-Espirito San    5.25    6/12/2015    EUR     2.65
Renaissance Credit   13.50    5/22/2019    USD    65.38
Virgolino de Olive   11.75     2/9/2022    USD     1.13
Norshore Atlantic    12.00   12/21/2018    USD    55.02
Tonon Luxembourg S   10.50    5/14/2024    USD    35.00
HSBC Bank PLC         0.69                 USD    60.78
Credit Mutuel Arke    0.86                 EUR    61.12
NIBC Bank NV          2.13                 USD    65.79
Banco Espirito San    2.67                 EUR    11.38
Assystem              4.50                 EUR    28.39
Vseukrainsky Aktsi    9.00    6/14/2019    USD     1.94
Nexity SA             0.63     1/1/2020    EUR    49.83
BPCE SA               0.54                 EUR    62.67
Depfa Funding IV L    5.03                 EUR    60.09
Talvivaara Mining     4.00   12/16/2015    EUR     0.81
Mriya Agro Holding   10.95    3/30/2016    USD     9.95
Aralco Finance SA    10.13     5/7/2020    USD     9.10
Praktiker AG          5.88    2/10/2016    EUR     0.12
Jasper Explorer PL   13.50    5/27/2016    USD     5.38
Lambay Capital Sec    6.25                 GBP     1.36
BLT Finance BV        7.50    5/15/2014    USD     5.25
Hellenic Republic     6.14    4/14/2028    EUR    68.13
Island Drilling Co    9.50     4/3/2018    USD    56.63
Ageasfinlux SA        1.40                 EUR    64.05
DF Deutsche Forfai    7.88    5/27/2020    EUR    58.50
Jyske Bank A/S        0.98                 EUR    65.67
Hellenic Republic     5.25     2/1/2016    JPY    65.00
Scandinavian Airli    2.38                 CHF    32.13
Noreco Norway AS      6.50     3/6/2018    NOK    55.88
OAS Investments Gm    8.25   10/19/2019    USD    15.25
Orco Property Grou    7.00    11/7/2019    EUR    74.00
Orpea                 1.75     1/1/2020    EUR    66.70
Paragon Offshore P    7.25    8/15/2024    USD    41.00
Paragon Offshore P    6.75    7/15/2022    USD    41.00
HSBC Bank PLC         0.60                 USD    60.77
Astana Finance BV     7.88     6/8/2010    EUR    12.50
Pescanova SA          8.75    2/17/2019    EUR     3.00
Cooperatieve Centr    0.50   11/26/2021    ZAR    55.47
Hellenic Republic     4.50     7/3/2017    JPY    65.25
Heta Asset Resolut    0.76    1/24/2017    EUR     3.26
Finance and Credit    9.25    1/25/2019    USD    10.00
Virgolino de Olive   10.88    1/13/2020    USD    11.00
Financing of Infra    7.40    4/20/2018    USD    43.50
Pierre & Vacances     3.50    10/1/2019    EUR    38.07
Espirito Santo Fin    6.88   10/21/2019    EUR     0.09
ATF Capital BV       10.00                 USD    65.63
Oesterreichische V    9.00    7/26/2018    EUR    48.75
Takko Luxembourg 2    7.01    4/15/2019    EUR    45.46
Nexans SA             4.00     1/1/2016    EUR    55.17
Dexia Credit Local    4.30                 EUR     5.88
Hellenic Republic     4.50    11/8/2016    JPY    65.63
BNP Paribas SA        0.48                 USD    61.50
Caisse Federale du    1.17                 EUR    61.00
International Indu    9.00     7/6/2011    EUR     0.70
Hellenic Railways     4.50    12/6/2016    JPY    68.88
Ukraine Railways v    9.50    5/21/2018    USD    40.00
Banco Espanol de C    0.61                 EUR    67.55
Corporate Commerci    8.25     8/8/2014    USD     2.87
PA Resources AB      13.50     3/3/2016    SEK     4.63
Ajecorp BV            6.50    5/14/2022    USD    69.50
Pohjola Bank Oyj      0.64                 EUR    69.47
TAG Immobilien AG     6.50   12/10/2015    EUR    11.91
Koninklijke Luchtv    0.75                 CHF    30.10
Le Noble Age          4.88     1/3/2016    EUR    18.87
National Westminst    0.63                 USD    63.00
Financing of Infra    8.38    11/3/2017    USD    44.00
Hybrid Raising Gmb    6.63                 EUR    12.13
Global PVQ SE         6.75   10/21/2015    EUR     0.94
Espirito Santo Fin    3.13    12/2/2018    EUR     2.00
Laurel GmbH           7.13   11/16/2017    EUR    35.75
Breeze Finance SA     6.71    4/19/2027    EUR    44.00
RENE LEZARD Mode G    7.25   11/25/2017    EUR    33.71
International Indu   11.00    2/19/2013    USD     0.70
Belfius Bank SA/NV    2.05                 FRF    55.00
Virgolino de Olive   10.50    1/28/2018    USD     1.10
Petrol AD             8.38    1/26/2017    EUR    25.00
Metinvest BV          8.75    2/14/2018    USD    40.25
Astana Finance BV     9.00   11/16/2011    USD    12.50
JZ Capital Partner    6.00    7/30/2021    GBP    11.00
Cirio Holding Luxe    6.25    2/16/2004    EUR     2.14
Hellenic Republic     5.25     2/1/2016    JPY    65.00
IM Skaugen SE         9.60    6/30/2016    NOK    50.01
BOA Offshore AS       8.04   12/18/2018    NOK    69.38
Kezizalog Zrt         7.75    10/1/2018    EUR     7.53
BDT Media Automati    8.13    10/9/2017    EUR    58.38
Songa Offshore        7.50   12/11/2018    NOK    73.88
Lehman Brothers UK    5.75                 EUR     0.01
SNS Bank NV          11.25                 EUR     0.85
SNS Bank NV           6.25   10/26/2020    EUR     2.42
Heta Asset Resolut    0.14    5/31/2016    EUR    54.38
Heta Asset Resolut    4.35    11/3/2016    EUR     3.29
Barclays Bank PLC     1.56                 GBP    71.10
Commerzbank Holdin    0.75                 USD    59.59
Air Berlin Finance    1.50    4/11/2027    EUR    75.00
Jyske Bank A/S        0.74                 EUR    65.65
Afren PLC            10.25     4/8/2019    USD    42.00
MS Deutschland Bet    6.88   12/18/2017    EUR    16.00
Brunswick Rail Fin    6.50    11/1/2017    USD    41.02
Rena GmbH             8.25    7/11/2018    EUR     8.63
Societe Air France    2.75     4/1/2020    EUR    20.58
Hellenic Bank PCL    10.00                 EUR    50.00
Windreich GmbH        6.50    7/15/2016    EUR    10.88
Far East Capital L    8.00     5/2/2018    USD    53.50
Nordea Bank Norge     0.56                 USD    63.17
PA Resources AB      12.25     4/5/2016    NOK     4.91
OGX Austria GmbH      8.50     6/1/2018    USD     0.01
APP International    11.75    10/1/2005    USD     0.01
Norske Skog Holdin    8.00    2/24/2023    USD    64.25
Barclays Bank PLC     0.63                 USD    60.50
Ukraine Government    5.00   12/20/2015    USD    51.13
Banco Comercial Po    5.00                 EUR    67.00
Lloyds Bank PLC       0.60                 USD    62.58
Virgolino de Olive   11.75     2/9/2022    USD     1.10
Pescanova SA          6.75     3/5/2015    EUR     3.33
Etablissements Mau    7.13    7/31/2015    EUR    13.42
Dannemora Mineral    11.75    3/22/2016    USD     0.67
Bank of Scotland P    0.63                 USD    62.46
Den Norske Creditb    0.53                 USD    61.88
Lehman Brothers UK    5.13                 EUR     0.03
Golden Gate AG        6.50   10/11/2014    EUR    37.10
Popular Capital SA    0.70                 EUR    59.00
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.63    2/28/2015    USD    14.13
Talvivaara Mining     9.75     4/4/2017    EUR     0.04
friedola Gebr Holz    7.25    4/11/2017    EUR    41.75
Societe Generale S    0.44                 USD    61.50
Raiffeisenlandesba    4.40    4/17/2024    EUR    72.75
Mox Telecom AG        7.25    11/2/2017    EUR     2.55
Metinvest BV         10.25    5/20/2015    USD    65.50
Barclays Bank PLC     0.63                 USD    60.58
QGOG Constellation    6.25    11/9/2019    USD    63.00
More & More AG        8.13    6/11/2018    EUR    48.75
Mechel                8.40    5/27/2021    RUB    57.01
GNB - Cia de Segur    3.53                 EUR    67.90
Dexia SA              4.89                 EUR     8.75
Heta Asset Resolut    1.91    9/29/2016    JPY    49.00
Heta Asset Resolut    5.92    2/22/2022    EUR     2.00
Afren PLC             6.63    12/9/2020    USD    46.25
Cirio Finance Luxe    7.50    11/3/2002    EUR     8.25
Barclays Bank PLC     1.18    3/21/2033    USD    68.50
Banco Pinto & Sott    1.08                 EUR    11.00
Hellenic Railways     4.50    12/6/2016    JPY    68.88
EDOB Abwicklungs A    7.50     4/1/2012    EUR     0.76
Sidetur Finance BV   10.00    4/20/2016    USD    13.00
TGC-2 OJSC           12.00   10/10/2018    RUB    70.35
Alpha Credit Group    1.70     2/1/2017    EUR    42.30
IKB Deutsche Indus    5.63    3/31/2017    EUR    19.55
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.25    3/16/2035    EUR     4.81
Dexia Kommunalbank    4.88   12/31/2016    EUR    20.00
Kaupthing Bank Hf     9.00                 USD     0.13
Hellenic Republic     5.00    8/22/2016    JPY    65.50
Lloyds Bank PLC       0.44                 USD    62.39
Barclays Bank PLC     1.44    3/28/2033    USD    68.78
AgroGeneration        8.00     4/1/2019    EUR    66.00
SiC Processing Gmb    7.13     3/1/2016    EUR     3.95
getgoods.de AG        7.75    10/2/2017    EUR     5.38
Heta Asset Resolut    4.25    5/31/2016    EUR    56.50
UniCredit Bank Aus    0.50   12/27/2031    EUR    63.50
Ukraine Government    7.50    4/17/2023    USD    47.07
GNB - Cia de Segur    2.23   12/19/2022    EUR    71.00
Hellenic Republic     5.80    7/14/2015    JPY    73.88
Heckler & Koch Gmb    9.50    5/15/2018    EUR    74.75
Agroton Public Ltd    6.00    7/14/2019    USD    30.00
KPNQwest NV          10.00    3/15/2012    EUR     0.50
DNB Bank ASA          0.56                 USD    62.21
Codere Finance Lux    9.25    2/15/2019    USD    64.00
National Westminst    0.69                 USD    63.00
Barclays Bank PLC     2.31    6/17/2033    USD    69.00
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.13    5/19/2016    USD     0.00
IKB Deutsche Indus    4.70    3/31/2017    EUR    18.00
Ukraine Government    9.25    7/24/2017    USD    45.74
Travel24.com AG       7.50    9/17/2017    EUR    53.00
Hellenic Railways     0.66    5/24/2016    EUR    69.13
Region of Piemont     0.34   11/27/2036    EUR    60.45
Hellenic Republic     2.27     2/7/2022    EUR    59.51
Barclays Bank PLC     0.63                 USD    64.90
Lloyds Bank PLC       0.48                 USD    63.63
Hellenic Republic     0.76    8/10/2019    EUR    66.72
EFG International     0.71                 EUR    73.50
CRC Breeze Finance    6.11     5/8/2016    EUR    54.63
Portigon AG           7.46   12/31/2019    EUR    15.00
Sazka AS              9.00    7/12/2021    EUR     0.84
Deutsche Bank AG/L    1.23    3/15/2033    USD    73.12
Afren PLC            11.50     2/1/2016    USD    42.41
Heta Asset Resolut    0.32    8/12/2017    EUR    52.13
Popular Capital SA    7.00   11/25/2015    EUR    32.00
Norske Skogindustr    7.13   10/15/2033    USD    44.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    2/15/2035    EUR     3.88
Mifa Mitteldeutsch    7.50    8/12/2018    EUR     3.20
Metinvest BV         10.50   11/28/2017    USD    46.88
Royal Bank of Scot    0.63                 USD    61.37
Colonia Real Estat    5.88    5/11/2015    EUR     6.96
Cirio Finanziaria     8.00   12/21/2005    EUR     1.57
Ukraine Government    6.88    9/23/2015    USD    50.78
Mechel                8.40    5/27/2021    RUB    56.51
Espirito Santo Fin    9.75   12/19/2025    EUR     2.67
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    11/2/2035    EUR     5.13
LBI HF                6.25                 EUR     0.00
Solarworld AG         6.38    7/13/2016    EUR    31.50
Royal Bank of Scot    3.84   11/16/2030    USD    74.00
Del Monte Finance     6.63    5/24/2006    EUR     8.38
Banco Espirito San    2.88                 EUR    11.50
Barclays Bank PLC     1.73     4/9/2028    USD    73.72
Alpine Holding Gmb    6.00    5/22/2017    EUR     0.00
Gunther Zamek Prod    7.75    5/15/2017    EUR     4.98
Teak Holz Internat    5.00    8/31/2015    EUR    55.00
Barclays Bank PLC     0.41   12/28/2040    EUR    68.85
Solarworld AG         6.13    1/21/2017    EUR    31.88
PNE Wind AG           3.75   10/10/2019    EUR     3.05
Barclays Bank PLC     1.68    4/19/2033    USD    68.27
SAG Solarstrom AG     6.25   12/14/2015    EUR    45.00
Penell GmbH Elektr    7.75    6/10/2019    EUR    10.30
IM Skaugen SE        10.42    4/11/2017    NOK    66.06
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.25    10/5/2035    EUR     4.48
National Westminst    0.56                 USD    63.50
WGF Westfaelische     6.35    12/1/2016    EUR     6.45
Societe Generale S    1.92                 EUR    64.20
Ideal Standard Int   11.75     5/1/2018    EUR    42.13
Abanka Vipa DD Via    1.90                 EUR     0.31
Barclays Bank PLC     2.95    5/31/2033    USD    69.63
Ukraine Government    7.80   11/28/2022    USD    45.57
Oesterreichische V    0.78    6/18/2018    EUR    65.00
Aralco Finance SA    10.13     5/7/2020    USD     5.00
Financing of Infra    8.38    11/3/2017    USD    43.89
Ukraine Government    6.75   11/14/2017    USD    45.56
Lloyds Bank PLC       1.70    2/22/2033    USD    67.50
UKRLANDFARMING PLC   10.88    3/26/2018    USD    50.50
Bank Nederlandse G    0.50    7/12/2022    ZAR    54.32
Depfa ACS Bank        0.25     7/8/2033    CAD    24.00
Cirio Del Monte NV    7.75    3/14/2005    EUR     1.87
Alpine Holding Gmb    5.25     7/1/2015    EUR     0.00
Glitnir HF            6.69    6/15/2016    USD     0.02
Heta Asset Resolut    4.63     3/4/2018    EUR    51.50
Petromena ASA         9.75    5/24/2015    NOK     1.95
Oesterreichische V    9.00    7/26/2024    EUR    65.00
Barclays Bank PLC     2.98   12/23/2033    USD    75.00
Rena GmbH             7.00   12/15/2015    EUR     8.63
Societe Generale S    1.50    2/28/2033    USD    74.00
Northland Resource   15.00    7/15/2019    USD     1.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf     6.75                 EUR     0.00
Standard Chartered    0.59                 USD    60.33
Ukraine Government    7.75    9/23/2020    USD    45.58
Saphir Finance PLC    6.85                 GBP     1.38
Den Norske Creditb    0.56                 USD    61.83
Mechel                8.40     6/1/2021    RUB    57.00
IT Holding Finance    9.88   11/15/2012    EUR     0.50
Glitnir HF            6.33    7/28/2011    USD    14.00
Hellas Telecommuni    8.50   10/15/2013    EUR     0.00
Frey                  6.00   11/15/2022    EUR    21.50
Sairgroup Finance     4.38     6/8/2006    EUR    14.88
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.00    5/17/2035    EUR     5.00
Standard Chartered    0.69                 GBP    62.54
Orient Express Ban   13.60     8/9/2018    RUB    43.01
UniCredit Bank Aus    0.57    8/20/2033    EUR    61.63
Swiss Re Europe Ho    6.85                 USD    46.50
DEMIRE Real Estate    6.00   12/30/2018    EUR     4.50
Northland Resource    4.00   10/15/2020    USD     0.15
Assystem              4.00     1/1/2017    EUR    23.02
Ukraine Government    6.25    6/17/2016    USD    45.58
KA Finanz AG          5.43    2/13/2024    EUR    50.88
SU-155 KAPITAL OOO   13.25    2/23/2016    RUB    36.51
Santander Finance     2.00                 EUR    40.00
BNP Paribas SA        1.62    4/30/2033    USD    68.78
KA Finanz AG          4.90    6/23/2031    EUR    63.88
Investkredit Bank     3.55    4/12/2022    EUR    74.70
Region of Puglia I    0.53     2/6/2023    EUR    74.31
Heta Asset Resolut    4.88    9/18/2017    EUR     2.80
Strenesse AG          9.00    3/15/2017    EUR    44.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00    3/18/2015    EUR     3.82
Dexia Kommunalbank    5.63   12/31/2017    EUR    12.00
DTEK Finance PLC      7.88     4/4/2018    USD    34.49
ADLER Real Estate     6.00    6/30/2017    EUR    12.60
OGX Austria GmbH      8.38     4/1/2022    USD     0.03
Region of Abruzzo     0.56    11/7/2036    EUR    63.33
Svyaznoy Bank ZAO    12.00     8/6/2015    RUB    36.01
Banca Carige SpA      8.34                 EUR    75.00
Far East Capital L    8.75     5/2/2020    USD    36.92
Codere Finance Lux    8.25    6/15/2015    EUR    64.13
Norske Skogindustr    7.13   10/15/2033    USD    44.00
Heta Asset Resolut    0.67   11/29/2032    EUR     2.76
Northland Resource    4.00   10/15/2020    NOK     0.15
Finmek Internation    7.00    12/3/2004    EUR     0.13
Allied Irish Banks    0.75   10/24/2035    EUR    23.13
Teksid Aluminum Lu   11.38    7/15/2011    EUR     0.11
Financing of Infra    7.40    4/20/2018    USD    43.66
Global PVQ Netherl    1.38    4/30/2012    EUR    24.13
Governo Portugues     2.75                 EUR    60.00
Kaupthing Bank Hf     6.25                 EUR     0.00
City of Kyiv Via K    9.38    7/11/2016    USD    46.25
Windreich GmbH        6.50     3/1/2015    EUR    10.88
Solar Millennium A    6.50    7/15/2015    EUR    12.57
Ukraine Government    4.95   10/13/2015    EUR    50.52
Karlie Group GmbH     6.75    6/25/2018    EUR    65.60
Glitnir HF            6.00     3/5/2012    GBP    14.00
Heta Asset Resolut    0.24     4/9/2043    EUR    60.00
Vnesheconombank       8.10    9/27/2018    RUB    70.07
Kaupthing Bank Hf     5.75    10/4/2011    USD    14.13
BLT Finance BV       12.00    2/10/2015    USD    10.50
Kaupthing Bank Hf     5.75    10/4/2011    USD    14.13
Centrosolar Group     7.00    2/15/2016    EUR     2.31
Standard Chartered    0.69                 USD    61.21
Mechel               10.00    8/25/2020    RUB    75.00
Global PVQ Netherl    1.38    4/30/2012    EUR    25.25
Alliance Oil Co OJ    8.85     6/4/2021    RUB    57.01
Phones4u Finance P    9.50     4/1/2018    GBP    31.88
Deutsche Morgan Gr    0.66                 USD    59.19
Lloyds Bank PLC       1.75    1/31/2033    USD    67.76
UniCredit Bank Aus    0.35    1/25/2031    EUR    69.00
Kaupthing Bank Hf     3.00    2/12/2010    CHF    14.13
Club Mediterranee     6.11    11/1/2015    EUR    24.31
Espirito Santo Fin    5.13    5/30/2016    EUR     3.57
Takko Luxembourg 2    9.88    4/15/2019    EUR    48.90
Piraeus Bank SA       0.98     2/9/2017    EUR    72.03
SU-155 KAPITAL OOO   13.25    2/23/2016    RUB    36.60
Global PVQ Netherl    5.75    5/26/2014    EUR    26.38
Indo Energy Financ    6.38    1/24/2023    USD    64.01
Hema Bondco II BV     8.50   12/15/2019    EUR    65.88
Alpine Holding Gmb    5.25    6/10/2016    EUR     0.00
Norske Skog Holdin    8.00    2/24/2023    USD    64.25
Schneekoppe GmbH &    6.45    9/20/2015    EUR     6.86
Breeze Finance SA    11.75    4/19/2027    EUR     3.00
Norske Skog Holdin    8.00    2/24/2021    EUR    67.63
TradeDoubler AB       6.75   12/20/2018    SEK    68.50
Heta Asset Resolut    3.42    11/7/2016    EUR    48.50
Glitnir HF            3.00    6/30/2010    EUR    14.00
WPE International    10.38    9/30/2020    USD     6.25
CBo Territoria        6.00     1/1/2020    EUR     3.96
Mriya Agro Holding    9.45    4/19/2018    USD    11.50
Ukraine Government    6.58   11/21/2016    USD    45.73
Credit Agricole Co    0.50    2/28/2018    RUB    71.64
Governo Portugues     3.00                 EUR    73.00
OL Groupe SA          7.00   12/28/2015    EUR     7.64
Nationwide Buildin    1.07                 GBP    70.00
Russian Standard B   13.00    4/10/2020    USD    64.00
Hellenic Bank PCL    11.00                 EUR    50.13
Solen AG              7.50     4/8/2016    EUR     1.11
ffk environment Gm    7.25     6/1/2016    EUR     3.57
Seabird Exploratio    6.00   12/18/2015    USD    26.13
Codere Finance Lux    9.25    2/15/2019    USD    64.00
MT-Energie GmbH &     8.25     4/4/2017    EUR    10.56
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00    2/16/2015    EUR     3.88
SNS Bank NV           2.75                 EUR     0.85
Ukraine Government    7.95    2/23/2021    USD    45.71
Heta Asset Resolut    0.49   12/18/2030    EUR     3.10
Bulgaria Steel Fin   12.00     5/4/2013    EUR     1.00
EXER D GmbH           5.70     2/1/2016    EUR    67.00
LBI HF                6.10    8/25/2011    USD     9.19
Danske Bank Oyj       1.63                 EUR    72.38
Oesterreichische V    9.00    7/26/2019    EUR    32.38
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.88    3/14/2013    CHF    11.13
Raiffeisen Bank In    4.50    9/28/2035    EUR    63.63
A-TEC Industries A    8.75   10/27/2014    EUR     2.00
Kaupthing Bank Hf     6.50     2/3/2045    EUR     0.00
Mechel               10.00    8/25/2020    RUB    75.00
Gazprom OAO           9.30   10/21/2043    RUB     6.06
Alliance Oil Co OJ    8.85     6/1/2021    RUB    72.01
Glitnir HF            8.00                 EUR     0.01
Vnesheconombank       8.40   12/20/2018    RUB    70.01
Kaupthing Bank Hf     1.80   10/20/2009    JPY    14.13
Glitnir HF            4.75   10/15/2010    USD    14.00
Petromena ASA        10.85   11/19/2014    USD     1.95
Solon SE              1.38    12/6/2012    EUR     0.33
Heta Asset Resolut    0.31    9/26/2043    EUR    47.88
Raiffeisenlandesba    5.00     7/1/2026    EUR    68.63
IVG Immobilien AG     5.81                 EUR     0.00
Standard Chartered    0.59                 USD    60.50
Privatbank CJSC Vi   10.88    2/28/2018    USD    62.25
Glitnir HF            4.38     2/5/2010    EUR    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.10     5/8/2017    HKD    29.88
Ukraine Government    5.00   12/20/2015    USD    51.13
Mechel                8.00     2/9/2021    RUB    50.01
LBI HF                7.43                 USD     0.00
Heta Asset Resolut    0.11    1/24/2017    EUR    52.63
Municipality Finan    0.50   11/21/2018    TRY    70.79
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    3/15/2022    ZAR    52.23
Espirito Santo Fin    5.05   11/15/2025    EUR     2.97
Hamburgische Lande    0.38    1/22/2041    EUR    59.08
BKN biostrom AG       7.50     6/5/2016    EUR     1.50
LBI HF                2.25    2/14/2011    CHF     2.81
Societe Generale S    2.37   11/29/2032    USD    70.14
Kaupthing Bank Hf     5.25    7/18/2017    BGN    14.13
Italy Government I    0.72    7/31/2045    EUR    72.18
Standard Chartered    0.50                 USD    59.92
Autonomous Communi    7.55    7/21/2026    EUR    47.91
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    3/14/2011    EUR     3.82
Piraeus Bank SA       0.97   12/27/2016    EUR    73.74
Kaupthing Bank Hf     5.90                 EUR     0.13
Deutsche Bank AG      1.24    6/28/2033    USD    70.54
Heta Asset Resolut    5.73   12/10/2021    EUR     3.00
Cooperatieve Centr    0.50    7/30/2043    MXN    19.33
Artea                 6.00     8/4/2019    EUR    13.73
BNP Paribas Emissi    4.50    6/25/2015    EUR    72.19
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00    9/22/2014    EUR     3.82
Glitnir HF            1.63    3/11/2009    CHF    14.00
Comune di Verona      0.31    12/1/2026    EUR    68.26
Financing of Infra    9.00    12/7/2017    USD    44.00
Alpha Credit Group    0.55    2/21/2021    EUR    29.84
Heta Asset Resolut    4.07    3/21/2017    EUR    52.50
Heta Asset Resolut    0.30    3/12/2043    EUR    47.88
Eksportfinans ASA     0.50     5/9/2030    CAD    29.13
Heta Asset Resolut    5.80    6/17/2017    EUR    50.50
Marine Subsea AS      9.00   12/16/2019    USD     0.50
Banco Espirito San   10.00    12/6/2021    EUR    10.13
Santander Finance     2.00                 EUR    37.75
Barclays Bank PLC     4.00   12/18/2015    USD     6.81
CaixaBank SA          1.92                 EUR    46.88
Czerwona Torebka S    6.66    4/15/2016    PLN    70.00
SAG Solarstrom AG     7.50    7/10/2017    EUR    45.00
Heta Asset Resolut    7.50    5/27/2024    ATS     2.97
Glitnir HF            5.44   12/22/2015    USD    14.00
Region of Molise I    0.58   12/15/2033    EUR    64.85
InterOil Explorati   15.00    3/14/2016    NOK    30.00
Sairgroup Finance     6.63    10/6/2010    EUR    16.50
SNS Bank NV           6.63    5/14/2018    EUR     2.42
DEIKON GmbH           1.00   11/16/2016    EUR    25.00
Raiffeisenlandesba    4.00    6/28/2023    EUR    73.88
Magnitogorsk Iron     8.70   11/22/2022    RUB    60.01
City of St Petersb    7.94     6/1/2017    RUB    60.01
GFI Informatique S    5.25     1/1/2017    EUR     6.20
Region of Abruzzo     0.40    11/7/2031    EUR    72.17
Cyprus Popular Ban    1.79    5/26/2016    EUR     3.37
Kaupthing Bank Hf     9.75    9/10/2015    USD    14.13
Public Power Corp     5.50     5/1/2019    EUR    72.23
Heta Asset Resolut    1.60    6/30/2019    CHF    51.50
ADLER Real Estate     6.00   12/27/2018    EUR    12.70
LBI HF                4.65                 EUR     0.00
Bong AB              10.00    6/27/2018    SEK     0.10
KPNQwest NV           7.13     6/1/2009    EUR     0.50
Deutsche Bank AG/L    1.42    1/31/2033    USD    66.00
Espirito Santo Fin    5.05   11/15/2025    EUR     2.16
Heta Asset Resolut    0.05    5/31/2016    EUR    48.50
Gazprom Neft OAO      8.50    1/26/2021    RUB    59.03
Transcapitalbank J   15.00    3/15/2016    RUB    60.11
Banco Pastor SA       2.44                 EUR    46.88
Codere Finance Lux    8.25    6/15/2015    EUR    64.13
Accentro Real Esta    6.25    3/27/2019    EUR     2.57
Kommunekredit         0.50   12/14/2020    ZAR    64.89
Glitnir HF            6.38    9/25/2012    USD    14.00
Glitnir HF            5.31   12/24/2012    USD    14.00
Province of Milan     0.42   12/22/2033    EUR    66.85
Ideal Standard Int   11.75     5/1/2018    EUR    42.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf     6.13    10/4/2016    USD    14.13
Municipality Finan    0.50    3/28/2018    BRL    73.36
Barclays Bank PLC     3.46    2/28/2034    USD    71.00
Cooperatieve Centr    0.50   10/30/2043    MXN    19.10
Kaupthing Bank Hf     5.50     2/2/2009    USD    14.13
Heta Asset Resolut    0.27     4/9/2018    EUR    47.50
SU-155 KAPITAL OOO   15.50    5/18/2015    RUB    53.63
Cooperatieve Centr    0.50   11/30/2027    MXN    45.93
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    8/25/2021    ZAR    61.22
KPNQwest NV           8.88     2/1/2008    EUR     0.50
Rena Lange Holding    8.00   12/12/2017    EUR     0.60
Notenstein Finance    1.00    9/17/2019    CHF    68.79
Sovcombank ICB JSC   13.40    6/20/2016    RUB    60.04
Codere Finance Lux    8.25    6/15/2015    EUR    63.88
Hypo Tirol Bank AG    0.50    7/23/2026    EUR    57.00
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    1/31/2022    ZAR    54.84
DEIKON GmbH           1.00     7/1/2015    EUR    29.00
Kaupthing Bank Hf     6.13    10/4/2016    USD    14.13
Montepio Holding S    5.00                 EUR    50.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.25    12/3/2015    EUR     6.63
Heta Asset Resolut    4.70     4/2/2018    EUR    51.50
Kommunalbanken AS     0.50     3/2/2018    BRL    73.21
Eirles Two Ltd        0.81    9/30/2046    USD    55.13
Societe Centrale d    9.00     7/1/2016    EUR     7.17
Kaupthing Bank Hf     4.70    2/15/2010    CAD    14.13
Heta Asset Resolut    0.30    2/10/2018    EUR    53.50
Heta Asset Resolut    0.29    3/10/2018    EUR    52.88
Allied Irish Banks    5.25    3/10/2035    GBP    26.50
Lehman Brothers Tr   11.00   12/20/2017    AUD     3.82
Astana Finance BV    14.50     7/2/2013    USD    12.50
Heta Asset Resolut    0.81    5/28/2017    EUR    55.00
Alpha Credit Group    2.00    4/27/2024    EUR    20.04
Province of Bresci    0.68    6/30/2036    EUR    60.46
SAir Group            0.13     7/7/2005    CHF    12.00
Bank Nederlandse G    0.50     8/9/2022    MXN    70.38
KPNQwest NV           8.13     6/1/2009    USD     0.50
Santander Finance     2.00                 USD    19.38
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00    12/2/2012    EUR     3.82
Kommunekredit         0.50   10/22/2019    BRL    61.81
Russian Railways J    9.00    9/20/2039    RUB     3.26
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.25    5/26/2026    EUR     3.82
Heta Asset Resolut    0.13    5/31/2016    EUR    51.50
Phosphorus Holdco    10.00     4/1/2019    GBP     1.94
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.50     5/2/2017    EUR     3.82
Heta Asset Resolut    0.25    3/29/2017    EUR    53.13
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.50     7/5/2016    EUR     3.82
City of Kiev Ukrai    8.00    11/6/2015    USD    48.00
Cooperatieve Centr    0.50   10/29/2027    MXN    46.42
BLT Finance BV        7.50    5/15/2014    USD     5.25
Heta Asset Resolut    6.94    6/10/2017    EUR    51.25
Oesterreichische V    9.00    7/26/2020    EUR    32.38
International Bank   13.50    6/23/2016    RUB    60.16
LBI HF                3.00    12/7/2010    CHF     2.81
Oesterreichische V    4.25     9/7/2020    EUR    25.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    1.00     5/9/2012    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.03    1/31/2015    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00   10/24/2012    EUR     3.82
Heta Asset Resolut    0.25    3/29/2017    EUR    49.75
Societe Generale S    0.50    5/30/2023    MXN    63.33
Bashneft OAO         10.70    5/13/2024    RUB    70.01
A-TEC Industries A    2.75    5/10/2014    EUR     2.00
Barclays Bank PLC     2.50    5/24/2017    USD    10.93
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    4/27/2027    NZD    58.02
Heta Asset Resolut    5.27     4/7/2028    EUR     2.73
Solarwatt GmbH        7.00    11/1/2015    EUR    14.50
Transcapitalbank J   10.75    5/30/2023    RUB    60.01
UniCredit Bank Aus    0.39    1/24/2031    EUR    63.88
Investkredit Bank     7.00    7/24/2022    EUR    63.69
City of Siret Roma    2.75     3/1/2028    RON    31.20
Deutsche Bank AG/L   11.50    8/31/2015    USD    47.58
Vontobel Financial    5.84     9/9/2016    EUR    60.47
Oesterreichische V    5.27     2/8/2027    EUR    62.75
Oesterreichische V    6.00    3/30/2017    EUR    59.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00    2/28/2010    EUR     6.63
NIBC Bank NV          2.32                 USD    74.88
Heta Asset Resolut    0.20    2/17/2017    EUR    53.63
BNP Paribas SA        0.50    1/31/2018    RUB    72.25
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.50     2/1/2045    USD     0.00
Republika Srpska      9.00    9/26/2027    BAM    63.00
Barclays Bank PLC     0.50    4/24/2023    MXN    62.13
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00   10/30/2012    EUR     3.82
Royal Bank of Scot    4.24    1/12/2046    EUR    72.25
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00    2/27/2014    EUR     3.82
UNIQA Sachversiche    2.99                 EUR    40.00
NIBC Bank NV          2.32                 USD    74.88
Mobile TeleSystems    5.00    6/29/2021    RUB    62.50
Ingra DD              6.13    12/6/2016    HRK    12.99
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    3/18/2015    USD     3.82
Banco Espirito San    1.59    5/27/2018    EUR    10.13
KA Finanz AG          4.44   12/20/2030    EUR    55.88
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.00   11/26/2013    EUR     3.82
Heta Asset Resolut    0.30    8/21/2017    EUR    51.50
Heta Asset Resolut    5.03    1/26/2017    EUR     2.22
SAir Group            5.50    7/23/2003    CHF    11.50
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50     4/3/2023    AUD    71.90
Russian Highways     12.40    4/22/2042    RUB    16.95
AK BARS Bank OJSC    18.00   12/26/2017    RUB    61.01
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.00    2/16/2016    EUR     3.82
SU-155 KAPITAL OOO   13.25    2/23/2016    RUB    36.10
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.88    1/28/2011    HKD    29.88
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    1/29/2027    NZD    58.82
WGF Westfaelische     5.35    5/15/2015    EUR     3.61
Moscow United Elec   11.00    9/12/2024    RUB    70.00
Enemona AD-Kozlodu   10.00    4/28/2017    BGN     0.34
Anglian Water Serv    1.02    1/26/2057    GBP    74.19
Heta Asset Resolut    4.54    9/22/2017    EUR    51.50
Heta Asset Resolut    0.20     2/9/2017    EUR    48.50
Mechel                8.00     2/9/2021    RUB    60.00
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    9/28/2018    IDR    73.92
UniCredit Bank AG     0.80   11/19/2029    EUR    71.50
LBI HF                3.20    5/10/2010    SKK     2.81
Heta Asset Resolut    0.10     8/1/2017    EUR    48.38
Pongs & Zahn AG       8.50                 EUR     0.30
Heta Asset Resolut    0.13    3/15/2017    EUR    52.63
hkw personalkonzep    8.25   11/15/2016    EUR     1.31
UniCredit Bank Aus    0.67   12/27/2026    EUR    72.63
Svyaznoy Bank ZAO    13.50     6/8/2018    RUB    68.14
UTair-Finans OOO     12.00    6/17/2016    RUB    30.30
SAir Group            6.25    4/12/2005    CHF    11.38
Alpha Credit Group    2.00   11/28/2032    EUR     8.83
Bank Nederlandse G    0.50    9/20/2022    MXN    69.93
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    7/30/2027    NZD    57.18
Vnesheconombank       2.00    6/18/2021    RUB    54.65
Heta Asset Resolut    0.25    4/22/2018    EUR    54.13
La Veggia Finance     7.13   11/14/2004    EUR     0.63
Atari SA              7.50    2/17/2020    EUR     0.29
Heta Asset Resolut    0.28    8/28/2017    EUR    51.50
Heta Asset Resolut    0.35    5/10/2017    EUR    52.75
Lehman Brothers Tr    1.46    2/19/2012    JPY    29.88
VEB-Leasing OAO       8.60     4/2/2021    RUB    58.01
Federal Grid Co Un    8.00     1/7/2028    RUB    70.01
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00     5/2/2022    EUR     6.63
Republika Srpska      1.50   12/24/2025    BAM    68.94
Alpha Credit Group    6.00    7/29/2020    EUR    48.75
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    8/28/2018    BRL    68.24
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.00   10/17/2014    EUR     3.82
Republic of Srpska    1.50     6/9/2025    BAM    71.00
Kommunekredit         0.50    7/30/2027    TRY    29.43
Santander Finance     2.00                 USD    19.25
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00    2/16/2017    EUR     6.63
Bosnia & Herzegovi    2.50    6/30/2023    BAM    71.00
Alpha Credit Group    1.50   12/18/2028    EUR     9.50
Oesterreichische V    3.00    9/22/2017    EUR    59.50
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.13    5/19/2016    USD     0.00
Heta Asset Resolut    0.30    5/17/2017    EUR    48.38
Heta Asset Resolut    0.12    7/18/2017    EUR    50.50
SAir Group            2.13    11/4/2004    CHF    11.50
Alpha Credit Group    6.00    4/11/2018    EUR    66.01
UTair-Finans OOO     13.00   11/13/2015    RUB    38.00
Raiffeisen-Holding    5.08                 EUR    73.25
Takko Luxembourg 2    7.01    4/15/2019    EUR    45.46
Erste Europaische     0.28     2/1/2037    USD    73.91
Heta Asset Resolut    0.75    9/20/2017    EUR     3.25
Heta Asset Resolut    3.90    1/24/2017    EUR    52.38
Oesterreichische V    3.13    6/30/2017    EUR    62.63
World of Building     7.70    6/25/2019    RUB     3.51
Glitnir HF            3.25    8/15/2016    EUR    14.00
JP Morgan Structur   12.00   11/24/2021    ZMW    67.55
Rosbank PJSC          0.01    1/15/2016    RUB    55.01
Heta Asset Resolut    1.29    5/31/2016    EUR    58.63
Heta Asset Resolut    0.05    1/24/2017    EUR    53.50
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50   10/30/2026    NZD    59.75
Northland Resource   12.25    3/26/2016    USD     1.01
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.69    2/19/2017    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   23.30    9/16/2008    USD     6.63
Salvator Grundbesi    9.50                 EUR    40.50
Atari SA              0.50    9/30/2015    EUR     1.34
Salvator Grundbesi    9.50   12/31/2021    EUR    12.00
Bank Nederlandse G    0.50     6/7/2022    ZAR    52.44
A-TEC Industries A    5.75    11/2/2010    EUR     2.00
LBI HF                4.34   12/22/2025    EUR     2.81
Investkredit Bank     0.56    3/14/2020    EUR    70.41
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.50    6/22/2010    USD     3.82
Cooperatieve Centr    0.50    8/21/2028    MXN    44.46
e-Kancelaria Grupa    8.00   10/17/2016    PLN     1.00
UTair-Finans OOO     13.00   11/13/2015    RUB    38.00
BNP Paribas SA        0.50     5/6/2021    MXN    72.11
wige MEDIA AG         6.00    3/17/2019    EUR     1.90
RFA-Invest OAO       12.00    2/24/2016    RUB    60.05
Province of Bresci    0.52   12/22/2036    EUR    59.83
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50     2/2/2023    AUD    72.55
DEIKON GmbH           1.00     7/1/2016    EUR    29.50
ECM Real Estate In    5.00    10/9/2011    EUR    10.38
SAir Group            5.13     3/1/2003    CHF    11.00
Heta Asset Resolut    0.35    5/17/2017    EUR    50.50
RSL Communications   10.13     3/1/2008    USD     1.25
Vnesheconombank       9.75    8/16/2029    RUB    70.00
Credit Agricole Co    0.50     3/6/2023    RUB    41.28
Russian Railways J   10.10    5/20/2044    RUB #N/A N/A
Heta Asset Resolut    3.72    3/15/2017    EUR    48.63
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.90     2/1/2016    EUR    14.13
Heta Asset Resolut    5.04    2/15/2023    EUR    48.38
Oesterreichische V    5.11    6/12/2017    EUR    66.13
Mriya Agro Holding   10.95    3/30/2016    USD    11.63
Deutsche Bank AG/L    0.50    10/5/2021    IDR    60.52
Avangard Bank OAO    18.00     2/1/2016    RUB    61.01
Russian Railways J   16.00    8/18/2033    RUB #N/A N/A
LBI HF                7.75    2/22/2016    USD     2.81
Espirito Santo Fin    5.63    7/28/2017    EUR     3.56
Dolomite Capital L   12.01   12/20/2019    ZAR    54.17
Oravita City Counc    2.63    6/15/2027    RON    58.00
Balkanstroy JSC       4.06     3/7/2016    EUR     5.00
MORTGAGE AGENT AHM    8.50     9/9/2045    RUB    57.01
Emporiki Group Fin    5.00    2/24/2022    EUR    36.79
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    2/24/2027    NZD    58.63
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    2/24/2023    AUD    72.96
LBI HF                6.00     6/6/2017    EUR     2.81
Lloyds Bank PLC       1.45    4/26/2033    USD    71.50
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    4/24/2029    AUD    56.65
LBI HF                6.10    8/25/2011    USD     8.63
Heta Asset Resolut    0.32     7/1/2017    EUR    48.50
CARPEVIGO AG          8.25    6/30/2016    EUR    29.95
Heta Asset Resolut    4.40    6/20/2017    EUR    51.00
Leonteq Securities   10.30    6/10/2015    CHF    68.34
Bank Nederlandse G    0.50    5/12/2021    ZAR    62.27
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    12/8/2026    AUD    58.80
UniCredit Bank ZAO   14.00    2/23/2016    RUB    60.09
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.65    8/24/2011    AUD    29.88
Alpha Credit Group    2.00     2/1/2017    EUR    72.72
Heta Asset Resolut    0.13    5/31/2016    EUR    51.63
Wlodarzewska SA       9.46    5/15/2016    PLN    70.00
Hellenic Republic     3.38    7/17/2017    EUR    72.78
Lehman Brothers Tr    1.75     2/7/2010    EUR     6.63
Metalloinvest Hold    0.01     3/7/2022    RUB    60.00
Windreich GmbH        6.25     3/1/2015    EUR    10.88
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.86    9/21/2011    SGD     6.63
Morgan Stanley BV     8.50    5/25/2015    EUR    57.23
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.55    3/12/2015    EUR     6.63
Northland Resource   15.00    7/15/2019    USD     1.01
Barclays Bank PLC     8.00    9/15/2015    USD    10.10
Glitnir HF            3.00   11/30/2009    EUR    14.00
Banque Cantonale V   17.75   11/17/2015    CHF    62.91
Atari SA              0.10     4/1/2020    EUR     1.81
Municipality Finan    0.50   11/25/2020    ZAR    65.58
Municipality Finan    0.50    6/19/2024    ZAR    44.90
Credit Suisse AG/L   15.00    9/18/2015    USD    53.67
Windreich GmbH        6.75     3/1/2015    EUR    10.88
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.00     6/6/2017    EUR     3.82
Eksportfinans ASA     0.25    7/14/2033    CAD    20.63
Heta Asset Resolut    5.68     7/5/2017    EUR    48.88
Municipiul Timisoa    1.28    5/12/2026    RON    70.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.80    3/31/2018    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    1.28    11/6/2010    JPY    29.88
UTair-Finans OOO     11.75    5/26/2015    RUB    35.00
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    12/2/2022    AUD    73.44
Kommunalbanken AS     0.50    6/18/2019    INR    70.48
Mortgage Agent Abs    9.20   11/12/2040    RUB    57.00
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.00     1/3/2012    BRL     3.82
Municipality Finan    0.50   12/14/2018    TRY    70.38
Oesterreichische V    4.80     5/9/2025    EUR    23.00
Oesterreichische V    4.44    4/12/2017    EUR    67.50
Emporiki Group Fin    5.10    12/9/2021    EUR    38.05
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.38     2/4/2014    USD     3.82
Glitnir HF            6.38    9/25/2012    USD    14.00
IT Holding Finance    9.88   11/15/2012    EUR     0.50
Oesterreichische V    3.78    7/21/2033    EUR    13.50
Leonteq Securities    5.65    5/27/2015    CHF    67.08
MirLand Developmen    8.50    8/31/2016    ILS    41.00
Barclays Bank PLC     0.50    1/28/2033    MXN    34.01
Oesterreichische V    4.26    3/22/2024    EUR    23.50
Glitnir HF            3.00   10/31/2015    EUR    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr   11.00     7/4/2011    USD     6.63
Republika Srpska      1.50   12/31/2022    BAM    75.00
Strommen Sparebank    2.41                 NOK    43.33
Armenian Treasury    10.00   10/29/2023    AMD    73.40
Dresdner Bank AG      0.77   11/19/2029    EUR    63.25
Accentro Real Esta    7.75    6/25/2017    EUR     3.07
Russian Railways J   17.70    9/19/2033    RUB #N/A N/A
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.35     8/8/2016    SGD    29.88
Sidetur Finance BV   10.00    4/20/2016    USD    18.63
Provinsor Fastighe    8.50    6/30/2015    DKK     0.10
Kvinesdal Spareban    2.65                 NOK    71.89
Oesterreichische V    4.90    8/18/2025    EUR    61.30
KFW                   0.25    10/6/2036    CAD    37.37
Heta Asset Resolut    0.20    8/11/2017    EUR    51.88
Credit Suisse AG      8.00    7/31/2015    USD    10.23
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.20    3/19/2018    JPY     6.63
Republika Srpska      1.50    5/31/2025    BAM    71.02
Ecureuil Vie Devel    0.98                 EUR    26.25
Oesterreichische V    4.20    2/22/2033    EUR    15.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf     5.00     1/4/2027    SKK    14.13
Araratbank OJSC       9.00   10/20/2015    USD    25.26
Oesterreichische V    3.88    3/15/2022    EUR    28.38
Hellenic Republic     3.80     8/8/2017    JPY    66.00
Atari SA              0.50    9/30/2015    EUR     1.94
Leonteq Securities   14.00   10/20/2015    CHF    66.95
UBS AG/London        11.00    5/13/2015    CHF    43.74
Glitnir HF            6.69    6/15/2016    USD     0.02
Kaupthing Bank Hf     4.65    2/19/2013    EUR    14.13
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.50   10/24/2011    USD     3.82
Emova Group           4.30     5/2/2022    EUR     6.25
Oesterreichische V    4.00   12/14/2023    EUR    23.25
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.25     2/3/2016    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    9.00     5/6/2011    CHF     6.63
Societe Generale S    0.50    6/12/2023    RUB    39.86
Glitnir HF            3.00     4/1/2010    CZK    14.00
COFIDUR SA            0.10   12/31/2024    EUR    15.05
Heta Asset Resolut    0.26     4/2/2018    EUR    51.50
SAir Group            6.25   10/27/2002    CHF    12.25
Locko-Bank ZAO       11.50    7/17/2018    RUB    60.01
JP Morgan Structur   14.00   11/23/2029    ZMW    64.99
JP Morgan Structur   13.00   11/25/2024    ZMW    65.36
Cerruti Finance SA    6.50    7/26/2004    EUR     1.04
RESO-Garantia OCAO   14.00    9/13/2022    RUB    60.01
UTair-Finans OOO     12.00    5/26/2015    RUB    30.30
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50   12/29/2026    AUD    62.64
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    3/28/2029    AUD    68.54
Credit Suisse AG/L    1.64     6/1/2042    USD    53.76
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.59   11/22/2009    MXN    29.88
MirLand Developmen    7.21    5/31/2020    ILS    39.01
Barclays Bank PLC     0.50    3/13/2023    RUB    41.09
Region of Stavropo    8.09    11/4/2020    RUB    60.01
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    2/22/2022    ZAR    52.60
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    4/25/2019    BRL    62.56
NIBC Bank NV         25.98     5/7/2029    EUR    70.94
LBI HF                3.11   11/10/2008    EUR     2.81
Kommunekredit         0.50    5/11/2029    CAD    71.84
Kaupthing Bank Hf     4.95     5/6/2009    EUR    14.13
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00    8/16/2017    EUR     3.82
Oesterreichische V    1.75     9/9/2020    EUR    30.13
Bank Petrocommerce   18.00   12/25/2019    RUB    61.00
Bank Julius Baer &    8.00     5/7/2015    USD    70.95
Oesterreichische V    2.00    4/24/2020    EUR    33.25
Bank Nederlandse G    0.50    8/15/2022    ZAR    53.60
Municipality Finan    0.50    1/10/2018    BRL    74.85
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    9/22/2015    EUR    63.90
Lehman Brothers Tr   13.50   11/28/2008    USD     6.63
Sviaz Bank OAO       11.40    4/13/2022    RUB    60.00
Oesterreichische V    1.80    5/24/2018    EUR    49.38
Heta Asset Resolut    0.28     3/4/2018    EUR    51.50
UTair-Finans OOO     12.00    6/17/2016    RUB    30.30
URALSIB Leasing Co   10.50    4/17/2018    RUB   100.00
Gold-Zack AG          7.00   12/14/2005    EUR    12.60
EFG International     6.48    5/29/2018    EUR    60.09
Oesterreichische V    1.05    5/20/2025    EUR    12.00
Oesterreichische V    2.75   10/21/2016    EUR    72.13
Emporiki Group Fin    5.00    12/2/2021    EUR    37.57
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.10    6/10/2014    SGD     6.63
Konservenfabrik Za    8.00     4/1/2016    EUR     0.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    2/14/2012    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00    7/27/2011    EUR     3.82
KPNQwest NV           7.13     6/1/2009    EUR     0.50
Oberoesterreichisc    0.30    4/25/2042    EUR    67.79
Mortgage Agent Abs    8.90    8/12/2041    RUB    54.70
Lehman Brothers Tr   11.75     3/1/2010    EUR     6.63
Raiffeisen-Holding    5.10                 EUR    62.63
Republika Srpska      1.50   12/22/2023    BAM    74.78
Credit Suisse AG/L   15.50     5/4/2016    USD    61.50
Credit Suisse AG/N   10.25    8/28/2015    USD    53.45
Bank Nederlandse G    0.50    9/20/2022    ZAR    53.09
Oesterreichische V    2.00     8/1/2016    EUR    74.88
Totens Sparebank      2.98                 NOK    65.32
Republika Srpska      1.50    9/25/2026    BAM    66.00
WGF Westfaelische     6.35     8/1/2017    EUR     3.52
Oesterreichische V    2.00   11/15/2016    EUR    70.25
Municipality Finan    0.50     8/8/2029    NZD    57.98
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.40    6/26/2015    USD    40.37
Lehman Brothers Tr   15.00    3/30/2011    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.50     5/2/2017    EUR     3.82
Kaupthing Bank Hf     1.65     7/5/2010    JPY    14.13
Oesterreichische V    4.81    7/29/2025    EUR    61.00
Housing Financing     2.70     1/1/2020    ISK    68.10
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.30    4/28/2014    JPY     3.82
Kaupthing Bank Hf     0.80    2/15/2011    EUR    14.13
Glitnir HF            2.25    2/15/2011    EUR    14.00
MirLand Developmen    6.50   12/31/2015    ILS    44.34
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    7/30/2019    IDR    68.15
MirLand Developmen    6.00   11/30/2017    ILS    40.27
Exane Finance         1.75    4/28/2016    EUR    55.75
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50   12/29/2022    AUD    73.15
Kommunalbanken AS     0.50    5/27/2022    ZAR    55.53
Barclays Bank PLC     0.50    3/19/2021    MXN    72.04
Kommunalbanken AS     0.50    11/8/2018    BRL    69.08
Zaklady Miesne Mys   11.00    7/25/2015    PLN    10.00
Glitnir HF            5.86    7/28/2016    GBP    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.80   11/16/2012    HKD     6.63
Heta Asset Resolut    0.29    7/28/2017    EUR    50.50
Glitnir HF            5.25     5/2/2014    ISK    14.00
Glitnir HF            5.25     5/2/2017    ISK    14.00
RSL Communications    9.13     3/1/2008    USD     1.25
RSL Communications   12.00    11/1/2008    USD     1.25
Lehman Brothers Tr   15.00     6/4/2009    CHF     6.63
Glitnir HF            4.85    4/26/2012    EUR    14.00
SAir Group            2.75    7/30/2004    CHF    11.38
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    8/28/2020    TRY    59.34
Glitnir HF            2.00    1/30/2009    CHF    14.00
Republika Srpska      1.50   12/15/2023    BAM    74.00
LBI HF                4.40    1/18/2010    CAD     2.81
Oesterreichische V    2.15    3/25/2019    EUR    42.00
Banque Cantonale V    5.25     7/2/2015    CHF    55.81
Societe Generale S    0.50     4/3/2023    RUB    40.95
LBI HF                4.38   10/20/2008    EUR     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.80   12/30/2016    EUR     3.82
Commerzbank AG        1.88    4/22/2016    EUR    73.12
Glitnir HF            3.45    8/22/2010    CZK    14.00
Rinol AG              5.50   10/15/2006    DEM     0.00
SAir Group            4.25     2/2/2007    CHF    11.75
Province of Trevis    0.40   12/31/2034    EUR    62.56
Oesterreichische V    5.45     8/2/2019    EUR    72.70
UBS AG               10.05   10/23/2015    USD    25.80
Oesterreichische V    5.50    8/26/2025    EUR    24.50
City of Hunedoara     2.43    8/15/2026    RON    70.00
BNP Paribas SA        0.50    2/13/2024    NZD    67.01
Oesterreichische V    3.00     2/3/2017    EUR    68.13
Societe Generale S    0.50    5/22/2024    MXN    61.06
Bank Nederlandse G    0.50    6/22/2021    ZAR    62.48
Oesterreichische V    3.78    8/25/2033    EUR    13.50
BNP Paribas SA        0.50    9/29/2029    AUD    54.62
Leonteq Securities    7.35     7/2/2015    USD    70.90
Kaupthing Bank Hf     4.90    5/29/2017    EUR    14.13
DeltaCredit Bank     11.92   10/10/2024    RUB    74.77
Oesterreichische V    4.21    1/25/2033    EUR    15.13
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50   10/30/2018    IDR    72.93
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.00     1/3/2011    EUR    14.13
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.00   12/31/2010    USD     6.63
Hellas Telecommuni    8.50   10/15/2013    EUR     0.00
Oesterreichische V    5.00    3/26/2018    EUR    57.13
Lehman Brothers Tr   11.00     7/4/2011    CHF     6.63
Glitnir HF            6.00     8/1/2015    ISK    14.00
Muehl Product & Se    6.75    3/10/2005    DEM     1.72
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.00    6/28/2011    EUR     3.82
LBI HF                3.45   12/18/2033    JPY     0.01
Kaupthing Bank Hf     6.50    10/8/2010    ISK    14.13
UTair-Finans OOO     12.00    6/17/2016    RUB    30.30
ZapSib-Transservic   15.00    4/17/2018    RUB    60.00
Credit Suisse AG/L    8.00   11/29/2019    USD     8.34
Oesterreichische V    4.33     2/1/2017    EUR    69.75
Bosnia & Herzegovi    2.50    6/30/2022    BAM    74.00
Oesterreichische V    1.38     2/8/2019    EUR    41.38
Leonteq Securities   19.94    5/21/2015    CHF    54.68
Russian Post FGUP     8.70   10/18/2019    RUB    59.01
Nutritek Internati    8.75   12/11/2008    USD     2.00
Glitnir HF           10.00    6/28/2017    USD    14.00
UniCredit Bank AG     4.00    6/26/2015    EUR    55.45
Municipality Finan    0.50    2/22/2019    IDR    70.77
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00    4/13/2011    CHF     3.82
Oesterreichische V    5.10     7/5/2022    EUR    30.75
Glitnir HF            3.25    9/15/2015    EUR    14.00
Glitnir HF            4.75   10/15/2010    USD    14.00
KPNQwest NV           8.88     2/1/2008    EUR     0.50
Province of Rovigo    0.42   12/28/2035    EUR    60.88
RSL Communications   10.50   11/15/2008    USD     1.25
RSL Communications    9.88   11/15/2009    USD     1.25
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.50    10/2/2010    EUR    14.13
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.60    1/31/2013    AUD     6.63
EDOB Abwicklungs A    7.50     4/1/2012    EUR     0.76
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.90    4/28/2016    EUR    14.13
Glitnir HF            5.25   10/23/2011    ISK    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.05    9/16/2008    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.60    5/21/2013    USD     3.82
Araratbank OJSC       8.50    6/14/2016    USD    25.58
Credit Suisse AG/L    8.25   11/29/2024    USD     9.45
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.85   12/22/2008    EUR     3.82
Barclays Bank PLC     3.50     2/5/2016    EUR    67.13
City of Predeal Ro    2.50    5/15/2026    RON    60.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.00    9/13/2010    JPY    29.88
Fonciere Volta SA     4.50    7/30/2020    EUR     2.71
Oesterreichische V    5.50    1/19/2017    EUR    71.63
City of Baile Herc    2.50   12/16/2020    RON    75.00
Vontobel Financial    8.85    5/22/2015    EUR    70.00
Bank Julius Baer &    9.40    5/27/2015    CHF    61.25
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    11/9/2018    IDR    72.77
Municipality Finan    0.50     5/8/2029    AUD    54.96
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50     2/5/2018    RUB    72.03
Eitzen Chemical AS   12.36     6/6/2016    NOK    20.88
Raiffeisen Versich    5.08                 EUR    58.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.50    7/31/2013    GBP     3.82
Municipality Finan    0.50     2/7/2018    BRL    74.33
ExpertGroup OOO/Ru   13.00   12/11/2015    RUB    60.01
Glitnir HF            6.33    7/28/2011    USD    14.00
Glitnir HF            5.86    7/28/2016    GBP    14.00
Banque Cantonale V    1.00     7/7/2016    CHF    33.39
EFG International     6.00   11/30/2017    EUR    51.57
Municipality Finan    0.50    4/26/2022    ZAR    51.49
Leonteq Securities   20.00    1/26/2016    CHF    60.24
Glitnir HF            7.32   12/19/2012    USD    14.00
Oesterreichische V    6.60     5/6/2023    EUR    32.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00    7/20/2012    EUR     3.82
Oesterreichische V    4.86   11/29/2017    EUR    60.25
Oesterreichische V    5.03    6/11/2019    EUR    46.50
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.00   10/23/2008    USD     6.63
Oesterreichische V    5.20     4/1/2020    EUR    41.63
Oesterreichische V    5.21    2/13/2026    EUR    22.88
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.25     9/5/2011    EUR     3.82
Landeskreditbank B    0.50    5/10/2027    CAD    74.93
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.50   12/30/2010    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00   11/22/2012    EUR     3.82
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.00    7/24/2009    ISK    14.13
LBI HF                5.08     3/1/2013    ISK     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr    9.50     4/1/2018    USD     3.82
Glitnir HF            3.75    1/15/2010    EUR    14.00
Leonteq Securities    7.00    1/22/2016    CHF    54.70
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.63    2/28/2015    USD    14.13
Oesterreichische V    5.26     2/5/2025    EUR    24.63
Synergy Classic Vi    2.00     8/2/2015    USD    58.02
Ukraine Government    7.75    9/23/2020    USD    45.38
UBS AG/London        10.50     6/5/2015    CHF    51.71
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    6/20/2029    AUD    66.61
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    6/29/2029    AUD    69.11
Municipality Finan    0.50    7/30/2029    AUD    69.19
Kommunekredit         0.50    2/20/2020    BRL    58.85
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    8/29/2029    AUD    69.86
Kommunalbanken AS     0.50    9/20/2018    BRL    69.82
Societe Generale S    0.50    4/30/2023    RUB    40.42
UniCredit Bank AG     4.00    6/25/2015    EUR    47.98
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00    4/24/2017    EUR     3.82
Driver & Bengsch A    8.50   12/31/2027    EUR     0.01
Bulgaria Steel Fin   12.00     5/4/2013    EUR     1.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.60     7/6/2016    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.10    6/22/2046    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00   10/24/2008    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.25    7/21/2014    EUR     3.82
Credit Suisse AG/L    8.00    1/11/2016    USD    45.70
Lehman Brothers Tr    9.00    5/15/2022    USD     3.82
Credit Suisse AG/L    7.60   10/15/2015    CHF    73.97
Commerzbank AG        2.00     2/3/2016    EUR    70.07
Kaupthing Bank Hf     1.99     7/5/2012    JPY    14.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf     0.20    7/12/2009    JPY    14.13
Lehman Brothers Tr   12.22   11/21/2017    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.40    9/21/2009    HKD     6.63
LBI HF                7.43                 USD     0.00
Glitnir HF            4.01     7/6/2009    HKD    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.00     8/8/2017    EUR     3.82
KPNQwest NV           7.13     6/1/2009    EUR     0.50
KPNQwest NV           8.88     2/1/2008    EUR     0.50
Glitnir HF            3.00    10/4/2011    EUR    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.15    3/21/2013    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00    2/15/2018    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.60    4/22/2014    MXN     3.82
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.70    10/2/2011    EUR    14.13
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.00    6/23/2009    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.44   11/22/2008    CHF     6.63
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50     6/9/2023    MXN    64.79
BNP Paribas SA        6.30    5/28/2021    RUB    74.09
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50     7/2/2020    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.50     3/7/2015    EUR     3.82
UBS AG               10.37   10/23/2015    USD    15.97
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.25    3/13/2021    EUR     6.63
Glitnir HF            5.00     2/1/2011    ISK    14.00
Kaupthing Bank Hf     8.00    6/22/2011    ISK     0.00
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.00    4/28/2012    ISK     0.00
Bamble Sparebank      2.58                 NOK    57.48
Raiffeisen-Holding    2.99                 EUR    67.75
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.05     4/8/2015    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.00    5/17/2010    EUR     6.63
Lloyds Bank PLC       0.50    7/26/2028    MXN    46.35
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.13    5/15/2015    CHF    73.58
Banque Cantonale V    4.25    8/28/2015    CHF    55.75
Leonteq Securities   20.00    2/23/2016    USD    62.81
Leonteq Securities   12.10   10/22/2015    USD    62.62
Oesterreichische V    5.00     3/5/2018    EUR    57.75
Oesterreichische V    1.02     7/3/2019    EUR    37.50
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.00    6/21/2011    EUR     3.82
Arizk                 3.00   12/20/2030    RUB    31.60
Leonteq Securities    7.62     5/6/2015    CHF    74.96
Municipality Finan    0.50    5/31/2022    ZAR    51.05
Oesterreichische V    1.93    7/20/2018    EUR    47.13
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    6/28/2022    ZAR    50.30
Kommunekredit         0.50    9/19/2019    BRL    62.28
Barclays Bank PLC     8.20     9/4/2015    USD    21.05
Oesterreichische V    1.46    7/13/2017    EUR    59.50
BNP Paribas SA        0.50   11/16/2032    MXN    35.38
Kommunalbanken AS     0.50    2/23/2018    BRL    73.32
Barclays Bank PLC     0.50    3/26/2021    MXN    71.95
JP Morgan Structur    5.65     7/1/2015    CHF    51.44
Kaupthing Bank Hf     0.69    5/21/2011    JPY    14.13
Caisse Centrale du    7.00    9/10/2015    EUR    15.39
Barclays Bank PLC     2.50     3/7/2017    EUR    54.52
LBI HF                4.53    4/24/2012    EUR     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00    2/28/2032    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr   14.90    9/15/2008    EUR     6.63
Araratbank OJSC       8.00    6/11/2018    USD    25.21
Notenstein Privatb   10.12    8/26/2015    USD    74.72
UBS AG/London        10.50    7/16/2015    CHF    51.49
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.60    7/31/2013    GBP     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.28    7/31/2013    GBP     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.32    7/31/2013    GBP     3.82
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.00    1/29/2016    CHF    53.09
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.50    7/24/2014    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00    5/12/2011    CHF     3.82
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.50    7/20/2015    USD    68.53
Leonteq Securities    6.00    7/14/2015    USD    67.09
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.20    3/19/2018    EUR     6.63
Leonteq Securities   29.61   10/26/2017    EUR    59.36
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    5/31/2019    IDR    69.01
Lehman Brothers Tr   11.00   12/20/2017    AUD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50   12/20/2017    AUD     3.82
LBI HF                3.00   10/22/2015    EUR     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.50    11/9/2011    CHF     3.82
Hjelmeland Spareba    2.92                 NOK    73.64
Nesset Sparebank      2.80                 NOK    55.49
Union Technologies    0.10     1/1/2020    EUR     5.50
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.50    9/19/2017    EUR     6.63
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    6/28/2019    IDR    68.75
LBI HF                6.75    8/18/2015    EUR     2.81
Municipality Finan    0.50    3/17/2025    CAD    72.43
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.70    3/23/2016    EUR     3.82
Oesterreichische V    4.00     2/1/2021    EUR    33.75
Lehman Brothers Tr   13.43     1/8/2009    ILS     6.63
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    3.60    8/21/2015    EUR    67.64
Societe Generale S   17.60   11/17/2015    EUR    52.90
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.05   12/20/2010    HKD     6.63
Oesterreichische V    3.50    1/14/2019    EUR    47.50
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.00    9/20/2011    USD     3.82
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   15.00    6/26/2015    EUR    62.40
UBS AG/London        10.60    5/12/2015    USD    60.00
UTair-Finans OOO      9.50    7/21/2016    RUB    30.30
Oesterreichische V    1.19   10/13/2020    EUR    28.88
Oesterreichische V    3.09   10/15/2020    EUR    33.00
Svensk Exportkredi    0.50    6/26/2019    TRY    65.92
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.25    8/28/2015    EUR    73.72
Vontobel Financial    5.75    6/12/2015    EUR    73.75
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.50    6/26/2015    EUR    64.00
BNP Paribas Emissi    5.00    5/21/2015    EUR    73.75
UniCredit Bank AG     4.75    6/25/2015    EUR    66.89
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.25   12/28/2015    EUR    66.32
Ukraine Government    7.50    4/17/2023    USD    47.00
Hellenic Republic     4.75    4/17/2019    EUR    73.78
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.75    1/30/2009    EUR     6.63
Skue Sparebank        2.62                 NOK    66.02
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.25   10/19/2012    CHF     3.82
UniCredit Bank AG     4.00    6/25/2015    EUR    50.83
Barclays Bank PLC     3.50    12/7/2015    EUR    68.54
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.80   12/27/2009    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   11.00   12/20/2017    AUD     3.82
Oesterreichische V    5.25   12/20/2022    EUR    29.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00     1/4/2011    USD     6.63
LBI HF                5.25     6/5/2023    EUR     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50   12/20/2017    AUD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50   12/20/2017    AUD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50   12/20/2017    AUD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50   12/20/2017    AUD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    9.30   12/21/2010    EUR     6.63
Oesterreichische V    5.10     1/2/2018    EUR    59.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50   12/20/2017    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50   12/20/2017    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50   12/20/2017    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50   12/20/2017    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr   13.00    7/25/2012    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.00     8/2/2037    JPY     3.82
Kaupthing Bank Hf     5.00    11/8/2013    EUR    14.13
Oesterreichische V    5.02    11/6/2017    EUR    61.25
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.50   12/20/2027    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.50   11/30/2012    CZK     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr   14.90   11/16/2010    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00   10/30/2012    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   16.00    10/8/2008    CHF     6.63
Oesterreichische V    5.23    12/5/2022    EUR    29.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.00    12/3/2012    EUR     3.82
Oesterreichische V    5.21    12/6/2022    EUR    29.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.37    7/15/2013    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.30   12/21/2018    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr   11.00    2/16/2009    CHF     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.00    2/16/2009    CHF     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   13.00    2/16/2009    CHF     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.00    2/15/2010    CHF     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00   10/12/2010    USD     6.63
Glitnir HF            6.00   12/15/2012    GBP    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    1.50   10/12/2010    EUR     3.82
ECM Real Estate In    5.00    10/9/2011    EUR    10.38
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.00   10/22/2010    EUR     3.82
Oesterreichische V    6.00   10/17/2017    EUR    63.38
Oesterreichische V    5.10   10/23/2017    EUR    61.75
Oesterreichische V    5.18   11/13/2017    EUR    61.25
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.50    8/23/2012    GBP     6.63
Sparebanken Din       2.67                 NOK    68.55
Ofoten Sparebank      2.70                 NOK    69.43
Drangedal Spareban    2.58                 NOK    69.19
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.00    8/13/2011    EUR     3.82
Kaupthing Bank Hf     3.75    2/15/2024    ISK    14.13
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    9/20/2011    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00     8/1/2025    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.50     8/1/2035    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.15    8/25/2020    EUR     6.63
Kaupthing Bank Hf     5.80     9/7/2012    EUR    14.13
LBI HF                3.36    8/17/2012    EUR     2.81
Glitnir HF            3.30    8/22/2012    EUR    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    12/6/2016    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.00    8/15/2017    EUR     3.82
Glitnir HF            0.01     5/6/2009    JPY    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.50    9/29/2017    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00     9/1/2011    EUR     3.82
UniCredit Bank Aus    0.53    1/22/2031    EUR    64.00
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.00     1/4/2010    USD     3.82
Glitnir HF            6.75    3/27/2013    EUR    14.00
Diversified Financ    2.18    7/27/2016    EUR    64.84
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.50    5/16/2015    EUR     3.82
Glitnir HF            5.00    3/14/2012    EUR    14.00
Kaupthing Bank Hf     6.40   12/15/2015    EUR    14.13
Glitnir HF            4.50     1/9/2012    EUR    14.00
Haltdalen Spareban    2.75                 NOK    54.88
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    7/28/2010    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    7/28/2010    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.90    7/28/2020    EUR     3.82
Gjerstad Sparebank    2.87                 NOK    74.37
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.82   10/20/2009    USD     6.63
LBI HF                2.22   10/15/2019    JPY     2.81
Glitnir HF            3.00   12/15/2009    EUR    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr   13.50     6/2/2009    USD     6.63
LBI HF                4.40    11/3/2009    CZK     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00     3/4/2015    USD     3.82
Oesterreichische V    5.01    3/26/2018    EUR    57.13
Oesterreichische V    5.01    3/26/2018    EUR    57.13
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.22     3/1/2024    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.50    6/20/2011    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.50    4/23/2014    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr   16.20    5/14/2009    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   16.00    11/9/2008    USD     6.63
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.50     4/2/2011    EUR    14.13
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.00    5/22/2009    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.60     8/1/2013    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.00    5/22/2009    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.25   11/30/2012    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    2/19/2023    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    1.00    2/26/2010    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.87    10/8/2013    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    1.95    11/4/2013    EUR     6.63
LBI HF                7.25     4/2/2011    EUR     2.81
LBI HF                7.00     4/2/2010    EUR     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.50    2/14/2010    AUD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00    12/6/2011    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50     6/2/2020    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   12.00     7/4/2011    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.50     7/8/2013    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.60     3/4/2010    NZD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   17.00     6/2/2009    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.75   10/28/2009    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.00     6/3/2010    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    9.75    6/22/2018    USD     3.82
LBI HF                1.68   12/22/2014    JPY     2.81
Province of Trevis    0.31   12/31/2034    EUR    60.84
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    5/29/2020    IDR    63.90
Municipality Finan    0.25    6/28/2040    CAD    28.40
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.75     1/3/2012    AUD     6.63
UBS AG                5.56    2/10/2016    USD    36.53
UBS AG                2.75    8/18/2016    USD     9.31
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.50    8/15/2012    CHF     3.82
LBI HF                4.08    3/16/2015    EUR     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00     8/7/2013    EUR     3.82
Glitnir HF            5.24   12/22/2010    USD    14.00
UBS AG               11.22     2/4/2016    USD    23.10
Lehman Brothers Tr   16.80    8/21/2009    USD     6.63
LBI HF                4.00    9/23/2015    EUR     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr   14.10   11/12/2008    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.75    3/29/2012    EUR     3.82
Glitnir HF            3.30    6/10/2010    EUR    14.00
Glitnir HF            5.35    5/11/2010    USD    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00    8/11/2010    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.30     6/6/2013    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.50    5/30/2010    AUD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   11.00     5/9/2020    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.30     6/4/2012    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00     6/5/2011    USD     6.63
UBS AG                8.42   12/17/2015    USD    26.12
LBI HF                2.14     2/3/2020    JPY     2.81
UBS AG                8.15    7/21/2015    USD    45.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.10     6/4/2010    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.25     7/8/2014    EUR     6.63
LBI HF                6.75    2/18/2015    EUR     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.60    5/23/2012    AUD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   16.00   10/28/2008    USD     6.63
LBI HF                2.75    3/16/2011    EUR     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.60     2/9/2009    EUR     3.92
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.70    3/23/2016    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.00    4/20/2009    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50    2/16/2009    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.63    7/22/2011    HKD     6.63
Glitnir HF            4.85     4/6/2012    EUR    14.00
Kaupthing Bank Hf     5.40    3/22/2014    ISK     0.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00    3/13/2009    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.72   12/29/2008    EUR     3.97
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.06   12/29/2008    EUR     3.98
Glitnir HF            2.57   12/31/2013    EUR    14.00
Glitnir HF            6.00   12/10/2009    ISK     0.02
Glitnir HF            6.20   12/20/2009    ISK     0.02
Glitnir HF            5.00     2/1/2016    ISK    14.00
Glitnir HF            6.00     8/1/2010    ISK    14.00
LBI HF                8.65     5/1/2011    ISK     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.00   10/23/2008    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.00   10/22/2008    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.45    2/20/2010    AUD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   12.40    6/12/2009    USD     6.63
Glitnir HF            0.50   11/26/2009    EUR    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.00    6/17/2009    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   13.15   10/30/2008    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.63     3/2/2012    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.50     8/1/2020    EUR     6.63
Royal Bank of Scot    1.69   11/14/2016    GBP     1.08
Glitnir HF            0.01     8/3/2009    JPY    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr   16.00   12/26/2008    USD     6.63
Kaupthing Bank Hf     7.50    12/5/2014    ISK    14.13
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.30    6/27/2013    USD     6.63
Oesterreichische V    5.01     2/5/2018    EUR    58.50
LBI HF                5.44     9/3/2018    EUR     0.01
Oesterreichische V    5.00    3/13/2018    EUR    57.50
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.00    3/21/2018    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.45    5/23/2013    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.10    5/20/2009    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.60    11/9/2011    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.60   10/11/2017    ILS    29.88
Oesterreichische V    5.00   12/12/2018    EUR    50.50
Lehman Brothers Tr   18.25    10/2/2008    USD     6.63
e-Kancelaria Grupa   10.00   10/23/2015    PLN     1.00
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   10.40   12/28/2015    EUR    74.92
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.20   11/27/2015    EUR    72.46
Notenstein Privatb    7.40   10/31/2016    CHF    45.09
UBS AG               14.25    6/26/2015    EUR    73.78
UBS AG               13.75    6/26/2015    EUR    74.33
UBS AG               14.50    6/26/2015    EUR    75.00
UBS AG               14.25    9/25/2015    EUR    74.90
Kommunalbanken AS     0.50    8/15/2018    BRL    71.28
UBS AG                7.75    6/26/2015    EUR    60.83
LBBW                  4.00    6/26/2015    EUR    59.20
UBS AG               12.25    6/26/2015    EUR    63.66
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.25    5/18/2015    CHF    72.82
UBS AG               12.25    9/25/2015    EUR    74.81
UBS AG               18.25    9/25/2015    EUR    62.59
UBS AG               12.00   12/29/2015    EUR    74.71
UBS AG               20.50   12/29/2015    EUR    72.19
UBS AG               20.25    9/25/2015    EUR    72.50
UBS AG               23.00    9/25/2015    EUR    56.20
UBS AG               19.75   12/29/2015    EUR    64.76
UBS AG               22.75   12/29/2015    EUR    68.80
UBS AG               23.00    9/25/2015    EUR    67.73
UBS AG/London         9.00    12/3/2015    CHF    74.97
LBBW                  4.25    8/28/2015    EUR    65.70
LBBW                  5.25    8/28/2015    EUR    61.55
LBBW                  6.50    8/28/2015    EUR    57.50
Zurcher Kantonalba    3.67    1/25/2016    CHF    54.93
UBS AG               10.00   12/29/2015    EUR    71.75
UBS AG               11.50    6/26/2015    EUR    60.30
Commerzbank AG       13.25   11/26/2015    EUR    72.81
Vontobel Financial    8.20    6/26/2015    EUR    74.99
Vontobel Financial    5.65    6/26/2015    EUR    67.96
Goldman Sachs & Co    7.00    6/24/2015    EUR    74.89
Goldman Sachs & Co   11.00    6/24/2015    EUR    71.69
Goldman Sachs & Co    9.00    6/24/2015    EUR    70.07
Goldman Sachs & Co   11.00    6/24/2015    EUR    66.46
Notenstein Privatb    8.80    7/24/2015    EUR    74.93
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.50    6/26/2015    EUR    69.95
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.00    7/10/2015    EUR    74.65
Goldman Sachs & Co    8.00    6/24/2015    EUR    73.97
Vontobel Financial    6.40    6/26/2015    EUR    71.25
UBS AG               24.00   12/29/2015    EUR    61.18
UBS AG               19.25    3/29/2016    EUR    66.74
UBS AG               19.75    6/24/2016    EUR    67.32
UBS AG               18.00    6/24/2016    EUR    69.01
UBS AG               22.00   12/29/2015    EUR    55.94
UBS AG               16.00    3/29/2016    EUR    72.98
UBS AG               17.50    6/24/2016    EUR    71.49
UBS AG               21.75    3/29/2016    EUR    66.11
UBS AG               22.50   12/29/2015    EUR    72.80
UBS AG               23.75    9/25/2015    EUR    70.54
UBS AG               23.00    6/26/2015    EUR    72.03
UBS AG               22.00   12/29/2015    EUR    73.58
UBS AG               22.00   12/29/2015    EUR    72.13
UBS AG               22.50   12/29/2015    EUR    74.78
UBS AG               24.75    9/25/2015    EUR    58.88
UBS AG               16.00    6/24/2016    EUR    71.07
UBS AG               23.75   12/29/2015    EUR    54.49
UBS AG               20.00   12/29/2015    EUR    57.58
UBS AG               20.25   12/29/2015    EUR    72.55
UBS AG               22.25   12/29/2015    EUR    69.92
UBS AG               21.75    6/26/2015    EUR    52.72
UBS AG               22.75    9/25/2015    EUR    53.34
UBS AG               23.75    6/26/2015    EUR    55.88
UBS AG               19.75    6/24/2016    EUR    73.15
UBS AG               18.75   12/29/2015    EUR    74.52
UBS AG               23.25    9/25/2015    EUR    68.34
UBS AG               21.25    3/29/2016    EUR    71.26
Vontobel Financial    4.00    6/12/2015    EUR    50.30
Vontobel Financial    8.00    6/12/2015    EUR    47.10
UBS AG               14.75    6/26/2015    EUR    67.43
UBS AG               13.25    6/26/2015    EUR    71.90
UBS AG               14.25   12/29/2015    EUR    72.63
Commerzbank AG       14.25   11/26/2015    EUR    71.53
UBS AG/London        11.50   11/26/2015    CHF    68.63
UBS AG/London        10.75   11/26/2015    CHF    68.17
Commerzbank AG       12.00   11/26/2015    EUR    67.82
UBS AG               24.00   12/29/2015    EUR    67.63
UBS AG               21.25    6/26/2015    EUR    59.02
UBS AG               20.25    3/29/2016    EUR    67.84
UBS AG               13.25   12/29/2015    EUR    60.48
UBS AG                8.75    9/25/2015    EUR    72.25
UBS AG                5.75    6/26/2015    EUR    59.92
UBS AG               10.75    6/26/2015    EUR    50.76
UBS AG                9.50   12/29/2015    EUR    62.69
UBS AG               14.75    3/29/2016    EUR    71.77
UBS AG                7.00    6/26/2015    EUR    60.07
LBBW                  3.50    8/28/2015    EUR    70.57
Notenstein Finance    7.00   10/23/2015    USD    72.87
Leonteq Securities    3.00    9/19/2019    CHF    64.25
Leonteq Securities   11.00    12/4/2015    USD    65.74
Notenstein Privatb    8.20    5/27/2016    CHF    74.34
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.50   11/27/2015    EUR    72.22
Commerzbank AG        9.50   10/22/2015    EUR    74.91
Commerzbank AG       11.50   10/22/2015    EUR    72.30
Commerzbank AG       13.75   10/22/2015    EUR    70.15
Commerzbank AG       15.75   10/22/2015    EUR    68.06
UBS AG/London        10.25   11/12/2015    CHF    73.22
UBS AG/London        11.75   11/12/2015    CHF    62.03
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   17.50   12/28/2015    EUR    64.91
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.70   12/28/2015    EUR    67.60
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   10.00   12/28/2015    EUR    71.25
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.90    8/28/2015    EUR    66.59
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   12.40   11/27/2015    EUR    68.60
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   15.50    5/20/2015    EUR    63.48
Goldman Sachs & Co   25.00    6/24/2015    EUR    73.19
Goldman Sachs & Co   25.00    8/26/2015    EUR    73.43
Goldman Sachs & Co   24.00    9/23/2015    EUR    74.88
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   11.00   10/23/2015    EUR    66.14
Notenstein Privatb    3.00    9/22/2020    CHF    69.59
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.75    7/24/2015    EUR    69.89
Commerzbank AG        7.00   10/22/2015    EUR    70.93
BNP Paribas Emissi   13.00   12/24/2015    EUR    67.16
Bank Julius Baer &   13.70   11/11/2015    CHF    67.45
UBS AG/London        12.35    11/3/2015    CHF    62.95
UBS AG/London         8.48    11/3/2015    CHF    61.20
BNP Paribas Emissi   15.00   12/24/2015    EUR    74.44
BNP Paribas Emissi   16.00   12/24/2015    EUR    72.47
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   17.00   12/28/2015    EUR    60.20
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   11.90   12/28/2015    EUR    63.76
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.70   12/28/2015    EUR    67.26
Commerzbank AG        7.00    9/24/2015    EUR    65.20
UBS AG               22.75   12/29/2015    EUR    64.44
UBS AG               21.00    9/25/2015    EUR    62.26
UBS AG               13.50   12/29/2015    EUR    74.05
UBS AG               20.25    9/25/2015    EUR    67.99
UBS AG               22.75   12/29/2015    EUR    74.35
UBS AG               22.75    6/26/2015    EUR    55.51
UBS AG               18.50    6/26/2015    EUR    61.47
UBS AG               19.25   12/29/2015    EUR    62.28
UBS AG               16.50    9/25/2015    EUR    65.34
UBS AG               20.50    6/26/2015    EUR    61.97
UBS AG               24.75    6/26/2015    EUR    53.03
UBS AG               16.50    6/26/2015    EUR    65.11
UBS AG               18.00   12/29/2015    EUR    64.15
UBS AG               21.50    9/25/2015    EUR    58.08
UBS AG               24.00    6/26/2015    EUR    57.31
UBS AG               22.00    9/25/2015    EUR    64.69
UBS AG               16.25   12/29/2015    EUR    69.81
UBS AG               18.00    9/25/2015    EUR    71.67
UBS AG               23.75    9/25/2015    EUR    61.89
UBS AG               20.50   12/29/2015    EUR    60.63
UBS AG               14.75    9/25/2015    EUR    68.54
UBS AG               21.25    9/25/2015    EUR    65.68
UBS AG                7.00   12/29/2015    EUR    66.71
UBS AG                6.25    6/26/2015    EUR    66.52
UBS AG                9.75    9/25/2015    EUR    57.51
UBS AG               24.25    9/25/2015    EUR    40.81
UBS AG                5.00    6/26/2015    EUR    72.60
UBS AG               18.00   12/29/2015    EUR    70.25
UBS AG               23.50    9/25/2015    EUR    74.26
UBS AG               20.75   12/29/2015    EUR    66.52
UBS AG               13.50    6/26/2015    EUR    62.72
UBS AG               12.00   12/29/2015    EUR    54.62
UBS AG               15.00    6/26/2015    EUR    59.76
UBS AG               13.75    9/25/2015    EUR    61.89
UBS AG               23.00    9/25/2015    EUR    62.54
UBS AG               22.00   12/29/2015    EUR    64.63
UBS AG               20.25    9/25/2015    EUR    66.41
UBS AG               22.50    6/26/2015    EUR    63.32
UBS AG               24.75    9/25/2015    EUR    59.88
UBS AG               24.25    6/26/2015    EUR    73.00
UBS AG               18.50    9/25/2015    EUR    70.62
UBS AG               19.50   12/29/2015    EUR    68.34
UBS AG               19.50   12/29/2015    EUR    71.36
UBS AG               12.50    9/25/2015    EUR    61.97
UBS AG                7.00    6/26/2015    EUR    63.89
UBS AG               10.25    6/26/2015    EUR    55.38
UBS AG               16.50    9/25/2015    EUR    58.93
UBS AG                5.25    9/25/2015    EUR    73.37
UBS AG               12.25    6/26/2015    EUR    52.02
UBS AG                5.50    6/26/2015    EUR    69.40
UBS AG               20.25    6/26/2015    EUR    66.28
UBS AG               23.50    9/25/2015    EUR    62.10
UBS AG               20.75    6/26/2015    EUR    66.25
UBS AG               20.50   12/29/2015    EUR    66.99
UBS AG                6.25   12/29/2015    EUR    68.83
UBS AG               16.75   12/29/2015    EUR    74.33
UBS AG               24.00    6/26/2015    EUR    60.66
UBS AG               11.00    9/25/2015    EUR    66.68
UBS AG               14.75   12/29/2015    EUR    61.86
UBS AG               24.50    9/25/2015    EUR    63.31
UBS AG               21.75   12/29/2015    EUR    67.98
UBS AG               18.00    6/26/2015    EUR    74.09
UBS AG               13.50   12/29/2015    EUR    62.75
UBS AG               21.75    9/25/2015    EUR    67.11
UBS AG               19.00   12/29/2015    EUR    69.81
UBS AG               17.75   12/29/2015    EUR    71.84
UBS AG                5.75   12/29/2015    EUR    71.30
UBS AG               21.75    6/26/2015    EUR    67.46
UBS AG               22.00    9/25/2015    EUR    64.17
UBS AG               17.50    9/25/2015    EUR    46.43
UBS AG               16.75    6/26/2015    EUR    57.59
UBS AG               15.00    9/25/2015    EUR    60.52
UBS AG               19.00    9/25/2015    EUR    71.85
UBS AG               20.25    6/26/2015    EUR    69.93
UBS AG               18.25    6/26/2015    EUR    55.61
UBS AG               12.50   12/29/2015    EUR    64.42
UBS AG               17.75    9/25/2015    EUR    74.02
UBS AG                9.50   12/29/2015    EUR    59.64
UBS AG               17.75    9/25/2015    EUR    70.41
UBS AG               23.00   12/29/2015    EUR    63.27
UBS AG               19.75    9/25/2015    EUR    67.96
UBS AG               22.50   12/29/2015    EUR    64.15
UBS AG               23.25    6/26/2015    EUR    61.68
UBS AG               18.00    6/26/2015    EUR    71.29
UBS AG               11.25   12/29/2015    EUR    66.54
UBS AG                5.25   12/29/2015    EUR    73.96
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.50     6/5/2015    CHF    70.04
SAir Group            2.75    7/30/2004    CHF    11.63
UBS AG               20.50    9/25/2015    EUR    67.02
UBS AG               20.25    6/26/2015    EUR    48.28
UBS AG                9.00   12/29/2015    EUR    70.58
UBS AG               11.00   12/29/2015    EUR    65.91
UBS AG               19.25    9/25/2015    EUR    68.97
UBS AG                8.75    6/26/2015    EUR    70.68
UBS AG               22.00    9/25/2015    EUR    48.05
UBS AG               14.50    9/25/2015    EUR    71.10
UBS AG               25.00    9/25/2015    EUR    73.55
UBS AG               16.50    6/26/2015    EUR    67.60
UBS AG               10.50    9/25/2015    EUR    66.08
UBS AG               12.50    6/26/2015    EUR    60.83
UBS AG               20.25    9/25/2015    EUR    50.17
UBS AG               21.75   12/29/2015    EUR    62.20
UBS AG               11.25    6/26/2015    EUR    63.76
UBS AG               18.25    9/25/2015    EUR    52.63
UBS AG               19.75   12/29/2015    EUR    64.30
UBS AG               17.25    9/25/2015    EUR    72.28
UBS AG               22.50    9/25/2015    EUR    60.14
UBS AG               16.50   12/29/2015    EUR    56.31
UBS AG               18.25   12/29/2015    EUR    54.23
UBS AG               12.75   12/29/2015    EUR    61.94
UBS AG               19.75   12/29/2015    EUR    52.41
UBS AG               20.00    9/25/2015    EUR    63.11
UBS AG               14.75   12/29/2015    EUR    58.89
UBS AG               17.75    6/26/2015    EUR    51.72
UBS AG               23.75    6/26/2015    EUR    72.45
UBS AG               24.50    9/25/2015    EUR    71.06
UBS AG               23.00    6/26/2015    EUR    74.42
UBS AG               19.75    6/26/2015    EUR    62.60
UBS AG               23.50    9/25/2015    EUR    62.82
UBS AG               23.75    6/26/2015    EUR    62.23
UBS AG               22.75    9/25/2015    EUR    73.84
UBS AG                8.50    9/25/2015    EUR    72.20
UBS AG               21.25   12/29/2015    EUR    50.94
UBS AG               17.75   12/29/2015    EUR    66.94
UBS AG               23.00   12/29/2015    EUR    73.44
UBS AG               24.75    9/25/2015    EUR    73.42
UBS AG               18.50   12/29/2015    EUR    66.18
UBS AG               20.25    6/26/2015    EUR    67.46
UBS AG               17.50   12/29/2015    EUR    67.96
UBS AG               15.00    9/25/2015    EUR    71.23
UBS AG               20.00    9/25/2015    EUR    60.25
UBS AG               23.75    9/25/2015    EUR    72.66
UBS AG               19.00    9/25/2015    EUR    74.67
UBS AG               23.00    6/26/2015    EUR    67.73
UBS AG               15.00   12/29/2015    EUR    68.68
UBS AG               24.75    6/26/2015    EUR    71.30
UBS AG               18.75    6/26/2015    EUR    64.67
UBS AG               18.00   12/29/2015    EUR    71.81
UBS AG               23.50    9/25/2015    EUR    58.92
UBS AG               17.75    6/26/2015    EUR    72.49
UBS AG               21.50    6/26/2015    EUR    70.21
UBS AG               13.50   12/29/2015    EUR    71.50
UBS AG               21.75   12/29/2015    EUR    59.21
UBS AG               17.00    6/26/2015    EUR    67.70
UBS AG               22.25    9/25/2015    EUR    60.50
UBS AG               20.75   12/29/2015    EUR    63.35
UBS AG               16.50    9/25/2015    EUR    68.57
UBS AG               20.75    6/26/2015    EUR    58.37
UBS AG               13.00    9/25/2015    EUR    72.24
UBS AG               24.50    9/25/2015    EUR    54.49
UBS AG               16.50   12/29/2015    EUR    66.21
UBS AG               13.50    9/25/2015    EUR    74.21
UBS AG               21.25   12/29/2015    EUR    66.54
UBS AG               19.50    9/25/2015    EUR    64.12
UBS AG               22.75    6/26/2015    EUR    63.20
UBS AG               19.25    6/26/2015    EUR    74.38
UBS AG               22.25    6/26/2015    EUR    59.52
UBS AG               19.75   12/29/2015    EUR    69.02
UBS AG               15.00   12/29/2015    EUR    71.88
UBS AG               18.00    9/25/2015    EUR    66.23
UBS AG               12.25    6/26/2015    EUR    69.44
UBS AG               20.75   12/29/2015    EUR    67.27
UBS AG               24.00    9/25/2015    EUR    74.19
UBS AG               15.50   12/29/2015    EUR    70.03
UBS AG               13.00   12/29/2015    EUR    73.79
UBS AG                7.50    6/26/2015    EUR    74.76
UBS AG               16.00    9/25/2015    EUR    55.51
UBS AG               22.75   12/29/2015    EUR    49.75
UBS AG                7.25    6/26/2015    EUR    66.19
UBS AG               13.75    6/26/2015    EUR    70.87
UBS AG               14.00    6/26/2015    EUR    69.24
UBS AG               13.75    9/25/2015    EUR    64.23
UBS AG               11.75    6/26/2015    EUR    63.71
UBS AG                6.75    6/26/2015    EUR    50.22
UBS AG                8.50   12/29/2015    EUR    74.06
UBS AG               10.25    9/25/2015    EUR    62.95
UBS AG                7.25   12/29/2015    EUR    73.36
UBS AG                9.50    6/26/2015    EUR    70.24
UBS AG               10.75    6/26/2015    EUR    53.23
UBS AG               10.75   12/29/2015    EUR    72.25
UBS AG               10.50    6/26/2015    EUR    43.69
UBS AG               14.75    9/25/2015    EUR    61.05
UBS AG               25.00   12/29/2015    EUR    72.89
UBS AG               14.00    6/24/2016    EUR    73.91
UBS AG               25.00    9/25/2015    EUR    67.52
UBS AG               23.75   12/29/2015    EUR    70.73
UBS AG               23.50    9/25/2015    EUR    69.82
UBS AG               23.00   12/29/2015    EUR    60.05
UBS AG               16.50    6/24/2016    EUR    72.87
UBS AG               13.75    3/29/2016    EUR    73.93
UBS AG               23.25   12/29/2015    EUR    70.36
UBS AG               20.75   12/29/2015    EUR    74.15
UBS AG               22.75    6/26/2015    EUR    72.24
UBS AG               21.25    3/29/2016    EUR    64.78
UBS AG               18.50    3/29/2016    EUR    69.75
UBS AG               19.00    6/24/2016    EUR    69.83
UBS AG               24.50   12/29/2015    EUR    62.41
UBS AG               23.00    6/26/2015    EUR    68.58
UBS AG               19.25    6/26/2015    EUR    73.64
UBS AG               21.50    9/25/2015    EUR    70.60
UBS AG               17.25    3/29/2016    EUR    71.23
UBS AG               20.25    6/24/2016    EUR    68.29
UBS AG               24.75    9/25/2015    EUR    69.25
UBS AG               23.50   12/29/2015    EUR    58.32
UBS AG               19.75    9/25/2015    EUR    73.17
UBS AG               20.00    6/26/2015    EUR    54.55
UBS AG               15.25    6/24/2016    EUR    74.21
UBS AG               21.75   12/29/2015    EUR    63.48
UBS AG               17.25    3/29/2016    EUR    69.39
UBS AG               21.00    6/26/2015    EUR    74.17
UBS AG               22.00    9/25/2015    EUR    72.38
UBS AG               20.75    3/29/2016    EUR    73.95
UBS AG               23.25    6/26/2015    EUR    70.53
UBS AG               14.75    3/29/2016    EUR    72.42
UBS AG               23.00    6/26/2015    EUR    40.18
UBS AG               20.75    6/26/2015    EUR    42.34
UBS AG               23.75   12/29/2015    EUR    71.04
UBS AG               19.75    3/29/2016    EUR    73.33
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.25    7/10/2015    EUR    67.92
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.75    7/10/2015    EUR    68.01
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.25    7/10/2015    EUR    68.10
Powszechne Towarzy    8.01     8/1/2016    PLN    49.00
e-Kancelaria Grupa    8.04    9/15/2016    PLN     1.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.28    3/26/2009    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.60    3/26/2009    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.55   12/29/2008    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    3/17/2011    EUR     3.82
Glitnir HF            2.75    3/31/2010    EUR    14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.00    7/11/2010    EUR     3.82
Leonteq Securities   13.00     6/5/2015    CHF    71.76
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.40    9/25/2015    EUR    74.62
Hypothekenbank Fra    0.29    6/30/2051    EUR    71.83
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00    3/10/2011    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.00    3/19/2012    USD     3.82
UBS AG               24.75    9/25/2015    EUR    71.25
UBS AG               23.50    6/26/2015    EUR    72.76
UBS AG               23.00   12/29/2015    EUR    73.98
UBS AG               22.50    9/25/2015    EUR    73.89
UBS AG               23.25    9/25/2015    EUR    73.59
UBS AG               13.75    9/25/2015    EUR    59.07
UBS AG               11.75    9/25/2015    EUR    63.56
UBS AG               15.00    6/26/2015    EUR    55.81
UBS AG               23.75    9/25/2015    EUR    46.27
UBS AG               24.50    9/25/2015    EUR    57.59
UBS AG               17.25    9/25/2015    EUR    66.63
UBS AG               23.00    6/26/2015    EUR    58.46
UBS AG               22.00    6/26/2015    EUR    64.45
UBS AG               22.75    6/26/2015    EUR    45.38
UBS AG               10.00   12/29/2015    EUR    68.13
UBS AG                8.25   12/29/2015    EUR    73.43
UBS AG               23.00    6/26/2015    EUR    73.96
UBS AG               13.00    6/26/2015    EUR    72.61
Leonteq Securities    4.50     4/4/2016    EUR    56.24
Commerzbank AG       11.25   11/26/2015    EUR    74.51
Leonteq Securities    5.00    5/23/2016    CHF    60.21
Barclays Bank PLC     4.17     1/5/2017    EUR    69.00
BNP Paribas Emissi   10.00    7/23/2015    EUR    64.37
BNP Paribas Emissi    8.00    7/23/2015    EUR    64.59
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.13    7/15/2015    CHF    73.98
Bank Julius Baer &    3.90   11/30/2015    CHF    71.95
Leonteq Securities    6.00     1/7/2016    EUR    45.95
Goldman Sachs Inte    1.00    12/5/2017    SEK    15.26
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   18.50    6/26/2015    EUR    61.81
Notenstein Privatb    7.00    6/17/2015    CHF    74.64
Commerzbank AG        3.00    12/3/2015    EUR    63.46
UBS AG               14.75    6/26/2015    EUR    71.35
UBS AG               12.75   12/29/2015    EUR    73.74
UBS AG               14.50   12/29/2015    EUR    68.40
UBS AG               13.75   12/29/2015    EUR    70.36
Societe Generale E    4.00    6/26/2017    EUR    52.02
Vontobel Financial    7.75    6/26/2015    EUR    74.25
Raiffeisen Centrob    8.56    7/22/2015    EUR    72.49
Raiffeisen Centrob    9.87    7/22/2015    EUR    72.98
UBS AG               10.75   12/29/2015    EUR    65.78
UBS AG               14.25    6/26/2015    EUR    55.30
Leonteq Securities    5.25    2/26/2016    CHF    59.57
Leonteq Securities    3.90     3/1/2016    EUR    49.37
Leonteq Securities    3.10     3/1/2016    EUR    73.75
Lehman Brothers Tr    9.25    6/20/2012    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    1.50     2/8/2012    CHF     3.82
Oesterreichische V    0.83   10/15/2019    EUR    34.25
Oesterreichische V    4.50   10/21/2020    EUR    37.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    0.01    9/20/2011    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.68   12/12/2045    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   13.00   12/14/2012    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.12    4/30/2027    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.75    2/21/2016    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.10    8/23/2010    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.25    6/20/2010    USD     3.82
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    3.50    9/23/2015    EUR    74.71
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.40    9/23/2015    EUR    71.89
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.80   12/23/2015    EUR    73.69
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.70    9/23/2015    EUR    69.68
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.70    9/23/2015    EUR    66.47
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.60    9/23/2015    EUR    63.14
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.10   12/23/2015    EUR    72.20
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.10   12/23/2015    EUR    69.03
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.40   12/23/2015    EUR    65.60
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    3.90    9/23/2015    EUR    74.92
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.80    9/23/2015    EUR    71.71
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.10   12/23/2015    EUR    74.18
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.60   12/23/2015    EUR    68.82
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    3.20   12/23/2015    EUR    67.93
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   19.80    6/26/2015    EUR    54.29
Commerzbank AG        9.25    9/24/2015    EUR    73.87
Commerzbank AG        7.50    9/24/2015    EUR    70.14
Commerzbank AG        9.25    9/24/2015    EUR    67.42
Commerzbank AG       11.25    9/24/2015    EUR    65.08
Commerzbank AG       20.50    9/24/2015    EUR    72.72
Commerzbank AG       23.75    9/24/2015    EUR    68.49
Vontobel Financial    7.60    9/25/2015    EUR    73.02
Oesterreichische V    4.78     6/7/2030    EUR    17.88
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.75   10/23/2015    EUR    73.10
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20   12/22/2015    EUR    72.50
Deutsche Bank AG      4.20    6/22/2015    EUR    70.00
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    70.30
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    6/21/2011    EUR     3.82
Leonteq Securities   11.20   12/29/2015    CHF    55.99
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    2.60    9/23/2015    EUR    69.11
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    3.10    9/23/2015    EUR    66.25
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.80    9/23/2015    EUR    66.91
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    2.70   12/23/2015    EUR    70.66
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.00    9/23/2015    EUR    72.75
Commerzbank AG       10.75    8/27/2015    EUR    60.44
Commerzbank AG        8.50    8/27/2015    EUR    62.70
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   19.30    6/26/2015    EUR    70.24
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   15.60    9/25/2015    EUR    74.08
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/22/2015    EUR    70.20
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    71.70
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20   12/22/2015    EUR    73.10
Commerzbank AG       26.75    9/24/2015    EUR    64.38
Deutsche Bank AG      4.20    6/22/2015    EUR    74.60
Deutsche Bank AG      4.20   12/22/2015    EUR    71.80
Deutsche Bank AG      4.20    9/22/2015    EUR    71.00
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    71.40
Lehman Brothers Tr   12.00    7/13/2037    JPY     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.00    6/11/2038    JPY     3.82
Oesterreichische V    1.34     3/1/2018    EUR    51.13
Oesterreichische V    1.39    1/28/2019    EUR    41.75
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.82   12/18/2036    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.25     4/1/2023    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.70    4/21/2011    USD     3.82
Oesterreichische V    0.95    2/11/2019    EUR    40.25
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.00    9/12/2036    JPY    29.88
Leonteq Securities   20.00   12/29/2015    CHF    64.22
Provincia di Ancon    0.31    6/30/2028    EUR    73.15
Bank Julius Baer &    8.85    9/25/2015    CHF    53.25
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.25    9/25/2015    EUR    65.00
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.00   10/23/2015    EUR    64.54
Bank Julius Baer &   14.20   10/28/2015    CHF    62.55
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   21.30    6/26/2015    EUR    46.89
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   15.80    6/26/2015    EUR    49.61
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.50    6/26/2015    EUR    55.02
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   17.10    9/25/2015    EUR    50.52
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   12.80    7/24/2015    EUR    52.12
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   11.30   10/23/2015    EUR    54.56
UBS AG/London         7.50   10/15/2015    CHF    57.59
Oesterreichische V    2.75    9/20/2016    EUR    73.50
Commerzbank AG        9.50    9/24/2015    EUR    63.73
Commerzbank AG       11.50    9/24/2015    EUR    61.39
Commerzbank AG       13.75    9/24/2015    EUR    59.44
Deutsche Bank AG     10.00    6/22/2015    EUR    70.80
Deutsche Bank AG     10.00    8/26/2015    EUR    72.60
Deutsche Bank AG     10.00   10/21/2015    EUR    74.00
Oesterreichische V    5.05     8/5/2030    EUR    18.63
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.40    9/25/2015    EUR    52.57
Deutsche Bank AG     10.00    7/22/2015    EUR    71.70
Deutsche Bank AG     10.00    9/22/2015    EUR    73.20
Deutsche Bank AG     10.00   11/25/2015    EUR    74.90
Oesterreichische V    2.75    8/24/2016    EUR    74.63
Oesterreichische V    1.33    6/14/2017    EUR    60.38
Credit Suisse AG/L    7.50    6/25/2015    USD    70.40
BNP Paribas Emissi    7.00   10/22/2015    EUR    55.67
BNP Paribas Emissi    9.00   10/22/2015    EUR    66.33
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   15.25    5/22/2015    EUR    52.13
UniCredit Bank AG     5.40    9/24/2015    EUR    54.36
UniCredit Bank AG     5.25    9/24/2015    EUR    54.92
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    9.75    5/22/2015    EUR    56.40
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   15.25    5/22/2015    EUR    53.47
Goldman Sachs & Co    6.00    7/22/2015    EUR    74.23
Goldman Sachs & Co    7.00   12/23/2015    EUR    73.16
Goldman Sachs & Co   11.00   12/23/2015    EUR    65.99
Vontobel Financial    8.95    6/26/2015    EUR    74.43
Vontobel Financial    4.50    6/26/2015    EUR    73.49
Vontobel Financial    8.35    6/26/2015    EUR    51.74
BNP Paribas Emissi    5.50    6/25/2015    EUR    73.96
BNP Paribas Emissi    7.50    6/25/2015    EUR    70.19
BNP Paribas Emissi    9.00    6/25/2015    EUR    66.77
Raiffeisen Centrob    7.55    1/20/2016    EUR    69.36
Raiffeisen Centrob    6.29    1/20/2016    EUR    67.11
Goldman Sachs & Co   14.00    5/20/2015    EUR    73.34
UniCredit Bank AG     4.25    9/24/2015    EUR    57.26
UniCredit Bank AG     5.75    9/24/2015    EUR    53.24
Credit Suisse AG/L    9.50    5/11/2015    USD    60.26
BNP Paribas Emissi    7.50    6/25/2015    EUR    74.24
BNP Paribas Emissi    9.00    6/25/2015    EUR    70.40
BNP Paribas Emissi   11.00    6/25/2015    EUR    67.04
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.50    6/26/2015    EUR    73.90
UniCredit Bank AG     4.50    6/24/2015    EUR    72.50
UniCredit Bank AG     4.75    6/24/2015    EUR    53.19
UniCredit Bank AG     4.50    6/24/2015    EUR    53.80
UniCredit Bank AG     5.00    6/24/2015    EUR    73.44
Vontobel Financial   11.20    5/15/2015    EUR    65.75
Leonteq Securities    9.07     5/3/2016    GBP    54.53
UBS AG/London         9.06   10/23/2015    CHF    62.40
UBS AG/London        12.88   10/23/2015    CHF    64.65
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.50    5/22/2015    EUR    56.51
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    51.20
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/22/2015    EUR    48.20
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    6/22/2015    EUR    51.30
Leonteq Securities   11.60    8/12/2015    USD    63.53
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   16.00    6/26/2015    EUR    58.33
UniCredit Bank AG     4.30    6/24/2015    EUR    54.44
UniCredit Bank AG     5.00    6/24/2015    EUR    68.64
UniCredit Bank AG     6.00    6/24/2015    EUR    72.55
UniCredit Bank AG     5.25    6/24/2015    EUR    52.00
UniCredit Bank AG     6.00    6/24/2015    EUR    70.26
UniCredit Bank AG     5.50    6/24/2015    EUR    51.43
UniCredit Bank AG     5.25    6/24/2015    EUR    66.87
UniCredit Bank AG     4.20    6/24/2015    EUR    74.60
UniCredit Bank AG     5.00    6/24/2015    EUR    52.59
UniCredit Bank AG     4.75    6/24/2015    EUR    70.52
Vontobel Financial    5.80    6/12/2015    EUR    67.71
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.25     5/4/2015    USD    72.20
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    6/22/2015    EUR    54.40
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    48.40
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/22/2015    EUR    51.00
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    6/22/2015    EUR    48.50
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/22/2015    EUR    54.20
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    54.30
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    69.60
Zurcher Kantonalba   14.00    7/29/2015    EUR    67.46
BNP Paribas Emissi    8.00    6/25/2015    EUR    60.31
BNP Paribas Emissi   10.50    6/25/2015    EUR    55.28
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    64.00
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    70.80
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    67.20
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20   12/22/2015    EUR    69.00
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/22/2015    EUR    69.60
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20   12/22/2015    EUR    65.20
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    66.10
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    6/22/2015    EUR    69.80
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20   12/22/2015    EUR    65.80
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    9/22/2015    EUR    68.00
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/22/2015    EUR    74.80
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    71.20
Notenstein Privatb    9.60    6/16/2015    CHF    43.96
Commerzbank AG        7.00    5/21/2015    EUR    70.47
Commerzbank AG        9.00    5/21/2015    EUR    66.88
Commerzbank AG       11.25    5/21/2015    EUR    63.65
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   14.50    6/26/2015    EUR    63.82
Goldman Sachs & Co   12.00    7/22/2015    EUR    64.44
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   10.50    5/22/2015    EUR    55.14
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   16.00    5/22/2015    EUR    52.17
Vontobel Financial    8.80    6/26/2015    EUR    66.72
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.25    6/26/2015    EUR    65.64
Bank Julius Baer &   15.25     6/4/2015    CHF    52.20
Vontobel Financial    4.95    9/11/2015    EUR    66.18
Vontobel Financial    7.80    9/11/2015    EUR    67.18
Commerzbank AG        8.75    5/21/2015    EUR    67.15
Commerzbank AG       11.00    5/21/2015    EUR    63.91
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.25     6/5/2015    EUR    73.96
UniCredit Bank AG     6.00    7/23/2015    EUR    51.69
UniCredit Bank AG     4.50    7/23/2015    EUR    55.86
UniCredit Bank AG     4.00    7/23/2015    EUR    57.19
UniCredit Bank AG     5.50    7/23/2015    EUR    68.24
UniCredit Bank AG     4.40    7/23/2015    EUR    73.85
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.50    9/11/2015    EUR    71.10
Commerzbank AG       11.50    5/21/2015    EUR    58.87
Commerzbank AG        7.25    5/21/2015    EUR    74.88
Commerzbank AG        7.50    5/21/2015    EUR    74.05
Commerzbank AG        6.50    5/21/2015    EUR    67.42
Commerzbank AG        9.00    5/21/2015    EUR    62.87
Vontobel Financial    6.05    9/25/2015    EUR    66.51
Vontobel Financial    9.20    9/25/2015    EUR    65.81
Vontobel Financial    5.90    9/25/2015    EUR    71.34
Vontobel Financial    6.40    6/26/2015    EUR    70.01
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.50    5/22/2015    EUR    67.48
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.50    5/22/2015    EUR    64.66
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   10.25    5/22/2015    EUR    59.69
BNP Paribas Emissi    6.00    6/25/2015    EUR    65.66
Commerzbank AG       10.50    5/21/2015    EUR    68.22
Vontobel Financial    7.50    6/26/2015    EUR    64.70
UniCredit Bank AG     5.50    7/23/2015    EUR    52.78
UniCredit Bank AG     5.00    7/23/2015    EUR    54.61
UniCredit Bank AG     5.20    7/23/2015    EUR    70.02
UniCredit Bank AG     4.80    7/23/2015    EUR    71.88
UniCredit Bank AG     6.00    7/23/2015    EUR    72.98
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   12.00    6/26/2015    EUR    58.07
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.50    6/26/2015    EUR    63.50
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.00    6/26/2015    EUR    73.94
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   15.00    6/26/2015    EUR    64.63
Commerzbank AG        9.25    5/21/2015    EUR    71.14
Commerzbank AG        6.75    5/21/2015    EUR    51.98
UBS AG/London         7.75    5/28/2015    CHF    43.95
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   16.00    5/22/2015    EUR    57.53
Deutsche Bank AG      4.00    5/25/2015    EUR    60.00
Zurcher Kantonalba    8.00     6/4/2015    CHF    50.29
Commerzbank AG        8.25    5/21/2015    EUR    71.70
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.40    6/12/2015    EUR    70.93
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.30    9/11/2015    EUR    72.32
Credit Suisse AG/L    9.00   12/18/2015    USD    44.79
Bank Julius Baer &   11.25     6/3/2015    CHF    51.85
Vontobel Financial    9.50    6/12/2015    EUR    66.44
Vontobel Financial   10.45    9/11/2015    EUR    65.89
Vontobel Financial    8.65    9/11/2015    EUR    68.52
Vontobel Financial    6.95    9/11/2015    EUR    71.50
Vontobel Financial    5.35    9/11/2015    EUR    74.87
Commerzbank AG        6.75    5/21/2015    EUR    70.78
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    9.50    6/26/2015    EUR    69.40
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   17.00    6/26/2015    EUR    73.79
Goldman Sachs & Co    7.00    5/20/2015    EUR    73.05
Goldman Sachs & Co    7.00    7/22/2015    EUR    74.75
Goldman Sachs & Co    8.00    7/22/2015    EUR    70.63
Goldman Sachs & Co   10.00    7/22/2015    EUR    67.43
Goldman Sachs & Co    8.00   12/23/2015    EUR    73.80
Goldman Sachs & Co   10.00   12/23/2015    EUR    68.26
Intertekhelektro-N    8.50    4/21/2020    RUB    60.00
Oesterreichische V    3.50    5/23/2022    EUR    25.63
Leonteq Securities    9.00     4/8/2016    USD    32.41
Oesterreichische V    2.75    8/26/2016    EUR    74.50
Bank Julius Baer &   10.20    10/7/2015    CHF    67.55
Zurcher Kantonalba    7.02    10/9/2015    CHF    62.21
Leonteq Securities   13.60     1/6/2016    CHF    73.17
UniCredit Bank AG     4.80   10/22/2015    EUR    74.87
UniCredit Bank AG     5.00   10/22/2015    EUR    73.82
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.60    10/7/2015    EUR    59.11
Goldman Sachs & Co    8.00    9/23/2015    EUR    72.79
Vontobel Financial    9.75   10/23/2015    EUR    74.09
Notenstein Finance    8.68     4/1/2016    USD    73.99
Bank Julius Baer &    8.25    10/9/2015    USD    65.00
UniCredit Bank AG     5.20   10/22/2015    EUR    71.75
Goldman Sachs & Co   10.00    5/20/2015    EUR    73.16
Goldman Sachs & Co   14.00    5/20/2015    EUR    65.37
Goldman Sachs & Co   12.00    9/23/2015    EUR    69.76
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.50    6/12/2015    EUR    68.29
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.25    6/12/2015    EUR    67.52
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.00    9/11/2015    EUR    69.86
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.80    6/12/2015    EUR    72.75
Bank Julius Baer &   11.50    5/21/2015    USD    63.65
Credit Suisse AG/L    8.00    5/29/2015    USD    60.66
UniCredit Bank AG     4.00    9/24/2015    EUR    49.31
UniCredit Bank AG     4.00    9/24/2015    EUR    74.74
UniCredit Bank AG     4.00    9/24/2015    EUR    50.53
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.50    6/12/2015    EUR    68.90
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.75    9/11/2015    EUR    70.78
Bank Julius Baer &   14.75    5/20/2015    CHF    57.55
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.50    6/26/2015    EUR    60.25
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    7/22/2015    EUR    74.00
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    8/26/2015    EUR    70.40
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    7/22/2015    EUR    74.20
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    7/22/2015    EUR    70.00
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    8/26/2015    EUR    74.40
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    8/26/2015    EUR    70.80
UBS AG/London        14.83    5/22/2015    CHF    62.70
UBS AG/London         6.50    5/22/2015    CHF    45.00
LBBW                  4.50    6/26/2015    EUR    73.84
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    7/22/2015    EUR    70.20
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    8/26/2015    EUR    74.70
UBS AG/London         8.98    5/22/2015    CHF    62.35
UBS AG/London         8.98    5/22/2015    CHF    74.45
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.75    6/26/2015    EUR    70.35
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.25    6/26/2015    EUR    61.05
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.25    6/26/2015    EUR    56.33
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.75    6/26/2015    EUR    71.48
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   16.00    6/26/2015    EUR    39.52
Vontobel Financial    7.75    6/26/2015    EUR    69.06
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.25    9/11/2015    EUR    70.82
Bank Julius Baer &    8.75    5/22/2015    USD    73.20
Vontobel Financial    7.50    6/26/2015    EUR    68.90
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   12.00    6/26/2015    EUR    73.93
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.50    6/26/2015    EUR    66.82
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    9.00    6/26/2015    EUR    69.43
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.00    9/25/2015    EUR    71.31
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.75    9/11/2015    EUR    69.42
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.25    9/11/2015    EUR    71.32
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.80    9/11/2015    EUR    74.00
Leonteq Securities    9.15    5/20/2015    USD    57.61
UBS AG/London        13.25    5/20/2015    CHF    43.39
UBS AG/London        12.53    5/22/2015    CHF    61.45
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.25   11/21/2009    USD     3.82
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.75    6/12/2015    EUR    64.57
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.50    6/12/2015    EUR    64.24
LBBW                  4.50   12/29/2015    EUR    73.43
LBBW                  2.50    7/24/2015    EUR    66.77
LBBW                  3.50    7/22/2016    EUR    73.23
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   23.50    6/26/2015    EUR    52.48
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.75   11/27/2015    EUR    68.14
Oesterreichische V    1.53   12/19/2016    EUR    68.00
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.50    7/24/2015    EUR    59.31
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   11.60   10/23/2015    EUR    61.67
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.50    9/25/2015    EUR    71.65
Goldman Sachs & Co   17.00    6/24/2015    EUR    72.09
Goldman Sachs & Co   16.00    7/22/2015    EUR    73.19
UBS AG/London        13.75    8/27/2015    CHF    64.11
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.00    6/26/2015    EUR    70.60
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.50    8/28/2015    EUR    68.29
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.40    6/26/2015    EUR    66.80
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.10    9/25/2015    EUR    68.24
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.00   12/28/2015    EUR    37.55
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.00   12/28/2015    EUR    64.98
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.60    9/25/2015    EUR    74.34
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.90   10/23/2015    EUR    72.18
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.00   12/28/2015    EUR    73.39
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   19.50    6/26/2015    EUR    73.72
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.50    8/28/2015    EUR    71.06
Leonteq Securities   15.20    12/2/2015    CHF    64.53
Commerzbank AG        8.75    8/27/2015    EUR    65.22
Commerzbank AG       10.75    8/27/2015    EUR    62.76
Commerzbank AG       10.25    8/27/2015    EUR    69.75
Commerzbank AG       11.00    8/27/2015    EUR    73.07
Commerzbank AG        6.75    8/27/2015    EUR    67.98
Vontobel Financial    6.60    6/12/2015    EUR    74.72
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.70     9/7/2015    EUR    69.18
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    9.50    7/24/2015    EUR    64.36
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   10.80    9/25/2015    EUR    63.31
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.80   10/23/2015    EUR    66.13
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.00   12/28/2015    EUR    46.36
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.00   12/28/2015    EUR    51.84
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.90    6/26/2015    EUR    73.07
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.70    7/24/2015    EUR    70.86
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   11.50    9/25/2015    EUR    67.61
e-Kancelaria Grupa    9.00   12/23/2015    PLN     2.00
BNP Paribas Emissi    7.25   10/22/2015    EUR    72.28
BNP Paribas Emissi    7.00    1/21/2016    EUR    72.84
e-Kancelaria Grupa    9.00    12/4/2015    PLN    40.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.20    12/3/2008    HKD     3.82
Leonteq Securities   13.00    8/25/2015    CHF    40.99
Notenstein Privatb   10.00    8/14/2015    USD    72.84
Leonteq Securities   14.20    8/25/2015    CHF    73.60
Commerzbank AG       16.25    6/25/2015    EUR    51.50
Bank Julius Baer &   11.50    8/19/2015    CHF    66.65
Vontobel Financial    6.80    9/25/2015    EUR    73.45
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   15.75    9/25/2015    EUR    67.79
Bank Julius Baer &   10.70    9/16/2015    CHF    66.85
Notenstein Privatb    7.20     9/3/2015    EUR    62.94
Vontobel Financial    7.65    6/12/2015    EUR    74.76
Bank Julius Baer &    8.20    9/23/2015    CHF    50.90
Leonteq Securities   12.00   12/15/2015    CHF    74.87
Vontobel Financial    8.10   12/28/2015    EUR    74.70
Vontobel Financial    9.45    9/25/2015    EUR    73.19
Vontobel Financial   11.55    6/26/2015    EUR    71.17
Vontobel Financial   24.30    6/26/2015    EUR    61.94
Leonteq Securities   13.80   12/22/2015    CHF    73.71
UBS AG/London        11.25    8/27/2015    CHF    48.00
Commerzbank AG       14.00    8/27/2015    EUR    66.92
Commerzbank AG       17.25    8/27/2015    EUR    60.90
Commerzbank AG       20.50    8/27/2015    EUR    56.00
Commerzbank AG       23.75    8/27/2015    EUR    51.83
Bank Julius Baer &    7.40     9/9/2015    CHF    47.90
BNP Paribas Emissi    8.50   12/24/2015    EUR    70.28
BNP Paribas Emissi    7.50    6/25/2015    EUR    70.51
Notenstein Privatb   10.00     9/5/2016    CHF    67.48
Leonteq Securities    9.50     9/8/2016    USD    61.34
Leonteq Securities    8.64     9/8/2016    CHF    61.96
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    9.00    6/26/2015    EUR    63.42
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.80    6/26/2015    EUR    63.25
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.50    9/25/2015    EUR    65.19
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.80    9/25/2015    EUR    64.92
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.10   12/28/2015    EUR    66.40
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.60   12/28/2015    EUR    66.07
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.00    6/26/2015    EUR    66.96
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.50   12/28/2015    EUR    69.70
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.00   12/28/2015    EUR    69.38
Leonteq Securities   20.00    12/8/2015    USD    45.65
BNP Paribas Emissi    7.50    9/24/2015    EUR    72.11
BNP Paribas Emissi    9.00    9/24/2015    EUR    69.08
BNP Paribas Emissi    7.25   12/24/2015    EUR    72.80
BNP Paribas Emissi    5.75    6/25/2015    EUR    74.53
BNP Paribas Emissi    9.50    6/25/2015    EUR    66.96
Leonteq Securities   13.00     9/2/2015    CHF    68.87
Notenstein Privatb    9.10    8/29/2016    CHF    73.04
Notenstein Privatb    9.10    8/29/2016    CHF    47.66
Credit Suisse AG/L   11.00    8/28/2015    USD    49.07
Bank Julius Baer &    7.00    8/28/2015    USD    71.65
Commerzbank AG       17.50    5/21/2015    EUR    50.01
Leonteq Securities   11.00    8/25/2015    USD    59.15
Commerzbank AG       13.00    5/21/2015    EUR    70.77
Commerzbank AG       23.25    6/25/2015    EUR    53.84
Commerzbank AG       24.25    7/23/2015    EUR    53.18
Commerzbank AG        9.00    7/23/2015    EUR    66.09
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.90    9/25/2015    EUR    64.57
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.00   12/28/2015    EUR    65.68
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.10   12/28/2015    EUR    65.10
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    9.00    6/26/2015    EUR    67.11
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.40    9/25/2015    EUR    68.80
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.80    9/25/2015    EUR    68.56
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.10    9/25/2015    EUR    68.29
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.90   12/28/2015    EUR    69.96
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    5.90   12/28/2015    EUR    68.67
Societe Generale S    0.50     4/4/2024    MXN    60.99
Societe Generale S    0.50   12/21/2022    AUD    74.54
Bank Julius Baer &    8.25    9/18/2015    CHF    48.75
Goldman Sachs & Co   11.00   10/21/2015    EUR    74.73
Veniti SA             9.70    3/28/2016    PLN    55.00
e-Kancelaria Grupa    9.00   10/25/2016    PLN     1.00
Cooperatieve Centr    0.50   12/29/2027    MXN    46.60
Goldman Sachs & Co   11.00    9/23/2015    EUR    73.95
Goldman Sachs & Co   11.00    9/23/2015    EUR    73.95
Goldman Sachs & Co   11.00    9/23/2015    EUR    73.95
Goldman Sachs & Co   11.00   10/21/2015    EUR    74.73
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50   12/20/2018    RUB    65.24
Commerzbank AG        7.50    6/25/2015    EUR    73.86
Commerzbank AG        8.00    7/23/2015    EUR    73.09
Commerzbank AG       11.75    7/23/2015    EUR    61.50
Commerzbank AG       16.00    7/23/2015    EUR    52.62
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    9.10     8/7/2015    EUR    70.40
Commerzbank AG        7.25    7/23/2015    EUR    73.14
Commerzbank AG        7.00    7/23/2015    EUR    66.06
Commerzbank AG       10.00    7/23/2015    EUR    56.59
Commerzbank AG       13.00    7/23/2015    EUR    49.52
Commerzbank AG       16.25    7/23/2015    EUR    44.55
Commerzbank AG       19.75    7/23/2015    EUR    40.68
Commerzbank AG       10.00    7/23/2015    EUR    60.47
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.50   12/15/2011    GBP     6.63
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.25    7/24/2015    EUR    59.68
Commerzbank AG        5.50    7/23/2015    EUR    72.97
Commerzbank AG        7.00    7/23/2015    EUR    70.33
Commerzbank AG        9.00    7/23/2015    EUR    68.02
Commerzbank AG        9.25    7/23/2015    EUR    62.30
Commerzbank AG       23.25    7/23/2015    EUR    37.74
Commerzbank AG        7.00    7/23/2015    EUR    64.62
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00   11/24/2016    EUR     3.82
Zurcher Kantonalba   11.03     8/7/2015    CHF    55.72
Notenstein Privatb    4.00     2/1/2016    EUR    65.87
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   16.00    8/28/2015    EUR    41.11
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.75    8/28/2015    EUR    64.84
Zurcher Kantonalba    7.50     8/6/2015    EUR    74.46
UBS AG/London         7.20    1/20/2016    EUR    69.35
Lehman Brothers Tr   11.00   12/19/2011    USD     3.82
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.50    9/25/2015    EUR    70.87
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   10.00    8/28/2015    EUR    72.09
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.00    9/25/2015    EUR    68.48
Province of Teramo    0.27   12/30/2030    EUR    67.97
UBS AG/London         5.00    7/31/2015    CHF    60.67
Societe Generale S    5.50    7/27/2015    EUR    58.87
Province of Trevis    0.17   12/31/2034    EUR    59.40
Zurcher Kantonalba    6.30     8/6/2015    EUR    73.58
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.00     2/8/2016    USD    72.90
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.05    9/16/2008    EUR     3.82
Kommunalbanken AS     0.50     2/2/2018    BRL    73.70
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50     3/1/2018    RUB    71.38
Eitzen Chemical AS   11.26     6/6/2016    USD    20.88
e-Kancelaria Grupa   10.00    11/6/2015    PLN     2.00
Instalexport SA       8.41   10/19/2015    PLN    50.00
Leonteq Securities   14.20   11/18/2015    CHF    73.23
UBS AG/London         4.25    6/26/2015    EUR    74.25
UBS AG/London         9.00    9/25/2015    EUR    61.94
UBS AG/London        13.75    6/26/2015    EUR    58.32
UBS AG/London         9.00   12/29/2015    EUR    64.21
Leonteq Securities    9.60   11/18/2015    CHF    74.66
UBS AG/London        21.25    9/25/2015    EUR    73.40
UBS AG/London        14.75    9/25/2015    EUR    65.38
Kaupthing Bank Hf     0.95   10/20/2010    JPY    14.13
UBS AG/London        10.25    9/25/2015    EUR    56.89
Kaupthing Bank Hf     4.50    1/17/2011    EUR    14.13
UBS AG/London        18.50    6/26/2015    EUR    54.13
UBS AG/London        24.75    9/25/2015    EUR    74.09
UBS AG/London        10.00     7/2/2015    CHF    46.99
Vontobel Financial    8.50    9/11/2015    EUR    72.51
Commerzbank AG        9.25    6/25/2015    EUR    72.87
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.00    7/24/2015    EUR    55.03
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.75    7/24/2015    EUR    68.74
Vontobel Financial    5.50    7/24/2015    EUR    73.54
Vontobel Financial    7.70   12/11/2015    EUR    74.08
Bank Julius Baer &   10.00     7/3/2015    USD    50.85
Banque Cantonale V   10.80    6/25/2015    CHF    53.23
Bank Julius Baer &    7.65     7/3/2015    USD    65.65
UBS AG/London        15.25    6/25/2015    CHF    46.01
Commerzbank AG        6.75    6/25/2015    EUR    63.83
Commerzbank AG        8.50    6/25/2015    EUR    60.56
Commerzbank AG       10.50    6/25/2015    EUR    57.96
Commerzbank AG        7.50    6/25/2015    EUR    52.35
Commerzbank AG        6.50    6/25/2015    EUR    68.76
Commerzbank AG        8.25    6/25/2015    EUR    65.44
Commerzbank AG       10.25    6/25/2015    EUR    62.05
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.25    7/24/2015    EUR    62.63
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   16.00    7/24/2015    EUR    36.01
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.25    1/11/2016    CHF    54.23
MORTGAGE AGENT AHM    3.00     9/9/2045    RUB    72.50
e-Kancelaria Grupa   10.00    6/27/2016    PLN     1.00
HSBC Bank PLC         0.50    4/11/2023    MXN    65.51
LBI HF                4.32    1/31/2010    EUR     2.81
UBS AG/London        21.25    6/26/2015    EUR    72.92
UBS AG/London        23.50    6/26/2015    EUR    50.76
Vontobel Financial    5.50    8/14/2015    EUR    73.09
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.00    9/25/2015    EUR    70.67
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.00    8/28/2015    EUR    61.66
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.00    9/25/2015    EUR    71.02
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.50    8/28/2015    EUR    65.86
UniCredit Bank AG     6.50    9/24/2015    EUR    74.08
LBI HF                4.75    5/31/2013    EUR     2.81
UBS AG               19.50    6/24/2016    EUR    74.87
Oesterreichische V    5.10    5/23/2022    EUR    31.13
UBS AG               16.00   12/23/2016    EUR    74.82
UBS AG               24.25   12/29/2015    EUR    68.71
UBS AG               16.00   12/23/2016    EUR    74.43
UBS AG               22.50    3/29/2016    EUR    71.05
Banca di Cividale     0.09    10/2/2036    EUR    60.22
Oesterreichische V    4.81     5/9/2035    EUR    16.88
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.50    6/15/2017    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00   12/30/2017    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    5/23/2018    CZK     3.82
UBS AG               21.75    3/29/2016    EUR    72.54
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.25    9/14/2015    CHF    74.00
LBBW                  4.30    9/23/2016    EUR    70.37
LBI HF                4.28   11/19/2010    EUR     2.81
Goldman Sachs & Co   17.00    5/20/2015    EUR    70.41
UBS AG/London        24.75    3/29/2016    EUR    67.11
UBS AG/London        17.75    9/25/2015    EUR    68.79
Credit Suisse AG/N    7.00     9/7/2015    CHF    72.25
Vontobel Financial    8.50    6/26/2015    EUR    66.67
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.00    8/14/2015    EUR    74.60
UBS AG/London        14.75    3/29/2016    EUR    74.56
Vontobel Financial    4.70    6/26/2015    EUR    65.69
Vontobel Financial    6.65    6/26/2015    EUR    66.17
UBS AG/London        16.50    3/29/2016    EUR    73.43
Societe Generale E    2.50    10/7/2016    EUR    58.95
Leonteq Securities    7.07    9/21/2015    CHF    49.19
UBS AG/London        14.75    6/24/2016    EUR    74.81
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.25    6/26/2015    EUR    66.73
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.00    9/11/2015    EUR    68.63
Deutsche Bank AG      4.20    6/22/2015    EUR    73.40
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/22/2015    EUR    73.60
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.25    6/26/2015    EUR    69.04
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/22/2015    EUR    71.50
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    71.70
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    69.70
UniCredit Bank AG     4.60    6/26/2015    EUR    71.52
UniCredit Bank AG     6.00    6/26/2015    EUR    51.83
Oesterreichische V    3.50    3/20/2018    EUR    52.50
Vontobel Financial    6.95    6/12/2015    EUR    66.93
Vontobel Financial    8.00    6/12/2015    EUR    67.04
Landesbank Hessen-    3.50    7/10/2015    EUR    54.50
UniCredit Bank AG     4.00    6/25/2015    EUR    73.56
UniCredit Bank AG     4.00    6/25/2015    EUR    63.99
Commerzbank AG        7.10    6/25/2015    EUR    70.49
Commerzbank AG        7.30    6/25/2015    EUR    73.97
Societe Generale S    4.00    3/29/2016    EUR    65.85
Commerzbank AG        7.00    6/25/2015    EUR    67.30
UniCredit Bank AG     5.00    6/25/2015    EUR    67.66
Commerzbank AG       10.75   12/24/2015    EUR    74.04
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.50    6/26/2015    EUR    69.55
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   14.00    6/26/2015    EUR    44.29
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.50    6/26/2015    EUR    52.34
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.50    6/26/2015    EUR    69.41
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   10.50    6/26/2015    EUR    74.82
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.00    6/26/2015    EUR    59.55
Commerzbank AG       14.75   12/24/2015    EUR    70.41
Klaebu Sparebank      2.72                 NOK    69.84
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   10.00    6/26/2015    EUR    48.78
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.50    9/25/2015    EUR    71.48
BNP Paribas Emissi    8.00    7/23/2015    EUR    53.64
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   14.50    8/28/2015    EUR    69.60
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.25    8/14/2015    EUR    68.78
BNP Paribas Emissi    9.00    5/21/2015    EUR    56.78
BNP Paribas Emissi    6.75    7/23/2015    EUR    56.69
BNP Paribas Emissi    6.75    7/23/2015    EUR    72.54
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.80   12/23/2015    EUR    74.76
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.00    6/26/2015    EUR    61.03
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   14.00    6/26/2015    EUR    73.42
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   14.00    6/26/2015    EUR    49.47
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   11.00    6/26/2015    EUR    53.94
Deutsche Bank AG      9.00    9/11/2015    EUR    67.83
BNP Paribas Emissi    8.00    6/25/2015    EUR    52.95
BNP Paribas Emissi    6.75    6/25/2015    EUR    56.10
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.25    5/15/2010    EUR     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.35   10/13/2016    EUR     3.82
Kaupthing Bank Hf     4.53    4/24/2012    EUR    14.13
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.75    8/24/2015    CHF    72.64
LBI HF                3.34    5/11/2012    EUR     2.81
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.39     5/4/2017    USD     3.82
UBS AG/London        16.25   12/29/2015    EUR    70.78
UBS AG/London        13.25    9/25/2015    EUR    72.55
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.25    10/9/2015    EUR    72.38
UBS AG               17.25   12/23/2016    EUR    73.55
Deutsche Bank AG      6.00    6/22/2015    EUR    73.70
Deutsche Bank AG      8.00    6/22/2015    EUR    71.90
Vontobel Financial    5.60    6/26/2015    EUR    71.52
Kaupthing Bank Hf     4.47   10/27/2010    EUR    14.13
DekaBank Deutsche     3.10    2/26/2018    EUR    74.61
Leonteq Securities    6.58    3/29/2016    EUR    69.75
UniCredit Bank AG     6.10    6/26/2015    EUR    62.90
UniCredit Bank AG     4.90    6/26/2015    EUR    69.60
UniCredit Bank AG     4.30    6/26/2015    EUR    73.55
UniCredit Bank AG     5.00    6/25/2015    EUR    71.77
UniCredit Bank AG     5.80    6/26/2015    EUR    64.44
UniCredit Bank AG     5.50    6/26/2015    EUR    53.01
UniCredit Bank AG     4.80    6/26/2015    EUR    54.20
Vontobel Financial    7.90    6/26/2015    EUR    70.23
UniCredit Bank AG     4.00    6/25/2015    EUR    70.26
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   27.50    6/26/2015    EUR    60.28
UniCredit Bank AG     5.50    6/25/2015    EUR    63.85
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.00    1/22/2016    EUR    74.07
UniCredit Bank AG     6.00    6/25/2015    EUR    68.74
UniCredit Bank AG     5.50    6/26/2015    EUR    66.07
UniCredit Bank AG     5.20    6/26/2015    EUR    67.78
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   14.00    6/26/2015    EUR    45.85
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.50    6/26/2015    EUR    54.87
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    9.50    6/26/2015    EUR    65.08
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.00    9/25/2015    EUR    69.83
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   14.00    6/26/2015    EUR    72.29
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.50    6/26/2015    EUR    70.22
Glitnir HF            3.50   10/30/2012    EUR    14.00
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.50    6/26/2015    EUR    71.86
LBI HF                4.34     3/1/2011    EUR     2.81
UBS AG/London        18.50   12/29/2015    EUR    69.20
Goldman Sachs & Co   14.00    8/26/2015    EUR    74.10
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00    5/30/2010    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.48    5/12/2009    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.25    5/12/2009    USD     3.82
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.50    6/26/2015    EUR    66.47
Leonteq Securities    8.64    8/25/2015    CHF    17.46
UBS AG               20.50    6/24/2016    EUR    73.88
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00    5/17/2010    USD     3.82
Notenstein Privatb   11.00    8/28/2015    CHF    69.30
Credit Suisse AG/N    7.75    8/28/2015    CHF    73.03
UniCredit Bank AG     4.80    9/24/2015    EUR    56.10
UniCredit Bank AG     4.75    9/24/2015    EUR    56.41
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   15.50    6/26/2015    EUR    56.45
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   16.00    6/26/2015    EUR    68.97
Credit Suisse AG/L    8.00     7/3/2015    CHF    70.83
Credit Suisse AG/N   10.50     7/9/2015    USD    52.77
UBS AG/London         6.75     7/2/2015    CHF    73.74
UBS AG/London         7.00    7/16/2015    CHF    42.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.50     8/2/2009    USD     6.63
Banque Cantonale V   13.10    7/21/2015    CHF    62.73
Commerzbank AG        9.50    7/23/2015    EUR    74.81
Zurcher Kantonalba    6.60    7/29/2015    CHF    48.23
Notenstein Privatb   13.40    7/28/2015    USD    57.67
Zaklady Miesne Mys   11.50    6/10/2015    PLN    10.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.50    6/15/2009    CHF     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    1.50   10/25/2011    EUR     3.82
Vontobel Financial    7.90    6/26/2015    EUR    67.23
Bank Julius Baer &    8.75    7/31/2015    EUR    71.20
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   10.00    6/26/2015    EUR    71.16
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   12.50    9/25/2015    EUR    68.61
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.50    9/25/2015    EUR    72.97
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   14.00    9/25/2015    EUR    56.91
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   10.50    9/25/2015    EUR    60.41
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.00    9/25/2015    EUR    59.25
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   10.00    9/25/2015    EUR    62.22
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    9.00    7/24/2015    EUR    62.69
Lehman Brothers Tr   11.00    6/29/2009    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.00     8/3/2009    USD     6.63
Bank Julius Baer &    9.10    5/22/2015    EUR    69.45
Leonteq Securities   12.40    4/27/2016    CHF    64.13
Bank Julius Baer &   11.00   10/14/2015    CHF    57.15
Oesterreichische V    4.05    12/1/2016    EUR    72.25
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.00   12/27/2032    JPY     3.82
Oesterreichische V    1.52    2/19/2018    EUR    51.63
Oesterreichische V    1.24     3/1/2022    EUR    21.75
Oesterreichische V    1.04     3/1/2021    EUR    25.75
Barclays Bank PLC     1.99    12/1/2040    USD    72.63
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    62.80
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20   12/22/2015    EUR    73.20
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20   12/22/2015    EUR    69.70
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20   12/22/2015    EUR    68.40
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/22/2015    EUR    65.90
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    67.60
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    9/22/2015    EUR    71.60
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    9/22/2015    EUR    64.80
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20   12/22/2015    EUR    72.50
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/22/2015    EUR    62.70
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    6/22/2015    EUR    66.20
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    6/22/2015    EUR    63.00
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20   12/22/2015    EUR    66.50
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20   12/22/2015    EUR    71.90
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    64.40
BNP Paribas Emissi    9.00    1/21/2016    EUR    65.14
UBS AG/London        10.50    10/8/2015    CHF    67.76
Leonteq Securities    9.00   10/20/2015    CHF    62.94
Bank Julius Baer &   10.60    10/9/2015    USD    71.70
UBS AG/London        12.00    10/1/2015    CHF    70.37
Commerzbank AG       10.00    5/21/2015    EUR    71.83
Barclays Bank PLC     1.64     6/3/2041    USD    72.48
Leonteq Securities    6.70     6/6/2016    USD    70.24
Vontobel Financial    8.00    8/28/2015    EUR    72.55
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.10     8/7/2015    EUR    73.90
UBS AG/London        14.25    8/13/2015    CHF    69.55
UBS AG/London         7.50    8/13/2015    CHF    46.43
e-Kancelaria Grupa    9.00    8/19/2016    PLN     2.00
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   10.20   10/23/2015    EUR    63.77
Cooperatieve Centr    0.50    1/31/2033    MXN    32.97
e-Kancelaria Grupa    9.91    7/11/2015    PLN     2.00
Vontobel Financial    3.30    7/10/2015    EUR    72.20
Vontobel Financial    5.05    7/10/2015    EUR    69.14
Vontobel Financial    7.20    7/10/2015    EUR    66.42
Vontobel Financial    9.60    7/10/2015    EUR    64.02
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.50     7/6/2009    CHF     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.50    9/13/2009    CHF     6.63
Commerzbank AG        8.75    6/25/2015    EUR    62.27
Commerzbank AG       10.75    6/25/2015    EUR    59.46
Commerzbank AG        6.25    5/21/2015    EUR    67.82
Commerzbank AG        8.75    5/21/2015    EUR    64.57
Commerzbank AG        6.00    6/25/2015    EUR    68.42
Commerzbank AG        8.25    6/25/2015    EUR    65.36
Commerzbank AG       11.00    6/25/2015    EUR    62.70
Commerzbank AG        7.00    6/25/2015    EUR    71.03
Commerzbank AG        9.00    5/21/2015    EUR    50.62
Commerzbank AG       12.50    5/21/2015    EUR    43.49
LBI HF                4.40   11/30/2035    EUR     0.01
Commerzbank AG       16.50    5/21/2015    EUR    38.23
Commerzbank AG       20.50    5/21/2015    EUR    34.34
Commerzbank AG       24.75    5/21/2015    EUR    31.13
Commerzbank AG        6.25    6/25/2015    EUR    60.68
Commerzbank AG        9.25    6/25/2015    EUR    51.50
Commerzbank AG       12.50    6/25/2015    EUR    44.69
Commerzbank AG       16.50    6/25/2015    EUR    39.25
Commerzbank AG       19.75    6/25/2015    EUR    36.20
Commerzbank AG       23.50    6/25/2015    EUR    33.33
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.50    7/24/2026    EUR     3.82
Deutsche Bank AG      4.50   12/22/2015    EUR    73.69
Glitnir HF            6.31    7/28/2011    USD    14.00
Glitnir HF            6.31    7/28/2011    USD    14.00
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.00    6/26/2015    EUR    72.32
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.25    9/25/2015    EUR    70.41
Leonteq Securities   10.00    1/22/2016    USD    69.84
Credit Suisse AG/N    8.25    7/31/2015    USD    68.16
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.40    7/23/2015    EUR    71.21
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.60   10/23/2015    EUR    72.80
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.70    7/23/2015    EUR    62.59
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.70    7/23/2015    EUR    60.18
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    3.90   10/23/2015    EUR    68.09
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.90   10/23/2015    EUR    65.07
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.80   10/23/2015    EUR    62.84
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.10    7/23/2015    EUR    69.95
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.10    7/23/2015    EUR    66.65
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    3.70    7/23/2015    EUR    65.84
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.20    7/23/2015    EUR    63.26
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.00   10/23/2015    EUR    72.40
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.70   10/23/2015    EUR    68.80
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.30    7/23/2015    EUR    63.51
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.90    7/23/2015    EUR    63.21
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.40    7/23/2015    EUR    57.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.90   10/23/2015    EUR    66.36
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.80   10/23/2015    EUR    63.32
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.70   10/23/2015    EUR    60.06
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    3.10    7/22/2015    EUR    69.64
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.90    7/22/2015    EUR    66.77
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    6.00    7/22/2015    EUR    65.48
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    3.90   10/22/2015    EUR    70.36
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    4.70   10/22/2015    EUR    69.14
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.60   10/22/2015    EUR    68.04
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.80    7/22/2015    EUR    72.81
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    3.70    7/22/2015    EUR    69.25
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.70    7/22/2015    EUR    66.10
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.30    7/22/2015    EUR    63.37
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    3.60   10/22/2015    EUR    72.15
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.30   10/22/2015    EUR    69.33
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.30   10/22/2015    EUR    66.92
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.50     3/6/2013    CHF     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.00    4/24/2009    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    9.00    6/13/2009    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    9.00    3/17/2009    GBP     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.00   11/28/2008    CHF     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.38    9/20/2008    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.85    4/24/2009    USD     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.25    10/6/2008    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.50     8/9/2010    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    8.00    5/22/2009    USD     6.63
Bank Julius Baer &    6.50    7/31/2015    USD    67.75
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.75    6/15/2009    CHF     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.50   10/24/2008    USD     6.63
UBS AG/London        15.00    7/23/2015    CHF    43.35
Lehman Brothers Tr   10.00    3/27/2009    USD     3.82
Lehman Brothers Tr    5.00   10/24/2008    CHF     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.00    4/14/2009    EUR     6.63
Bank Julius Baer &    6.60    7/27/2015    EUR    72.20
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.95   10/25/2036    EUR     3.82
Leonteq Securities   11.52   10/28/2015    CHF    60.16
BNP Paribas Emissi    7.00    6/25/2015    EUR    67.04
BNP Paribas Emissi   10.00    6/25/2015    EUR    62.74
BNP Paribas Emissi    5.00    6/25/2015    EUR    74.43
BNP Paribas Emissi    7.00    6/25/2015    EUR    66.62
BNP Paribas Emissi   10.00    6/25/2015    EUR    60.48
BNP Paribas Emissi   14.00    6/25/2015    EUR    55.66
BNP Paribas Emissi   14.00    6/25/2015    EUR    62.52
BNP Paribas Emissi   17.00    6/25/2015    EUR    57.92
BNP Paribas Emissi   20.00    6/25/2015    EUR    54.07
UBS AG/London        12.00     7/9/2015    CHF    49.51
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.00   11/16/2009    EUR     3.82
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    6/22/2015    EUR    66.80
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    6/22/2015    EUR    62.10
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    63.10
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20   12/22/2015    EUR    64.40
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/22/2015    EUR    61.80
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    63.50
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20   12/22/2015    EUR    70.30
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/22/2015    EUR    66.50
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20   12/22/2015    EUR    65.70
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    66.70
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    68.20
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    67.80
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20   12/22/2015    EUR    69.70
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    9/22/2015    EUR    68.60
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20   12/22/2015    EUR    69.00
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    62.00
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20   12/22/2015    EUR    65.10
Vontobel Financial    5.70   12/11/2015    EUR    73.59
Commerzbank AG       11.00    6/25/2015    EUR    57.38
Leonteq Securities    9.40    10/8/2015    USD    73.64
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    5.50    9/25/2015    EUR    72.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    9.25    7/24/2015    EUR    71.04
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   12.50    9/25/2015    EUR    66.85
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.50    9/25/2015    EUR    70.88
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    6.50    7/24/2015    EUR    73.39
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   15.00    9/25/2015    EUR    55.16
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   12.00    9/25/2015    EUR    58.45
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.50    9/25/2015    EUR    65.06
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.00    9/25/2015    EUR    72.40
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   16.50    6/26/2015    EUR    71.82
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   11.00    6/26/2015    EUR    62.31
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   12.50    9/25/2015    EUR    61.06
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   10.00    9/25/2015    EUR    64.53
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.50    7/24/2015    EUR    65.10
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    6/23/2015    EUR    54.80
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/23/2015    EUR    54.50
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/23/2015    EUR    54.70
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    64.20
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    9/22/2015    EUR    65.00
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    64.60
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    9/22/2015    EUR    61.90
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    61.50
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    61.10
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    9/22/2015    EUR    59.10
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    58.70
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    58.30
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    9/22/2015    EUR    56.60
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    56.20
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    55.80
Commerzbank AG        7.25    6/25/2015    EUR    73.49
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.70     6/6/2009    EUR     3.82
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    4.90    7/10/2015    EUR    68.29
UBS AG/London         7.00     7/9/2015    CHF    41.44
Kaupthing Bank Hf     1.75     6/7/2016    EUR    14.13
Commerzbank AG        6.00    6/25/2015    EUR    63.55
Commerzbank AG        7.50    6/25/2015    EUR    67.97
Commerzbank AG        7.00    6/25/2015    EUR    69.66
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    9.50    7/24/2015    EUR    60.61
LBI HF                7.20    4/27/2026    EUR     0.01
Glitnir HF            6.84   12/15/2015    EUR     0.02
Vontobel Financial    8.35    6/26/2015    EUR    64.38
Vontobel Financial    5.30    6/26/2015    EUR    67.90
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/23/2015    EUR    57.10
Vontobel Financial    5.80    9/11/2015    EUR    72.43
Vontobel Financial    5.00    9/11/2015    EUR    72.15
Vontobel Financial    5.10   12/11/2015    EUR    73.23
Vontobel Financial    4.45   12/11/2015    EUR    72.84
Glitnir HF            3.63     4/5/2009    EUR    14.00
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    9.00    7/24/2015    EUR    61.14
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.50    9/25/2015    EUR    74.66
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.00    9/25/2015    EUR    68.53
Bank Julius Baer &    7.10     7/8/2015    CHF    42.65
UniCredit Bank AG     4.90    9/24/2015    EUR    55.80
Notenstein Privatb    6.10   12/30/2015    EUR    72.75
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    8.00    6/26/2015    EUR    67.16
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   16.00    6/26/2015    EUR    71.61
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    70.90
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    67.60
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/23/2015    EUR    63.00
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/23/2015    EUR    63.20
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    6/23/2015    EUR    63.30
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    6/23/2015    EUR    59.90
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/23/2015    EUR    60.00
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    6/23/2015    EUR    60.20
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    6/23/2015    EUR    57.40
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/23/2015    EUR    57.20
UBS AG/London        12.25    6/26/2015    EUR    73.44
UBS AG/London        18.75   12/23/2016    EUR    72.62
UBS AG/London        16.00    3/29/2016    EUR    71.55
UBS AG/London        15.00   12/29/2015    EUR    71.58
UBS AG/London        11.75   12/29/2015    EUR    74.91
UBS AG/London        22.25    6/24/2016    EUR    68.88
Lehman Brothers Tr    4.10    2/19/2010    EUR     3.82
UBS AG/London        23.75    6/26/2015    EUR    63.54
UBS AG/London         5.00     8/6/2015    USD    61.59
Raiffeisen Centrob    7.33    8/21/2015    EUR    66.87
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    9.50    8/28/2015    EUR    67.42
BNP Paribas Emissi    9.00    6/25/2015    EUR    74.44
Lehman Brothers Tr    3.50   10/31/2011    USD     3.82
Credit Suisse AG/N   10.25    8/14/2015    CHF    74.08
Notenstein Privatb   11.00    8/14/2015    CHF    70.22
UBS AG/London        15.75    6/26/2015    EUR    69.62
UBS AG/London        19.25    9/25/2015    EUR    67.73
Lehman Brothers Tr    7.00    2/15/2012    EUR     6.63
UBS AG/London        12.50    6/24/2016    EUR    74.10
UBS AG/London        15.00    6/24/2016    EUR    72.53
UBS AG/London        21.75    6/26/2015    EUR    64.90
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.60    2/22/2012    EUR     6.63
Lehman Brothers Tr    1.68     3/5/2015    EUR     3.82
BNP Paribas Emissi   10.00    6/25/2015    EUR    70.53
Deutsche Bank AG      7.00    6/22/2015    EUR    73.80
Deutsche Bank AG      7.00    6/22/2015    EUR    71.80
Deutsche Bank AG      8.00    6/22/2015    EUR    69.90
Deutsche Bank AG      8.00    6/22/2015    EUR    74.00
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.75     4/5/2012    EUR     3.82
UBS AG/London        18.00    6/26/2015    EUR    67.99
UBS AG/London        13.25    6/24/2016    EUR    73.41
UBS AG/London        13.25    3/29/2016    EUR    73.68
UBS AG/London        22.00    9/25/2015    EUR    65.77
Lehman Brothers Tr    6.00    5/12/2017    EUR     3.82
UBS AG/London        14.25    3/29/2016    EUR    72.97
UBS AG/London        18.00   12/23/2016    EUR    73.02
UBS AG/London        13.00   12/29/2015    EUR    73.81
UBS AG/London        23.50    6/24/2016    EUR    68.69
UBS AG/London        15.00    9/25/2015    EUR    71.31
Vontobel Financial    9.25    6/26/2015    EUR    70.42
DekaBank Deutsche     3.40     3/5/2018    EUR    74.26
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    73.70
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    6/22/2015    EUR    74.90
Raiffeisen Centrob    2.80   11/14/2016    EUR    68.86
EFG International    12.86   10/30/2017    EUR    67.54
Leonteq Securities    6.25   11/13/2015    CHF    55.32
Goldman Sachs & Co    9.00    5/20/2015    EUR    65.17
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    9/22/2015    EUR    73.50
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    68.90
Deutsche Bank AG      7.20    9/22/2015    EUR    69.70
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    73.10
Deutsche Bank AG      6.20    9/22/2015    EUR    69.30
Zurcher Kantonalba   12.00    7/23/2015    CHF    48.78
Goldman Sachs & Co   16.00    5/20/2015    EUR    59.32
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   14.00    6/26/2015    EUR    47.53
Goldman Sachs & Co   13.00    5/20/2015    EUR    59.20
Goldman Sachs & Co    7.00    9/23/2015    EUR    71.54
Goldman Sachs & Co   10.00    9/23/2015    EUR    65.73
Goldman Sachs & Co   11.00    9/23/2015    EUR    63.16
LBBW                  4.00    6/26/2015    EUR    73.50
LBBW                  5.00    6/26/2015    EUR    70.74
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   13.50    6/26/2015    EUR    71.49
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   11.00    6/26/2015    EUR    50.90
Goldman Sachs & Co   13.00    5/20/2015    EUR    74.91
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.25    6/26/2015    EUR    63.30
Goldman Sachs & Co    8.00    9/23/2015    EUR    71.93
Bank Julius Baer &    9.00    10/8/2015    CHF    47.70
Goldman Sachs & Co    6.00    5/20/2015    EUR    73.01
Goldman Sachs & Co    8.00    5/20/2015    EUR    69.02
Leonteq Securities   12.20    7/22/2015    USD    68.45
Vontobel Financial    5.00     5/6/2016    EUR    72.30
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    9.00    6/26/2015    EUR    68.37
Lehman Brothers Tr    1.60    6/21/2010    JPY     3.82
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu    7.00    9/25/2015    EUR    67.88
Deutsche Bank AG      5.20    9/22/2015    EUR    72.70
UniCredit Bank AG     5.00    6/25/2015    EUR    52.29
UniCredit Bank AG     6.25    6/25/2015    EUR    50.69
UniCredit Bank AG     4.75    6/25/2015    EUR    53.52
UniCredit Bank AG     4.25    6/25/2015    EUR    54.78
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    8.25    6/26/2015    EUR    50.78
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    7.50    6/26/2015    EUR    68.16
DZ Bank AG Deutsch    9.25    6/12/2015    EUR    68.99
DZ Bank AG Deutsch   10.00    6/12/2015    EUR    69.07
Lehman Brothers Tr    2.40    6/20/2011    JPY     3.82
UniCredit Bank AG     6.10    6/25/2015    EUR    51.26
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   14.00    6/26/2015    EUR    58.48
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   10.00    6/26/2015    EUR    63.36
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu   11.50    6/26/2015    EUR    64.71
UniCredit Bank AG     6.50    6/25/2015    EUR    50.14
Oesterreichische V    1.61    5/18/2020    EUR    32.00
Oesterreichische V    1.61    5/18/2020    EUR    32.50
Oesterreichische V    1.61    5/18/2020    EUR    32.50
Leonteq Securities    7.60   11/20/2015    USD    47.52
Raiffeisen Centrob    2.40   12/19/2016    EUR    69.32


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *