TCREUR_Public/150612.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, June 12, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 115



GREECE: Creditors Issues Warnings as Negotiations Continue
GREECE: S&P Lowers Sovereign Rating to 'CCC', Outlook Negative


NIBC BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Subordinated Debt Rating


ASTRA ASIGURARI: Puts 160 Million Shares Up For Sale
OLTCHIM SA: Three Companies Interested in Buying Firm


PYMES BANESTO 2: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class C Notes


TEKSTIL BANKASI: Fitch Raises Issuer Default Rating From 'B+'


ENERGOBANK: NBU Commences Liquidation Procedure
MRIYA AGRO: Creditors Provide $25MM Six-Month Credit Line
UKRAINE: May Stop Paying Sovereign Creditors if Debt Talks Fail
VUHILLIA UKRAINY: Files Bankruptcy Petition n Kyiv Court

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AFREN PLC: Misses Interest Payment on 2020 Bond
AFREN PLC: S&P Lowers Corporate Rating to 'D' Following Default
ASIA RESOURCE: Rothschild Sells Shares as Default Looms
CHERRY TREE: Creditors May File Proofs of Claim Until June 29
CENTROL RECYCLING: Sold After Falling Into Administration

EDWARDS OF MANCHESTER: Insolvency Firm Launches Bid to Save Store
LOMBARD STREET I: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'


* INSOL Announces Graduating Class of Global Insolvency Course
* BOOK REVIEW: BOARD GAMES - Changing Shape of Corporate Power



GREECE: Creditors Issues Warnings as Negotiations Continue
Peter Spiegel and Shawn Donnan at The Financial Times report that
Greece's creditors on June 11 issued their starkest warnings to
Athens since the start of a five-month stand-off over the
country's soon-to-expire EUR172 billion bailout, with the
International Monetary Fund withdrawing its negotiating team and
European leaders saying the time for compromise had ended.

The pointed language in public reflected growing private fears
that Alexis Tsipras, Greek prime minister, had overestimated the
amount of time he has left to cut a deal to release the bailout's
final EUR7.2 billion aid tranche, the FT notes.

In a series of meeting in Brussels, Mr. Tsipras was told his cash-
strapped government must quickly decide whether to accede to more
economic reforms or face bankruptcy, the FT relays.

"We need decisions not negotiations now, the FT relates.  It's my
opinion that the Greek government has to be, I think, a little
more realistic," the FT quotes Donald Tusk, the European Council
president, who met Mr. Tsipras privately on June 10, as saying.

"There's no more space for gambling, there's no more time for
gambling.  The day is coming, I'm afraid, where someone says the
game is over."

The IMF was equally direct, announcing its lead negotiators had
returned to Washington, citing "major differences" and a lack of
progress in negotiations, the FT states.  "There are major
differences between us in most key areas," Gerry Rice, IMF
spokesman, as cited by the FT, said.  "There has been no progress
in narrowing these differences recently."

Officials believe that if no deal is struck by early next week,
Greece and other eurozone parliaments will not have enough time to
pass the legislation for Athens to access rescue funds before two
big bills fall due: a EUR1.5 billion loan repayment to the IMF on
June 30, and a EUR3.5 billion bond redemption on July 20, the FT

Signs suggest that Athens has already shifted strategy in response
to the stark warnings, the FT states.  According to the FT, a
government official said Nikos Pappas, minister of state and Mr.
Tsipras' closest political aide, and Euclid Tsakalotos, a deputy
economy minister, would take over day-to-day negotiations from the
"Brussels Group".  The official said Mr. Tsipras would oversee the
"whole process" in the hope of securing a deal by next week, the
FT relates.

The German government has privately been sending signals in recent
days intimating that it was time to cut off talks and adopt a
harder-line, "take it or leave it" approach to the talks, the FT

GREECE: S&P Lowers Sovereign Rating to 'CCC', Outlook Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term sovereign
credit rating on the Hellenic Republic to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'.  The
'C' short-term rating is unchanged, and the outlook is negative.

As defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 (EU CRA Regulation), the
ratings on Greece are subject to certain publication restrictions
set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation, including publication
in accordance with a pre-established calendar.  Under the EU CRA
Regulation, deviations from the announced calendar are allowed
only in limited circumstances and must be accompanied by a
detailed explanation of the reasons for the deviation.  In
Greece's case, the deviation was prompted by the decision of the
central government to delay making a scheduled debt service
payment to the IMF that was due on June 5, 2015.


As its liquidity position continues to deteriorate, Greece appears
to be prioritizing other spending items over debt servicing.  In
S&P's view, without a turnaround in the trajectory of nominal GDP
and deep public-sector reform, Greece's debt is unsustainable.
The downgrade reflects S&P's view that in the absence of an
agreement with its official creditors, Greece will likely default
on its commercial debt within the next 12 months.

The European Central Bank (ECB) is currently providing financing
to Greece's banks and economy at a level exceeding 60% of GDP.
Continuous withdrawals of deposits from Greek banks increase the
possibility that the government could impose capital controls to
staunch further deposit outflows and issue a parallel currency
alongside the euro.  The uncertainty around Greece's relations
with its creditors and its broader political stability is weighing
on the economy; tax payment arrears rose materially in May, while
the government appears to be conserving cash by delaying payments
to suppliers.  A weakening underlying fiscal position raises
questions about the realism of any agreement with Greece's
creditors on fiscal targets, as projections for tax receipts and
real and nominal GDP appear speculative.  Even if an agreement
with official creditors were to be reached over the next
fortnight, S&P do not expect that such an agreement would cover
Greece's debt service requirements beyond September.


The outlook is negative, given the risk of a further worsening of
liquidity for the sovereign, its banks, and the economy.  S&P's
understanding is that the Greek government has decided to
consolidate this month's EUR1.6 billion in debt servicing owed to
the IMF, an official creditor, into a single payment on June 30.
If an agreement were reached between Greece and its official
creditors over the next week, S&P would still expect this to
involve a temporary three-month liquidity infusion.  S&P do not
consider it likely that there would be any official debt relief or
more substantial financing agreed to in the next few days.  In
S&P's view, this implies that confidence and investment activity
will remain weak and growth prospects muted.

The negative outlook means that S&P could lower the rating again
within a year if it perceives that the likelihood of a distressed
exchange of Greece's commercial debt will increase further.  This
could be the case if, for example, S&P took the view that further
official creditor disbursements would remain elusive, resulting in
the Greek government's inability to honor all its financial
obligations in full and in a timely manner.

The ratings could stabilize at the current level if S&P believes
that a new financial support program will be agreed with policy
conditions that satisfy both the political priorities in Greece
and the creditor countries.  Such a scenario could contribute to
promoting political stability, tax compliance, and a gradual
economic recovery.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that all key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating


                                    To             From
Greece (Hellenic Republic)
Sovereign credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency        CCC/Neg./C     CCC+/Neg./C
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment
  T&C Assessment                    AAA            AAA
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency [#1]   CCC            CCC+
  Foreign and Local Currency        CCC            CCC+
Short-Term Debt
  Foreign and Local Currency [#1]   C              C
Commercial Paper
  Local Currency                    C              C

[#1] Issuer: National Bank of Greece S.A., Guarantor: Greece
     (Hellenic Republic)


NIBC BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Subordinated Debt Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed NIBC Bank N.V.'s Long-term Issuer
Default Rating at 'BBB-' and its Short-term IDR at 'F3'.  The
Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Stable.  Fitch has also affirmed
NIBC's Viability Rating (VR) at 'bbb-'.



NIBC's ratings reflect the bank's niche franchise and business
model, which makes its performance more cyclical with fairly
undiversified earnings and weaker operating margins than the
industry average.  They also factor in the bank's solid
capitalization and comfortable liquidity position and its ability
to keep impaired loans reasonably low throughout the economic

NIBC's corporate business model is built around offering
structured and asset-based financing to mid-cap companies, with a
significant presence in cyclical industries (most notably,
commercial real estate and shipping, which together comprise
around a third of the bank's gross corporate exposure).

NIBC aims to reduce its above-average concentrations by reducing
larger exposures and expanding in currently smaller segments, and
combined with additional non-interest income revenues, improve its
earnings diversification.  Long tenors of existing loans, fairly
limited volumes of new business, and a competitive market for
advisory services mean a significant improvement in stable
earnings generation may take time.

NIBC's pre-impairment profitability improved in 2014, but is
structurally reliant on net interest income and under pressure
from fairly narrow margins while the contribution of recurring
fees remains minimal.  Net interest margin widened in 2014, helped
by firmer loan pricing and slightly lower funding costs.

For 2015 and 2016, Fitch expects improved profitability, supported
by lower loan impairment charges in an improving domestic economy.
We expect the improvements to come from increasing volumes as well
as from more diversified revenues sources, including fee income
and through its expanding retail activities.  Fitch does not
expect NIBC's risk appetite to increase in order to achieve these
goals, and the bank has a track record of managing its asset
quality reasonably well through a downturn, due to its sound
collateral valuation and management.

Capitalization and leverage remain strong and compare well with
peers.  At end-2014, NIBC's Fitch core capital (FCC)/risk-weighted
assets ratio was 17.1% and tangible common equity/ tangible assets
ratio was 7.6%.  The sound capitalization should, however, be
considered in conjunction with still mediocre pre-impairment
profit, which may be insufficient to absorb losses in case of a
severe stress.

NIBC has reduced its reliance on wholesale funding in recent
years, mainly by actively attracting retail savings.  High
proportion of term deposits and the Dutch deposit guarantee scheme
contribute to the stability of this funding source, although Fitch
expects that the bank may offer more competitive pricing than its
larger domestic peers, particularly should competition increase
for retail deposits.  The bank maintains a comfortable buffer of
liquid assets, which in our opinion, mitigates its refinancing


The bank's Support Rating of '5' and Support Rating Floor of 'No
Floor' reflect Fitch's view that while sovereign support is
possible, it cannot be relied upon in case of need.  In addition,
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives (including the
implementation of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD)) have substantially reduced the likelihood of sovereign
support for European Union commercial banks in general.

Similarly, while there is a possibility that its owner, a
consortium led by the private equity firm JC Flowers & Co, may
support NIBC in case of need, Fitch is unable to adequately assess
the owner's capacity to support and as a result potential support
from its ultimate shareholders is not factored into NIBC's Support


NIBC's subordinated and hybrid debt is notched off the bank's VR.

Tier 2 debt issued by NIBC is rated one notch below the bank's VR
to reflect the above-average loss severity of this type of debt.

Hybrid Tier 1 securities are rated four notches below NIBC's VR,
reflecting the higher-than-average loss severity risk of these
securities (two notches from the VR) as well as a high risk of
non-performance (an additional two notches).



NIBC's company profile currently constrains the upside potential
for its ratings.  An upgrade would be contingent on a sustained
track record of improved profitability, both in absolute terms and
in the composition and quality of its earnings, resulting in an
increased capacity to absorb shocks stemming from the bank's
business model.  Weakening of the bank's capitalization, which
currently serves as the main buffer against unexpected losses,
and/or sharp deterioration of its liquidity position could result
in a downgrade.


Any upgrade to the Support Rating and upward revision to the
Support Rating Floor would be contingent on a positive change in
the Netherland's propensity to support its banks, as well as a
NIBC growing its domestic franchise significantly.  While not
impossible, this is highly unlikely in Fitch's view.


Subordinated debt and other hybrid securities issued by NIBC are
broadly sensitive to the same considerations that affect the
bank's VR.

The rating actions are:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'/'F3'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB+'
Hybrid Tier 1 securities: affirmed at 'B+'


ASTRA ASIGURARI: Puts 160 Million Shares Up For Sale
Romania Insider reports that Astra Asigurari has put up for sale
160 million shares, with RON2.66 (EUR0.6) per share, to raise
EUR95.7 million.

The Financial Supervisory Authority (ASF) has asked for a capital
increase, so that the company's solvency and liquidity indicators
return within legal limits, the report says.

According to the report, Misu Negritoiu, president of the
country's Financial Supervisory Authority, said Astra Asigurari
could find out in July whether there is any strategic investor
interested in acquiring it.

Astra Asigurari has been under financial administration for almost
a year. Its fate is still unclear, as the company's liquidity
ratio approaches zero, the report notes. "We are in talks with
several strategic investors," the report quotes Negritoiu as

The best scenario for the insurer is a capital boost, and the
worst scenario is liquidation, Romania Insider notes.

Astra Insurance is a Romania-based insurance company. The company
is listed on Rasdaq market of the Bucharest Stock Exchange.

OLTCHIM SA: Three Companies Interested in Buying Firm
Romania Insider reports that three companies are interested in
buying Romania's insolvent state-owned chemical producer Oltchim,
said Economy Minister Florin Tudose. Two of the companies are
Chinese and one is from Europe, the report says.

The representatives of a Chinese consortium visited Oltchim
earlier this month, said Tudose, cited by local,
Romania Insider relates.

The report says the Government needs to receive first the
companies' intention letters, to proceed with the sale.

The plant's creditors approved at the beginning of March the
reorganization plan proposed by Oltchim's judicial administrators.
The minimum price to sell Oltchim is EUR 307 million, according to
the plan, the report states.

Romania Insider notes that the chemical producer has been under
insolvency for two years. Privatization attempts had failed
several times in the past. The company, which is the largest
chemical producer in Romania, currently has debts of
EUR800 million, the report discloses.


PYMES BANESTO 2: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class C Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed FTA PYMES Banesto 2, as follows:

Class A2 (ISIN ES0372260010): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
Class B (ISIN ES0372260028): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative
Class C (ISIN ES0372260036): affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE 0%

FTA PYMES Banesto 2 (the issuer) is a cash flow SME CLO originated
by Banco Espanol de Credito S.A, now part of Banco Santander S.A.
(Banco Santander; A-/Stable/F2).  At closing, the issuer used the
note proceeds to purchase a EUR1bn portfolio of secured and
unsecured loans granted to Spanish small and medium enterprises
and self-employed individuals.  The transaction is managed by
Santander de Titulizacion, S.G.F.T., S.A.


The affirmation of the class A2 and B notes reflects the
portfolio's performance, which has stabilized throughout the past
year.  The class A2 notes are continuing to deleverage, leading to
increased credit enhancement for the most senior notes.  Since the
last review, the class A2 notes have amortized by and credit
enhancement has increased to 37.8% from 31.9%.  Credit enhancement
for the class B notes has marginally decreased to 15.8% from 16.6%
as a result of increased defaults.

Defaults increased by EUR7.97 mil. over the past year, with
current defaults now making up for 20% of the outstanding balance,
compared with 16.4% at the last review.  However, delinquency
levels have decreased significantly, with 90+ day delinquencies
now representing 3.4% of the portfolio compared with 6.7% at the
last review.  180 day delinquencies have decreased to 2.2% from

The current recovery rate of 11% is very low compared with other
Spanish SME deals.  In its analysis, Fitch assumed the portfolio
to be unsecured to reflect the low observed recovery rate.  In
addition, the agency applied a 10-year recovery lag.

The Negative Outlook on the class B notes continues to reflect
that credit enhancement could erode quickly if the transaction was
exposed to further defaults and recoveries remain low.

Credit enhancement for the class C notes has decreased
significantly over the past year to -15.09% from -4.8%.  This is
due to the increase in the principal deficiency ledger to EUR16.6
mil. from EUR7.7 mil. over the past year and the reserve fund
being depleted since March 2012.


Applying a 1.25x default rate multiplier to all assets in the
portfolio would result in a downgrade of the class B notes by one


No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's initial
closing.  The subsequent performance of the transaction over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


TEKSTIL BANKASI: Fitch Raises Issuer Default Rating From 'B+'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Tekstil Bankasi A.S.'s Long-term
foreign currency Issuer Default Rating to 'BBB' from 'B+' and
removed the rating from Rating Watch Positive (RWP).  The Outlook
is Stable.

The rating action follows the change of ownership completed on 22
May 2015, whereby Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC;
A/Stable) acquired a 75.5% stake in the bank.

Tekstilbank's IDRs, National Rating and Support Rating have been
upgraded because Fitch believes ICBC would provide support to its
new subsidiary, if required.  The Support Rating Floor (SRF) has
been affirmed and withdrawn, as SRFs are only assigned to banks
whose primary source of external support is considered to be the
sovereign; this is no longer the case for Tekstilbank.


The bank's IDRs, National and Support Ratings are now driven by
potential support from ICBC.  ICBC's own Long-term IDR of
'A'/Stable is driven by Fitch's expectation of a very high
probability of Chinese sovereign support for the bank, should it
be required.

ICBC is 73%- owned by the Chinese authorities and has a 13% market
share in the Chinese banking sector.  Fitch believes the Chinese
authorities are highly supportive of their banking sector and
would allow support to flow through to foreign subsidiaries should
this be required.

Tekstilbank's Long-term foreign currency IDRs are constrained by
Turkey's 'BBB' Country Ceiling.  The Long-term local currency IDR
is notched down twice from ICBC's Long-term local currency IDR,
reflecting Fitch's view that Tekstilbank is currently of limited
strategic importance for ICBC, rather than a core subsidiary.  The
Stable Outlook reflects the Outlook on ICBC's Long-term IDR.

Tekstilbank's Short-term IDR has been upgraded to 'F2', the higher
of the two possible Short-term IDRs corresponding to its Long-term
IDR of 'BBB', reflecting available liquidity support from ICBC.

ICBC recently acquired a majority stake in a small bank in the UK
and has a large global presence covering 43 countries and six
continents.  The Tekstilbank acquisition is a relatively small
investment in a potential growth market.  China is Turkey's third-
largest trading partner with bilateral trade between the two
countries having reached USD28bn at end-2014.  The expansion into
the region is in line with China's "One Belt, One Road" strategy.

Under the capital markets law of Turkey, the transaction will
trigger a mandatory offer for the remaining 24.5% stake currently
quoted on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, which could raise ICBC's
ownership to 100%.


Tekstilbank's Long-term IDRs could be downgraded if (i) ICBCs
Long-term IDRs are downgraded (only a two-notch downgrade of ICBC
would result in a downgrade of Tekstilbank's Long-term foreign
currency IDR) (ii) Turkey's sovereign ratings and Country Ceiling
are downgraded; or (iii) Fitch believes that the parent bank's
propensity to support its subsidiary has weakened.  None of these
scenarios is currently expected by Fitch.

Tekstilbank's Long-term foreign currency IDR could be upgraded if
Turkey's Country Ceiling is upgraded.  An upgrade of the Long-term
local currency IDR would be contingent on both a Turkish sovereign
upgrade and an upgrade of ICBC.

The rating actions are:

Tekstil Bankasi A.S.

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'B+'; off
  RWP; Stable Outlook

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'F2' from 'B'; off

  Long-term local currency IDR: upgraded to 'BBB+' from 'B+'; off
  RWP; Stable Outlook

  Short-term local currency IDR: upgraded to 'F2' from 'B'; off

  Viability Rating: unaffected at 'b+'

  Support Rating: upgraded to '2' from '5'; off RWP

  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor' and withdrawn

  National Long-term Rating: upgraded to 'AAA(tur)' from 'A(tur)';
  off RWP; Stable Outlook


ENERGOBANK: NBU Commences Liquidation Procedure
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the National Bank of Ukraine has
decided to liquidate Energobank.

"After reviewing the proposal of the fund [Individuals' Deposit
Guarantee Fund], the NBU board passed resolution No. 370 of
June 11, 2015 on revoking the banking licenses of public joint-
stock company Energobank and its liquidation," Interfax-Ukraine
quotes the regulator as saying.

The Individuals' Deposit Guarantee Fund introduced temporary
administration at Energobank from February 13 to May 12, and the
fund subsequently extended its operation until June 11, Interfax-
Ukraine relates.

On January 28, it became known that the board of ES2 Holding Ltd.
(Singapore) decided to terminate the planned deal on the
acquisition of the ownership of Energobank's shares, held by
Roylance Services Limited (Cyprus), Interfax-Ukraine relays.

Energobank was established in 1991.  It ranked 62nd among the 158
operating banks in the country as of January 1, 2015 by total
assets (UAH2.098 billion), according to the NBU.

MRIYA AGRO: Creditors Provide $25MM Six-Month Credit Line
Interax-Ukraine reports that Mriya Agroholding has opened a credit
line of US$25 million to replenish its working capital.

"The credit line as opened by current creditors of Mriya for the
period of six months.  The funds raised will be sent to finance
the harvesting campaign and conducting the autumn sowing
campaign," Interax-Ukraine quotes the holding as saying in a press
release issued on June 11.

Mriya CEO Simon Cherniavsky said that the replenishment of working
capital was a top-priority task for the company, as well as its
stabilization and normal work, Interax-Ukraine relates.

"We've managed to settle the issue, and now the company's managers
will focus their efforts on restructuring the debt portfolio they
received from the previous owners of the company. We plan to
present our debt restructuring plan to creditors in late June or
early July," Mr. Cherniavsky, as cited by Interax-Ukraine, said.

Mriya Agro Holding is a Ukrainian agriculture company.

UKRAINE: May Stop Paying Sovereign Creditors if Debt Talks Fail
Shawn Donnan at The Financial Times reports that Natalie Jaresko,
Ukraine's finance minister, said on June 10 the company could stop
paying its sovereign creditors within weeks if they do not agree
to a debt restructuring, offering a provocative option over one of
the country's economic problems amid signs of a deadlock in

The government in Kiev and the International Monetary Fund have
set the end of this month as a target to agree on a restructuring
of Ukraine's US$70 billion in sovereign debt aimed at saving it
more than US$15 billion in debt payments over the next four years,
the FT discloses.

Mr. Jaresko told reporters in Washington that while she was ready
to sit down with creditors at any time, the government could not
wait much longer, the FT relates.

She cited a law passed by parliament last month that would allow
the government to unilaterally declare a debt moratorium, the FT

Speaking to the FT afterwards, she confirmed that she saw the debt
moratorium as a viable option, the FT relays.

Ms. Jaresko, as cited by the FT, said the current proposal from
creditors would force the government to withdraw US$8 billion from
the central bank's foreign exchange reserves and use that to pay
down some of its debts.  But Ms. Jaresko said that was not an
option as it would be illegal under Ukrainian law, the FT notes.

Ukraine had made a counterproposal but she refused to disclose
what that was, the FT states.  According to the FT, any deal would
have to meet three criteria agreed with the IMF, she said: a
US$15.3 billion reduction in debt servicing costs over the next
four years, a lowering of Ukraine's debt load to 71% of GDP, and a
guarantee that the government's financing costs in the future
would not go above 10% of GDP.

The creditors had a "moral imperative" to reach an agreement, she
said, particularly as the debts were the result of business they
had done with the previous government, which she called a
"dictatorship", the FT relays.

VUHILLIA UKRAINY: Files Bankruptcy Petition n Kyiv Court
Interfax-Ukraine reports that state-run Vuhillia Ukrainy (Coal of
Ukraine) has applied to Kyiv's commercial court asking for it to
be recognized as bankrupt.

The company's application was accepted by the court on June 3,
2015 for further consideration, Interfax-Ukraine relays, citing an
announcement published in the national register of court

Preliminary court hearings are scheduled for June 16,
Interfax-Ukraine discloses.

Vuhillia Ukrainy's core business is purchasing coal from state-run
coalmines and selling it to power generation companies.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AFREN PLC: Misses Interest Payment on 2020 Bond
Paul Whitfield at The Deal reports that Afren plc has missed an
interest payment on its 2020 bond and expects to default on the
note next month, but said creditors had agreed not to demand the
early repayment of about US$1.65 billion of debt ahead of a
restructuring planned for next month.

The London-listed company said on June 10, that it didn't pay
US$11.9 million of interest, due June 9, on the US$360 million
note, activating a 30-day grace period that it said would also
pass without payment, The Deal relates.

"While such non-payment will result in a default under the 2020
notes, this will not result in an immediate obligation to repay
such 2020 notes or a cross-default [on the] 2016 notes or 2019
notes or other debt facilities," The Deal quotes Afren as saying.
"The company has received assurance from the ad hoc (bondholders)
committee . . . . that the committee has no current intention to
take enforcement action."

Afren, which produces oil and gas principally in Nigeria, entered
talks with creditors earlier this year after its earnings tumbled
along with oil prices, leaving it unable to meet repayments on its
bonds and bank loans, The Deal relays.

The decision to default on the 2020 note means that Afren has now
defaulted on all three of its bonds, The Deal states.  The company
last month missed a US$12.8 million payment on a US$250 million
note due in 2019, and in March defaulted on a US$324 million 2016
note when it missed a US$15 million interest payment, The Deal
recounts.  The defaults leave the company open to demands for
accelerated repayments, though Afren said that creditors had
agreed to waive that option while they wait for a restructuring to
complete, The Deal states.

Under the terms of that restructuring, bondholders have agreed to
swap US$934 million of bonds and accrued interest for two US$350
million high-yield notes, due 2019 and 2020, and 80% of the
company's equity, The Deal discloses.

The restructuring will leave Afren with gross debt of US$1.8
billion, almost US$150 million more than its pre-restructuring
debt, and US$348 million in cash, The Deal says.  Existing
shareholders will be left with a maximum 15% of the company,
assuming they fully subscribe to a US$75 million discounted share
sale, the company wrote in a June 8 letter to its creditors,
according to The Deal.

Afren needs the support of a majority of its shareholders for the
restructuring to go ahead, The Deal says.

According to The Deal, in a presentation on June 1, the company
warned that voting against the deal will result in a mandatory
restructuring that would increase the company's debt by $600
million over two years and require the forced sale of the business
in 2016.

Afren expects the voluntary restructuring to complete in July, The
Deal discloses.

Afren plc is an international independent oil exploration and
production company.  It is listed on the London Stock Exchange.

AFREN PLC: S&P Lowers Corporate Rating to 'D' Following Default
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services downgraded U.K.-headquartered
oil and gas exploration and production company Afren PLC to 'D'
(default) from 'SD' (selective default).

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue rating on its senior
secured bonds maturing in 2020 to 'D' from 'CC' and affirmed its
'D' issue rating on the bonds maturing in 2016 and 2019.

S&P lowered its long-term corporate rating on Afren to 'D',
because the company has now defaulted on all three of its bonds,
after defaulting on its bonds maturing in 2016 and 2019 earlier
this year.

S&P lowered the issue rating on the bonds maturing in December
2020, because Afren failed to pay its interest obligation on time;
S&P understands the amount outstanding on the bond is
$360 million.  S&P considers the nonpayment a default, under its

S&P believes the company is likely to utilize a 30-day grace
period under its 2020 bonds for the $11.9 million interest payment
originally due June 9, 2015.  S&P notes that the company has
announced that it is unlikely to pay this obligation within the
grace period, given the company's intention to complete a broad
recapitalization plan by the end of July.  The company recently
obtained $200 million in funding from bondholders in the form of
super-senior private placement notes.  The holders of the
company's 2016, 2019, and 2020 notes have also agreed to subscribe
for further new senior notes up to the maximum level permitted of
$369 million to be used to refinance the abovementioned funding,
to fund Nigerian assets, and for general working capital purposes.

S&P notes that the nonpayment of interest on the notes due 2020
does not result in an immediate obligation to repay those notes,
or to a cross-default of the notes due in 2016 and 2019, or the
other debt facilities.

ASIA RESOURCE: Rothschild Sells Shares as Default Looms
Firat Kayakiran and David Yong at Bloomberg News report that
financier Nathaniel Rothschild's decision to accept a takeover
offer for his stake in Asia Resource Minerals Plc paves the way
for the new owners to renegotiate bond repayments to avoid default
in July.

Bloomberg relates that Indonesia's PT Berau Coal Energy, of which
ARMS owns 85 percent, has $450 million in notes maturing on
July 8 and $500 million of debentures due in March 2017. ARMS,
with a market value of GBP88.6 million ($136 million), is seeking
to extend debt maturity to 2019 after saying there wasn't enough
cash for noteholders, according to Bloomberg.

"The only way to avoid a missed principal payment is to execute
the debt exchange," Brian Grieser, an analyst in Singapore at
Moody's Investors Service, told Bloomberg. "There's been a lot of
noise at the ARMS shareholder level which has prevented them from
moving forward with this bond transaction. I'd be surprised if
they can get the refinancing done before they resolve their
shareholding issues."

Bloomberg relates that Mr. Rothschild on June 8 said he will
accept 56 pence a share for his 17.2 percent ARMS stake from Asia
Coal Energy Ventures, or ACE, a vehicle funded by billionaire Eka
Tjipta Widjaja's Sinarmas Group. That's 37 percent more than an
earlier bid and values ARMS's equity at $207 million, the report

ACE is due to make a formal offer by June 11, Bloomberg notes.
ARMS's board will set out its views on the new takeover terms at a
general meeting to be held by the end of the month, the U.K.
company said in a regulatory filing, Bloomberg relays.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Rothschild's earlier plans to
underwrite a $100 million equity raising to help ARMS renegotiate
its debt and avoid a default were derailed last month when ACE
made a 41-pence-a-share offer. While Mr. Rothschild derided that
bid, he abandoned plans to make an offer of his own with Russian
mining group SUEK Plc, the report recalls.

"If investors are going in for the long haul, they do need to
really feel comfortable with the sponsor behind ACE," Bloomeberg
quote Nancy Koh, a credit analyst in Singapore at DBS Group
Holdings Ltd, as saying. "For Berau bondholders, there's just too
much speculation and guesswork until there is a serious proposal
on the table."

Berau's 2015 notes were down 0.1 cents at 65.8 cents on the dollar
as of 11:04 a.m. in Hong Kong on June 9, after surging 3.9 cents
on June 8. The 2017 notes fetched 63.3 cents, following a 3.2 cent
advance on June 8. Both securities traded below 50 cents in
January, Bloomberg notes.

Asia Resource Minerals plc (Asia Resource Minerals), formerly Bumi
plc, is a United Kingdom-based company, which is engaged in
exploring for, developing, mining and delivering coal. The Company
operates its coal mines through its subsidiaries PT Berau and Bumi
Resources Group. PT Berau operates the Company's coal operations
near Tanjung Redeb, East Kalimantan in Indonesia. PT Berau has
three open cut mining operations, which include Lati, Binungan,
and Sambarata, which are located in a 118,400 hectare concession
area. The Company serves a range of customers across the markets
of Asia, mainly coal-fired power utilities. Bumi Resources is a
natural resources group based in Indonesia, which focuses
primarily on coal mining.

CHERRY TREE: Creditors May File Proofs of Claim Until June 29
A.V. Lomas, S.A. Pearson, G.E. Bruce and J.G. Parr, the Joint
Administrators of Cherry Tree Mortgages Limited, notified
interested parties that they intend to make a distribution (by
way of paying a final dividend) to the preferential creditors
(if any) and to the unsecured, non-preferential creditors of
Cherry Tree.

Creditors may file their proofs of debt at any point no later
than June 29, 2015.  Creditors are requested to lodge their
proofs of debt at the earliest possible opportunity.

Creditors may be required, if so requested, to provide further
details or produce documents or other evidence to their proofs of
debt as the Joint Administrators deem necessary.

The Joint Administrators will not be obliged to deal with proofs
of debt filed after the bar date but may do so if they think fit.

The Joint Administrators intend to make the announced
distribution within the period of two months from the last date
of proving claims.

For further information, contact details, and proof of debt
forms, creditors may visit

Creditors must complete and return a proof of debt form together
with relevant supporting documents, to PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP, 7 More London Riverside, London SE1 2RT marked for the
attention of Jennifer Hills.  Alternatively, they may email a
completed proof of debt form to

CENTROL RECYCLING: Sold After Falling Into Administration
Liverpool Echo reports that Centrol Recycling Group, a Widnes
recycling firm, which fell into administration after its
environmental permit was revoked has been sold.

SFP Restructuring Limited were appointed as administrators of
Centrol Recycling, based on Everite Road in Ditton, in May
following a breach of its Company Voluntary Arrangement and a
petition to wind up the business, according to Liverpool Echo.

Centrol was set up in the 1960s as a family-run business and
specialised in waste disposal and recycling, but lost an appeal to
overturn a decision to revoke its license in March, the report

When SFP took over the firm in May, it had accumulated more than
600 tonnes of municipal waste, which was subject to a removal
notice issued by the Environment Agency (EA), the report says.

The EA also revoked Centrol's environmental permit in April.

The waste -- which had been investigated as the potential source
of a recent fly invasion in Ditton -- had attracted the attention
of more than 200 residents and Halton MP Derek Twigg who wished to
see the waste disposed of in a timely manner, the report

Simon Plant and Daniel Plant of SFP were appointed as
administrators and attended to the waste following dialogue with
the EA, while seeking a buyer for the firm.

A buyer was found and a sale was completed on Wednesday, May 21, a
SFP spokesman said, and that it was sought "in the interests of
preserving jobs and maximizing realizations," the report relays.

SFP sought the EA's guidance throughout the waste removal process
and the spokesman added that the "direct and prompt actions of SFP
has ultimately enabled a positive outcome" and "avoided a more
serious environmental concern," the report notes.

The report relays that Mr. Simon said: "The legitimate concerns of
local residents had to be considered and we worked closely with
the EA and local parties to ensure the waste was cleared with the
minimum of additional disruption and the maximum care.

"Centrol could not fund the removal of the waste and accordingly,
my firm spent significant sums instructing a recognized contractor
to attend to it.  It was a complex scenario but ultimately, the
interests of public health needed to prevail and I am pleased to
have played such a significant role bringing to an end such a wide
reaching concern," the report quoted Mr. Simon as saying.

In March, Centrol lost its appeal to overturn a decision to revoke
its license, the report notes.

In 2013, it was fined GBP20,000 and ordered to pay GBP3,800 in EA
costs after 420 tons of mixed waste stored outside led to what an
inspection team leader described as the "worst fly infestation" he
had seen during his 20-year career, the report adds.

EDWARDS OF MANCHESTER: Insolvency Firm Launches Bid to Save Store
Alex Hibbert at Manchester Evening News reports that an insolvency
firm has launched a bid to save an iconic Manchester store from

Edwards of Manchester suddenly closed last month after selling
shoes in the city centre for almost 200 years, the report relates.

According to the report, the Barton Arcade shop had been supplying
made-to-measure shoes to clients since 1830 before it went into

But now an insolvency firm is exploring ways in which one of the
country's oldest retailers could be saved after being called in by
Edwards' director Steve Fitzsimmons, who bought the company in
2008, the report says.

HJS Recovery has now launched an investigation to discover why the
company was forced to fold, with a creditors meeting due to be
held later this month.

Manchester Evening News quotes the report quotes HJS's managing
director Gordon Johnston, the Senior Insolvency Practitioner
dealing with Edwards' liquidation, as saying that: "The business
recovery specialists at HJS Recovery have been called in to assess
the viability of Edwards.

"Edwards is one of the oldest shoe retailers in the UK and has
enjoyed a buoyant position in the city for many years, catering
for all types of clients, including well-known footballers.

"Unfortunately, due mainly to a change in the market perspective
and a significant drop in footfall in Manchester the business has
diminished to the extent that in its current format and location
it is no longer viable financially.

"It is hoped that the business can be rescued and that it will be
able to trade in the near future."

Edwards of Manchester is England's oldest independent shoe shop
outside London, and has been based on the same site since it
opened in the 1800s.

LOMBARD STREET I: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
all classes of notes in Lombard Street CLO I PLC.

The upgrades follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the
transaction using data from the trustee report dated March 31,
2015, and the application of its relevant criteria.

"Our review of the transaction highlights that the Rev Ln Fac and
class A notes, the senior classes of notes in the structure,
continue to amortize pro rata.  We also note that the class E
notes have partially amortized.  This has resulted in an increase
in the available credit enhancement for all classes of notes.
Under the transaction documents, once the reinvestment period
ends, the issuer uses 20% of the remaining interest proceeds,
after paying all expenses from items A to W in the interest
waterfall, to redeem the class E notes.  The reinvestment period
ended in February 2013," S&P said.

The percentage of 'CCC' rated assets (debt obligations of obligors
rated 'CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') in the portfolio has fallen in
notional terms but risen in percentage terms, to 4.27% from 3.44%,
due to portfolio deleveraging since S&P's previous review.  Assets
that S&P considers to be defaulted (i.e., debt obligations of
obligors rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD' [selective default], or 'D')
decreased to 2.11% from 2.63%.  Additionally, the collateral
portfolio's reported weighted-average spread has decreased to
3.67% from 3.80% since S&P's previous review.

S&P considers the portfolio to be well diversified with more than
58 distinct obligors (average exposure of 1.75%).  The portfolio's
average credit quality is more or less unchanged since S&P's
previous review, while the weighted-average life has marginally
increased.  This has resulted in slightly higher scenario default
rates (SDRs), the minimum level of portfolio defaults that S&P
expects each CDO tranche to be able to support at the specific
rating level using CDO Evaluator.

The underlying portfolio includes exposure to assets domiciled in
lower-rated sovereigns (Italy and Spain).  Under S&P's
nonsovereign ratings criteria, as the transaction's exposure to
these sovereigns is below 10% of the portfolio balance, S&P gives
full credit to obligors from these sovereigns in its cash flow

S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes.  The BDR
represents S&P's estimate of the maximum level of gross defaults,
based on its stress assumptions, that a tranche can withstand and
still fully repay the noteholders.  S&P used the portfolio balance
that it considers to be performing, the reported weighted-average
spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P
considered to be appropriate.  S&P incorporated various cash flow
stress scenarios using its standard default patterns, levels, and
timings for each rating category assumed for each class of notes,
combined with different interest stress scenarios as outlined in
S&P's criteria.  S&P also subjected the transaction's cash flows
to additional stresses that bias defaults toward each of the
portfolio's assets' currency denominations.

The issuer has entered into a cross-currency options agreement
with Citibank N.A. (A/Stable/A-1).  In S&P's opinion, the
documented downgrade provisions do not fully comply with its
current counterparty criteria.  Therefore, in S&P's cash flow
analysis, it has assumed that there are no cross-currency options
in the transaction in rating scenarios that are above the long-
term issuer credit rating on the counterparty plus one notch, and
has applied its standard foreign-exchange stresses, in line with
S&P's current counterparty criteria.

The increase in available credit enhancement for all of the rated
classes of notes, due to the structural deleveraging, has resulted
in each class of notes achieving higher ratings in S&P's cash flow
analysis.  The results of S&P's cash flow analysis indicate that
all of the rated classes of notes are able to sustain defaults at
higher rating levels than those currently assigned.  S&P has
therefore raised its ratings on these classes of notes.

Lombard Street CLO I is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-
grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in December 2006.


Class           Rating          Rating
                To              From

Lombard Street CLO I PLC
EUR392 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

Rev Ln Fac      AAA (sf)        AA+ (sf)
A               AAA (sf)        AA+ (sf)
B               AA+ (sf)        AA- (sf)
C               AA- (sf)        A (sf)
D               BBB+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)
E               BB+ (sf)        BB- (sf)


* INSOL Announces Graduating Class of Global Insolvency Course
INSOL International announced the sixth graduating class of the
Global Insolvency Practice Course.

The successful participants are now formally recognized as a
Fellow, INSOL International.

  Scott Abel Buddle Findlay New Zealand

  Scott Aspinall Barrister Wentworth Chambers Australia

  Scott Butler McCullough Robertson Lawyers Australia

  Matthew Byrnes Grant Thornton Australia

  Zaheer Cassim Cassim Incorporated South Africa

  Tara Cooper Burnside Higgs & Johnson Bahamas

  Ruta Darius Uganda Registration Services Bureau Uganda

  Solange de Billy-Tremblay de Billy-Tremblay & Associes INC

  Timothy Graulich Davis, Polk & Wardwell LLP USA

  Andrea Harris KRyS Global Guernsey

  Anthony Idigbe Punuka Attorneys & Solicitors Nigeria

  Sigrid Jansen Allen & Overy LLP The Netherlands

  Benjamin Jones Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP UK

  Ian Mann Harneys Hong Kong

  John Mairo Porzio, Bromberg & Newman P.C. USA

  Charlotte Moller Reed Smith LLP UK

  Andrew Morrison FTI Consulting Cayman Islands

  Julie Nettleton Grand Thornton UK

  Reinout Philips RESOR N.V. The Netherlands

  Robert Schiebe Schiebe und Collegen Germany

  Vincent Vroom Loyens & Loeff UK

The Global Insolvency Practice Course is the pre-eminent advanced
educational qualification focusing on international insolvency.

With the fast growing number of cross-border insolvency cases and
the adoption in many jurisdictions of international insolvency
rules and provisions, the turnaround and insolvency profession
faces increasing challenges in the current economic environment.
The current outlook demonstrates that the practitioners of
tomorrow need to have extensive knowledge of the transnational and
international aspects of legal and financial problems of
businesses in distress.

The format of the fellowship program is intensive, carried out
over three modules.  The first module took place in
London, November 10 to 12, 2014.  The second module was held in
San Francisco from March 19 to 21, 2015 prior to INSOL San
Francisco. The last module involved the students utilizing web
enabled technology which included a virtual court and undertaking
real time negotiations for a restructuring plan involving multiple
jurisdictions.  The platform for this module was made available
through the generous support of the University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.  A number of senior judges from
around the world took part in Module C in order for the
participants to gain experience of court to court situations.  The
judges included The Hon. Robert Drain, US Bankruptcy Judge,
Southern District of New York; Sir David Richards, Justice of the
High Court, Chancery Division, Royal Courts of Justice, London;
The Honourable Judge Eberhard Nietzer, Heilbronn Bankruptcy Court,
Germany: The Honourable Geoffrey Morawetz, Justice of the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice, (Commercial List), Toronto,
Canada: Mr Justice Paul Heath, High Court of New Zealand: Mr
Justice Daniel Carnio Costa, Court of Sao Paulo,

Admission to the course is limited.  This ensures academic
excellence and the opportunity for good personal
contact between students and faculty.  Potential candidates must
already hold a degree or equivalent to be considered for this
program and must have a minimum of 5 years experience in the
field.  Participants represent the different jurisdictions of the

                       INSOL'S Mission

INSOL with its Member Associations will take the leadership role
in international turnaround, insolvency and related credit issues;
facilitate the exchange of information and ideas; encourage
greater international co-operation and communication amongst the
insolvency profession, credit community and related INSOL
International is a worldwide federation of national associations
of accountants and lawyers who specialize in turnaround and
insolvency.  There are currently 40 Member Associations with over
10,000 professionals participating as members.

* BOOK REVIEW: BOARD GAMES - Changing Shape of Corporate Power
Author: Arthur Fleischer, Jr.,
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and
Miriam Z. Klipper
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 248 pages
List Price: $34.95
Order your personal copy today at

A ruling by the Delaware Supreme Court on January 29, 1985 was a
wake-up call to directors of U. S. corporations. On this date,
overruling a lower court decision, the Delaware Supreme Court
ruled that the nine board members of Chicago company Trans Union
Corporation were "guilty of breaching their duty to the company's
shareholders." What the board members had done was agree to sell
Trans Union without a satisfactory review of its value. The guilty
board members were ordered by the Court to pay "the difference
between the per share selling price and the 'real' market value of
the company's shares."

Needless to say, the nine Trans Union directors were shocked at
the guilt verdict and the punishment. The chairman of the board,
Jerome Van Gorkom, was a lawyer and a CPA who was also a board
member of other large, respected corporations. For the most part,
it was he who had put together the terms of the potential sale,
including setting value of the company's stock at $55.00 even
though it was trading at about $38.00 per share. News of the
possible sale immediately drove the stock up to $51.50 per share,
and was commented on favorably in a "New York Times" business
article. Still, Van Gorkom and the other directors were found
guilty of breaching their duty, and ordered by Delaware's highest
court to pay a sum to injured parties that would be financially
ruinous. This was clearly more than board members of the Trans
Union Corporation or any other corporation had ever bargained for.
It was more than board members had ever conceived was possible
without evidence of fraud or graft. The three authors are all
attorneys who have worked at the highest levels of the legal
field, business, and government.

Fleischer is the senior partner of the law firm Fried, Frank,
Harris, Schriver & Jacobson at the head of its mergers and
acquisitions department.

He's also the author of the textbook "Takeover Defenses" which is
in its 6th edition. Hazard is a Professor of Law and former
reporter for the American Bar Association's special committee on
the lawyers' ethics code; while Klipper has been a New York
assistant district attorney prosecuting corporate and financial
fraud, and also a corporate attorney on Wall Street. Using the
Trans Union Corporation case as a watershed event for members of
boards of directors, the highly-experienced legal professionals
lay out the new ground rules for board members. In laying out the
circumstances and facts of a number of cases; keen, concise
analyses of these; and finding where and how board members went
wrong, the authors provide guidance for corporate directors, top
executives, and corporate and private business attorneys on
issues, processes, and decisions of critical importance to them.
Household International, Union Carbide, Gelco Corp., Revlon, SCM,
and Freuhauf are other major corporations whose merger-and
acquisitions activities resulted in court cases that the authors
study to the benefit of readers. The Boards of Directors of these
as well as Trans Union and their positions with other companies
are listed in the appendix. Many other corporations and their
board members are also referred to in the text.

With respect to each of the cases it deals with, BOARD GAMES
outlines the business environment, identifies important
individuals, analyzes decisions, and discusses considerations
regarding laws, government regulations, and corporate practice. In
all of this, however, given the exceptional legal background of
the three authors, the book recurringly brings into the picture
the legalities applying to the activities and decisions of board
members and in many instances, court rulings on these. Passages
from court transcripts are occasionally recorded and commented on.

Elsewhere, legal terms and concepts -- e.g., "gross nonattendance"
-- are defined as much as they can be. In one place, the authors
discuss six levels of responsibility for board members from
"assure proper result" through negligence up to fraud. Without
being overly technical, the authors' legal experience and guidance
is continually in the forefront. Needless to say, with this, BOARD
GAMES is a work of importance to board members and others with the
responsibility of overseeing and running corporations in the
present-day, post-Enron business environment where shareholders
and government officials are scrutinizing their behavior and


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *