TCREUR_Public/150702.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, July 2, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 129

                            Headlines

G E R M A N Y

PHOENIX PHARMAHANDEL: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB+', Outlook Stable


G R E E C E

GREECE: Defaults on IMF Debt; PM Calls for No Vote on Austerity
GREECE: Fitch Cuts Currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'CC'
GREEK BANKS: S&P Lowers Ratings on 4 Institutions to 'SD'
NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Affirms 'BB' CCR, Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

HARVEST CLO IX: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Notes
LADBROKES IRELAND: Examiner Favors Parent Company's Rescue Plan
* IRELAND: SME Examinership Saves 703 Jobs in 2015, Index Shows


L U X E M B O U R G

AIR NEWCO 5: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

CADOGAN SQUARE VI: Moody's Assigns B2 Ratings to 2 Note Classes
CADOGAN SQUARE VI: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
EURO-GALAXY IV: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F Notes
EURO-GALAXY IV: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating to Class F Notes
INTERXION HOLDING: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB-', Outlook Stable

REPSOL INT'L: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Final Rating to Hybrid Notes


P O R T U G A L

BANCO ESPIRITO: 3 Bidders Submit Binding Offers for Novo Banco


R U S S I A

AGENCY FOR HOUSING: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Issuer Credit Ratings
LENTA LLC: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
SME BANK: S&P Puts 'BB+/B' ICRs on CreditWatch Negative


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: S&P Raises Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'B+'
IM CAJA LABORAL: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class E Notes


S W E D E N

DUFRY AG: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB' on World Duty Free Acquisition


T U R K E Y

FINANS FINANSAL: Moody's Withdraws Ba3 CFR for Business Reasons


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALBA 2005-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-'
CLS OFFSHORE: Shareholders Buy Business; CVA Agreement Vetoed
STONEGATE PUB: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'B+' CCR


X X X X X X X X

* S&P Takes Rating Actions on European Synthetic CDO Tranches


                            *********


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G E R M A N Y
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PHOENIX PHARMAHANDEL: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB+', Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has raised its
long-term corporate credit rating on Germany-based pharmaceutical
distributor PHOENIX Pharmahandel GmbH & Co. KG to 'BB+' from
'BB'. The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P raised the issue ratings to 'BB+' from 'BB'
on PHOENIX's EUR1.05 billion credit facility and two EUR300
million senior unsecured notes.  The recovery rating on these
notes remains '4', indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-
50%) recovery prospects, at the low end of the range, in the
event of a payment default.

The upgrade follows PHOENIX's resilient performance in the face
of challenging operating conditions in 2014 and 2015.  S&P now
expects stronger operating performance in 2016 and its base-case
scenario is for a steady improvement in leverage metrics, which
S&P forecasts to remain at levels commensurate with the higher
credit rating.  S&P has removed its negative comparable ratings
analysis modifier, which previously reflected its view that the
company's business and financial risk profiles were both
positioned at the lower end of the range for their respective
categories.

S&P views PHOENIX's business risk profile as "satisfactory" due
to the group's track record of profitable growth across its
portfolio of business activities, encompassing a number of links
in the pharmaceutical supply chain.  Phoenix is present in 25
European countries and operates in health care logistics and
pharmaceutical wholesaling, as well as running dispensing
pharmacies.  S&P believes this diversification reduces the impact
of local regulatory changes, supporting business continuity
across the entire group.

In addition, S&P believes PHOENIX has strong brand equity that it
has generated through a track record of reliable and good-quality
service offerings, such as nationwide coverage at a minimal and
guaranteed delivery time for products ordered.  On the other
hand, S&P takes into account the industry's vulnerability to
regulatory actions and the disruptive effect of price-based
competition in the low-margin pharma wholesale and distribution
business.

S&P assesses PHOENIX's financial risk profile as "significant,"
factoring in its pronounced deleveraging over the past four
years. However, S&P estimates Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to
EBITDA to increase to about 3.5x for the fiscal year ending Jan.
31, 2016.  This is primarily due to PHOENIX's planned drawings on
the EUR250 million bridge facility to partially finance the
acquisition of Dutch pharmacy and medical supply company Mediq in
a joint venture (55% owned by PHOENIX) with Celesio.

Despite relatively thin operating margins of less than 3% on a
reported basis, which is typical for pharma wholesaling
operations, PHOENIX has generated sustainable stable operating
cash flows of about EUR400 million annually over the past two
years.  Due to the likely lower profitability and a one-off
working capital cash outflow of about EUR300 million, S&P expects
the group's operating cash flow to be about EUR15 million in
fiscal 2015.  From 2016, S&P expects credit metrics to gradually
catch up as PHOENIX will likely have absorbed the main
repercussions of lower prices in Germany.  S&P don't anticipate a
quick recovery in the operating margin to pre-2013 levels,
however, because S&P believes it will take the group time to
recoup lost ground in terms of profitability from its German
operations.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Revenue growth of 2%-3% in fiscal years 2015 and 2016,
      mainly driven by the wholesale market in Germany and growth
      in Northern Europe.

   -- EBITDA margins of about 2.0% in fiscal 2015 and 2.3% in
      fiscal 2016.

   -- Capital expenditure (capex) of EUR200 million in fiscal
      2015 and EUR175 million in fiscal 2015.

   -- Optimization of working capital, resulting in a one-off
      cash outflow of EUR300 million in 2015.

   -- Acquisitions of EUR30 million in fiscal 2015 and EUR50
      million in 2016.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- An adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 3.5x in fiscal
      2015 and 2.8x in fiscal 2016.

   -- Adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 19%
      in fiscal 2015 and 24% in fiscal 2016.

   -- Adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of about 5.9x in fiscal
      2015 and 6.5x in fiscal 2016.

The stable outlook on PHOENIX reflects S&P's view that the
company has achieved and will likely sustain debt to EBITDA of
less than 4x on a fully adjusted basis.  S&P's base-case EBITDA
interest coverage is close to 6x, at the higher end of the
"significant" category, thanks to further deleveraging (albeit
more gradually than in the past), provided the group maintains
its current financial policy.

S&P could lower the rating if PHOENIX's EBITDA fell materially
outside of S&P's operating base-case assumptions, pushing
leverage above 4x and eroding free operating cash flow (FOCF).
This could happen if the company's most recent acquisitions,
including Mediq, are unable to deliver synergies that S&P expects
under its base-case scenario or if price-based competition
restarted in Germany.

An upgrade of PHOENIX would likely be contingent on continuous
profitability growth and ongoing material FOCF generation as well
as the group's commitment to a permanent reduction in leverage.
S&P would likely view debt to EBITDA of permanently below 3x as
consistent with a higher rating.



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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Defaults on IMF Debt; PM Calls for No Vote on Austerity
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mehreen Khan and Matthew Holehouse at The Telegraph report that
Greece has become the first developed country in history to
default to the International Monetary Fund.

The cash-strapped nation failed to make a EUR1.5 billion payment
to the IMF by an 11:00 p.m. deadline on June 30, triggering an
arrears process, which was last suffered by Zimbabwe in 2001, The
Telegraph relates.

In a statement, the IMF said: "We have informed our Executive
Board that Greece is now in arrears and can only receive IMF
financing once the arrears are cleared."

The default comes after the country lodged a desperate last-
minute plea for a reprieve to the IMF, The Telegraph relays,
citing Greek deputy prime minister Yannis Dragasakis.

According to The Telegraph, spokesman Gerry Rice confirmed the
IMF had "received a request from the Greek authorities for an
extension of Greece's repayment obligation that fell on June 30,
which will go to the IMF's Executive Board in due course."

In a sign of the total collapse in trust between its partners, it
is unlikely Greece will now be given the traditional 30-day grace
period afforded to other debtor nations who have missed repayment
in the IMF's 71-year-history, The Telegraph notes.

                          Referendum

Meanwhile, Bloomberg News' Jenny Paris, Rebecca Christie, and
Theophilos Argitis report that Greek Prime Minister Alexis
Tsipras called on voters to reject austerity measures in the
July 5 referendum, hardening a standoff with creditors hours
after making a renewed bid for aid as the nation sinks deeper
into financial misery.

On a third day of capital controls rationing pensions that also
marked the expiry of Greece's bailout, the government in Athens
said it was willing to accept the latest offer from creditors as
a basis for compromise, Bloomberg relates.  The looming vote
remains a stumbling block, along with disagreements over
pensions, spending and taxes, and Mr. Tsipras was defiant on the
outcome, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Europe's
dominant leader, and her finance minister, Wolfgang Schaeuble,
burned by five months of brinkmanship, said there would be no
talks on a new bailout until after the July 5 vote.

Talks broke down at the weekend with Mr. Tsipras taking European
leaders and his own country by surprise and declaring he would
hold a public vote, Bloomberg recounts.

Other officials have said Mr. Tsipras needs to call for a "yes"
vote or cancel the plebiscite altogether to regain euro-area
support, Bloomberg relates.

If Greece votes "yes," it might be able to win approval for a
third bailout package in the next few weeks, Bloomberg states.
If there were a deal in principle, it is possible Greece could
get quick disbursement of EUR3.3 billion (US$3.7 billion) from
central-bank profits on bond purchases -- money that was set
aside for the second bailout and then taken off the table on
June 30, Bloomberg discloses.

If voters say "no," the pressure on its banking system would
ratchet up quickly, leaving Greece little choice but to consider
printing its own money, Bloomberg says.  That's because Greek
banks would be unable to meet ECB demands for the collateral
needed to keep access to emergency liquidity, and the government
would run out of cash to pay its bills and pay its workers,
Bloomberg notes.

                      Pension Rationing

According to Bloomberg News' Eleni Chrepa, Elliott Gotkine and
Paul Tugwell, about a third of the nation's depleted banks
cracked open their doors after being closed for three days.  But
all they did was ration pension payments, hours after the country
became the first advanced economy to miss a payment to the IMF
and its bailout program expired, Bloomberg relays.

While Greek retirees receive a fraction of what they're due,
European officials resume efforts to prevent the economy from
cratering after more than five years of crisis-fighting,
Bloomberg relates.  Finance ministers weigh a new aid bid from
Prime Minister Mr. Tsipras and European Central Bank policy
makers discuss whether to maintain their emergency lifeline,
Bloomberg discloses.

The first poll before a snap referendum on July 5 indicated most
people back Mr. Tsipras, Bloomberg says.  The survey, in
Efimerida ton Syntakton newspaper, showed 54% would vote "no" --
rejecting austerity in exchange for aid -- and 33% would vote
"yes" -- accepting austerity as the price of staying in the euro,
Bloomberg states.  The poll was conducted by ProRata, which
surveyed 1,200 people June 28 to 29 with a margin of error of
2.8%, Bloomberg notes.

Even the reduced payments risked putting more pressure on banks
than they could bear, underscoring the desperate choices facing
the six-month-old left-wing government and voters in the
referendum, Bloomberg says.  Two senior bank executives said as
many as 500 of the country's more than 7,000 automatic teller
machines had run out of cash by June 28, Bloomberg recounts.

In an effort to give talks traction, Greece has agreed to offer
more information and said it might change its referendum terms
and recommendation, Bloomberg relays, citing an official speaking
on condition of anonymity.


GREECE: Fitch Cuts Currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'CC'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Greece's Long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) by one notch to 'CC' from
'CCC'. The issue ratings on Greece's senior unsecured foreign and
local currency bonds have also been downgraded by one notch to
'CC' from 'CCC'. The Short-term foreign currency IDR has been
affirmed at 'C'. The Country Ceiling has been lowered by one
notch to 'CCC' from 'B-'.

Under EU credit rating agency (CRA) regulation, the publication
of sovereign reviews is subject to restrictions and must take
place according to a published schedule, except where it is
necessary for CRAs to deviate from this in order to comply with
their legal obligations. Fitch interprets this provision as
allowing us to publish a rating review in situations where there
is a material change in the creditworthiness of the issuer that
we believe makes it inappropriate for us to wait until the next
scheduled review date to update the rating or Outlook/Watch
status. The next scheduled review date for Fitch's sovereign
rating on Greece is 13 November 2015, but Fitch believes that
developments in Greece warrant such a deviation from the calendar
and our rationale for this is laid out below.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade of Greece's IDRs reflects the following key rating
drivers and their relative weights:

HIGH

The breakdown of the negotiations between the Greek government
and its creditors has significantly increased the risk that
Greece will not be able to honor its debt obligations in the
coming months, including bonds held by the private sector. We now
view a default on government debt held by private creditors as
probable. Recent events have taken us beyond our previous base
case that a deal would be struck before the expiry of the
program.

The government has called a referendum for July 5 on whether to
accept the June 25 proposals of the creditor institutions
regarding policy conditionality and is endorsing a 'No' vote to
reject the deal. Although early polls suggest a 'Yes' vote is the
more likely outcome, the risk of a 'No' vote is significant. In
our view, a 'No' vote would dramatically increase the risk of a
Greek exit from the eurozone. Such an exit would probably be
disorderly as the current government is unlikely to co-operate
with the European authorities in such an event.

Although a 'Yes' vote may help to avoid some of the more extreme
risks face by Greece, the credit situation would remain
precarious. A 'Yes' could lead to the formation of a new
government with a mandate to reach an agreement with creditors on
policy conditionality. However, the composition of the Greek
parliament (two-thirds of MPs belong to anti-austerity parties)
and the short timeframe before Greece's EUR3.5 billion Eurosystem
redemption would make this a challenging prospect.

The current situation also means that Greece will most
probably begin to run arrears with the IMF (EUR1.6 billion loan
repayment due  June 30) and risks running arrears on bonds held
by the Eurosystem (EUR3.5 billion due July 20). Excluding bonds
held by the Eurosystem, coupon payments and redemptions in July
amount to about EUR200 million.

The breakdown in talks has led the ECB to cap the level of
emergency liquidity assistance provided to the domestic banks,
requiring the authorities to impose extra bank holidays and
capital controls to limit further drains on the system's
liquidity. These measures led Fitch to downgrade the IDRs of the
four main Greek banks to 'RD' (Restricted Default) because the
deposit restrictions affect a material part of the banks' senior
obligations. The deposit restrictions will further damage
Greece's economic prospects; we have revised down our GDP
forecast to a contraction of 1.5% in 2015. The risks to the
economic outlook remain tilted heavily to the downside, with a
deeper recession following from a 'No' vote.

The imposition of capital controls in Greece and risk of a
disorderly and more permanent break from the Eurozone's payment
system has led us to lower the Country Ceiling by one notch to
'CCC'. This reflects an increased risk that domestic entities
will be unable to service international debt obligations due to
the restrictions on capital outflows from the Greek economy.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments that could, individually or collectively, result in
a downgrade include:

-- Non-payment, redenomination and/or distressed debt exchange
    of government debt securities issued in the market.
-- A government-declared moratorium on all debt service.
-- As previously stated, arrears to the IMF would not in and of
    themselves constitute a rating default.

Future developments that could, individually or collectively,
result in an upgrade include:

-- A rapid rapprochement with Greece's creditors following the
    referendum could allow for a disbursement of official funds,
    although the expiry of the current program makes this
    technically more complicated.

-- A track record of cooperation between Greece and its official
    creditors, for example agreement on a follow-up arrangement
    between Greece and its official creditors. This would
    probably take the form, if not the name, of a third program
    of policy-conditional financial support.

-- An economic recovery, further primary surpluses, and official
    sector debt relief (OSI) would put upward pressure on the
    ratings over the medium term.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The ratings are sensitive to the following key assumption:

The EFSF would not exercise its right to declare the EUR29.7
billion PSI sweetener loan to be due and payable in the event
that Greece begins to run arrears on IMF repayments. Such a
declaration would trigger a cross-default clause in the
privately-held new bonds issued in 2012, which Fitch rates.


GREEK BANKS: S&P Lowers Ratings on 4 Institutions to 'SD'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on June 30, 2015, said that
it has lowered its long- and short-term counterparty credit
ratings on Alpha Bank A.E., Eurobank Ergasias S.A., National Bank
of Greece S.A., and Piraeus Bank S.A. to 'SD' (selective default)
from 'CCC/C'.  S&P has also lowered its issue ratings on the
banks' senior unsecured debt to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'.  S&P has
affirmed its 'C' subordinated debt ratings on the four
institutions.

The downgrades to 'SD' follow the measures introduced by the
Greek government on Monday June 29.  Specifically, these include
limits to deposit withdrawals, the closure of bank branches for a
full working week, and the prohibition of money transfers out of
Greece unless authorized by the Greek Ministry of Finance.  The
rating actions reflect S&P's opinion that private individuals'
lack of access to their deposits on a timely and in-full basis,
and the constraints to their ability to transfer funds,
constitute a selective default under S&P's criteria.  S&P's
downgrade of all outstanding senior unsecured notes to 'CCC-'
reflects its opinion that it is now inevitable that Greek banks
will default within six months in the absence of support from the
EU authorities; S&P do not anticipate such support will be
forthcoming.

Following the interruption of negotiations between the
international authorities and the Greek government, the ECB
announced on June 28 that it is maintaining the emergency
liquidity assistance it provides to Greece's banks at the level
set on June 26, around EUR89 billion.  In S&P's opinion, this has
left the Greek banks with very limited liquidity buffers to cover
their upcoming needs, taking into account the large deposit
withdrawals they have experienced in recent weeks.

The Greek authorities have consequently decided to impose
restrictions on the banks, such that:

   -- All banks will remain closed until July 6.

   -- Individual Greek depositors can withdraw a maximum of EUR60
      per day, per card, in cash (although funds deposited can be
      used a means of payment via electronic transfer or using
      credit and debit cards).

   -- Cross-border transfers through banks are prohibited, unless
      authorized by the Greek Ministry of Finance.

S&P understands the finance minister could further extend, or
shorten, bank closures.

S&P views the banks' liquidity positions as having weakened
further after these recent events, which it sees as constraining
the banks' ability to meet their upcoming financial obligations,
when due.  S&P therefore believes the default of the Greek banks
is a virtual certainty unless unexpected additional external
support materializes.  As such, S&P has revised down its stand-
alone credit profile for all the four Greek banks to 'cc' from
'ccc-'.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded; CreditWatch/Outlook Action

                                 To                 From
Alpha Bank A.E.
Counterparty Credit Rating      SD/SD              CCC/Neg./C

Alpha Credit Group PLC
Senior Unsecured (1)            CCC-               CCC

Ratings Affirmed

Alpha Credit Group PLC
Subordinated (1)                C                  C

Alpha Group Jersey Ltd.
Preference Stock (1)            D                  D


Downgraded; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                 To                 From
Eurobank Ergasias S.A
Counterparty Credit Rating      SD/SD              CCC/Neg./C

EFG Hellas (Cayman Islands) Ltd.
Senior Unsecured (2)            CCC-               CCC

ERB Hellas plc
Senior Unsecured (2)            CCC-               CCC
Senior Unsecured (2)            CCC-p              CCCp

Ratings Affirmed

ERB Hellas plc
Subordinated (2)                C                  C

Downgraded; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                 To                 From
National Bank of Greece S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      SD/SD              CCC/Neg./C

Ratings Affirmed

NBG Finance PLC
Subordinated (3)                C                  C

Downgraded; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                 To                 From
Piraeus Bank S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      SD/SD              CCC/Neg./C

Piraeus Group Finance PLC
Senior Unsecured (4)            CCC-               CCC

Ratings Affirmed

Piraeus Group Capital Ltd.
Preferred Stock (4)             D                  D

Piraeus Group Finance PLC
Subordinated (4)                C                  C
Commercial Paper (4)            C                  C

(1)Guaranteed by Alpha Bank A.E
(2)Guaranteed by Eurobank Ergasias S.A
(3)Guaranteed by National Bank of Greece S.A.
(4)Guaranteed by Piraeus Bank S.A.


NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Affirms 'BB' CCR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB' long-term
corporate credit rating on Marshall Islands-registered drybulk
and container shipping company Navios Maritime Partners L.P.
(Navios Partners).  The outlook is stable.

In addition, S&P raised its issue rating on Navios Partners'
senior secured debt to 'BB+' from 'BB' and assigned a recovery
rating of '2', reflecting S&P's expectation of a substantial
recovery (70%-90%) in the event of payment default.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Navios Partners'
financial profile will likely remain close to the current rating-
commensurate level over S&P's 2015-2016 forecast horizon despite
difficult charter rate conditions in the drybulk shipping sector.
S&P believes that the stability that the company's medium-term
charter profile provides should help stabilize its revenues and
earnings and provide some cushion against cyclical pressures.

Navios Partners' "significant" financial risk profile reflects
the company's slightly weakened (albeit set to improve) core
credit ratios in 2014, given its partly debt-funded investment in
new tonnage and lower time-charter rates (time-charter refers to
longer-term contracts) achieved from the employed drybulk fleet.
S&P takes into consideration that the company has been in an
expansionary phase since 2013, in which it has acquired several
vessels and, most notably, strategically diversified into the
container segment.  Consequently, the 2013-2014 credit ratios
were restrained by cash flow and debt mismatches.  S&P forecasts
a slight rebound in credit measures in 2015 because two
containerships acquired during 2014 will generate 12 months of
EBITDA, and a highly cash-generative containership was delivered
in April 2015.  Combined, these vessels will more than offset the
likely lower time-charter rates in the drybulk business.  Navios
Partners posted stable EBITDA of about US$38 million in the first
quarter of 2015 and S&P estimates the company's reported EBITDA
will rebound to about US$165 million in 2015, from approximately
US$153 million in 2014.

S&P takes into account Navios Partners' high contracted revenues,
which provide good earnings visibility and consequently downside
protection.  As of May 4, 2015, about 98% of Navios Partners'
vessel-operating days were fixed for 2015, about 58% for 2016,
and about 45% for 2017.  S&P understands that the charter rates
in these contracts are above the current market rates; hence, it
is critical to Navios Partners' credit quality that charterers
deliver on their commitments.

In S&P's base case it assumes:

   -- Slightly stronger global growth this year and next, despite
      a continuing slowdown in China, as the U.S., the eurozone,
      Japan, and India are all forecast to grow faster;

   -- Stabilization of economic growth in Asia-Pacific, the
      largest importer of iron ore and coal, at 5.7% in 2015 and
      5.8% in 2016, compared with 5.6% in 2014, with China's
      growth cooling to 6.8% in 2015 and 6.6% in 2016, down from
      7.4% in 2014;

   -- Contracted vessels to perform in accordance with the
      committed daily rate.  Revenue calculations are based on
      360 operating days per year.

   -- No customer defaults under the charters.

   -- Time charter rates for Capesize ships of US$11,000 per day
      in 2015 and US$15,000 per day in 2016 (compared with the
      industry average rate of about US$22,000 per day in 2014,
      according to Clarkson Research); for Panamax and Handymax
      of US$9,000 per day in 2015 and US$12,000 per day in 2016
      (as compared with the industry average rate of US$11,000-
      US$12,000 per day in 2014, according to Clarkson Research).

   -- Capital expenditure of US$148 million for the new 13,000
      twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) containership Christina
      delivered in April 2015 and the related incremental annual
      EBITDA from the vessel of about US$18 million.

   -- Dividends paid based on stated dividend policy of quarterly
      distribution.

   -- Further potential additions to the fleet to be funded using
      equity so that it supports credit measures consistent with
      a "significant" financial risk profile.

Under S&P's base case, it arrives at these credit measures for
Navios Partners:

   -- A weighted average ratio of Standard & Poor's-adjusted FFO
      to debt of 22%-24% in 2015-2016, up from approximately 22%
      in 2014.

   -- A weighted average ratio of adjusted debt to EBITDA of
      about 3.4x-3.6x in 2015-2016, down from about 3.8x in 2014.

In accordance with S&P's methodology, it do not factor in
reported cash into these credit ratios because of Navios
Partners' "weak" business risk profile.

The rating on Navios Partners remains constrained by S&P's view
of its business risk profile as "weak," which in turn reflects
S&P's assessment of the shipping industry's "high" risk.  S&P
believes the level of risk in the industry stems from its capital
intensity, high fragmentation, frequent imbalances between demand
and supply, lack of meaningful supply discipline, and volatility
in charter rates and vessel values.  Further constraints include
the prolonged sluggish charter rate environment, which S&P
believes will recover in 2016 after a weak 2015, as the
industry's demand and supply imbalance tightens.  The company
also has a relatively narrow, albeit recently improved, business
scope and diversity, with a predominant focus on the oversupplied
drybulk and container industries and a fairly concentrated
customer base.

A key credit support for Navios Partners' "fair" competitive
position comes from its medium-term time-charter profile.  This
largely insulates the company from the structurally oversupplied
industry and currently historically low market rates, and
supports its solid and relatively stable profitability, as
measured by the absolute level and volatility of EBITDA margins
and returns on capital.  Furthermore, Navios Partners benefits
from its competitive and predictable cost base, with no exposure
to volatile bunker fuel prices and other voyage expenses, which
are borne by the counterparty as stipulated in the time-charter
agreements.  This combined will add to operating stability,
provided charterers deliver on their commitments.  S&P also
believes that Navios Partners' competitive position benefits from
its relatively young fleet.

S&P assess Navios Partners' management and governance as
"strong," which leads to one-notch uplift to S&P's 'bb-' anchor,
under its criteria.  S&P thinks that Navios Partners has a strong
management team with substantial industry experience and
expertise and a demonstrated track record in operational
effectiveness, in particular during the prolonged drybulk
shipping industry downturn.

"We believe Navios Maritime Holdings Inc. (Navios Holdings;
Navios Partners' largest shareholder) exercises meaningful
ongoing control and influence over Navios Partners by virtue of
its control of Navios GP LLC, Navios Partners' general partner.
We consider the strategic and financial interests of Navios
Holdings and the other unitholders in Navios Partners to be
aligned currently.  Unitholders elect four of the seven members
of Navios Partners' board of directors.  We understand that this
is the key reason for Navios Holdings not consolidating Navios
Partners in its U.S. generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) accounts," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that, despite persistently
weak charter rate conditions, Navios Partners will maintain
rating-commensurate credit metrics underpinned by its medium-term
time-charter profile and its competitive and predictable cost
structure.  Furthermore, the most recent fleet additions will
lend support to earnings, which we forecast will expand
moderately and offset the effect of lower charter rates.  We
forecast that the company will maintain a ratio of adjusted FFO
to debt of more than 20%, which we consider to be consistent with
the 'BB' rating.  This reflects our expectation that the company
will continue to prudently use equity to fund its likely further
expansion, and that its counterparties and charterers will honor
their commitments," S&P added.

Given the inherent volatility of the shipping sector, S&P views
the company's consistently "adequate" liquidity profile and
manageable covenant compliance tests as important to stabilizing
the rating.

A downgrade could primarily stem from unexpected significant
debt-funded investments in additional tonnage, higher-than-
anticipated cyclical pressure on charter rates and asset values,
charterer defaults, or more-aggressive shareholder distributions
than S&P currently forecasts.  These would weaken the company's
liquidity and credit measures, including the ratio of adjusted
FFO to debt falling below 20%.  Given that rates embedded in the
majority of charter agreements are higher than the current market
rates, Navios Partners' earnings, and consequently its liquidity,
would come under pressure if the company were forced to re-employ
a large number of its vessels at market rates.

Furthermore, S&P would lower the rating if it regarded
management's operating strategy, its operational effectiveness,
and its stance toward the company as no longer consistent with
S&P's "strong" management and governance assessment.

The rating could also come under pressure if Navios Partners'
general partner, Navios Holdings experienced a higher-than-
expected deterioration in its credit metrics resulting in
consolidated (Navios Partners and Navios Holdings combined)
adjusted FFO to debt falling below 12%.  As defined in S&P's
Master Limited Partnerships criteria, the credit quality of
Navios Holdings has a bearing on the rating on Navios Partners
because of Navios Holdings' meaningful level of influence over
Navios Partners.  If the consolidated ratio of FFO to debt were
to fall into the "highly leveraged" category S&P would notch down
the rating on Navios Partners.

S&P considers rating upside over the next 12 months to be
unlikely owing to depressed dry charter rates and the weak credit
metrics of Navios Holdings.

However, S&P could consider an upgrade in the medium term if
Navios Partners delivered consistent EBITDA growth through a
rebound in dry charter rates, reduced debt, and improved core
credit ratios such that adjusted FFO to debt sustainably exceeded
30%.  An upgrade would depend, however, on Navios Holdings'
credit metrics being supportive of a higher rating on Navios
Partners.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


HARVEST CLO IX: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Harvest CLO IX Limited as follows:

EUR304.2 million class A affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR60.8 million class B affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR30.4 million class C affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR24.1 million class D affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR35.5 million class E affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR15 million class F affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR55 million subordinated notes: not rated

Harvest CLO IX Limited is an arbitrage cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO). Net proceeds from the issuance of the
notes were used to purchase a EUR507 million portfolio of mostly
European leveraged loans. The portfolio is managed by 3i Debt
Management Investments Limited and the reinvestment period is
scheduled to end in 2018.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation reflects the transaction's stable performance
over the past 12 months. Credit enhancement has increased
marginally for all rated notes and there have been no reported
defaults. The transaction is EUR0.66 million above target par and
is currently passing all portfolio profile and collateral quality
tests.

On the effective date the transaction increased the maximum
weighted average rating factor from 33.5 to 34 and the minimum
weighted average spread from 3.7% to 4.1% and reduced the minimum
weighted average recovery rate from 68% to 65.8%. The transaction
covenants represent a compliant matrix point and the current
levels are within the thresholds. Most notably the weighted
average recovery rate is passing the minimum covenant by 2.7% and
the weighted average rating factor is 0.99 below the maximum
covenant.

The portfolio is well within the covenants but has experienced
negative rating migration, as reflected in the increased weighted
average rating factor. Based on Fitch's classification, loans
from the US, Germany and UK represent 57% of the portfolio and
the top five industries represent 47%. Peripheral exposure,
defined as exposure to countries with a Country Ceiling below
'AAA', accounts for 7.73% of the portfolio and resides within
Italy and Spain, within the restriction of 10%. Floating rate
loans currently represent 100% of the collateral balance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would
lead to a downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes. A
25% reduction in the expected recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to four notches for the rated notes.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis.

-- Loan-by-loan data provided by USbank as at May 29, 2015.
-- Transaction reporting provided by USbank as at May 29, 2015.


LADBROKES IRELAND: Examiner Favors Parent Company's Rescue Plan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that bookmaker
Ladbrokes Ireland's parent's rescue plan for the troubled
business has trumped alternatives proposed by rival Boylesports
and others.

Kenneth Fennell, the examiner appointed by the High Court to
oversee the rescue of Ladbrokes Ireland told creditors and other
interested parties on June 30 that he favors the plan put forward
by the chain's UK parent, The Irish Times relates.

That proposal involves closing 60 out of 196 of its betting shops
in the Republic, cutting 250 of its 840 jobs and repudiating a
number of its leases, The Irish Times discloses.

Rival Boylesports made an alternative offer, valued at a reported
EUR25 million, and said that it would close fewer shops and cut a
smaller number of jobs, The Irish Times relays.  Two other
bidders, including British operator, Betfred, were also said to
have expressed interest in the business, The Irish Times notes.

According to The Irish Times, the examiner has until July 29 to
finalize the rescue plan and bring to the High Court for
approval.  The scheme will need the support of at least one group
of creditors, The Irish Times says.

Ladbrokes is a London-listed bookmaker.


* IRELAND: SME Examinership Saves 703 Jobs in 2015, Index Shows
---------------------------------------------------------------
Business & Leadership, citing the Hughes Blake SME Examinership
Index, reports that the total number of jobs saved through SME
examinership in Ireland so far this year was 703, with 331 of
these saved in the past three months.

The lower-cost more accessible version of examinership offered in
the Circuit Court (as opposed to the High Court, where it was
traditionally exclusively available) now represents a majority of
examinerships for the first time, Business & Leadership relates.

"We would all prefer to think that the rising tides we are seeing
in the Irish economy have lifted all boats.  But the fact is that
many SMEs have been unable to benefit from the upturn because of
legacy debts," Business & Leadership quotes Neil Hughes, managing
partner at Hughes Blake as saying.

"The Central Bank has pointed to EUR22.6 billion in impaired SME
debt, and while we are seeing welcome steps being taken to
address the mortgage arrears crisis, the plight of the heavily
indebted SME has remained largely under the radar.

"The examinership process has played a role in addressing the
issue with more than 300 jobs saved in the last three months
alone.  However, many more jobs are lost each quarter through
receivership and liquidation.

"The recent Clerys controversy and loss of jobs has starkly
illustrated the risks many businesses face where their secured
loan has been sold on to a private equity fund that has no long
term interests in Ireland."



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


AIR NEWCO 5: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating to Luxembourg-based holding company Air
Newco 5 S.a.R.l. (ACS).  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to Air Newco
LLC's first-lien loan and revolving credit facility (RCF).  The
recovery rating on these debt instruments is '3', indicating
S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-70%; higher half of
the range) in the event of a payment default.

S&P also assigned a 'CCC+' issue rating to Air Newco LLC's
second-lien loan, with a recovery rating of '6', indicating S&P's
expectation of negligible recovery (0-10%) in the event of a
payment default.

These ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings S&P
assigned on Jan. 20, 2015.

S&P's ratings reflect ACS' business risk profile, which is
primarily constrained by its limited geographic diversity, small
scale, and highly competitive and fragmented market in IT
software and solutions.

These weaknesses are partly offset by ACS' market leadership in
niche segments, strong growth prospects in the health care
market, and its high customer retention rate.

S&P considers that ACS' financial risk profile reflects its high
leverage and loose incurrence covenants, partly offset by S&P's
anticipation of short-term deleveraging to and adjusted debt-to-
EBITDA ratio well below 7x, in line with S&P's forecast for
revenue growth and meaningful efficiencies, resulting in 10%
EBITDA growth in fiscal 2015 (year ended Feb. 28) after
restructuring costs.  S&P's adjusted debt measure excludes
financial sponsor Vista Partners' preferred equity certificates
(PECs) of about GBP358 million.  In S&P's view, the PECs' terms
are favorable for third-party creditors and sufficiently
restricted from transfer.  S&P believes this creates an economic
incentive for Vista to not enforce its creditor rights under the
PECs because doing so could jeopardize its control of the
company.

S&P's base case for ACS has not changed materially since it
assigned the preliminary ratings on Jan. 20, 2015.  S&P's
assumptions include:

   -- High-single-digit revenue growth in fiscal 2015, fueled by
      growth in the health care market, and mid-single-digit
      revenue growth thereafter.

   -- Improvement of the EBITDA margin to about 25% (after
      restructuring costs) by the end of fiscal 2016, owing to
      realization of cost synergies related to acquisitions.

   -- Stable capital expenditures of about GBP5 million annually.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these adjusted credit
measures for ACS:

   -- An EBITDA margin higher than 25% in fiscal 2015, rising
      above 30% in two years.

   -- Debt to EBITDA of 8x in fiscal 2015, reducing to below 7x
      in fiscal 2016, following an improvement in EBITDA and
      modest debt amortization.

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt lower than 10% in
      fiscal years 2015 and 2016.

   -- Low EBITDA cash interest coverage of about 2x in fiscal
      2016.

The stable outlook on ACS reflects S&P's anticipations of mid-
single-digit revenue growth, adjusted EBITDA margins widening
beyond 25%, adequate liquidity, and positive free operating cash
flow (FOCF) in fiscal 2016.

S&P could lower the rating if it expects ACS' adjusted debt to
EBITDA to remain higher than 6x beyond fiscal 2016, if FOCF to
debt declined to less than 5%, if EBITDA cash interest coverage
fell below 2x for a prolonged period, or if ACS' liquidity
weakened to "less than adequate."  These downside factors could
materialize if the company is unable to realize planned cost
efficiencies, if restructuring costs are higher than expected, if
increased competition hampers revenue or profitability, if S&P's
confidence in management's strategy or it ability to execute its
strategy deteriorates based on track record, or if the company
takes advantage of EBITDA growth to recapitalize or fund
acquisitions.

S&P thinks rating upside is limited over the next 12 months,
given ACS' sizable debt.  However, S&P could raise its rating if
it expects the debt-to-EBITDA ratio to decline below 5x on a
sustainable basis.  This could occur if the company's adjusted
EBITDA margins (after restructuring costs) strengthened to more
than 30% and if organic growth led to steady revenue gains
approaching 10%.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CADOGAN SQUARE VI: Moody's Assigns B2 Ratings to 2 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned these
definitive ratings to notes issued by Cadogan Square CLO VI B.V.:

  EUR219,250,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf);

  GBP8,401,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf);

  EUR5,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf);

  EUR10,750,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf);

  GBP1,602,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf);

  EUR32,000,000 Class B-3 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf);

  EUR24,000,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf);

  GBP900,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf);

  EUR23,250,000 Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf);

  GBP871,000 Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf);

  EUR25,750,000 Class E-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf);

  GBP965,000 Class E-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf);

  EUR9,600,000 Class F-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf); and

  GBP360,000 Class F-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2029.  The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure.  Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Credit Suisse
Asset Management Limited ("CSAM"), has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Cadogan Square CLO VI B.V. is a managed cash flow CLO with a
target portfolio made up of EUR 400,000,000 par value of mainly
European corporate leveraged loans.  At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans, floating rate
notes or senior secured bonds, and up to 15% of the portfolio may
consist of second-lien loans, unsecured loans, mezzanine
obligations and high yield bonds.  The portfolio may also consist
of up to 12.5% of fixed rate obligations and between 0% and 10%
of assets denominated in GBP.  The portfolio is 98% ramped up as
of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.  The
remainder of the portfolio will be acquired during the six month
ramp-up period in compliance with the portfolio guidelines.

CSAM will manage the CLO.  It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, collateral purchases are permitted using principal
proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from
sales of credit risk obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the 14 classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer issued EUR43.25 mil. of subordinated notes denominated in
EUR and GBP1.621 mil. denominated GBP, both of which are not
rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty.  The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  CSAM's investment decisions
and management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modelled the transaction using its European Cash Flow
Model, a cash flow model based on the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in February 2014.  The cash flow model
evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the binomial distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate.  In each default
scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is
calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the
outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.  Therefore,
the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of
(i) the probability of occurrence of each default scenario and
(ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.  As such, Moody's encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used these base-case modelling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR400,000,000
Diversity Score: 39
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.10%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.00%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 41.5%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years
Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the defintive rating assigned to the
rated notes.  This sensitivity analysis includes increased
default probability relative to the base case.  Below is a
summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:
Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3220 from 2800)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0
Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0
Class A-3 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0
Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes:-1
Class B-3 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes:-1
Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-2
Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-2
Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-1
Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-1
Class E-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-1
Class E-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-1
Class F-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:0
Class F-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:0
Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3640 from 2800)
Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class A-3 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1
Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3
Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes:-3
Class B-3 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes:-3
Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-4
Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-4
Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-2
Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-2
Class E-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-2
Class E-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-2
Class F-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-2
Class F-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-2


CADOGAN SQUARE VI: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Cadogan Square CLO VI B.V.'s notes
final ratings as follows:

EUR219.3 million class A-1: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
GBP8.4 million class A-2: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR5m class A-3: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR10.8 million class B-1: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
GBP1.6 million class B-2: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR32 million class B-3: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR24 million class C-1: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
GBP0.9 million class C-2: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR23.3 million class D-1: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
GBP0.9 million class D-2: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR25.8 million class E-1: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
GBP1 million class E-2: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR9.6 million class F-1: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
GBP0.4 million class F-2: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR43.3 million class M-1: not rated
GBP1.6 million class M-2: not rated

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Unhedged FX Exposure

The manager may invest up to 10% in unhedged sterling
obligations, which are naturally hedged by 5% in sterling
liabilities. Also, they may invest up to 5% in unhedged and FX
forward hedged non-euro assets not denominated in sterling. The
total amount of unhedged and principal hedged obligations cannot
be more than 10%. Unhedged assets other than sterling may only be
purchased if, after a haircut of 50%, the portfolio notional is
still above target par.

Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch has public ratings or credit opinions on 105 of the 109
obligors in the identified portfolio and expects the average
credit quality to be in the 'B' to 'B-' range. The weighted
average rating factor of the identified portfolio is 33.94.

High Expected Recoveries
At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations. Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to 105 of the
109 obligations. The weighted average recovery rating of the
identified portfolio is 71.1%.

Diversified Asset Portfolio

Unlike other post-crisis transactions, this deal contains a
covenant that limits the top 10 obligors in the portfolio to 20%
of the portfolio balance. This ensures that the asset portfolio
will not be exposed to excessive obligor concentration.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability would lead to a
downgrade of up to three notches for the rated notes.

A 25% reduction in expected recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to four notches for the rated notes.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


EURO-GALAXY IV: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned these
ratings to notes issued by Euro-Galaxy IV CLO B.V.:

  EUR66,000,000 Class A-1D Senior Secured Delayed Draw Floating
   Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned Aaa (sf);

  EUR91,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned Aaa (sf);

  EUR39,250,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned Aaa (sf);

  EUR7,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned Aa2 (sf);

  EUR28,700,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned Aa2 (sf);

  EUR17,600,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned A2 (sf);

  EUR18,100,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned Baa2 (sf);

  EUR20,250,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned Ba2 (sf); and

  EUR8,750,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's rating of the rated notes addresses the expected loss
posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the notes in
2028. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of loans given the characteristics and
eligibility criteria of the constituent assets, the relevant
portfolio tests and covenants as well as the transaction's
capital and legal structure.  Furthermore, Moody's is of the
opinion that the Lead Collateral Manager, PineBridge Investments
Europe Limited, has sufficient experience and operational
capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Euro-Galaxy IV is a managed cash flow CLO.  At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of secured senior loans or senior secured
bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior loans, second-lien loans, high yield bonds and mezzanine
loans.  The portfolio is expected to be approximately 80% ramped
up as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.  The
remainder of the portfolio will be acquired during the seven
month ramp-up period in compliance with the portfolio guidelines.

PineBridge will manage the CLO.  It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the nine classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer has issued EUR 38,400,000 of subordinated notes.  Moody's
has not assigned rating to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty.  The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  PineBridge's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
February 2014.  The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders.  Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.

Moody's used these base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR 320,000,000
Diversity Score: 36
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.50%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

As part of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential
exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with local currency
country risk ceiling (LCC) of A1 or below.  As per the portfolio
constraints, exposures to countries with local currency country
risk ceiling rating of A1 or below cannot exceed 10%, with
exposures to countries local currency country risk ceiling rating
of Baa1 to Baa3 further limited to 5%.  Following the effective
date, and given these portfolio constraints and the current
sovereign ratings of eligible countries, the total exposure to
countries with a LCC of A1 or below may not exceed 10% of the
total portfolio.  As a worst case scenario, a maximum 5% of the
pool would be domiciled in countries with LCC of Baa1 to Baa3.
The remainder of the pool will be domiciled in countries which
currently have a LCC of Aa3 and above.  Given this portfolio
composition, the model was run with different target par amounts
depending on the target rating of each class of notes as further
described in the methodology.  The portfolio haircuts are a
function of the exposure size to peripheral countries and the
target ratings of the rated notes and amount to 0.75% for the
Class A notes, 0.50% for the Class B notes, 0.375% for the Class
C notes and 0% for Classes D, E and F.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
rated notes.  This sensitivity analysis includes increased
default probability relative to the base case.  Below is a
summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3220 from 2820)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A-1D Senior Secured Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes: 0
Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0
Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class B-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2
Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0
Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3640 from 2800)
Class A-1D Senior Secured Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes: 0
Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0
Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class B-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3
Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3
Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3
Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3
Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1


EURO-GALAXY IV: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating to Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its credit ratings to
Euro-Galaxy IV CLO B.V.'s class A-1D delayed draw notes, and
class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C, D, E, and F notes.  At closing,
Euro-Galaxy IV CLO also issued an unrated subordinated class of
notes.

S&P's ratings reflect its assessment of the collateral
portfolio's credit quality.  S&P considers that the portfolio as
of closing is diversified, primarily comprising broadly
syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans and senior
secured bonds.

S&P's ratings also reflect the available credit enhancement for
the rated notes through the subordination of payable cash flow to
the subordinated notes.  S&P subjected the capital structure to a
cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate (BDR)
for each rated class of notes.

To determine the BDR for each rated class, S&P used the target
par amount of EUR320 million, the covenanted weighted-average
spread of 3.90% and the covenanted weighted-average recovery
rates.  S&P applied various cash flow stress scenarios, using
four different default patterns, in conjunction with different
interest rate stress scenarios for each liability rating
category.

S&P's ratings are commensurate with its assessment of available
credit enhancement following its credit and cash flow analysis.
S&P's analysis shows that the available credit enhancement for
each class of notes was sufficient to withstand the defaults that
S&P applied in its supplemental tests (not counting excess
spread) outlined in S&P's corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) criteria.

In S&P's analysis, it considered that the transaction documents'
replacement and remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate the
transaction's exposure to counterparty risk under S&P's current
counterparty criteria.

Following the application of S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria,
it considers the transaction's exposure to country risk is
sufficiently mitigated at the assigned rating levels.  This is
because the concentration of the pool comprising assets in
countries rated lower than 'A-' is limited to 10% of the
aggregate collateral balance.

The transaction's legal structure is bankruptcy-remote at
closing, in accordance with S&P's European legal criteria.

Euro-Galaxy IV CLO is a European cash flow corporate loan
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) securitization of a
revolving pool, comprising euro-denominated senior secured loans
and bonds issued mainly by European borrowers.  PineBridge
Investments Europe Ltd. is the lead collateral manager and Credit
Industriel et Commercial S.A. is the co-collateral manager.

RATINGS LIST

Euro-Galaxy IV CLO B.V.

EUR335.05 Million Delayed Draw And Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes

Class                   Rating           Amount
                                       (mil. EUR)

A-1D                    AAA (sf)          66.00
A-1                     AAA (sf)          91.00
A-2                     AAA (sf)          39.25
B-1                     AA (sf)            7.00
B-2                     AA (sf)           28.70
C                       A (sf)            17.60
D                       BBB (sf)          18.10
E                       BB (sf)           20.25
F                       B- (sf)            8.75
Subordinated            NR                38.40

NR--Not rated.


INTERXION HOLDING: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB-', Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on The Netherlands-based data center operator
Interxion Holding N.V. (Interxion) to 'BB-' from 'B+'.  The
outlook is stable.

At the same, S&P raised its issue rating on Interxion's super
senior revolving credit facility (RCF) to 'BB+' from 'BB' and
raised its issue rating on its senior secured notes to 'BB-' from
'B+'.  The recovery ratings on these debt instruments are
unchanged at '1' and '3', respectively, with recovery
expectations in the lower half of the 50%-70% range for the
senior secured notes.

S&P has also removed the ratings from CreditWatch positive, where
it placed them on March 13, 2015.

S&P's upgrade follows the termination of Interxion's merger with
U.K.-based TelecityGroup PLC, which S&P now expects will be
acquired by competitor Equinix Inc.  Despite the prospect of
becoming a relatively smaller player in the collocated data
center market, due to this potential merger, S&P believes the
negative impact to its competitive position would be largely
offset by the overall benefit of sector consolidation.  The
upgrade indicates S&P's expectation that Interxion will maintain
strong growth and a good track record of strengthening its
margins thanks to the group's rising scale, high occupancy rates,
and relatively high recurring revenues.  S&P anticipates that
Interxion will maintain adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 4.0x in
2015 and 2016, while maintaining a ratio of funds from
operations (FFO) to debt of about 17%.  S&P forecasts that
Interxion will achieve neutral free operating cash flow (FOCF) in
2017, thanks to a gradual decrease in capital expenditures
(capex) after about EUR200 million in 2015.  While S&P has viewed
Interxion's negative FOCF, resulting from high capital
investment, as a limit to higher ratings in the past, such
investments support Interxion's stable growth prospects and
operating cash flow generation, and S&P believes the underlying
demand for its data centers and Interxion's disciplined
approach to expansion support the 'BB-' rating.  In case of a
downturn in demand, S&P expects that Interxion would rapidly
reduce investment, allowing for its utilization rates to rise and
FOCF to turn positive.

S&P believes Interxion's business risk profile benefits from
demand for high-end connectivity within some industry sectors,
such as financial services, cloud services, and multimedia.
Furthermore, the currently favorable supply-demand dynamics help
accelerate the development of new and existing data centers.
These supply-demand patterns are determined by the limited amount
of space available in key Internet hub locations; growth in
Internet traffic and communications volumes in general; and the
limited penetration of outsourced data centers in Europe.  S&P
also takes into account Interxion's relatively high recurring
revenues and its customer contracts, which typically last for an
initial period of three to five years, with automatic one-year
renewal thereafter, providing good revenue visibility.  However,
these strengths are partially offset by the competitive
environment, which could lead to meaningful shifts in the supply-
demand dynamics of the data center and co-location market
over the next few years.  These potential variations could
increase pressure on operating margins, owing to Interxion's
inherently high operating leverage, and on its cash flow
generation.

S&P believes that Interxion's established customer relationships
and communities of interest among clients support customer
loyalty.  This can be seen in the group's low churn rate of 0.5%-
0.75% on average per month over the past few years, which results
in a high level of recurring revenue.  In addition, the opening
of new data centers introduces the group to new customers.
Interxion has reported strong and improving profitability over
the past several years, with a reported EBITDA margin slightly
above 40% over the past two years.

Although the introduction of additional data center capacity can
put pressure on profit margins, the group has maintained
relatively high capacity utilization rates while increasing
capacity.

S&P's opinion of Interxion's financial risk profile reflects
S&P's forecast of a Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA
ratio of about 4.0x over the next two years, falling to 3.5x
thereafter.  S&P believes FOCF will remain sensitive to the pace
of growth projects, which requires significant expansion capex.
S&P's adjustment for operating leases represents more than 1x of
its adjusted leverage ratio for Interxion in 2014, and S&P
forecasts a similar proportion for the future.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation of stable debt to
EBITDA of about 4x as the group maintains its track record of
steady organic growth on continued demand for data center
services.

S&P could raise the rating if the group continues to grow its
revenues and margins, improving adjusted leverage sustainably and
significantly to less than 3.5x and adjusted FFO to debt above
25% while also achieving positive FOCF generation.  This would
most likely result from the group achieving a significantly
larger operating scale relative to its expansion program, or a
slowdown in contracted expansion that continued to raise its
average utilization ratio.  S&P could also raise the rating on
significantly increased geographic diversity and scale, which
could lead S&P to revise upward its view of its business risk
profile, if achieved while maintaining the current financial
profile.  An upgrade would also require the group to
maintain "adequate" liquidity.

S&P could lower its rating if Interxion does not deliver on its
targets for revenue growth, margin improvement, and cash flow
generation, leading to weaker-than-anticipated metrics, including
adjusted debt to EBITDA above 4.5x, FFO to debt of less than 15%,
and negative cash flow generation.  This could result from an
increase in competition that negatively affects pricing or
capacity utilization, or if the group increases spending on
organic growth above S&P's expectation.  S&P could also lower the
rating if the group more aggressively raises debt to fund
acquisition growth.


REPSOL INT'L: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Final Rating to Hybrid Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Repsol International Finance's (RIF)
subordinated notes a final rating of 'BB+'. The notes are
guaranteed by Repsol S.A. (BBB/Stable).

The rating of the hybrid capital securities reflects the highly
subordinated nature of the notes, considered to have lower
recovery prospects in a liquidation or bankruptcy scenario. The
equity credit reflects the structural equity-like characteristics
of the instruments including subordination, maturity in excess of
five years and deferrable interest coupon payments. Equity credit
is limited to 50% given the cumulative interest coupon, a feature
considered more debt-like in nature.

KEY RATING DRIVERS FOR THE NOTES

Ratings Reflect Deep Subordination
Fitch has notched the notes' rating down by two notches from
Repsol's Long-term Issuer Default Rating of 'BBB'/Stable given
their deep subordination and consequently, the lower recovery
prospects in a liquidation or bankruptcy scenario relative to the
senior obligations of the issuer and guarantor.

Equity Treatment Given Equity-Like Features
The proposed securities qualify for 50% equity credit as they
meet Fitch's criteria with regards to deep subordination,
remaining effective maturity of at least five years, full
discretion to defer coupons for at least five years and limited
events of default. These are key equity-like characteristics,
affording Repsol greater financial flexibility.

Cumulative Coupon Limits Equity Treatment

The interest coupon deferrals are cumulative, which results in
50% equity treatment and 50% debt treatment of the hybrid notes
by Fitch. Despite the 50% equity treatment, we treat coupon
payments as 100% interest. The company will be obliged to make a
mandatory settlement of deferred interest payments under certain
circumstances, including the payment of a dividend. This is a
feature similar to debt-like securities and provides the company
with reduced financial flexibility.

KEY RATING DRIVERS FOR REPSOL

Stable Outlook

Fitch revised the Outlook on Repsol's IDR to Stable from Positive
and affirmed the IDR in December 2014. The Outlook revision
followed Repsol's acquisition of all common shares in Talisman
for USD8.3bn in cash, which was announced in December 2014. The
transaction closed in May 2015.

Focus on Stronger Upstream

"We view the acquisition as dramatically improving Repsol's
hydrocarbon production profile and mitigating the fall-out from
YPF's nationalization. Post-closing, Repsol's daily hydrocarbon
production will be ahead of OMV AG's (A-/Stable, 309mboepd in
2014) and BG Energy Holdings Ltd.'s (BG, A-/RWP, 606mboepd in
2014). Its proved reserves (1P) of 2.4bn barrels of oil
equivalent (boe) will rank ahead of OMV's 1.1bn boe, but behind
BG's 3.5bn boe, while its proved and probable (2P) reserves are
estimated at 3.5bn boe, or about 14 years its combined
production. Repsol's upstream will account for nearly 60% of its
total capital employed as calculated by the company, up from
about 40% before the transaction."

Fitch expects that the combined entity will have a higher degree
of flexibility regarding the timing and allocation of capital
expenditure. Coupled with strong vertical integration, this
should help maintain a healthy balance sheet with funds from
operations adjusted net leverage below the 3.0x needed for a
'BBB' rating.

Talisman Performance Risks

Fitch downgraded Talisman in September 2014 to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'
due to its weaker production and reserve profiles, relatively
high finding, development and acquisition costs, remaining non-
core asset sale obstacles and extended development horizon, and
possibility for higher leverage metrics without the execution of
targeted asset sales.

Integration Strategy Key to Financial Profile

When preparing combined Repsol-Talisman forecasts, we used our
most recent Brent oil price deck of USD55 per barrel (bbl) of oil
in 2015 raising to USD75/bbl in 2017 and gas prices of USD6 per
thousand cubic feet (tcf) in the UK and USD3/tcf in the US. Our
base case forecasts are based on the combined pre-acquisition
forecasts for Repsol and Talisman, show Repsol's post-closing FFO
adjusted net leverage to fluctuate around 3x and FFO fixed charge
coverage to around 4x, weaker than those of a median 'BBB' rated
oil & gas company. However, we note that Repsol is yet to
announce its strategy regarding the integration of Talisman
assets, projected capex spending and targeted oil and gas
production level, which will likely have a significant impact on
leverage ratios.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Brent oil price deck of USD55/bbl in 2015 increasing to
    USD75/bbl in 2017
-- Gas prices of USD6 per thousand cubic feet (tcf) in the UK
    and USD3/tcf in the US

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

-- FFO adjusted net leverage of 2.5x and FFO fixed charge cover
    of 8x on a sustained basis.
-- Stable FFO margin greater than 10%.
-- Capex of no more than 100% operating cash flow.
-- Improved downstream performance.

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

-- FFO adjusted net leverage above 3x and FFO fixed charge cover
    of 6x and below on a sustained basis.
-- Weaker downstream performance than forecast.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Repsol's cash and deposit balance at end-March 2015 was EUR9.8
billion (including EUR1.2 billion of deposits with a maturity
longer than three months) and covered EUR3.5 billion of short-
term debt (excluding EUR2.5 billion of related-party balances).



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO ESPIRITO: 3 Bidders Submit Binding Offers for Novo Banco
--------------------------------------------------------------
Sergio Goncalves and Andrei Khalip at Reuters report that the
Bank of Portugal said on June 30 three bidders have submitted
binding offers for Novo Banco, the successor to Banco Espirito
Santo after a state rescue last year.

A source close to Chinese group Fosun International told Reuters
earlier the company had submitted its offer before the June 30
deadline.

The list of contenders shrank from five that the central bank
picked in April and who had until the end of June to present
binding bids, Reuters notes.

Portuguese authorities hope to sell Novo Banco soon to recover
funds injected last August in a EUR4.9 billion rescue operation,
when the country's second-largest lender crumbled under the debts
of its founding Espirito Santo family, Reuters says.  The central
bank said it will evaluate the offers in the coming weeks,
Reuters relates.

Sources told Reuters earlier this month Fosun and privately owned
Chinese insurer Anbang offered just over EUR4 billion each for
Novo Banco in April and were likely to face off in the final
phase of the sale process as other contenders offered much less.

                    About Banco Espirito Santo

Banco Espirito Santo is a private Portuguese bank based in
Lisbon, Portugal.  It is 20% owned by Espirito Santo Financial
Group.

In August 2014, Banco Espirito Santo was split into "good"
and "bad" banks as part of a EUR4.9 billion rescue of the
distressed Portuguese lender that protects taxpayers and senior
creditors but leaves shareholders and junior bondholders holding
only toxic assets.  A total of EUR4.9 billion in fresh capital
was injected into this "good bank", which will subsequently be
offered for sale.  It has been renamed "Novo Banco", meaning new
bank, and will include all BES's branches, workers, deposits and
healthy credit portfolios.

In August 2014, Espirito Santo Financial Portugal, a unit fully
owned by Espirito Santo Financial Group, filed under Portuguese
corporate insolvency and recovery code.

Also in August 2014, Espirito Santo Financiere SA, another entity
of troubled Portuguese conglomerate Espirito Santo International
SA, filed for creditor protection in Luxembourg.

In July 2014, Portuguese conglomerate Espirito Santo
International SA filed for creditor protection in a Luxembourg
court, saying it is unable to meet its debt obligations.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


AGENCY FOR HOUSING: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Issuer Credit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its long- and short-
term issuer credit ratings on Russia's Agency for Housing
Mortgage Lending OJSC (AHML) at 'BB+/B'.  The outlook remains
negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'ruAA+' Russia national scale
ratings on AHML.

The ratings on AHML are supported by S&P's view of the agency's
"very important" role for, and "very strong" link to the Russian
government, its "moderate" business position, and "very strong"
capital and earnings.  In addition, the ratings are based on
AHML's "adequate" risk position, "average" funding, and
"adequate" liquidity, under S&P's criteria.

However, rating constraints include high risk concentrations in
the residential real estate sector; high political risk, which
may complicate AHML's medium-term strategy; and declining
earnings capacity, due to the agency's mission of providing
social housing and lowering mortgage rates, which is inherent to
its mandate as a development institution.

In early 2015, the government announced plans to consolidate its
numerous policy instruments in the housing and construction
development markets, to increase affordability of housing and
save costs by having a single development institution with a
broader mandate.  According to the recent plans and the draft law
presented to the Russian parliament and approved in the first
hearing on June 10, 2015, this proposal will be carried out by
incorporating into AHML the Russian Housing Development
Foundation (RHDF). RHDF is a not-for-profit state-owned fund,
which the government has used since 2008 to provide land plots
and engineering infrastructure for housing construction.  The
merger and the exact details of the updated company's strategy
are to be finalized by year-end 2015.  Although S&P currently has
little information about the transaction, S&P understands that
RHDF has no debt on its balance sheet and that the transaction is
likely to somewhat broaden AHML's mandate.  S&P also understands
that the incorporation of the new subsidiary will not affect
AHML's current legal status and core policy mission.

For this reason, S&P still considers AHML to be a government-
related entity (GRE).

The negative outlook on AHML reflects that on Russia.

Given S&P's 'bb' SACP assessment for AHML and the notch of uplift
for government support in the long-term rating on AHML, if S&P
lowers its ratings on Russia S&P will lower its long-term rating
n AMHL.

Moreover, the rating on AHML could come under pressure over the
next year, regardless of any rating actions on Russia, should the
federal government reduce the agency's role in implementing its
policy and loosen control over the agency's operations, for
example, through an unexpected privatization, or a reorganization
of AHML that would lead to a weaker link between AHML and the
government.

S&P would consider revising the outlook to stable if it was to
take a similar action on Russia.


LENTA LLC: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Lenta LLC Long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'BB-' and a National
Long-term rating of 'A+(rus)'. The Outlooks are Positive.

The 'BB-' IDR reflects Lenta's strong position in hypermarket
food retail segment in Russia and the company's ability to
maintain strong operating metrics and profitability, despite
accelerated store roll-outs and focus on promotions. In Fitch's
view, a price-led business model and low share of discretionary
non-food items will enable Lenta to maintain healthy like-for-
like (LFL) sales growth amid the current economic slowdown. The
ratings are supported by Lenta's low leverage and strong
financial flexibility.

The ratings are constrained by Lenta's small scale (sixth-largest
in Russia), which is commensurate with the 'B' rating category
median, and limited diversification outside its core hypermarket
format. However, this is balanced by Lenta's consistent market
share gains, high opportunities for further growth and lower
competition in the fragmented Russian food retail market relative
to more mature western Europe countries.

The Positive Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that Lenta will
maintain fast growth pace due to store expansion and positive
like-for-like sales growth improving its market position. We note
Lenta's deleveraging capacity over the medium term due to the
company's strong operating cash flow generation and negative
working capital position. Successful execution of the company's
growth plans without significant margin sacrifices and evidence
of sustainable deleveraging may lead to an upgrade.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Leading Hypermarket Operator in Russia

The rating reflects Lenta's moderate market position and scale,
as Russia's sixth-largest food retailer and third largest large-
format operator (after Auchan and Metro) measured by 2014 sales.
Lenta's current relatively small size (EBITDAR of EUR439 million
in 2014) is mitigated by its consistent market share gains, high
growth opportunities and relatively low competition compared to
developed markets resulting from fragmented nature of the Russian
food retail market. A successful execution of its growth strategy
will likely solidify Lenta's market position and scale in the
'BB' rating category.

Limited Format Diversification

Despite Lenta's launch of a supermarket format in 2013, we expect
the company to remain focused on its hypermarket format over the
medium term with supermarkets accounting for less than 10% of
sales by 2018 (2014: 3%). At the same time, Fitch views
positively Lenta's wide geographic diversification across
Russia's regions with a continued reduction in reliance on St.
Petersburg market, one of the most competitive in Russia
(accounting for 27% of sales in 2014).

Robust Margins Despite Rapid Business Growth

Over the past four years, Lenta has shown a strong track record
of fast revenue growth driven by both LFL sales growth and new
store roll-outs, while maintaining strong EBITDA margin. However,
our rating forecasts factor in a moderate decline in EBITDA
margin to 10.0%-10.8% (2014: 11.1%) over the medium term as a
result of increasing operating lease expenses and gross margin
sacrifices to support its price-led business model. These
profitability metrics will remain strong compared with Russian
and European food retail peers.

Subdued Consumer Sentiment

Hypermarket operators are usually exposed to higher cyclicality
of their business. However, Fitch believes that Lenta's 'value-
for-money' proposition, focus on promotions and low share of non-
food sales in revenues will enable the company to maintain LFL
sales growth in the current period of weak consumer spending, as
customers trade down. Fitch expects this consumer behavior will
remain for some time. Erosion of consumer purchasing power should
also facilitate customer migration from traditional retail to
federal retail chains, including Lenta.

Low Leverage

Fitch expects Lenta's funds from operations (FFO) adjusted
leverage to decrease to 3.1x in 2015 (2014: 3.9x) due to RUB12.6
billion net SPO proceeds in March 2015 raised by its holding
company Lenta Ltd and applied to repay debt and fund expansion at
the Lenta LLC level. Although Fitch expects free cash flow (FCF)
to remain negative over the medium term due to high capex plans,
further deleveraging to 2.8x-2.9x (FFO adjusted leverage) will be
supported by growing operating cash flows and maintenance of
negative working capital position. Fitch expects Lenta to be able
to fund 70%-80% of capex with internally generated cash flows
over 2016-2018.

Strong Interest Coverage Metrics

Lenta's FFO fixed charge cover (2014: 2.6x) is strong relative to
Russian peers as a result of high proportion of owned selling
space and thus relatively low operating lease expenses. Despite
the increased cost of funding and planned growth of leased space
due to new supermarket openings, Fitch expects FFO fixed charge
coverage to remain strong for the rating.

Average Recoveries for Unsecured Bondholders

Fitch has assigned a senior unsecured long-term rating to Lenta's
rouble bonds in line with its 'BB-' Long-term local currency IDR,
reflecting average recovery expectations in case of default.
Fitch has not applied any notching to the senior unsecured rating
compared with the Long-term IDR as prior-ranking debt constitutes
less than 2x of group EBITDA and Fitch expects the debt mix to
remain over the rating horizon.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Annual revenue growth of close to 30% driven by high single-
    digit LFL sales growth (driven both by traffic and basket
    growth) and selling space CAGR of 20% over 2015-2018

-- EBITDA margin decreasing to around 10.0%-10.8% as a result of
    increasing share of leased space in store portfolio and
    margin sacrifices

-- Capex at around 9%-11% of revenue

-- No external dividends paid by Lenta Ltd funded by Lenta LLC.

-- Neutral to negative FCF margin

-- No large-scale debt-funded M&A

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that could lead to a revision of
the Outlook to Stable from Positive include:

-- Slowdown in store roll-outs, deterioration in like-for-like
    sales performance relative to close peers reflecting a
    challenging operating environment or materialization of
    execution risks in its growth strategy.
-- No evidence of sustained deleveraging, based on FFO adjusted
    gross leverage (2014: 3.9x).

Future developments that could lead to a downgrade include:

-- A sharp contraction in like-for-like sales growth relative to
    close peers along with material failure in executing
    expansion plan.

-- EBITDA margin erosion to below 7% (2014: 11.1%).
-- FFO-adjusted gross leverage above 4.5x on a sustained basis.
-- FFO fixed charge cover below 2.0x (2014: 2.6x).
-- Deterioration of its liquidity position as a result of high
    capex, worsened working capital turnover and weakened access
    to local funding.

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

-- Solid execution of its expansion plan and positive like-for-
    like sales growth relative to peers leading to improved
    market position in Russia's food retail sector.
-- The ability to maintain the EBITDA margin at around 9%.
-- FFO-adjusted gross leverage below 3.5x on a sustained basis.
-- FFO fixed charge coverage around 2.5x on a sustained basis.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

As at end-March 2015, Lenta's liquidity position was adequate.
Unrestricted cash of RUB7.8 billion and cash balance of RUB8.8
billion at Lenta Ltd level (with most of it downstreamed to Lenta
during the second quarter) together with available undrawn credit
lines (RUB7.3 billion) were sufficient to cover expected negative
FCF and RUB9.5 billion short-term debt.

Although Fitch acknowledges Lenta's growth-led model, even if the
rating agency assumed a substantial deceleration in the expansion
program post-2015, the group would generate positive FCF in the
low to mid-single digits of sales, which would be strong for the
rating, therefore mitigating any refinancing risks.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Long-term foreign currency IDR assigned 'BB-', Positive Outlook
Long-term local currency IDR assigned 'BB-', Positive Outlook
National rating assigned 'A+(rus)', Positive Outlook
Senior unsecured rating assigned 'BB-'/RR4
National senior unsecured rating assigned 'A+(rus)'


SME BANK: S&P Puts 'BB+/B' ICRs on CreditWatch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB+/B' foreign
currency long- and short-term and 'BBB-/A-3' local currency long-
and short-term issuer credit ratings on Russia-based SME Bank on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The CreditWatch reflects the uncertainty related to the Russian
government's decision to transfer SME Bank from Vnesheconombank
(VEB) to the new joint-stock company "Federal Corporation for The
Development of Small and Medium Entreprises" (FCDSME), as per a
presidential decree dated June 5, 2015.

S&P understands that the government has requested that VEB
transfer 100% of its shares in SME Bank into FCDSME.  VEB will
later exchange all 100% of these shares for a share in FCDSME.
However, the timing of both actions is uncertain.

The ownership change, which will likely affect SME Bank's "core"
subsidiary status for VEB, a government-related entity (GRE) with
an "almost certain" likelihood of timely and sufficient
extraordinary support from the Russian Federation, as defined in
S&P's GRE criteria.  Without taking into account the pending
ownership transfer, S&P regards SME Bank as a "core" subsidiary
of VEB because there are incentives for VEB to provide support
during the transition period.  SME Bank plays an important role
in the implementation of the federal government's program for the
development of the small and midsize enterprise sector, one of
the government's priorities that SME Bank takes care of directly.

Depending on the final set-up of the FCDSME, S&P might reconsider
its "high" assessment of the likelihood of timely and sufficient
extraordinary support for SME Bank from the Russian government.
S&P's current assessment of the likelihood of extraordinary
support is based on its view of SME Bank's "important" role for
Russia, in addressing deficiencies in the SME financing market
and in decreasing interest rates for the sector, and S&P's view
of the bank's "integral" link with the government, due to the
state's full ownership of SME Bank via VEB and its strong
oversight of the bank's business and financial plans.

S&P's assessment of SME Bank's stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
at 'b+' remains unchanged, reflecting SME Bank's strong
capitalization.  However, it is uncertain whether VEB's annual
capital injections -- amounting to 10% of its annual profits --
to SME Bank will continue.  Nevertheless, S&P thinks such
injections are highly unlikely in 2015, due to VEB financial
results.  S&P understands that SME Bank will not seek growth
plans in 2015, so the pressure on capitalization will come only
from expected elevated credit costs.  S&P do not assume that SME
Bank will face difficulties in refinancing outstanding debt of
about Russian ruble (RUB) 6 billion (about US$110 million), about
6% of total liabilities as of year-end 2014), which can become
due following the change of control clause trigger.  S&P also
notes that SME Bank enjoys meaningful support from the Russian
central bank, which provides more than a quarter of its
liabilities.

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch within the next three months
after it receives more information on how the ownership transfer
to FCDSME will affect the role of SME Bank within the VEB group,
as well as the impact on the bank's SACP.

Once SME Bank loses its "core" status for VEB in the absence of
potential mitigating factors, S&P might lower the ratings on SME
Bank.  The magnitude of the downgrade would depend on the degree
of support from the VEB group after the ownership transfer,
potential support from FCDSME, S&P's view of the likelihood of
extraordinary government support (which include S&P's
reassessments of SME Bank's role and link to the government), and
the bank's SACP, including capital adequacy and funding.

S&P would take SME Bank off CreditWatch and affirm the ratings
should S&P believes that expectations of support from VEB,
FCDSME, or the state lead S&P to continue equalizing the ratings
with those on Russia.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: S&P Raises Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'B+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'B+' from 'B' its
long-term corporate credit rating on Spanish engineering and
construction company Abengoa S.A.  The outlook is stable.  S&P
has affirmed the short-term corporate credit rating at 'B'.

S&P has also raised to 'B+' from 'B' the issue rating on the
senior unsecured notes issued by Abengoa, Abengoa Finance S.A.U.,
and Abengoa Greenfield, S.A.  The recovery rating on these notes
remains unchanged at '4', indicating S&P's expectation of average
(30%-50%) recovery prospects for noteholders in the event of a
payment default.  S&P's recovery expectations are in the higher
half of this range.

S&P have removed all ratings from CreditWatch positive where it
placed them on June 5, 2015.

"The upgrade reflects our change of consolidation approach for
Abengoa, based on our belief that Abengoa is committed to
reducing its stake in power company Abengoa Yield PLC to below
50% within the next three months.  We therefore now deconsolidate
both Abengoa Yield and the concession assets that Abengoa has on
balance sheet (Abengoa currently reports Abengoa Yield within
"assets held for sale" on its balance sheet).  We continue to
consolidate nonrecourse debt in process, which relates to
concessions under construction.  We expect Abengoa will continue
to place concession assets into Abengoa Yield (BB+/Stable/--) and
we therefore believe that the concession business is of less
strategic importance to Abengoa than we previously assumed.  The
debt associated with the concession business is all nonrecourse
to Abengoa.  We don't expect Abengoa to provide any credit
support to Abengoa Yield or any of its project finance
concessions," S&P said.

"The change in scope of consolidation will lead to a debt
reduction of about EUR6.4 billion from our adjusted debt
calculation of EUR12.9 billion at year-end 2014 (EUR3.4 billion
of the reduction is from Abengoa Yield and EUR3 billion is
project debt at year-end 2014, the majority related to
concessions).  Furthermore, in our assumption, we expect
Abengoa's management to execute various actions to reduce debt
over 2015, with a EUR1 billion reduction already achieved in the
first half of 2015.  This includes the sale of 13% of Abengoa
Yield, the sale of concession assets from Abengoa to Abengoa
Yield, and the initial payment from a new joint venture with EIG
Global Energy Partners, which will take over most of Abengoa's
projects.  We therefore believe management has demonstrated its
ability to execute both its strategy and its access to the
financial market.  We also believe that the ownership in the
yield company creates some financial flexibility.  Nevertheless,
we continue to view Abengoa's corporate structure as complex,"
S&P noted.

S&P expects consolidated credit ratios to improve gradually over
2015 as a consequence of more projects coming on stream and
management initiatives to reduce debt.  S&P expects credit ratios
to remain in the lower end of its "aggressive" category and it
therefore applies its negative comparable rating analysis
modifier.

S&P continues to assess Abengoa's business risk as "fair,"
despite now excluding the concession business. Abengoa's
competitive position also benefits from reputed technical
abilities and proprietary technology, especially in the solar
power generation business, in S&P's opinion.

The stable outlook on Abengoa reflects S&P's expectation that the
group's leverage ratios will remain in the lower end of the
"aggressive" category, excluding both Abengoa Yield and
concession assets.  At the current rating level, S&P expects the
group to maintain a ratio of adjusted debt to EBITDA about 5x and
FFO to debt of about 12%.

S&P could lower the rating on Abengoa if S&P perceives that the
group's business fundamentals have weakened because of the sale
of a more stable business to fund investments, or if the group
continues increasing its participation in what S&P views as more
volatile segments.  If management were to financially support any
of its concession assets, S&P might also consider a downgrade.

S&P might consider an upgrade if Abengoa decided to use proceeds
from asset sales for debt reduction beyond S&P's expectations for
the current rating level, while maintaining "adequate" liquidity.
Credit ratios would likely need to improve to at least the middle
of the range for the "aggressive" category, for example FFO to
debt above 15%, for a positive rating action.


IM CAJA LABORAL: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 tranches and upgraded 2 tranches of
four Spanish RMBS deals.

The deals are serviced by ABANCA Corporacion Bancaria, S.A.
(BB+/Stable/B) for AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario Caixa
Galicia I; by Kutxabank, S.A (BBB/Positive/F3) for AyT
Colaterales Global Hipotecario Caja Vital 1; by Caja Laboral
Popular Cooperativa de Credito (BBB+/Stable/F2) for IM Caja
Laboral 1, FTA and by Banca March, S.A for TDA 30, FTA.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Credit Enhancement

IM Caja Laboral 1 is paying down on a pro-rata basis. The rest of
the notes are currently paying down sequentially. AyT CGH Caixa
Galicia I may switch to pro-rata in the next 18 months as the
relevant triggers are close to being met. We do not expect the
remaining to switch to pro-rata in the near future as the
conditions are not expected to be met. Fitch believes that
available credit enhancement is sufficient to withstand the
stress scenarios associated with the ratings, which is reflected
in the rating actions.

Stable Asset Performance

The deals have shown sound asset performance compared with the
Spanish average. As of the latest reporting periods, three-months
plus arrears (excluding defaults) as a percentage of the current
pool balance range from 0.38% (IM Caja Laboral 1) to 1.20% (AyT
CGH Caixa Galicia I). These numbers are below Fitch's index of
three-months plus arrears (excluding defaults) of 1.6%.

Cumulative defaults, defined as mortgages in arrears by more than
18 months in both AyT deals and 12 months in IM Caja Laboral and
TDA 30, remain below the sector average of 5%. However, Fitch
believes that these levels may rise further as late-stage arrears
roll into the default category.

Reserve Fund Draws

The reserve fund for AyT CGH Caja Vital remains close to its
target (94.7%). Fitch believes further draws may take place on
future payment dates, but expect them to be limited in size and
have a limited effect on the junior tranches. In contrast the
other deals have fully funded reserve funds. The resilience of
the reserve funds is reflected in the rating actions and the
Stable Outlooks across the structures.

Payment Interruption Risk
The current reserve fund levels provide sufficient liquidity to
cover at least six months of senior fees and interest on the
senior notes in case of default of the servicer or the collection
account bank.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A worsening of the Spanish macroeconomic environment, especially
employment conditions, or an abrupt shift in interest rates could
jeopardise the ability of the underlying borrowers to meet their
payment obligations.

Should the effect of the macroeconomic factors result in more
volatile arrears patterns or a material increase in default
rates, this could trigger negative rating action. Fitch may also
take rating action if significant draws from the reserve fund
occur on the next payment dates as this may compromise the
protection of the junior classes.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

For AyT CGH Caixa Galicia I, AyT CGH Caja Vital 1 and IM Caja
Laboral 1 Fitch did not undertake a review of the information
provided about the underlying asset pools ahead of the
transactions' initial closing. The subsequent performance of the
transactions over the years is consistent with the agency's
expectations given the operating environment and Fitch is
therefore satisfied that the asset pool information relied upon
for its initial rating analysis was adequately reliable.

For TDA 30; prior to the transaction closing, Fitch did not
review the results of a third party assessment conducted on the
asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

For TDA 30; Fitch's analysis of Representations, Warranties &
Enforcement Mechanisms (RW&Es) for transactions rated on or after
26 September 2011 can be found in the new issue report appendix.
In addition "Representations, Warranties, and Enforcement
Mechanisms in Global Structured Finance Transactions" dated 17
April 2012 is available at www.fitchratings.com. A comparison of
the transaction's RW&Es to those typical for that asset class is
available by accessing the new issue reports.

The rating actions are as follows:

AyT CGH Caixa Galicia 1:

Class A notes (ISIN ES0312273289): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from
'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B notes (ISIN ES0312273297): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
Stable
Class C notes (ISIN ES0312273305): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook
Stable
Class D notes (ISIN ES0312273313): affirmed at 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable

AyT CGH Caja Vital 1:

Class A notes (ISIN ES0312273081): upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AA-
sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B notes (ISIN ES0312273099): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
Stable
Class C notes (ISIN ES0312273107): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable
Class D notes (ISIN ES0312273115): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable

IM Caja Laboral 1:

Class A notes (ISIN ES0347565006): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook
Stable
Class B notes (ISIN ES0347565014): affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
Stable
Class C notes (ISIN ES0347565022): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook
Stable
Class D notes (ISIN ES0347565030): affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
Stable
Class E notes (ISIN ES0347565048): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
Estimate: 85%

TDA 30:

Class A notes (ISIN ES0377844008): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook
Stable



===========
S W E D E N
===========


DUFRY AG: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB' on World Duty Free Acquisition
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Swiss travel retailer Dufry AG to 'BB'
from 'BB+'.  The outlook is positive.

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue ratings on the company's
existing senior unsecured debt facilities, including a EUR500
million bond due 2022, a Swiss franc (CHF) 900 million
(approximately EUR870 million) revolving credit facility (RCF)
due 2019, and US$500 million notes due 2020, to 'BB' from 'BB+'.
The recovery rating remains at '4', indicating S&P's expectation
of average recovery, in the higher half of the 30%-50% range, in
the event of a payment default.

S&P removed all the abovementioned ratings from CreditWatch
negative, where it had placed them on April 1, 2015.

In addition, S&P has assigned a 'BB' rating to Dufry's proposed
senior unsecured notes.  The recovery rating is '4', indicating
S&P's expectation of average recovery, in the higher half of the
30%-50% range.

The ratings on the proposed notes are subject to their successful
issuance and S&P's review of the final documentation.  If
Standard & Poor's does not receive the final documentation within
a reasonable time frame, or if the final documentation differs
from the materials S&P has already reviewed, it reserves the
right to withdraw or change its ratings.

The downgrade follows S&P's expectation that the completion of
Dufry's acquisition of competitor World Duty Free (WDF) in the
second half of 2015 for approximately CHF3.8 billion
(approximately EUR3.67 billion) will weaken its debt metrics and
bears integration risk, given the size of the transaction.  The
company will finance the transaction with its recently conducted
CHF2.2 billion capital increase and up to CHF1.6 billion of
additional debt.

Dufry has signed an agreement to acquire 50.1% of WDF through a
private transaction with the Benetton family and plans to launch
a mandatory takeover offer for the publicly held remainder.  S&P
assumes Dufry will eventually acquire 100% of the remaining free
float.

In S&P's view, this acquisition will strengthen Dufry's position
as the world's leading travel retailer.  Following the
acquisition of competitor The Nuance Group in 2014, Dufry
expanded its market share in the airport retail industry to 15%
from 9%-10%.  Including the acquisition of WDF, Dufry's market
share should increase further to about 24%, thereby significantly
exceeding that of the world's No. 2 player, LS Travel Retail
(Lagardere group), which has about an 8% market share.

Dufry's larger size after the acquisition will likely result in
improved purchasing power and stronger negotiating positions with
its suppliers.  The acquisition should also better position the
company to compete for new and up-for-renewal concession
contracts.  In combination with lower costs from the closure of
WDF headquarters and the adoption of uniform logistics and IT
systems, total synergies of the WDF transaction could reach about
CHF100 million annually.

Dufry's geographic mix continues to be well balanced, in S&P's
view, enabling the company to offset negative swings in some
markets through better business in other markets.  The
acquisition of WDF further enhances Dufry's geographic reach, as
WDF is particularly strong in the U.K. and Spain, where Dufry
currently has fairly limited exposure.

Although the average duration of concessions from The Nuance
Group was below the figure S&P estimated for Dufry (about six
years), WDF's concessions have an average duration of more than
nine years.  In S&P's view, this provides fairly good visibility
for the years to come and implies limited risk of shortfalls in
revenues and profits from unexpected concession terminations.

Conversely, on a fully consolidated basis, S&P estimates Dufry's
average Standard & Poor's adjusted EBITDA margin for the fiscal
years 2015 and 2016 (each ending Dec. 31) will decline to 11.0%-
12.0% from 12.0%-12.5% before the transaction.  Overall, S&P
continues to assess the company's business risk profile as
"satisfactory."

Under the assumption of a 100% takeover and a full 12 months of
profit contribution for the current fiscal year, S&P estimates
that the takeover will lead to a reduction in its average funds
from operations (FFO)-to-debt ratio to 20%-22% from 24%-25% for
fiscal years 2015 and 2016.  In fiscal 2015 only, FFO to debt
could fall below 20%, which is the lower threshold for S&P's
"significant" financial risk profile.  However, S&P believes that
FFO to debt will recover from this low, following the completion
of the acquisition, and likely exceed 20% in fiscal 2016, subject
to the exact closing date.

Furthermore, S&P forecasts its adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will
rise to about 3.5x from about 3.0x and our adjusted EBITDA
interest coverage will decline to 5.5x-6.0x from 6.0x-6.5x.

Although S&P's financial risk profile remains at "significant,"
it factors in the temporary shortfall in its adjusted FFO to debt
into the "aggressive" category by lowering its 'bb+' anchor by
one notch.  This is also a reflection of the integration risk
given the size of the transaction.

S&P's positive outlook reflects its expectation that Dufry's
leverage metrics should improve from the lows right after closing
and that WDF would be integrated smoothly.

S&P could raise its ratings should the company deleverage its
balance sheet, leading its adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio to rise
sustainably above 20%.  This would be commensurate with a
"significant" financial risk.  In order to achieve this, S&P
estimates Dufry to generate a discretionary cash flow of CHF350
million-CHF450 million per year post-closing of the WDF
acquisition.  S&P expects a smooth integration of WDF, with no
disruptions in operations, unexpected restructuring needs, or
material unexpected adjustments related to off-balance sheet
liabilities.

S&P could revise its outlook on Dufry to stable if deleveraging
is slower than S&P currently anticipates, in particular if FFO to
debt remains protractedly below 20% after the closing of the
acquisition.  This may be the result of either a slower
underlying business, for example, as a result of a general
slowdown in air traffic or disruptions during the integration
process of WDF.  The latter could also involve additional
restructuring costs.  S&P could also revise its outlook should
headroom under financial covenants decline to below 15% or if
there were material unexpected adjustments related to off-balance
sheet liabilities.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


FINANS FINANSAL: Moody's Withdraws Ba3 CFR for Business Reasons
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn all ratings of Finans
Finansal Kiralama A.S (Finansleasing).  At the time of withdrawal
the following ratings were outstanding -- long-term Issuer rating
at Ba3 Negative and long-term Corporate Family Rating at Ba3
Negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ALBA 2005-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in ALBA 2005 - 1 PLC, ALBA 2006 - 1 PLC, ALBA 2006 - 2
PLC, and ALBA 2007 - 1 PLC.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised its ratings on ALBA 2005-1 and ALBA 2006-1’s class
      B, C, and D notes, and ALBA 2006-2's class C, D, and E
      notes;

   -- Lowered its ratings on ALBA 2005-1 and ALBA 2006-1’s class
      E notes, and ALBA 2006-2’s class A3a and A3b notes; and

   -- Affirmed its ratings on ALBA 2005-1’s class A3 notes, ALBA
      2006-1’s class A3a and A3b notes, ALBA 2006-2’s class B and
      F notes, and ALBA 2007-1’s class A2, A3, B, C, D, and E
      notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance based on the most recent information that S&P
received from each transaction's investor report.

ALBA 2005-1

Delinquencies of more than 90 days have declined to 3.93% from
6.82% since S&P's previous review.

S&P's weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) assumptions
at the 'AAA' and 'AA' rating levels and our weighted-average loss
severity (WALS) assumptions have also decreased since S&P's June
2012 review.  S&P's WAFF assumptions decreased due to reduced
delinquencies and increased seasoning.  S&P's WALS assumptions
decreased as a result of increasing house prices, which has
resulted in a decrease in S&P's weighted-average indexed current
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.  However, S&P's WAFF assumptions for
lower rating levels have increased since its June 2012 review due
to its assumption on capitalized arrears.

Rating level    WAFF (%)       WALS (%)

AAA                39.71          37.09
AA                 33.26          29.11
A                  28.29          16.92
BBB                24.04          10.64
BB                 19.61           6.96
B                  17.92           4.28

Available credit enhancement in this transaction has slightly
increased since S&P's June 2012 review, due to deleveraging.  The
transaction is currently paying both principal and interest
sequentially.

Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis and the application of its current counterparty
criteria, S&P considers the available credit enhancement for ALBA
2005-1's class B, C, and D notes to be commensurate with higher
ratings than those currently assigned.  S&P has therefore raised
to 'AA- (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)', to 'A- (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)', and
to 'BBB (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' its ratings on the class B, C, and D
notes, respectively.

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class A3
notes to be commensurate with our currently assigned rating.  S&P
has therefore affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A3
notes.

At the same time, S&P's analysis indicates that the available
credit enhancement for the class E notes is commensurate with a
lower rating than that currently assigned.  S&P has therefore
lowered to 'B- (sf)' from 'B (sf)' its rating on the class E
notes.

ALBA 2006-1

Arrears have declined to 15.07% from 21.14% since our June 2012
review.

S&P's WAFF assumptions at the 'AAA' and 'AA' rating levels and
its WALS assumptions have also decreased since its June 2012
review. S&P's WAFF assumptions decreased due to reduced
delinquencies and increased seasoning.  S&P's WALS assumptions
decreased as a result of increasing house prices, which has
resulted in a decrease in our weighted-average indexed current
LTV ratio.  However, S&P's WAFF assumptions for lower rating
levels have increased since its June 2012 review due to our
assumption on capitalized arrears.

Rating level    WAFF (%)      WALS (%)

AAA                42.08         43.79
AA                 35.89         37.11
A                  30.63         26.38
BBB                26.27         20.13
BB                 21.78         15.68
B                  19.93         11.73

Available credit enhancement in this transaction has slightly
increased since S&P's June 2012 review, due to deleveraging.  The
transaction is currently paying both principal and interest pro
rata, as all the pro rata conditions in the transaction documents
have been met.

Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis and the application of its current counterparty
criteria, S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the
class B, C, and D notes to be commensurate with higher ratings
than those currently assigned.  S&P has therefore raised to 'AA-
(sf)' from 'A+ (sf)', to 'A+ (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)', and to 'BBB
(sf)' from 'BB (sf)' its ratings on the class B, C, and D notes,
respectively.

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class A3a
and A3b notes to be commensurate with its currently assigned
ratings.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on
the class A3a and A3b notes.

S&P's analysis also indicates that the available credit
enhancement for the class E notes is commensurate with a lower
rating than that currently assigned.  S&P has therefore lowered
to 'B- (sf)' from 'B (sf)' its rating on the class E notes.

ALBA 2006-2

Delinquencies of more than 90 days have declined to 6.69% from
13.53% since S&P's June 2012 review.

S&P's WAFF assumptions at the 'AAA' and 'AA' rating levels and
its WALS assumptions have also decreased since S&P's previous
review. S&P's WAFF assumptions decreased due to reduced
delinquencies and increased seasoning.  S&P's WALS assumptions
decreased as a result of increasing house prices, which has
resulted in a decrease in our weighted-average indexed current
LTV ratio.  However, S&P's WAFF assumptions for lower rating
levels have increased since its June 2012 review due to our
assumption on capitalized arrears.

Rating level    WAFF (%)       WALS (%)

AAA                38.68          39.61
AA                 33.04          32.79
A                  28.16          21.88
BBB                24.34          15.70
BB                 20.28          11.51
B                  18.51           8.02

Available credit enhancement in this transaction has slightly
increased since S&P's June 2012 review, due to deleveraging.  The
transaction is currently paying both principal and interest pro
rata, as all the pro rata conditions in the transaction documents
have been met.

Following the application of S&P's criteria for rating U.K.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions, the
class A3a, A3b, and B notes pass our cash flow stresses at higher
rating levels than those currently assigned.  However, S&P do not
consider the guaranteed investment contract (GIC) documentation
to be in line with its current counterparty criteria.
Consequently, the highest rating that these classes of notes can
achieve is equal to S&P's long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on
the GIC provider, Barclays Bank PLC (A-/Stable/A-2).  S&P has
therefore lowered to 'A- (sf)' from 'A (sf)' its ratings on the
class A3a and A3b notes, and has affirmed its 'A- (sf)' rating on
the class B notes.

At the same time, taking into account the results of S&P's credit
and cash flow analysis and the application of its current
counterparty criteria, S&P considers the available credit
enhancement for the class C, D, and E notes to be commensurate
with higher ratings than those currently assigned.  S&P has
therefore raised to 'A- (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)', to 'BBB (sf)'
from 'BB (sf)', and to 'BB- (sf)' from 'B (sf)' its ratings on
the class C, D, and E notes, respectively.

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class F
notes to be commensurate with our currently assigned rating.  S&P
has therefore affirmed its 'B- (sf)' rating on the class F notes.

ALBA 2007-1

Delinquencies of more than 90 days have declined to 5.75% from
8.48% since our June 2012 review.

S&P's WAFF assumptions at the 'AAA' and 'AA' rating levels and
its WALS assumptions have decreased since its June 2012 review.
S&P's WAFF assumptions decreased due to reduced delinquencies and
increased seasoning.  S&P's WALS assumptions decreased as a
result of increasing house prices, which has resulted in a
decrease in S&P's weighted-average indexed current LTV ratio.
However, S&P's WAFF assumptions for lower rating levels have
increased since its June 2012 review due to our assumption on
capitalized arrears.

Rating level    WAFF (%)       WALS (%)

AAA                42.91          47.20
AA                 36.37          40.69
A                  30.67          30.03
BBB                26.14          23.60
BB                 21.49          19.00
B                  19.53          14.85

Available credit enhancement in this transaction has increased
since S&P's June 2012 review, due to deleveraging.  The
transaction is currently paying both principal and interest
sequentially.

Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis and the application of its current counterparty
criteria, S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the
class A2, A3, B, C, D, and E notes to be commensurate with our
currently assigned ratings.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on the class A2 and A3 notes, and its 'A- (sf)',
'BBB (sf)', 'BB- (sf)', and 'B (sf)' ratings on the class B, C,
D, and E notes, respectively.

S&P's credit stability analysis indicates that the maximum
projected deterioration that it would expect at each rating level
for one- and three-year horizons under moderate stress conditions
is in line with S&P's credit stability criteria.

The transaction account and GIC provider in each of these
transactions is Barclays Bank.  Following S&P's June 9, 2015,
downgrade of Barclays Bank, it breached the documented 'A-1'
replacement trigger as stated in the transaction documents for
ALBA 2005-1, ALBA 2006-1, and ALBA 2007-1.  Currently, S&P is
still within the replacement period.  According to the
transaction documents, in order to maintain the current rating on
the notes, the GIC provider and transaction account provider must
take remedial action within the remedy period indicated in S&P's
current counterparty criteria. Failure to take such action may
lead to further rating actions.

ALBA 2005-1, ALBA 2006-1, ALBA 2006-2, and ALBA 2007-1 are backed
by mortgage pools of nonconforming first-ranking residential
mortgages in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.

RATINGS LIST

Class                    Rating
                To                    From

ALBA 2005 - 1 PLC
GBP301 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

B               AA- (sf)              A+ (sf)
C               A- (sf)               BBB- (sf)
D               BBB (sf)              BB (sf)

Rating Lowered

E               B- (sf)               B (sf)

Rating Affirmed

A3              AAA (sf)

ALBA 2006 - 1 PLC
GBP556.25 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

B               AA- (sf)              A+ (sf)
C               A+ (sf)               BBB+ (sf)
D               BBB (sf)              BB (sf)

Rating Lowered

E               B- (sf)               B (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A3a             AAA (sf)
A3b             AAA (sf)

ALBA 2006 - 2 PLC
EUR110 Million, GBP466.641 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate
Notes

Ratings Raised

C               A- (sf)               BBB- (sf)
D               BBB (sf)              BB (sf)
E               BB- (sf)              B (sf)

Ratings Lowered

A3a             A- (sf)               A (sf)
A3b             A- (sf)               A (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B               A- (sf)
F               B- (sf)

ALBA 2007 - 1 PLC
EUR190 Million, GBP841 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate
Notes

Rating Affirmed

A2              AAA (sf)
A3              AAA (sf)
B               A- (sf)
C               BBB (sf)
D               BB- (sf)
E               B (sf)


CLS OFFSHORE: Shareholders Buy Business; CVA Agreement Vetoed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Pullinger at Eastern Daily Press reports that CLS
Offshore, which had been battling debts of about GBP5 million
went into administration after HM Revenue and Customs, vetoed a
proposed company voluntary arrangement (CVA).

However, the shareholders of CLS Offshore, led by founder David
James, have quickly struck a deal to acquire the business which
will now trade as CLS Global Solutions, Eastern Daily Press
relates.

According to Eastern Daily Press, Mr. James said in a statement:
"Following the decision to veto the CVA agreement, negotiations
were held with investors and a deal was agreed through a brief
period of administration."

"This included a reduction in personnel and the return of the
major shareholders to manage the day to day operations of the
business leading to the previous managing and financial directors
exiting the business."

The company has been asked to clarify the position of CLS
Offshore's 100-plus creditors but declined to expand on its
statement, Eastern Daily Press notes.

Had the CVA been accepted, creditors would have received about
50p% of money owed over a period of up to five years, Eastern
Daily Press states.

The company, whose workforce had steadily declined during its
troubles from a peak of more than 200, also declined to confirm
the scale of redundancies, Eastern Daily Press relays.

According to Eastern Daily Press, a creditors' meeting was told
last month that CLS, based in Malthouse Lane, had run into
difficulties over two major contracts, putting "great pressure"
on the company's working capital and extending its resources.

CLS Offshore is a Gorleston-based offshore firm.


STONEGATE PUB: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'B+' CCR
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has revised its
outlook on British pub operator Stonegate Pub Co. Ltd. to
negative from stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+' long-term corporate
credit rating on the company and its 'B+' long-term issue rating
on Stonegate's senior secured notes.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's opinion that Stonegate's free
cash flow generation is under a degree of pressure as a result of
higher-than-expected capital expenditure (capex) and less-
favorable working capital movements.

Historically, the company has reported positive working capital
inflows, which helped to boost operating cash flows, but in the
financial year (FY) ending Sept. 30, 2015, S&P expects working
capital to be neutral.  Over the same period, S&P expects
Stonegate to invest approximately GBP40 million on refurbishing
recently acquired pubs.

S&P also believes that Stonegate may continue to acquire pubs to
add to its portfolio, which in turn could require additional
capex for refurbishment and conversion to Stonegate brands.  This
would place further strain on free cash flow generation, and
ultimately Stonegate's liquidity position, which is at the low
end of S&P's requirements for "adequate" liquidity according to
its criteria definitions.

The rating on Stonegate continues to reflect S&P's view of the
company's business risk profile as "fair" and the financial risk
profile as "highly leveraged," as S&P's criteria define the
terms. This combination of business and financial risk profiles
results in an anchor of 'b'.  To reflect that S&P views
Stonegate's business risk as being at the higher end of "fair"
compared with peers that operate under the higher-risk "tenanted"
business model -- as opposed to Stonegate's "managed" model --
S&P adds one notch to the 'b' anchor by assigning a positive
comparable rating analysis modifier, to arrive at S&P's final
rating of 'B+'.

S&P views Stonegate's financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged."  Both of S&P's core leverage ratios -- Standard &
Poor's-adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt and debt to
EBITDA -- are distant from the thresholds S&P would associate
with a higher assessment.  S&P estimates FFO to debt will remain
below 10% in the coming years, and debt to EBITDA will stay above
6x, including S&P's adjustment for operating leases.  In
addition, the group's private equity ownership means that S&P
caps its financial risk assessment at "highly leveraged."

S&P considers Stonegate's financial metrics to be favorable
compared with peers in the "highly leveraged" financial risk
category.  In addition, Stonegate has significant asset backing,
with underlying property value greater than GBP400 million --
exceeding the company's outstanding financial debt.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Around 3% revenue growth in FY2015 and 5% in FY2016
      reflecting the continued underlying strength in Stonegate's
      business as well as the recent acquisition of 15 sites from
      Macalay Inns.

   -- Adjusted EBITDA margin improving to about 18%-19% over the
      next 12-18 months as additional cost synergies are realized
      from recent acquisitions.

   -- Neutral working capital in FY2015, turning modestly
      positive in FY2016.

   -- Relatively high capex of about GBP40 million in FY2015 and
      GBP36 million in FY2016, as the company continues to
      refurbish recently acquired sites and convert them to
      Stonegate brands.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 7.0x-7.5x in FY2015,
      falling below 7x in FY2016.

   -- Unadjusted EBITDA interest coverage of about 3.0x in both
      years.

   -- Marginal free operating cash flow, although this assumes no
      additional opportunistic acquisitions.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's expectations of weakening
free operating cash flow over the next 12 months.  While S&P sees
Stonegate's core business as growing steadily, there are risks to
free cash flow generation and the company's liquidity position as
a result of increased capex to refurbish newly acquired sites,
neutral or slightly positive working capital inflows, and
opportunistic outside acquisitions.

S&P could lower the ratings if Stonegate's reported free cash
flow generation does not recover to at least GBP10 million in
September, or if its liquidity position were to significantly
weaken.  This could occur if the company were to accelerate its
investment program, or if it decided to undertake a more sizable
opportunistic acquisition.  Additionally, S&P could lower the
ratings if reported EBITDA interest coverage were to fall
consistently below 2x.

S&P could revise its outlook back to stable if Stonegate were to
exceed S&P's revised expectations with regards to operating
performance, and generated significantly higher levels of
operating cash flow.  Additionally, S&P would look for
improvements in FFO to debt to above 12% and debt to EBITDA to
below 5x, which is commensurate with S&P's definition of an
"aggressive" financial risk profile.  S&P do not consider an
upgrade as likely in the near term.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* S&P Takes Rating Actions on European Synthetic CDO Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on five European synthetic collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) of CDOs tranches.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Placed on CreditWatch positive its rating on one tranche;
      and

   -- Affirmed its ratings on four tranches.

The rating actions are part of S&P's regular monthly review of
European synthetic CDOs.  The actions reflect, among other
things, the effect of recent rating migration within reference
portfolios and recent credit events on referenced obligations.
S&P has used its SROC (synthetic rated overcollateralization; see
"What Is SROC?" below) tool to surveil S&P's ratings on these
synthetic CDOs.

WHERE S&P HAS PLACED ITS RATINGS ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

The tranche's current SROC exceeds 100%, which indicates to S&P
that the tranche's credit enhancement is greater than that
required to maintain the current rating.  Additionally, S&P's
analysis indicates that the current SROC would be greater than
100% at a higher rating level than currently assigned.

WHERE S&P HAS AFFIRMED ITS RATINGS

S&P has affirmed its ratings on those tranches for which credit
enhancement is, in S&P's opinion, still at a level commensurate
with their current ratings.

ANALYSIS

The rating actions follow the application of S&P's relevant
criteria.

S&P has used its CDO Evaluator model 6.3 to determine the amount
of net losses in each portfolio that S&P expects to occur in each
rating scenario.

S&P has also applied its top obligor and industry tests.

WHAT IS SROC?

One of the main steps in S&P's rating analysis is the review of
the credit quality of the portfolio referenced assets.  SROC is
one of the tools S&P uses when surveilling its ratings on
synthetic CDO tranches with reference portfolios.

SROC is a measure of the degree by which the credit enhancement
(or attachment point) of a tranche exceeds the stressed loss rate
assumed for a given rating scenario.  SROC helps capture what S&P
considers to be the major influences on portfolio performance:
Credit events, asset rating migration, asset amortization, and
time to maturity.  It is a comparable measure across different
tranches of the same rating.

http://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-
/view/type/HTML/id/1410502


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *