TCREUR_Public/150617.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, June 17, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 118

                            Headlines

C Y P R U S

RCB BANK: Moody's Assigns B3 Counterparty Risk Assessment Rating


F R A N C E

SPIE SA: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB', Then Withdraws Rating
WFS GLOBAL: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable


G E R M A N Y

EUROMAX VI: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class H Debt
PORTFOLIO GREEN: Moody's Withdraws Junk Ratings on 2 Note Classes
SUEDZUCKER: S&P Lowers Rating on Hybrid Debt Instrument to 'B'
* Germany Not Preparing for Any Insolvent Country's Restructuring


G R E E C E

ELLAKTOR SA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-', Outlook Negative
GREECE: Tsipras Not Backing Down, Balks at IMF's Actions
HELLENIC BANK: Moody's Raises LT Deposit Rating to 'Caa2'


I R E L A N D

CLERYS: Employees to Receive Basic Statutory Redundancy
MAGI FUNDING I: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Sub. Notes II-A
* IRELAND: No. of Wexford Firm Declaring Insolvency Drops to 1


L U X E M B O U R G

TOPAZ ENERGY: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Remains Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

ARCOS DORADOS: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Rating to 'BB+'
AVOCA CLO II: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to Ca
TIKEHAU CLO: Moody's Rates EUR25MM Class E Notes '(P)Ba2'


P O R T U G A L

CAIX GERAL: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Ratings to B1


R O M A N I A

BANCA COMERCIALA: Moody's Hikes Deposit Ratings to 'Ba1'


R U S S I A

GAZPROMBANK: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1(cr)' CR Assessment Rating


S P A I N

SPAIN: Enacts Provisions For Secured Creditors in Insolvency


S W E D E N

COM HEM: S&P Revises Outlook to Positive & Affirms 'BB-' CCR


U K R A I N E

BANK NATIONAL: NBU Declares Bank Insolvent
ENERGOBANK PJSC: National Bank of Ukraine Winds Up Insolvent Bank
KREDITPROMBANK PJSC: Placed Under Liquidation


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CONSORTIUM TECHNOLOGY: 3 Directors Banned for Misleading Public
DFS FURNITURE: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corporate Family Rating
NEWDAY FUNDING: Fitch Rates Series 2015-1 F Debt 'B(EXP)sf'
NEWLOOK ROOF: Disqualified as Director for 12 Years
OPTIMAL PAYMENTS: S&P Assigns 'BB' CCR, Outlook Stable


X X X X X X X X

* Government Action Needed on Insolvency Redundancy Consultations


                            *********


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C Y P R U S
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RCB BANK: Moody's Assigns B3 Counterparty Risk Assessment Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned long and short-term
Counterparty Risk Assessment of B3(cr)/Not-Prime(cr) to RCB Bank
Ltd.

CR Assessments are opinions of how counterparty obligations are
likely to be treated if a bank fails, and are distinct from debt
and deposit ratings in that they (1) consider only the risk of
default rather than expected loss and (2) apply to counterparty
obligations and contractual commitments rather than debt or
deposit instruments. The CR Assessment is an opinion of the
counterparty risk related to a bank's covered bonds, contractual
performance obligations (servicing), derivatives (e.g., swaps),
letters of credit, guarantees and liquidity facilities.

The CR Assessment takes into account the issuer's standalone
strength as well as the likelihood of affiliate and government
support in the event of need, reflecting the anticipated
seniority of these obligations in the liabilities hierarchy. The
CR Assessment also incorporates other steps authorities can take
to preserve the key operations of a bank should it enter a
resolution.

RCB Bank's B3(cr) CR Assessment, is positioned one notch above
the bank's Adjusted BCA of caa1, based on the cushion against
default provided to the senior obligations represented by the CR
Assessment by subordinated instruments amounting to 14% of
Tangible Banking Assets. The main difference with Moody's
Advanced LGF approach used to determine instrument ratings is
that the CR Assessment captures the probability of default on
certain senior obligations, rather than expected loss. Therefore,
Moody's focuses purely on subordination and takes no account of
the volume of the instrument class.

In the case of RCB Bank, the B3(cr) CR Assessment of the bank is
constrained by the B3 local-currency deposit ceiling in Cyprus.
According to Moody's methodology, CR Assessments are capped by
the lower of: the local-currency deposit ceiling, or the local
government bond rating plus one notch, or plus two notches where
the adjusted BCA itself is already above the local government
bond rating, which is not the case with RCB Bank.

The CR Assessment does not benefit from any government support,
in line with our support assumptions on deposits. This reflects
our view that operating activities and obligations reflected by
the CR Assessment are unlikely to benefit from any support
provisions from resolution authorities to deposits.

The principal methodology used in these ratings/analysis was
Banks published in March 2015.



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F R A N C E
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SPIE SA: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB', Then Withdraws Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised to 'BB'
from 'B+' its long-term corporate credit ratings on French multi-
technical services provider Spie Bondco 3 S.C.A (Spie3) and its
indirect subsidiary, Financiere SPIE.  These ratings were
subsequently withdrawn, together with all of S&P's issue and
recovery ratings on the repaid facilities.

At the same time, S&P assigned a 'BB' long-term corporate credit
rating to SPIE SA (SPIE), the publicly listed entity.

Furthermore, S&P assigned issue ratings of 'BB' to the new
EUR1.125 billion senior unsecured term loan A and EUR400 million
senior unsecured revolving credit facility, both maturing in June
2020.  The recovery rating is '4', in the lower end of the range.

The upgrades and withdrawals follow the completion of SPIE's IPO,
which successfully raised EUR700 million of additional capital
that the company used to deleverage the capital structure, along
with drawings under its new EUR1.525 billion senior unsecured
facilities maturing 2020.  In addition, the last remaining amount
under the shareholder loan provided by Clayax Acquisition
Luxembourg 5 SCA was converted to equity.

Post IPO, S&P anticipates that SPIE's total adjusted debt will
fall to EUR1.7 billion on Dec. 31, 2015, from approximately
EUR3.0 billion at the end of December 2014, and S&P forecasts
adjusted funds from operations (FFO) of EUR233 million for
financial year 2015.  S&P also forecasts that SPIE's adjusted
debt to EBITDA for the financial year ending Dec. 31, 2015 will
be lower than 4.5x and FFO-to-debt will be about 15%.  These
metrics are commensurate with a financial risk profile of
"aggressive" under our criteria, an improvement from S&P's
previous assessment of "highly leveraged".

Given the IPO and the reduction in the private equity ownership
of Clayton, Dubilier & Rice (CDR) and partners, S&P views this
partial exit as positive for the company's financial policy.  S&P
has now revised its financial policy assessment upwards to FS-5
from FS-6. A further reduction in CDR and partners' stake to
below 40% would result in another review of this assessment.

S&P's assessment of SPIE's business risk remains driven by its
geographic diversification and significant scale of operations in
France, as well as the somewhat lower than average margins
compared with other facilities services peers.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- A gradual improvement of European economies, with notably
      an increase in French GDP of above 1% in 2015, leading to
      generally stable revenues complemented by growth from
      acquisitions.  SPIE's reported revenue growth of over 10%
      for 2014, thanks to the full-year consolidation of German
      construction firm Hochtief, and S&P's forecast for revenue
      growth of about 2% in 2015 and 2016.  A modest improvement
      in SPIE's adjusted EBITDA margin of about 20 basis points
      in 2015, as integration costs for the Hochtief acquisition
      no longer lower adjusted margins and are offset by
      productivity gains.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of below 4.5x.
   -- Adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of over 3x.
   -- Adjusted free operating cash flow of roughly EUR250
      million.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that SPIE's operating
performance will remain steady throughout 2015.  S&P expects that
generated cash flow will be in line with credit metrics
commensurate with an "aggressive" financial risk profile for
2015. This includes adjusted FFO to debt of about 15% and
adjusted debt to EBITDA of approximately 4.5x.  S&P assumes that
over time, SPIE will maintain interest coverage of at least 3x,
slowly improve its ratio of FFO to debt, and continue to generate
significant positive free operating cash flows.

S&P could consider a positive rating action if SPIE's adjusted
FFO to debt moves sustainably above 20% and adjusted debt to
EBITDA below 4x -- a level that would require further
deleveraging or a reduction of ownership by CDR and partners to
below 40%. Additionally, establishing a track record for
maintaining conservative financial leverage levels could generate
positive rating pressure.

S&P could consider taking a negative rating action if unexpected
adverse operating developments -- such as sudden contract losses
with established clients resulting in a sizable shortfall in
sales and margin levels.  This could cause adjusted FFO to debt
to fall below 12%.  S&P considers this scenario as unlikely.


WFS GLOBAL: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating to French airport ground
handler WFS Global Holding SAS (WFS).  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its preliminary 'B' issue rating
to the proposed EUR225 million senior secured notes to be issued
by WFS.  The preliminary recovery rating on these notes is '4',
indicating recovery prospects in the lower half of the 30%-50%
range.

The preliminary 'B' rating on WFS reflects S&P's view of the
company's business risk profile as "weak" and its financial risk
profile as "highly leveraged," as S&P's criteria define these
terms.

WFS' "weak" business risk profile is constrained by S&P's view of
the company's large exposure to the air cargo handling market,
which S&P generally views as more volatile than ramp and
passenger handling activities.  S&P considers cargo to be
sensitive to the general economic environment and therefore
dependent on the recovery and future growth of the global
economy.  Cargo handling activities accounted for 63% of WFS'
revenues in 2014, and for 67% of EBITDA.  Also, S&P views WFS'
geographical exposure as somewhat weaker than peers', with around
46% and 70% of revenues generated in France and Europe,
respectively.

These weaknesses are partly offset by S&P's view of WFS' position
as a leading niche player in the global air cargo handling
market, its ownership of warehouses, and its road feeder system--
which S&P believes enhances the company's competitive position
and operating efficiency.  The ground and cargo handling market
is very fragmented and the scale of established players such as
WFS provides a competitive edge in terms of reputation and the
ability to afford the capital outlay and offer complimentary
services at any given airport.  The company's "fair"
profitability assessment is supported by industry-average
profitability measures under S&P's base case, such as return on
capital of about 6%. Additionally, WFS has entered the Brazilian
market, which benefits from a higher margin than the more mature
markets of Europe, and in S&P's opinion, should drive some margin
improvement over time.

S&P's financial risk profile assessment of "highly leveraged"
reflects S&P's view that WFS will have weighted-average funds
from operations (FFO)-to-debt and debt-to-EBITDA ratios of about
8%-9% and 6x, respectively, for the next two years.  The scale of
WFS' operations is smaller than market leaders that have global
reach. As a result, S&P believes that WFS' financial strength is
constrained by its fairly low absolute EBITDA and cash flow,
which, in S&P's opinion, make the financial measures susceptible
to underperformance relative to S&P's base case.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Improving cargo volumes at WFS' key airports in Europe and
      Asia, offset by weaker performance in North America.

   -- Stable to slightly positive pricing environment, which,
      combined with improving volumes, is likely to lead to about
      2%-3% revenue growth in the cargo business unit.

   -- Good performance in the company's ramp and passenger unit,
      leading to revenue growth of about 6%-7%.

   -- Reported EBITDA margin of about 4%-5%.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Weighted average adjusted FFO to debt of about 8%-9%.
   -- Weighted average adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 6x-7x.
   -- EBITDA interest coverage of about 2x.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that WFS will be
able to maintain an adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio in excess of 6% in
the next 12 months.  S&P expects the company to deliver fairly
stable operating performance as global markets continue to pick
up throughout 2015 and 2016.  S&P views significant deleveraging
as unlikely over the short-to-medium term, due to the lack of
amortizing debt in the pro forma capital structure.  Furthermore,
given the relatively small scale of WFS' operations, S&P
considers the company's consistently "adequate" liquidity -- with
sources covering uses by at least 1.2x for the next 12 months --
to be an important and stabilizing rating factor.

S&P could consider a positive rating action if WFS reduces debt
through improved operating performance, leading to stronger
credit metrics, such as adjusted FFO to debt of more than 12% and
debt to EBITDA of less than 5x, on a sustainable basis.  This
would also require S&P to believe that the company's private
equity shareholders were unlikely to recapitalize the business to
further increase leverage.

S&P might consider a negative rating action if WFS' debt
increases materially as a result of a sizable debt-financed
acquisition or aggressive shareholder distributions, to the
extent that FFO to debt falls below 6%.  S&P could also consider
a negative rating action if the company's liquidity position
deteriorates significantly as a result of weaker-than-anticipated
operating performance or cash flow generation.



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G E R M A N Y
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EUROMAX VI: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class H Debt
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Euromax VI ABS Limited,
as follows:

EUR84.6 million Class A (XS0294719082): affirmed at 'CCCsf'
EUR37 million Class B (XS0294720171): affirmed at 'CCsf'
EUR16 million Class C (XS0294720338): affirmed at 'Csf'
EUR16 million Class D (XS0294720841): affirmed at 'Csf'
EUR3 million Class E (XS0294721146): affirmed at 'Csf'
EUR8 million Class G (XS0294722201): affirmed at 'CCsf'
EUR24 million Class H (XS0294722896): affirmed at 'Csf'

Euromax VI is a securitization of mainly European structured
finance securities with a total note issuance of EUR430m invested
in a portfolio of EUR425 million. The current portfolio including
defaulted assets is EUR169 million. In addition the transaction
has accumulated EUR1 million of principal proceeds.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation of the notes' reflects the transactions stable
performance over the last 12 months. Since then, class A notes
have amortized by EUR13.5 million, leading to increases in credit
enhancement on the class A and B notes. The class A notes are now
25% of their initial balance. Credit enhancement, excluding
defaulted assets, but including assets rated 'CC' and 'C', is now
46.3% and 22.4% for the class A and B notes, respectively, up
from 43% and 21.6%.

For the remaining notes, credit enhancement has decreased due to
deferral of interest since 2009 and additional defaults over the
last 12 months. As such credit enhancement on the class C notes
decreased to 11.2% from 12.3%, the class D notes to -0.9% from
3%, and the class E notes to -3.5% from 1.3%.

The portfolio has now amortized to below 40% of its initial
balance, increasing its concentration with regard to industry and
country distribution. The majority of the portfolio consists of
RMBS and CMBS assets, which make up 63% and 28%, compared with
58% and 33%, respectively, a year ago. A third of the assets are
of German origin, followed by 22.5% of Dutch assets, 14.3%
Spanish assets and 12.7% of British origin. European peripheral
exposure adds another 30% and is represented by Spanish, Italian,
Portuguese and Greek assets.

Defaulted assets represent 9.11% of the performing balance,
compared with 5.5% a year ago. All defaults are CMBS assets,
which, with the exception of one asset, are of German origin.
There have been two new defaults over the past year; both German
CMBS. There are no recovery expectations on any of the defaulted
assets.

The performing balance includes 'CC'- and 'C'-rated assets, which
represent a 35% share. The 'CCC' and below bucket is now just
below 40% of the performing balance and just under 30% of the
performing balance is backed by investment-grade assets.

The overcollateralization (OC) tests have failed since 2009. The
interest coverage (IC) test is passing with high buffers and has
not failed throughout the transaction's life. The portfolio's
weighted average life test is failing with a reported value of
eight years, up from 7.7 years a year ago and compared with a
trigger of six years.

Rating Sensitivities

In its stress tests Fitch found that increasing the default
probability or reducing the recovery rate by 25% each would not
affect the notes' ratings.

Due Diligence Usage

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Data Adequacy

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


PORTFOLIO GREEN: Moody's Withdraws Junk Ratings on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings of two
classes of EMEA CMBS notes issued by the Portfolio Green German
CMBS GmbH.

  -- EUR20 million (current outstanding balance of EUR1.93M) E
     Notes, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2014 Affirmed
     Caa1 (sf)

  -- EUR12 million (current outstanding balance of EUR2.35M) F
     Notes, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2014 Affirmed
     Caa2 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class H Notes.

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.


SUEDZUCKER: S&P Lowers Rating on Hybrid Debt Instrument to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered to
'BBB-/A-3' from 'BBB/A-2' its long- and short-term corporate
credit ratings on Germany-based sugar and ethanol producer
Suedzucker.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P lowered the issue ratings on Suedzucker's
senior unsecured debt to 'BBB-' from 'BBB', the short-term issue
rating on the commercial paper program to 'A-3' from 'A-2', and
the issue ratings on the subordinated hybrid debt instrument to
'B' from 'BB'.

The rating downgrade reflects S&P's view that Suedzucker's
operating margins and cash flow generation will likely remain
below historical averages over the next two years.  This is
because of a combination of prevailing low sugar prices and
structural constraints of the EU sugar quota regime that is set
to last until the second half of 2017.  Although S&P recognizes
that Suedzucker is one of Europe's largest and most cost
efficient sugar producers, it will face considerable operating
uncertainty, as supply and demand come into balance during the
transition to full market liberalization in the EU.

S&P notably forecasts Standard & Poor's fully adjusted funds from
operations (FFO)-to-debt ratio to be around 16%-22% and the debt-
to-EBITDA ratio to peak at about 4.9x in 2015/2016, decreasing to
about 3.6x in 2016/2017.  Overall, S&P sees Suedzucker's credit
metrics mostly in the "significant" rating category for the next
two years, commensurate with the current rating and stable
outlook

For the sugar sold under the EU quota, S&P forecasts continuing
low underlying demand trends due to changes in consumer tastes
and health regulations.  S&P expects there will be more pricing
volatility as the EU quota prices become more correlated to world
prices, and as European sugar producers adjust their cultivation
areas and production.  The outlook for ethanol remains weak, in
S&P's view, with prices influenced by industry overcapacity, as
well as low oil prices.

Suedzucker's standing in the "satisfactory" business risk
category remains supported by its large scale and efficient
manufacturing base in its main activities such as sugar, ethanol,
and fruit juice concentrates and preparations; the good location
of its processing plants near the main sugarbeet production
areas; the long-tenured and stable supply relationships with
sugarbeet farmers; the large and diverse customer base, mostly in
the food and beverage and pharmaceuticals sector; and the stable
growth and profitability prospects of the food products and
fruits businesses.

Going forward S&P expects the volatility inherent to commodities
like sugar and ethanol will continue to affect Suedzucker's
profitability and cash flow.  From 2017/2018, the opening of the
EU sugar market should help Suedzucker gain volume sales both in
the EU and outside, so long as its sourcing agreements with
farmers and capacity utilization allow it to retain a competitive
cost structure.

S&P's base-case financial projections for 2015/2016 and 2015/2017
assume:

   -- Revenues of EUR6.3 billion in 2015/2016 (7% year-on-year
      decline) and EUR6.4 billion in 2016 (2% year-on-year
      increase).  In 2015/2016 this is driven by a double-digit
      decline in sugar and ethanol revenues, due to low selling
      prices and lower volumes, flat sales growth in special
      products, and mid-single digit growth in fruits.  In
      2016/2017, S&P assumes positive low-single-digit revenue
      growth for most business segments, except ethanol, with
      notably slightly higher average selling prices in sugar
      compared to 2015/2016.  EBITDA of EUR380 million in
      2015/2016 (EBITDA margin of 6%) and EUR500 million in
      2016/2017.  In 2015/2016 S&P sees very low EBITDA
      contribution from sugar and ethanol activities, offset by
      stable earnings from special products and fruits and
      slightly lower energy costs.  In 2016/2017, S&P sees a
      rebound in profitability, notably from higher revenues and
      effects of cost restructuring in sugar, but still weak
      profitability in ethanol due notably to continued low oil
      prices.  FFO of EUR300 million in 2015/2016 and EUR400
      million with lower interest expenses compared to 2014/2015.

   -- Free operating cash flow slightly negative in 2015/2016 at
      around negative EUR20 million due to lower EBITDA base,
      despite a positive working capital inflow.  This should
      improve to EUR90 million in 2016/2017 with stronger
      earnings and lower capital expenditures.  Net debt of
      EUR1.8 billion-EUR1.9 billion.  In addition to borrowings,
      net debt includes S&P's assumption of EUR826 million of net
      pension deficit, EUR342 million of hybrid debt, and EUR34
      million of operating leases.  S&P applies a 5% haircut to
      cash balances and marketable securities for restricted
      cash, based on S&P's estimate of cash not being readily
      available for debt reduction.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these Standard &
Poor's credit measures:

   -- FFO to debt of around 16%-22%.
   -- Debt to EBITDA peaking at 4.9x in 2015/2016, then
      decreasing to 3.6x in 2016/2017.
   -- Free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt of around 0%-5%.

S&P also lowered to 'B' from 'BB' the issue rating on the EUR700
million subordinated hybrid instrument, which S&P treats as
intermediate equity (50% debt, 50% equity).  The rating action is
motivated by S&P's view that there is a high risk of interest
deferral over the next 12 months as S&P forecasts that the
headroom under the cash flow to revenues covenant will be tight
(5%-15%).

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Suedzucker's cash
flow generation and debt leverage metrics should remain overall
in the "significant" category the next 12-24 months as S&P do not
foresee a strong rebound in the operating performance of the
sugar and ethanol activities by 2016/2017.  Still, the stable
cash flow generation of other activities (fruits, juices, and
frozen food production), lower energy and financing expenses, and
the cost reduction program should help stabilize credit metrics
at current levels.  S&P thus expects Suedzucker to maintain an
FFO-to-debt ratio of 20%-30% and a Standard & Poor's debt-to-
EBITDA ratio of 3x-4x over the next 24 months.

S&P could lower the rating if it sees further decline in
Suedzucker's profitability and cash flow generation, due for
example to weak performance from the fruits, juices, and food
production activities.  S&P would also view negatively continued
high volatility of profitability in sugar and ethanol, especially
if Suedzucker is unable to operate with a more flexible cost
structure, and continue to optimize capacity utilization in a
more volatile pricing environment.  S&P will also monitor the
sizable pension deficit (45% of Standard & Poor's debt at
February 2015), which affects Suedzucker.  Finally, S&P would
view negatively any weakening in the company's credit metrics,
such as Standard & Poor's debt to EBITDA remaining above 4x and
negative free operating cash flow over the next two years.

S&P could raise the rating if it sees a significant and sustained
rebound in earnings and cash flow contribution from the sugar and
ethanol businesses in the next two years.  This could occur owing
to a rebound in industrial demand, a sharp decrease in industry
supply and inventories, and a strong rebound in oil prices (for
ethanol), as well as a leaner operating cost base.  S&P would
consider a Standard & Poor's debt-to-EBITDA ratio declining
sustainably below 3.0x and FFO-to-debt rising to above 30% to be
consistent with a higher credit rating.


* Germany Not Preparing for Any Insolvent Country's Restructuring
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Germany's finance ministry denied a report
on June 13 that its officials were working on a plan to allow an
orderly debt restructuring for any country that becomes
insolvent.

German magazine Der Spiegel had reported that Finance Minister
Wolfgang Schaeuble asked officials to draft plans for a system of
debt restructuring for any insolvent country so that it could
stay in the euro, Reuters relates.

Greece, Reuters says, is negotiating for loans in exchange for
reforms so that it can repay debts due in the coming weeks and
avoid default.

But on June 13, a spokesman for the finance ministry denied that
any preparation of such a framework was taking place, Reuters
relays.



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G R E E C E
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ELLAKTOR SA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-', Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has lowered its
long-term corporate credit ratings on two Greece-based
corporations, concessions and construction group Ellaktor S.A.
and utility Public Power Corp. S.A. (PPC).

   -- S&P has lowered the long-term corporate credit rating on
      Ellaktor S.A. to 'B-' from 'B'.  The outlook is negative.
      At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B' short-term rating.

   -- S&P has lowered the long-term corporate credit rating on
      Public Power Corp. S.A. (PPC) to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'.  The
      ratings have been removed from CreditWatch negative, where
      they were placed on April 22, 2015.  The outlook is
      negative.

The rating actions follow the lowering of S&P's sovereign credit
rating on Greece to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'.

The rating action on Ellaktor reflects S&P's view of the
company's significant reliance on Greece for its earnings, and
S&P's view that there is an increasing likelihood of economic
stress in Greece owing to the deterioration of sovereign credit
quality.  The rating action on PPC reflects S&P's view of the
company as a government-related entity, therefore the downgrade
follows that of Greece.

ELLAKTOR S.A.

"We have lowered the long-term corporate credit rating on Greece-
based group Ellaktor to 'B-' from 'B' and affirmed the 'B' short-
term rating.  Ellaktor has significant exposure to the Greek
economy, sovereign, and banks, and we believe that deteriorating
macroeconomic conditions in Greece will constrain the group's
business and financial prospects.  We believe that the risks of
operating in Greece have heightened, and have made downwards
revisions to our forecasts, particularly for the group's
construction business.  We now expect adjusted debt to EBITDA
will exceed 5x and adjusted FFO to debt will be below 12% over
our forecast period.  The 'B-' rating reflects our view that the
group's business risk profile is currently "vulnerable" and
financial risk profile is currently "highly leveraged"," S&P
said.

PUBLIC POWER CORP. S.A.

"We have lowered the long-term corporate credit rating on Greek
utility Public Power Corp. S.A. (PPC) to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'.  We
have removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where they were placed on April 22, 2015.  The
outlook is negative.  The rating actions also follow a similar
action on Greece and the Greek banks.  We believe PPC faces
liquidity risks stemming from the continuously deteriorating
macroeconomic conditions in Greece and the shrinking funding
sources available to PPC.  In light of the group's increasing
working capital needs, heavy investment commitments, and reliance
on the depressed Greek banking system (especially for the
refinancing of the power network IPTO), we believe its liquidity
could weaken materially in the coming months.  The financial
market shutdown leaves PPC heavily reliant on the weak Greek
banking system.  Given the group's financing needs for the year,
S&P believes this exposes it to liquidity risk, despite
management's significant achievements during 2014 to improve the
group's capital structure and liquidity.  S&P nevertheless
understands that PPC's consolidated cash has improved since year-
end 2014 and that existing credit lines have remained available
to the group. Operating performance in first-quarter 2015 was in
line with expectations, while working capital continued to
deteriorate, although to a much lower level than over the same
period last year.  On a 12-month basis, working capital
deterioration had a negative effect on cash flow generation,
leading to an increase in unadjusted net debt of about EUR350
million to about EUR5 billion.

RATINGS LIST
                            To               From

Ellaktor S.A.
Corporate credit rating     B-/Neg./B    B/Neg./B

Public Power Corp. S.A.
Corporate credit rating     CCC/Neg.     CCC+/Watch Neg


GREECE: Tsipras Not Backing Down, Balks at IMF's Actions
--------------------------------------------------------
Eleni Chrepa and Arne Delfs at Bloomberg News report that
Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras hurled criticism at Greece's
creditors, accusing the International Monetary Fund of "criminal"
responsibility for his country's predicament.

Addressing lawmakers in Athens on June 16, Mr. Tsipras gave no
sign of backing down in the standoff over Greece's bailout,
Bloomberg relates.  Instead, he blasted the IMF's adherence to
austerity and accused the European Central Bank of using tactics
that were akin to "financial asphyxiation" Bloomberg relays.

"The situation in which we find ourselves today is that IMF
positions prevail when it comes to the strictness of austerity
measures asked, while at the same time EU positions prevail when
it comes to the denial for any discussion about Greek debt
sustainability," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Tsipras as saying.

Mr. Tsipras's rhetoric further diminishes the chances that the
Greek government will be able to bridge the divide with its
creditors in the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission any
time soon, Bloomberg notes.  With two weeks until Greece's
euro-area bailout expires on June 30, the onus on resolving the
deadlock lies with a meeting of finance ministers on Thursday,
June 18, followed by a June 25-26 summit of European Union
leaders, Bloomberg states.

The Greek government has declined to submit a new compromise
proposal to its creditors, making it almost certain that the
June 18 meeting of euro-area finance ministers won't resolve the
standoff, Bloomberg relays.

Officials in Brussels have been discussing the possibility of an
emergency European Union summit to break the deadlock, Bloomberg
discloses.  Only a political decision could unlock the EUR7
billion remaining in Greece's current bailout program and open
the way to talks on the next such plan, Bloomberg says.  But
there's little room for a political deal, too, Bloomberg states.

Greece and its creditors have failed to find common ground,
Bloomberg says.

Greece has snubbed European pleas to submit a new proposal to
avert a default, saying it was up to creditors to make the next
move, Bloomberg relates.  The country needs to seal an accord or
get an extension before the euro area's bailout expires on
June 30, or risk missing payments on its debt of about EUR313
billion (US$352 billion), Bloomberg notes.

Finnish Prime Minister Juha Sipila, as cited by Bloomberg, said
while Europe's leaders seek a solution to Greece's funding
difficulties, they also have unofficially discussed a possible
default.

                       Economic Meltdown

Meanwhile, The Telegraph's Peter Dominiczak reports that Greece
is on the brink of economic meltdown after Germany appeared
poised to push the country out of the eurozone.

With the embattled country set to default on a EUR1.5 billion
(GBP1.1 billion) debt repayment, senior German politicians warned
that "enough is enough", The Telegraph relates.

As the crisis intensified, it emerged that George Osborne, the
Chancellor, will later this week chair an emergency meeting as
ministers seek to protect Britain's economy from a potential
Greek exit from the single currency -- dubbed a Grexit, The
Telegraph relays.

Officials want to ensure that the Government has "contingency
plans" in place to ensure that UK businesses are not damaged by a
Greek withdrawal, The Telegraph discloses.

"Clearly, there are difficult decisions to come," The Telegraph
quotes a senior government source as saying.  "Understandably,
the Government is doing everything it can to protect British
interests."

The Prime Minister's official spokesman on June 15 urged eurozone
countries "to find a solution" to the crisis at a summit to be
held this week, The Telegraph recounts.


HELLENIC BANK: Moody's Raises LT Deposit Rating to 'Caa2'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded Hellenic Bank Public Company
Ltd.'s long-term deposit rating to Caa2 from Caa3, and has
affirmed the bank's caa3 baseline credit assessment (BCA) and the
Not-Prime short-term deposit ratings. The actions conclude the
review on the bank's deposit ratings which was initiated on
March 17, 2015 following the publication of Moody's revised bank
methodology (see "Rating Methodology: Banks," March 16, 2015,
available at moodys.com).

In light of the new banking methodology, Moody's rating actions
on Hellenic Bank primarily reflect the following considerations:
(1) the "Very Weak" macro profile of Cyprus (B3 stable); (2) the
bank's weak financial profile; and (3) Moody's Advanced Loss
Given Failure (LGF) analysis.

The rating agency has also assigned long and short-term
Counterparty Risk Assessments (CR Assessments) of B3(cr)/Not-
Prime(cr) to the bank, in line with the revised methodology.

Moody's has assigned stable outlooks to the long-term deposit
ratings.

The new methodology includes a number of elements that Moody's
has developed to help accurately predict bank failures and
determine how each creditor class is likely to be treated when a
bank fails and enters resolution. These new elements capture
insights gained from the crisis and the fundamental shift in the
banking industry and its regulation.

(1) THE VERY WEAK MACRO PROFILE OF CYPRUS

The affirmation of Hellenic's caa3 BCA takes into account Moody's
assessment of a Very Weak macro profile for Cyprus, driven
primarily by the country's weak funding conditions, brought about
by still fragile depositor confidence. Credit conditions also
remain very weak, with private-sector debt standing at 300% of
GDP, with over a third of it built up over the last four years.

The macro profile also captures the rating agency's expectations
of a mild economic recovery in 2015, and progressive GDP growth
rising to around 2% over the medium term, although the outlook
remains vulnerable to private-sector deleveraging and a high
stock of problem loans. Moody's expects that recent amendments to
the legal framework will benefit Cypriot banks, by ensuring a
more timely execution of collateral. However, benefits to these
amendments will take time to feed through and are therefore not
yet explicitly reflected in the macro profile.

(2) HELLENIC BANK'S WEAK FINANCIAL PROFILE

Moody's affirmation of Hellenic Bank's caa3 BCA also reflects the
bank's weak financial profile, capturing the bank's significant
asset-quality challenges which offset its enhanced capital base
and ample liquidity buffers.

The bank continues to face a large stock of non-performing loans
(NPLs) against which cash provisions (loan loss reserves) remain
low. The ratio of NPLs (defined as 90 days past due and impaired
loans, net of interest in suspense) to gross loans stood at 51.3%
as of March 2015, while non-performing exposures -- according to
the European Banking Authority's definition -- were 53.3% of
gross loans. At the same time, the ratio of loan loss reserves
(excluding interest in suspense) to NPLs was a low 42% as of
March 2015. Although the arrears management and recoveries unit
has been strengthened in 2014, loan restructuring progress has
been slow. The recent implementation of a more timely foreclosure
framework in Cyprus is a positive development for the bank,
however it is too early to assess its potential benefit.

Moody's does, however, acknowledge the bank's solid liquidity
cushion and stronger capital. As of March 2015, cash and
placements with banks accounted for 44% of total assets, and
including bond investments this ratio increases to 56%. This high
liquidity buffer mitigates the risks that arise from the high
vulnerability of the bank's funding base, and would allow the
bank to withstand large deposit outflows. Hellenic Bank has a
significant funding reliance to corporate deposits of non-
resident corporations, mainly originating from Commonwealth of
Independent States. As of March 2015, around half of the bank's
deposits were from corporate entities, according to Moody's
estimates.

Hellenic Bank's financial profile also benefits from its
strengthened capital buffers. Following a successful capital
increase completed in December 2014, the bank's Common Equity
Tier 1 Ratio increased to 13.3% against a 7.3% Core Tier 1
capital ratio at end-2013, and its Tier 1 capital ratio, which
also reflects around EUR130 million of high-trigger capital
securities, increased to 16.2% as of March 2015.

(3) PROTECTION OFFERED TO CREDITORS MORE SENIOR IN THE CREDITOR
    HIERARCHY, AS CAPTURED BY MOODY'S ADVANCED LGF LIABILITY
    ANALYSIS

The upgrade of the bank's deposit ratings to Caa2 from Caa3 takes
into account the LGF analysis of the bank's own volume of
deposits and securities subordinated to them in Moody's creditor
hierarchy. Hellenic Bank benefits from a large volume of deposits
(accounting for 21% of tangible assets), resulting in a low loss
given failure.

Despite its systemic importance being the third largest core
domestic bank, Hellenic Bank's deposit ratings do not benefit
from government support uplift, given the track record for
support in Cyprus. In March 2013, senior creditors, including
depositors, of the country's two largest banks suffered
significant losses as part of bank resolution.

Upward pressure on the ratings could develop following a
reduction in the volume of NPLs and increased loan loss
provisions. Downward pressure on the bank's ratings could develop
following higher-than-expected asset-quality deterioration and
credit costs, which would significantly erode the bank's capital
buffers bringing them close to the regulatory minimum.

As part of the action, Moody's has assigned long and short-term
CR Assessments of B3(cr)/NP(cr) to Hellenic Bank.

CR Assessments are opinions of how counterparty obligations are
likely to be treated if a bank fails, and are distinct from debt
and deposit ratings in that they (1) consider only the risk of
default rather than expected loss; and (2) apply to counterparty
obligations and contractual commitments rather than debt or
deposit instruments. The CR Assessment is an opinion of the
counterparty risk related to a bank's covered bonds, contractual
performance obligations (servicing), derivatives (e.g., swaps),
letters of credit, guarantees and liquidity facilities.

The CR Assessment takes into account the issuer's standalone
strength as well as the likelihood of affiliate and government
support in the event of need, reflecting the anticipated
seniority of these obligations in the liabilities hierarchy. The
CR Assessment also incorporates other steps authorities can take
to preserve the key operations of a bank should it enter a
resolution.

Hellenic's B3(cr) CR Assessment, is positioned three notches
above the Adjusted BCA of caa3, based on the cushion against
default provided to the senior obligations represented by the CR
Assessment by subordinated instruments amounting to 24% of
Tangible Banking Assets. The main difference with Moody's
Advanced LGF approach used to determine instrument ratings is
that the CR Assessment captures the probability of default on
certain senior obligations, rather than expected loss. Therefore,
Moody's focuses purely on subordination and takes no account of
the volume of the instrument class.

The CR Assessment does not benefit from any government support,
in line with our support assumptions on deposits. This reflects
our view that operating activities and obligations reflected by
the CR Assessment are unlikely to benefit from any support
provisions from resolution authorities to senior unsecured debt
or deposits.

Issuer: HELLENIC BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED

  -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed caa3

  -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed caa3

  -- Long-Term Bank Deposit Ratings, Upgraded to Caa2 Stable from
     Caa3 Ratings Under Review

  -- Short Term Bank Deposit Ratings, Affirmed NP

  -- Short-Term Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B3(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

  -- Outlook, Stable

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


CLERYS: Employees to Receive Basic Statutory Redundancy
-------------------------------------------------------
Ciaran Hancock, Mary Minihan and Aoife Carr, writing for The
Irish Times, report that a rally in support of Clerys workers
outside the department store on Dublin's O'Connell St. has
finished.

The protest followed the news that 130 direct employees of Clerys
will receive basic statutory redundancy, and "robust" exchanges
at Liberty Hall as liquidators for Clerys met with union
officials, The Irish Times relates.

Representatives from KPMG, including court-appointed liquidator
Kieran Wallace, were present at the discussions involving union
members and shop stewards in Dublin city center, The Irish Times
discloses.

Speaking afterwards, Siptu's retail sector organiser Teresa
Hannick said it could be more than eight weeks before former
employees of the department store receive any reimbursement for
wages owed or statutory payments to which they are entitled, The
Irish Times relays.

"The taxpayer will be paying for the redundancy, the taxpayer
will be paying our members' back wages and for holiday
entitlements . . . it's the taxpayer again who is going to have
to pay for this," The Irish Times quotes Ms. Hannick as saying.

Also present was Michael Meegan, an organizer with the Mandate
trade union, who thanked KPMG for its handling of the sudden
closure on June 12, which resulted in the loss of 460 jobs, The
Irish Times notes.

During a meeting earlier on June 16, liquidators informed
Minister of State for Business and Employment Ged Nash that 130
direct employees of Clerys will receive basic statutory
redundancy, with no funding set aside for additional ex gratia
payments, such as payments for length of service, The Irish Times
relates.

According to The Irish Times, an additional 330 employees worked
for concession stands within the store, about half of whom had no
union affiliation.

The concession holders claim they are owed up to EUR5 million in
stock and cash from Clerys, The Irish Times says.

In a statement, the concession holders demanded an urgent and
immediate return of their directly owned stock, valued at more
than EUR3 million, which they were forced to leave in the store
after it closed on June 12, The Irish Times relates.

They also demanded the immediate return of EUR2 million in cash,
which they say is owed to them from their own direct sales
proceeds, which should have been held in trust by Clerys, The
Irish Times notes.

The liquidators have endeavored to enter into one-on-one meetings
with all those affected in order to process claims for monies
owed, The Irish Times states.

Although Government assistance will be provided through social
protection funds, the situation regarding holiday and pension
payments remains unclear, according to The Irish Times.

Clerys is a Dublin-based retailer.  The company owns three home
furnishings stores, in Leopardstown and Blanchardstown in Dublin,
and in Naas, Co Kildare.


MAGI FUNDING I: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Sub. Notes II-A
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
following classes of notes issued by Magi Funding I plc:

  -- EUR212,600,000 (current balance EUR7,205,423) Class A
     Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
     on Nov 10,, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR33,800,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2014
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- EUR7,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2021, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2014
     Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- EUR11,760,000 (current balance EUR4,850,051) Subordinated
     Notes II A due 2021, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov
     10, 2014 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Magi Funding I plc, issued in February 2006, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield senior secured European loans managed by
Henderson Global Investors Ltd. This transaction ended its
reinvestment period in April 2012.

According to Moody's, the upgrade of Class B and Class C notes is
primarily a result of the continued amortization of the portfolio
and subsequent increase in the collateralization ratios since the
last rating action in November 2014. Moody's notes that Class A
notes have paid down by EUR 57.9 million (27.2% of closing
balance) on the last two payment dates in October 2014 and April
2015, leading to an increase in the overcollateralization ratios
(or "OC ratios") of the rated notes. As per the trustee report
dated May 2015, the Class A, Class B, and Class C OC ratios are
reported at 946.37%, 166.30%, and 140.58%, compared to October
2014 levels of 195.52%, 128.68%, and 119.61% respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
EUR pool with performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR68.8 million, defaulted par of EUR1.0 million, a weighted
average default probability of 23.72% (consistent with a WARF of
3109 over a weighted average life of 4.93 years), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.00% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 13 and a weighted average
spread of 3.98%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 100% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default. In each
case, historical and market performance and a collateral
manager's latitude to trade collateral are also relevant factors.
Moody's incorporates these default and recovery characteristics
of the collateral pool into its cash flow model analysis,
subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability it is analyzing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were within one notch of the base case results for Classes A
and B and five notches of the base case results for Classes C and
Subordinated II A notes.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

(1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

(2) Around 7.6 % of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed
large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate
as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

(3) Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

(4) Liquidation value of long dated assets: Approximately 9.8%
of the portfolio is comprised of assets that mature after the
maturity date of the transaction ("long dated assets"). For those
assets, Moody's assumed a weighted average liquidation value of
87.4% in its analysis. Any volatility between the assumed
liquidation value and the actual liquidation value may create
additional performance uncertainties.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


* IRELAND: No. of Wexford Firm Declaring Insolvency Drops to 1
--------------------------------------------------------------
wexfordpeople.ie reports that only one Wexford company was
declared insolvent in May this year, compared to eight registered
in Ireland during the same period last year.

Over the same period, five new 'wholesale and retail companies'
started up, compared to three in May, 2014, and five companies
listed as 'professional services' started up, down one on a year
ago, wexfordpeople.ie says.

wexfordpeople.ie relates that the figures were released by
business and credit risk analyst Vision-net.ie, although the
names of the start-ups and insolvent companies were not
published.

Nationally, 3,653 company and business start-ups were recorded
(or 135 each day), a 24 per cent rise on the same month in 2014.
59 per cent of all new registered business names were sole
traderships, the report adds.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


TOPAZ ENERGY: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Remains Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' corporate
credit rating on Dubai-based offshore support vessel company
Topaz Energy and Marine.  The outlook remains stable.

S&P also affirmed its 'B-' issue rating on Topaz's US$350 million
senior unsecured five-year notes, issued through special purpose
financing vehicle Topaz Marine S.A.  The recovery rating on these
notes is '5', indicating S&P's expectation of modest (10%-30%)
recovery prospects for noteholders in the event of a payment
default.  S&P's recovery expectations are in the lower half of
the 10%-30% range.

The affirmation of the rating primarily reflects S&P's view that
credit metrics at the parent level will remain within the
"aggressive" category on a weighted average basis.  However, S&P
anticipates metrics could deteriorate slightly and temporarily as
market conditions in oil services soften as a result of
investment and cost-cutting measures at oil companies worldwide.

Following Topaz's recent refinancing, S&P has revised its
liquidity assessment to "adequate" from "less than adequate,"
reflecting lower financing costs, longer debt maturity, and
improved covenant headroom.

S&P primarily bases its rating on Topaz on S&P's assessment of
its "highly strategic" importance to its parent, Renaissance
Services SAOG.  S&P assess Renaissance Services' group credit
profile (GCP) at 'b'.  As per S&P's criteria, the corporate
credit rating on a "highly strategic" subsidiary is generally one
notch below the GCP, except if the entity's SACP is equal to or
higher than the GCP.

S&P believes that Renaissance Services is highly unlikely to sell
Topaz because of the major role that the subsidiary plays within
the group and S&P's view that senior management has made a strong
long-term commitment to Topaz.  There are no meaningful
insulation measures in place that protect Topaz from its parent
and, therefore, S&P's 'B' issuer credit rating on Topaz is capped
at Renaissance Services' 'b' GCP.

Topaz's business risk profile continues to reflect its exposure
to the volatile and cyclical marine services industry and a
relative degree of geographic and customer concentration.
Mitigating factors for these risks include: Topaz's strong market
position in the Caspian region, where barriers to entry are
relatively high; a modern fleet; a strong contract position; and
experienced senior management.  The revenue backlog totaled
slightly less than US$1 billion at the end of the first quarter
of 2015, equivalent to slightly less than 2.5x 2014 revenues.
Although this metric has weakened compared with previous
quarters, it remains relatively solid in light of the current
difficult market environment and still provides some
predictability of future revenues and cash flows.

S&P also assess Renaissance Services SAOG's business risk profile
as "fair," benefiting from an element of diversity that the
contract-services business provides to the group, as well as the
long-term contracted cash flows from Topaz.

S&P assess Topaz's credit metrics in the "aggressive" category,
with adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 17.7% for
the year ended Dec. 31, 2014.  However, S&P expects the company's
cash flow and leverage ratios to worsen by one or two categories
during periods of stress, which is why S&P assess the financial
risk profile as "highly leveraged."

The rating is partially driven by the somewhat higher financial
leverage of Renaissance Services, since it controls Topaz's
financial policy and strategy.  Renaissance Services' adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA ratio was 4.1x and FFO to debt was 13.8% for the
year ended Dec. 31, 2014.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that key credit metrics at
Renaissance Services will remain in line with S&P's current
assessment, such as FFO to debt of about 12% and debt to EBITDA
of about 5x.  As S&P anticipates challenging market conditions
for the group, its financial risk profile assessment already
takes into account temporary deviations in credit metrics from
the "aggressive" category.  Overall, S&P anticipates a somewhat
weaker performance in 2015 on the group level compared with the
prior year.

S&P could raise the rating if Renaissance Services and Topaz
maintained credit metrics in line with the "significant"
category, such as consolidated debt to EBITDA of below 4x and FFO
to debt of above 20%.

S&P could lower the rating if earnings fell as a result of, for
example, a long market downturn that lowered charter and
utilization rates for offshore support vessel companies.  S&P
could also consider a downgrade if the financial policy changed,
or if the liquidity position of either Renaissance Services or
Topaz were to unexpectedly weaken.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ARCOS DORADOS: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Rating to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the ratings of Arcos Dorados B.V.
(AD) and Arcos Dorados Holdings Inc. (Arcos), as well as the
BRL675 million and USD475 million senior unsecured notes issued
by Arcos, to 'BB+'. The Outlook for the corporate ratings is
Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade of Arcos' and AD's ratings reflects the company's
weak operating performance, which has felt the impact of a very
challenging macroeconomic environment in Latin America,
specifically in Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico. Soft consumption
across the region and currency devaluations have contributed to
an increase in the company's net lease-adjusted leverage above
4.5x, which is above the 3.5x ratio expected by Fitch. The
Negative Outlook reflects concern that the company may not be
able to reduce its net lease-adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR ratio to
below 4.0x within the next 12 to 24 months.

Weak Regional Performance

Increased volatility in Venezuela, a soft consumer environment in
Brazil and Mexico, and currency devaluations have contributed to
a sharp decline in EBITDA. Arcos' Fitch-calculated EBITDA was
USD233 million during the LTM ended March 31, 2015. This figure
compares with USD240 million at year-end 2014 and USD343 million
at year-end 2013. Fitch forecasts regional GDP growth to be 0.5%
in 2015 and a contraction of 1% in Brazil, which is Arcos'
largest market.

Increased Importance of Brazil

Brazil is the company's largest market, contributing to 50% of
sales and 76% of EBITDA during 2014. Excluding operations in
Venezuela and Argentina, Fitch estimates these figures to be
about 60% and 85%, respectively. Brazil has become increasingly
important to the success of Arcos' operations in Latin America
and is the main market for its three-year restaurant opening plan
under the master franchise agreement (MFA) with McDonald's
Corporation ('BBB+', Outlook Stable). Negatively, Brazilian
consumption has stagnated and Fitch expects soft consumption for
the next 12-18 months.

Increased Leverage

Arcos' net lease-adjusted leverage was 4.6x as of Dec. 31, 2014;
this compares negatively to an average of 3.2x maintained from
2010 to 2013. Fitch estimates that its net lease-adjusted
debt/EBITDAR excluding EBITDA from Venezuela and Argentina is
about 4.9x. Arcos' decision to suspend dividend payments in 2015
and slow the pace of its expansion under the MFA is positive and
should reduce pressure on the company's cash flow generation. In
2015 the company expects to have 40-45 gross restaurant openings.
In the absence of real estate asset sales and/or the realization
of other measures announced by the company, such as re-
franchising, Fitch does not expect a significant deleveraging in
the next couple of years. The company seeks to sell around USD200
million of assets, which would lower leverage to around 3.5x.

Exposure to Transferability Risk

Arcos is exposed to high transferability risk in its Venezuelan
operations. Restrictions imposed by the Venezuelan Central Bank
have limited the U.S.-dollar supply in that country, which
constrains the repatriation of available cash and restricts
payment for imported goods as well as royalties. Following
measures announced by the local government, Arcos obtained a
temporary waiver to reduce royalty payments to McDonald's
Corporation in 2012, 2013, and 2014. Fitch estimates that
Venezuela represented about 5% of total sales in 2014. Arcos is
also exposed to transferability risk with its Argentine
operation. However, this risk is partially mitigated by the fact
that its local operation does not generate excess cash, as Arcos'
headquarters is based in Argentina.

MFA with McDonald's

The MFA sets strict strategic, commercial, and financial
guidelines for Arcos' operations which support the operating and
financial stability of the business as well as the underlying
value of the McDonald's brand in the region. Arcos is the largest
McDonald's franchisee in the world in terms of system-wide sales
and number of restaurants. About 75% of the restaurants are
operated by Arcos, and the remaining 25% are franchised
restaurants. The company's 2015 strategy includes 40-45
restaurants (gross openings) that would require investments of
USD90 million to USD120 million. In 2014 Arcos was not in
compliance with certain debt covenants established by the MFA;
McDonald's granted a waiver through March 31, 2015. In addition,
the company is in negotiations with McDonald's to modify the
current three-year expansion plan given the weak Latin American
environment.

Under the terms of the MFA, McDonald's has a call option to
repurchase its assets in the region under certain events. Terms
of the notes specify that these funds should be applied to debt
repayment. The call option price is set as the fair market value
of all assets of the operating companies (80% in the case of a
material breach), minus debt at operating company and
contingencies, plus cash. The MFA requires all group companies to
remain current on their financial obligations to avoid a material
breach of the agreement.

Strength of McDonald's Franchise

The ratings also incorporate the strength of McDonald's as
franchisor and its long-standing relationship with Arcos' owners
and management. Arcos' controlling shareholder was the joint
venture partner of McDonald's in Argentina for over 20 years and
served as president of the McDonald's South America division from
2004 until the acquisition. On average, the management team has
worked for over 12 years at McDonald's.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Arcos include
the following:

   -- No growth in sales or EBITDA in 2015 due to weak regional
      environment, specifically Brazil
   -- Revenues grow 1% in 2016, 1.5% in 2017 and 2% in 2018
   -- 30% devaluation in Argentina in 2016
   -- EBITDA margin approaches 8% by 2018
   -- No dividends in 2015 or 2016
   -- BRL bond refinanced in 2016
   -- Arcos receives about USD200 million from 2016-2018 in real
      estate asset sales and redevelopment. Proceeds used to
      reduce debt.
   -- Modest annual deleveraging to reach a net lease-adjusted
      leverage ratio of around 3.5x by 2018

Rating Sensitivities

Arcos' ratings could be negatively affected by continued weak
performance in Brazil; significant deterioration of same store
sales; and higher than expected investments and dividends,
pressuring free cash flow FCF and leverage ratios. Additional
factors that could lead to consideration of a further downgrade
include: inability of Argentine and Venezuelan operations to be
self-sustaining; failure to comply with the terms of the MFA;
failure to execute non-core real estate asset sales; and/or a
consolidated net lease adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR ratio above 4.0x
on a sustained basis.

A positive rating action is not likely in the near- to medium-
term. The ratings could be positively affected by higher than
expected cash generation from investment-grade countries that
would lead to a material improvement in leverage metrics such as
net lease-adjusted debt levels below 3.5x.

Liquidity

Arcos had USD2 billion of total adjusted debt and USD71 million
of cash and marketable securities as of March 31, 2015; the
company has about USD4 million of cash in Venezuela which Fitch
considers as restricted cash. Short-term debt totaled USD64
million, which includes about USD10 million in derivatives, USD5
million in interest, and a USD5 million current portion of long-
term debt. Liquidity is further enhanced by a USD75 million
revolving credit facility with Bank of America which matures in
August 2015. As of March 31, 2015, Arcos had borrowed USD35
million due in April 2015. Fitch expects that this facility will
be renewed for an additional two years. In addition, Arcos has
credit and debit card receivables of about USD39 million as of
Dec. 31, 2014, meal voucher receivables of USD13 million, and
USD38 million in receivables from franchisees.

Full List of Rating Actions

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:

AD
   -- Foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB+' from
      'BBB-';
   -- Local currency IDR to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.

Arcos

   -- Foreign currency IDR to 'BB+' from 'BBB-';
   -- BRL675 million senior unsecured Brazilian-real notes due
      2016 to 'BB+' from 'BBB-';
   -- USD473.767 million senior unsecured notes due 2023 to 'BB+'
      from 'BBB-'.

The Outlook for the corporate ratings was revised to Negative
from Stable.


AVOCA CLO II: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to Ca
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
following notes issued by Avoca CLO II B.V.:

  -- EUR27 million (Current balance outstanding EUR26.48
     million) Class B Senior Secured Deferable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 9,
     2014 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- EUR15.7 million Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2020, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Sep 9, 2014 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- EUR7.5 million Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed
     Rate Notes due 2020, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Sep 9, 2014 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- EUR5 million (Current balance outstanding EUR5.16 million)
     Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2020, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2014
     Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Avoca CLO II B.V., issued in November 2004, is a Collateralised
Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of high yield senior
secured European and US loans, managed by Avoca Capital Holdings
Limited. This transaction ended its reinvestment period in
January 2010.

The upgrade to the rating on the Class B notes is primarily a
result of the significant amount of loan pre payments since the
last payment date in January 2015; the downgrades to the ratings
on the Class C and D notes are due to deterioration of the key
credit metrics of the underlying pool since the payment date in
January 2015.

The loan prepayments since the last payment date in January 2015
have led to the increase in the principle balance to EUR 24.19M
as of April 2015 trustee report, an amount sufficient to pay 90%
of the Class B outstanding balance at the next payment date in
July 2015.

The credit quality of the pool has worsened as reflected in the
average credit rating of the portfolio (measured by the weighted
average rating factor, or WARF). As per the April 2015 trustee
report, the WARF was 3,847 compared to 3,092 in July 2014. Over
the same period, securities rated Caa1 or lower by Moody's,
increased from 4.4% to 17.1% and the reported diversity score
reduced from 9.45 to 4.10. The defaulted par, as percentage of
the total par, has also increased which has led to a decrease in
the Class C and Class D OC ratios over the last year. As of the
April 2015 trustee report, the Class C and Class D OC ratios were
99.23% and 90.16%, respectively, versus July 2014 levels of
105.14% and 97.65%, respectively. Currently both Class C and
Class D are failing their Interest Coverage Tests.

Moody's did not use any quantitative models and no additional
sensitivities or stress scenarios were run because Moody's
analyzed the transaction by assessing the overcollateralization
of the rated notes.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the rating on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

(1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

(2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

(3) Around 19.9% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed
large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate
as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions," published in October 2009.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's has
incorporated into its analysis, qualitative factors are part of
the rating committee's considerations. These qualitative factors
include the structural protections in the transaction, its recent
performance given the market environment, the legal environment,
specific documentation features, the collateral manager's track
record and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, can influence the
final rating decision.


TIKEHAU CLO: Moody's Rates EUR25MM Class E Notes '(P)Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following provisional
ratings to notes to be issued by Tikehau CLO B.V.:

  -- EUR161,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR40,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed/Floating Rate
     Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR39,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  -- EUR20,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  -- EUR18,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

  -- EUR25,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

  -- EUR10,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.

Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2028. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Tikehau Capital
Europe Limited ("Tikehau"), has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Tikehau CLO. B.V. is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured obligations and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of senior unsecured obligations,
second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and high yield bonds.
The portfolio is expected to be 70% ramped up as of the closing
date and to be comprised predominantly of corporate loans to
obligors domiciled in Western Europe. The remainder of the
portfolio will be acquired during the six month ramp-up period in
compliance with the portfolio guidelines.

Tikehau will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk obligations or credit improved obligations, and are subject
to certain restrictions.

In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR41,700,000 of subordinated notes which will
not be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Tikehau's investment decisions
and management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
February 2014. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

- Par Amount: EUR 340,000,000

- Diversity Score: 35

- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.10%

- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.00%

- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 40.00%

- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the provisional rating
assigned to the rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes
increased default probability relative to the base case. Below is
a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3163 from 2750)

- Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

- Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

- Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed/Floating Rate Notes: 0

- Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

- Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-2

- Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

- Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

- Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3575 from 2750)

- Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

- Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed/Floating Rate Notes: -1

- Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

- Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

- Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

- Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

- Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


CAIX GERAL: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Ratings to B1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service concluded its reviews on the ratings of
six banks in Portugal. The reviews were initiated on March 17,
2015, following the publication of Moody's new bank rating
methodology and revisions to Moody's government support
assumptions for these banks.

In light of the new banking methodology, Moody's rating actions
generally reflect the following considerations: (1) the
"Moderate" macro profile of Portugal (Ba1 stable); (2)
stabilizing credit trends, though the banks' core financial
fundamentals are still weak; (3) the protections offered to
depositors and senior creditors as assessed by Moody's Advanced
Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis, reflecting the benefit of
instrument volume and subordination protecting creditors from
losses in the event of resolution; and (4) Moody's view of a
decline in the likelihood of government support for Portuguese
banks.

Among the rating actions that Moody's has taken on the Portuguese
banks are the following:

  -- 2 long-term bank deposit ratings upgraded, 2 confirmed and 2
     downgraded

  -- 1 short-term bank deposit rating upgraded and 5 affirmed

  -- 1 bank senior unsecured debt rating upgraded, 3 confirmed
     and 1 downgraded

  -- 1 short-term bank senior debt rating confirmed and 4
     affirmed

  -- 3 baseline credit assessments (BCAs) upgraded and 3 affirmed

Moody's has also assigned Counterparty Risk (CR) Assessments to
the operating subsidiaries of six Portuguese banking groups and
their branches, in line with its new bank rating methodology.

Moody's has withdrawn the outlooks on all junior instrument
ratings and subordinated debt ratings for its own business
reasons.

Outlooks, which provide an opinion on the likely rating direction
over the medium term, are now assigned only to long-term deposit
and issuer/senior unsecured debt ratings.

Moody's has assigned stable outlooks to the deposit and senior
debt ratings of all affected banks, with the exception of a
negative outlook on the senior debt ratings of Caixa Geral de
Depositos S.A (CGD) and on the deposit ratings of Banif -- Banco
Internacional do Funchal, S.A. (Banif).

The rating action excludes Novo Banco S.A., whose senior debt and
deposit ratings were placed on review with direction uncertain on
May 28, 2015, and for which Moody's cannot conclude its LGF
analysis until the bank discloses 2014 audited financial
statements. Moody's will assign a CR Assessment to Novo Banco
once it concludes its LGF analysis.

A full list of affected credit ratings is available at:

                         http://is.gd/z9PLrn

The new methodology includes a number of elements that Moody's
has developed to help accurately predict bank failures and
determine how each creditor class is likely to be treated when a
bank fails and enters resolution. These new elements capture
insights gained from the crisis and the fundamental shift in the
banking industry and its regulation.

(1) THE "MODERATE" MACRO PROFILE OF PORTUGAL

Portuguese banks' operations have a strong domestic focus, so
they are constrained by Portugal's improving, albeit persistently
challenging, macroeconomic environment, characterized by very
high public and private sector indebtedness, weak economic growth
outlook, as well as moderate susceptibility to event risk.

Large Portuguese banks display some geographic diversification
and therefore are exposed to macro variables across various
countries and regions.

(2) BANKS DISPLAY WEAK CORE FINANCIAL FUNDAMENTALS

The Portuguese banks' BCAs (average asset-weighted BCA is b3)
reflect their very modest core financial ratios, including (i) a
high level of problem loans in aggregate; (ii) improved, albeit
still relatively weak, loss absorption capacity as solvency
remains pressured by very weak core profitability metrics; and
(iii) improved liquidity metrics thanks to continued balance
sheet deleveraging and regained market access.

However, the banks' BCAs range widely from caa3 to ba3, with the
differences reflecting the long-term execution of each bank's
restructuring and recapitalization plans, which the EU and
Portuguese authorities approved in 2012, and which has resulted
in varying degrees of improvement in the banks' financial
fundamentals, particularly for those that received extensive
public sector support or have been forced to implement drastic
restructuring measures. In addition, the Portuguese banks' BCAs
reflect Moody's assessment of their resilience to the challenges
of the domestic operating environment and their capacity to cope
with such pressures, namely by improving or preserving their
capital cushions (see below for the analytical considerations for
the banks).

(3) PROTECTION OFFERED TO SENIOR CREDITORS, AS CAPTURED BY
    MOODY'S ADVANCED LGF LIABILITY ANALYSIS

Portuguese banks are subject to the European Bank Resolution and
Recovery Directive (BRRD), which Moody's considers to be an
Operational Resolution Regime. Accordingly, Moody's applies its
Advanced LGF analysis to these banks' liability structures,
thereby mostly applying its standard assumptions. These
assumptions include a residual tangible common equity of 3%,
losses post-failure of 8% of tangible banking assets, a 25% run-
off in junior wholesale deposits, a 5% run-off in preferred
deposits, and a 25% probability of deposits being preferred to
senior unsecured debt. Because Moody's assumes that the country's
deposit base is essentially retail in nature, it considers a
proportion of 10% of junior wholesale deposits below the
estimated EU-wide average of 26% for the affected banks, except
for Banco Santander Totta. The Advanced LGF analysis results
generally in "low" to "moderate" loss-given-failure for long-term
junior deposits as well as senior debt ratings, reflecting the
banks' substantial volume of deposit funding as well as the
amount of senior debt and securities more subordinated to it.

(4) DECLINE IN THE LIKELIHOOD OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

Deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings now range from Baa3 to
Caa2. In addition to the effects of the new methodology on the
banks' ratings, Moody's has lowered its expectations about the
degree of government support for banks in Portugal. The main
trigger for this reassessment is the introduction of the BRRD in
the European Union in January 2015. Following Moody's revised
assumptions, only three Portuguese banks' ratings continue to
benefit from government support uplift. However, in some cases,
the negative effect on the Portuguese banks' ratings from a
decline in the expectation of government support has been
counterbalanced by the low loss assumptions under the new LGF
framework, but for other banks it has caused a downgrade of their
deposit and senior debt ratings.

Almost all Portuguese banks affected by today's rating actions
have a stable outlook on their deposit and senior unsecured
debt/issuer ratings, reflecting Moody's expectations that the
banks' credit profiles will remain resilient at current levels
despite further asset quality and profitability pressures, which
should nevertheless ease relative to 2014 performance.

Moody's has assigned a negative outlook to the B1 senior debt
ratings of CGD and to the Caa2 deposit ratings of Banif. The
assigned ratings reflect Moody's expectations that further
moderate progress in the ongoing balance sheet deleveraging
through 2015 will result in lower loss-given-failure for the
banks' senior debt and deposits in the near term. However, the
negative outlook indicates potential ratings pressure if the
banks' deleveraging efforts prove insufficient to achieve the
anticipated level of subordination and hence expected loss
severity in the event of a resolution, which support the current
senior debt or deposit rating levels.

Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A. (CGD):

The downgrade of the bank's long-term deposit and senior debt
ratings to B1 from Ba3 incorporates a one-notch upgrade of the
BCA and adjusted BCA to b3, as well as the Advanced LGF analysis
that provides one notch of uplift from the bank's adjusted BCA,
together partly offsetting reduced government support
assumptions.

Moody's upgraded CGD's standalone BCA to b3, recognizing the
bank's sound liquidity and appropriate funding position as the
country's largest deposit-taking institution with regained market
access. At the same time, the BCA remains constrained by a weak
solvency consideration. In particular, the bank displays modest
loss absorption capacity that is constrained by very weak revenue
generation capacity and lack of flexibility to raise capital
outside the support delivered by its owner, the Portuguese
government. The BCA also reflects CGD's weakened asset quality
indicators, although provisioning costs will likely decelerate as
the formation of new problem loans slows against a backdrop of
modest improvement in the Portuguese economy.

Although CGD is government-owned, Moody's has reduced its
expectations for the possibility of government support for CGD
because of the severe restrictions imposed by the BRRD, under
which authorities can use public monies to fund a bank
recapitalization. However, because CGD is the largest banking
institution in the country, national authorities are likely to
regard it as particularly important in the domestic market. As a
result of both considerations, Moody's has lowered its government
support assumptions for CGD to "moderate", leading to one notch
of support uplift for the senior debt and deposit ratings, from
"very high" and four notches previously.

The outlook on CGD's long-term deposit ratings is stable while it
is negative on the long-term senior debt ratings, reflecting
downward pressures from slower-than-anticipated balance sheet
deleveraging and hence lower volumes of subordination for the
benefit of senior creditors.

Banco Comercial Portugues S.A. (BCP):

The confirmation of the bank's long-term deposit and senior debt
ratings at B1 with a stable outlook incorporates a one-notch
upgrade of the BCA and adjusted BCA to caa1, as well as the
Advanced LGF analysis that provides two notches of uplift from
the bank's adjusted BCA, thereby counterbalancing the reduced
government support assumptions.

In upgrading BCP's standalone BCA, Moody's has taken into account
(1) the bank's overall still weak risk absorption capacity
despite the broad public-sector support that it received in 2012;
(2) improving, albeit still weak, profitability ratios; and (3)
stabilizing asset risk trends, although BCP still displays a high
level of problematic assets in its domestic portfolio. The BCA
also reflects BCP's improved liquidity position, although
reliance on ECB funding is still high.

The Advanced LGF analysis provides two notches of uplift from the
bank's caa1 adjusted BCA given the very low loss-given-failure
for BCP's deposit and senior debt obligations, which reflects the
substantial volume of respective liabilities and the amount of
subordinated debt.

Moody's reduced the government support assumptions for the bank
to "moderate", leading to one notch of uplift from support for
the senior debt and deposit ratings, from "very high" and four
notches previously. The reduction reflects the expected
implementation of resolution legislation and Moody's view that
national authorities will recognize BCP as domestically important
given that it is the second largest bank in the country.

Banco BPI S.A. (BPI):

The confirmation of BPI's long-term deposit and senior debt
ratings at Ba3 with a stable outlook reflects (1) the affirmation
of the bank's b1 BCA and the confirmation of its adjusted BCA at
the same level, (2) the incorporation of the Advanced LGF
analysis that provides no uplift from the bank's adjusted BCA, as
well as (3) the maintenance of one notch of government support
uplift.

BPI's affirmed BCA of b1 reflects the bank's weak risk-absorption
capacity and its weak profitability levels. BPI's BCA also
reflects the bank's solid market positioning in Portugal; its
stabilising asset quality metrics, which compare better than the
Portuguese system average; and its adequate liquidity profile.

Under Moody's Advanced LGF analysis, BPI's long-term deposit and
senior debt ratings take into account their moderate loss-given-
failure because of the group's relatively low volume of
subordinated and senior unsecured debt outstanding, leading to no
uplift from the bank's b1 adjusted BCA.

BPI's Ba3 long-term deposit and senior debt ratings continue to
benefit from one notch of government support uplift despite
Moody's revision of government support expectations to "moderate"
from "high" for the third-largest banking institution in
Portugal.

On Feb. 19, 2015, Spain's Caixabank announced the launching of a
public tender offer for the acquisition of the 55.9% of BPI's
share capital that it does not already own. If this tender offer
is successfully completed, BPI's senior unsecured debt and
deposit ratings could benefit from Caixabank's parental support.

Banco Santander Totta S.A. (BST):

The upgrade of the bank's deposit ratings to Baa3/Prime-3 and the
confirmation of its senior debt ratings at Ba1/Not Prime reflect
the affirmation of the bank's ba3 BCA and its ba1 adjusted BCA
after considering affiliate support. The rating actions also
incorporate Moody's Advanced LGF analysis that provides one notch
of uplift from the bank's adjusted BCA of ba1 for the deposit
ratings and no uplift for the senior debt ratings.

The affirmation of BST's standalone ba3 BCA reflects the bank's
resilient asset quality and profitability despite ongoing
challenges for Portuguese banks and the bank's improved liquidity
profile thanks to ongoing deleveraging. BST's BCA also reflects
Moody's weak capital assessment given the significant burden of
deferred tax assets. Moody's believes that the probability of
affiliate support from its parent, Banco Santander S.A. (Baa1
review for upgrade, baa1), is high. As a result of Moody's
support assessment, the rating agency affirmed BST's adjusted BCA
at ba1, two notches above its BCA.

The upgrade of BST's deposit ratings reflects the low loss-given-
failure for the bank's wholesale deposits because of the
considerable volumes of deposits and subordination to it, leading
to a one-notch uplift from its ba1 adjusted BCA. Conversely,
BST's senior unsecured ratings take into account their moderate
loss-given-failure, which reflects very limited volumes of senior
debt outstanding, resulting in no further uplift.

Caixa Economica Montepio Geral (Montepio):

The upgrade of Montepio's long-term deposit and senior debt
ratings to B1 with a stable outlook incorporates the affirmation
of the bank's b3 BCA and adjusted BCA, as well as the Advanced
LGF analysis that provides two notches of uplift from the bank's
adjusted BCA, thereby more than offsetting the reduced government
support assumptions.

In affirming Montepio's BCA of b3, Moody's anticipates the near-
term implementation of a capital measure in the form of a EUR200
million issuance of participation units that the bank announced
in May 2015. While the capital measure is still subject to parent
company's agreement, the rating agency believes a decision is
likely to be forthcoming shortly, followed by a swift execution.
Such capital strengthening would enhance the bank's currently
weak risk absorption capacity to levels more commensurate with
the b3 BCA level. While Montepio's BCA is constrained by its weak
profitability and its high level of non-earning assets, it also
incorporates the bank's improved liquidity profile underpinned by
ongoing deleveraging, although exposure to European Central Bank
(ECB) funding remains high.

The upgrade of Montepio's long-term deposit and senior debt
ratings reflects their very low loss-given-failure because of the
bank's substantial volume of deposits and senior debt
outstanding, leading to a two-notch uplift from its b3 adjusted
BCA. This uplift was partially offset by the removal of one notch
of government support uplift previously factored into the bank's
long-term ratings.

BANIF-Banco Internacional do Funchal, S.A. (Banif):

The downgrade of Banif's long-term deposit ratings to Caa2
incorporates the one notch upgrade of the BCA and adjusted BCA to
caa3, as well as the Advanced LGF analysis that provides one
notch of uplift from the bank's adjusted BCA, together partly
offsetting reduced government support assumptions.

In upgrading Banif's BCA to caa3, Moody's has incorporated the
bank's improved liquidity profile aided by the increase in
deposits in the domestic franchise, continued balance sheet
deleveraging, reduced -- albeit high -- reliance on ECB funding
as well as signs of stabilization on its very weak credit
fundamentals, namely asset risk and profitability. The bank's
standalone BCA incorporates its (1) very weak asset risk, which
should stabilize as the Portuguese economy modestly recovers; (2)
very weak profitability, which reached break-even in Q1 2015
after sizable losses over the last three years supported by
trading income; and (3) very low loss absorption capacity, with
capacity to generate capital dependent on the accomplishment of
the restructuring plan focused on significant downsizing of the
bank's balance sheet and is still in the process of being
implemented.

The downgrade of Banif's long-term deposit ratings to Caa2
reflects (1) their low loss-given-failure under the Advanced LGF
analysis under the assumption that the ongoing balance sheet
deleveraging of the group will lead in the near term to a
comfortable level of subordinated and senior unsecured debt
outstanding, allowing one notch of uplift from the bank's caa3
adjusted BCA; and (2) the removal of three notches of government
support uplift previously factored into the deposit ratings.

The outlook on the deposit ratings is negative, reflecting
downward pressures from slower-than-anticipated balance sheet
deleveraging and hence lower volumes of subordination for the
benefit of senior creditors.

Moody's has also assigned CR Assessments to six Portuguese banks.
CR Assessments are opinions of how counterparty obligations are
likely to be treated if a bank fails, and are distinct from debt
and deposit ratings in that they (1) consider only the risk of
default rather than expected loss and (2) apply to counterparty
obligations and contractual commitments rather than debt or
deposit instruments. The CR Assessment is an opinion of the
counterparty risk related to a bank's covered bonds, contractual
performance obligations (servicing), derivatives (e.g., swaps),
letters of credit, guarantees and liquidity facilities.

The CR Assessment takes into account the issuer's standalone
strength as well as the likelihood of affiliate and government
support in the event of need, reflecting the anticipated
seniority of these obligations in the liabilities hierarchy. The
CR Assessment also incorporates other steps that authorities can
take to preserve the key operations of a bank should it enter a
resolution. The CR Assessments for most Portuguese banks are one
notch above their deposit ratings.

For the six affected Portuguese banks, the CR Assessments are
positioned, prior to government support, one to three notches
above the banks' adjusted BCAs, based on the cushion against
default provided to the senior obligations represented by the CR
Assessment by subordinated instruments. The main difference with
Moody's Advanced LGF approach used to determine instrument
ratings is that the CR Assessment captures the probability of
default on certain senior obligations, rather than expected loss,
therefore focusing purely on subordination and taking no account
of the volume of the instrument class.

For two of these banks, the CR Assessments also benefit from
government support in line with Moody's support assumptions on
deposits and senior unsecured debt. This reflects Moody's view
that any support that governmental authorities provide to a bank
and that benefits senior unsecured debt or deposits is very
likely to benefit operating activities and obligations reflected
by the CR Assessment as well, consistent with Moody's belief that
governments are likely to maintain such operations as a going-
concern in order to reduce contagion and preserve a bank's
critical functions.

Upward pressure on the six Portuguese banks' ratings could be
driven by clear visibility of asset-quality improvements,
together with a sustainable recovery in their profitability,
leading to an overall strengthening of the banks' loss-absorption
capacity.

Downward pressure could emerge if (1) asset-quality and
profitability indicators deteriorate further than anticipated,
leading to significant pressure on the banks' capital bases; (2)
operating conditions fall significantly short of Moody's current
central scenario of 1.7% GDP growth for 2015; and/or (3) the
banks' liquidity profiles deteriorate significantly.

In addition, negative pressure on Montepio's ratings could arise
if the announced capital increase does not succeed.

CGD's long-term senior debt and Banif's long-term deposit ratings
could come under downward pressure if the banks' balance sheet
deleveraging efforts prove insufficient to achieve the
anticipated level of subordination and hence expected loss
severity in the event of a resolution, which support the current
debt or deposit rating levels.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.



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R O M A N I A
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BANCA COMERCIALA: Moody's Hikes Deposit Ratings to 'Ba1'
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service concluded its rating reviews on three
banks in Romania: Banca Comerciala Romana S.A. (BCR), BRD -
Groupe Societe Generale (BRD) and Raiffeisen Bank SA.

The review on Raiffeisen Bank SA was initiated on December 29,
2014, following the rating action on its parent Raiffeisen Bank
International AG (Baa2 under review/ Prime-2; BCA: ba3), and was
extended on February 25, 2015. The review on the other two banks
was initiated on March 17, and followed the introduction of the
rating agency's revised bank rating methodology published on
March 16, 2015.

In light of the revised banking methodology, Moody's rating
actions generally reflect the following considerations (1) the
"Moderate-" macro profile of Romania (Baa3 stable); (2) the
banks' modest core financial ratios; (3) the protections offered
to depositors and senior creditors as assessed by Moody's
Advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis, reflecting the
benefit of instrument volume and subordination protecting
creditors from losses in the event of resolution; and (4) Moody's
view of a decline in the likelihood of government support for
some institutions.

Moody's has taken the following actions on the Romanian banks:

  -- Upgraded two banks' long-term local and foreign-currency
     deposit ratings

  -- Confirmed one bank's long-term local and foreign-currency
     deposit ratings

  -- Affirmed three banks' short-term local and foreign-currency
     deposit ratings

  -- Downgraded one bank's long-term local-currency senior
     unsecured debt rating

  -- Affirmed two banks' baseline credit assessments (BCAs)

  -- Assigned negative outlooks to deposit ratings of two banks
     and stable outlook to deposit and debt ratings of one bank

Moody's has also assigned Counterparty Risk Assessments (CR
assessments) to the three Romanian banks, in line with its
revised bank rating methodology.

The revised methodology includes several elements that Moody's
has developed to help accurately predict bank failures and
determine how each creditor class is likely to be treated when a
bank fails and enters resolution. These new elements capture
insights gained from the crisis and the fundamental shift in the
banking industry and its regulation.

(1) THE "MODERATE-" MACRO PROFILE OF ROMANIA

Romania's Macro Profile reflects moderate economic strength, high
institutional strength and low susceptibility to event risk.
However, the Macro Profile is constrained by modest, albeit
rising, credit demand and high share of foreign-currency
denominated assets and liabilities on the banks' balance sheets.

(2) THE BANKS' MODEST CORE FINANCIAL RATIOS

The Romanian banks' BCAs (the average asset-weighted BCA stands
at b2) reflect their modest core financial ratios, including a
high, albeit declining, level of problem loans, moderate capital
ratios, weak profitability and good liquidity metrics. However,
the banks' BCAs range materially - from b3 to ba3 - with the
differences reflecting the long-term execution of each bank's
business plan, which has resulted in variations in their
performance volatility and financial fundamentals.

(3) PROTECTION OFFERED TO SENIOR CREDITORS, AS CAPTURED BY
    MOODY'S ADVANCED LGF LIABILITY ANALYSIS

Under its revised methodology, Moody's applies its Advanced LGF
analysis to the liability structures of banks subject to
operational resolution regimes. Moody's expects that Romania, as
a member of the European Union, will introduce bank resolution
legislation in line with the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive (BRRD). Accordingly, Moody's applies its Advanced LGF
analysis to these banks' liability structures. For the three
banks included in this rating action, this analysis results in
"very low" or "low" loss given failure for long-term deposits
and/or senior unsecured debt, taking into account the banks'
substantial volume of deposit funding and the volume of
securities subordinated to deposits in their liability
structures.

(4) DECLINE IN THE LIKELIHOOD OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

The lowering of Moody's government support assumptions reflects
the reduced likelihood of support being forthcoming within the
context of the expected implementation of the new bank recovery
and resolution legislation. The negative effect on the banks'
deposit ratings from a decline in the expectation of government
support has generally been counterbalanced by the low loss given
failure assumptions under Moody's Advanced LGF framework.

Banca Comerciala Romana S.A.:

The upgrade of the bank's local-currency deposit ratings to
Ba1/Not Prime from Ba3/Not Prime reflects the combination of the
following: (1) the Advanced LGF analysis that provides two
notches of uplift from the bank's adjusted BCA of b1 (BCA is b3);
and (2) Moody's assumption of moderate government support to BCR
being the largest bank in Romania, which provides one notch of
rating uplift. The bank benefits from a large volume of deposits,
and limited senior and subordinated debt, resulting in very low
loss given failure.

BCR's b3 BCA is driven by the bank's weak asset quality, which
requires high loan loss provisions and exerts negative pressure
on the profitability and capitalisation. Problem loans accounted
for 24.8% of the bank's gross loans at year-end 2014, down from
31% at year-end 2013. The reduction in problem loans was mainly
due to a significant level of sale and write-off of such loans.
However, rising loan loss provisions and declining revenues
resulted in a large loss of RON2.79 billion, which translated
into a negative return on average assets (RoAA) of 4.35% in 2014.
Consequently, BCR's leverage ratio (Shareholders' Equity-to-
Total Assets) decreased to 7.97% at year-end 2014 from 11.12% at
year-end 2013.

BCR's adjusted BCA of b1 receives two notches of uplift from
Moody's assumption of high support from the bank's parent Erste
Group Bank AG (Baa2/Baa2 review for upgrade, ba1).

The outlook on the bank's long-term deposit ratings is negative,
reflecting its weak asset quality and profitability.

BRD - Groupe Societe Generale:

The upgrade of the bank's local-currency deposit ratings to
Ba1/Not Prime from Ba2/Not Prime is due to the Advanced LGF
analysis that provides two notches of uplift from the bank's
adjusted BCA of ba3 (BCA is b2) and offsets reduced government
support assumptions. BRD benefits from a large volume of
deposits, and limited senior and subordinated debt, resulting in
very low loss given failure. However, because of the expected
implementation of resolution legislation, Moody's has lowered its
government support assumptions for the bank to "low", leading to
no uplift from support, from "high" and one notch previously.

BRD's b2 BCA is driven by the bank's weak asset quality, which
requires high loan loss provisions and exerts negative pressure
on the profitability. Problem loans accounted for 20.1% of the
bank's gross loans at year-end 2014, down from 24.5% at year-end
2013. The reduction in problem loans was mainly due to a
significant level of sale and write-off of such loans. During
2014 BRD returned to profitability, although only marginally,
reporting a net income of RON67.9 million, equivalent to a RoAA
of 0.14%. This was, however, primarily driven by lower loan loss
provisioning (RON1.2 billion, compared to RON2.1 billion in
2013). BRD's capitalisation remains adequate, with a TCE ratio
(Tangible Common Equity --to-- Risk Weighted Assets) of 18.92% as
of year-end 2014.

BRD's adjusted BCA of ba3 receives two notches of uplift from
Moody's assumption of high support from the bank's parent Societe
Generale (A2/A2 stable, baa2).

The outlook on the bank's long-term deposit ratings is negative,
reflecting its weak asset quality and profitability.

Raiffeisen Bank SA:

The confirmation of the bank's long-term deposit ratings at Ba1
and affirmation of the short-term deposits at Not-Prime reflects
the Advanced LGF analysis that provides two notches of uplift
from the bank's adjusted BCA of ba3 (BCA is ba3) and offsets
reduced government support assumptions. Raiffeisen Bank SA
benefits from a large volume of deposits, and limited senior and
subordinated debt, resulting in very low loss given failure.
However, because of the expected implementation of resolution
legislation, Moody's has lowered its government support
assumptions for the bank to "low", leading to no uplift from
support, from "high" and two notches previously.

The downgrade of the bank's senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2
from Ba1 takes into account the Advanced LGF analysis and Moody's
reduced assumption regarding the likelihood of government
support. The Advanced LGF analysis, which also takes into account
the bank's volume of senior debt and the volume of securities
subordinated to it in Moody's creditor hierarchy, results in a
low loss given failure and provides one notch of uplift from the
bank's adjusted BCA of ba3. However, this does not fully offset
the decrease in government support assumptions resulting to no
uplift from two notches of uplift previously.

The outlook on the bank's long-term deposit and debt ratings is
stable, reflecting its acceptable asset quality, profitability
and capitalization.

Moody's has also assigned CR Assessments to the Romanian banks.
CR Assessments are opinions of how counterparty obligations are
likely to be treated if a bank fails and are distinct from debt
and deposit ratings in that they (1) consider only the risk of
default rather than expected loss; and (2) apply to counterparty
obligations and contractual commitments rather than debt or
deposit instruments. The CR Assessment is an opinion of the
counterparty risk related to a bank's covered bonds, contractual
performance obligations (servicing), derivatives (e.g., swaps),
letters of credit, guarantees and liquidity facilities.

The CR Assessments for the three Romanian banks are three or four
notches above their adjusted BCAs, and reflect the seniority of
the counterparty obligations and the volume of liabilities
subordinated to them under Moody's Advanced LGF framework.

Upward rating momentum on the banks' ratings could develop from
(1) a sustained improvement in profitability; (2) materially
stronger capital positions; and/or (3) a significant reduction in
problem loans.

Downward rating pressure could emerge if (1) credit underwriting
standards deteriorate noticeably; and/or (2) further asset
quality and profitability pressures emerge owing to a potential
weakening in the operating. environment.

List of Affected Credit Ratings:

Banca Comerciala Romana S.A.

- Long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings upgraded
   to Ba1 from Ba3

- Not Prime short-term local and foreign-currency deposit
   ratings affirmed

- BCA of b3 and adjusted BCA of b1 affirmed

- CR Assessment of Baa3 (cr) / Prime-3 (cr) assigned

- Negative outlook assigned to long-term deposit ratings

- Outlook Negative

BRD - Groupe Societe Generale

- Long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings upgraded
   to Ba1 from Ba2

- Not Prime short-term local and foreign-currency deposit
   ratings affirmed

- BCA of b2 and adjusted BCA of ba3 affirmed

- CR Assessment of Baa3 (cr) / Prime-3 (cr) assigned

- Negative outlook assigned to long-term deposit ratings

- Outlook Negative

Raiffeisen Bank SA

- Long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings confirmed
   at Ba1

- Not Prime short-term local and foreign-currency deposit
   ratings affirmed

- Long-term local-currency senior unsecured debt rating
   downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1

- CR Assessment of Baa3 (cr) / Prime-3 (cr) assigned

- Stable outlook assigned to long-term deposit and senior
   unsecured debt ratings

- Outlook Stable

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


GAZPROMBANK: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1(cr)' CR Assessment Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned Counterparty Risk Assessments
(CR Assessments) to 34 Russian banks. This announcement follows
the publication of the rating agency's revised bank rating
methodology.

Concurrently, Moody's affirmed the ratings of Gazprombank, Home
Credit & Finance Bank, CB Renaissance Credit LLC, Khanty-Mansiysk
Bank Otkritie PJSC, Bank of Moscow and MTS Bank PJSC. The
outlooks on the long-term deposit and senior unsecured debt
ratings remain negative for all six banks. Moody's has also
withdrawn, for its own business reasons, the outlooks on these
banks' subordinated debt ratings.

GAZPROMBANK

The affirmation of Gazprombank's b1 baseline credit assessment
(BCA), b1 adjusted BCA, Ba2 long-term local and foreign-currency
deposit ratings and Not-Prime short-term foreign-currency deposit
rating, Ba2 senior unsecured debt and B2 subordinated debt rating
reflects adequate liquidity and funding position of Gazprombank,
with only limited refinancing requirements in 2015-16.

At the same time, Moody's notes the bank's growing problem loans
(calculated as per Moody's standard approach as corporate
impaired loans and retail overdue 90+ days loans), which worsened
to 13.3% of gross loans as of year-end 2014 relative to only
around 2% as of year-end 2013 driven by recognition of a few
large impaired loans in Ukraine and Russia. Also, the bank's
already modest net income has weakened in 2014 compared with the
previous year, and the current operating environment will put
pressure on the bank's profitability over the next 12-18 months.
In turn, the bank's capital adequacy ratio, although sufficient
to absorb anticipated base case losses, declined to 10.7% as of
year-end 2014 from 13.2% at end-2013. Moody's, however, expects
that the Russian state authorities will inject additional capital
into the bank in 2015, which will help to absorb potential losses
stemming from deteriorating asset quality.

As the third-largest systemically important bank, Gazprombank's
long-term local and foreign-currency debt and local-currency
deposit ratings continues to benefit from two notches of systemic
support uplift from its BCA.

HOME CREDIT & FINANCE BANK

The affirmation of Home Credit & Finance Bank's b2 baseline
credit assessment (BCA), b2 adjusted BCA, B2/Not-Prime local and
foreign-currency deposit ratings, (P)B2 senior unsecured debt and
B3 subordinated debt ratings reflects (1) the bank's asset-
quality pressures (as its problem loans accounted for 15.6% of
total loans as of year-end 2014), which stem from the bank's
exposure to its single business line, consumer lending in Russia
(Ba1 negative) exacerbated by the deteriorated operating
environment in Russia; and (2) the bank's weakening profitability
(with return on average assets of -1.3% as of year-end 2014) and
its historically rapid loan book growth in the past, which
heightens the likelihood of potential future losses in future. At
the same time, the ratings are supported by (1) adequate
capitalization with capital adequacy ratio of 24.4% and Tier 1
capital ratio of 17% as of year-end 2014; and (2) adequate
funding and liquidity positions. The long-term deposit and senior
unsecured debt ratings do no benefit from any government support
uplift.

CB RENAISSANCE CREDIT LLC

The affirmation of Commercial Bank "Renaissance Credit" LLC b3
BCA, b3 adjusted BCA, B3/Not-Prime local and foreign-currency
deposit ratings, B3 senior unsecured debt and Caa1 subordinated
debt ratings reflects (1) the bank's monoline specialization in
consumer lending in Russia exacerbated by the deteriorated
operating environment in Russia; (2) weak asset quality with
problem loans accounting for 21.1% of total loans as of year-end
2014; (3) its loss-making performance (with return on average
assets of around -13% as of year-end 2014) and only a limited
probability of returning to profit over next 12-18 months; (4)
capital support from CBRC's key shareholder (ONEXIM) as reflected
in recent capital injections and still strong Basel total capital
ratio of 17.0% at year-end 2014; and (5) an adequate retail
funding base in conjunction with a stable liquidity position. The
long-term deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings do no benefit
from any government support uplift.

KHANTY-MANSIYSK BANK OTKRITIE PJSC

The affirmation of Khanty-Mansiysk bank Otkritie's (KhMBO) b2
BCA, b1 adjusted BCA, B1/Not-Prime local and foreign-currency
deposit ratings, and B3 (hyb) subordinated debt ratings reflects
the bank's adequate funding and liquidity profile (cash
instruments accounted for 33% as of year-end 2014 under IFRS), as
well as the benefits it derives from its strengthened market
position and historically solid customer franchise in the region
of Khanty-Mansiysk AO (Ba2, negative). At the same time, the
ratings are constrained by (1) the deteriorated operating
environment in Russia, which pressures bank's financial
fundamentals; (2) worsening asset quality both in retail and
corporate loan books with NPLs (overdue more than 90 days)
amounting to 6.9% at year-end 2014 (2% in 2013) under audited
IFRS, (3) heightened credit risk profile given the recent merger
with Bank Otkritie, which formerly focused on unsecured consumer
loans (60% of loans as of June 30, 2014); and (3) weakening
profitability and capitalization on the back of higher credit
costs, narrowing margins and negative revaluation of securities.
Regulatory total capital adequacy ratio amounted to 11.7% as of 1
May 2015.

The rating agency incorporates a high probability of affiliate
support from Bank Otkritie Financial Corporation PJSC
(deposits/senior unsecured Ba3, negative, BCA b1), resulting in
one notch of uplift from the bank's b2 BCA. This is based on the
parent's ultimate majority ownership, the close strategic fit and
importance of KhMBO to the consolidated financial position of
BOFC.

KhMBO's long-term deposit ratings do no benefit from any
government support uplift.

BANK OF MOSCOW

The affirmation of Bank of Moscow b2 BCA, ba2 adjusted BCA,
ratings Ba2 long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings
and Not-Prime short-term foreign-currency deposit rating, Ba2
senior unsecured debt and B1 subordinated debt rating reflects
(1) challenging credit conditions in Russia that exert pressure
on the bank's asset quality, profitability and capital adequacy;
(2) the bank's comfortable liquidity profile, supported by stable
deposit-based funding; and (3) a diversified business profile
with a strong position in the highly competitive Moscow region.
Bank of Moscow's performance in 2014 was already negatively
affected by growing credit costs with provisioning expenses
accounted for 3% of average loan book in 2014 resulting in 90%
drop of net income with RoAA of 0.1% and RoE of 1.3% (down from
2.6% and 18.7%, respectively, a year before). The standalone BCA
is also compromised by the bank's status under a government-led
financial rehabilitation program -- i.e., the bank is not in full
compliance with the statutory requirements if the necessary loan-
loss provisions are applied. Moody's expects this status to last
until 30 June 2015. In addition, the standalone BCA is
constrained by the bank's significantly impaired asset quality,
which results in modest profitability from stable sources, as
approximately 20% of the loan book is not accruing interest.

The rating agency incorporates a high probability of affiliate
support from Bank VTB, JSC (deposits Ba2 negative/senior
unsecured Ba1 negative, BCA b1), given BOM's deep integration
into VTB Group -- as its 96% subsidiary -- and the significant
contribution BOM makes to the group's financial results. At the
same time, Moody's believes that the majority of support will be
ultimately provided by the sovereign, given the bank's importance
to the Moscow region and the banking system as a whole.

Bank of Moscow's long-term deposit and senior unsecured debt
ratings do no benefit from any government support uplift in
addition to its affiliate support uplift.

MTS Bank PJSC

The affirmation of MTS Bank PJSC's (MTSB) b3 BCA, b2 adjusted
BCA, B2/Not-Prime local and foreign-currency deposit ratings and
B3 subordinated debt rating reflects the bank's weak asset
quality with overdue over 30 days loans accounted for over 26% of
the bank's loan book as at year-end 2014, while growing credit
costs have already resulted in loss-making performance in 2014.
Furthermore, whilst MTSB reports consistently strong capital
adequacy ratios with Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of
17.82% and total CAR of 25.52% as at January 1, 2015, it has
become increasingly dependent on capital support from its
shareholders, a less reliable form of support. At the same time,
Moody's acknowledges that MTSB's BCA is supported by (1) the
bank's partnership with a sister company Mobile TeleSystems OJSC
(Ba1 corporate family rating, on review for downgrade); (2) ample
liquidity buffer; and (3) lower risk appetite in unsecured
consumer lending and overall improvement of risk profile. The
latter is demonstrated by a reduced single-name borrower
concentration and the improved business model and transparency of
MTSB's 66%-owned subsidiary East-West United Bank S.A.

The rating agency incorporates a moderate probability of
affiliate support to MTSB from JSFC Sistema (B1 CFR, negative) in
case of need.

MTS's long-term deposit ratings do not benefit from any
government support uplift.

The negative outlooks on these banks' long-term deposit and debt
ratings imply that upward rating pressure is limited. The outlook
on the long-term ratings could be changed to stable if the banks
improve their profitability and asset-quality metrics, while
increasing their capital levels or maintaining them at adequate
levels.

Downward rating pressure could emerge if (1) the already
unfavorable operating environment in Russia further deteriorates,
putting additional systemic-wide pressure on the banks' asset
quality, profitability and capital adequacy ratios; and/or (2)
the individual financial performance of the abovementioned banks
becomes detrimental for their credit profiles.

CR ASSESSMENTS:

Moody's has also assigned CR Assessments to 34 banks. CR
Assessments are opinions of how counterparty obligations are
likely to be treated if a bank fails, and are distinct from debt
and deposit ratings in that they (1) consider only the risk of
default rather than expected loss and (2) apply to counterparty
obligations and contractual commitments rather than debt or
deposit instruments. The CR Assessment is an opinion of the
counterparty risk related to a bank's covered bonds, contractual
performance obligations (servicing), derivatives (e.g., swaps),
letters of credit, guarantees and liquidity facilities.

For Russian banks, the CR Assessment is positioned, prior to
government support, one notch above the Adjusted BCA and
therefore above senior unsecured and deposit ratings, reflecting
Moody's view that its probability of default is lower than that
of senior unsecured debt and deposits. Moody's believe that
senior obligations represented by the CR Assessment will be more
likely preserved in order to limit contagion, minimize losses and
avoid disruption of critical functions.

For 4 Russian banks, the CR Assessments also benefit from
government support in line with Moody's support assumptions on
deposits and senior unsecured debt. This reflects Moody's view
that any support provided by governmental authorities to a bank
which benefits senior unsecured debt or deposits is very likely
to benefit operating activities and obligations reflected by the
CR Assessment as well, consistent with Moody's belief that
governments are likely to maintain such operations as a going-
concern in order to reduce contagion and preserve a bank's
critical functions. The remaining 30 CR Assessments do not
benefit from any government support, in line with the support
assumptions on deposits and senior unsecured debt. This reflects
the view that operating activities and obligations reflected by
the CR Assessment are unlikely to benefit from any support
provisions from resolution authorities to senior unsecured debt
or deposits.

At the same time, the rating agency assigned Prime-3(cr) short-
term CR Assessments to ING Bank Eurasia and Rusfinance Bank, and
Not-Prime(cr) short-term CR Assessments to the other 32 banks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.

Assignments:

Issuer: Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending OJSC

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Ba1(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Akibank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: AK BARS Bank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Autotorgbank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Baltinvestbank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Bank of Moscow

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Ba1(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Bank ZENIT PJSC

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Ba3(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: CB Renaissance Credit LLC

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Center-Invest Bank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Ba3(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Commercial Bank Agropromcredit (LLC)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Commercial Bank OBRAZOVANIE

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: CREDIT BANK OF MOSCOW

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Ba3(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Derzhava

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Evrofinance Mosnarbank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Ba3(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Far Eastern Bank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Ba3(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Gazbank JSCB

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Gazprombank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Ba1(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Home Credit & Finance Bank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: ING Bank Eurasia

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Baa3(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned P-3(cr)

Issuer: Interprombank, JSCB

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Khanty-Mansiysk bank Otkritie PJSC

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Ba3(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Maritime Bank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Metallurgical Commercial Bank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: MTS Bank PJSC

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: NBD Bank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Ba3(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Novikombank JSC Bank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: OTP Bank (Russia), OJSC

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Ba2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Pervobank JSC

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Petrocommerce Bank (OJSC)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Rosdorbank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Rusfinance Bank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Baa3(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned P-3(cr)

Issuer: Russian International Bank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Russian Regional Development Bank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned Ba2(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Tatfondbank

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Affirmations:

Issuer: Bank of Moscow

  -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed ba2

  -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b2

  -- LT Bank Deposits, Affirmed Ba2 Negative

  -- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba2
     Negative

  -- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1

  -- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba2

Issuer: CB Renaissance Credit LLC

  -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b3

  -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b3

  -- LT Bank Deposits, Affirmed B3 Negative

  -- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP

  -- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)B3

  -- Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)NP

  -- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Caa1

  -- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Caa1

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B3
     Negative

Issuer: Gazprombank

  -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b1

  -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b1

  -- LT Bank Deposits, Affirmed Ba2 Negative

  -- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP

  -- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)B2

  -- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba2

  -- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B2

  -- BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba2
     Negative

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba2
     Negative

Issuer: Home Credit & Finance Bank

  -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b2

  -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b2

  -- LT Bank Deposits, Affirmed B2 Negative

  -- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP

  -- BACKED Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
     (P)B2

  -- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)B3

  -- Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)NP

  -- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B3

Issuer: Khanty-Mansiysk bank Otkritie PJSC

  -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b1

  -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b2

  -- LT Bank Deposits, Affirmed B1 Negative

  -- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP

  -- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B3 (hyb)

Issuer: MTS Bank PJSC

  -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b2

  -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b3

  -- LT Bank Deposits, Affirmed B2 Negative

  -- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP

  -- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B3

Issuer: Kuznetski Capital S.A.

  -- BACKED Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Bank of Moscow

  -- Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: CB Renaissance Credit LLC

  -- Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Gazprombank

  -- Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Home Credit & Finance Bank

  -- Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Khanty-Mansiysk bank Otkritie PJSC

  -- Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: MTS Bank PJSC

  -- Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Kuznetski Capital S.A.

  -- Outlook, Remains Negative



=========
S P A I N
=========


SPAIN: Enacts Provisions For Secured Creditors in Insolvency
------------------------------------------------------------
Antonio Garcia, Julio Parrilla and Jesus Varela at Dentons report
that a new milestone has been reached in the reform process of
the Spanish Insolvency Act. On May 25, 2015, the draft bill of
the Law 9/2015, of urgent measures in insolvency proceedings, has
finally been enacted as law, Denton says. The new rule
"validates" many of the modifications introduced by the latest
Royal-Decree Laws, with some changes, the report notes.

Dentons relates that one of the main novelties in the last months
had been the new calculation method of the value of the security
over collateralized assets, now set at 90% of the fair value of
the collateral at hand, once all securities ranking ahead, if
any, had been deducted. This means that the mortgage liability
noted as secured amount in the Land Registry loses all relevance
upon the declaration of insolvency, the report states. According
to the report, the new rule (the "9/10 rule") has raised many
concerns, especially in the distressed debt market, where some
investors have considered this as a potential deal-breaker (the
value of the collaterals may have sunk dramatically from the
moment when the mortgage was granted, leaving de facto many debts
unsecured.

A new amendment proposed by the party in the government has
casted some light on the destiny of the proceeds obtained from
the foreclosure of collaterals in insolvency: secured creditors
are entitled to any proceeds obtained from the sale of the
relevant asset up to the original amount granted (and not to the
VofS calculated pursuant to the 9/10 rule, as it was deducted
from the former wording), says Dentons. Any surplus must be added
to the insolvency estate, the report notes.

This creates a breathing space for investors having purchased
impaired debt portfolios, Dentons relates. It still needs to be
clarified whether secured creditors are entitled to credit-bid
for the collateral in an auction up to the original amount
granted.  "We believe that this is the case in the light of the
new provision (the secured creditor has precedence over any other
creditors up to said amount), and that the lawmaker's intention
is to limit the effects of the 9/10 rule to the calculation of
voting rights in refinancing and composition agreements. This
will have to be settled in the coming months through case law and
scholarship," Dentons states.

In any case, this is good news for the distressed debt market,
Dentons adds.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


COM HEM: S&P Revises Outlook to Positive & Affirms 'BB-' CCR
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Swedish
cable operator Com Hem Holding AB (publ) to positive from stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' long-term corporate
credit rating on Com Hem, our 'BB-' issue rating on its senior
secured debt, and its 'B' issue rating on its senior unsecured
debt.  The recovery rating on the senior secured debt remains
'3', indicating S&P's expectation of "meaningful" recovery (50%-
70%; higher half of the range) in the event of a payment default.
The recovery rating on the senior unsecured debt remains '6',
indicating S&P's expectation of "negligible" recovery (0-10%) in
the event of a payment default.

S&P also assigned a 'BB-' issue rating to the company's Swedish
krona (SEK) 500 million credit facility (about EUR53 million)
maturing March 2017, with a recovery rating of '3'.  The recovery
rating indicates S&P's expectation of "meaningful" recovery (50%-
70%; higher half of the range).

The outlook revision reflects S&P's expectation that Com Hem's
credit ratios will gradually strengthen in 2015 and 2016 on
higher revenues, lower interest expenses, and lower debt.  S&P
thinks Com Hem's revenues and EBITDA will continue to increase in
2015 and 2016 in digital-TV (supported by the TiVo platform) and
broadband services as customers migrate to faster speeds.  The
company's recent focus on the small enterprise segment could also
support further growth.  Interest expenses were halved in the
first quarter of 2015 compared with the same period the previous
year, and could decrease further, given that S&P expects Com Hem
will refinance at a lower rate, in November 2015, its EUR186.6
million (SEK1.7 billion) notes bearing a 10.75% coupon.
Furthermore, S&P now deducts surplus cash from its adjusted debt,
in line with its criteria, after the financial sponsor BC
Partners reduced its stake in Com Hem to 35.6% from 47.7% in
March 2015.

S&P's assessment of Com Hem's business risk profile remains
supported by the company's established position in the Swedish
market, with connections to about 40% of the country's
households. Moreover, Com Hem has a stable and diverse customer
base of landlords for its basic cable-TV access business, with a
low turnover rate and high barriers to entry, associated with
revenues generated from landlords.  Com Hem also has a well-
invested and upgraded hybrid-fiber-coaxial DOCSIS 3.0 network
that offers Internet speeds of 500 megabits per second in 92% of
its coverage area; high profitability, with a Standard & Poor's-
adjusted EBITDA margin in the 45%-50% range; and growth
opportunities.

These strengths are partly offset by intense competition from
various technology platforms in multidwelling areas, including a
70% overlap with fiber networks (although Com Hem's superior
network offers higher speeds in 80% of its footprint).  Com Hem
competes with much larger operators TeliaSonera AB and Telenor
ASA, which use several alternative technologies, including
digital subscriber lines and fiber optic networks.

S&P's assessment of Com Hem's financial risk profile remains
constrained by the company's relatively high leverage and modest,
although improving, FOCF generation.  S&P forecasts an adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 4.5x in 2015, compared with 4.9x in
2014, and further improvements in 2016.  Part of the improvement
is due to S&P's surplus-cash adjustment, in accordance with its
methodology, from 2015 after financial sponsors reduced their
stake in Com Hem to less than 40%.  Given the company's financial
policy targeting a reported leverage ratio of 3.5x-4.0x, which
S&P thinks will translate into Standard & Poor's-adjusted
leverage of 4.1x-4.6x, S&P expects adjusted leverage will remain
less than 4.5x.  S&P also expects FOCF will remain modest in 2015
and 2016. These weaknesses are partly offset by solid interest
coverage ratios.

Compared with those of peers, some credit ratios are currently
weak for the rating.  Notably, S&P expects that FOCF to debt will
be at or below 5% in 2015.

S&P has revised its management and governance assessment to
"satisfactory" from "fair," following the ownership reduction by
the financial sponsor, but this does not affect our ratings on
Com Hem.

The positive outlook reflects the possibility that S&P could
upgrade Com Hem by one notch over the next 12 months if credit
ratios continue to strengthen while its business position does
not materially weaken.

S&P could raise the ratings if adjusted debt to EBITDA remains
sustainably below 4.5x while FOCF to debt improves to about 7%-
8%.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if revenues and EBITDA are
weaker than it expects, for example, on lower prices or market-
share erosion, or if the company's debt increases.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


BANK NATIONAL: NBU Declares Bank Insolvent
------------------------------------------
The National Bank of Ukraine declared Bank National Credit PJSC
insolvent on June 5, 2015.

In view of the systematic infringement by this bank of the law on
Prevention and Counteraction to Legalization (Laundering) of the
Proceeds from Crime, and in light of a deterioration in the
quality of assets, which, consequently, adversely affected the
liquidity position of this bank, Bank National Credit PJSC was
declared a problem bank.

The resolution plan, which Bank National Credit PJSC had
submitted to the National Bank of Ukraine as prescribed by
applicable laws, was never implemented. The bank's financial
standing deteriorated. Due to the lack of funds, the bank failed
to meet its obligations to creditors in due time and in full.

In violation of Article 58 of the Law of Ukraine On Banks and
Banking, which obliges the qualifying shareholders in a bank to
take timely measures to prevent the bank from slipping into
insolvency, the owner of a qualifying holding in this bank failed
to take timely measures to provide sufficient funding to Bank
National Credit PJSC.

In view of the above, and in order to protect the interests of
depositors and other creditors, by virtue of Articles 7, 15, and
55 of the Law of Ukraine on the National Bank of Ukraine, and
articles 67, 73, 75, and 76 of the Law of Ukraine On Banks and
Banking the Board of the National Bank of Ukraine adopted a
decision to declare Bank National Credit PJSC insolvent.

As a side note, according to the applicable Ukrainian laws, the
bank that has been declared insolvent shall be placed under
jurisdiction of the Deposit Guarantee Fund, which shall appoint
the provisional administration and authorized officials to this
financial institution. The Fund guarantees the reimbursement of
deposits to all depositors who will receive compensation for the
amount of their deposit, including the interest accrued thereon
on the date when the National Bank of Ukraine adopts a decision
to declare the bank insolvent and the Fund initiates a winding-up
procedure against this bank, but up to the compensation limit
established on the date of the respective decision, regardless of
the number of deposits held in one bank.


ENERGOBANK PJSC: National Bank of Ukraine Winds Up Insolvent Bank
-----------------------------------------------------------------
As part of the already launched resolution procedure in respect
of Energobank PJSC, on June 11, 2015, the National Bank of
Ukraine adopted a decision on the withdrawal of the banking
license and liquidation of the bank.

Given Energobank PJSC's involvement in risky activities, as
evidenced by the deteriorating performance indicators, in
January 2015, the bank was declared a problem bank and the NBU
employee was appointed as a supervising officer to this bank.

After this bank had been adjudicated a problem bank, the senior
management team of the National Bank of Ukraine held a succession
of meetings with the managers and potential investors of
Energobank PJSC in an effort to stabilize the situation.
However, no credible and reasonable proposals on how to put this
bank back on a sound footing have been submitted to the National
Bank of Ukraine.

Considering the deterioration in the bank's liquidity position
and solvency, as evidenced by numerous complaints filed by this
bank's customers, and the lack of timely support from the bank's
owners, in February 2015 the bank was declared insolvent.

In compliance with Article 34 of the Ukrainian Law On Household
Deposit Guarantee System, the Executive Directorate of the
Household Deposit Guarantee Fund (the DGF), on the next business
day after the bank was declared insolvent by the NBU, placed the
bank under provisional administration for the period from Feb.
13, 2015 to May 12, 2015 (prolonged until June 11, 2015), and
appointed an authorized person to that effect.

Having considered the DGF proposal, the Board of the National
Bank of Ukraine passed Resolution No.370, dated June 11, 2015 on
revoking a banking license and winding up Energobank PJSC.


KREDITPROMBANK PJSC: Placed Under Liquidation
----------------------------------------------
In the course of removing the insolvent Kreditprombank PJSC from
the market, on June 2, 2015, the National Bank of Ukraine adopted
a decision on withdrawal of the banking license and liquidation
of this insolvent bank.

Considering the fact that during January 2015, Kreditprombank
PJSC reported twice that the short-term liquidity ratio (R6) fell
by 5 and more percent below the minimum required level, and given
that this bank had violated applicable banking laws and NBU
regulations, thus posing a threat to the interests of depositors
and other creditors, KREDITPROMBANK PJSC was declared a problem
bank and the NBU employee was appointed as an overseer to this
bank.

After being declared a problem bank, Kreditprombank PJSC's
performance indicators deteriorated markedly. In addition,
Kreditprombank PJSC failed to submit in due time the resolution
plan that the bank had to finalize in connection with a
substantial deterioration in its financial standing.

The qualifying shareholders in a bank failed to take timely
measures to prevent the bank from slipping into insolvency.

In view of the above, by virtue of Article 76 of the Law of
Ukraine On Banks and Banking, the Board of the National Bank of
Ukraine adopted a decision to declare Kreditprombank PJSC
insolvent (NBU Board Resolution No  151, dated March 2, 2015).

In compliance with Article 34 of the Ukrainian Law On Household
Deposit Guarantee System, the Executive Directorate of the
Household Deposit Guarantee Fund (the DGF), on the next business
day after the bank was declared insolvent by the NBU, placed the
bank under provisional administration (for the period from
March 3, 2015 to June 2, 2015), and appointed an authorized
person to that effect.

Having considered the DGF proposal, the National Bank of Ukraine
issued Resolution No. 353, dated June 2, 2015 on revoking a
banking license and winding up Kreditprombank PJSC.

Kreditprombank was Ukraine's 18th largest bank by assets as of
January 1, according to statistics from the National Bank of
Ukraine.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CONSORTIUM TECHNOLOGY: 3 Directors Banned for Misleading Public
---------------------------------------------------------------
Insider Media reports that three Swansea-based directors of
Consortium Technology Ltd. were banned by the Insolvency Service
for misleading the public into paying GBP12 million for services
to reduce credit card debt or recover PPI.

Amrinder Patwal (32) was disqualified for 12 years from May 29,
2015, Nicholas Stephen Harle (39) for ten years from February 18,
2015, and Victoria Ruth Skivington (28) for four years from
March 10, 2015, Insider Media discloses.

An investigation by the Insolvency Service found that Consortium
made inaccurate statements and omissions in cold calls and emails
to the public, Insider Media relays.  As a consequence, at least
2,264 claims were lodged, with the promised services never
received, Insider Media says.

The company was placed into liquidation on November 14, 2012,
Insider Media recounts.  Prior to this, it was generating annual
turnover of more than GBP12 million, Insider Media notes.

As a result of the bans, the three will be banned from in the
capacity as directors without permission from a court, Insider
Media states.


DFS FURNITURE: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corporate Family Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn DFS Furniture Holdings
plc's corporate family rating of B2 and probability of default
rating of B2-PD, following the IPO and refinancing of DFS. At the
time of withdrawal, the aforementioned ratings carried a stable
outlook.

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.


NEWDAY FUNDING: Fitch Rates Series 2015-1 F Debt 'B(EXP)sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned NewDay Funding's notes expected
ratings as follows:

Series 2015-1 A: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Series 2015-1 B: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Series 2015-1 C: 'A(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Series 2015-1 D: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Series 2015-1 E: 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Series 2015-1 F: 'B(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Series 2015-VFN: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

The final ratings are contingent on the receipt of final
documentation conforming to information already reviewed,
including the issue amounts.

The transaction is a securitization of UK non-prime credit card
receivables originated by NewDay Ltd.

Key Rating Drivers

Non-Prime Asset Performance

The charge-off and payment rate performance of the pools reflects
the non-prime nature of the assets, which is mitigated by
available credit enhancement. Fitch has set a steady state
charge-off assumption of 18%, with a stress on the lower end of
the spectrum due to the high absolute level of the steady state
assumption (3.5x for AAAsf). We applied a payment rate steady
state assumption of 10% with a stress of 45% at 'AAAsf'.

Given the specific nature of the underlying receivables,
performance is not directly comparable with prime UK credit card
transactions.

Changing Pool Composition

The portfolio consists of an open book and a closed book that
have displayed different historical performance trends. Overall
pool performance is expected to migrate towards the performance
of the open book as the closed book amortizes. Fitch built this
expectation into its steady state asset assumptions.

Variable Funding Notes (VFN)

In addition to Series 2015-VFN providing the funding flexibility
that is typical and necessary for credit card trusts, the
structure employs a separate originator VFN, purchased and held
by NewDay Funding Transferor Ltd (the transferor). This note will
serve three main purposes: to provide credit enhancement to the
rated notes; to add protection against dilution by way of a
separate functional transferor interest; and to serve the minimum
risk retention requirements.

Unrated Originator and Servicer

The NewDay group will act in a number of capacities through its
various entities, most prominently as originator and servicer,
but also as cash manager to the securitization. In most other UK
trusts these roles are fulfilled by large institutions with
strong credit profiles. The degree of reliance in this
transaction is mitigated by the transferability of operations,
agreements with established card service providers, a back-up
cash management agreement and a non-amortizing liquidity reserve
per series.

Steady Asset Outlook

Fitch expects UK credit card performance to remain stable, with
only limited up-ticks in delinquency and charge-off levels
throughout 2015. Payment rates and yields are expected to remain
stable in 2015, but there is still no clarity as to how lenders
which are reliant on interchange to fund their reward programs
will replace the loss of this income source.

Rating Sensitivities

Rating sensitivity to increased charge-off rate
Increase base case by 25% / 50% / 75%
Series 2015-1 A: 'AA(EXP)sf' / 'A+(EXP)sf' / 'A-(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 B: 'A+(EXP)sf' / 'A (EXP)sf' / 'A-(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 C: 'BBB+(EXP)sf' / 'BBB (EXP)sf' / 'BBB-(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 D: 'BB+(EXP)sf' / 'BB-(EXP)sf' / 'B+(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 E: 'B+(EXP)sf' / 'N/A'/ 'N/A'
Series 2015-1 F: 'N/A'/ 'N/A'/ 'N/A'

Rating sensitivity to reduced MPR
Reduce base case by 15% / 25% / 35%

Series 2015-1 A: 'AA(EXP)sf' / 'A+(EXP)sf' / 'A-(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 B: 'A+(EXP)sf' / 'BBB+(EXP)sf' / 'BBB(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 C: 'BBB+(EXP)sf' / 'BBB(EXP)sf' / 'BBB-(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 D: 'BB+(EXP)sf' / 'BB+(EXP)sf' / 'BB(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 E: 'B+(EXP)sf' / 'B+(EXP)sf' / 'B+(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 F: 'N/A'/ 'N/A' / 'N/A'

Rating sensitivity to reduced purchase rate (ie aggregate new
purchases divided by aggregate principal repayments in a given
month)
Reduce base case by 50% / 75%

Series 2015-1 A: 'AAA(EXP)sf' / 'AAA(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 B: 'AA(EXP)sf' / 'AA(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 C: 'A(EXP)sf' / 'A(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 D: 'BB+(EXP)sf' / 'BB+(EXP)sf'
Series 2015-1 E: 'B(EXP)sf' / 'N/A'
Series 2015-1 F: 'N/A' / 'N/A'


NEWLOOK ROOF: Disqualified as Director for 12 Years
----------------------------------------------------
Insider Media reports that Phillip Christopher Twose (62), the
sole director of Newlook Roof Coatings Ltd. in Monmouth, has been
disqualified for 12 years for causing the company to target
vulnerable customers using coercive and misleading selling
practices.

The investigation by the Insolvency Service, in partnership with
Trading Standards, HM Revenue & Customs and the Health and Safety
Executive, found that the company cold called predominantly
elderly and vulnerable people and coerced them into signing
agreements for completely unnecessary work that involved applying
roof coatings, Insider Media relates.

It would then claim that moss found during the work meant a new
roof was required, Insider Media notes.

According to Insider Media, the investigation also found that the
prices charged were "considerably over-inflated".

The business was also found to have submitted inaccurate VAT
returns and to be non-compliant with health and safety
requirements, Insider Media discloses.

The company went into liquidation on October 11, 2013 with an
estimated deficiency of GBP689,143, Insider Media recounts.

As a result of the bans, Mr. Twose will be banned from in the
capacity as director without permission from a court, Insider
Media states.

Newlook Roof Coatings Ltd. traded from Singleton Court Business
Centre, Wonastow Road Industrial Estate (West), Monmouth.


OPTIMAL PAYMENTS: S&P Assigns 'BB' CCR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB' long-term
corporate credit rating to U.K.-based global provider of digital
payment solutions Optimal Payments PLC.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'BB+' issue rating to the
EUR215 million senior secured term loan B, which forms part of a
new EUR500 million senior secured facility issued by Optimal
Payments, and the $85 million senior secured revolving credit
facility (RCF), also issued by Optimal Payments.  The recovery
rating on these facilities is '2', indicating S&P's expectation
of recovery in the event of a payment default in the upper half
of the 70%-90% range.

The corporate credit rating reflects S&P's assessment of Optimal
Payments' business risk profile as "weak" and its financial risk
profile as "intermediate," following the successful acquisition
of U.K.-headquartered provider of digital wallet and prepaid
online payment services Skrill Group Ltd. (Skrill).

On March 23, 2015, Optimal Payments announced its intention to
acquire Sentinel Topco Ltd., Skrill's ultimate parent, for a
purchase price of about EUR1.1 billion.  Optimal Payments will
fund the acquisition with approximately EUR0.6 billion of new
equity, which it raised in May 2015, and a new EUR500 million
senior secured facility, which is divided into 'A' and 'B'
facilities of EUR285 million and EUR215 million, respectively.
The acquisition is due to close after regulatory clearance in the
third quarter of 2015.

S&P's assessment of the Optimal Payments' business risk profile
as "weak," pro forma the acquisition, is constrained by the
relatively narrow focus of its product portfolio compared with
the overall payment services market and also the wider software
and services industry.  At this point, alternative payment
methods of e-wallets and online prepaid vouchers remain at the
center of Optimal Payments' and Skrill's value proposition.
Although these services experience good take-up in certain
subsectors, they remain niche products within the wider digital
payments market, in S&P's view, with some uncertainty as to their
long-term market position as payment technologies change.  At the
same time, the combined group remains a fairly small player in
online payment processing, which we perceive as a well-
established business benefitting from steady growth in e-commerce
markets.

Additionally, S&P sees customer concentration as a key risk for
the combined group, notably its meaningful exposure to a single
client in the gambling industry, which generates more than 15% of
the combined group's revenues.  Similarly, the combined group's
focus on e-wallets and prepaid vouchers leads to a marked
exposure to the online gambling sector, as this sector is one of
the primary users of these services. Revenues from this sector
are also susceptible to unexpected adverse changes in online
gaming regulation, as is evident from Optimal Payments' recent
market exits from Singapore and Turkey.  The combined group is
also subject to financial regulation in its e-wallet business.

These risk factors are partly mitigated by the combined group's
good track record of organic growth, and its well-established
position in the e-wallet and online gambling niche markets as a
market leader following the acquisition of Skrill.  S&P also
thinks that the combined group's experience in dealing with
sector-specific regulation and the critical mass of its e-wallet
and prepaid voucher platforms create some barriers to market
entry within those subsegments.  S&P expects Optimal Payments'
profitability metrics to improve after the acquisition of Skrill,
thanks to increased operating leverage.  S&P also expects it to
benefit from greater scale and geographic diversification.

S&P's assessment of Optimal Payments' financial risk profile as
"intermediate" is primarily based on S&P's expectation that the
company's credit metrics will improve substantially after the
acquisition has closed, partly thanks to good cash flow
generation and the company's financial policy to deleverage.  S&P
expects Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA to decline to
slightly more than 2x and adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to
debt to rise above 40% in 2017, from 3.4x-3.6x and 25% at year-
end 2015, respectively.  Due to S&P's assessment of Optimal
Payments' "weak" business risk profile, it do not deduct surplus
cash in calculating Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt.  The
improvement in future credit metrics will be driven by a
combination of resilient EBITDA growth and meaningful
amortization on Optimal Payments' new term loan A from 2016.  In
addition to solid organic revenue growth, EBITDA growth is also
supported from 2016 by gradually receding onetime expenses for
the integration of Skrill, coupled with the ramp-up of moderate
cost synergies.

In S&P's opinion, Optimal Payments' free cash flow generation
benefits from limited working capital needs and modest capital
expenditure (capex) requirements.  Following the purchase of
Skrill, in S&P's view, Optimal Payments is likely to continue to
pursue acquisition-led growth.  However, Optimal Payments'
explicit commitment to maintaining net debt between 2.0x and 2.5x
should prevent spikes in leverage for anything more than
temporary periods.

In S&P's base case, where it reviews the combined entity on a pro
forma basis, it assumes:

   -- Organic revenue growth, excluding currency effects, for the
      combined entity of about 12% in 2015, based on Optimal
      Payments' acquisitions of Meritus Payment Solutions and
      Global Merchant Advisors Inc. (GMA) included in the figures
      for full-year 2014.  This is equivalent to total revenues
      of slightly below $800 million.  S&P assumes revenue growth
      of about 10% in 2016, driven by solid performance across
      both stored-value products and payment processing services.
      EBITDA margins, before integration costs, synergies, and
      expenses for share-based compensation of 23%-25% in 2015,
      rising to 25%-27% in 2017, owing to operating leverage
      inherent in both the e-wallet and ecommerce processing
      platforms.

   -- Approximately $20 million of expenses per year for
      integration-related exceptional items in 2015 and 2016,
      partly offset by synergies from the acquisition from 2016.

   -- Capex of about $30 million in 2015 and 2016.

   -- Dividends of $25 million-$30 million due to former Skrill
      shareholders in 2015, and cash taxes of no more than
      $10 million in 2015 and 2016.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 3.4x-3.6x at year-end
      2015, improving to about 2.6x--2.8x by the end of 2016,
      thanks to EBITDA growth and amortization payments on one of
      the senior secured facilities.

   -- Adjusted FFO to debt of about 25% in 2015 and more than 30%
      in 2016.

   -- Adjusted free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt of 13%-16%
      in 2015, increasing significantly in 2016.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Optimal Payments will
successfully integrate Skrill, and that the combined entity will
continue to show at least high-single-digit organic revenue
growth and improving EBITDA margins (before exceptional and
onetime items), supporting a reduction in adjusted debt to EBITDA
to comfortably below 3x in 2016.

S&P could lower its rating on Optimal Payments if adjusted debt
to EBITDA exceeds 3x on a sustained basis, or if S&P sees a risk
that FFO to debt will be materially below 30% in 2016, for
example as a result of operating underperformance, difficulties
integrating Skrill, or large debt-funded acquisitions.  S&P could
also lower the rating if FOCF weakens significantly compared to
its expectations.

Rating upside over the next 12 months is remote due to the
upcoming risks related to the integration of Skrill.  Over the
medium term, S&P could consider an upgrade if Optimal Payments
manages to substantially enhance its position in the payment
processing services market, by gaining significant market share,
broadening its product portfolio, and by diversifying its revenue
streams away from specific sectors or individual customers.
Ratings upside would also require an improvement in the EBITDA
margin to the high 20% range.

Although not in line with Optimal Payments' current financial
policy, ratings upside could result from Optimal Payments
lowering adjusted debt-to-EBITDA sustainably below 2x and, at the
same time, growing FFO to debt toward 45%, while continuing to
show solid FOCF.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Government Action Needed on Insolvency Redundancy Consultations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Government action is needed to reform the collective redundancy
process in insolvencies, says R3 the insolvency trade body, in
its response to the government "call for evidence" on the matter
closed Friday, June 12.

The profession is calling for a number of measures including
clear guidance from government and reform of the 'protective
award' compensation regime, which currently sees the taxpayer
foot the bill for incomplete redundancy consultations.
Current rules require 45 days of redundancy consultation, and
alternatives to redundancy to be discussed.  Insolvent businesses
however, do not have the funds to comply and there are rarely any
realistic alternatives.  This leaves insolvency practitioners
seeking to comply with the law in an impossible position.
Andrew Tate, R3 vice-president, says: "The government 'call for
evidence' is very welcome.  This is a perfect chance to embrace
the calls for reform and sort out the very real problems that
exist with trying to consult on redundancy when companies fail."
"Existing consultation requirements are near impossible to
fulfill in many company insolvency situations.  This is a
hopeless state of affairs which needs to be addressed urgently."

"Clear guidance is needed from government.  Insolvency
practitioners will try and save jobs and businesses, but the
rules on what they should do when they can't are problematic and
unworkable.  R3 has called for clarity now for some time.  The
government needs to work with a range of stakeholders, from the
unions to the insolvency profession, to achieve meaningful
reform."

Since 2009, there has been a Memorandum of Understanding between
R3, the Insolvency Service, and Jobcentre Plus to enable advice
to be given quickly to employees made redundant as a result of
insolvency.

Andrew Tate continues: "Insolvency practitioners should always
provide as much advice to employees as possible about
redundancies, and the profession works closely with Jobcentre
Plus to make sure help is available.  However, in a fast-moving
insolvency situation, with limited time and money, and where job
losses are inevitable, a full 45-day consultation can often be
impossible."

"Companies can become insolvent incredibly rapidly.  There may
not be enough money left to pay salaries for a week let alone 45
days while consultation takes place, or even to pay for the
consultation process itself.  Moreover in an insolvency process
the future of the business might not be clear enough for
meaningful consultation."

"The success of the MOU between R3 and Jobcentre Plus -- which
has helped 120,000 people facing redundancy in the last five
years -- shows that non-regulatory solutions are possible."

Protective awards

If a full consultation cannot be completed, the insolvent company
may be required to pay employees a "protective award" by an
Employment Tribunal.  Since the company is insolvent, this award
is usually paid by the taxpayer via the National Insurance Fund
-- the fund then seeks to recoup this payment from the insolvent
company's remaining assets later on.

Andrew Tate says: "The existing protective award scheme does not
work.  The current legislation intends that the awards be a
penalty for non-consultation, but the company's management has no
incentive to avoid the penalty: they are no longer involved or
liable by the time the penalty is awarded.  The award punishes
the taxpayer in this situation and there is little deterrent."
"Even if the company management knows redundancies are likely,
they can choose not consult and leave the insolvency
practitioner, employees, taxpayer, and other creditors to carry
the can later on."

"A protective award in insolvency becomes a penalty borne by the
taxpayer and the other creditors of the failed business.  Every
additional pound that the insolvent company's estate has to pay
back to the taxpayer is a pound less back to the company's other
creditors."

                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *