TCREUR_Public/150527.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, May 27, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 103

                            Headlines

B U L G A R I A

NAFTEX PETROL: Lovech Court Commences Insolvency Proceedings


G E R M A N Y

KUKA AG: Moody's Alters Outlook on 'Ba2' CFR to Positive


G R E E C E

GLOBUS MARITIME: E&Y Expresses Going Concern Doubt
GREECE: Bailout Talks Show Little Progress as Deadline Looms


N E T H E R L A N D S

CAIRN CLO V: Moody's Rates EUR7.7MM Class F Notes (P)B2
CHAPEL 2007: Moody's Reviews Ca Ratings on 2 Notes for Upgrade
HIGHLANDER EURO II: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes


R O M A N I A

OLTCHIM SA: Posts EUR844K Loss in First Quarter Ended March 31
* ROMANIA: 60% of Big Companies Face Imminent Insolvency Risk


S P A I N

PESCANOVA SA: Creditors Back Restructuring Plan for 10 Units


U K R A I N E

MERCURY BANK: Deposit Guarantee Fund Extends Liquidation Period
METINVEST: In Debt Negotiations with Creditors


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

WISE 2006-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to Caa3
* UK: Supermarkets Fail to Pay Suppliers on Time, Research Shows
* UK: Creates Conciliation Service to Settle Late Payment Dispute


                            *********


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


NAFTEX PETROL: Lovech Court Commences Insolvency Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------------
Slav Okov at Bloomberg News reports that a court in Bulgarian
town of Lovech starts insolvency proceedings on creditor's claim
against Naftex Petrol.

Creditors are claiming collateralized assets of Petrol Group as
part of court enforcement, Bloomberg discloses.

Naftex Petrol is Petrol's wholesale fuel distribution unit.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


KUKA AG: Moody's Alters Outlook on 'Ba2' CFR to Positive
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed to positive from stable the
outlook on the Ba2 corporate family rating and the Ba2-PD
probability of default rating of KUKA AG. Concurrently, Moody's
has affirmed these ratings.

The rating action recognizes the steps KUKA has taken to further
grow and diversify its business, while keeping its capital
structure very strong and liquidity healthy. At the end of 2014
KUKA acquired Swisslog, a Swiss company active primarily in
logistics and healthcare, for an equivalent of approximately
EUR270 million, financed by a combination of cash and new equity.
As such its Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA and retained cash flow
(RCF)/net debt remained at very healthy levels of 2.1x and 63% in
2014, respectively, even without any profit contribution from
Swisslog in 2014. These levels position KUKA strongly in the Ba2
category.

Swisslog will increase KUKA's still fairly small size and
decrease its reliance on automotive industry and fairly
concentrated customer base of large car manufacturers. Going
forward, KUKA's dependence on the automotive industry will
decrease to some 50% from over two thirds in 2013, with a focus
shifted to inherently more stable end markets. Swisslog, with
EBITA margin in low single digit in % terms, will however,
initially dilute KUKA's profitability until synergies are
realized.

The positive outlook also reflects Moody's expectation that
KUKA's automotive business will continue enjoying good momentum
in the next 12-18 months, which will support healthy free cash
flow generation during the period.

For an upgrade to Ba1, the rating agency would expect to see a
track record of Swisslog being successfully integrated, as
exhibited by group EBITA margin, as adjusted by Moody's, moving
back to current levels (8.2% in 2014) through 2016 and continued
material free cash flow generation. Moody's would also look for
continued track record of KUKA maintaining very conservative
financial policies and a healthy liquidity profile with
substantial headroom under its covenants at all times, while
continuing with further diversification of its business.

KUKA's Ba2 ratings remain constrained by its vulnerability to the
inherent cyclicality of the automotive industry, which can cause
volatility in operating profits and cash flow through the
economic cycle. This volatility requires the maintenance of a
sizeable liquidity cushion in order to cope with cyclical
downturns. In addition, the group will need to maintain tight
control over cost efficiency and working capital in a competitive
environment. The Ba2 ratings also remain constrained by KUKA's
relatively small size, high level of customer concentration,
still somewhat limited diversification both in terms of industry
as well as geography, and strong competition in its markets, with
large competitors such as ABB Ltd. (A2 stable).

More positively, the Ba2 ratings are supported by KUKA's strong
competitive position in its relevant markets with, according to
the company, a number one market position in robotics for the
automotive industry worldwide, a number one market position in
systems (e.g., body-in-white) in the US and number two in Europe,
which KUKA has been able to protect over time. The ratings also
reflect KUKA's high level of innovation and technology leadership
as well as its long-standing customer relationships.

The rating agency could consider upgrading KUKA's Ba2 ratings if
the company were able to (1) further diversify its business
profile in terms of end markets, customer base and geographies;
and (2) build on a track record of robust operating performance
through the cycle, as exemplified by the ability to generate
positive FCF even in an adverse economic environment, while
maintaining a solid liquidity cushion and strong capital
structure.

Moody's could downgrade KUKA's Ba2 ratings if its adjusted gross
debt/EBITDA were to rise above 3.0x on a sustained basis (2.0x
for the 12-month period to March 2015), for instance driven by a
more aggressive approach with regard to shareholder distribution
or debt-financed growth. In addition, negative rating pressure
could result if (1) KUKA's EBITA margins were to fall below 5%
(8.2% in 2014) as a result of the deterioration of its market
position or weakening operational efficiency; (2) KUKA's last-12-
month FCF turned negative for a prolonged period of time; or (3)
its liquidity position weakened.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Manufacturing Companies published in July 2014. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Augsburg, Germany, KUKA AG focuses on robot-
supported automation of manufacturing processes and is active in
the mechanical and plant engineering sector. After the
acquisition of Swisslog end of 2014 the group started operating
under three divisions: KUKA Robotics (approximately 30% of group
revenues on a pro-forma basis), KUKA Systems (approximately 50%)
and Swisslog (roughly 20%). In 2014, KUKA generated revenues of
around EUR2.1 billion (excluding Swisslog). KUKA is publicly
listed, with Voith GmbH (Baa3 negative), being its largest
shareholder holding around 25% stake.



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G R E E C E
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GLOBUS MARITIME: E&Y Expresses Going Concern Doubt
-----------------------------------------------------
In Globus Maritime Limited's annual report for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2014, Ernst & Young (Hellas) Certified Auditors
Accountants S.A. expressed substantial doubt about the Company's
ability to continue as a going concern, citing that the Company
reports that it is probable not to be able to meet certain of the
restrictive covenants included in certain of its bank loan
agreements and meet scheduled debt principal repayments within
2015.

As of Dec. 31, 2014, the Company was not in compliance with the
security value requirement contained in the Kelty Loan Agreement
that requires the market value of the m/v Energy Globe (formerly
called m/v Jin Star) and any additional security provided,
including the minimum liquidity with the lender, to be equal or
greater than 130% of the aggregate principal amount of debt
outstanding under the Kelty Loan Agreement. In such
circumstances, upon request from the lender, in order to remedy
this non-compliance, the Company must either provide the lender
acceptable additional security with a net realizable value at
least equal to the shortfall, or prepay an amount that will
eliminate the shortfall, which as of Dec. 31, 2014 is estimated
to be $2.1 million.

All the Company's loan arrangements contain cross-default
provisions that provide that if it's in default under any of its
loan arrangements, the lender of another loan arrangement can
declare a default under its other loan arrangement, which could
result in default of all of its loan arrangements.  Because of
the presence of cross-default provisions in the Company's loan
arrangements, the refusal of any lender to grant or extend a
waiver could result in most of its indebtedness being
accelerated, notwithstanding that other lenders have waived
covenant defaults under their respective loan arrangements.

As of April 30, 2015, the Company was in breach with the minimum
liquidity requirement of maintaining at least US$5.0 million
contained in its Credit Facility and the DVB Loan Agreement, and
the minimum liquidity requirement contained in the HSH Loan
Agreement.

As of April 30, 2015, none of the Company's lenders had declared
an event of default under the relevant loan agreements for which
the Company was not in compliance as of December 31, 2014 or
currently.  However, if these breaches are not remediated, they
could constitute potential events of default that may result in
the lenders requiring immediate repayment of the loans.

The Company reported net income of US$3.21 million on US$26.4
million of time charter revenue in 2014, compared with net income
of US$5.68 million on US$29.43 million of time charter revenue in
the prior year.

The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2014, showed US$152
million in total assets, US$88.8 million in total liabilities and
total stockholders' equity of US$63.3 million.

A copy of the Form 20-F filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission is available at:

                       http://is.gd/ohJF2P

Headquartered in Athens, Greece, Globus Maritime Limited owns,
operates and manages a fleet of dry bulk vessels that transport
iron ore, coal, grain, steel products, cement, alumina and other
dry bulk cargoes internationally.  The Company conducts its
operations through Globus Shipmanagement Corp.


GREECE: Bailout Talks Show Little Progress as Deadline Looms
------------------------------------------------------------
Nikos Chrysoloras and Rebecca Christie at Bloomberg News report
that there has been little convergence in talks between Greece
and its creditors as time runs out to secure a deal before the
country needs to make payments to the International Monetary Fund
in early June.

According to Bloomberg, people familiar with the matter said
talks to release bailout funds the country needs to pay the IMF
almost EUR1.6 billion (US$1.75 billion) next month have made
little progress in recent days.  The first of the transfers is
due June 5, Bloomberg notes.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois
Hollande last week set a target of reaching a deal by the end of
May, a goal that Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras's spokesman
Gabriel Sakellaridis said on May 25 can still be reached,
Bloomberg relates.  Mr. Sakellaridis, as cited by Bloomberg, key
sticking points remain in areas such as budget targets, sales-tax
rates, pension and labor market rules.

"Unfortunately, a lot of time has been lost," Bloomberg quotes
European Central Bank Governing Council member Ardo Hansson as
saying in Tallinn, Estonia.  "An agreement where underlying
principles aren't undermined would be in everyone's interest, but
so far it has been progressing very arduously."

According to Bloomberg, Greece's standoff with lenders is likely
to be a major topic on the sidelines of a Group of seven
gathering starting today, May 27, in Dresden, Germany, for
finance ministers and central bank governors.

Greece has seen liquidity evaporate, pushing the economy back
into recession, Bloomberg relays.  Record deposit withdrawals and
the state's increasing difficulty in meeting debt payments have
renewed doubts about the country's ability to stay in the euro,
Bloomberg states.

The ECB is scheduled to hold a weekly conference call today,
May 27, to review the liquidity situation of Greek banks, as well
as the discount it applies to the collateral the lenders pledge
in exchange for emergency cash, Bloomberg discloses.  The banks
have lost access to capital markets, forcing them to rely on
EUR80 billion of emergency assistance to stay afloat, Bloomberg
notes.  The ECB can restrict those funds, if it judges that
beneficiary lenders are not solvent or don't have enough eligible
collateral, Bloomberg states.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CAIRN CLO V: Moody's Rates EUR7.7MM Class F Notes (P)B2
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following provisional
ratings to notes to be issued by Cairn CLO V B.V.:

  -- EUR181,800,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR25,200,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  -- EUR7,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
     2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  -- EUR18,750,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  -- EUR15,750,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

  -- EUR20,200,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

  -- EUR7,700,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.

Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2028. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Cairn Loan
Investments LLP, has sufficient experience and operational
capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Cairn V CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and high
yield bonds. The portfolio is expected to be at least 65% ramped
up as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

CLI will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR 32.15m of subordinated notes which will not
be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modelled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
February 2014. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

- Par amount: EUR 300,000,000

- Diversity Score: 36

- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.95%

- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.25%

- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.00%

- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the provisional rating assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3163 from 2750)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

- Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

- Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

- Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

- Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

- Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

- Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

- Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3575 from 2750)

- Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

- Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

- Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

- Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

- Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

- Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

- Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. CLI 's investment decisions
and management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.


CHAPEL 2007: Moody's Reviews Ca Ratings on 2 Notes for Upgrade
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for upgrade its
ratings in four transactions backed by loans that the now-
bankrupt Dutch DSB Bank N.V. originated: Monastery 2004-I B.V.
and Monastery 2006-I B.V., which are residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS); and Chapel 2003-I B.V. and Chapel 2007 B.V.,
which are asset-backed securities transactions (ABS).

At the same time, Moody's has placed its ratings on the interest
rate swap in Chapel 2003-I B.V. and the liquidity facility in
Chapel 2007 B.V. on review for upgrade.

The review placements follow 1) a pay-out from the DSB Bank N.V.
bankruptcy estate, representing a 74% recovery on the special-
purpose vehicle's (SPV) counterclaims; 2) current bankruptcy
trustees's expectation of borrowers compensations relating to due
care claims linked to DSB Bank N.V.'s lending and intermediation
practices, which are lower than previously assumed by Moody's;
and 3) in Monastery 2006-I B.V. and Monastery 2004-I B.V. senior
notes, the review reflects a lower risk of payment disruptions,
as mitigants support payment continuity in case of servicer
disruption.

Borrowers claimed that DSB Bank N.V. did not exercise due care
when it, among other things, 1) originated the loans, claiming
that the bank allowed loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income
ratios that were too high; and 2) sold unnecessary or
inappropriately priced insurance products.

Due care claims are a legal matter between DSB Bank N.V. and the
borrowers, but any claim that is granted a compensation either
through a court verdict or through a settlement between the
parties exposes securitization SPVs to set-off risk.

The framework agreement ratified in November 2014 allows
borrowers to offset compensation amounts against their
outstanding loan balance and any arrears amounts they might have.
This framework has removed a high level of uncertainty regarding
1) the potential amount of the compensations; and 2) the timeline
for these compensations.

Intertrust Management B.V., director of the SPVs, provided
Moody's with expectations of due care claims amounts for all four
transactions based on (a) the number of claims already received;
(b) the influx of new claims; and (c) the reduced timeline for
borrowers to submit their due-care claims: EUR55 million in
Chapel 2003-I B.V.;EUR52 million in Chapel 2007 B.V.; EUR6
million in Monastery 2004-I B.V. and EUR13 million in Monastery
2006-I B.V. The revised expectations of due care claims amounts
are below the maximum due care claims amounts provided by the
bankruptcy trustee in September 2011: EUR75 million in Chapel
2003-1 B.V., EUR85 million in Chapel 2007 B.V., EUR10 million in
Monastery 2004-I B.V. and EUR15 million in Monastery 2006-I B.V.

Given that borrowers have already made -- and settled -- part of
these due care claims, the remaining amounts represent a
potential future loss of 6.6% of Chapel 2003-I B.V.'s current
pool balance, 3.9% for Chapel 2007 B.V., 0.3% for Monastery 2004-
I B.V. and 0.5% for Monastery 2006-I B.V. The remaining potential
loss amounts, combined with losses that have already occurred
following the due care claims, are lower than Moody's previously
assumed.

The issuers have counter-claimed the compensation amounts set off
against the loans in the respective portfolios from DSB Bank
N.V.'s bankruptcy estate. The bankrupt entity obtained a loan
(preferred ranking) from Dutch banks, which allowed it to make a
material payment distribution in December 2014. This results in a
total pay-out of 74% on due care claims to date. Chapel 2007 B.V.
already received a 74% pay-out applicable to claims already filed
in the bankruptcy on the last payment date in April 2015. The
other three transactions should reflect this pay-out on the next
payment date, by the end of June 2015.

The growth in delinquencies is slowing down in all four
portfolios. Delinquencies for more than 90 days has decreased
since Q1 2014 in Chapel 2003-I B.V. to currently 1.98% of the
current pool balance from 3.00%, and in Chapel 2007 B.V. to 1.38%
from 3.11%. The high losses associated with due care claims
contributed to the depletion of the reserve fund and the build-up
in the unpaid principal deficiency in Chapel 2003-1 B.V. and
Chapel 2007 B.V..90+ day delinquencies decreased to 3.32% of the
current pool balance from 3.74% in Monastery 2004-I B.V. and from
3.82% in Monastery 2006-I B.V. since Q1- 2014.

Following DSB Bank N.V.'s bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustees
entered into a sub-delegation agreement with Quion (not rated).
The servicing transfer took place successfully in June 2013. DSB
Bank N.V. continues to service the due care claims, with the
bankruptcy trustee committed to run-off the portfolio for the
next five years. Liquidity facilities represent 3.5% Chapel 2007
B.V., 4.0% of Chapel 2007 B.V., 4.6% of Monastery 2004-I B.V. and
3.5% of Monastery 2006-I B.V.'s note balance. Moody's believes
that the liquidity is sufficient to support interest payments on
the notes in case of servicer disruption. Moody's have therefore
placed Monastery 2004-I B.V. and Monastery 2006-I B.V.'s class A2
notes on review for upgrade.

During the review process, Moody's will reassess the loss
expectations on the securitized pool for all transactions based
on updated estimation of due care claims and potential expected
pay-outs and will take into account the collateral performance.

Moody's rates the interest rate swap Baa3 (sf) in Chapel 2003-I
B.V. and the liquidity facility Baa2 (sf) in Chapel 2007 B.V.
These ratings measure the expected losses to the counterparties
if the respective issuer is unable to honor its obligations under
the referenced financial contracts by maturity.

Repayment of the interest rate swap in Chapel 2003-I B.V. and the
liquidity facility in Chapel 2007 B.V. rank senior to the rated
notes in the payment waterfall. They are linked to the
performance of the underlying assets. Therefore, Moody's has
placed these counterparty instrument ratings on review for
upgrade.

The principal methodology used in rating Monastery 2004-I B.V.
and Monastery 2006-I B.V. was Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS
Using the MILAN Framework published in January 2015. Please see
the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this
methodology.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage. Please see Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN
Framework for further information on Moody's analysis at the
initial rating assignment and the on-going surveillance in RMBS.

The principal methodology used in rating Chapel 2003-I B.V. and
Chapel 2007 B.V. was Moody's Approach to Rating Consumer Loan-
Backed ABS published in January 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include 1) better-than-expected collateral performance;
2) deleveraging of the capital structure 3) lower than-
anticipated ultimate borrower compensation amounts; and 4)
higher-than-anticipated recovery on the SPV's counterclaims.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include 1) worse-than-expected collateral performance; 2)
deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement; 3)
deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties; and 4) higher- than-anticipated ultimate borrower
compensation amounts.

Issuer: Chapel 2003-I B.V.

  -- EUR890 million A Notes, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 2, 2011 Downgraded to B2
     (sf)

  -- Interest Rate Swap, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 5, 2014 Assigned Baa3
     (sf)

Issuer: Chapel 2007 B.V.

  -- EUR300 million A2 Notes, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 2, 2011 Downgraded to B3
     (sf)

  -- EUR13.8 million B Notes, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 2, 2011 Downgraded to Ca
     (sf)

  -- EUR23.5 million C Notes, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 2, 2011 Confirmed at Ca
     (sf)

  -- Liquidity Facility Rating, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 4, 2013 Assigned Baa2
     (sf)

Issuer: Monastery 2004-I B.V.

  -- EUR604.5 million A2 Notes, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 2, 2011 Confirmed at A2
     (sf)

  -- EUR24.5 million B Notes, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 2, 2011 Confirmed at A2
     (sf)

  -- EUR21.5 million C Notes, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 2, 2011 Confirmed at A3
     (sf)

  -- EUR8.5 million D Notes, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 2, 2011 Confirmed at Ba2
     (sf)

  -- EUR10.5 million E Notes, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 2, 2011 Confirmed at
     Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Monastery 2006-I B.V.

  -- EUR663.6 million A2 Notes, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 2, 2011 Confirmed at A2
     (sf)

  -- EUR28 million B Notes, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 2, 2011 Confirmed at
     Baa1 (sf)

  -- EUR28.7 million C Notes, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 2, 2011 Confirmed at B3
     (sf)


HIGHLANDER EURO II: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken the following rating actions
on the following notes issued by Highlander Euro CDO II B.V. /
Highlander Euro CDO II (Cayman) Ltd.:

Issuer: Highlander Euro CDO II B.V.

  -- EUR479.5 million (EUR285.2 million outstanding) Class A
     Primary Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
     Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 24, 2014 Upgraded to
     Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR56 million Class B Primary Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 24,
     2014 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- EUR42 million Class C Primary Senior Secured Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A2 (sf);
     previously on Apr 24, 2014 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- EUR28 million Class D Primary Senior Secured Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously
     on Apr 24, 2014 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Highlander Euro CDO II (Cayman) Ltd.

  -- EUR3 million Class C Secondary Senior Secured Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A2 (sf);
     previously on Apr 24, 2014 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- EUR2.5 million Class D Secondary Senior Secured Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously
     on Apr 24, 2014 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

  -- EUR24.5 million (EUR20.7 million outstanding) Class E
     Secondary Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2022, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 24, 2014 Affirmed
     Ba3 (sf)

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
improvement in over-collateralization ratios over the last four
quarterly payment dates. Since the last rating action in April
2014 the Class A notes have amortized by approximately
EUR175.55M or 36.6% of their original outstanding balance.
Additionally as reported by the trustee in April 2015 the cash
balance in the principal account is EUR33.7 million.

As a result of the deleveraging, over-collateralization has
increased. As of the trustee's April 2015 report, the Class A/ B,
Class C, Class D and Class E over-collateralization ratios were
135.30%, 120.47%, 112.26% and 106.87% compared with 122.60%,
113.38%, 107.97% and 104.21% respectively, as of the trustee's
April 2014 report.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR461.59
million, defaulted par of EUR1.2 million, a weighted average
default probability of 19.7% over 4.92 years weighted average
life (consistent with a 10 year WARF of 2635), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 47.20% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 33 and a weighted average spread of
3.94%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 92.61% of the portfolio exposed to first-
lien senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon
default, while the 1.15% non-first lien corporate assets and
6.22% structured finance assets would recover 15% and 11.5%
respectively upon default. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted a
sensitivity analyses on the estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults. As the portfolio is increasingly becoming less
granular the expected loss of the pool could potentially be more
exposed to variation in future recovery rates on defaulted
assets. Moody's ran a model whereby it decreased the weighted
average recovery rate upon default by 5%; the model generated
outputs which are within one notch of the base case.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

(1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

(2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


OLTCHIM SA: Posts EUR844K Loss in First Quarter Ended March 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
Romania-Insider.com reports that Oltchim SA recorded in the first
quarter of the year a EUR844,000 loss, 15 times lower than in the
same period last year. The loss amounted to EUR12.6 million in
the first three months of 2014.

Romania-Insider.com discloses that Oltchim's operating income
reached EUR39.9 million in the first quarter of this year while
the financial one amounted to EUR228,000. Its operating expenses
totaled EUR40.3 million while the financial costs reached
EUR443,000.

The producer's receivables amounted on March 31 to EUR15.1
million and its debts totaled EUR837,000, down 0.3% year-on-year,
the report relays.

The report says Economy Minister Florin Tudose said earlier this
month that three companies are interested in buying Oltchim. Two
of them are Chinese and one is European, the report notes.

Oltchim SA is a Romanian chemical producer.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 1, 2013,
SeeNews said a court in the southwestern Romanian county of
Valcea declared Oltchim insolvent. According to SeeNews, Oltchim
said in a statement the court appointed a consortium made up of
Rominsolv SPRL and BDO Business Restructuring SPRL as its
temporary administrator. The state-controlled company filed for
insolvency on Jan. 24, 2013.


* ROMANIA: 60% of Big Companies Face Imminent Insolvency Risk
-------------------------------------------------------------
Romania-Insider.com reports that about 60% of the companies with
assets of over EUR1.5 million are under imminent insolvency risk
or in difficulty, said Andrei Cionca, general manager of
insolvency firm CITR Group.

Mr. Cionca said that in the first three months of 2015, the
number of insolvent companies in Romania halved year-on-year.
However, 86% of these were companies with no activity, the report
relates.

"The drop in the insolvency number is an inconclusive
quantitative indicator about the state of the Romanian economy,"
he added, cited by local Mediafax, the report relay. "The
companies which were in difficulty and went through insolvency
haven't significantly recovered."



=========
S P A I N
=========


PESCANOVA SA: Creditors Back Restructuring Plan for 10 Units
------------------------------------------------------------
Undercurrent News reports that Pescanova's creditors have backed
the restructuring proposal for all ten subsidiaries that filed
for voluntary proceedings last year, including Bajamar Septima
and Frinova, announced the Spanish financial regulator CNMV.

According to the report, breaded and battered fish processor
Frinova has avoided liquidation after the majority of creditors
(94.37%) voted for the banks' bailout plan, which states that
creditors will recover just 4% of their share in the subsidiary's
debt.

Among the creditors that have backed the restructuring of Frinova
are the US bank Morgan Stanley, holding a debt of EUR42 million,
Undercurrent News relates citing local newspaper Faro de.

In the second creditors' meeting, held on May 22, Pescanova has
also seen subsidiaries Pescafina Bacalao, Insuina, Novapesca
Trading and Pescapuerta saved from liquidation, as creditors have
backed their restructuring plan, the report states.

Undercurrent News relates that Pescanova, on May 21, had the
first creditors' meeting, in which Bajamar Septima, Frigodis,
Frivipesca Chapela and Fricamar also had their restructuring
proposal supported by creditors.

Bajamar Septima, which it was also feared would face a
liquidation in case majority of creditors did not support the
bailout plan, received the support from 80.91% of creditors, the
report notes.

The write-off stated in the proposal for the shrimp processor was
95.9% of its debt. Creditor banks -- or the so-called "G7", that
is, Bank Sabadell, Popular, Caixabank, Abanca, BBVA, Bankia and
UBI Banca -- hold 31.6% of Bajamar Septima's debt, adds
Undercurrent News.

Pescanova SA is a Galicia-based fishing company.  The company
catches, processes, and packages fish on factory ships.  It is
one of the world's largest fishing groups.

Pescanova filed for insolvency on April 15, 2013, on at least
EUR1.5 billion (US$2 billion) of debt run up to fuel expansion
before economic crisis hit its earnings.  The Pontevedra
mercantile court in northwestern Galicia accepted Pescanova's
insolvency petition on April 25.  The court ordered the board of
directors to step down and proposed Deloitte as the firm's
administrator.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


MERCURY BANK: Deposit Guarantee Fund Extends Liquidation Period
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ukrainian News Agency reports that the Deposit Guarantee Fund
said it has prolonged the liquidation of Mercury Bank until
June 11, 2016 inclusive.

The decision was taken by the DGF on May 21, 2015, Ukrainian News
relates.

Viktor Kulish will remain in his role as the bank's provisional
administrator, Ukrainian News notes.

On May 14, 2014, the DGF took the bank into provisional
administration for the period of three months until June 13,
Ukrainian News recounts.

On June 12, 2014, the DGF launched the liquidation of the bank,
Ukrainian News relays.

Mercury Bank is based in Kharkiv.


METINVEST: In Debt Negotiations with Creditors
----------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that Metinvest CEO Yuriy Ryzhenkov said
the company is holding negotiations on the possibility of
postponing the fulfillment of its liabilities which expire up
until January 2016 with its creditors.

"We ask our creditors to give us a chance of postponing the
fulfillment of our liabilities for the whole debt of US$3
billion, comprehend the situation at the company and give respite
to us until January 31, 2016," Interfax-Ukraine quotes
Mr. Ryzhenkov as saying.

He said that this concern the entire debt of the group, Interfax-
Ukraine notes.

While commenting on talks with 2015 note holders who do not
support debt restructuring, Mr. Ryzhenkov, as cited by Interfax-
Ukraine, said that there is no clarity regarding a meeting of
note holders on June 1, 2015.

He said that in late 2014, Metinvest proposed restructuring the
notes, and 80% of note holders supported the proposal, Interfax-
Ukraine relates.  The negotiations are being held with 20% of the
holders, Interfax-Ukraine discloses.

"The rest of them bought the securities with a discount and now
they want to receive the whole sum," Mr. Ryzhenkov, as cited by
Interfax-Ukraine, said.

He said that this troubled sum includes less than 5% of the total
debt of the group and 10% of the debt on 2015 notes, Interfax-
Ukraine relays.

Metinvest is Ukraine's largest mining and metal group.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


WISE 2006-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of three classes
of notes issued by Wise 2006-1 PLC, and the rating of a Super
Senior Credit Default Swap entered into by Dexia Credit Local:

Issuer: Dexia Credit Local - Super Senior Credit Default Swap
WISE 2006-1 PLC

  -- GBP1436.25 million (current outstanding balance GBP1370
     million) Super Senior Swap Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on Jan 20, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: WISE 2006-1 PLC

  -- GBP30 million Class A Credit-Linked Notes due 2058,
     Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba3 (sf)

  -- GBP22.5 million Class B Credit-Linked Notes due 2058,
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- GBP11.25 million Class C Credit-Linked Notes due 2058,
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

The transaction is a synthetic project finance CDO with an
underlying portfolio consisting of GBP denominated PFI and
regulated utility bonds, each guaranteed by one of seven
monolines.

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deterioration in
the credit quality of the underlying reference portfolio since
March 2015. The deterioration in credit quality is largely
attributable to the downgrade of the fixed rate guaranteed senior
secured bonds issued by Peterborough (Progress Health) plc, a UK
based PFI project in the healthcare sector. Peterborough
(Progress Health) plc's bonds were initially downgraded to Baa3,
on review uncertain, from Baa1 in March 2015; and subsequently
further downgraded to Ba3, on review for downgrade, on April 2,
2015.

Deterioration in the credit quality is observed through a higher
average credit rating of the portfolio (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor "WARF"). In particular, the WARF
(as calculated by Moody's) has increased to 307.2 as of May 2015
from 229.4 in March 2015.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralised Debt Obligations Backed by
Project Finance and Infrastructure Assets" published in October
2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analysis on key parameters for the rated notes.
Moody's considered a model run where a project with the largest
exposure amounting to a 15% of the underlying portfolio, was
treated as defaulted. This run generated an output that was
within one notch of the base case result.

Uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

- Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the underlying portfolio.
   Moody's has assumed the average life of the bonds as reported
   however legal final maturity could be up to 41 years.

- Construction Risk: Around 23% of projects are still in their
   construction phase. Uncertainty around a successful transition
   to operation phase could lead to deterioration in the
   underlying credit quality of the reference portfolio.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating.


* UK: Supermarkets Fail to Pay Suppliers on Time, Research Shows
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tracy Ewen, managing director of IGF Invoice Finance, comments on
research from Experian revealing that supermarkets are taking
more than a month longer than agreed terms to settle debts with
suppliers

"The payment terms that many suppliers in the UK are subject to
are not fit for purpose -- with supermarkets in particular the
worst offenders in taking too long to pay their suppliers.
Clearly, for many small businesses this isn't a sustainable
practice, yet it is a reality that they have very little power to
change.  The intense cashflow pressures that these firms face
should be enough to push the government to adopt the stronger
regulatory stance set out in Sajid Javid's Enterprise Bill, which
seeks to stop such abuses of power by some of the UK's larger
companies.

If nothing changes, we may see small companies fold
unnecessarily.  The macroeconomic impact of this could have
damaging repercussions for the economy as a whole.  For those
firms mired in long payment terms, there are options available
that cover the gap between work completed and money in the bank.
It's therefore important for firms to thoroughly review their
options and make use of any free financial advice that their own
financial partners and suppliers can offer before pressure from
large customers impacts their growth or operations."


* UK: Creates Conciliation Service to Settle Late Payment Dispute
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary of State for Business Sajid Javid on May 19 confirmed
the creation of a Small Business Conciliation Service to help
settle disputes between small and large businesses, especially
over late payment practices.  This will form part of the
government's new Enterprise Bill.

Charles Wilson, CEO of Lovetts the commercial debt recovery legal
firm welcomes the move but fears the service will help only a
small proportion of firms struggling with late payment of their
invoices.

Mr. Wilson says: "Just 1% of the debts coming to us for legal
intervention are disputed so while this measure is a step in the
right direction, it is not really addressing the problem.
"Javid needs to focus his efforts on persuading late paying
businesses that it is in their economic interests to pay on time.
Late payers rely on the reluctance of their suppliers to take
firm action against them -- Javid has acknowledged this.  The
government needs to help small businesses to use the tools and
late payment law already available to them to claim late payment
compensation and interest.  Under the Late Payment law, they can
make claims for debts going back six years.  In addition, more
realistic recoverable legal costs would further discourage late
payers from risking court claims, and encourage the new culture
that business so badly needs.

"Both these measures will send a strong message to habitual late
payers that it doesn't pay to delay.  If more big businesses were
aware of the legal claim their suppliers have to interest, costs
and compensation I believe there would be a major change in late
payment practices in the UK."


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *