TCREUR_Public/150710.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, July 10, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 135



CORPBANK: Institutions No Reaction to Bankruptcy Indications


DECOMEUBLES PARTNERS: Fitch Affirms 'B-' IDR, Outlook Stable
EUROPCAR GROUPE: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+' Following IPO


AEOLOS SA: S&P Lowers Rating on EUR355MM Class A Notes to 'CCC-'
GREECE: Seeks 3-Year Bailout, Banks to Stay Close Until July 13
NATIONAL BANK: Fitch Says Downgrade No Impact on Bulgarian Units


CLERYS: Liquidation to Cost Taxpayer 'Millions'
IRISH BANK: Special Liquidator Uncovers Fraud on Quinn Portfolio


KAZKOMMERTS-POLICY JSC: S&P Keeps B+ CCR on Watch Negative


FIDJI LUXEMBOURG: Moody's Puts 'B1' CFR on Review for Upgrade
ONEX WIZARD: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Stable


HERBERT PARK: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class E Notes


BELTICO GROUP: Closures at Praia D'el Rey Due to Insolvency Order


BANK CENTERCREDIT: Fitch Rates 7 Sr. Currency Bonds 'B(EXP)'
BANK PSB: Bank of Russia Investigates Financial Standing
COMPANION INSURANCE: Put Under Provisional Administration
KOMESTRA INSURANCE: Put Under Provisional Administration
PROMSBERBANK JSC: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration

RENAISSANCE CREDIT: S&P Cuts Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B-'


BANCAJA 9: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class E Tranche
NOVO BANCO: Moody's Confirms 'B2' Long-Term Deposit Ratings


KOCOGLU GROUP: Gov't Assumes Debts, Kalyon to Take Over Project


FERREXPO FINANCE: Moody's Assigns Caa3 Rating to 2019 Notes
STATE ODESSA: Group DF No Intention to Bankrupt Company

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ASHPERRY LTD: Insolvency Service Bans Two Club Directors
BORDER PRECISION: Helping Hand After Liquidation
INTERNATIONAL PROJECT: High Court Winds Up Fake Loan Firms
ONTINUITY LTD: Sole Director Disqualified For 8 Years
PRIMA HOTELS: AIB Owed GBP36MM Following Luxury Hotel Group Admin


* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit



Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Bulgaria-based integrated telecom
operator Bulgarian Telecommunications Co. EAD (Vivacom) to 'B-'
from 'B'. S&P also lowered its long-term issue rating on
Vivacom's senior secured debt to 'B-' from 'B'.

The ratings remain on CreditWatch with developing implications,
where S&P placed them on April 2, 2015.

The downgrade follows further delays with the refinancing of the
EUR150 million bridge loan at Vivacom's holding company, which
matured in May 2015.  As a result, it is S&P's view that the
group credit profile (GCP) has meaningfully deteriorated, and
that the bridge loan is unlikely to be repaid.  S&P continues to
view the group's liquidity as "weak" and revises its assessment
of the GCP to 'ccc' from 'b-'.

In S&P's view, failure to repay the loan may potentially lead to
enforcement proceedings at the holding company.  S&P, therefore,
sees higher uncertainties regarding how these potential
proceedings may affect Vivacom.  Another potential risk S&P sees
is that any proceedings may lead to a change of control at
Vivacom, which could trigger accelerated payment of the bonds
Vivacom has issued, thereby materially weakening its liquidity.
That said, S&P continues to assess Vivacom as an insulated entity
due to several key restrictions, including, but not limited to:

   -- No cross defaults with the debt at Vivacom;
   -- The ring-fence between Vivacom and the holding company;
   -- Restrictions on payments from Vivacom to the holding
   -- Vivacom's status as a separate entity, with its own funds,
      books, and liabilities; and
   -- S&P's view that the shareholders have no economic incentive
      to draw Vivacom into any proceedings, since the bondholders
      have a first-lien security over Vivacom's shares.

S&P understands that VTB Capital, the group's second largest
shareholder with a 33% stake, is the largest bridge loan lender,
which creates an economic interest to keep Vivacom's credit
quality intact.  S&P therefore assess that it is unlikely that a
default at the holding company would lead to a default at

S&P notes the recent change in Vivacom's ownership structure as a
result of the purchase by LIC33, a Luxembourg-based company, of a
43.3% stake in Vivacom from Tzvetan Vassilev.  S&P understands
that this transaction is still subject to regulatory approval.

S&P's assessment of Vivacom's stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
continues to reflect the company's solid market position in
Bulgaria as the largest telecom operator.  Vivacom's offering
includes land-line and mobile phone services, broadband, and pay
TV, and it has the highest fixed-line coverage in the market.
S&P's assessment also reflects Vivacom's solid operating
efficiency, which has translated into EBITDA margins of about
40%. This strength is somewhat offset by Bulgaria's highly
competitive and price-sensitive telecom market, where Vivacom
competes with subsidiaries of larger telecom operators.

The SACP is supported by S&P's forecast of adjusted leverage of
about 3.5x-4.0x and adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt
of more than 20%.  S&P's credit ratios include the debt at
Vivacom's parent company.

S&P's base case for 2015-2016 remains broadly unchanged.

The CreditWatch status reflects the possibility that S&P could
lower or raise the ratings depending on the implications of the
potential nonpayment or refinancing of the bridge loan at the
holding company.

If the group eventually refinances the bridge loan with a long-
term facility, or if any proceedings at the holding company do
not have a negative impact on Vivacom, S&P will likely revise its
assessment of the GCP upward and raise the long-term rating on
Vivacom to the level of Vivacom's SACP.

However, if the loan is not refinanced and S&P sees signs that
any proceedings at the holding company will likely erode
Vivacom's liquidity, S&P could lower the rating.

CORPBANK: Institutions No Reaction to Bankruptcy Indications
FOCUS News Agency reports that Vladislav Nikolov, MP from
mandate-holder Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria,
told Radio FOCUS "Bulgarian institutions haven't reacted to the
indications for bankruptcy of the Corporate Commercial Bank

Mr. Nikolov, as cited by FOCUS News, said checks have been
carried out and added that the banking supervision was of great

"This bank was very aggressive on the market in terms of
collecting money and that was the way it operated. CorpBank
offered higher interest rates to people, they deposited with the
bank and it used their money to finance certain firms," FOCUS
News quotes Mr. Nikolov as saying.  "CorpBank lent this same
money to second and third firms, and so the pyramid was growing.
Therefore, there were indications [for bankruptcy] since long

               About Corporate Commercial Bank AD

Corporate Commercial Bank AD is the fourth largest bank in
Bulgaria in terms of assets, third in terms of net profit, and
first in terms of deposit growth.

Bulgaria's central bank placed Corpbank under its administration
and suspended shareholders' rights in June 2014 after a run
drained the bank of cash to meet client demands.


DECOMEUBLES PARTNERS: Fitch Affirms 'B-' IDR, Outlook Stable
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Decomeubles Partners SAS's (BUT) Long-
term Issuer Default Rating at 'B-' with a Stable Outlook. The
agency has also upgraded BUT SAS's EUR180 million senior secured
notes by one notch to 'B+'/'RR2'/74% from 'B'/'RR3'/69% .

BUT's IDR continues to reflect the issuer's size and its strong
market and brand position in the French home improvement market.
Fitch expects BUT to benefit from further consolidation,
particularly with a focus on growth in the value segment and at
the expense of independent retailers.

Since refinancing in 2014, BUT's management has implemented a
series of self-help measures aimed at improving the group's
operational cost base, supply chain and logistics as well as the
customer offering, which Fitch thinks will lead to improved year-
on-year profitability and cash generation in FY15 (fiscal year
ending June 2015).  This has increased the group's headroom under
the rating and triggered the improving debt recovery assumption.
However the Outlook remains Stable as we expect BUT's financial
and operating performance to remain steady against a backdrop of
challenging market conditions.  Evidence of BUT's ability to
protect underlying performance improvements, as well as
defensibility of its evolving business model could drive a
positive rating action if it translates into a conservatively
managed balance sheet.


Improved Financial Headroom

Fitch expects funds from operations (FFO)-adjusted gross leverage
for FY15 based on management guidance for the full year to
improve to just under 6.0x (FY14: 7.0x) with FFO fixed charge
cover at 1.5x (1.2x), which increases rating headroom relative to
Fitch's defined sensitivities.

While last year's refinancing left BUT with fairly manageable on
balance-sheet debt, high rental expenses translate into an
aggressive financial risk profile.  This is reflected in the
group's lease-adjusted debt protection ratios (which Fitch has
conservatively based on the full value of 'occupancy costs' as
presented by management).

Evolving Business Model

BUT's management continue to successfully focus on streamlining
and optimizing the customer offer and optimizing cost and cash
management by simplifying its supply chain and centralizing the
logistics function domestically.  In addition, it is also aiming
to increase direct control over its brand and store appearance by
moving away from the traditional franchise model and taking a
more centralized approach to key management decisions including
range, pricing, marketing and multi-channel offering.  The
evolving business model and operating efficiencies including a
strong focus on working capital have strengthened the underlying
profitability and cash generation of the business with FY15
(ending June) expected like-for-like growth of 1.8%, a 100bps
EBITDA margin improvement and a free cash flow (FCF) margin
trending towards 2.0%.

Profitability Supported by Consumer Financing

Credit income generated from consumer financing supports EBITDA,
adding approximately 100bps to the EBITDA margin.  Consumer
finance is a key part of BUT's promotional activity, a strong
sales driver, and a source of differentiation against
competitors, leading to a 25% credit penetration rate of its
customer base. Given the integral role of consumer finance in
BUT's business model and the ring-fenced nature of the associated
credit risk, Fitch includes the consumer finance contribution in
its operating EBITDA calculation.

The group offers consumer finance products (including store
cards, installment loans, personal loans) in combination with
Cetelem (the consumer finance arm of BNP Paribas Personal
Finance), which manages credit risks on a non-recourse basis for
BUT.  In addition, BUT offers appliance warranties, which are
managed via an in-house insurance vehicle.  The consumer finance
and insurance arrangements are subject to regulatory risks.

Asset Light Business Model

Since its original buy-out in 2008, BUT has gradually implemented
an 'asset-light' business model by selling and leasing back
assets, particularly with regard to its owned store network and
logistics operations.  The key assets in the business therefore
remain the brand value and inventory, which is reflected in
Fitch's debt protection ratio analysis (adjusted for lease
obligations) and recovery analysis.  While an asset-light capital
structure is not uncommon in non-food retail, it leads to
pressures on profitability and cash flows due to high rental
costs.  This translates into high operating leverage and
potentially a volatile earnings profile in a downturn.

Geographic Concentration, Competitive Pressures

Limited geographic diversification and concentration on the
French retail market are a key rating constraint.  This is
particularly true in a subdued, albeit stabilizing French
consumer environment characterized by limited near-term economic
stimuli.  In addition, Fitch expects further medium-term
consolidation and competitive pressures at the value end of the
home equipment market in France.

Fitch notes the concentration of market share amongst the top
three national players in the home equipment market, which have
been able to grow market share amongst each to 45.9% in FY14
(from 40.6% in FY2009), at the expense of independent and local
players. Fitch believes that in this context BUT's strategy to
concentrate on network expansion in smaller cities is sensible in
that it should help boost and defend market share.

Established Brand, Market Position

The ratings reflect BUT's position as a leading home equipment
retailer in France, with a strong nationwide store footprint and
a diversified product range spanning across home furnishing and
decoration, domestic appliances as well as select home-related
consumer electronics.  BUT's promotional-driven business model is
supported by a strong and well-recognized retail brand.

Above Average Recoveries

Fitch believes that expected recoveries would be maximized in a
going-concern scenario rather than in a liquidation scenario
given the asset-light nature of BUT's business, where Fitch views
the brand value and established retail network as key assets.
Fitch estimates that senior secured noteholders could expect a
recovery rate estimated at 74% (RR2), leading to a two-notch
uplift for the senior secured instrument rating from the IDR to
'B+'.  However, the 74% recovery assumption is at the lower end
of the 'RR2' recovery category and hence subject to revision
should underlying recovery assumptions and/or the debt amount
change.  For its recovery assumptions Fitch applies a 35%
distressed EBITDA discount partially incorporating the year-on-
year improvement in profitability as permanent enhancement, and a
4.5x EV/EBITDA multiple.

The expected senior secured recovery is underpinned by guarantors
representing at least 85% of the group's EBITDA and by
noteholders' second-ranking claim on any enforcement proceeds in
a distressed sale of assets or the business.


Fitch's expectations are based on its internally produced,
conservative rating case forecasts over the four-year rating
horizon.  They do not represent the forecasts of rated issuers
individually or on aggregate.  Key Fitch forecast assumptions

   -- Moderate like for like sales growth, below GDP assumptions

   -- Stable EBITDA margins reflecting the benefits achieved in
      FY15 mitigated by competitive pressures and consolidation
      in the French home equipment market

   -- Continued focus on supply chain and working capital

   -- Disciplined approach to capex representing 1.9%-2.2% of
      annual sales


Future developments that, individually or collectively, could
lead to positive rating action include:

   -- FFO adjusted gross leverage at 6x or below, FFO fixed
      charge cover at above 1.5x, combined with market share
      gains and improvements in FCF generation and operating
      profitability, all on a sustained basis

Future developments that, individually or collectively, could
lead to negative rating action include:

   -- FFO gross lease adjusted leverage of 7.0x or above on a
      sustained basis

   -- FFO fixed charge cover of 1.0x or below on a sustained

   -- A significant deterioration in market share, revenues
      and/or operating profitability

   -- Negative FCF eroding the group's liquidity buffer


Adequate Mid-Term Liquidity

Fitch views BUT's liquidity as adequate in its medium-term rating
case supported by the availability of the EUR30 million RCF
coupled with reported cash on balance sheet of EUR108 million
(FYE14).  Of this amount Fitch deducts EUR40 million as not
readily available to allow for seasonal working capital
fluctuations and restricted cash related to consumer financing.
This is adequate as BUT does not face any meaningful debt
redemptions until 2019.

EUROPCAR GROUPE: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+' Following IPO
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit ratings on Europcar Groupe S.A. (Europcar) and wholly
owned financing subsidiary Europcar International S.A.S.U. to
'B+' from 'B'.  S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where
it had placed them with positive implications on May 26, 2015.
The outlook is stable.

S&P raised the issue rating on Europcar's EUR350 million senior
secured revolving credit facility (RCF) to 'BB-' from 'B+'.  The
recovery rating on the RCF is unchanged at '2', indicating S&P's
expectation of substantial recovery (70%-90%) in the event of a
payment default.

S&P raised the issue rating on EC Finance's EUR350 million senior
secured notes due 2021 to 'B+' from 'B'.  S&P also raised the
recovery rating on the notes to '3' from '4', to reflect its view
that recovery prospects for the senior secured notes have
improved following the IPO.  S&P's recovery expectations are in
the lower half of the 50%-70% range.

S&P raised the issue rating on the EUR475 million senior notes
due 2022 to 'B-' from 'CCC+'.  The recovery rating on the senior
notes is unchanged at '6', indicating S&P's view of negligible
(0%-10%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

The issue ratings on the RCF, the senior secured notes, and the
senior notes have also been removed from CreditWatch with
positive implications.

Finally, S&P has withdrawn the issue and recovery ratings on the
EUR324 million subordinated secured notes due 2017 and the EUR400
million subordinated unsecured notes due 2018, as they have been
redeemed in full.

The upgrade follows the completion of Europcar's IPO and debt
refinancing and reflects S&P's expectation of stronger leverage
metrics in 2015 and 2016.  Under S&P's base-case operating
scenario, it forecasts leverage ratios for Europcar in 2015 and
2016 of funds from operations (FFO) to Standard & Poor's-adjusted
debt of 12%-13% and adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4.6x-4.8x.  S&P
also envisage adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of 2.5x-3.0x.
S&P has revised upward its assessment of Europcar's financial
risk profile to "aggressive" from "highly leveraged," albeit at
the weaker end of the 12%-20% range for the category.

S&P's base-case operating scenario for Europcar assumes:

   -- Continued expansion in the car hire market, supported by
      the company's initiatives, leading to 3%-4% annual revenue

   -- Reported EBIT margins of around 10%-11%, supported by cost
      reduction efforts and assuming continued limited
      restructuring costs as guided by the company.

   -- Continued working capital investment to support the growth
      of the fleet.  Limited non-fleet-related capital
      expenditure (capex).

   -- No dividend payments until 2017.

   -- Limited spending on bolt-on acquisitions.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
for 2015 and 2016:

   -- FFO to debt of 12%-13%.
   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4.6x-4.8x.
   -- EBITDA interest coverage of 2.5x-3.0x.

The IPO has reduced shareholder Eurazeo's stake in Europcar from
nearly 100% to around 50%, with a free float of about 50%.
Eurazeo's stake could fall to about 42% if the over-allotment
option is exercised in full.  (S&P includes shares owned by ECIP
Europcar Sarl as being controlled by Eurazeo.)  As Eurazeo's
stake in Europcar has remained above 40%, S&P continues to assess
the company as being owned by a financial sponsor, under its
criteria. This assessment does not constrain the rating.  Despite
Eurazeo remaining a key shareholder, S&P believes that Europcar's
wider shareholder base will see it maintain a moderate and
predictable financial policy.

S&P continues to assess Europcar's business risk profile as
"fair."  S&P's assessment is constrained by its view of the
competitive, cyclical, and capital-intensive nature of the car
rental market.  S&P also considers Europcar to have limited
business and geographic diversity, with European countries
accounting for 92% of 2014 revenues.  Annual restructuring
expenses and other charges have lowered operating profits, and
the group remains loss-making at the pretax level after
significant interest and other financial expenses.

Supportive factors for Europcar's business risk profile include
its market share in Europe, where it is the clear leader.  S&P
considers its business mix to be balanced between the business
(45%) and leisure (55%) segments, as well as between airport
(42%) and non-airport (58%).

S&P believes that Europcar benefits from good operational
flexibility and efficiency, with a fleet utilization rate of 76%
in 2014.  This is supported by Europcar's use of buy-back
arrangements with manufacturers or dealers for most of its fleet
(92% in 2014), which significantly reduces residual value risk
and provides the financial flexibility to reduce fleet size and
related debt if needed during a downturn.  S&P also recognizes
that the company is making progress with its cost-saving
initiatives, which should continue to support margins.

As of Dec. 31, 2014, S&P's adjusted debt calculation for Europcar
was EUR3.7 billion.  On this basis, S&P's year-end ratio of FFO
to adjusted debt was 10% and S&P's ratio of adjusted debt to
EBITDA was 5.2x.  S&P adjusts the EUR2.2 billion of on-balance-
sheet reported debt by adding EUR1.4 billion for operating
leases, mostly related to the off-balance sheet car fleet.  This
reflects S&P's adjustment based on the present value of lease
payments, in which it assumes that the year one payments for the
fleet continue in future years.  S&P regards Europcar's retained
cash as being tied to operations so we make no adjustment for
cash.  S&P also adds back to EBITDA a portion of fleet-holding
costs related to vehicles subject to buy-back agreements and "at-
risk" vehicles (2014: EUR164 million).

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Europcar will
continue to develop and grow its car-rental activities.  S&P
regards its credit ratios, including adjusted FFO to debt of
12%-15% and adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4.5x-5.0x, as consistent
with the rating.

S&P considers the potential for a positive rating action to be
limited in the near term.  S&P could consider an upgrade in the
future if, over time, Europcar reported a stronger operating
performance and sustainably stronger credit measures such as FFO
to debt of above 15%, and debt to EBITDA of below 4.5x.

S&P does not envisage lowering the ratings in the near term, but
could do so if Europcar were to report notably weaker revenues
and profitability than S&P currently expects.  Other factors
might include Europcar adopting a more shareholder-supportive
dividend policy or larger-than-expected acquisitions, leading to
a sustained weakening of credit ratios of adjusted FFO to debt to
below 12% and adjusted debt to EBITDA to above 5.0x.


AEOLOS SA: S&P Lowers Rating on EUR355MM Class A Notes to 'CCC-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'
its credit rating on Aeolos S.A.'s EUR355 million floating-rate
asset-backed class A notes.

The downgrade follows S&P's June 29, 2015 lowering to 'CCC-' of
its long-term sovereign credit rating on Greece (Hellenic
Republic), which acts as the guarantor of Aeolos.

S&P's current counterparty criteria link its rating on Aeolos'
class A notes to its long-term sovereign rating on Greece as the

Therefore, following S&P's recent rating action on Greece, S&P
has consequently lowered to 'CCC-' from 'CCC' its rating on
Aeolos' class A notes.

Aeolos is a Greek repack transaction.  The underlying collateral
consists of receivables due from The European Organisation for
the Safety of Air Navigation for the provision of air traffic
control services in Greece.

GREECE: Seeks 3-Year Bailout, Banks to Stay Close Until July 13
Gabriele Steinhauser and Tom Fairless at The Wall Street Journal
report that Greece took a first step toward addressing demands
that eurozone leaders say it must meet to stay in the euro, as
pressure grew on both sides to reach a deal and avert the
country's imminent financial meltdown.

The government in Athens formally asked for a three-year bailout
from the eurozone's rescue fund on July 8 and pledged to start
implementing some economic-policy overhauls by early next week,
according to a copy of the request seen by The Journal.

But whether European leaders accept the application for more
emergency loans at a crisis summit on Sunday still depends on
Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras making a drastic turnaround on
pension cuts, tax increases and other austerity measures after
five months of often-acrimonious negotiations.

According to The Journal, eurozone officials expect the request
for more aid to be followed up by a full list of detailed policy
overhauls and budget cuts that go beyond those that Greek voters
overwhelmingly rejected in a referendum last weekend.

"The actual examination can only begin once the full package has
been put on the table," The Journal quotes a spokesman for German
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble, who has pushed a hard line on
Greece and made clear that Germany is prepared for a potential
Greek exit from the eurozone, as saying.

                     Bank Closures Extended

BBC News reports that the Greek government has extended bank
closures and a EUR60 (GBP43; US$66) daily limit on ATM
withdrawals until Monday, July 13.

The curbs were imposed on June 28, after a deadlock in bailout
talks with creditors led to a rush of withdrawals, BBC relates.

According to BBC, the European Central Bank has decided not to
increase support for Greek banks until the debt crisis is

An emergency summit will involve all 28 EU members -- not just
the 19 eurozone countries, BBC discloses.

European Council President Donald Tusk has warned that this was
now the "most critical moment in the history of the eurozone",
BBC relays.

"The final deadline ends this week," Mr. Tusk, as cited by BBC,
said after emergency talks of the eurozone leaders in Brussels on
July 7.

In an address in Washington on July 8, IMF Managing Director
Christine Lagarde reiterated that debt restructuring alongside a
program of reforms was the only way forward for the stricken
Greek economy, BBC notes.

NATIONAL BANK: Fitch Says Downgrade No Impact on Bulgarian Units
Fitch Ratings says Finansbank A.S. (BBB-/Stable) and United
Bulgarian Bank AD's (UBB; B/Stable) ratings are unaffected by the
downgrade of their parent, National Bank of Greece S.A. (NBG) to
'RD', following the imposition of capital controls on Greek

Fitch believes there is limited contagion risk from NBG due to
the subsidiaries' self-sustainability in terms of funding,
marginal or no credit exposure to NBG group and Greece in
general, and independent local franchises.  The banks continue to
maintain substantial liquidity buffers and have relatively high
capital ratios.  Finansbank and UBB's Issuer Default Ratings
(IDR) are driven by their intrinsic financial strength, as
expressed by their respective Viability Ratings of 'bbb-' and


Ongoing events at NBG have had a negligible impact on
Finansbank's credit profile.  Asset exposures to NBG, or Greece
more generally, are negligible, and funding from the parent is
limited (at end-1Q15: mainly subordinated debt, TRY2.4 bil. in
total, equal to 3.3% of liabilities).

Contagion risk is mitigated by the subsidiary's separate brand,
which has limited association with the parent, and funding
independence.  In 2015, Finansbank has maintained deposit
stability and suffered no loss of franchise or market access, a
similar situation to NBG's previous failure in 2011.

Finansbank's external funding maturity schedule is manageable in
our view.  The USD790 mil. syndicated loan facility due in
November 2015, which the bank plans to refinance, represents less
than 3% of the bank's end-1H15 total liabilities, and other near-
term repayments are small and granular.  At end-1H15, available
foreign currency liquidity, mainly comprising funds placed under
the reserve option mechanism, largely covered short-term foreign
currency wholesale funding.


To date, there have been no signs of abrupt deposit withdrawals
from UBB and the wider Bulgarian banking sector, although Greek-
owned banks in Bulgaria have been gradually losing their market
franchise and Fitch believes that customers are more cautious
than a year ago.  Bulgarian banks generally have substantial
liquidity buffers to absorb potential increased deposit outflows.
At end-May 2015, the banking sector's liquidity ratio (under BNB
Ordinance No. 11) was a comfortable 33.6%.  UBB reported a
liquidity ratio of 30.3% at June 26, 2015.

UBB has minimal funding from its parent, in the form of a
subordinated loan of BGN152.7 mil. at end-2014, or a low 2.8% of
the bank's total liabilities.  Fitch calculates that the bank's
liquid assets net of this subordinated loan remain a comfortable
27% of total customer deposits at end-June 2015.  UBB's exposure
to the NBG Group is also minimal, and significantly reduced from
its end-2014 levels, when intragroup exposure accounted for about
13% of UBB's total assets.  Fitch understands from UBB that its
credit exposure to Greece is limited.

UBB's VR rating of 'b' mostly reflects UBB's weak asset quality,
marked by high non-performing loans (NPLs) and concentration in
the construction and real estate sectors, but also takes into
account the bank's reasonable loss absorption capacity.  The
broadly stable deposit-based funding and a comfortable liquidity
buffer support the bank's credit profile.

The Bulgarian central bank took early measures in February 2015
to eliminate potential channels of contagion by requiring Greek-
owned banks to cut their credit exposures to the parent groups
and introducing daily reporting of their intragroup transactions.
Relative to other EU countries, the Bulgarian banking sector is
more exposed to negative developments in Greece due to the
significant presence of Greek-owned banks in the country.  The
latter accounted for 22% of the domestic banking sector's total
assets at end-March 2015.


CLERYS: Liquidation to Cost Taxpayer 'Millions'
RTE News reports that Tanaiste and Minister for Social Protection
Joan Burton has confirmed that the cost to the taxpayer of the
Clerys liquidation is set to run into millions.

Speaking as she arrived at the ICTU conference in Ennis, she
described the actions of the owners of Clerys as "predator
capitalism," according to RTE News.

The report relates that Ms. Burton said it was not right that the
owners had left workers in the lurch and left the State facing
the redundancy bill.

The State had better things to do with its money than bail them
out, Ms. Burton said, the report notes.

Given that the effect of the owners' actions was to place its
private obligation to pay redundancy onto the State, Ms. Burton
said she will use every legal avenue to vindicate the State and
taxpayers' rights in this regard, the report discloses.

The report notes that Ms. Burton also said she expects a Low Pay
Commission report, due this month, to recommend a rise in the
national minimum wage.

The minimum wage, currently at EUR8.65 an hour, was the minimum
value put on work, Ms. Burton said, the report relays.

However, Ms. Burton acknowledged that while it was a protection
against exploitation, it was not a guarantee of fair or even
adequate wages, the report notes.

The Tanaiste signed the new ICTU charter on workers' rights,
which includes a commitment to pursue the introduction of the
living wage calculated at EUR11.45, the report adds.

IRISH BANK: Special Liquidator Uncovers Fraud on Quinn Portfolio
Shane Phelan at Belfast Telegraph reports that Kieran Wallace, a
special liquidator, has claimed he had to overcome "dishonest and
fraudulent activity" to secure control over major assets in the
EUR500 million (GBP355 million) property portfolio of the family
of former billionaire Sean Quinn.

Mr. Wallace told Dublin's Commercial Court that "contrived
bankruptcies" had been one of the tactics used in an attempt to
put the three properties -- in Russia and Ukraine -- beyond the
reach of Quinn family creditors, Belfast Telegraph relates.

He also admitted that it was proving "extremely challenging" to
secure control over eight other Quinn properties in Russia,
Belfast Telegraph discloses.

Mr. Wallace, the joint special liquidator of the Irish Bank
Resolution Corporation, said documents had been falsified and
backdated, while bogus and inflated debts had also been created,
Belfast Telegraph relays.

The comments were made in an affidavit informing the Commercial
Court that control of three assets had been secured following an
agreement with the A1 trading and investment company, Belfast
Telegraph notes.

IBRC began using the services of the Russian firm, controlled by
oligarch Mikhail Fridman, in 2013 in a bid to recover the
Fermanagh family's assets after previous efforts proved
fruitless, Belfast Telegraph recounts.

The joint venture has now secured control of the Q Park logistics
facility in Kazan, the Kutuzoff Tower in Moscow and the Univermag
Shopping Centre in Kiev, together currently valued at around
US$120 million (GBP77.7 million), Belfast Telegraph discloses.

However, an agreement has been reached with A1 to defer the sale
of the properties until the property market in both countries
rebounds, Belfast Telegraph states.

The disclosure comes at a crucial stage in behind-the-scenes
talks between the Quinns and IBRC to settle long-running
litigation, Belfast Telegraph notes.

Retired Supreme Court Judge Joseph Finnegan has agreed to act as
a mediator in the case, where the family deny liability for loans
of EUR2.3 billion (GBP1.5 billion) made by IBRC's predecessor
Anglo, according to Belfast Telegraph.

                    About Irish Bank Resolution

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.  Irish Bank Resolution sought assistance
from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Irish Nationwide Building Society.  The two banks failed and were
merged into IBRC in July 2011.  IBRC is tasked with winding them
down and liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish
lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was
placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to
complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some EUR25 billion (US$33.5 billion). About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about EUR50 billion, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

IBRC was granted protection under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code in December 2013.

Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson of KPMG have been named the
special liquidators.

                       About Anglo Irish

Anglo Irish Bank was an Irish bank headquartered in Dublin from
1964 to 2011.  It went into wind-down mode after nationalization
in 2009.  In July 2011, Anglo Irish merged with the Irish
Nationwide Building Society, with the new company being named the
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC).

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Irish Bank
Resolution Corp. Ltd. (IBRC) to 'D/D' from 'B-/C'.   S&P also
lowered the senior unsecured ratings to 'D' from 'B-'.  S&P then
withdrew the counterparty credit ratings, the senior unsecured
ratings, and the preferred stock ratings on IBRC.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'BBB+' issue rating on three government-
guaranteed debt issues.

The rating actions follow the Feb. 6, 2013, announcement that the
Irish government has liquidated IBRC.

The former Irish bank sought protection from creditors under
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on Aug. 26, 2013 (Bankr.
D. Del., Case No. 13-12159).  The former bank's Foreign
Representatives are Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson.  Its
U.S. bankruptcy counsel are Mark D. Collins, Esq., and Jason M.
Madron, Esq., at Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., in Wilmington,


KAZKOMMERTS-POLICY JSC: S&P Keeps B+ CCR on Watch Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has kept on
CreditWatch with negative implications its 'B+' long-term
counterparty credit and insurer financial strength ratings on
Insurance Co. Kazkommerts-Policy JSC.

S&P also kept on CreditWatch negative its 'kzBBB-' Kazakhstan
national scale rating on Kazkommerts-Policy.

The CreditWatch placement reflected the similar rating action on
Kazkommerts-Policy's parent, Kazkommertsbank JSC (KKB).

"We continue to consider Kazkommerts-Policy to be a strategically
important subsidiary of KKB.  We do not, however, add any support
to the rating on Kazkommerts-Policy because the insurer's 'b+'
stand-alone credit profile is higher than KKB's 'b' group credit
profile.  We consider the insurance company to be insulated from
KKB, as per our rating approach.  We therefore consider
Kazkommerts-Policy able to be rated higher than its parent.  This
is because the regulatory framework provides some protection for
the insurer in the event of adverse intervention from KKB.  The
regulatory framework also includes constant oversight from the
National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  Once the merger of
BTA Insurance with Kazkommerts-Policy is complete, we could
reassess the company's status as an insulated insurance
subsidiary," S&P said.

S&P considers that the long-term counterparty credit and insurer
financial strength ratings should be limited to one notch above
the long-term ratings on the parent.

The ratings on Kazkommerts-Policy continue to be constrained by
the company's small premium base in absolute terms, geographic
focus on Kazakhstan, and negative underwriting performance.
While S&P anticipates that Kazkommerts-Policy's competitive
position could improve once the company fully completes its
merger with BTA Insurance, the degree of strengthening will
depend on the reorganized company's ability to maintain positive
operating performance.  In S&P's opinion, Kazkommerts-Policy's
financial risk profile is constrained by the overall credit
quality of its investments, which is -- on average -- in S&P's
'BB' category. However, the company's capital and earnings are
moderately strong, thanks to the current capital adequacy and
expected premium growth.  S&P understands that once BTA Insurance
is fully merged with Kazkommerts-Policy, shareholders may
consider taking part of the capital out of the company, but S&P
expects that its capital adequacy will remain at least moderately
strong.  S&P also believes that dividends will not constrain the
company's liquidity position and thus not constrain the rating.

The resolution of the CreditWatch placement depends on a similar
resolution of the CreditWatch placement of the ratings on KKB.
This will depend on S&P's assessment of the terms and details of
the transfer of assets between KKB and BTA and the subsequent
deconsolidation of BTA, taking into account any other
developments that might change S&P's assessment of the capital of
the consolidated bank.  S&P expects to have more clarity on the
ratings impact of these issues over the next three months.

S&P could lower its ratings on Kazkommerts-Policy if S&P
downgrades KKB.  S&P's ratings on Kazkommerts-Policy will likely
be at most one notch higher than that on KKB.

S&P would also consider a negative rating action on Kazkommerts-
Policy if S&P was to perceive KKB's actions as having a negative
effect on the insurance company's operating results or infringing
on the policyholders' rights.  Furthermore, a negative rating
action could follow if S&P was to observe that any expected
consolidation of BTA Insurance with Kazkommerts-Policy could
weaken Kazkommerts-Policy's status as an insulated insurance

S&P could remove the ratings from CreditWatch negative and affirm
them following a similar rating action on KKB, assuming S&P
continues to believe that Kazkommerts-Policy is insulated from
its parent.


FIDJI LUXEMBOURG: Moody's Puts 'B1' CFR on Review for Upgrade
Moody's Investors Service has placed Fidji Luxembourg (BC4) S.A
R.L.'s (FCI) B1 corporate family rating and B1 first lien term
loan rating on review for upgrade. Concurrently, the B1 rating on
FCI Asia Pte Ltd's (FCI Asia), a wholly owned subsidiary of FCI,
revolving credit facility has also been placed on review for


The rating action follows Amphenol Corporation's (Baa1 stable)
announcement that it has made a binding offer to acquire 100% of
the shares of FCI Asia for US$1.28 billion. Completion of the
transaction is subject to customary regulatory consents and
approvals and acceptance of the binding offer. The transaction is
expected to close by the end of 2015.

FCI Asia is a wholly owned subsidiary of FCI and co-borrower on
the credit facilities. The operating assets of FCI are controlled
by FCI Asia.

Moody's expects Amphenol to fund the acquisition of FCI with a
combination of cash and debt and repay the existing debt at FCI.
As at April 3, 2015, FCI had total debt outstanding of
approximately $240 million and its adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio
was under 2.5x.

FCI's credit agreement contains a change of control provision
that provides lenders the option to declare outstanding
borrowings due and payable and cancel their revolver commitments,
if Bain Capital, FCI's and FCI Asia's financial sponsor, were to
cease controlling 50% of the voting interest in the consolidated
group or 100% of the equity in the two borrowers. Additionally,
the credit agreement gives FCI the right to prepay the
outstanding loans without penalty.

Amphenol is a leading producer of highly engineered electrical
connectors, components, interconnect systems and cables supplied
to multiple industry segments including enterprise, telecom,
industrial, automotive, commercial aerospace and military. The
acquisition of FCI will further help to diversify Amphenol's end
market exposure and enhance its access to Asian markets.

Moody's review will focus on: (1) the timing and structure of a
successful acquisition by Amphenol; (2) final funding and
organizational structure of the transaction, including where FCI
will ultimately fit in Amphenol's organizational and capital
structure; and (3) the overall integration strategy between the
two companies.

Ultimately, depending on the perceived level of parental support
from Amphenol, FCI's ratings may be upgraded by no more than one
to two notches.

If the transaction fails to materialize, it is likely that FCI's
rating will be affirmed at B1 stable.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Manufacturing Companies published in July 2014.

FCI, based in Singapore, is a specialized manufacturer of
electronic connectors for the telecom, data, commercial, and
consumer markets. FCI has a broad customer base in different end
markets, operating in over 30 countries. FCI reported around $600
million of revenues for the year ended December 2014.

ONEX WIZARD: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating to Onex Wizard Acquisition Company II
S.C.A., the Luxembourg-registered financial holding company for
Swiss asceptic beverage carton manufacturer SIG Combibloc.  The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B+' issue rating to the
company's senior secured EUR300 million revolving credit facility
(RCF) and its EUR2,134 million-equivalent senior secured term
loan facilities.  The recovery rating on these facilities is '3'.
S&P also assigned its 'B-' issue rating to the EUR675 million
senior unsecured notes.  The recovery rating on the unsecured
notes is '6'.

These ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings S&P
assigned on Jan. 19, 2015.

The rating on Onex Wizard Acquisition Company II reflects S&P's
assessment of SIG Combibloc's business risk profile as
"satisfactory" and its financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged," as S&P's criteria define these terms.

S&P's assessment of the business risk profile as "satisfactory"
is based on SIG Combibloc's strong market position as the world's
second-largest aseptic-carton packaging supplier in a capital-
intensive industry that has high barriers to entry. SIG Combibloc
has a proven business model; a differentiated offering compared
with competitors; and embedded operations, long-standing
relationships customers, and long-term contracts with a diverse
client base.  As a result, its revenues and earnings are
relatively predictable.  The group has a track record of sound
profitability and the nondiscretionary nature of its end-user
products -- for example, milk -- means that the correlation of
its profitability with economic cycles is somewhat limited.  S&P
views its EBITDA margin as being above-average for the packaging

On the other hand, SIG Combibloc exhibits relatively limited
product diversity and scope of operations compared with some of
its packaging peers.  The group is also expanding into high-
growth, but also higher-risk, regions such as South America,
Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Africa.  The group is a price
follower and uses no contractual cost pass-through mechanisms.
It therefore remains exposed to fluctuations in the cost of
volatile key raw materials such as liquid paperboard, polymers,
and aluminum.

SIG Combibloc's growth depends on the capital-intensive
manufacture and installation of filler machinery -- although this
creates some barriers to entry, it does not create value.  A
significant proportion of the upfront costs are recouped by
selling carton sleeves.

S&P's assessment of SIG's financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged" reflects the group's high Standard & Poor's-adjusted
debt and the company's private-equity ownership.

S&P's base-case assumptions for SIG Combibloc have not changed
materially since S&P assigned the preliminary rating on Jan. 19,
2015.  S&P continues to anticipate revenue growth of about 4%,
chiefly based on demand from emerging markets; and EBITDA margins
improving to about 24%-26% as a result of cost reduction
measures. Taking into account the slightly higher amount of debt
issued and the slightly lower interest expense after a repricing
earlier this year, S&P continues to forecast that leverage will
reduce modestly from about 6.9x adjusted debt to EBITDA at the
close of the transaction in the coming years.  S&P also
anticipates that adjusted EBITDA interest coverage will be about
3x going forward.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that the group's credit
metrics will demonstrate a gradual reduction in leverage over the
next 12-18 months, but will still remain highly leveraged, with
average debt to EBITDA of around 6.6x and an EBITDA interest
coverage of around 3x.  S&P expects that SIG Combibloc will be
able to increase its revenues and strengthen its margins, as
operations continue to benefit from cost curtailment.

S&P's ratings assume that leverage will gradually fall toward 6x
adjusted debt/EBITDA over the next few years from the high levels
at the close of the transaction.  Should this not occur, either
through underperformance or management actions, S&P could lower
the ratings.  S&P could also lower the ratings if the group
exhibited an unexpected weakening of liquidity or earnings, so
that interest coverage ratios fell below 2x.  Although S&P sees
it as less likely, it could also lower the ratings if it observes
a significant reduction in the stability or absolute level of
adjusted EBITDA margins to below 17%, which could cause S&P to
revise downward its business risk assessment.  This could occur
after higher-than-expected pressures on sales volumes caused by a
combination of a weak economies, product substitution, and direct

S&P considers that an upgrade is unlikely at this stage, because
of SIG Combibloc's high tolerance for aggressive financial
policies and high leverage.  Nevertheless, S&P could raise the
ratings by one notch if the financial risk profile improved
toward the "aggressive" category on a sustainable basis.  More
specifically, this would entail adjusted debt to EBITDA sustained
at less than 5x, funds from operations of more than 12% at the
same time, and sound positive free operating cash flows.


HERBERT PARK: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class E Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Herbert Park CLO Limited:

   -- EUR235 mil. class A-1 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- EUR40 mil. class A-2 affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- EUR37 mil. class B affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- EUR21 mil. class C affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- EUR23.5 mil. class D affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- EUR12 mil. class E affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable; and
   -- EUR44.6 mil. subordinated notes: not rated

Herbert Park B.V. is an arbitrage cash flow collateralized loan
obligation.  Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes were
used to purchase a EUR400 mil. portfolio of European leveraged
loans and bonds.  The portfolio is managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt
Funds Management Europe Limited.  The reinvestment period is
scheduled to end in 2017.


The affirmation reflects the transaction's stable performance
since the last review on July 29, 2014.  The transaction is
currently passing all portfolio profile and collateral quality
tests, there have been no reported defaults and credit
enhancement has increased for all rated notes.  The transaction
has significantly increased par and is currently EUR4.4 mil.
above target par, compared with EUR1.7 mil. at last review.

Since the last review the transaction has moved to the six-year
weighted average life matrix.  As a result, the maximum weighted
average rating factor covenant has increased to 34 from 33, the
minimum weighted average spread has increased to 4.25% from 4.00%
and the minimum weighted average recovery rate has fallen to
68.25% from 69.50%.  The transaction covenants represent a
compliant matrix point and the current levels are within the
thresholds.  Most notably the weighted average recovery rate is
passing the minimum covenant by 1.22%.

The transaction has increased par by EUR2.7 mil. since last
review primarily due to the sale of equity.  This has resulted in
improved credit enhancement for all rated notes, most
significantly for the class D and E notes, with an approximate 1%
increase each.

The portfolio has experienced positive rating migration since the
last review.  Industry concentration has remained relatively
constant and country concentration has fallen.  Based on Fitch's
classification, debt from the US, UK and France represent 51% of
the portfolio with the top five industries representing 43%.
Peripheral exposure, defined as exposure to countries with a
Country Ceiling below 'AAA', accounts for 8.03% of the portfolio
and resides within Italy and Spain, within the restriction of
10%. Floating rate assets currently represent 100% of the
collateral balance.


A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would
lead to a downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes.  A
25% reduction in the expected recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes.

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies.  Fitch has relied
on the practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


BELTICO GROUP: Closures at Praia D'el Rey Due to Insolvency Order
The Portugal News reports that insolvency administrators of the
Beltico Group, which manages a part of the Praia D'El Rey Resort
have revealed that the closure of two restaurants and a company
at the resort in Obidos is the result of an asset seizure order
resulting from an insolvency order.

In comments to Lusa News Agency, the administrator explained that
a court order issued on March 19 was carried out on July 1, the
report says.

According to Portugal News, the order affects the closure of the
Club House and Argento restaurant located at the Praia D'El Rey
Marriott Golf & Beach Resort.

Lusa News Agency reported on July 1 that around 60 villas at the
resort had been shut by administrators as a result of the
insolvency order, Portugal News relays.

Portugal News says the closure of the restaurants reportedly
caught workers by surprise with unions lashing out the treatment
of the workers.

Unions were also concerned that workers who maintain villas at
the resort could also face losing their jobs as "the locks of 60
homes have been changed", suggesting that another company might
take over this task of keeping the holiday homes in order,
according to Portugal News.

Questioned by Lusa News Agency, the insolvency administrator
justified the changing of locks, including at villas, as being
"due to security reasons" and said July 2 that the future of the
restaurants remained unknown, Portugal News relates.

Reports from the site have since revealed that signs have posted
at the entrance to the Club House stating that it will from July
4 be run by Hotel da Praia, S.A., owner of the Hotel Marriott
Praia D'El Rey, which was unaffected by the insolvency order,
according to Portugal News.

It remains unclear when the villas at Praia DEl Rey will be
reopened and which company will be taking over their management,
adds Portugal News.


BANK CENTERCREDIT: Fitch Rates 7 Sr. Currency Bonds 'B(EXP)'
Fitch Ratings has assigned Bank Centercredit's (BCC) upcoming
series 7 senior unsecured local currency bonds under the second
bond issuance programme an expected Long-term rating of 'B(EXP)'
and an expected National Long-term rating of 'BB+(kaz)(EXP)'.
The issue's expected Recovery Rating is 'RR4(EXP)'.  The issue's
volume is KZT10 bil., it matures in ten years and has a 9% coupon
paid semi-annually.


The issue's ratings are aligned with BCC's Long-term local
currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'B' and National Long-
term rating of 'BB+(kaz)'.  BCC's ratings reflect its weak asset
quality, moderate capitalization, modest profitability and near-
term business risks stemming from the slowdown in Kazakhstan's
economy and lower oil prices.  However, the ratings are supported
by the bank's reasonable coverage of currently recognized problem
loans, track record of continued debt repayments, solid liquidity
cushion and limited amount of remaining senior wholesale funding.


Any changes to BCC's Long-term local currency IDR would impact
the issue's ratings.  The ratings would be downgraded in case of
material further asset quality deterioration, capital erosion
and/or a liquidity squeeze.  An upgrade would require a balance
sheet clean-up and/or significant improvements in capitalization
and core performance.

BANK PSB: Bank of Russia Investigates Financial Standing
During the inspection of financial standing of the credit
institution, the provisional administration of OJSC Bank PSB
appointed by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-3161, dated
November 11, 2014, due to the revocation of its banking license,
revealed operations of the bank's former management bearing
evidence of bank assets' diversion by issuing loans in excess of
RUR400 million to companies with dubious solvency.

By the estimate of the provisional administration, the assets of
Bank PSB do not exceed RUR494.9 million, whereas the bank's
liabilities to its creditors amount to RUR687.3 million.

Under these circumstances, on January 15, 2015, the court of
arbitration of the Republic of Bashkortostan made a ruling on
recognizing Bank PSB as insolvent (bankrupt) and on initiating
bankruptcy proceedings.  The state corporation Deposit Insurance
Agency was appointed as a receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted information on the financial
transactions bearing the evidence of criminal offense conducted
by the former management and owners of Bank PSB to the General
Prosecutor's Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and to the
Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for
consideration and procedural decision making.

COMPANION INSURANCE: Put Under Provisional Administration
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1502 dated July 1, 2015,
took a decision to appoint a provisional administration to
Companion Insurance Group, LLC.

The decision to appoint the provisional administration was taken
due to the suspension of the Company's insurance and reinsurance
license (Bank of Russia Order No. 1235, dated June 3, 2015).

The powers of the executive bodies of the Company are suspended.

V.A. Iosipchuk, member of the non-profit partnership Siberian
Association of Receivers, has been appointed head of the
provisional administration.

KOMESTRA INSURANCE: Put Under Provisional Administration
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1504 dated July 1, 2015,
took a decision to appoint a provisional administration to the
Insurance Company KOMESTRA, LLC.

The decision to appoint the provisional administration was taken
due to the suspension of the Company's insurance license (Bank of
Russia Order No. 1156, dated May 26, 2015).

The powers of the executive bodies of the Company are suspended.

N.E. Gulyaschikh, member of the non-profit partnership First
Self-regulatory Association of Receivers, has been appointed head
of the provisional administration.

PROMSBERBANK JSC: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
Due to the ruling of the Arbitration Court of the city of Moscow,
dated June 16, 2015, on recognizing insolvent (bankrupt) the
credit institution closed joint-stock company Industrial Savings
Bank or CJSC Promsberbank (Bank of Russia registration No. 1043,
date of registration is November 30, 1990), and appointing a
receiver in compliance with Clause 3 of Article 18927 of the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", the Bank of Russia
took a decision (Order No. OD-1524, dated July 2, 2015) to
terminate from July 3, 2015 the activity of the provisional
administration of the credit institution closed joint-stock
company Industrial Savings Bank, appointed by Bank of Russia
Order No. OD-702, dated April 2, 2015, "On the Appointment of the
Provisional Administration to Manage the Podolsk-Based Credit
Institution Closed Joint-stock Company Industrial Savings Bank
Due to the Revocation of Its banking License."

RENAISSANCE CREDIT: S&P Cuts Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its foreign and local
currency long-term counterparty credit ratings on Russia-based
Commercial Bank Renaissance Credit LLC (RenCredit) to 'B-' from
'B'.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'C' short-term
counterparty credit rating on RenCredit.  The outlook is

S&P also lowered the Russia national scale rating to 'ruBBB-'
from 'ruBBB+'.

S&P has removed all ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where it placed them on June 1, 2015.

S&P believes that RenCredit's capitalization will be weak over
the coming 12 months, pressured by high credit losses and reduced
net interest margins, but supported by recurrent capital
injections from its parent, ONEXIM Group.

S&P believes capitalization will remain weak at best, regardless
of the outcome of the potential acquisition of Bank Sviaznoy.

S&P projects that its risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio for
RenCredit, before adjustments for diversification, will be
between 3% and 4% in 2015, compared with 3.9% at the end of 2014.

Overall, the ratings on RenCredit reflect S&P's 'bb-' anchor for
a bank operating primarily in Russia and the bank's "moderate"
business position, "weak" capital and earnings and risk position,
"average" funding, and "adequate" liquidity, as S&P's criteria
define these terms.  S&P assess the stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) at 'ccc+', reflecting its view that without external
capital support throughout 2015 the bank may breach regulatory
capital ratios.  At the same time, S&P rates the bank one notch
higher than the SACP, reflecting its expectations of additional
support from ONEXIM, which are not fully captured in the
indicative issuer credit rating.  Consequently, the long-term
counterparty credit rating is 'B-'.

S&P's assessment of RenCredit's business position reflects the
bank's niche consumer finance business model, very risky product
line strategy, and relatively small scale in its peer group.
With total assets of Russian ruble (RUB) 129 billion (about $2.3
billion) on Dec. 31, 2014, RenCredit is a midsize consumer
finance specialist in Russia.

In S&P's opinion, credit risk is high, reflecting RenCredit's
focus on risky unsecured consumer lending and loan portfolio
metrics that remain worse than peers'.  In 2014, RenCredit's
credit costs skyrocketed to 32.3% and were at least twice as high
as its peers', resulting in a massive loss of RUB15 billion (121%
of 2013 adjusted total equity).  In addition, S&P sees the
potential for continuing high credit costs at least in 2015.

S&P sees no immediate pressure on funding or liquidity.  S&P
admits that RenCredit's deposit base was volatile in December
2014.  However, S&P notes that the bank has experienced a net
inflow of retail deposits since then, despite numerous cuts in
interest rates.  RenCredit does not depend on central bank
funding, although it has access to liquidity facilities at the
central bank of Russia.

The loan-to-deposit ratio dropped to 84% in 2014 from 127% on
Dec. 31, 2013, and S&P expects it to remain low and even decrease
further in 2015, as the bank has been actively buying out its own
outstanding bonds.

S&P believes the cash-rich ONEXIM group will continue to support
RenCredit.  S&P notes that, in 2014, RenCredit received
RUB10.6 billion from ONEXIM group, which was similar to the total
size of its regulatory capital at the beginning of 2014.  ONEXIM
group has continued to provide capital support to RenCredit in
2015, with RUB3.8 billion received in the first six months of
2015.  S&P understands that ONEXIM is ready to provide an
additional injection in 2015 if needed, whether or not the
Svyaznoy Bank acquisition goes ahead.

The negative outlook on RenCredit reflects the possibility of a
downgrade in the next 12 months if S&P sees that its losses are
not balanced by capital support from ONEXIM.  Such a scenario
could arise from the acquisition of Svyaznoy Bank, if not backed
by sufficient funds from either Deposit Insurance Agency or
ONEXIM, or from a change of ONEXIM's supportive approach to
RenCredit.  Insufficient support would rapidly place the
creditworthiness of RenCredit under severe pressure, as it could
put its statutory capital ratios at risk.

S&P considers the possibility of a positive rating action to be
remote in the current environment.  S&P does not see the bank as
having a sufficiently strong business model to generate capital
internally in 2015 or to operate without the umbrella of its
cash-rich owner.  This weakness constrains the rating, as it
leaves the bank dependent on ONEXIM's support.


BANCAJA 9: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class E Tranche
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 25 tranches and upgraded one tranche
of eight Bancaja transactions, a series of Spanish prime RMBS
comprising loans originated and serviced by Bankia, S.A.


Stable Performance

The affirmations reflect the robust performance of the
securitized portfolios.  Three-month plus arrears across the
eight transactions have stabilized over the past 12 months, at
between 0.8% (Bancaja 3) and 3% (Bancaja 9) as of the latest
reporting periods.  The stabilization reflects both an improved
economic environment in Spain, and a lower roll rate of late-
stage arrears into default.

However, asset performance diverges between the more seasoned
transactions (Bancaja 3 to 7) and the more recent issuance
(Bancaja 8, 9 and 13).  As of the latest reporting periods,
cumulative defaults range between 0.4% (Bancaja 5) and 1.1%
(Bancaja 7) compared with the 3.5%, 6.7% and 6% for Bancaja 8, 9
and 13 relative to the original securitized EUR balance.  The
better performance of the more seasoned transactions is driven by
low weighted average Fitch-estimated indexed current loan-to-
value mortgages (between 22.4% and 44.2%), which compares with
63.8% in Bancaja 9 and 102.5% in Bancaja 13.

The average seasoning of the collateral across the Bancaja
transactions ranges from 12.8 years (Bancaja 4) to 6.5 years
(Bancaja 13).

Reserve Fund Replenishments

The transactions' structures allow for the full provisioning of
defaulted loans, which are defined as loans in arrears by more
than 18 months.  Over the last 12 months gross excess spread has
remained adequate to fully provision for defaulted loans and to
ensure that the reserve funds remain fully funded in Bancaja 3 to
6.  Gross excess spread and recoveries in Bancaja 7, 8, 9 and 13
have been also sufficient to fully cover period defaults, leading
to replenishments of the respective reserve funds.  The reserve
fund levels currently stand at 100%, 81%, 43% and 69% in Bancaja
7, 8, 9 and 13, respectively.

Fitch understands from the issuers that recovery cash flows
obtained by the securitization funds to date are linked to
property acquisitions by the originator, rather than foreclosure
management on real estate assets that secure the mortgage loans.
As Fitch considers this practice to be unsustainable under stress
scenarios, the credit and rating analysis incorporates the
property and recovery stresses that Fitch defines within its
Spanish RMBS criteria.

The Outlook on class A2 in Bancaja 7 was revised to Stable from
Positive in expectation of a switch to pro-rata amortization from
sequential as the now fully replenished reserve fund will limit
the credit enhancement build-up for the notes.  The Negative
Outlooks on the junior class D notes of Bancaja 7 and all notes
in Bancaja 9 and 13 reflect Fitch's expectations of future
reserve draws, despite the recent replenishments, due to late
stage arrears (on average 2.3%) being higher than Spanish average

Broker Loans Foreclosure Frequency Adjustment

The rating actions taken are also substantiated by Fitch's
application of a reduced default probability to broker-originated
loans of 100%, rather than the criteria standard 200%.

While Fitch believes broker-originated loans are typically
exposed to greater performance volatility than loans originated
via traditional bank branches, the seasoned broker-originated
loans that are current in terms of payment have demonstrated
resilience in periods of economic crisis.  Fitch therefore expect
those loans to maintain their stronger performance than
traditional branch-originated loans.

The presence of broker originated loans in the transactions range
from 25% in Bancaja 3 to 54% in Bancaja 4.  This calibration is
explained by the comparable performance observed on broker-
originated loans versus loans originated via traditional
channels, which has been possible as of end-March 2015 via the
loan-by-loan data sets provided by the European Data Warehouse.


Deterioration in asset performance may result from economic
factors, in particular the increasing effect of unemployment.  A
corresponding increase in new defaults and associated pressure on
excess spread levels and reserve funds could result in negative
rating action.


No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
portfolios and the transaction.  Consistency checks performed for
Bancaja 13 indicated some minor discrepancies in the arrears
levels reported between the latest loan level data and the
corresponding aggregate investor reporting.  Fitch applied an
upward adjustment to the default probabilities to reflect the
potential inaccuracy in the data.  Fitch has not reviewed the
results of any third party assessment of the asset portfolio
information or conducted a review of origination files as part of
its ongoing monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the Bancaja 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8 and 9, FTA initial closing.  The subsequent performance of
the transactions over the years is consistent with the agency's
expectations given the operating environment and Fitch is
therefore satisfied that the asset pool information relied upon
for its initial rating analysis was adequately reliable.

Prior to assignment of ratings to Bancaja 13 in April 2011, Fitch
reviewed the results of a third party assessment conducted on the
asset portfolio information ahead of initial closing in December
2008, which indicated no adverse findings material to the rating

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Bancaja 3, FTA
Class A (ISIN ES0312882006): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN ES0312882014): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN ES0312882022): upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'BBBsf';
Outlook Stable

Bancaja 4, FTH
Class A (ISIN ES0312883004): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN ES0312883012): affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN ES0312883020): affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable

Bancaja 5, FTA
Class A (ISIN ES0312884002): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN ES0312884010): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN ES0312884028): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable

Bancaja 6, FTA
Class A2 (ISIN ES0312885017): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN ES0312885025): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN ES0312885033): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

Bancaja 7, FTA
Class A2 (ISIN ES0312886015): affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Positive
Class B (ISIN ES0312886023): affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN ES0312886031): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN ES0312886049): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative

Bancaja 8, FTA
Class A (ISIN ES0312887005): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN ES0312887013): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN ES0312887021): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN ES0312887039): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

Bancaja 9, FTA
Class A2 (ISIN ES0312888011): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative
Class B (ISIN ES0312888029): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
Class C (ISIN ES0312888037): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative
Class D (ISIN ES0312888045): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative
Class E (ISIN ES0312888052): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate revised to 0% from 50%

Bancaja 13, FTA
Class A (ISIN ES0312847009): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Negative

NOVO BANCO: Moody's Confirms 'B2' Long-Term Deposit Ratings
Moody's Investors Service confirmed Novo Banco S.A.'s and its
supported entities' long-term deposit ratings at B2 and has
upgraded the long-term senior unsecured debt ratings to B2 from
B3. The outlook on the deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings
is developing. Furthermore, Moody's assigned to Novo Banco a
Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment) of B1(cr)/Not

At the same time, Moody's affirmed the bank's short-term deposit
and backed commercial paper ratings at Not Prime, and the
standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) at caa2.

The review on the bank's deposit and senior unsecured debt
ratings was initiated on August 12, 2014 and extended on
November 24, 2014 and again on May 28, 2015



Moody's said that the affirmation of Novo Banco's standalone BCA
of caa2 reflects its weak risk-absorption capacity, despite
above-average provisioning coverage (loan loss reserves as a
proportion of non-performing loans stood at 77.8% at year-end
2014). The weak risk absorption is due mainly to the bank's
modest capital buffers (phased-in Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of
9.5% at year-end 2014) that are challenged by the bank's
deteriorating asset-quality metrics (non-performing loan ratio
reached 16.5% at year-end 2014 compared with the system's average
of 12.0%) and large losses booked in 2014 (EUR497.6 million).
Novo Banco's standalone BCA also reflects its (1) weak liquidity
position, despite visible improvements in restoring customer
confidence and the generation of liquidity through asset sales
and balance-sheet deleveraging; and (2) its status as a bridge
bank, with the associated high degree of uncertainty around
future strategy together with the remaining risk that not all the
underlying causes of Banco Espirito Santo S.A.'s (BES; unrated)
failure have yet been resolved.


Moody's says that the confirmation of Novo Banco's deposit
ratings and the upgrade of the senior unsecured debt ratings
derive from the affirmation of bank's standalone BCA at caa2, the
introduction of the rating agency's Advanced Loss Given Failure
(LGF) analysis, and revised government support assumptions.

Novo Banco is subject to the European Bank Resolution and
Recovery Directive, which Moody's considers to be an Operational
Resolution Regime. Accordingly, Moody's applies its Advanced LGF
analysis to these banks' liability structures, thereby mostly
applying its standard assumptions. These assumptions include a
residual tangible common equity of 3%, losses post-failure of 8%
of tangible banking assets, a 25% run-off in junior wholesale
deposits, a 5% run-off in preferred deposits, and a 25%
probability of deposits being preferred to senior unsecured debt.
Because Moody's assumes that Novo Banco's deposit base is
essentially retail in nature, it considers a proportion of 10% of
junior deposits below the estimated EU-wide average of 26%. The
Advanced LGF analysis results in a "very low" loss-given-failure
for long-term junior deposits as well as senior debt ratings,
reflecting the bank's substantial volume of deposit funding as
well as the amount of senior debt and securities more
subordinated to it.

In addition to the effects of the new methodology on the banks'
ratings, Moody's has lowered its expectations about the degree of
government support for Novo Banco. The main trigger for this
reassessment is the introduction of the Bank Resolution and
Recovery Directive in the European Union in January 2015. Moody's
has reduced its assumption of government support for Novo Banco
to moderate from very high, leading to one notch of uplift from
three notches for deposits and two notches for senior debt


Novo Banco's deposit and senior debt ratings have a developing
outlook that reflects the uncertainties around the outcome of the
sale process in which the bank is currently immersed that could
affect Moody's final assessment of the deposits and senior debt

In late 2014, Bank of Portugal, as the Portuguese resolution
authority, started to promote the sale by the Resolution Fund of
Novo Banco and requested banks to submit expressions of interest.
On June 30, 2015, Bank of Portugal stated that three entities had
presented binding offers for Novo Banco and that it will review
such proposals during the next weeks.

Successfully selling Novo Banco to a financially strong buyer
with strategic interests could benefit the bank's financial
profile and business prospects and support its recovery following
last year's resolution. At the same time, Moody's would re-assess
its current government support assumptions once Novo Banco's
ownership changes. Conversely, a failure to comply with the
European Commission's state aid ruling, which requires a
divestment of Novo Banco by August 2016, would result in the
final liquidation of the bank under the ownership of the
Resolution Fund with potentially more uncertainty and heightened
risks to creditors.

The developing outlook also reflects the evolving composition of
Novo Banco's balance sheet (i.e., ongoing reduction in tangible
banking assets and debt amortizations), which could affect
Moody's LGF assessment and therefore change the current two
notches of uplift for the bank's deposit and senior debt ratings.


As part of the actions, Moody's has assigned a B1(cr)/Not
Prime(cr) CR Assessment to Novo Banco and its branches. Novo
Banco's CR Assessment is driven by the bank's caa2 BCA and by
substantial bail-in-able debt and deposits likely to support the
operating obligations. The bank's CR Assessment also benefits
from one notch of systemic support, in line with Moody's support
assumptions on deposits and senior unsecured debt.

The CR Assessment, which is not a rating, reflects an issuer's
probability of defaulting on certain bank operating liabilities,
such as covered bonds, derivatives, letters of credit and other
contractual commitments. In assigning the CR Assessment, Moody's
evaluates the issuer's standalone strength and the likelihood,
should the need arise, of affiliate and government support, as
well as the anticipated seniority of counterparty obligations
under Moody's Advanced LGF framework. The CR Assessment also
assumes that authorities will likely take steps to preserve the
continuity of a bank's key operations, maintain payment flows,
and avoid contagion should the bank enter a resolution.


Upward pressure on Novo Banco's deposits and senior debt ratings
could arise if the bank is acquired by a financial strong and
strategic buyer as senior creditors could benefit from measures
aimed at strengthening the bank's financial fundamentals as well
as affiliate support.

An improvement of the BCA could result from a clear improvement
in the bank's capital buffers, a reduction in the stock of
problematic assets, a sustainable recovery in Novo Banco's
profitability and regaining market funding access. Any
significant macroeconomic growth for Portugal beyond Moody's
central scenario of 1.7% GDP growth in 2015 could underpin signs
of a turnaround and exert positive pressure on the ratings.

Downward pressure on Novo Banco's deposits and senior debt
ratings could result from (1) a final buyer's strategy for the
bank triggering a substantial downsizing in the balance sheet
perimeter, which could heighten risks for senior creditors; (2)
the Portuguese Resolution Fund failing to conclude the bank's
sale process before August 2016 and the bank entering
liquidation; and (3) changes in Moody's LGF analysis that could
derive from a variation in the bank's asset and liability



Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to B2
  developing from B3 Rating under Review

Issuer: BES Finance Ltd.

  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to B2
  developing from B3 Rating under Review

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., London Branch

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to B2
  developing from B3 Rating under Review

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., Luxembourg Branch

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to B2
  developing from B3 Rating under Review


Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.

  Long-term Bank Deposit Rating, Confirmed at B2, outlook

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., London Branch

  Long-term Bank Deposit Rating, Confirmed at B2, outlook

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., Luxembourg Branch

  Long-term Bank Deposit Rating, Confirmed at B2, outlook

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Cayman Branch

  Long-term Bank Deposit Rating, Confirmed at B2, outlook

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Madeira Branch

  Long-term Bank Deposit Rating, Confirmed at B2, outlook


Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.

  Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed caa2

  Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed caa2

  Short-term Bank Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP

  Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., London Branch

  Short-term Bank Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP

  Deposit Note/CD Program, Affirmed NP

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., Luxembourg Branch

  Short-term Bank Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Cayman Branch

  Short-term Bank Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Madeira Branch

  Short-term Bank Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP


Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.

  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., London Branch

  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., Luxembourg Branch

  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Cayman Branch

  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Madeira Branch

  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

  Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

Outlook Actions:

  Outlook, Changed To Developing From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.
Issuer: BES Finance Ltd.
Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., London Branch
Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., Luxembourg Branch
Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Cayman Branch
Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Madeira Branch


KOCOGLU GROUP: Gov't Assumes Debts, Kalyon to Take Over Project
Mustafa Kusen at Today's Zaman reports that with the construction
of Sabuncubeli Tunnel in western Turkey halted due to the
bankruptcy of the company that won the initial tender, the state
has now given the unfinished project to Kalyon Insaat, a
construction company that is known for its close ties with the
Justice and Development Party (AK Party).

The state has also taken on the bankrupt company's debt incurred
from earlier external financing loans, Today's Zaman discloses.

On Sept. 9, 2011, the Kocoglu Group started constructing the
Sabuncubeli Tunnel, which would reduce traveling time between the
provinces of Izmir and Manisa to 15 minutes, Today's Zaman
relates.  However, the company announced in late 2014 that it had
gone bankrupt, unable to repay US$35 million in loans, Today's
Zaman recounts.  The General Directorate of Highways (KGM), the
tendering authority for the project, agreed to cover this debt,
Today's Zaman relays.

Republican People's Party (CHP) Manisa deputy and parliamentary
group deputy chairman Ozgur Ozel, speaking to Today's Zaman, said
his party had criticized the authorities since the beginning of
the project for awarding the tender to the Kocoglu Group.

"They [the AK Party] gave the tender to a company that had not
even dug a molehill before.  I argued many times before that this
is not appropriate.  The Kocoglu Group went bankrupt and the
tunnel construction stopped.  The state took on the company's
US$35 million loan debt.  This money will be paid from our
citizens' pockets," Today's Zaman quotes Mr. Ozel as saying.

Kalyon Insaat will now continue the project for which the state
has agreed to pay US$150 million once construction is completed,
Today's Zaman discloses.

Kocoglu Group was a tunnel builder based in Turkey.


FERREXPO FINANCE: Moody's Assigns Caa3 Rating to 2019 Notes
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive Caa3 rating to
US$185.6 million in new senior unsecured notes due 2019 which
Ferrexpo Finance Plc, a fully owned subsidiary of Ferrexpo Plc,
has issued in exchange of the remaining 7.875% senior unsecured
notes maturing in April 2016.  The ratings on the Existing Notes
are withdrawn following the repayment of the obligations as a
result of the exchange.  Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the
Caa3 corporate family rating ('CFR') of Ferrexpo, its Caa3-PD
probability of default rating ('PDR'), and the Caa3 rating on the
Existing US$160.7 million 2019 Notes issued by Ferrexpo Finance
plc. The outlook on all Ferrexpo's ratings remains negative.

Though Moody's recognizes that the execution of the exchange
offer improves liquidity position and refinancing profile of the
company, the agency, as per its own definition, views the
exchange as a distressed exchange considered by Moody's as a
limited default. Following the completion of the exchange offer,
Moody's has also appended a limited default (/LD) designation to
Ferrexpo's Caa3-PD/LD PDR. The agency expects to remove the "/LD"
suffix after approximately three business days following the
completion of the debt exchange. This is also in line with the
treatment by the agency of the first exchange offer on the 2016
notes completed by the company in February 2015.


Ferrexpo's ratings are constrained by Ukraine's foreign currency
ceiling, because the company is exposed to Ukraine's political,
legal, fiscal and regulatory environment, given that all of its
processing and mining assets are located within the country.
Although the company export all its production abroad and invoice
almost all of its revenues in US dollars, the company's capacity
to service its corporate debt, which is mostly in foreign
currency (in US dollars), could be negatively affected by the
potential actions taken by the Ukrainian government to preserve
the country's foreign-exchange reserves.

The ratings also reflect (1) the group's exposure to a single
commodity, iron ore, whose prices have fallen substantially
during 2014 and are expected to remain weak over the coming
several years; (2) the fact that the company's iron ore resources
are concentrated in a single large deposit in central Ukraine,
which increases production outage risk, albeit this risk is
mitigated by the development of a second mine exploiting the same
deposit; (3) a still high level of customer concentration risk,
with the two main customers accounting for c.35% of the group's
revenues in 2014; and (4) a concentrated ownership structure,
with a single individual, Mr. Zhevago -- who is also the CEO --
retaining a 50.3% ownership interest in the company.

Ferrexpo's financial profile is strong for a Caa3 rating, as it
has a track record of solid credit metrics, with modest leverage
and comfortable interest coverage. Furthermore, we acknowledge a
number of credit strengths, related to Ferrexpo's (1) access to
sizeable iron ore reserves and unexploited iron ore resources
adjacent to its existing iron ore deposits; (2) favorable
geographic location (close to the Black Sea) and in-house
logistics capabilities, providing advantaged access to European
and seaborne markets; (3) track record as a reliable iron ore
pellet supplier to international steel producers; and (4)
profitable mining and processing operations, also supported by
recently completed strategic mining projects, including a second
mine, Yeristovo, which has meaningfully contributed to 2014
results, by adding volumes and reducing average group's cash
costs per tonne. We also positively consider management's
disciplined financial policy. Taking into account lower iron ore
prices, compared to the previous year, as well as the supporting
effect of the lower local currency on the margins, Moody's
expects Ferrexpo to maintain solid leverage metrics.


The negative outlook reflects the negative outlook on the
Ukrainian sovereign ratings. A potential further downgrade of
Ukraine's Ca sovereign ratings may result in the further lowering
of Ukraine's foreign and/or local currency bond country ceiling,
that currently constrains Ferrexpo's ratings.


Execution of the two-step exchange of 2016 bonds reflect
Ferrexpo's proactive approach in managing its challenging debt
maturity profile, as well as the management's willingness to use
a portion of Ferrexpo's cash balances to service its debt
obligations. The exchanges support the company's liquidity
position as they have addressed the refinancing risk in 2016.

At the end of 2014, Ferrexpo reported that it had approximately
US$627 million of cash, to a large extent placed outside of
Ukraine at various international financial institutions
throughout Western Europe. However, approximately US$160 million
was held within Ukraine at Bank Finance & Credit JSC (Ca,
negative), a related entity under common control of the majority
owner of Ferrexpo, Mr. Zhevago, to fund immediate operational
needs in the country, chiefly represented by scheduled capex,
working capital, wages and other local operating costs.

"We expect Ferrexpo to use these substantial cash reserves, as
well as US$41.5 million cash proceeds received following the
agreed divestment of Ferrexpo Resources, to fund scheduled
repayments under its PXF facilities in 2015 and 2016 and to pay
about US$100 million in cash installment under the agreed terms
of the second exchange of the Existing Notes."

While Ferrexpo has two committed pre-export finance (PXF)
facilities totaling US$682 million, these are fully drawn. One
PXF of about US$332 million outstanding is amortizing with final
repayment in July 2016, and the other one of US$350 million
outstanding, also amortizing from November 2016 with final
maturity in August 2018. Ferrexpo is expected to maintain good
headroom under the financial covenants of these facilities.


The New Notes are unsecured guaranteed obligations issued by
Ferrexpo Finance Plc and benefit from a suretyship provided by
Ferrexpo Poltava Mining (FPM). As of the end of 2014, the
consolidated net assets and EBITDA of the guarantors, when
aggregated, represented approximately 87% and 95% of the
consolidated net assets and EBITDA of the group, respectively.

The Caa3 rating on the New Notes is in line with the rating on
the existing senior unsecured 2019 notes that the company put in
place as a result of the first bond exchange of the Existing
Notes completed in February 2015, as they are pari-passu.


Ratings are likely to be downgraded if there is a downgrade of
Ukraine's sovereign rating and/or lowering of the foreign-
currency bond country ceiling, or in case of a material
deterioration in the liquidity of the company.

Positive pressure, albeit unlikely, could be exerted on the
ratings if Moody's were to raise Ukraine's foreign-currency bond
country ceiling, provided there is no material deterioration in
the company-specific factors, including its operating and
financial performance, market position and liquidity.

Ferrexpo Plc, headquartered in Switzerland and incorporated in
the UK, is a mid-sized iron ore pellet producer with mining and
processing assets located in Ukraine. The group has total Joint
Ore Reserves Committee Code (JORC) classified resources of 6.7
billion tonnes, around 1.5 billion tonnes of which are proved and
probable reserves. The average grade of Ferrexpo's ore is
approximately 31% Fe. In 2014 the group achieved a pellet
production of 11 million and generated revenues of US$1.39

STATE ODESSA: Group DF No Intention to Bankrupt Company
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the accusations of Ukrainian Prime
Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk on the alleged intention of Group DF,
which combines the assets of businessman Dmytro Firtash, to
bankrupt State Odessa Port Plant are lies.

"We confirm that the plant's debt only to Ostchem, Group's
chemical business, amounts to US$193.26 million.  We're saying,
with respect, that in spite of the huge debts of the plant to the
Group, we have never considered the issue, nor taken any steps
aimed at bankrupting the plant," Interfax-Ukraine quotes a
statement released by Group DF on July 8.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, the statement said Group DF
considers Odessa Port Plant to be a key partner of the Group in
chemistry sector.  The group is going to participate in the
plant's privatization if there are open, transparent and fair
bids, Interfax-Ukraine discloses.

"We consider Mr. Yatseniuk's slander to be the continuation of
politically motivated persecution of our business, as well as an
attempt to discredit the Group as one of the strongest
participants in the announced provocation of Odessa Port Plant,"
Group DF, as cited by Interfax-Ukraine, said.

On July 7, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk said that
Ostchem of Group DF had sold overpriced natural gas to Odesa
port-side chemical plant to bring it to bankruptcy, and as a
result the Interior Ministry opened criminal proceedings,
Interfax-Ukraine relates.

"This is the group of Yanukovych-Firtash-Liovochkin.  Damage to
the state was inflicted, and the Interior Ministry began criminal
proceedings," Interfax-Ukraine quotes Mr. Yatseniuk as saying.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ASHPERRY LTD: Insolvency Service Bans Two Club Directors
Following an investigation by the Insolvency Service, Nicholas
Pratt and Luke Parker, directors of Ashperry Ltd and Carbris
Leisure Ltd, have been disqualified for 9 years each. Messrs.
Pratt and Parker caused or allowed Ashperry and Carbris to misuse
the Annual Accounting Scheme for VAT and also caused the
companies to trade to the detriment of HMRC.

Mr. Pratt has given a disqualification undertaking to the
Secretary Of State which runs from June 4, 2015 until June 3,

Mr. Parker has given an undertaking to the Secretary Of State
which runs from July 13, 2015 until July 12, 2024.

The investigation also found that:

   -- The directors took advantage of a scheme designed for
      smaller businesses in order to accrue large VAT debts
      undetected by HMRC. In the case of Carbris, HMRC had been
      advised that the expected turnover would be GBP78,000 and
      HMRC had estimated the annual VAT at GBP10,000

   -- The directors failed to tell HMRC that the turnover had
      exceeded this level within a week of trading and after nine
      months of trading the turnover was over GBP5.4 million,
      leading to a VAT liability of GBP392,775

Commenting on the disqualification, Mark Bruce, a Chief
Investigator for The Insolvency Service said:

"Directly as a result of the directors actions, money which had
been charged to customers or deducted from employees totalling
over GBP1.25million, which should have been paid to HMRC, was
unfairly kept by the company to finance its trading.

"Limited liability protection is a privilege to ensure businesses
trade in an open and fair market. Such protection is only
available to those who comply with their obligations. If those
obligations are ignored, that protection will be withdrawn."

Ashperry Ltd was incorporated on May 14, 2010. Ashperry Ltd went
into liquidation on October 11, 2012. Mr. Parker was a director
of Ashperry Ltd from September 12, 2011 until the liquidation.
Mr. Pratt was a director of Ashperry Ltd from May 21, 2010 until
the liquidation.

Carbris Leisure Ltd was incorporated on May 3, 2006, although it
did not start trading until 2012. Carbris Leisure Ltd went into
administration on August 12, 2013. Mr. Parker was a director of
Carbris Leisure Ltd from February 20, 2012 until the
administration. Mr. Pratt was a director of Carbris Leisure Ltd
from February 20, 2012 until the administration.

Ashperry Ltd and Carbris Leisure Ltd both operated Le Monde
Restaurant, Soda Bar, Soda Lounge and Bunker Nightclub from
premises St Mary Street and Mill Lane, Cardiff.

Ashperry Ltd and Carbris leisure Ltd both operated Mbargo, Mbargo
Lounge and Bunker Nightclub from premises in Clifton Triangle,

BORDER PRECISION: Helping Hand After Liquidation
The Southern Reporter reports that workers affected by Border
Precision Engineering going into liquidation have been invited to
a support event on July 7.

The event, organised by Partnership Action for Continuing
Employment (PACE), will be held in the Tait Hall between 1:00
p.m. and 4:00 p.m. and will feature support agencies and training
providers, according to The Southern Reporter.

The report notes that it will also be attended by representatives
of firms who might be able to offer jobs to some of the workers

INTERNATIONAL PROJECT: High Court Winds Up Fake Loan Firms
Two companies that ran a scheme that took large sums of money
from businesses and provided nothing in return, have been wound
up by the High Court following an investigation by Company
Investigations, a part of the Insolvency Service.

International Project Management Limited (IPL) and International
Group Limited (IGL), which were both registered overseas and had
no link with UK companies of the same or similar names, targeted
property developers and builders looking for funding. The sole
active director of both companies was Patrick O'Sullivan.

The companies, which, despite their overseas registration were
based in Hampshire, claimed to have access to large amounts of
money from offshore investors which could be made available to
developers in return for payment of up front fees to cover "due
diligence" and "administration". After paying the fees, which
could run into hundreds of thousands of pounds, the clients were
left empty-handed as the companies failed to provide any funding.

In several instances, clients were introduced to the companies by
an 'introducer', Jones Taylor Estates Limited (itself wound up
following an Insolvency Service investigation in February), who
received a cut of the money paid over by the client. The client's
money was paid into the client account of John Swindell
solicitors, who passed the money on to IPML's bank account.

There was no evidence that IPML or IGL made any efforts to obtain
funds for the clients; however, the funds received were swiftly
divided up and distributed, with large amounts withdrawn in cash
and the reminder shared between various individuals and
businesses registered in Bulgaria.

Commenting on the action, David Hill, Chief Investigator at the
Insolvency Service, said:

"These companies told clients would be able to secure loans for
them. The reality was that they were aware this was never likely
to happen.

"The Insolvency Service will investigate and bring to a halt the
activities of companies that mislead clients in this way and that
are found to be operating against the public interest."

International Project Management Limited was incorporated as a
non-resident domestic company in the Republic of the Marshall
Islands on September 13, 2006 with corporation number 20141. Its
100% shareholder and director is Patrick Donnell O'Sullivan.
There is a second director, Mr. Cecil John Cooper Wynne-Edwards,
but he does not appear to have played an active role in the

International Group Limited was incorporated as a non-resident
domestic corporation in the Republic of Liberia on March 16, 1994
under the registration number C-74016. The only known director is
Patrick Donnell O'Sullivan.

Both companies maintained a UK place of business at Suite A, The
Chambers, 5A The Square, Petersfield, Hampshire GU32 3HJ.

In the case of both companies, the petition was presented under
s124A of the Insolvency Act 1986 on June 10, 2014 and the Winding
Up Order was made on June 12, 2015.

ONTINUITY LTD: Sole Director Disqualified For 8 Years
Keith Hawker, the sole director of Ontinuity Ltd, a bespoke web
hosting company, has been disqualified for 8 years for failing to
deal with the company's tax affairs and for diverting money to a
company of which he was director and main shareholder.

The disqualification, from May 26, 2015 follows an investigation
by the Insolvency Service and means that Mr. Hawker is banned
from acting as a director or in any way managing or controlling a
company until May 2019.

Mr. Hawker gave an undertaking to the Secretary of State for
Business, Innovation & Skills not be involved in managing,
controlling a company or being a director for the duration of his

Ontinuity Ltd was placed in liquidation on February 27, 2013 with
a liability of GBP81,856 outstanding to HMRC on account of its
tax. The liability dated back to when the company commenced
trading and continued to accrue till it was placed in

Prior to liquidation, Mr. Hawker, 59, had negotiated a time to
pay agreement with HMRC to deal with Ontinuity's tax. However, he
failed to honour this agreement. Investigations found that before
placing Ontinuity Ltd in Liquidation, Mr. Hawker diverted
GBP194,268 to an associated company of which he remained a
director and majority shareholder.

Commenting on these disqualifications, Mark Bruce, Chief
Examiner, Investigation and Enforcement Services at the
Insolvency Service, said:

"The Insolvency Service will rigorously pursue company directors
who seek to benefit themselves ahead of their creditors by
extracting company funds when others are not being paid.

"Limited liability protection is only available to those who
comply with their obligations as company directors. If those
obligations are ignored, that protection will be withdrawn."

Ontinuity Limited was incorporated on October 16, 2003 and was
placed into Creditors Voluntary Liquidation on February 27, 2013.

Mr. Hawker provided a disqualification undertaking to the
Secretary of State on May 5, 2015. The disqualification commences
on May 26, 2015.

Ontinuity Ltd traded from trading premises at Unit G. Mill Green
Business Park, Mill Green Road, in Mitcham, Surrey, providing
web-hosting and computer related activities to its clients.

PRIMA HOTELS: AIB Owed GBP36MM Following Luxury Hotel Group Admin
Richard Frost at Insider Media Limited reports that a Prima
Hotels Ltd, a Greater Manchester-headquartered luxury hotel
group, was forced into administration after a downturn in trade
and an unsuccessful legal claim prompted its bank to take
measures to recover its GBP36 million lending, it has emerged.

Administrators have also revealed that several potential buyers
have expressed an interest in taking over one or more of the
group's hotels, which continue to trade as normal, according to
Insider Media Limited.

Ryan Grant, Lee Causer and Catherine Williamson from AlixPartners
were called into four hotels owned and managed by Prima Hotels
Ltd in May, the report notes.

The hotels are:

   -- The Stanneylands Hotel in Wilmslow;
   -- Nunsmere Hall Hotel in Northwich;
   -- The Quorn Country Hotel in Leicestershire; and
   -- Hellaby Hall Hotel in Rotherham.

A further appointment was made over the Royal Terrace Hotel in

A report to creditors said the group's bank AIB Group (UK) took
steps to protect its lending in April after negotiations between
the two parties broke down, Insider Media Limited says.

Based on current forecasts, it is thought the bank could suffer a
multimillion-pound shortfall on the secured debt, although the
exact amount is not yet known, the report notes.

Meanwhile Prima Hotels Ltd owes GBP2.2 million to unsecured
creditors, Nunsmere Hall Ltd owes GBP667,164, Fontenhall Ltd
(which trades as Hellaby Hall) owes GBP892,316 and Hallco 1494
Ltd (which does not have a trading name) owes GBP2.4 million, the
report discloses. None of the unsecured creditors are expected to
receive any money following the administration.

Following the group's collapse, AlixPartners engaged Legacy
Hotels & Resorts to operate the hotels.  The administrators
reported that all bookings have been fulfilled and future
bookings will continue to be honoured as they seek buyers for the
hotels, the report notes.

The report relays that the administrators said: "The value of the
hotels will be maximized by selling them as operating hotels,
rather than vacant properties. The administrators' strategy is
therefore to trade the hotels with a view to formally commencing
marketing in early to mid-September 2015 to sell the hotels as
going concerns.

"This strategy will also reduce claims from a number of potential
creditor groups who could have claimed as unsecured creditors;
principally customers who paid deposits and would have had
unsecured claims, and employees who would have had preferential
and unsecured claims, had trading ceased upon appointment," the
report quoted the administrators as saying.

"To date, the administrators have been contacted by a significant
number of external third parties expressing interest in one or
more of the hotels and the administrators remain optimistic that
going-concern sales of the hotels will be achieved. Once formal
marketing of the hotels commences, these parties will be
contacted and invited to submit formal offers," the
administrators added.


* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
Author: Frank H. Knight
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 381 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Order your personal copy today at

The tenets Frank H. Knight sets out in this, his first book,
have become an integral part of modern economic theory. Still
readable today, it was included as a classic in the 1998 Forbes
reading list. The book grew out of Knight's 1917 Cornell
University doctoral thesis, which took second prize in an essay
contest that year sponsored by Hart, Schaffner and Marx. In it,
he examined the relationship between knowledge on the part of
entrepreneurs and changes in the economy. He, quite famously,
distinguished between two types of change, risk and uncertainty,
defining risk as randomness with knowable probabilities and
uncertainty as randomness with unknowable probabilities. Risk,
he said, arises from repeated changes for which probabilities
can be calculated and insured against, such as the risk of fire.
Uncertainty arises from unpredictable changes in an economy,
such as resources, preferences, and knowledge, changes that
cannot be insured against. Uncertainty, he said "is one of the
fundamental facts of life."

One of the larger issues of Knight's time was how the
entrepreneur, the central figure in a free enterprise system,
earns profits in the face of competition. It was thought that
competition would reduce profits to zero across a sector because
any profits would attract more entrepreneurs into the sector and
increase supply, which would drive prices down, resulting in
competitive equilibrium and zero profit.

Knight argued that uncertainty itself may allow some
entrepreneurs to earn profits despite this equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs, he said, are forced to guess at their expected
total receipts. They cannot foresee the number of products they
will sell because of the unpredictability of consumer
preferences. Still, they must purchase product inputs, so they
base these purchases on the number of products they guess they
will sell. Finally, they have to guess the price at which their
products will sell. These factors are all uncertain and
impossible to know. Profits are earned when uncertainty yields
higher total receipts than forecasted total receipts. Thus,
Knight postulated, profits are merely due to luck. Such
entrepreneurs who "get lucky" will try to reproduce their
success, but will be unable to because their luck will eventually

At the time, some theorists were saying that when this luck runs
out, entrepreneurs will then rely on and substitute improved
decision making and management for their original
entrepreneurship, and the profits will return. Knight saw
entrepreneurs as poor managers, however, who will in time fail
against new and lucky entrepreneurs. He concluded that economic
change is a result of this constant interplay between new
entrepreneurial action and existing businesses hedging against
uncertainty by improving their internal organization.

Frank H. Knight has been called "among the most broad-ranging
and influential economists of the twentieth century" and "one of
the most eclectic economists and perhaps the deepest thinker and
scholar American economics has produced." He stands among the
giants of American economists that include Schumpeter and Viner.
His students included Nobel Laureates Milton Friedman, George
Stigler and James Buchanan, as well as Paul Samuelson. At the
University of Chicago, Knight specialized in the history of
economic thought. He revolutionized the economics department
there, becoming one the leaders of what has become known as the
Chicago School of Economics. Under his tutelage and guidance,
the University of Chicago became the bulwark against the more
interventionist and anti-market approaches followed elsewhere in
American economic thought. He died in 1972.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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