TCREUR_Public/150709.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Thursday, July 9, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 134

                             Headlines

B U L G A R I A

UNITED BULGARIAN: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings


F R A N C E

EUROPCAR GROUPE: Moody's Raises CFR to 'B1' Following IPO
TECHNIP: To Cut 6,000 Jobs Following Oil Price Decline


G E R M A N Y

SENVION HOLDING: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to EUR400MM Sr. Notes
STABILUS SA: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating


G R E E C E

GREECE: Deadline Set for Bailout Deal, Faces Bankruptcy Risk
PIRAEUS BANK: Rolls Over EUR4.5 Billion of "Phantom Bonds"


I R E L A N D

CLERYS: Nash Says Legal Protection in Liquidation Sufficient
CLERYS: Traders Weigh Cost of Fighting Liquidation Process
PHOENIX PARK: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class E Notes
TAURUS CMBS 2007-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A2 Notes to B3


I T A L Y

BLUE PANORAMA: July 23 Deadline Set for Submission of Offers


K A Z A K H S T A N

KAZKOMMERTSBANK: S&P Keeps 'B' ICR on CreditWatch Negative


N E T H E R L A N D S

AI ALABAMA: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to 7-Yr. EUR205MM Loan


R U S S I A

BANK ENO: Under Provisional Administration; Licensed Revoked
BANK GAGARINSKY: Put Under Provisional Administration
BANK KLIENTSKY: Under Provisional Administration; License Revoked
BANK STARIY: Under Provisional Administration; License Revoked
NATIONAL FACTORING: Moody's Changes Outlook on B3 Ratings to Neg.

PROMSBERBANK CJSC: Bank of Russia Gives Update on Administration
RUSSNEFT: Moody's Confirms B2 Corp. Family Rating, Outlook Neg.
STANDARD BANK: Fitch Lowers LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'B-'
URALKALI OJSC: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB+'


S P A I N

EMPARK APARCAMIENTOS: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB', Outlook Stable


U K R A I N E

BANK KYIV: Deposit Guarantee Fund Starts Liquidation Procedure
DNIPROPETROVSK CITY: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'CCC-' ICR
IVANO-FRANKIVSK CITY: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'CCC-' ICR
LVIV CITY: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws CCC- Issuer Credit Rating
UKREXIMBANK: Creditors Okay US$1.5-Bil. Restructuring Deal


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRIT LIMITED: Fitch Cuts Rating on Subordinated Notes to 'BB'


U Z B E K I S T A N

KAPITALBANK: S&P Revises Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'B-/C' Rating


                            *********


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B U L G A R I A
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UNITED BULGARIAN: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'B-/C' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on United
Bulgarian Bank (UBB).  The outlook remains negative.

The rating action follows S&P's review of UBB after the lowering
of the rating on UBB's 99% owner the National Bank of Greece
(NBG) to 'SD' (selective default) on June 30, 2015.

In S&P's view, the Bulgarian regulator has partly ring-fenced UBB
to minimize the contagion risk for UBB from its Greek parent and
prevent capital or liquidity outflows to the parent.  UBB has
liquidated its exposure to NBG, except for a Bulgarian lev (BGN)
152.8 million (about EUR78 million) subordinated loan to be
repaid by year-end 2017 through annual installments of BGN50.9
million, which accounted for about 3% of UBB's funding as of
March 31, 2015.  As part of the ring-fencing UBB is not paying
any dividends to NBG for 2014.  UBB maintains a high ratio of
liquid assets to customer deposits in excess of 30%.

S&P continues to reflect contagion risk from NBG in S&P's view of
UBB's 'b-' stand-alone credit profile (SACP), namely in S&P's
assessment of UBB's business position and liquidity.  S&P's
"moderate" business position assessment continues to reflect
concerns on reputation risk weighing on UBB's franchise and
possibly reducing its ability to attract customers, due to its
ownership by the Greek bank.  For the same reason, S&P continues
to regard UBB's liquidity as "moderate" due to concerns about a
potential customer deposit outflow.

S&P notes that in the first half of 2015, UBB's retail deposits
reduced by 5.5%, but the bank did not experience major outflows
in June 2015 when deposit outflows at its parent intensified and
the rating on NBG was lowered.  Moreover, as of July 1, 2015,
about 30% of UBB's total assets were in liquid form, representing
a cushion against contagion risk from the parent.  In addition,
S&P considers UBB's capitalization to be adequate and
substantially exceeding regulatory capital requirements.  UBB's
Tier 1 and total capitalization ratios were 24.2% and 27.4%,
respectively, as of year-end 2014, well exceeding the regulatory
minimum of 11.5% and 13.5%.

The ratings on UBB continue to reflect the 'bb' anchor, which is
the starting point of S&P's rating on commercial banks operating
in Bulgaria, and the bank's "moderate" business position,
"adequate" capital and earnings, "weak" risk position, "average"
funding, and "moderate" liquidity, as defined in S&P's criteria.

The long-term rating on UBB is at the same level as S&P's SACP
assessment, reflecting two opposing dynamics.  On the one hand,
S&P adds a one-notch uplift to the SACP to reflect potential
extraordinary government support to UBB.  This is because S&P
views UBB as having "high systemic importance" as the fourth-
largest bank in Bulgaria, with a sound market share of retail
deposits, and S&P classifies the Bulgarian government as
"supportive" of the country's banking sector.  On the other hand,
S&P applies a negative adjustment of one notch to take into
account the contagion risk related to UBB's parent, NBG.

The negative outlook on UBB mainly reflects ongoing near-term
contagion risk due to UBB's ownership by NBG and high uncertainty
regarding Greece's future.  It also reflects the negative
economic and industry trends in Bulgaria's banking industry, due
to limited growth prospects, high nonperforming loans, and
material ownership of Bulgarian banks by Greek financial
institutions.

S&P could lower the ratings on UBB if:

   -- Its view of extraordinary Bulgarian government support to
      UBB were to weaken;

   -- Contagion risk were to materialize and erode UBB's SACP,
      especially with regard to funding and liquidity from
      material deposit outflows; or

   -- UBB's business continuity were threatened by developments
      at the parent.

S&P could revise its outlook on UBB to stable if S&P saw signs of
improvements at NBG, while UBB continues to demonstrate stable
funding and liquidity metrics, and the negative trend in economic
and industry risks for Bulgarian banks reverses.



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F R A N C E
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EUROPCAR GROUPE: Moody's Raises CFR to 'B1' Following IPO
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded Europcar Groupe S.A.'s
corporate family rating to B1 from B3 and probability of default
rating to B1-PD from B3-PD.  Concurrently, Moody's changed the
instrument rating on the EUR475 million Senior Notes due 2022,
the obligations of which have been transferred to the company
from Europcar Notes Limited after the completion of Europcar
Groupe S.A.'s initial public offering (IPO), to definitive B3
from provisional (P)B3 and upgraded EC Finance Plc's instrument
rating on the EUR350 million Senior Secured Notes due 2021 to B2
from B3.  The outlook on the ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action follows the Paris IPO of Europcar, with 50.3%
of the share capital now in public ownership with Eurazeo and
ECIP Europcar S.a.r.l holding the remaining 49.7% before the use
of an over-allotment option exercisable until July 24, 2015.  Net
IPO proceeds of approximately EUR441 million were mainly used to
redeem the EUR324 million Senior Subordinated Secured Notes due
2017.  Concurrently to the completion of the IPO, Europcar used a
portion of the proceeds from the issuance of the EUR475 million
Senior Notes due 2022 to redeem the EUR400 million Senior
Subordinated Unsecured Notes due 2018.  The overfunding from the
IPO and Notes issuance of approximately EUR112 million is
earmarked for strategic initiatives, including bolt-on
acquisitions.

"Europcar's B1 CFR reflects the company's improved credit metrics
following its IPO, the proceeds of which were used to reduce its
outstanding debt.  Pro-forma for the IPO, Europcar's adjusted
leverage ratio improves to 4.0x (pro-forma for the IPO and debt
refinancing as of December 31, 2014 and as adjusted by Moody's
mainly for operating leases) from 4.4x while adjusted EBITDA-to-
Interest increases to 3.8x on a pro-forma basis from 2.4x.  The
CFR also reflects Moody's expectation that Europcar will
experience further improvement in metrics in 2015 driven by the
positive growth momentum, which started in 2014, in the context
of a more favorable market in Europe, which we expect to grow at
around 2-3% over the next 2 years and improving profitability
from ongoing cost savings generated through the Fast Lane
Programme", says Sebastien Cieniewski, Moody's lead analyst for
Europcar.

However, Moody's notes that de-leveraging will be limited as
improved operating performance will be partly offset by
additional drawings under the asset-backed fleet financing to
fund the increasing fleet base.  On the other hand, in a weaker
trading environment, Moody's expects Europcar to reduce the size
of its fleet using the proceeds from the disposal of vehicles to
reduce its outstanding debt.  Europcar is largely protected from
the residual value exposure of the used car market as the
majority of its rental fleet consists of program cars that will
be repurchased by the automobile OEMs for a predetermined price
within a short time period.

The B3 rating assigned to the EUR475 million Senior Notes due
2022 reflects their relatively weaker security package and/or the
absence of guarantees from operating subsidiaries compared with
Europcar's other debt facilities, including the EUR350 million
Senior Secured Notes due 2021 rated B2 issued at the level of EC
Finance plc.  Moody's also considers that the Senior Secured
Notes should remain below the CFR considering their subordination
to other bank facilities.  These bank facilities include the
EUR350 million Revolving Credit Facility, which benefits from a
strong collateral package, considering its first ranking
collateral on bank accounts, receivables, and share pledges, as
well as guarantees by the majority of Europcar's operating
entities.  In addition, the EUR350 million Senior Secured Notes
rank junior relative to sizeable fleet debt, as they are secured
on a second priority interest on some fleet assets, that are also
securing the Senior Asset Revolving Facility, which has a first
priority ranking.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Europcar
will experience continued top line growth over the rating horizon
in the context of a more favorable macro-economic environment.

Upward rating pressure could develop if adjusted leverage
decreases to below 3.5x and EBITDA-to-Interest increases above
4.5x on a sustainable basis, and the company generates positive
free cash flow and maintains a good liquidity profile.

On the other hand, negative pressure could arise if adjusted
leverage trends towards 4.5x, EBITDA-to-Interest decreases to
below 3.25x, the liquidity position weakens, and/or the company
adopts a more aggressive financial policy.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Equipment and
Transportation Rental Industry published in December 2014.  Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Paris, France, Europcar is the European leader
in car rental services, providing short- to medium-term rentals
of passenger vehicles and light trucks to corporate, leisure and
replacement clients.  Founded in 1949, Europcar has a global
presence in over 140 countries, giving access to a global car
rental network with c.3,650 stations (of which around 1,620 are
directly- or agent-operated with the remaining being franchises).
Europcar operates in five main markets: Germany, the UK, France,
Italy, and Spain with additional operations in Portugal, Belgium,
Australia and New Zealand.  In FY 2014, Europcar generated total
revenues of EUR1,979 million.


TECHNIP: To Cut 6,000 Jobs Following Oil Price Decline
------------------------------------------------------
Michael Stothard at the Financial Times reports that Technip
announced a profit warning and 6,000 job cuts, becoming the
latest victim of the fall in the oil price.

The Paris-based group said late on July 6 it would take a EUR650
million charge related to the restructuring, leaving shares down
8% on July 7 in the biggest drop of the year, the FT relates.

According to the FT, Technip noted that the sharp fall in oil
prices "has had a substantial impact on clients' behavior,
national and international oil companies alike", adding that this
has "worsened over the last two months".

"The slowdown in the oil and gas industry is prolonged and
harsh," the FT quotes Thierry Pilenko, Technip's chief executive,
as saying.

Mr. Pilenko said the 15% drop in headcount, combined with an
accelerated reduction of Technip's fleet size, will help the
company save EUR830 million a year by 2017, the FT relays.

The company plans to reduce its presence through sales or
closures in some countries where it believes it is unlikely to be
profitable in the medium term, including in Europe, Asia and
Latin America, the FT says.

Technip is a European oil and gas services group.



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G E R M A N Y
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SENVION HOLDING: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to EUR400MM Sr. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive B2 rating to
the EUR400 million senior secured notes issued by Senvion Holding
GmbH and guaranteed, among others, by Rapid TopCo GmbH, following
a review of the final bond documentation.  The corporate family
rating (CFR) of B1 and the probability of default rating (PDR) of
B1-PD of Rapid TopCo GmbH remain unchanged.  The outlook on all
the ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The assignment of a B2 rating to the EUR400 million senior
secured bond, which is one notch below the CFR, principally
reflects the bond's subordinated position in the loss given
default waterfall with regards to the super senior secured
syndicated facility in a default scenario, even though the
facility and the bond share the same guarantor and collateral
package.  The facility is large enough (i.e., EUR125 million
revolving credit facility and EUR825 million letter of guarantees
facility) to justify the notching of the senior secured bond
below the CFR.  The EUR825 million letter of guarantees facility,
although not a cash credit, also enjoys super seniority status
versus the notes.

The CFR of B1 primarily reflects Senvion's (1) structurally low
profitability with mid-single-digit Moody's-adjusted EBITA
margins, which, while broadly in line with other wind turbine
generator (WTG) manufacturers, is below the vast majority of
similarly rated manufacturing companies; (2) limited product and
end industry diversification, with a focus on the wind market in
which continued regulatory support dictates growth; and (3)
geographical concentration risk, with three key markets (i.e.,
Germany, France and UK) representing almost 55% of the group's
cumulative installed capacity to date.

However, the B1 CFR assignment balances the aforementioned
constraints against a number of positive factors, including the
Senvion's (1) modest leverage for the rating category (3.7x pro
forma Moody's-adjusted gross debt/EBITDA expected for fiscal year
(FY) 2014-15 ended March 31, 2015); (2) size and market
leadership positions, ranking number four to five worldwide and
typically number two to three in its key markets; (3)
historically relatively stable and resilient profitability
compared to some other WTG competitors as well as some other
similarly rated manufacturing companies, owing to low vertical
integration with a very high share of component outsourcing
leading to a fairly variable cost base and an increasing share of
highly profitable and fairly stable and predictable service
business (roughly 10% of revenues); (4) healthy order book with
roughly 1.5 years of sales (excluding service backlog) as of
December 2014, providing good revenue visibility in the short-
term.

RATIONALE FOR OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects the rating agency's expectation that
Senvion will in the next 12-18 months (1) maintain a Moody's-
adjusted EBITA margin of around 5%; (2) continue generating
positive free cash flow and (3) improve its leverage, with its
Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA moving below 3.5x.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Upward pressure on the rating could arise if Senvion were to
demonstrate its ability to (1) sustain its Moody's adjusted EBITA
margin above 5% (5% expected for FY2014-15); (2) further build on
its track record of meaningful positive free cash flow
generation; and (3) sustainably improve its Moody's-adjusted
debt/EBITDA towards 3.0x (3.7x expected pro-forma for FY2014-15).

Moody's could downgrade Senvion if its (1) Moody's EBITA margin
were to fall sustainably well below 5% (5% expected for FY2014-
15), indicating that it is unable to withstand competitive
pressure in the market; (2) free cash flow turned negative for a
pro-longed period; (3) Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA deteriorated
sustainably above 4.0x (3.7x expected pro-forma for FY2014-15);
or (4) liquidity profile deteriorated.

Rapid TopCo GmbH will be the ultimate parent holding company of
the Senvion group.  Headquartered in Hamburg, Germany, Senvion
group is one of the leading manufacturers of WTGs.  The group
develops, manufactures, assembles and installs WTGs with rated
outputs ranging from 2 MW to 6.15 MW, covering all wind classes
in both onshore and offshore markets.  The group does not engage
in project development or wind farm ownership.  Senvion employs a
workforce of more than 3,400 worldwide and generated revenues of
almost EUR2 billion in the 12-month period to December 2014, with
cumulative installed capacity worldwide of approximately 12 GW.
Senvion has been recently sold to Centerbridge Partners LP, USA
(unrated) for approximately EUR1 billion.


STABILUS SA: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has affirmed its
'B+' long-term corporate credit rating on Germany-based auto
supplier Stabilus S.A.  S&P subsequently withdrew the rating at
the company's request.  The outlook was stable at the time of the
withdrawal.

S&P also affirmed and then withdrew its 'B+' long-term issue and
'4' recovery ratings on the company's outstanding EUR256 million
senior secured 7.75% notes due 2018.

The ratings have been withdrawn following Stabilus' decision to
redeem the outstanding senior secured notes on June 16 with
drawings under new bank facilities of EUR320 million, comprising
a EUR270 million term loan and EUR50 million revolving credit
facility.

At the time of withdrawal, the ratings on Stabilus reflected
S&P's view of its business risk profile as "fair" and its
financial risk profile as "aggressive."

S&P's business risk profile assessment was constrained by the
company's modest size, limited end-market diversity with a focus
on the auto sector, and narrow product range with niche
applications.  Supportive factors for the business risk profile
were its leading market position in gas springs and dampers, the
geographical spread of its operations, its long-established
customer relationships, and its growing revenues and profits.

In S&P's base-case scenario for the financial year ending
Sept. 30, 2015, S&P expects revenue growth to continue, with
reported EBITDA margins of around 15%.  S&P forecasts limited
free operating cash flow (FOCF), after investments in working
capital and capital expenditure to expand the business, and S&P
envisage limited dividend payments.  S&P expects leverage metrics
to continue to improve, with Standard & Poor's-adjusted funds
from operations (FFO) to debt of around 20% and debt to EBITDA of
around 3.2x.  As of March 31, 2015, S&P estimates Stabilus'
adjusted debt at EUR312 million, adjusted FFO to debt of 15%, and
debt to EBITDA of 3.3x.

At the time of the withdrawal, S&P continued to apply a one-notch
downward adjustment to the 'bb-' anchor for its comparable
ratings analysis, reflecting its view that Stabilus' business
risk profile is at the lower end of the range relative to peers
in the "fair" category.  S&P revised its financial policy
modifier to neutral from financial sponsor-5 following the
reduction in shareholding held by Triton, which had no impact on
the rating.  S&P continued to assess liquidity as "adequate."

Stabilus is a developer and manufacturer of gas springs,
hydraulic dampers, and electromechanical lifting equipment used
in the auto and industrial sectors.  In the financial year to
Sept. 30, 2014, the company reported revenues of EUR507 million.

At the time of the withdrawal, the stable outlook reflected S&P's
view that Stabilus' operating performance and leverage metrics
will improve, with ratios of FFO to debt and debt to EBITDA of
around 20% and 3.2x respectively for the current financial year,
but this is tempered by S&P's expectations of limited FOCF.



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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Deadline Set for Bailout Deal, Faces Bankruptcy Risk
------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Spiegel, Anne-Sylvaine Chassany and Duncan Robinson at The
Financial Times report that Greece was given five days to reach a
deal with its creditors or face bankruptcy after European leaders
called an emergency summit for Sunday, July 12, of all 28 EU
members to decide the country's fate.

In the strongest language since the start of the six-month stand-
off between the far-left government in Athens and eurozone
lenders, EU leaders said the No vote in the weekend referendum
had severely constrained their ability to offer Greece aid and
warned that any new bailout deal would include much tougher terms
than those that could have been reached just two weeks ago, the
FT relates.

"I am strongly against Grexit [Greek exit from the eurozone] but
I can't prevent it if the Greek government is not doing what we
expected," the FT quotes Jean-Claude Juncker, the European
Commission president, as saying.  "We have a Grexit scenario
prepared in detail: we have a scenario as far as humanitarian aid
is concerned."

Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, brushed aside suggestions
that a short-term financing deal could be reached to take Athens
through the summer before a two or three-year bailout agreement
is agreed, insisting that the Greek government come forward with
a full range of reforms that could cover a multiyear program, the
FT notes.

According to the FT, she warned that, with the Greek economy in a
tailspin, Athens would have to suggest new ways to make up an
even bigger fiscal gap than before Alexis Tsipras, the Greek
prime minister, was forced to close his country's banks last
week.  She gave Athens until today, July 9, to present those
plans, the FT relays.

Mr. Tsipras, as cited by the FT, said he was ready to make
"efforts" to reach an accord that "guarantees a way out of the
crisis".

Greece has faced, and missed, repeated deadlines over the course
of the stand-off but EU leaders made clear that a final decision
on the country's future would be made on Sunday, July 12, the FT
discloses.

Many eurozone officials expressed extreme pessimism that a deal
could be reached -- Ms Merkel said she was not "somebody who is
very optimistic" -- and many said they had become resigned to
Greece exiting the eurozone, the FT notes.

Mario Draghi, the European Central Bank president, briefed the
summit on the situation for Greek banks, indicating that they
could survive to the end of the week but not much longer, the FT
relates.  He also signaled that emergency central bank loans
keeping the banks alive, which the ECB must approve, could not be
extended beyond the weekend, the FT states.

"Our inability to find agreement may lead to the bankruptcy of
Greece and the insolvency of its banking system," the FT quotes
Donald Tusk, the European Council president, as saying.  "For
sure, it will be most painful for the Greek people."

According to the FT, the ECB is weighing whether to withdraw the
emergency loans -- it receives government-backed securities as
collateral for the loans, which become worthless if Greece goes
bankrupt -- and has indicated that it will ask eurozone leaders
to guarantee Greece's solvency before cutting the aid.

Without the ECB-approved loans, Greek banks would collapse and a
new currency would be needed to restart the financial sector, the
FT relays.  Asked whether Greece might need to introduce a
parallel currency, Ms. Merkel, as cited by the FT, said the issue
had been discussed by eurozone finance ministers.


PIRAEUS BANK: Rolls Over EUR4.5 Billion of "Phantom Bonds"
----------------------------------------------------------
Tom Beardsworth and Luca Casiraghi at Bloomberg News report that
Piraeus Bank SA rolled over EUR4.5 billion (US$4.9 billion) of
bonds issued to itself and used as collateral for emergency loans
from the Bank of Greece as the nation's lenders struggle to
survive.

The three-month notes, which are guaranteed by the Greek
government, replace securities issued in April, according to data
compiled by Bloomberg.

Former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis wrote on his blog last
year such "phantom bonds" are designed to get around the European
Central Bank's emergency lending rules and amount to a "hidden
bailout" by taxpayers, Bloomberg recounts.  The ECB tightened
collateral conditions on July 6, making it more difficult for
Greek banks to access the funds that have kept them alive,
Bloomberg relays.

"It's perfectly legal but tests the bounds of logic," Bloomberg
quotes Ioannis Glinavos, a senior lecturer at the University of
Westminister in London, as saying.  "It's circular financing,
artificially inflating the ratings so it can draw liquidity out
of the euro system."

While the risk of emergency liquidity assistance is nominally
borne by the national central bank that provides it, the
Frankfurt-based ECB has broad discretion over the terms,
Bloomberg notes.

Headquartered in Athens, Piraeus Bank S.A., together with its
subsidiaries, provides various banking products and services in
the Southeastern Europe, Greece, Western Europe, and Egypt.

                           *   *   *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 5,
2015, Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2 the
long-term deposit ratings of Piraeus Bank SA.



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I R E L A N D
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CLERYS: Nash Says Legal Protection in Liquidation Sufficient
------------------------------------------------------------
Charlie Taylor at The Irish Times reports that minister for
Business and Employment Ged Nash has said he believes there is
sufficient legal protection in place to deal with issues arising
from cases such as the liquidation of the department store
Clerys.

Mr. Nash, as cited by The Irish Times, said workers and creditors
at Clerys would not get paid over and above statutory payments by
the liquidators but added that current law does provide for a
situation where assets are kept in one arm of a company, while
losses accumulate in another part, which is then liquidated.

The Minister said that in economic terms, the State may well turn
out to be the biggest loser in the controversy as it will have to
pay out large sums of money to former employees of the company,
The Irish Times relates.

According to The Irish Times, in a report sent to the Government
on July 7 on the closure of the department store, Mr. Nash again
urged the owners of Natrium, the joint venture which acquired the
Clerys building last month, to meet with him to discuss its
future plans.

In a letter addressed to Taoiseach Enda Kenny sent with the
preliminary report, Mr. Nash said he did not believe there were
deficiencies in the legislative framework to protect employees
and creditors and to recover corporate assets, The Irish Times
relays.  He said he expected that the company's assets should be
available to the liquidators but said that if this turns out not
to be the case that action should be taken to address the issue,
The Irish Times notes.

Clerys was sold last month by Boston-based Gordon Brothers to
Natrium, which comprises Irish investment group D2 Private, and
Cheyne Capital Management in the UK, with financing from Quadrant
Real Estate Advisers, The Irish Times recounts.

OCS Operations Ltd., which ran the department store, was then
placed into liquidation in dramatic fashion, resulting in the
immediate closure of the department store and the loss of about
400 jobs, The Irish Times discloses.

Clerys is a Dublin-based retailer.  The company owns three home
furnishings stores, in Leopardstown and Blanchardstown in Dublin,
and in Naas, Co Kildare.


CLERYS: Traders Weigh Cost of Fighting Liquidation Process
----------------------------------------------------------
Irish Independent reports that traders owed nearly EUR1 million
from the closure of Clerys are weighing whether to oppose the
confirmation of Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson as
liquidators.

The High Court named the KPMG partners as joint provisional
liquidators of the company that operated Clerys on June 12, but
the appointments need to be confirmed by the court, according to
Irish Independent.

A group of 15 "concessionaires" who traded in the department
store say they may try to block that confirmation, but face a
potential legal bill of EUR20,000 if they opt to fight the case,
the report relates.

Siptu, which represents workers who lost jobs when Clerys was
shut, had been expected to oppose the confirmation of the
liquidators but it is understood the union will not now
intervene, fearing it could delay redundancy payouts, the report
notes.

Natrium, the company which bought Clerys from Gordon Bros this
month, moved swiftly to put OCS Operations Ltd, which ran Clerys,
into liquidation, the report discloses.

The report says that the group of 15 mainly smaller concession
holders in the department store are being represented by
solicitor Michael Lavelle and met to discuss the crisis.

One of the main stumbling blocks for the group is thought to be
the legal costs associated with trying to replace the liquidators
with their own nominee, the report notes.  The traders are
carrying an already huge financial cost, the report discloses.

Keith Rogers, who is head of retail for shoe company Ecco, said
his company had spent thousands of euro on shoes for the upcoming
autumn season and would likely have to cut prices at other
outlets as a result of the Clerys debacle, the report relays.

"[The closure] is devastating to be honest. It affects different
companies in different ways," the report quoted Mr. Rogers as
saying.  "We had 11 staff in Clerys, and while they have been re-
employed, it does increase our costs," Mr. Rogers said.
The report notes that Mr. Rogers added: "In our case, we bought
thousands of shoes to sell in Clerys but now must be sold in
other stores, and customers may benefit but at a cost to us."

In a department store, concessions rely on the department store
to manage their cash. The takings are then reimbursed to the
concession at a later date, Mr. Rogers said, the report relays.

But Clerys closed down just before a payment was due to the
concession holders, leaving them out of pocket on six weeks of
takings. Several businesses are on the verge of going bust
because of the Clerys debacle, Mr. Rogers said, the report
relays.

Louise Hogan, who ran the "Nail Zone" concession, said she is
looking for a new location in the city center but time was
running out to keep the business afloat, the report relates.
"When we eventually got the stock back last week, I had to store
some of it in my car, only for it to be robbed," Ms. Hogan said,
the report notes.

The closure of Clerys has had a brutal effect, Ms. Hogan said.
Her words were echoed by Mushiirah Umarlehah -- the manager of
the "Wink" eye salon in Clerys, the report adds.


PHOENIX PARK: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Phoenix Park CLO Limited as follows:

EUR236 million class A-1 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR47 million class A-2 affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR24 million class B affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR23 million class C affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR24 million class D affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR14 million class E affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR45.3 million subordinated notes: not rated

Phoenix Park CLO Limited is an arbitrage cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO). Net proceeds from the notes were used to
purchase a EUR400 million portfolio of European leveraged loans
and bonds. The portfolio is managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds
Management Europe Limited. The transaction features a four-year
reinvestment period.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation reflects the transaction's stable performance.
There have been no reported defaults and the transaction is
currently passing all portfolio profile and collateral quality
tests. Credit enhancement has increased marginally for all rated
notes and the transaction is EUR1.5 million above target par.

On the effective date, the transaction increased the maximum
weighted average rating factor to 34.5 from 34, the minimum
weighted average spread to 4.1% from 4% and reduced the minimum
weighted average recovery rate to 65.8% from 69.35%. The
transaction covenants represent a compliant matrix point and the
current levels are within the thresholds. Most notably the
weighted average recovery rate is passing the minimum covenant by
3.6% and the weighted average rating factor is 1.72 below the
maximum covenant.

The portfolio has experienced positive rating migration compared
with the target portfolio at closing. Based on Fitch's
classification, debt from the US, France and Germany represents
53.5% of the portfolio and the top five industries represent
47.14%. Peripheral exposure, defined as exposure to countries
with a Country Ceiling below 'AAA', accounts for 8.4% of the
portfolio and resides within Italy and Spain, within the
restriction of 10%. Floating rate assets currently represent 100%
of the collateral balance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would
lead to a downgrade of up to three notches for the rated notes. A
25% reduction in the expected recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to three notches for the rated notes.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


TAURUS CMBS 2007-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A2 Notes to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of these
classes of Notes issued by Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2007-1
Limited.

Moody's rating action is:
  EUR407.6 mil. A1 Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
   May 1, 2014 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  EUR21.3 mil. A2 Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
   May 1, 2014 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E,
Class F, Class X1, and the Class X2 Notes.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action results from the Note Event of Default (NEoD)
on the May 2015 interest payment date (IPD) after a non-payment
of interest on the most senior class of Notes and an increase in
Moody's loss expectation driven by the underperformance of the
pool's largest loan, Fishman JEC (79% of current pool balance).

Due to the opening of safeguard proceedings in respect of the
borrowers under the Fishman JEC loan all income is frozen in
respect of the Fishman JEC Whole Loan until a safeguard plan is
adopted by the French courts.  Drawings under the liquidity
facility were insufficient to cover the entire shortfall on the
notes mainly due to legal costs associated with the safeguard
proceedings related to the Fishman JEC Loan.

The safeguard plan, if adopted in its current form, will entail a
property disposal plan which extends beyond the notes' legal
final maturity date in February 2020.  Due to the currently
proposed timing of the repayment plan, the risk is increased that
noteholders do not receive recovery proceeds by that date.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Main factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade or
downgrade of the ratings are higher or lower than expected
recoveries from any court approved safeguard repayment plan by
legal final maturity date combined with higher or lower than
expected recoveries from the Hutley Portfolio Loan.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BLUE PANORAMA: July 23 Deadline Set for Submission of Offers
------------------------------------------------------------
Giuseppe Leogrande, The Extraordinary Commissioner of Blue
Panorama Airlines S.p.A., under Extraordinary Administration, in
compliance with the authorization issued by the Ministry of the
Economic Development on June 17, 2015, disclosed that in the
context of the procedure for the sale of the going concern
through private negotiation conducted by the Company, the
deadline for the finalization of the binding purchase offers
already submitted or the submission of new offers is extended
until 5:00 p.m. on July 23, 2015.

The binding offers should be delivered by registered letter to
the office of the Notary Public Marco Jeva, in Viva Maria
Cristina no. 8, Rome, Italy from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., and from
3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Monday through Thursday and from 9:00
a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on Friday.

The terms and conditions for the admissibility of the offers
pointed out in the preceding notices, and specifically in the
notice published on May 29, 2015, shall continue to be
applicable.

Starting from July 1, 2015, the form of the agreement that shall
govern the transfer of the going concern and the regulation for
the selection of the prospective purchaser shall be included in
the data room.

Reiterating that the submission of a binding purchase offer shall
result in the full acceptance of any and all terms and conditions
of the agreement governing the transfer of the going concern in
the form filed with the data room, all offerors are invited to
submit, along with the purchase offer, a copy of the agreement
duly initiated on each page as evidence of the full acceptance of
relevant terms and conditions.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KAZKOMMERTSBANK: S&P Keeps 'B' ICR on CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services kept on CreditWatch with
negative implications its 'B' long-term issuer credit rating on
Kazakhstan-based Kazkommertsbank JSC (KKB).

S&P also kept on CreditWatch negative its 'kzBB' national scale
rating on KKB and our 'CCC' rating on its subordinated debt.

S&P placed its ratings on KKB and its debt on CreditWatch
negative on Oct. 13, 2014 because, in S&P's view, KKB's
consolidated capitalization had weakened following its
acquisition of Kazakhstan-based BTA Bank.  S&P expects KKB's
capital to remain under pressure given its weak earnings
generation and the burden of overwhelming levels of nonperforming
assets at both KKB and BTA (over 60% for KKB and BTA combined) as
of March 31, 2015.

In S&P's view, it will be extremely difficult for KKB's
management to achieve meaningful problem asset recovery at KKB
without material government support.  S&P understands that
because KKB has a significant market share in the banking sector,
the government is willing to facilitate the cleanup exercise by
providing support through Distressed Assets Fund JSC (DAF) that
was set up and provided with funding by the government with the
aim of supporting the clean-up exercise in the banking sector.

S&P previously expected government support to KKB to take the
form of transferring problem loans from the bank to DAF, but S&P
understands that the support measures that were being discussed
at the end of 2014 and beginning of 2015 were subsequently
changed. Instead of an asset transfer, an initial tranche of
KZT250 billion (about US$1.3 billion) provided by the government
to DAF will be used to provide KKB with long-term funding to help
the bank facilitate its problem loans recovery and clean-up. KKB
has signed an agreement with DAF to receive funding of KZT250
billion for 10 years and received the money in June.  This should
support KKB's capitalization.

S&P also understands that problem assets previously held by KKB
and BTA are to be concentrated at BTA, which has ceased to exist
as a banking institution.  BTA will be deconsolidated from KKB.
This should improve KKB ratio of nonperforming loans.

S&P expects to receive further information on the asset transfer
and deconsolidation of BTA within the next three months.  This
will enable S&P to assess the potential impact of the transfer on
KKB's capital position and resolve the CreditWatch placement.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch once it has further information
regarding the terms and details of the transfer of assets between
KKB and BTA and subsequent deconsolidation of BTA.  S&P's
analysis will also take into account any other developments that
might affect its assessment of KKB's capital.  S&P expects to be
able to clarify the ratings impact of these changes over the next
three months.

S&P could lower the ratings if KKB does not receive sufficient
capital relief to cause our forecasted Standard & Poor's risk-
adjusted capital (RAC) ratio to rise sustainably above 5%.  A
downgrade would become more likely if S&P observes a further
deterioration in the quality of the loan portfolio, a weakening
the capital position, or if the restructuring process becomes
elongated.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


AI ALABAMA: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to 7-Yr. EUR205MM Loan
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a definitive B1 (LGD3) rating
to the 7-year EUR205 million 1st Lien Term loan and the 6-year
EUR40 million Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) issued by AI
Alabama Midco B.V. ("Ammeraal").  A Caa1 (LGD 5) definitive
rating has been assigned to the 8-year EUR60 million 2nd Lien
Term Loan.  The borrower under the loans is AI Alabama B.V., the
holding company of Ammeraal Beltech Holding B.V. Proceeds from
the issuance will be used by Advent International Corporation to
part-fund the purchase price for Ammeraal, refinance Ammeraal's
existing debt as well as cover transaction-related fees and
expenses.

The company's B2 Corporate Family Rating (CFR), B2-PD probability
of default rating (PDR) as well as the stable outlooks on the
ratings, remain unchanged.  Moody's definitive ratings are in
line with the provisional ratings assigned on June 23, 2015.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B2 Corporate Family Rating reflects Ammeraal's good and
defensive, albeit not dominant, niche market position in the
relatively fragmented light-weight belting market.  Ammeraal is
exposed to cyclicality as evidenced by the decline in earnings in
the downturn of 2008/09.  However, Ammeraal's integrated business
model (manufacture and fabrication), product quality, innovation
and good customer relationships, have ensured a large proportion
of recurring revenues.  These characteristics have provided the
company with a greater degree of earnings stability and a
relatively swift recovery following the downturn.

The rating also reflects the good future demand fundamentals for
light-weight belting product and Ammeraal's strategy of targeting
strategic customers and identifying cross-selling opportunities.
This, combined with a notable step-up in Ammeraal's FY15 EBITDA
margin owing to improved product-mix and efficiency measures,
should modestly increase the generation of positive free cash
flow in the short to medium-term.  However, we highlight that
whilst Ammeraal's cost base and capex remain fairly flexible, the
higher debt burden following the buyout by funds managed by
Advent will increase the level of interest paid and also limit
Ammeraal's free cash flow (FCF) in terms of FCF to debt to the
low single digits.

A ratings constraint represents Ammeraal's high leverage
following the EUR305 million refinancing as measured by gross
adjusted debt/EBITDA.  This is expected to remain around 5.5x in
the medium-term.  Meaningful deleveraging from EBITDA growth is
not expected after 2015 as the EBITDA growth post 2015 is only
modest. Moreover the term loans do not amortize and we do not
expect cash surpluses to be made for the purpose of debt
repayment.  One possible use of cash surpluses is for
opportunistic bolt-on acquisitions to allow Ammeraal to
participate in the consolidation of the industry and accelerate
its growth plans.  However, in such a scenario, cash-funded
acquisitions would positively impact EBITDA and gross leverage.

The rating assumes Ammeraal is committed to deleveraging.
Covenants based on unadjusted total net debt/EBITDA are loosely
set and allow additional debt to be raised either through
drawings of the RCF and/or additional permitted indebtedness.
Signs of a more aggressive financial policy will likely lead to
negative rating action.

The company's liquidity is also deemed to be good in the context
of the rating.

Positive rating action is likely where:

   -- Improving trend in the company's market positions including
      greater penetration in Asia and the US

   -- Adjusted gross debt/EBITDA decreases to below 5.0x on a
      sustainable basis, reflecting both improvements in EBITDA
      but also the company's commitment to maintaining a
      conservative financial policy

   -- Free cash flow/debt is sustainably around the mid single-
      digit range, supported by EBITA margins of around 10%

Negative rating action is likely where:

   -- Deteriorating market positions, particularly in main
      markets such as Europe or within the food industry, where
      it currently benefits from a strong market position

   -- Adjusted gross debt/EBITDA sustainably in excess of 6.0x,
      reflecting a deterioration in EBITDA and/or additional
      indebtedness and evidence of an aggressive financial policy
      (dividends or large acquisitions)

   -- Interest coverage as defined by EBITA to interest expense
      weakens to below 1.5x

   -- Negative FCF on a sustainable basis

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The B1 ratings assigned to the EUR205 million senior secured
first lien term loan and the EUR40 million revolving credit
facility is one notch above the group's CFR.  The rating on these
instruments reflects their contractual seniority in the capital
structure and benefits from a collateral package.  This comprises
of a pledge over the majority of the group's assets as well as
upstream guarantees from most of the group's operating
subsidiaries, representing more than 80% of aggregate EBITDA and
assets.  Lenders of the second lien term loan benefit from the
same collateral and guarantee package, but on a subordinated
basis.  The rating of the second lien term loan, therefore, is
two notches below the group's B2 corporate family rating at Caa1.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Manufacturing Companies published in July 2014.  Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

COMPANY PROFILE

Ammeraal, incorporated in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, is a global
producer of light-weight belting products focusing on the
manufacturing, fabrication, assembly, sales and service of
synthetic belts (41% of FY14 revenues), modular belts (20% of
FY14 revenues), specialty belts (19% of FY14 revenues) and other
belt types representing the remainder.  The company serves a
variety of end markets including industries such as food,
logistics, industrials, airports, paper and print with customers
representing OEMs, distributors and end-users.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK ENO: Under Provisional Administration; Licensed Revoked
------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1551 dated July 3, 2015,
revoked the banking license of Krasnodar-based credit institution
JSC ENO (PJSC).

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- due to the credit institution's failure to
comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia regulations,
repeated violations within one year of Bank of Russia
requirements stipulated by Article 7 (excluding Clause 3 of
Article 7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism", as well as Bank of Russia regulations issued in
accordance with the said Federal Law, and application of measures
envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian
Federation (Bank of Russia)".

ENO implemented a high-risk lending policy and failed to make
provisions on possible losses on loans and other assets
commensurate with the risks assumed.  Besides, the credit
institution failed to comply with legislation requirements as
regards countering the legalization (laundering) of criminally
obtained incomes and the financing of terrorism in respect of
identifying its clients.  At the same time, the rules of internal
control of the credit organization to counter the legalization
(laundering) of criminally obtained incomes and the financing of
terrorism did not comply with Bank of Russia regulations.  The
management and owners of the credit institution did not take any
effective measures to bring its activity back to normal.

The Bank of Russia has appointed a provisional administration to
ENO for the period until the appointments of a receiver pursuant
to the federal law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive body are suspended.

ENO is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The revocation
of the banking license is an insured event envisaged by Federal
Law No. 177-FZ "On Insurance of Household Deposits with Russian
Banks" regarding the banks' obligations on deposits of households
determined in accordance with legislation.

According to financial statements, as of June 1, 2015, JSC ENO
(PJSC) ranked 759th by assets in the Russian banking system.


BANK GAGARINSKY: Put Under Provisional Administration
-----------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1549 dated July 3, 2015,
revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit institution
Commercial Bank Gagarinsky.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, and due to repeated violations within one year of
the requirements stipulated by Article 7 (excluding Clause 3 of
Article 7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism", and also taking into account application of measures
envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian
Federation (Bank of Russia)".

Bank Gagarinsky implemented high-risk lending policy and did not
create adequate loan loss provisions commensurate with risks
assumed.  These practices consistently created grounds for the
bank's initiating measures to prevent insolvency (bankruptcy).
Besides, the credit institution did not comply with the
requirements of legislation on anti-money laundering and
combating the financing of terrorism in respect of customer
identification procedure.  The management and owners of the bank
have not taken measures required to normalize its activities.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1550 dated July 3, 2015,
appointed a provisional administration to Bank Gagarinsky for the
period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator
under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the
credit institution's executive bodies are suspended.

Bank Gagarinsky is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.

According to its financial statements, as of June 1, 2015,
Bank Gagarinsky ranked 384th by assets in the Russian banking
system.


BANK KLIENTSKY: Under Provisional Administration; License Revoked
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1545 dated July 3, 2015,
revoked the banking license of JSC Bank Klientsky.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- due to the credit institution's failure to
comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia regulations,
repeated violations within one year of Bank of Russia regulations
issued in accordance with the Federal Law "On Countering the
Legalisation (Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the
Financing of Terrorism", and due to applications within one year
of measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of
the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)".

Due to the low quality of its assets, Bank Klientsky failed to
adequately assess its loan portfolio and the risks thereto
related.  An adequate assessment risks assumed created grounds
for the bank to implement insolvency (bankruptcy) prevention
measures.  At the same time, the credit institution implemented
an aggressive lending policy and failed to comply with the
supervisory authority's instructions to restrict its activities.

Bank Klientsky also failed to comply with Bank of Russia
regulations in terms of countering the legalization (laundering)
of criminally obtained incomes and the financing of terrorism in
respect of submitting to the authorized body of reliable data on
operations subject to obligatory control.  Bank management and
owners did not take any measures to bring its activity back to
normal.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1546, dated July 3, 2015,
appointed a provisional administration to Bank Klientsky for the
period until the appointments of a receiver pursuant to the
federal law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator
under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the
credit institution's executive body are suspended.

Bank Klientsky is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event envisaged
by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On Insurance of Household Deposits
with Russian Banks" regarding the banks' obligations on deposits
of households determined in accordance with legislation.

According to financial statements, as of June 1, 2015,
JSC Bank Klientsky ranked 200th by assets in the Russian banking
system.


BANK STARIY: Under Provisional Administration; License Revoked
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1547 dated July 3, 2015,
revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit institution
Bank Stariy Kreml, LLC.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, and due to repeated violations within one year of
the requirements stipulated by Article 7 (excluding Clause 3 of
Article 7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism", and also taking into account application of measures
envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian
Federation (Bank of Russia)".

Bank Stariy Kreml implemented high-risk lending policy and did
not create adequate loan loss provisions commensurate with risks
assumed.  Besides, the bank did not comply with the requirements
of legislation on anti-money laundering and combating the
financing of terrorism in respect of timely submitting to the
authorized body reliable data on operations subject to obligatory
control, and also on customer identification procedure.  The
management and owners of the bank have not taken measures
required to normalize its activities.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1548 dated July 2, 2015,
appointed a provisional administration to Bank Stariy Kreml for
the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator
under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the
credit institution's executive bodies are suspended.

Bank Stariy Kreml is a member of the deposit insurance system.
The revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.

According to its financial statements, as of June 1, 2015, Bank
Stariy Kreml ranked 735th by assets in the Russian banking
system.


NATIONAL FACTORING: Moody's Changes Outlook on B3 Ratings to Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on National
Factoring Company's B3 long-term local and foreign-currency
deposit ratings and its B3 local-currency debt rating to negative
from stable.  At the same time, Moody's has affirmed these
ratings and has also affirmed the company's Not-Prime short-term
local and foreign-currency deposit ratings and the b3 baseline
credit assessment.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The key driver for changing the outlook to negative is the
increasing fragility of National Factoring Company's funding and
business profiles, given its high reliance on funding from a
related group of companies and particularly from Bank Uralsib
(Caa1/Caa1 negative, caa1) whose long-term deposit ratings were
recently downgraded.

Funding from Bank Uralsib and related companies accounted for
about 46% of National Factoring Company's non-equity funding, or
about 37% of its total assets as of year-end 2014.  Therefore,
given the limited funding alternatives, the ability to roll over
this funding is very important for National Factoring Company's
business and liquidity profiles.  Although Moody's believes the
willingness of Bank Uralsib and related companies to provide such
funding remains high, its recent downgrade of Bank Uralsib's
ratings means a weakened credit profile of the major fund
provider, and therefore, increasing refinancing risk for National
Factoring Company.

Despite its high reliance on others for much of its funding,
Moody's notes the liquid nature of National Factoring Company's
assets, with the majority of exposures being factoring advances
that are very short-term.  This should enable National Factoring
Company to accumulate sufficient liquidity in case it fails to
secure non-equity funding.  Despite that, the likelihood of a
scenario where the company is not able to refinance most of its
non-equity funding has now increased.  This potential scenario
would mean rapid deleveraging for the company and substantial
challenges for its business profile that might lead to loss-
making operations and capital erosion.  The risk of such a
scenario is now reflected in the outlook on National Factoring
Company long-term ratings.

The affirmation of National Factoring Company's ratings reflects
its strong reported capital adequacy, with an 18.5% equity-to-
assets ratio as of year-end 2014, weak but stable earnings and
its relatively conservative appetite for credit risk as reflected
in its historically low level of non-performing loans (NPLs).  In
2014, the volume of NPLs increased by 2.5% and credit costs
totaled 1.4% of average gross loans and factoring advances.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

An upgrade of the ratings is unlikely in the next 12 to 18 months
as reflected in the negative outlook.  National Factoring
Company's ratings could be downgraded if the company fails to
roll over its funding and/or were funding and credit costs to
increase, i.e. negatively affecting earnings and capital base.


PROMSBERBANK CJSC: Bank of Russia Gives Update on Administration
----------------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of CJSC Promsberbank appointed by
Bank of Russia Order No. OD-702 dated April 2, 2015, due to the
revocation of its banking license as a result of a full loss of
capital by the bank, encountered a considerable obstruction to
its activity starting the first day of its mandate.

The former management and owners of Promsberbank failed to pass
over to the provisional administration the originals of corporate
and retail credit agreements to the total amount of more than
RUR5 billion.

In the course of the inspection held, the provisional
administration established that prior to its banking license
revocation the bank had assigned to its affiliated Insurance
Company ORANTA, limited liability company, receivables under
credit agreements with marketable collateral worth RUR1.3 billion
in exchange for de facto missing securities.

In order to mask the unfair character of acquired receivables,
ORANTA (its license was revoked by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-
958, dated April 29, 2014) assigned the receivables of
Promsberbank to another party.  As a result, the ultimate
creditor is a non-resident company, which is affiliated with the
bank's owners and which, according to the Bank of Russia's
assessment, does not conduct any real business activities.

The examination of the financial standing of Promsberbank
established that the value of its assets did not exceed RUR1.9
billion, while the value of its liabilities to the creditors
totaled RUR6.1 billion.

In these circumstances, on June 9, 2015, the Moscow Arbitration
Court issued a ruling on recognizing the Bank insolvent
(bankrupt) and on initiating bankruptcy proceedings.  The state
corporation Deposit Insurance Agency was assigned the receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted information on the financial
transactions bearing the evidence of criminal offense conducted
by the former management and owners of Promsberbank to the
General Prosecutor's Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and to
the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for
consideration and procedural decision making.


RUSSNEFT: Moody's Confirms B2 Corp. Family Rating, Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed RussNeft's corporate
family rating and probability of default rating at B2 and B2-PD,
respectively.  The action concludes the review for downgrade
initiated on Feb. 20, 2015.  The outlook on the ratings is
negative.

"We have confirmed RussNeft's B2 rating following successful debt
restructuring efforts in partnership with Bank VTB, its largest
creditor, which will make it much easier for the company to
service its current debts," says Julia Pribytkova, a Moody's Vice
President -- Senior Analyst.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The confirmation of Russneft's ratings primarily reflects the
completion of debt restructuring and achievement of a sustainable
liquidity profile by the company for the medium term.  The
company's payments under its US$2.3 billion loan from Bank VTB,
JSC (VTB, Ba2 negative) will not exceed US$40.0 million a year
until March 2018, providing for a comfortable debt service
profile.

Moody's previous action on RussNeft was on Feb. 20, 2015, when
the agency downgraded the company to B2 from Ba3, and maintained
it on review for downgrade.  The action was triggered by the
company's anticipated difficulty servicing its debt and complying
with the financial covenants embedded in the loans provided by
VTB.

Recently completed debt restructuring orchestrated by VTB
simplified the company's debt/capital structure.  As of end-May
2015, total debt amounted to US$5.4 billion, of which third-party
debt was almost entirely represented by the US$2.3 billion loan
from VTB, the company's largest creditor.  The VTB loan has been
increased for the amount of the converted-into-debt US$0.7
billion guarantee issued by RussNeft in favour of its beneficiary
Mr. Gutseriev.  Other debt is represented by approximately US$3.0
billion worth of promissory notes issued to related parties,
including US$0.8 billion of converted payables to Neftisa group
(unrated), and US$1.3 billion issued to the leading diversified
natural resources group Glencore International AG (Glencore, Baa2
stable), which remains a shareholder at the level of RussNeft's
various operating subsidiaries and the company's second-largest
creditor.  RussNeft expects to convert up to US$900 million of
Glencore debt into equity at the company's holding level.

Moody's notes that the conversion of payables and addition to
debt following M&A activity increased RussNeft's leverage
measured by gross debt/EBITDA to more than 7.0x in 2015.
However, third party debt/EBITDA remains within the rating
agency's expectations at 2.8x.  All promissory notes are
contractually subordinated to the VTB loan, which fully amortizes
by 2023.

Moody's foresees material refinancing risk for RussNeft starting
from March 2018, when the company will have to repay US$500
million a year, an amount exceeding the company's current cash
flow generation.

RussNeft has no rated debt.

RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on the company's ratings reflects Moody's
expectation that RussNeft will further evolve in the medium term,
which may involve merging into other holdings of the beneficiary
(which are not within the rated perimeter, such as Neftisa), and
engaging in meaningful asset transfer transactions with related
parties.

Although debt restructuring resulted in VTB exercising greater
control over RussNeft's debt/capital structure, Moody's notes
that the visibility on the company's future asset composition,
long-term capital structure, production profile and financial
policies, as well as information disclosure, remains very
limited.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's could upgrade RussNeft if it demonstrated (1) greater
clarity and stability over its reserves, production and cash flow
generation profile, addressing Moody's longer term liquidity
concerns; (2) an ability to maintain profitability and reserves
replacement ratios commensurate with industry levels; (3) clarity
on the group's assets composition and organizational structure;
and (4) improvements to the company's capitalization profile via
conversion of part of the shareholder debt to equity.

Conversely, Moody's would consider a negative rating action if
RussNeft's financial and/or operating profile were to deteriorate
beyond Moody's current expectations.  Lack of transparency over
future cash flow generation capacity, including that resulting
from related-party transactions would also exert pressure on the
ratings.

Headquartered in Moscow, RussNeft operates a number of oilfields
on the territory of Russia.  The company had more than 706.6
million barrels of oil equivalent (boe) of proven oil and gas
reserves in accordance with the Society of Petroleum Engineers'
Petroleum Resources Management System (PRMS-SPE) classification
(based on proportionate ownership) as at Dec. 31, 2014.  In 2014,
RussNeft reported US$2.9 billion in revenue and its Moody's --
adjusted EBITDA amounted to US$0.9 billion.


STANDARD BANK: Fitch Lowers LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Russian Standard Bank's (RSB) Long-
term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and senior debt to 'B-' from
'B'. At the same time, the agency has downgraded the bank's
Viability Rating (VR) to 'ccc' from 'b' and subordinated debt
rating to 'CC' from 'B-'. The Outlooks on the IDRs are Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, VR, NATIONAL RATING AND DEBT RATINGS

The downgrade of RSB's VR to 'ccc' reflects the ongoing
deterioration of its core capital position amid a weakening
operating environment, which has resulted in a marked
deterioration in asset quality and pre-impairment profitability.
As a result, under regulatory accounts RSB's core retail business
has been loss-making since 4Q14 and is not expected to return to
breakeven in the near future, meaning that pressure on the
capital position is likely to remain.

RSB's Long-term IDRs, senior debt rating and National rating are
driven by the bank's standalone creditworthiness, as expressed by
its VR. The downgrades of these ratings reflect the downgrade of
the VR. However, the Long-term IDRs and senior debt rating are
notched up once from RSB's VR, reflecting the considerable
protection offered to senior creditors by RSB's loss-absorbing
junior debt. Fitch estimates that at end-5M15 RSB's 'new style'
subordinated debt with loss-absorption features was equal to 9%
of regulatory risk-weighted assets. If RSB approaches non-
viability this debt may be fully or partially written off to help
restore the bank's solvency. Total subordinated liabilities,
including 'old style' non-loss-absorbing debt and a subordinated
loan from Vnesheconombank (VEB), were equal to 15% of risk-
weighted assets at end-5m2015. In Fitch's view, it is less likely
that facilities apart from the 'new style' subordinated debt
would be used to help restore the bank's core capital.

The downgrade of RSB's 'new style' subordinated debt rating to
'CC' from 'B-' reflects the downgrade of the bank's VR. The
subordinated debt rating is one notch lower than the VR due to
expected weak recovery prospects for the debt in case of the bank
reaching non-viability.

RSB's Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio dropped to below 1% at end-
2014, and Fitch estimates that this would have turned negative by
end-5M15. FCC (RUB1 billion at end-2014) is significantly lower
than RSB's reported Basel II Tier I capital (RUB13 billion), as
Fitch deducts RSB's investment in the treasury shares of its
holding company (RUB5.5 billion at end-2014), deferred tax assets
(RUB5.2 billion) and intangibles (RUB1.2 billion) from RSB's IFRS
equity to calculate FCC. RSB's regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio is
supported by the non-deduction of these assets, but was only
marginally above the regulatory minimum of 6% at end-5M15.

RSB's weak core capital position is further undermined by (i) the
bank's RUB10 billion of net non-core corporate loans, of which
RUB3.6 billion to related parties; (ii) the RUB12 billion
difference at end-2014 between the carrying value and the fair
value of RSB's sizeable portfolio of held-to-maturity securities
(equal to 25% of end-2014 assets), although this difference is
likely to have reduced significantly since; and (iii) a RUB3.8
billion investment (net of reserves) in the equity of a related
alcohol company, contributed as new equity in 2Q15. These
exposures were equal to a combined 7% of regulatory risk-weighted
assets at end-5M15.

RSB's 2014 IFRS accounts indicated a further significant
deterioration of asset quality in retail lending, as credit
losses (defined as generation of non-performing loans (90 days
overdue) divided by average performing loans) reached 29% in 2H14
(24% for FY2014), up from 20% in 1H14 and 14% in 2013. This
compares with RSB's breakeven loss rate of 12% in 2014. Continued
significant provisioning of the loan book in regulatory accounts
in 5M15 suggests asset quality has yet to stabilize.

Pre-impairment profitability has weakened considerably as a
result of increased funding costs and sluggish new loan
production, as the portfolio contracted by 20% in 5M15 in order
to reduce capital pressure. Fitch estimates RSB's operating loss
in 5M15 regulatory accounts at RUB9.5 billion (equal to 24% of
end-2014 statutory equity), only partially offset by the RUB3.8
billion contribution of the alcohol company stake. Fitch expects
RSB to report a further loss in 2H15, notwithstanding a likely
gradual reduction in funding costs as the policy rate comes down.

In Fitch's view, RSB has sufficient liquidity to meet the put
option on its USD525 million senior unsecured eurobond on
July 11, 2015. If this facility is repaid in full, remaining
liquidity will be equal a moderate 8% of retail deposits.
However, customer funding has been reasonably stable to date and
cash generation from shrinking loan book remains significant.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

RSB's '5' Support Rating reflects Fitch's view that support from
the bank's private shareholder cannot be relied upon. The Support
Rating Floor of 'No Floor' also reflects the agency's view that
support from the Russian authorities cannot be relied upon to the
extent that this would prevent losses for senior creditors, given
the bank's still small size and lack of overall systemic
importance. However, some support, for example in the form of
regulatory forbearance or facilitation of a takeover of the bank,
is possible, given its considerable retail deposit franchise
(RUB162bn at end-5M15).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

As the Long-term IDRs and senior debt ratings are notched up from
RSB's VR, they and the National rating are sensitive to a
downgrade of the VR.

The notching up of the IDRs and senior debt above the VR is
sensitive to changes in Fitch's view on RSB's potential capital
requirements, and the extent to which a write down of the bank's
subordinated debt could be sufficient to meet these. The notching
could also be widened or eliminated if it becomes clearer that
senior creditors will not/will be required to take losses as part
of any resolution process required by the bank.

VR AND SUBORDINATED DEBT

Further deterioration of RSB's capital position could lead to a
downgrade of the VR. If RSB breaches minimum regulatory capital
adequacy ratios without any prospect of its solvency being
restored, then its VR is likely to be downgraded to 'f'. A
stabilization of performance and the capital position would
reduce downward pressure on the VR and subordinated debt rating.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

RSB's Support Rating could be upgraded if it is acquired by a
more highly-rated entity. An upward revision of the Support
Rating Floor is unlikely given the bank's limited systemic
importance.

The rating actions are as follows:

Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: downgraded to 'B-'
from 'B'; off Rating Watch Negative (RWN); Outlook Negative

National Long-term Rating: downgraded to 'BB-(rus)' from 'BBB-
(rus)'; off RWN; Outlook Negative

Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; off RWN

Viability Rating: downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b'; off RWN

Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Senior unsecured debt (including that issued by Russian Standard
Finance SA) downgraded to 'B-' from 'B', Recovery Rating 'RR4';
off RWN

Subordinated debt (issued by Russian Standard Finance SA) Long-
term rating: downgraded to 'CC' from 'B-', Recovery Rating 'RR5';
off RWN


URALKALI OJSC: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Russia-based OJSC Uralkali's
(Uralkali) Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) to 'BB+' from
'BBB-'. The Outlook is Negative. The foreign currency senior
unsecured rating on Uralkali Finance Limited's notes has been
downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.

The downgrade reflects Uralkali's weakened financial and
operational profile as well as corporate governance that can no
longer be considered materially above average against Russian
peers. It follows a USD1.1 billion share buyback and commencement
of a discretionary dividend policy from 2015 at a time of low
production following the Solikamsk mine accident, leading to
accelerated capex spend, and continued weak potash pricing. As a
result, Fitch forecasts funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net
leverage will go over the negative rating sensitivity of 2.5x to
3.0x at FY15, and may stay above 2.5x after 2015 subject to the
shareholder distributions made after the announced buyback. This
is despite Uralkali's continued leading cost position in the
potash market and strong cash generative capacity through the
cycle.

The Negative Outlook reflects the uncertainty around the future
pace of deleveraging stemming from uncertainty on future
shareholder returns, following Uralkali's departure from its
previously communicated deleveraging target.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Share Buybacks increase Leverage

In 2013, Fitch revised the Outlook to Negative when debt-funded
share-buy backs threatened the group's credit profile and were
followed by a subsequent collapse in potash prices due to the
break-up of BPC, Uralkali's trading joint-venture with Belarus-
based JSC Belaruskali. Fitch then revised the Outlook to Stable
in 2014 following management making debt reduction a priority and
publicly guiding to a net debt to EBITDA target below 2.0x.

The company has departed from this target by carrying out a
further USD1.1bn share buyback in 2015 and adopting a less
predictable discretionary dividend policy. This is at a time of
low production following the Solikamsk mine accident leading to
accelerated capex spend and continued weaker than expected potash
price recovery, meaning FFO adjusted net leverage will reach
around 3x at FY15.

Corporate Governance Discount Increases

Fitch has re-evaluated the one-notch corporate governance
discount applied by it on Uralkali's IDR following the share
buyback and commencement of a discretionary dividend policy. The
notching reflected the above average corporate governance that
Uralkali's diversified shareholding structure, listing on LSE and
MICEX and robustness of financial strategy provided. Fitch notes
that several majority shareholders may have allied interests
despite the presence of independent directors, and that a less
concentrated shareholder structure does not necessarily imply
balance of interests across all stakeholders.

Fitch therefore now applies a two-notch corporate governance
discount to Uralkali, on a par with its Russian peers with a
concentrated ownership structure.

Lower Production, Higher Capex

The flood accident at Uralkali's Solikamsk-2 potash mine resulted
in around 1.7mt of lost capacity meaning 2015 production is
expected at 10.4mt, down from 12.1mt in 2014. Production is not
expected to reach 2014 levels until 2020 when new potash fields
come on line. Uralkali has therefore accelerated capex plans to
help bring production on line in order to help partially restore
production volumes over the next few years. This will help it
recover market share and earnings, although Fitch does not
forecast Uralkali will meet 2014 sales levels until 2017.

Uralkali's decrease in earnings from lower production is offset
by rouble depreciation, which is helping lower Uralkali's
production costs compared with its US dollar-linked revenues.

Continued Pricing Pressure

The break-up of the BPC potash cartel resulted in intensifying
competition on prices since late 2013 as Uralkali fought to
regain lost market shares. This was a stark departure from the
supply-discipline that had characterised the market and
underpinned the resilience of potash prices through the cycle.
Spot Free on Board prices remain at depressed levels of over
USD300/t in 2015 reflecting the fundamental rebasing of potash
prices at a lower level. Uralkali's seaborne contract to China,
the floor for global prices, was set at a slight increase to 2014
levels at USD315/t from USD305/t. Fitch forecasts a prudent 2%
increase in potash prices per year to 2018. However, we believe
that low potash prices will continue, considering significant
excessive capacity in the market as well as potential capacity
coming on in Canada and a low grain environment in the short
term.

Leverage Drives Negative Outlook

Under Fitch's base case, Uralkali's vertical integration and
competitive cost base continue to translate into EBITDA margins
of around 50% through the cycle. Under Fitch's forecast, FFO net
leverage increases to 3x at FY15 following the share buyback.
However, it is then forecast to remain over guideline levels of
2.5x until 2018 due to pressure from higher capex, lower prices
and lower production. Combined with Uralkali's departure from a
previously communicated deleveraging target and the recent
adoption of a less predictable discretionary dividend policy,
this drives the Negative Outlook.

Country and Industry Risks

Rating constraints include Uralkali's full exposure to the potash
demand cycle. In Fitch's view, combined with the high
contribution of emerging markets to revenues (64% in 2014
excluding Russia), this implies higher earnings volatility than
for more diversified peers. Although these markets present strong
growth potential, they also tend to exhibit more erratic demand
patterns than mature agricultural regions. Operational risks are
also higher in potash mining as the water soluble salt deposits
are susceptible to flooding. Finally, the rating is constrained
by the higher than average legal, business and regulatory risks
associated with Russia (BBB-/Negative/F3).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

-- A further lower rebasing of potash prices, material
    disruptions and decrease in production or a continued
    aggressive financial policy resulting in FFO net leverage
    sustained materially above 2.5x (FYE15: 3x)

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

-- A stable and transparent financial policy resulting in FFO
    net leverage sustainably moving to below 2.5x over the next
    two years could lead to the stabilization of the Outlook.

-- A stable and transparent financial policy, coupled with an
    improvement in potash pricing and higher production resulting
    in FFO net leverage sustainably below 1.5x could lead to an
    upgrade.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Uralkali's liquidity is robust with USD2.5bn of available cash at
YE14 and positive free cash flow generation forecast over 2015,
against USD0.7 billion short-term financial obligations and a
cash outflow of USD1.1 billion for the share buyback. The buyback
in May 2015 has had a limited impact on liquidity as Uralkali had
ample available cash to cover the buyback. Uralkali also
continues to access capital markets as demonstrated by the recent
four-year pre-export financing loan of USD655 million.



=========
S P A I N
=========


EMPARK APARCAMIENTOS: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB', Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on Spanish car park concession operator EMPARK
Aparcamientos y Servicios, S.A. (Empark) to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P raised to 'BB' from 'BB-' the issue ratings
on Empark's Funding S.A.'s EUR235 million secured fixed-rate
notes due 2019 and EUR150 million secured floating-rate notes due
2019. The recovery rating on both of these issues is '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery
prospects for noteholders in the event of a payment default.  S&P
sees the recovery prospects as being in the higher half of the
30%-50% range.

The upgrade reflects Empark's good operating performance in 2014
on the back of a recovering Spanish economy, which saw the
company's financial ratios improve.  In S&P's revised base-case
scenario, it now expects Empark will maintain adjusted FFO to
debt above 6% over the next two years as the Spanish economy
continues to strengthen and lead to growing volumes in parking
facilities. S&P has therefore revised its assessment of Empark's
financial risk profile to "aggressive" from "highly leveraged."

Empark's "strong" business risk profile reflects S&P's view that
the company benefits from long-term concessions in key parking
infrastructure in major cities across Spain and Portugal.  In
terms of number of parking spaces, Empark is the largest operator
in these markets, giving it significant scale advantages over key
peers on the Iberian Peninsula.  Despite significant economic
pressures, the company has managed to maintain EBITDA margins
above 30% through regulated price increases and cost
efficiencies -- this supports S&P's view of the company's
business risk profile.  S&P considers it important that Empark
has no significant exposures to Spanish or Portuguese
municipalities, given the current economic conditions in those
countries.  The company typically collects money from customers,
rather than municipalities.  Where Empark collects on behalf of
the municipalities, it can typically deduct its costs before
passing the proceeds on to the municipalities.

These strengths are partially offset by the fact that Empark
manages car parks for third parties on a contract basis; S&P sees
the contract management business as significantly weaker than the
core business because the contracts are short-term and less
profitable.  The management contracts have also shown the
potential to be loss making if mispriced.

The "aggressive" financial risk profile incorporates these base-
case assumptions.

   -- S&P has updated its macroeconomic assumptions in line with
      its updated macroeconomic forecast.  The GDP changes have
      been positive; in 2015, S&P expects GDP growth in Spain
      will be 3.0% and in 2016, 2.6%.

   -- For Empark's off-street parking business, S&P has assumed
      moderate volume growth of 2%-3% in 2015 and 2016, in line
      with the GDP forecast.  S&P also expects relatively flat
      pricing due to low inflation forecasts in the eurozone.
      There are no major concession maturities in 2014 or 2015,
      leading to moderate like-for-like revenue growth (excluding
      the effects of the sale of the Sevilla car parking
      facility).

   -- In the on-street parking business S&P sees revenue growth
      of about 0%-2% mainly driven by growth through new
      contracts.

   -- S&P sees some improvement in EBITDA margins in the off-
      street parking business driven by higher use, while on-
      street profitability is expected to be flat to negative.

   -- S&P anticipates Empark's management contract business will
      generate a small negative EBITDA.

   -- In S&P's base case, it assumes about EUR15 million-EUR20
      million of capital expenditure (capex) in 2015 and 2016.
      S&P also anticipates that the company will make no
      dividends, allowing it to generate some discretionary cash
      flow in 2015.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- EBITDA margin of 35%-36%;
   -- Weighted average FFO to debt between 7%-8%; and
   -- EBITDA interest coverage between 2x-3x.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Empark will be able
to maintain adequate liquidity over the next 12 months and that
management is unlikely to take actions that would lead to a
material increase in leverage beyond S&P's base-case assumptions.

S&P could lower the ratings if Empark's FFO to debt was to
decline below 6%, for example due to weaker-than-anticipated
volumes in its car parking business or higher-than-anticipated
shareholder returns.  In S&P's view, volumes would have to
decline by about 2% (our base case assumes growth in volumes) for
the FFO to debt to drop below 6%.

S&P could raise the rating if adjusted FFO to debt increased on a
sustainable basis to above 8%.  In S&P's view, this will require
material positive revisions of Spanish and Portuguese GDP growth,
which would lead to greater use of off-street parking facilities.
For an upgrade S&P anticipates that the company would need to
grow revenues by about 6% and materially improve its EBITDA
margin and reduce leverage.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


BANK KYIV: Deposit Guarantee Fund Starts Liquidation Procedure
--------------------------------------------------------------
interfax.com.ua reports that the Individuals' Deposit Guarantee
Fund has started the liquidation procedure of Bank Kyiv after the
transfer of its assets and liabilities to state-run Ukrgasbank,
the fund said on its website.

"Under a resolution of the Board of the NBU [National Bank of
Ukraine] No. 411 of June 24, 2015 on revoking the banking license
of insolvent Bank Kyiv and liquidating it, the executive
directorate of the fund issued order No. 122 on the start of the
liquidation procedure of Bank Kyiv," reads the report.

The liquidation procedure will last for one year -- until June
24, 2016. Oleh Kichuk has been appointed as bank liquidator.

The fund said that Ukrgasbank received assets worth UAH 740.1
million and liabilities worth UAH 1.379 billion. The fund saved
UAH 346.7 million from the transfer of Bank Kyiv's assets and
liabilities to Ukrgasbank, as all creditors and depositors of the
insolvent bank, including individuals and companies, became
clients of Ukrgasbank.

The fund said that all the liabilities to depositors of Bank Kyiv
in foreign currency were transferred to Ukrgasbank in the
national currency at the official exchange rate of the NBU on the
day when temporary administration was introduced at the bank, and
other conditions of the agreements were left unchanged.

As reported, on June 25, government-controlled Ukrgasbank (Kyiv)
finished the procedure of joining the assets and liabilities of
Bank Kyiv.

The special procedure was applied to Bank Kyiv, which will allow
the bank to be removed from the market and its deposits will be
transferred to another bank with a state owned stake --
Ukrgasbank.

Bank Kyiv was established in 1993. The bank was transferred to
the control of the state during the implementation of an anti-
crisis program to recapitalize crisis-hit banks. The Finance
Ministry's stake in the bank as of early January 2015 was
99.9369%.

Bank Kyiv ranked 67th among 158 operating banks as of January 1,
2015, in terms of total assets worth UAH 1.485 billion, according
to the NBU.


DNIPROPETROVSK CITY: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'CCC-' ICR
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC-' long-term
issuer credit rating and 'uaCCC-' Ukraine national scale rating
on the city of Dnipropetrovsk.  S&P subsequently withdrew the
ratings, due to termination of the contract.  At the time of
withdrawal, the outlook was negative.

As a "sovereign rating" (as defined in EU CRA Regulation
1060/2009 "EU CRA Regulation"), the ratings on Dnipropetrovsk are
subject to certain publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of
the EU CRA Regulation, including publication in accordance with a
pre-established calendar.  Under the EU CRA Regulation,
deviations from the announced calendar are allowed only in
limited circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed
explanation of the reasons for the deviation.  In this case, the
deviation has been prompted by the contract termination.

RATIONALE

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Dnipropetrovsk continues
to perform in line with S&P's base-case scenario.

The ratings on Dnipropetrovsk incorporate Ukraine's very volatile
and underfunded institutional framework, which causes S&P to view
the city's budgetary flexibility as very weak.  S&P also factors
in its view of Dnipropetrovsk's weak financial management, very
high contingent liabilities (even below the Ukrainian average)
related to municipal utilities, very weak economy, and weak
liquidity.  These constraints are mitigated by the city's very
low debt burden and average budgetary performance.  The long-term
issuer credit rating on Dnipropetrovsk is at the same level as
S&P's assessment of its stand-alone credit profile.

At the time of withdrawal, the outlook was negative, reflecting
S&P's view that Dnipropetrovsk's restricted access to its cash
reserves in the central government's treasury may lead to its
inability to service its debt within the next six months.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                               Ratings
                               To                  From
Ratings Affirmed
Dnipropetrovsk (City of)
Issuer credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency   CCC-/Negative/--    CCC-/Neg./--
  Ukraine National Scale       uaCCC-/--/--        uaCCC-/--/--

Ratings Withdrawn
Dnipropetrovsk (City of)
Issuer credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency   NR                  CCC-/Neg./--
  Ukraine National Scale       NR                  uaCCC-/--/--
Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency               NR                  CCC-
  Ukraine National Scale       NR                  uaCCC-

NR--Not rated.


IVANO-FRANKIVSK CITY: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'CCC-' ICR
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC-' long-term
issuer credit rating and 'uaCCC-' Ukraine national scale rating
on the City of Ivano-Frankivsk.  S&P subsequently withdrew the
ratings due to termination of the contract.  At the time of
withdrawal, the outlook was negative.

As a "sovereign rating" (as defined in EU CRA Regulation
1060/2009 "EU CRA Regulation"), the ratings on the City of Ivano-
Frankivsk are subject to certain publication restrictions set out
in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation, including publication in
accordance with a pre-established calendar.  Under the EU CRA
Regulation, deviations from the announced calendar are allowed
only in limited circumstances and must be accompanied by a
detailed explanation of the reasons for the deviation.  In this
case, the deviation has been prompted by the contract
termination.

RATIONALE

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Ivano-Frankivsk
continues to perform in line with its base-case scenario.

The ratings on Ivano-Frankivsk reflected Ukraine's very volatile
and underfunded institutional framework.  They also reflect
Ivano-Frankivsk's very weak budgetary flexibility, very weak
economy, weak financial management, weak liquidity, and moderate
contingent liabilities related to the weak financial position of
the city's government-related entities.  However, Ivano-
Frankivsk's low debt and average budgetary performance help
offset these weaknesses. The long-term issuer credit rating on
Ivano-Frankivsk was at the same level as the stand-alone credit
profile.

At the time of withdrawal, the outlook was negative, reflecting
S&P's view that Ivano-Frankivsk's restricted access to the city's
cash reserves in the central government's treasury may lead to
its inability to service its debt within the next six months.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all
rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action

RATINGS LIST

                               Rating                Rating
                               To                    From
Ivano-Frankivsk (City of)
Issuer credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency   CCC-/Negative/--      CCC-/Neg./--
  Ukraine National Scale       uaCCC-/--/--          uaCCC-/--/--

Ratings Subsequently Withdrawn
Ivano-Frankivsk (City of)
Issuer credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency   NR                    CCC-/Neg./--
  Ukraine National Scale       NR                    uaCCC-/--/--

NR--Not rated.


LVIV CITY: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws CCC- Issuer Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC-' long-term
issuer credit rating and 'uaCCC-' Ukraine national scale rating
on the City of Lviv.  S&P subsequently withdrew the ratings due
to termination of the contract.  At the time of withdrawal, the
outlook was negative.

As a "sovereign rating" (as defined in EU CRA Regulation
1060/2009 "EU CRA Regulation"), the ratings on the City of Lviv
are subject to certain publication restrictions set out in Art 8a
of the EU CRA Regulation, including publication in accordance
with a pre-established calendar.  Under the EU CRA Regulation,
deviations from the announced calendar are allowed only in
limited circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed
explanation of the reasons for the deviation.  In this case, the
deviation has been prompted by the contract termination.

RATIONALE

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Lviv continues to
perform in line with its base-case scenario.

The ratings on Lviv reflected Ukraine's very volatile and
underfunded institutional framework, and S&P's view of the city's
economy and budgetary flexibility as very weak.  Furthermore, S&P
views Lviv's liquidity and financial management as weak.  Lviv
has high contingent liabilities related to its municipal
utilities, which also constrain its creditworthiness.  On the
positive side, S&P considers Lviv to have strong budgetary
performance and low debt.  The long-term issuer credit rating on
Lviv was at the same level as its stand-alone credit profile.

At the time of withdrawal, the outlook was negative, reflecting
S&P's view that Lviv's likely restricted access to its cash
reserves at the central treasury may lead to its inability to
service debt within the next six months.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                Ratings
                                To                From
Lviv (City of)
Issuer credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency    CCC-/Neg./--      CCC-/Neg./--
  Ukraine National Scale        uaCCC-/--/--      uaCCC-/--/--

Ratings Subsequently Withdrawn
Lviv (City of)
Issuer credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency    NR                CCC-/Neg./--
  Ukraine National Scale        NR                uaCCC-/--/--

NR--Not rated.


UKREXIMBANK: Creditors Okay US$1.5-Bil. Restructuring Deal
----------------------------------------------------------
Natasha Doff at Bloomberg News reports that bondholders of State
Export-Import Bank of Ukraine, known as Ukreximbank, voted in
favor of changing terms on US$1.5 billion of debt, completing the
first reprofiling in Ukraine's debt overhaul.

Ukreximbank said in a statement creditors of the state-run bank
agreed to push back maturity dates by seven years and raise
interest on notes due in 2015, 2016 and 2018, Bloomberg relates.
According to Bloomberg, at least 79% of bondholders who cast
ballots in each of the three maturities voted in favor of the new
terms.

The bank hasn't suffered from the same stumbling blocks with
creditors as the government because it's not asking them to
accept a writedown on principal, a condition Ukraine is seeking
in its $19 billion sovereign restructuring, Bloomberg notes.

"Ukrexim offered great terms and investors grabbed the
opportunity," Bloomberg quotes Vitaliy Sivach, a Kiev-based bond
trader at Investment Capital Ukraine, as saying by e-mail.  "This
won't have any implications for the sovereign because Ukrexim is
crucial for the economy and the government was trying to do
everything needed to avoid outright default."

Ukreximbank is one of three state-owned companies that the
government agreed would be subject to easier restructuring terms
due to their role in the economy, Bloomberg states.

The State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine is Ukraine's third
biggest bank.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BRIT LIMITED: Fitch Cuts Rating on Subordinated Notes to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Brit Limited's (Brit), Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) to 'BBB' from 'BBB+' and removed it from
Rating Watch Negative (RWN). A Stable Outlook has been assigned.

The GBP135 million subordinated notes have also been downgraded
to 'BB' from 'BB+', in line with Fitch's notching criteria.

Brit was formerly Brit PLC prior to its delisting from the London
Stock Exchange, and it continues to be the issuer of the GBP135
million subordinated debt.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating action follows the completion of the acquisition of
Brit by the Canadian financial services group, Fairfax Financial
Holdings Limited (Fairfax).

The downgrade reflects Fitch's view of the financial strength of
the Fairfax group as a whole, which constrains Brit's ratings by
one notch. This reflects the risk that if the Fairfax group were
to come under financial stress, it could seek to extract capital
or other resources from Brit to support the rest of the group.

The underlying performance of Brit has been good. Fitch views
Brit's solid financial profile, supported by strong risk-adjusted
capitalization and underlying earning, as a strong positive
factor. Brit reported on overall profit after tax for 2014 of
GBP139 million (2013: GBP99.5 million) and a combined ratio,
excluding the effects of foreign exchange movements, of 89.5%
(2013: 85.4%). Fitch expects Brit's underlying earnings and risk-
adjusted capitalization to remain supportive of the current
ratings.

Fairfax posted net income of USD1.6 billion in 2014 (2013: USD0.6
billion loss). Its consolidated combined ratio dropped to 90.8%
in 2014 from 92.7% in 2013, 99.9% in 2012 and 114.2% in 2011, due
to more modest catastrophe losses.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

If new notching criteria proposed by Fitch are made final, Fitch
expects to upgrade the subordinated notes issued by Brit to
'BB+'. No other Brit ratings are expected to be impacted by the
proposed changes to Fitch's notching criteria.

The key rating trigger that could result in an upgrade of Brit
would be what Fitch views as improvement of the Fairfax group's
financial strength. Similarly, deterioration in the financial
strength of the Fairfax group could result in a downgrade of
Brit.



===================
U Z B E K I S T A N
===================


KAPITALBANK: S&P Revises Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'B-/C' Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its
outlook on Uzbekistan-based Kapitalbank to positive from stable.
S&P also affirmed its 'B-/C' long- and short-term counterparty
credit ratings on the bank.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's expectation that
Kapitalbank's robust profitability, along with tightening minimum
capital requirements in Uzbekistan, should allow the bank to
maintain a risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio comfortably above
3%.

Kapitalbank posted a RAC ratio of 4.0% at year-end 2014, owing to
a higher-than-expected net interest margin of 5.4% and strong
bottom-line results.  The RAC ratio was substantially better than
S&P's earlier forecast of 2%-3%.  S&P expects the bank's assets
to increase by 25%-27% in 2015-2016, showing visibly lower growth
than during the previous two years, while registering a lower net
interest margin of about 4% and cost of risk of 2.3%-2.5%.  This
is because S&P expects the bank's collective provisioning
requirements to remain high.  S&P do not expect Kapitalbank to
pay any dividends or receive any capital injections over the next
two years.

S&P notes that the bank's tempered growth appetite stems partly
from the increasing minimum capital requirements in Uzbekistan.
The minimum total capital adequacy ratio is set to increase to
11.5% in 2016 from 10%, and continue rising by one percentage
point per annum until it reaches 14.5%.  In addition, the Central
Bank of Uzbekistan plans to implement Basel III in Uzbekistan,
which S&P believes will lead to slower lending growth rates.  S&P
believes that during the transition period, Kapitalbank is likely
to continue operating within 100 basis points of the minimum
requirement.

S&P expects the bank's RAC ratio to remain above 3% over the next
12 to 18 months, which would allow S&P to reclassify capital and
earnings to "weak" from "very weak," as defined in S&P's
criteria. Nevertheless, S&P believes operating conditions in
Uzbekistan limit the predictability of the bank's ultimate
financial performance.  S&P also notes that there are substantial
risks to its base-case assumptions, which, if they materialize,
could put pressure on the bank's capitalization.  These risks
include potential volatility in the country's currency that
weighs on loan quality and volume of risk-weighted assets, or
higher-than-expected credit losses, given the bank's highly
concentrated lending book.

The positive outlook on Kapitalbank indicates that S&P may raise
the ratings over the next 12-18 months if the bank maintains a
RAC ratio comfortably higher than 3%, as well as adequate loan
portfolio quality.  In S&P's opinion, the slowdown of the bank's
growth, along with robust profitability and tightening capital
requirements in Uzbekistan, will likely support stronger
capitalization over that period.

S&P may revise the outlook to stable if Kapitalbank's
capitalization does not improve as S&P expects, with the RAC
ratio falling below 3%.  A negative rating action may also follow
if S&P sees the bank's asset quality deteriorating or customer
confidence declining.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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