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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, July 24, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 145

                            Headlines

A L B A N I A

CREDINS BANK: Moody's Cuts Local Currency Deposit Ratings to B2


C R O A T I A

HRVATSKA ELEKTROPRIVREDA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Negative


C Y P R U S

IG SEISMIC: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative


D E N M A R K

O.W. BUNKER: Court Refuses Anti-Suit Injunction to SwissMarine


F R A N C E

HOLDIKKS SAS: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B', Outlook Stable
TETU: Declared Bankrupt by Paris Court, 10 Jobs Affected


G E R M A N Y

JOYOU AG: Hamburg Local Court Starts insolvency Process


G R E E C E

GREECE: MPs Back Third Bailout Program to Clear Way for Talks


I R E L A N D

BALLYRIDER LIMITED: Court Removes Accountant as Liquidator


N E T H E R L A N D S

DUCHESS V CLO: Moody's Hikes Class D Notes' Rating From 'Ba1(sf)'
GOODYEAR DUNLOP: S&P Lowers EUR250MM Unsec. Notes' Rating to BB


P O L A N D

KOMPANIA WEGLOWA: Three Companies to Contribute to Bailout


P O R T U G A L

GAMMA SOCIEDADE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to B-(sf)


S P A I N

IBERCAJA BANCO: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EXP)' Rating to Sub. Notes
PESCADOS JUAN: In Liquidation But Remains Unsold
RMBS SANTANDER 3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Series B Notes to Caa1


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BONDCUBE: Files for Liquidation Three Months After Lunch
BROADCASTING SUPPORT: In Administration, 100 Job at Risk
F G HAWKES: High Court bans directors of for 10 years
FIMA CONSULTING: Director Banned For 13 Years For GBP1MM Fraud
LEHMAN COMMERCIAL: September 1 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set

LEHMAN BROTHERS: August 14 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set
MILLWALL FOOTBALL CLUB: Chairman Writes Off Interest on Debt
PRECISE MORTGAGE 2015-2B: Moody's Rates Class E Notes Ba3(sf)
SHIELD HOLDCO: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB-', Then Withdraws Rating
SKELWITH: Enters Liquidation Casting Doubt Over 2,500 New Homes

SKELWITH LEISURE: Raithwaite Estate Future Hangs in Doubt
WARLORD PRODUCTIONS: Goes Into Liquidation


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Hospitals, Health and People


                            *********


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A L B A N I A
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CREDINS BANK: Moody's Cuts Local Currency Deposit Ratings to B2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the local-currency deposit
ratings of Credins Bank to B2/Not-Prime (from B1/Not-Prime) and
the bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to b3 from b2. The
outlook on the long-term deposit ratings was changed to stable.
Concurrently, Moody's affirmed the bank's foreign currency
deposit ratings at B2/Not-Prime, previously capped by the foreign
currency deposit ceiling in Albania.

Moody's has also assigned Counterparty Risk Assessments (CR
Assessments) of B1(cr)/Not-Prime(cr), in line with its new bank
rating methodology.

Moody's rating action is driven by: (1) the deterioration in
Credins Bank's asset quality primarily due to its concentrated
exposures to the construction and real estate sector, which
continue to perform poorly, and subsequent pressure on
profitability stemming from high provisioning requirements; and
(2) modest capitalization available to absorb losses, in the
context of the low coverage of non-performing loans (NPLs) by
loan loss reserves.

The stable outlook takes into the bank's comfortable liquidity
buffers, solid deposit funding structure and high probability of
government support in case of need.

RATINGS RATIONALE

-- REAL ESTATE EXPOSURES PRESSURE ASSET QUALITY AND
    PROFITABILITY

The main driver for the rating action is Credins Bank's weakening
asset quality metrics owing primarily to its exposures to the
construction and real estate sector. Moody's notes that although
the pace of growth in problematic exposures has eased in 2015,
Credins Bank's impaired loans (defined as past due by more than
90 days) as a percentage to gross loans ratio grew to 22.9% as at
March 2015, compared to 21.8% ratio as of end-2014 and 16.5% as
of end- 2013.

Moody's notes that Credins Bank remains exposed to a few large
customers in the construction and real-estate sector, which
continue to perform poorly and limit the bank's ability to reduce
the stock of non-performing loans (NPLs). The construction and
real estate sector, which accounted for approximately 19% of the
bank's gross loans in December 2014, remains under pressure
mainly due to supply and demand imbalances leading to cash flow
problems for related corporates. While GDP grew by 1.7% in 2014,
construction was the only sector contributing negatively to
Albania's economic growth.

Moody's notes that the high stock of impaired loans is also
resulting in increased provisioning needs and dampening Credins
bank's profitability. According to audited FYE2014 financial
statements, provisioning expenses accounted for 2.9% of the
bank's gross loans, well above the pre-2008 levels of less than
0.5%, absorbing 79% of pre-provision profits. Moody's expects
bottom-line profitability to remain under pressure over the
coming quarters as the bank improves the coverage of its impaired
loans by booking additional provisions. As of end-March 2015, the
coverage of impaired loans by loan loss reserves was modest at
53%, according to unaudited Q1 2015 financial statements of the
bank.

-- MODEST CAPITALISATION AVAILABLE TO ABSORB LOSSES

Credins Bank's capital adequacy ratio stood at 15.2% as of end-
2014, slightly above the 14% regulatory minimum. While Moody's
understands that the bank plans to raise capital in H2 2015,
through a rights issue to existing shareholders, it expects that
Credins Bank's loss absorption capacity will remain modest in the
context of its low provisioning coverage. Moody's estimates that
uncovered NPLs as a percentage of shareholders' equity rose to a
high 89% as of year-end 2014, from 39% at year-end 2013.

-- SOUND LIQUIDITY BUFFERS AND HIGH LIKELIHOOD OF PUBLIC SUPPORT
    CONTINUE TO UNDERPIN THE RATINGS

The B2 deposit rating and corresponding stable outlook also take
into account the bank's comfortable liquidity buffers, solid
deposit funding structure and high probability of government
support in case of need.

Despite the aforementioned negative drivers, Moody's also
recognizes that the bank's standalone profile continues to be
supported by sound liquidity buffers and by its well-diversified
funding base, sourced primarily from individuals. Moody's notes
that the bank benefits from a growing deposit franchise -- with
deposits accounting for 85% of total assets as of end-2014 --
which also underpin its comfortable liquidity levels, with liquid
assets to total asset estimated at around 35% as at end-2014.

Moody's also considers that there is a high likelihood of
government support for Credins Bank's rated deposits, underpinned
by the bank's relative importance to the domestic financial
system with a 10% market share of deposits. Thus Moody's
continues to incorporate one notch of government support in the
bank's B2 long-term deposit ratings.

-- COUNTERPARTY RISK ASSESSMENT

Moody's has also assigned a CR Assessment of B1(cr)/Not-Prime(cr)
to Credins Bank, which, taking into account our Loss Given
Failure framework and the same extent of government support
uplift as applied to deposit ratings, is positioned two notches
above the bank's Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA). As a
result, the CR Assessment for Credins Bank is one notch higher
than its deposit ratings, reflecting Moody's view that
authorities are likely to honor the operating obligations the CR
Assessment refers to in order to preserve a bank's critical
functions and reduce potential for contagion.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS DOWN/UP

Downward pressure could develop on Credins Bank's ratings if the
operating environment weakens, affecting the bank's asset
quality, profitability and capital levels beyond current
expectations. Upward pressure on the bank's ratings might develop
following a material improvement in the bank's asset quality and
profitability metrics.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

-- Long-term local-currency deposit ratings downgraded to B2
    from B1

-- Long-term foreign-currency deposit ratings affirmed at B2

-- Short-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings
    affirmed at Not-Prime

-- BCA downgraded to b3 from b2

-- Adjusted BCA downgraded to b3 from b2

-- Long-term / Short-term CR Assessments of B1(cr)/
    Not-Prime(cr) assigned

-- Outlook on long-term deposit ratings is stable



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C R O A T I A
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HRVATSKA ELEKTROPRIVREDA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Croatian-based vertically integrated multi-utility Hrvatska
Elektroprivreda (HEP) to negative from stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' long-term corporate
credit rating on HEP and S&P's 'BB-' issue rating on its senior
unsecured debt.

The outlook revision mirrors that on the sovereign rating.  It
reflects S&P's view that the Croatian government's ability to
provide support to HEP in a financial stress scenario could
weaken.  S&P considers HEP to be a government-related entity
(GRE), and believe there is a "high" likelihood that the Croatian
government would provide extraordinary support to HEP in the
event of financial distress.  According to S&P's GRE criteria, a
downgrade of Croatia (BB/Negative/B) would result in a one notch
downgrade of HEP, all else being equal.

S&P bases its ratings on HEP on its stand-alone credit profile
(SACP), which S&P continues to assess at 'b+', reflecting S&P's
view of its "fair" business risk profile and "aggressive"
financial risk profile.  In accordance with S&P's criteria for
GREs, S&P's view of a "high" likelihood of extraordinary
government support is based on S&P's assessment of HEP's:

   -- "Very important" role for the energy sector and the broader
      economy in Croatia, along with S&P's view that the dividend
      payouts boost Croatia's state budget.  Recently, the
      Croatian government has also set an obligation for HEP
      wherein HEP has to provide electricity as a universal and
      guaranteed service to households in Croatia, and a
      guaranteed service to the commercial customers;

   -- "Strong" link with the Croatian government, which is the
      sole shareholder and is actively involved in defining HEP's
      strategy, including payouts and reinvestments.  Also, the
      government has a legal framework that gives it the ability
      to intervene in the managerial decisions of the company.

S&P's view of HEP's business risk profile as "fair" is
constrained by what S&P sees as high regulatory risk.  This stems
from unpredictable tariff setting absent a regulatory track
record and an established framework.  This results in what S&P
views as HEP's relatively weaker competitive position compared to
many regulated utility peers in Western Europe.  S&P believes the
Croatian government's track record of adjusting tariffs has been
inconsistent in the past.  Nevertheless, S&P believes the new
Energy Act, which has granted full tariff-setting powers to
Croatia's independent energy regulator, could reduce the risk of
political interference over the medium term, although the
regulator has yet to establish a track record.

S&P views HEP's profitability as below average and relatively
volatile because of its reliance on hydrological output,
fluctuating commodity prices, and the need to procure electricity
abroad to meet Croatia's needs.  These constraints are somewhat
offset by HEP's de facto monopoly position in Croatia's
electricity market along the value chain.  Furthermore, HEP has
an important role as a public provider to tariff customers who
have not exercised their right to switch supplier.

HEP's "aggressive" financial risk profile is based on S&P's
forecasts that it will generate negative discretionary cash flows
after 2015, following two strong years on the back of very
favorable hydrological conditions.  Despite HEP's large cash flow
deficit constraints, S&P views its credit metrics as stabilizing
at adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of more than 30%.
S&P uses the standard volatility table because it views HEP's
regulatory framework as relatively unpredictable.

HEP's credit metrics will benefit from declining electricity
import prices and decreasing procurement costs for natural gas,
as HEP has renegotiated its gas supply contracts.  However,
credit metrics are exposed to the uncertainty of the potential
extent of regulatory tariff reduction.  S&P also sees the balance
sheet weakening if HEP decides to invest in the new thermal power
plant, Plomin.  S&P might consolidate the investment if HEP bears
the economic burden from this investment through power purchase
agreements or any other direct or reputational links.

The negative outlook on HEP reflects that on the sovereign and
the possibility that if S&P was to downgrade Croatia it could
lead S&P to lower the rating on HEP.

Under S&P's criteria for GREs, a downward revision of the stand-
alone credit profile (SACP) by one notch is unlikely to affect
the rating on HEP, all else being equal.  That said, a one notch
lowering of the rating on Croatia would result in a similar
rating action on HEP.

S&P would consider revising downward the SACP if HEP's credit
metrics weaken, depending on if and how HEP invests in the large
scale thermal power plant, Plomin.  S&P could also reassess its
view of the "high" likelihood of extraordinary state support that
S&P currently assumes if there is no evidence of government
support for the project.

Negative pressure on the SACP could build if HEP's liquidity
position deteriorates -- for example, if the negative
discretionary cash flow exceeds our base-case scenario due to
more ambitious investment levels or worse market conditions than
S&P currently anticipates.  S&P would also views covenant
breaches as weakening HEP's credit quality, although S&P views
these as unlikely at present.  Equally, the SACP could come under
pressure if the company resumes paying dividends to the
government, which S&P do not consider likely in the context of
the company's large investment needs.  The SACP might also
deteriorate if HEP's business risk profile weakens, say from a
loss of retail market share due to competition or delayed or
insufficient tariff increases.

An upward revision of HEP's SACP would depend on a continued,
sustainable improvement in the company's liquidity profile to a
level that S&P considers "adequate" under its criteria.  S&P
would take a positive view of:

   -- Timely prefunding of any committed investment projects;
   -- Extension and a staggering of debt maturities; and
   -- Maintenance of sufficient headroom under committed back-up
      liquidity facilities to cover unexpected cost overruns.

According to S&P's GRE criteria, it would need to revise upward
HEP's SACP by more than one notch to raise the rating on HEP by
one notch, all else being equal.


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C Y P R U S
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IG SEISMIC: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had placed its
'B' long-term global scale corporate credit rating on Cyprus-
headquartered seismic group IG Seismic Services PLC (IGSS) and
Russia-domiciled core subsidiary GEOTECH Seismic Services on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

S&P also placed its 'ruA-' Russia national scale rating on
GEOTECH Seismic Services on CreditWatch negative.

The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's view that IGSS'
liquidity could have weakened in the past few months.  S&P
understands that the company used a meaningful portion of
available liquidity sources to service its debt maturities in the
second quarter of 2015 and its capital structure could have
shifted toward shorter-term financing.

S&P understands that the company is currently negotiating to
refinance its short-term maturities.  If successful, this could
allow the company to restore its liquidity to "adequate" as
defined in S&P's criteria.  That said, S&P do not expect IGSS to
be unable to secure the rollover of its short-term bank lines;
rather, S&P sees a risk of a significant shift toward short-term
financing in its capital structure, which might not be
commensurate with the current ratings.

S&P also believes that EBITDA and cash flow generation in the
first half of 2015 might have been weaker than S&P's previous
expectations, thereby leading to increased leverage and creating
more pressure on liquidity.  Although S&P generally thinks that
the operating environment for Russian oilfield services companies
is better than for its global peers, as Russian oil companies
have not meaningfully lowered their capital spending, there is
still significant pressure on operating profits.  S&P believes
that challenging industry conditions are set to continue in the
medium term, which could further weaken IGSS' leverage and
liquidity.

S&P views IGSS' financial risk profile as "highly leveraged," due
to S&P's view of its increased debt and forecast negative free
cash flow generation.  These weaknesses are partly offset by
relatively low expected capital expenditures, taking into account
IGSS' technically advanced position in the local market.
Additionally, S&P do not foresee any dividend payments.

S&P assess the company's business risk profile as "weak."  S&P
bases its assessment on the company's fairly small size, its
participation in the highly cyclical, competitive, and niche
seismic industry, and its reliance on the exploration spending of
oil and gas companies, which S&P sees limiting its pricing power.
On the upside, international players have a relatively limited
presence in Russia.  IGSS has leading positions in this small
market, with more advanced technologies than local competitors,
thanks to support from its minority shareholder, Schlumberger.

S&P continues to view GEOTECH Seismic Services as a core
subsidiary of IGSS under S&P's criteria.  S&P considers that it
is an integral part of IGSS' business, generating a large chunk
of total EBITDA.  S&P therefore continues to equalize its global
scale rating on the subsidiary with that on IGSS.

The CreditWatch placement reflects the lack of visibility with
regard to IGSS' liquidity with a potential shift toward short-
term financing, which might not be commensurate with the current
rating.  S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch in the next three
months.

S&P could lower the global scale rating by one notch if the
company does not improve the duration of its debt by raising
longer-term financing.  Equally, S&P could lower the rating if it
sees a risk of debt to EBITDA rising higher than 5x on a
sustainable basis and FFO to debt falling below 10%.

S&P could affirm the global scale rating at 'B' if the company
manages to improve its liquidity by securing long-term financing.
To support a 'B' rating, S&P would also expect leverage to remain
at below 5x.



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D E N M A R K
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O.W. BUNKER: Court Refuses Anti-Suit Injunction to SwissMarine
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ship & Bunker reports that Denmark's Commercial Court has refused
to grant an anti-suit injunction to SwissMarine Corporation
Limited to restrain proceedings brought against it by O.W. Supply
& Trading A/S (OW), International law firm Reed Smith LLP said.

Ship & Bunker relates that the law firm said the decision
highlights that "protection under national insolvency law may be
sought for the very purpose of overriding contractual rights and
obligations."

The OW entity was said to have been in the money at the time of
its bankruptcy and has commenced numerous actions against its
counterparties in Denmark, including SwissMarine, according to
Ship & Bunker.

However by the time the Danish Proceedings had been brought,
SwissMarine had already commenced proceedings in England for
declaratory relief against OW, declaring that it had no liability
to OW under the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement, which was governed by
English law, Ship & Bunker relates.

The report says SwissMarine argued that the anti-suit injunction
was necessary because OW's Danish proceedings were in breach of
the exclusive jurisdiction agreement under the ISDA Agreement.

However, the judge ruled that the ISDA wording could not have
been intended by either party to amount to an abandonment of the
protection of their national insolvency regimes, the report
notes.

Indeed, much clearer wording would be need to have that effect,
they said, and ultimately OW was entitled to bring proceedings in
a non-exclusive jurisdiction, Ship & Bunker relays.

"This decision highlights that in the event of insolvency of one
of the parties, the insolvent estate may nevertheless seek to
rely on its own national insolvency rules and bring proceedings
before its own courts, regardless of the contractual position
between the parties," the report quotes Reed Smith as saying.

"Protection under national insolvency law may be sought for the
very purpose of overriding contractual rights and obligations.
Whilst the English Courts may be prepared to grant declarations
of non-liability in such circumstances and may refuse to
recognise a foreign insolvency judgment, anti-suit injunctions
are unlikely to be available to put an end to the proceedings
brought for relief under a party's national insolvency rules.

"Indeed, the English court stated in this case that, while a
Danish insolvency judgment would not be recognised in England, it
may be recognised elsewhere, and the judge appeared to accept
that this was a legitimate purpose of OW's pursuit."

Earlier this month, it was reported that legal disputes resulting
from the fallout from last year's OW Bunker bankruptcy could help
clarify U.S. law as to whether it is the bunker broker or the
physical supplier who has the maritime lien, Ship & Bunker adds.

                         About OW Bunker

OW Bunker AS is a global marine fuel (bunker) company founded in
Denmark.  On Nov. 6, 2014, OW Bunker A/S placed OWB Trading and
O.W. Bunker Supply & Trading A/S in an in-court restructuring
procedure with the probate court in Aalborg, Denmark.  By Nov. 7,
2014, the Danish entities (plus O.W. Bunker Supply & Trading A/S,
O.W. Cargo Denmark A/S, and Dynamic Oil Trading A/S) were placed
under formal Danish bankruptcy (liquidation) proceedings in the
Aalborg probate court.

The company declared bankruptcy following its admission that it
had lost US$275 million through a combination of fraud committed
by senior executives at its Singaporean unit.

The Danish company placed its U.S. subsidiaries -- O.W. Bunker
Holding North America Inc., O.W. Bunker North America Inc. and
O.W. Bunker USA Inc. -- in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Bankr. D. Conn.
Case Nos. 14-51720 to 14-51722) in Bridgeport, Conn., on Nov. 13,
2014.

The U.S. cases are assigned to Judge Alan H.W. Shiff.  The U.S.
Debtors have tapped Patrick M. Birney, Esq., and Michael R.
Enright, Esq., at Robinson & Cole LLP, as counsel.   McCracken,
Walker & Rhoads LLP is serving as co-counsel.  Alvarez & Marsal
is the financial advisor.

The Office of the United States Trustee formed an official
committee of unsecured creditors of the Debtors on Nov. 26, 2014.



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F R A N C E
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HOLDIKKS SAS: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B', Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on HoldIKKS SAS, the parent company of
France-based premium fashion retailer IKKS Group SAS
(collectively, IKKS), to 'B' from 'B+'.  The outlook is stable.

In addition, S&P lowered its long-term issue rating on IKKS'
EUR33 million super senior revolving credit facility (RCF), which
has been downsized from EUR40 million as part of the transaction,
to 'B+' from 'BB-'.  The recovery rating on the RCF remains at
'2', reflecting S&P's expectation of substantial (70%-90%)
recovery, in the higher half of the range, in the event of a
payment default.

S&P also lowered its long-term issue rating on IKKS' EUR320
million senior secured notes to 'B' from 'B+'.  The recovery
rating on these notes remains at '4', reflecting S&P's
expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery, in the higher half of
the range, in the event of a payment default.

The downgrade follows IKKS' announcement, earlier this month,
that it has been acquired by private-equity firm LBO France, and
reflects the increase in the company's Standard & Poor's adjusted
leverage, post transaction.  The acquisition has been financed
with a combination of equity, a vendor loan, and shareholder
instruments, issued by the acquiring Holding IKKS Invest, which
sits above HoldIKKS -- the bond issuer -- in the corporate
structure. S&P notes that the EUR320 million senior secured notes
due 2021 will remain in place.  S&P calculates its Standard &
Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio at around 6.3x in 2015
(including the EUR40 million vendor loan and the EUR94 million
convertible bonds granted by the shareholders that S&P considers
as debt under its criteria), compared with S&P's expectation of
5.4x before the transaction.  Consequently, S&P no longer views
IKKS' financial risk profile in the stronger end of its "highly
leveraged" category.

The rating action also encompasses S&P's view of the ownership
and control of the company by a financial sponsor, LBO France.
In S&P's view, in the absence of amortizing debt in the capital
structure, and given the investment strategy of the main
shareholder, IKKS' deleveraging potential from the closing of the
transaction will depend on its ability to increase EBITDA and on
its financial policy under its new owner.

S&P acknowledges that the amount of debt requiring cash interest
payments will likely be unchanged after the transaction, given
the cash-preserving characteristics of the vendor loan and
shareholder instruments.  This supports positive free operating
cash flow (FOCF) generation and a funds from operations (FFO)-to-
cash interest coverage ratio in the 3.0x-3.5x range, under S&P's
base case scenario for the next 12 months.  S&P estimates that
IKKS should be able to generate at least EUR10 million in FOCF in
2015 and 2016.

S&P continues to assess IKKS' business risk profile as "fair,"
although at the low end of this category.  S&P's assessment
primarily incorporates its view of the retailer's exposure to the
apparel industry -- which S&P assess as cyclical and competitive,
with limited barriers to entry -- and to fashion risk.  It
further reflects the company's relatively limited size and
geographic exposure to France, where it generates about 80% of
its revenues. Additionally, S&P sees some execution risks in
IKKS' international expansion strategy, although S&P understands
that part of this expansion will be in countries where IKKS is
already present.

These weaknesses are partially offset by IKKS' diversification in
terms of distribution channels, brands, and target customers.
S&P understands that the company's positioning in premium urban
casual wear somewhat reduces fashion risk.  The company's retail
strategy is partially based on an "affiliate" business model.
S&P views this favorably as it reduces operating leverage by
transferring some fixed costs, such as staff and rent, to
partners.  The company's business risk profile is also supported
by its profitability, which S&P continues to assess as "above
average" under its criteria.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- French real GDP growth of 1.3% in 2015 and 1.6% in 2016,
      compared with 0.2% in 2014, and a recovery in private
      consumption on the back of improved purchasing power, due
      to low inflation and reduced tax pressure.

   -- Low double-digit revenue growth in 2015 and 2016, primarily
      on new store openings.  Stable reported EBITDA margin at
      about 20% over S&P's 2015-2017 forecast period, because S&P
      anticipates that the positive scale effect will be offset
      by higher marketing and communication expenses.

   -- Capital expenditures (capex) in the EUR20 million-EUR25
      million range.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
for IKKS:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 6.3x in 2015, declining to
      about 5.9x in 2016.  Adjusted FFO to debt in the 5%-10%
      range in 2015 and 2016.  FFO cash interest coverage in the
      3.0x-3.5x range in 2015 and 2016.

   -- Reported FOCF of about EUR10 million in 2015 and 2016.

The stable rating outlook reflects S&P's expectation that IKKS'
future earnings growth, fueled by positive trading and the
successful execution of the company's store network expansion
under its new owner, should enable the company to moderately
reduce leverage post transaction.  S&P also anticipates that IKKS
will likely report an adjusted FFO cash interest coverage ratio
in the 3.0x-3.5x range and generate positive FOCF in 2015 and
2016.

Importantly, the outlook incorporates S&P's expectations that new
ownership will not result in significant changes or disruption in
IKKS' management team, strategy, financial policy, or ability to
expand operations.

S&P could lower the ratings if IKKS' operating performance
significantly deviated from our expectations.  This might lead
S&P to revise its assessment of the company's business risk
profile downward to "weak," which could raise the credit ratio
requirements for staying at the same rating level.  S&P could
also consider a downgrade if IKKS failed to generate FOCF or if
S&P saw marked weakening in the company's liquidity.  An adjusted
FFO cash interest coverage ratio decreasing toward 1.5x could
also put pressure on the ratings.

S&P considers a positive rating action as unlikely in the coming
quarters, given IKKS' highly leveraged capital structure.  S&P
could raise the ratings on IKKS if it projected that its adjusted
debt to EBITDA would decrease toward 5x and if S&P perceived that
the risk of releveraging is low, based on the company's financial
policy and S&P's view of LBO France's financial risk appetite.  A
positive rating action would also hinge on S&P's anticipation of
sustainably positive like-for-like revenue growth, EBITDA margin
that is at least stable or widening, and sizable FOCF generation.


TETU: Declared Bankrupt by Paris Court, 10 Jobs Affected
--------------------------------------------------------
Laure Guilbault at WWD reports that a commercial court in Paris
declared French magazine Tetu bankrupt during a hearing on
July 23.

Tetu editor-in-chief Yannick Barbe said the four-month
observation period allowing potential buyers to step in, granted
June 1, had been shortened "due to the lack of serious
candidates", WWD relates.

Mr. Barbe, as cited by WWD, said layoff procedures for the 10
employees of the general interest gay magazine, including 5
editorial positions, are to commence.

Mr. Barbe blames the closure on what he perceives as an
underestimation of the gay market's potential in France, where
same-sex marriages have been legal since 2013, WWD discloses.  He
said another factor is the extreme difficulty for an independent
publication to attract advertisers, WWD notes.

Jean-Jacques Augier, a businessman who was French President
Franáois Hollande's campaign treasurer in 2012, bought loss-
making Tetu from Pierre Berge in 2013, WWD recounts.

According to WWD, the magazine is estimated to have reduced its
annual losses to around EUR1.1 million in 2014, or US$1.5 million
at average exchange, and was expected to post losses of around
EUR600,000, or US$652,026 at current exchange, in 2015.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


JOYOU AG: Hamburg Local Court Starts insolvency Process
-------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Hamburg Local Court commenced insolvency
proceedings in respect of assets of Joyou AG.

Insolvency administrator has just decided to apply for revocation
of admission for trading on Prime Standard of Frankfurt Stock
Exchange, Reuters relates.

The report says admission of shares for trading on Regulated
Market (General Standard) should remain unaffected.

Joyou AG on May 21, 2015, filed an application for the opening of
insolvency proceedings with the competent local court
(Amtsgericht) of Hamburg following the existing over-indebtedness
of the Company. "Due to the necessity to completely write down,
the Company's participation in Hong Kong Zhongyu Sanitary
Technology Limited as well as existing guarantee obligations of
the Company in the aggregate amount of US$300 million with
respect to the credit facility in the amount of US$300 million
granted by creditors to Joyou Hong Kong, the Company is over-
indebted," Joyou said.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: MPs Back Third Bailout Program to Clear Way for Talks
-------------------------------------------------------------
Helena Smith and Graeme Wearden at The Guardian report that
Greece's prime minister easily won a crucial vote on a third
bailout program for the debt-stricken nation early on July 23,
hours after the European Central Bank infused cash-starved Greek
banks with further emergency liquidity.

According to The Guardian, a total of 230 MPs backed the economic
reforms program demanded by Greece's creditors, while 63 voted
against the plan at the late-night vote.

Alexis Tsipras again faced down rebels within his own party who
oppose a third bailout, The Guardian relays.  Thirty-six Syriza
MPs either voted no or abstained, three fewer than at a similar
vote last week, The Guardian discloses.

The vote clears the way for Greece to begin formal talks with its
lenders on a three-year package of loans that could be worth
EUR86 billion, The Guardian notes.

Before the vote, Mr. Tsipras had urged MPs to support the
bailout, which will save Greece from bankruptcy and preserve its
place in the eurozone, The Guardian relays.

Mr. Tsipras told MPs, "We made difficult choices and now we must
all adapt to the new situation," repeating that he did not agree
with many of the reforms but would do his best to implement them,
The Guardian relates.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


BALLYRIDER LIMITED: Court Removes Accountant as Liquidator
----------------------------------------------------------
Limerick Post reports that Anthony J. Fitzpatrick of Fitzpatrick
& Co, Clonmoney House, Newenham Street, Limerick, who was
appointed as a liquidator of a failed business has been removed
from his position by a High Court judge in the first ruling of
its kind from an Irish court.

Mr. Fitzpatrick, a Limerick accountant, was removed by Justice
Roderick Murphy from his position where he was charged with the
wind up of Ballyrider Limited, according to Limerick Post.

The report notes that the High Court petition was brought by the
office of the Revenue Commissioners after they said they lost
confidence in the manner which Mr. Fitzpatrick was carrying out
his duties.

The report relates that Justice Murphy found that the liquidation
had not been conducted in an efficient and cost effective manner
and that the evidence suggested the Limerick accountant has a
flawed understanding of the role and duties of a liquidator.

The report notes that Mr. Fitzpatrick was appointed voluntary
liquidator to the business, which included the ownership of the
Hazel Hotel in Monasterevin in County Kildare, on November 19,
2010.

Ballyrider Limited was set up on Monday August 17, 1987, in Co.
Kildare.

The company's current directors John Kelly and Margaret Kelly
have been the directors of two other Irish companies between
them; both of which are now closed. Ballyrider Limited has two
shareholders, the report discloses.

Following the hearing at the High Court, Justice Murphy found
that given the evidence of the petition put forward, the concerns
of Revenue were both genuine and warranted, the report relays.

Issues surrounding costs of the liquidation and costs incurred
were highlighted to have exposed the liquidation fund and that
Mr. Fitzpatrick could not therefore remain in place as liquidator
to the failed firm, the report notes.

In his ruling, Justice Murphy said that he was aware the effect
the removal would have on Mr. Fitzpatrick's professional position
but that such damage flowed directly from his own
ineffectiveness, the report adds.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DUCHESS V CLO: Moody's Hikes Class D Notes' Rating From 'Ba1(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
following classes of notes issued by Duchess V CLO B.V.:

  EUR35.25 Million (current balance EUR 1.77M) Class B Second
  Priority Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 17, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR29.50 Million Class C Third Priority Deferrable Secured
  Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously
  on Nov 17, 2014 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  EUR31.50 Million Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Secured
  Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously
  on Nov 17, 2014 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  EUR7.00 Million (current balance EUR 4.72M) Class O Combination
  Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 17,
  2014 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Duchess V CLO B.V., issued in December 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield
senior secured European loans managed by Babson Capital
Management (UK) Limited. The transaction's reinvestment period
ended in February 2011.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
the result of the substantial deleveraging since last rating
action in November 2014 which was based on September 2014 data.

Class A-1 and Class B notes have paid down in aggregate by
approximately EUR 57.9 million since the last rating action, as a
result of which over-collateralization (OC) ratios of all classes
of rated notes have increased significantly. As per the trustee
report dated May 2015, Class B, Class C, and Class D OC ratios
are reported at 4562.8%, 258.2%, and 128.7% compared to September
2014 levels of 233.5%, 156.2% and 115.5%, respectively.

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class O,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the rated
coupon of 0.25% per annum, accrued on the Rated Balance on the
preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all payments made
from the issue date to such date, either through interest or
principal payments. The Rated Balance may not necessarily
correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported by the
trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR66.73 million and GBP15.18 million,
defaulted par of EUR1.66 million, a weighted average default
probability of 29.4% (consistent with a WARF of 4550 over a
weighted average life of 3.57 years), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 48.46% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 13 and a weighted average spread of 3.78%.
Assets denominated in GBP are hedged by a GBP/EUR macro swap
which has been modelled in Moody's analysis.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% of the 95.6% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan corporate
assets upon default. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Moody's notes that shortly after this analysis was completed, the
June 2015 trustee report has been issued. There is no material
change in key portfolio metrics such as WARF, diversity score,
and weighted average spread as well as OC ratios for Classes B, C
and D from their May 2015 levels.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were unchanged for Classes B and C, and within one notch of
the base-case results for Class D.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

-- Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

-- Around 19.6% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed
large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate
as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions," published in October 2009 and
available at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461

-- Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analysed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.


GOODYEAR DUNLOP: S&P Lowers EUR250MM Unsec. Notes' Rating to BB
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has lowered its
issue-level rating on Goodyear Dunlop Tires Europe B.V.'s
(GDTE's) EUR250 million senior unsecured notes to 'BB' from 'BB+'
and revised its recovery rating on the notes to '3' from '2'.
The '3' recovery rating indicates S&P's expectation of meaningful
recovery (50%-70%; upper half of the range) in the event of a
default.  All of S&P's other issue-level and recovery ratings on
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. remain unchanged.

S&P's recovery ratings on unsecured debt issued by corporate
entities that S&P rates 'BB-' or higher are generally capped at
'3' to account for the risk that their recovery prospects are at
a greater risk of being impaired by the issuance of additional
priority or pari passu debt prior to default.  S&P had previously
not applied this cap to the EUR250 million senior unsecured notes
given its valuation of GDTE, the amount of value available to the
unsecured notes, and the entity's status as a joint venture
which, in S&P's opinion, provided a measure of ring-fencing with
regard to debt incurrence (as evidenced by the fact that the
equity was not pledged), thereby affording a '2' recovery rating
to the notes.  While S&P's valuation of GDTE has not declined,
the company's June announcement that its joint-venture agreement
with Sumitomo Rubber Industries Ltd. would end (making GDTE a
wholly owned subsidiary of The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. when
the dissolution is effective) and its decision to upsize GDTE's
senior secured revolving credit facility effective May 2015
(increased from EUR400 million to EUR550 million), therefore
reducing the value available to the senior unsecured notes in the
event of a simulated default, have led S&P to apply the cap.
GDTE's EUR250 million senior unsecured notes are guaranteed by
Goodyear and its subsidiaries that guarantee Goodyear's notes.
The guarantee lapses if the Goodyear notes are rated investment
grade.  S&P views these notes as structurally senior to the U.S.
senior unsecured notes since they benefit from the aforementioned
guarantees.

RATINGS LIST

The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

Corporate Credit Rating           BB/Stable/--

Rating Lowered; Recovery Rating Revised

                                       To       From

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Europe B.V.
EUR250 Mil. Senior Unsecured Notes    BB       BB+

  Recovery Rating                      3H       2H



===========
P O L A N D
===========


KOMPANIA WEGLOWA: Three Companies to Contribute to Bailout
----------------------------------------------------------
Agnieszka Barteczko and Adrian Krajewski at Reuters report that
Poland has persuaded at least three major companies to contribute
to a bailout of troubled coal miner Kompania Weglowa, despite
some executives' misgivings about the commercial logic of getting
involved.

According to Reuters, sources with knowledge of the matter said
after weeks of talks with more than a dozen firms it hoped would
take part in the rescue, government officials have received
proposals from three: copper miner KGHM, utility PGE and
chemicals producer Grupa Azoty.

The government, facing a tough re-election battle in October,
cannot afford to let Kompania Weglowa go bankrupt because it
depends on votes from mining regions, but it is also barred by
European Union rules from giving state aid, Reuters notes.

The three companies preparing to take part in the rescue are
state-controlled, but a significant part of their equity is held
by private shareholders who want the firms to return profits and
dividends, Reuters states.

KW, which is the EU's No.1 coal miner, and JSW, the bloc's
biggest coking coal producer, are both facing insolvency, an
outcome which would anger politically-influential mining unions
in an election year, Reuters says.

To avoid that, Poland's treasury ministry has forged a special
fund whose function is in part to help the troubled state-run
miners, Reuters discloses.  It will have PLN6 billion (US$1.59
billion) worth of assets, Reuters relays.

State bank BGK and its investment vehicle PIR are to invest
PLN1.5 billion in the fund by the end of August, Reuters
discloses.  The rest is supposed to come from major Polish
companies, either in the form of cash or non-cash assets, Reuters
notes.

According to Reuters, sources close to companies in talks with
the government said PGE tentatively offered a combination of cash
and its telecom arm Exatel as its contribution to the fund.

The sources, as cited by Reuters, said KGHM, Europe's No. 2
copper producer, would offer spa resorts in Poland which are
controlled by KGHM's investment fund for non-core assets.  Azoty
was also to offer assets, Reuters states.

The sources said that the negotiations were still underway and
that proposals from the companies could change, Reuters relays.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


GAMMA SOCIEDADE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to B-(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit rating on the class A notes GAMMA
Sociedade de Titularizacao de Creditos, S.A.'s Atlantes Mortgage
No. 2.  At the same time, S&P has lowered its ratings on the
class B and C notes.

Upon publishing its updated criteria for Portuguese residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria), S&P placed those
ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received as
of the June 2015 interest payment date.  S&P's analysis reflects
the application of its RMBS criteria.

On Feb. 18, 2015, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its rating
on the class A notes for counterparty reasons.

On June 9, 2015, S&P took various rating actions on certain U.K.
and German commercial banks following the introduction of well-
formed bank resolution frameworks in these countries, the ongoing
regulatory impetus to have systemic banks hold sizeable buffers
of bail-in capital that the authorities could use to recapitalize
them, and the associated reduced prospects for extraordinary
government support.  S&P's rating actions included the lowering
of its long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on The Royal Bank of
Scotland PLC (RBS), counterparty for Atlantes Mortgages No. 2.

This transaction features an amortizing reserve fund, which
currently represents 7.47% of the outstanding balance of the
notes.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days at 1.76% are on average
higher for this transaction than our Portuguese RMBS index.
Delinquencies of more than 90 days have decreased to 1.76% from
1.95% since S&P's Dec. 22, 2014 review.

Defaults are defined as mortgage loans in arrears for more than
12 months in this transaction.  Cumulative defaults, at 3.39%,
are also higher than in other Portuguese RMBS transactions that
S&P rates.  Prepayment levels remain low and the transaction is
unlikely to pay down significantly in the near term, in S&P's
opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show an increase in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and an increase in the weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) for each rating level.

Rating level    WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
AAA                28.68       33.01
AA                 21.82       28.82
A                  17.93       21.04
BBB                13.55       17.02
BB                  8.98       14.31
B                   7.51       11.91

The increase in the WAFF is mainly due to the geographic
concentration and the use of the original loan-to-value (OLTV)
ratio in the default calculations.  S&P applies a penalty of
1.25x on 72.20% of the pool as province concentration in Algarve,
Minho-Lima, Baixo Vouga, Grande Porto, Grande Lisboa, and Pinhal
Interior Norte exceeds the limit set by the RMBS criteria.  The
weighted-average OLTV ratio is relatively high, with 64.04% of
the outstanding pool balance having an OLTV ratio of above 70%.
This means that, in line with S&P's RMBS criteria, most of the
pool is penalized, as the weighted-average OLTV ratio is above
the 73% threshold.  At the same time, seasoning partially offsets
the negative effect of geographic concentration and the weighted-
average OLTV ratio.  This is because S&P's updated criteria give
greater credit to well-seasoned pools.  The transaction has a
weighted-average seasoning of 105.85 months, which means that
most of the loans will have a 0.5x adjustment.

The increase in the WALS is mainly due to the application of
S&P's revised market value decline assumptions and the indexing
of its valuations under its RMBS criteria.  The overall effect is
an increase in the required credit coverage for each rating
level.

Following the application of S&P's RMBS criteria and considering
its criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above
the sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the class of notes
can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria.

In this transaction, S&P's unsolicited long-term rating on the
Republic of Portugal (BB/Positive/B) constrains S&P's ratings on
the class A and B notes.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

The class A notes can support the stresses that S&P applies at a
'A+' rating level.  S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk
sensitivity for RMBS as "moderate".  Under S&P's RAS criteria,
this transaction's notes can therefore be rated four notches
above the sovereign rating, if they have sufficient credit
enhancement to pass a minimum of a "severe" stress.  However, as
not all of the conditions in paragraph 44 of the RAS criteria are
met, S&P cannot assign any additional notches of uplift (apart of
the four notches uplift mentioned above) to the ratings in this
transaction.

Consequently, S&P can assign a rating on the class A notes up to
a maximum of four notches above the sovereign rating.  At the
same time, the remedy actions outlined in the swap documents were
not taken in November 2013 when S&P lowered its long-term ICR on
the swap provider, RBS, to 'BBB+'.

Consequently, under S&P's current counterparty criteria, this
breach of the agreement caps the maximum potential rating on the
class A notes at 'BBB+ (sf)', S&P's long-term ICR on the
counterparty.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'BBB+ (sf)' and
removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on the class A
notes.

The class B notes cannot support the stresses that S&P applies at
a rating level higher than that on the sovereign.  Consequently,
S&P can assign a rating to the class B notes up to the sovereign
rating.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)'
its rating on the class B notes.

S&P's analysis indicates that the available credit enhancement
for the class C notes is no longer sufficient to support its
currently assigned rating.  Consequently, S&P has lowered to 'B-
(sf)' from 'BB (sf)' its rating on the class C notes.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 8% for one-year and three-year
horizons.  This did not result in S&P's rating deteriorating
below the maximum projected deterioration that it would associate
with each relevant rating level, as outlined in S&P's credit
stability criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Portuguese residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and sluggish house price appreciation for the
remainder of 2015 and 2016.

On the back of the weak macroeconomic conditions, S&P don't
expect the performance of the transactions in its Portuguese RMBS
index to significantly improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include weak economic growth and high unemployment.  On the
positive side, S&P expects interest rates to remain low.

Atlantes Mortgages No. 2 is a Portuguese RMBS transaction, which
closed in March 2008.  Atlantes Mortgages No.2 and securitizes a
pool of first-ranking mortgage loans.  Banif Banco Internacional
do Funchal originated the pool, which comprises loans backed by
properties located in Portugal.

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating            Rating
            To                From

GAMMA Sociedade de Titularizacao de Creditos, S.A.
EUR391.125 Million Floating-Rate Notes (Atlantes Mortgage No. 2)

Rating Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A           BBB+ (sf)         A- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered

B           BB (sf)           BBB- (sf)
C           B- (sf)           BB (sf)



=========
S P A I N
=========


IBERCAJA BANCO: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EXP)' Rating to Sub. Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Ibercaja Banco S.A.'s forthcoming
subordinated notes a 'BB(EXP)' expected rating.

The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final
documents and legal opinions conforming to the information
already received.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The subordinated notes are notched down one level from Ibercaja
Banco's Viability Rating (VR) of 'bb+' for loss severity because
of lower recovery expectations relative to senior unsecured debt.
These securities are subordinated to all senior unsecured
creditors.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The subordinated notes' expected rating is sensitive to changes
in Ibercaja Banco's VR, which drives the bank's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR).

Ibercaja Banco's ratings are:

Long-term IDR: 'BB+'; Outlook Positive
Short-term IDR: 'B'
Viability Rating: 'bb+'
Support Rating: '5'
Support Rating Floor: 'No Floor'


PESCADOS JUAN: In Liquidation But Remains Unsold
------------------------------------------------
Alicia Villegas at Undercurrent News reports that Spanish
processor and distributor Pescados Juan Fernandez, which begun
its liquidation on May 25, has not been sold yet.

The La Coruna-based company distributing fish and shellfish
entered liquidation about four months after it filed for
bankruptcy, according to Undercurrent News.

Administrator Diego Comendador Alonso declined to make further
comments to Undercurrent, as he said the company is in the middle
of judicial bankruptcy proceedings.

The seafood firm became a casualty of Spain's economic crisis, La
Voz de Galicia reported, and it stopped its activity at the end
of last year, the report notes.

In 2012, it posted a loss of EUR310,000 and a EUR12.6 million
turnover, 12% down over the previous year, according to
Alimarket, the report relays.

In 2010, the company sold a 36.29% stake in the Spanish canner
Mar de Couso, headquartered in Ribeira, and owned by Fernandez'
brother Juan Luis, as the two brothers decided to go their
separate ways, the report recalls.


RMBS SANTANDER 3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Series B Notes to Caa1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of FTA RMBS
Santander 3's classes A and C notes, and downgraded the ratings
of the class B notes. These rating actions follow Moody's review
of the recent structural changes to FTA RMBS Santander 3 and
concluded that these amendments have both neutral and negative
impact on the ratings, depending on the ranking of the notes:

Issuer: FTA RMBS Santander 3

EUR5395 million Series A Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on
Jan 23, 2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR1105 million Series B Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf);
previously on Jan 23, 2015 Affirmed B2 (sf)

EUR975 million Series C Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on
Nov 17, 2014 Definitive Rating Assigned Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The structural amendments relates to a reduction of the size of
the reserve fund from 15.0% of the initial amount of classes A
and B notes at closing to 5.0% of the outstanding amount of the
classes A and B notes. The reserve fund was funded by the
issuance of the class C notes. Consequently, Class C will
amortize to EUR313.6million equal to 5% of the new outstanding
amount of classes A and B.

The size of the class A will decrease to EUR4,704.8 million which
will represent 75% of the classes A and B notes. The amortization
on the class A will be on an extraordinary payment date, as
described in the amendment. Simultaneously, there will be an
increase in the size of the class B to EUR1,568 million which
will represent 25% of the classes A and B notes. Class A will
benefit from sufficient credit enhancement to maintain the rating
of the notes. However, Class B is negatively impacted because it
will be protected by a lower reserve fund.

In reaching this conclusion, Moody's has taken into consideration
the characteristics of the mortgage pool, the current level of
credit enhancement and the level of credit enhancement that will
be present in the transaction after the amendments have taken
place, together with the amount of liquidity within the
transaction given by the new reserve fund level. However, Moody's
opinion addresses only the credit impact associated with the
proposed amendment, and Moody's is not expressing any opinion as
to whether the amendment has, or could have, other non-credit
related effects that may have a detrimental impact on the
interests of note holders and/or counterparties.

The key collateral assumptions have not been updated as part of
this restructuring. The performance of the underlying asset
portfolio remains in line with Moody's assumptions.

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
to key transaction counterparties, including the roles of
servicer and account bank provided by Banco Santander S.A.
(Spain) (A3(cr)/P-2(cr)).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.

The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time, but rather how the initial rating of the security
might have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

At the time the deal was restructured, the model output indicated
that the Series A notes would have achieved an A2 if the expected
loss was as high as 16.8% and the MILAN CE was 33.0% and all
other factors were constant.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach To Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published in
January 2015. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com
for a copy of this methodology.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of a
rating for an RMBS security may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage. Please see Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN
Framework for further information on Moody's analysis at the
initial rating assignment and the on-going surveillance in RMBS.

Moody's will continue monitoring the ratings. Any change in the
ratings will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest with respect of
the class A notes and ultimate payment of principal by the legal
final maturity. Moody's ratings only address the credit risk
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

TRANSACTION FEATURES

The transaction is a securitization of Spanish prime mortgage
loans originated by Banco Santander S.A. (Spain) (A3/P-2 CRA) and
Banco Espanol de Credito, S.A. (Banesto) to obligors located in
Spain. The portfolio consists of high Loan To Value ("HLTV")
mortgage loans secured by residential properties including a high
percentage of renegotiated loans (20%).

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) further reduction in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is better than
Moody's expected, (3) deleveraging of the capital structure and
(4) improvements in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is worse than
Moody's expects, (3) deterioration in the notes' available credit
enhancement and (4) deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BONDCUBE: Files for Liquidation Three Months After Lunch
--------------------------------------------------------
John Detrixhe at Bloomberg News reports that a startup fixed-
income platform called Bondcube has filed for liquidation just
three months after its launch, a sign that entrepreneurs are
finding it difficult to ease bond trading.

The London-based company was 30% owned by Deutsche Boerse AG,
which provided two rounds of investment, Bloomberg discloses.  It
went live for fixed-income trading in the U.S. and Europe in
April, Bloomberg recounts.

"Although Bondcube succeeded to launch its platform, over recent
months sufficient business prospects failed to materialize and as
a result the long-term financial viability of the business
deteriorated," Bloomberg quotes Deutsche Boerse as saying in a
statement.  "In these circumstances, the shareholders decided not
to provide further funding to Bondcube."


BROADCASTING SUPPORT: In Administration, 100 Job at Risk
--------------------------------------------------------
Manchester Evening News reports that more than 100 people are set
to lose their jobs after Broadcasting Support Services, a call
center, went into administration.

Broadcasting Support Services (BSS), based in Portland Street in
Manchester city center, is set to close on August 14 with
everyone employed by the company facing redundancy, according to
Manchester Evening News.

The report notes that the not-for-profit organization manages
helplines for a number of charities and services including mental
health charity Mind, Action Fraud and the Eczema Helpline for the
National Skin Condition Charity.

A staff member, who wishes to remain anonymous, said
administrators ReSolve Partners announced they were being made
redundant last Friday, July 17, the report relates.

The report discloses that the staff member said: "Last Friday,
more or less out of the blue, the administrators came in and said
there are only two weeks to salvage the company.  The atmosphere
was just sadness basically with sporadic outbursts of anger."

Hundreds of workers were employed to manage the helplines and
answer the calls while a number of workers were employed to
maintain BSS websites, the report relays.

The company also has offices in Edinburgh and Glasgow, which are
also understood to have been closed down, the report notes.

The report discloses that workers are now planning legal action
and are trying to get a Protective Award.

BSS had an office inside Westminster House on Portland Street
The award is a sum of money from the government equating to eight
weeks pay for the lack of redundancy notice given, the report
relays.

BSS Manchester appears to currently not be open for business and
phone calls to the reception are diverted to a recorded message,
the report notes.

The report notes that the message said: "BSS have gone into
administration as of July 17, 2015. ReSolve Partners Limited have
been appointed as administrators.  The affairs, business and
property of the company are being managed by the administrators."


F G HAWKES: High Court bans directors of for 10 years
-----------------------------------------------------
Frederick Geraint Hawkes and his mother Janis Hawkes, the
directors of F G Hawkes (Western) Limited (FGH), have been
disqualified for 10 years for causing the company to submit
annual financial accounts which they knew contained false
information and submitting false VAT returns to HM Revenue &
Customs (HMRC).

The disqualifications follow an investigation by the Insolvency
Service and prevent Mr. and Mrs. Hawkes from becoming directly or
indirectly involved in the promotion, formation or management of
a company for 10 years from July 22, 2015.

The company was incorporated on March 2, 1987, and traded as
importers of plywood and sheet materials; latterly it also traded
in the rental of holiday villas. Its trading name was RKL
Plywood. It ceased trading on Oct. 3, 2011, and was placed into
administration on the same date.

The Insolvency Service's investigation found that Mr. and Mrs.
Hawkes signed FGH's annual accounts for the period ended July 31,
2009, and the year ended July 31, 2010, on April 30, 2010, and
April 28, 2011, respectively, knowing that they contained false
information.

The investigation also found that Mr. and Mrs. Hawkes caused FGH
to submit false VAT returns to HMRC for the quarters ending
between April 2010 and April 2011 leading to an under declaration
of VAT owed of at least GBP1,518,539.

The Court also ordered Mr. and Mrs. Hawkes to pay costs of
GBP16,750 by July 29, 2015.

Commenting on the disqualification, Sue MacLeod, Chief
Investigator at The Insolvency Service, said:

"These disqualifications send a clear message to directors that
they have statutory obligations.

"The signing of documents knowing they contain misleading
information which may be relied upon by third parties, and
submitting false VAT returns is serious misconduct, which the
Insolvency Service will investigate with a view to removing you
from the market place."

F G Hawkes (Western) Limited was incorporated on March 2, 1987,
and traded from Forest Products Terminal, Lockhead, Kings Dock,
in Swansea, SA1 1QR as Importers of plywood and sheet materials
and also in the rental of holiday villas. The Company went into
administration on Oct. 3, 2011, with an estimated deficiency of
GBP26,705,170.


FIMA CONSULTING: Director Banned For 13 Years For GBP1MM Fraud
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fiaz Razzak Malik, a director of Fima Consulting Ltd, a wholesale
mobile phone business based in Slough has been disqualified as a
director by the High Court for 13 years for participating in
contrived transactions with a view to gaining VAT refunds of over
GBP1 million.

Mr. Malik's disqualification from July 1, 2015 means that he
cannot promote, manage, or be a director of a limited company
until June 30, 2028.

This disqualification follows investigation by the Official
Receiver at the Public Interest Unit, a specialist team of the
Insolvency Service, whose involvement commenced with the winding
up of the company, for unpaid VAT owed to HMRC.

The Official Receiver's investigation uncovered that Fima
Consulting Ltd participated in a form of VAT fraud known as
Missing Trader Intra Community fraud (MTIC) and that Mr. Malik
(36) was a director of the company at the time it engaged in
these activities.

MTIC is commonly known as "Carousel" fraud, as large consignments
of electrical or other small item size high value goods are
invoiced rapidly and repeatedly around trading chains, speeded up
by movement on paper, with actual movement of goods only taking
place as they enter or exit the UK.

Such fraud indicators included the rapid succession of same day
trades without deliveries within the UK of goods sitting at a
shared freight forwarder, the common use of the same offshore
bank, and entering into payment arrangements involving third
parties who were neither suppliers nor customers. All traders
banked with the First Curacao International Bank, which was shut
down by the Netherlands Antilles authorities in September 2006 in
order to prevent money laundering.

Commenting on this case Paul Titherington, Official Receiver in
the Public Interest Unit, said:

"This type of VAT fraud is very serious and a high priority for
HMRC and the Insolvency Service. MTIC fraud has been a great
strain on the public purse and has cost the tax payer many
billions of pounds in fraudulent VAT claims. The Insolvency
Service is committed to making directors account for their
actions."

Fima Consulting Ltd was incorporated on Oct. 8, 2003, as Office
Designs Ltd but changed its name to Parts Trading Ltd on
Aug. 13, 2004, and then to its current name on Aug. 18, 2004. Its
trading address was at Flat 5 Stroma Court, Lincoln Way, in
Slough, Berkshire SL1 5RQ.

The petition to wind up the company was presented by HM Revenue &
Customs in respect of unpaid VAT of GBP646,768. The winding up
order against Fima Consulting Ltd was made on Jan. 28, 2013.

On June 10, 2015, in the High Court of Justice, Registrar Briggs
ordered that Mr. Fiaz Razzak Malik be disqualified for a period
of 13 years. The period of disqualification will commence on
July 1, 2015.


LEHMAN COMMERCIAL: September 1 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Rule 2.95 of the Insolvency Rules 1986, A.V. Lomas,
S.A. Pearson, G.E. Bruce and J.G. Parr, the Joint Administrators
of Lehman Commercial Mortgage Conduit Limited, intend to make a
distribution (by way of paying an interim dividend) to the
preferential creditors (if any) and to the unsecured, non-
preferential creditors of LCMC.

Proofs of debt may be lodged at any point up to (and including)
September 1, 2015, the last date for proving claims, however,
creditors are requested to lodge their proofs of debt at the
earliest possible opportunity.

Persons so proving are required, if so requested, to provide such
further details or produce such documents or other evidence as
may appear to the Joint Administrators to be necessary.

The Joint Administrators will not be obliged to deal with proofs
lodged after the last date for proving but they may do so if they
think fit.

The Joint Administrators intend to make such distribution within
the period of two months from the last date for proving claims.

For further information, contact details, and proof of debt
forms, please visit http://is.gd/elC7Vi

Please complete and return a proof of debt form, together
with relevant supporting documents to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
7 More London Riverside, London SE1 2RT marked for the attention
of Jennifer Hills.  Alternatively, you can email a completed
proof of debt form to lehman.affiliates@uk.pwc.com

Rule 2.95(2)(c) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 requires the Joint
Administrators to state in this notice the value of the
prescribed part of LCMC's net property which is required to be
made available for the satisfaction of LCMC's unsecured debts
pursuant to section 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986.  There are
no floating charges over the assets of LCMC and accordingly,
there shall be no prescribed part.  All of LCMC's net property
will be available for the satisfaction of LCMC's unsecured debts.

                       About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- http://www.lehman.com/-- was
the fourth largest investment bank in the United States.  For
more than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in the
global financial markets by serving the financial needs of
corporations, governmental units, institutional clients and
individuals worldwide.

Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy Sept. 15, 2008
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 08-13555).  Lehman's bankruptcy
petition disclosed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion in
debts, effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing the
largest in U.S. history.  Several other affiliates followed
thereafter.

Affiliates Merit LLC, LB Somerset LLC and LB Preferred Somerset
LLC sought for bankruptcy protection in December 2009.

The Debtors' bankruptcy cases are handled by Judge James M. Peck.
Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Richard P. Krasnow, Esq., Lori R. Fife,
Esq., Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., and Jacqueline Marcus, Esq., at
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, in New York, represent Lehman.  Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.

Dennis F. Dunne, Esq., Evan Fleck, Esq., and Dennis O'Donnell,
Esq., at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, in New York, serve
as counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital, Inc., is the Committee's
investment banker.

On Sept. 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered an
order commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuant
to the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (Case
No. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)).  James W. Giddens was appointed as
trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI.

The Bankruptcy Court approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase of
Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and capital
markets operations and supporting infrastructure for US$1.75
billion.  Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage house in
Japan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2 plus the
retention of most of employees.  Nomura also bought Lehman's
operations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

Lehman emerged from bankruptcy protection on March 6, 2012, more
than three years after it filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S.
history.  The Chapter 11 plan for the Lehman companies other than
the broker was confirmed in December 2011.

As of Oct. 2, 2014, Lehman's total distributions to unsecured
creditors have amounted to $92.0 billion.  As of Sept. 30, 2014,
the brokerage trustee has substantially completed customer claims
distributions, distributing more than $106 billion to 111,000
customers.


LEHMAN BROTHERS: August 14 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Rule 2.95 of the Insolvency Rules 1986, A.V. Lomas,
S.A. Pearson, G.E. Bruce and J.G. Parr, the Joint Administrators
of Lehman Brothers Lease & Finance No. 1 Limited, intend to make
a distribution (by way of paying a final dividend) to the
preferential creditors (if any) and to the unsecured, non-
preferential creditors of LBL&F.

Proofs of debt may be lodged at any point up to (and including)
August 14, 2015, the last date for proving claims, however,
creditors are requested to lodge their proofs of debt at the
earliest possible opportunity.

Persons so proving are required, if so requested, to provide such
further details or produce such documents or other evidence as
may appear to the Joint Administrators to be necessary.

The Joint Administrators will not be obliged to deal with proofs
lodged after the last date for proving but they may do so if they
think fit.

The Joint Administrators intend to make such distribution within
the period of two months from the last date for proving claims.

For further information, contact details, and proof of debt
forms, please visit http://is.gd/UzPOOa

Please complete and return a proof of debt form, together
with relevant supporting documents to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
7 More London Riverside, London SE1 2RT marked for the attention
of Claire Taylor.  Alternatively, you can email a completed proof
of debt form to lehman.affiliates@uk.pwc.com

Rule 2.95(2)(c) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 requires the Joint
Administrators to state in this notice the value of the
prescribed part of LBL&F's net property which is required to be
made available for the satisfaction of LBL&F's unsecured debts
pursuant to section 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986.  There are
no floating charges over the assets of LBL&F and accordingly,
there shall be no prescribed part.  All of LBL&F's net property
will be available for the satisfaction of LBL&F's unsecured
debts.

                      About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- http://www.lehman.com/-- was
the fourth largest investment bank in the United States.  For
more than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in the
global financial markets by serving the financial needs of
corporations, governmental units, institutional clients and
individuals worldwide.

Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy Sept. 15, 2008
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 08-13555).  Lehman's bankruptcy
petition disclosed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion in
debts, effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing the
largest in U.S. history.  Several other affiliates followed
thereafter.

Affiliates Merit LLC, LB Somerset LLC and LB Preferred Somerset
LLC sought for bankruptcy protection in December 2009.

The Debtors' bankruptcy cases are handled by Judge James M. Peck.
Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Richard P. Krasnow, Esq., Lori R. Fife,
Esq., Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., and Jacqueline Marcus, Esq., at
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, in New York, represent Lehman.  Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.

Dennis F. Dunne, Esq., Evan Fleck, Esq., and Dennis O'Donnell,
Esq., at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, in New York, serve
as counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital, Inc., is the Committee's
investment banker.

On Sept. 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered an
order commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuant
to the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (Case
No. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)).  James W. Giddens was appointed as
trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI.

The Bankruptcy Court approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase of
Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and capital
markets operations and supporting infrastructure for US$1.75
billion.  Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage house in
Japan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2 plus the
retention of most of employees.  Nomura also bought Lehman's
operations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

Lehman emerged from bankruptcy protection on March 6, 2012, more
than three years after it filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S.
history.  The Chapter 11 plan for the Lehman companies other than
the broker was confirmed in December 2011.

As of Oct. 2, 2014, Lehman's total distributions to unsecured
creditors have amounted to $92.0 billion.  As of Sept. 30, 2014,
the brokerage trustee has substantially completed customer claims
distributions, distributing more than $106 billion to 111,000
customers.


MILLWALL FOOTBALL CLUB: Chairman Writes Off Interest on Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
millwallfc.co.uk reports that John Berylson has agreed to write
off GBP8.4 million of accrued interest owed by the Millwall
Football Club to his company, Chestnut Hill Ventures.  In
addition, he has agreed not to charge any further interest at the
present time, according to millwallfc.co.uk.

Separately, cash funding of the ongoing losses is being made by
issue of B shares (equity, not debt) and GBP12.375 million of B
shares were issued during the year to June 30, 2015 covering the
last two years, the report notes.

The report discloses that the chairman said: "I have agreed to
fund the club on an ongoing basis by way of shares and am as
fully committed as ever.  Obviously League 1 means less revenue
but, having funded the Academy for some time, it is encouraging
to see so many good young players coming through which will be
vital going forward."

The report relays that fan on the Board, Peter Garston, added: "I
am glad the board has agreed to make this information available
to fans.  This is the latest financing of a number that have
taken place in recent years and it once again shows the board's
financial commitment and input to Millwall Football Club.

"It also banishes any worries expressed by some fans.  I would
like to thank John Berylson and the board for their continued
unwavering support," the report adds.


PRECISE MORTGAGE 2015-2B: Moody's Rates Class E Notes Ba3(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive long-term
credit ratings to Notes issued by Precise Mortgage Funding 2015-
2B PLC:

GBP180.4 Million Class A Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
June 2048, Assigned Aaa (sf)

GBP5.6 Million Class B Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
June 2048, Assigned Aaa (sf)

GBP17.9 Million Class C Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
June 2048, Assigned Aa2 (sf)

GBP12.9 Million Class D Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
June 2048, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

GBP6.2 Million Class E Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
June 2048, Assigned Ba3(sf)

Moody's has not assigned ratings to the GBP1.2M Class Z Mortgage
Backed Fixed Rate Notes due June 2048 and the Residual
Certificates.

The portfolio backing this transaction consists of first ranking
buy-to-let mortgage loans to semi professional landlords with
small portfolios secured by property located in England, Scotland
and Wales.

On the closing date, Buttermere plc will sell the portfolio to
Precise Mortgage Funding 2015-2B PLC.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating takes into account the credit quality of the
underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined the
MILAN Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss, as well
as the transaction structure and legal considerations. The
expected portfolio loss of 2% and the MILAN required credit
enhancement of 13% serve as input parameters for Moody's cash
flow model and tranching model, which is based on a probabilistic
lognormal distribution.

Portfolio expected loss of 2%: this is marginally higher than
other buy to let pools in the UK and is based on Moody's
assessment of the lifetime loss expectation taking into account:
(i) the originators' historical performance, (ii) the current
macroeconomic environment in the UK, (iii) the collateral
performance to date along with an average seasoning of 2.2 years;
and (iv) benchmarking with similar UK Buy to Let transactions.

MILAN CE of 13%: this is higher than other UK buy to let
transactions due to (i) the originators' historical performance
and (ii) the weighted average LTV of 72.44%.

At closing the mortgage pool balance will consist of GBP 224
million of loans. The Reserve fund will be funded to 2.9% of the
initial mortgage pool balance. The Reserve fund will not be
amortized. Moreover, the class A and B notes benefit from
principal to pay interest.

Operational Risk Analysis: Charter Court Financial Services
Limited ("CCFS", not rated) will be acting as servicer. In order
to mitigate the operational risk, there will be a back-up
servicer facilitator and Elavon Financial Services Limited,
acting through its UK Branch, will be acting as an independent
cash manager from close. To ensure continuity of payments over
the transaction's lifetime the transaction documents incorporate
estimation language whereby the cash manager can use the three
most recent servicer reports to determine the cash allocation in
case no servicer report is available.

Interest Rate Risk Analysis: The transaction will benefit from an
interest rate swap provided by Credit Suisse International (A1/P-
1). Under the swap agreements during the term of the life of the
fixed rate loans the issuer will pay a fixed swap rate of 1.1%
and receive three month sterling Libor from the swap
counterparty.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
January 2015.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of a
rating for an RMBS security may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage. Please see Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN
Framework for further information on Moody's analysis at the
initial rating assignment and the on-going surveillance in RMBS.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with our
expectations at close due to either a change in economic
conditions from our central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic
performance factors would lead to rating actions. For instance,
should economic conditions be worse than forecast, the higher
defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in downgrade of the ratings.
Deleveraging of the capital structure or conversely a
deterioration in the notes available credit enhancement could
result in an upgrade or a downgrade of the rating, respectively.

Stress Scenarios:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the portfolio expected loss
was increased from 2% to 4% of current balance, and the MILAN CE
was increased from 13% to 18.2%, the model output indicates that
the Class A notes would still achieve Aaa(sf) assuming that all
other factors remained equal. Moody's Parameter Sensitivities
quantify the potential rating impact on a structured finance
security from changing certain input parameters used in the
initial rating. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged
and is not intended to measure how the rating of the security
might change over time, but instead what the initial rating of
the security might have been under different key rating inputs.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.

The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time, but rather how the initial rating of the security
might have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.


SHIELD HOLDCO: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB-', Then Withdraws Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on security software company Shield Holdco Ltd.
(Sophos) to 'BB-' from 'B+'.  S&P also removed the rating from
CreditWatch with positive implications, where it had been placed
on June 9, 2015.

S&P subsequently withdrew the rating at the company's request.
The outlook was stable at the time of the withdrawal.

The rating was withdrawn after the company redeemed its rated
senior secured loans.

Before withdrawing the corporate credit rating, S&P raised it in
response to Sophos' recent listing on the London Stock Exchange.
As part of the listing, Sophos successfully raised net proceeds
of $100 million, which were used to reduce its debt.  In
conjunction with the IPO, the company launched full refinancing
of its debt facilities.  Combined with the debt reduction, this
process caused its cash interest payments to fall by more than
50%.  In addition, before the IPO, the group converted its
preferred equity certificates into equity.

Following all these transactions, and assuming that Sophos
continues to see more than 10% billing growth, S&P forecasts that
its Standard & Poor's gross adjusted leverage will decline to
about 4x in the financial year (FY) ending March 2016, and
further decline in FY2017.  S&P also anticipates that Sophos will
meaningfully strengthen its cash flow ratios, such that, for
example, its free operating cash flow (FOCF)-to-debt ratio will
rise to about 20% in FY2017.  Apax Partners' stake in Sophos has
declined to about 40% and S&P expects that it will sell off more
of its stake over the short term.  Additionally, Sophos now has a
public dividend policy of 20% of its free cash flows.  S&P is,
therefore, revising upward its assessment of the company's
financial risk profile to "significant."

S&P's assessment of Sophos' business risk profile remains
constrained by the highly competitive and fragmented information
technology security market, in which it competes with far larger
and better capitalized players that could invest or acquire
superior research and development capabilities.  There are also
no meaningful switching costs for its customers, limited
diversity, high operating leverage, and meaningful reputational
risks.

S&P assess Sophos' business risk profile at the higher end of the
"weak" category because its business model is largely based on
recurring revenues and because security applications are critical
to its corporate customers, which enables it to achieve very high
customer retention.

S&P's base-case operating scenario for Sophos assumes:

   -- Continued billing growth of about 18% from unified threat
      management products and growth of about 5% from endpoint
      products such as antivirus and firewalls in FY2016.

   -- An increase in adjusted EBITDA margins of about 1%-2%,
      chiefly due to lower exceptional costs.  Capital
      expenditure (capex) declining to about 2% of billings.

   -- Annual dividends of 20% of the company's free cash flow.

Based on these S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 4x in FY2016, or about 3.2x on a
      cash EBITDA basis.
   -- Free operating cash flow to debt of about 18%-20%.
   -- EBITDA cash interest coverage of more than 6x (excluding
      one-off transaction related costs), signifying cash EBITDA
      coverage of about 7.5x.

At the time of the withdrawal, the stable outlook reflected S&P's
anticipation that Sophos' billings would continue to grow
organically over the next 12 months, supporting maintenance of
adjusted debt to EBITDA well below 4x.


SKELWITH: Enters Liquidation Casting Doubt Over 2,500 New Homes
---------------------------------------------------------------
harrogate-news.co.uk reports that York developer Skelwith has
said that they have entered provisional liquidation.

The developer had plans to deliver up 2,500 new homes on the site
near to Knaresborough, at the previous Flaxby golf course, as
well as a hotel, as part of a revised masterplan for the site,
according to harrogate-news.co.uk.

The report notes that Skelwith has already invested heavily in
infrastructure, completing earlier this year a new GBP4 million
roundabout for the site.

Howver, the Skelwith group is in a legal battle with local
farmers, the Armstrong family, developers, the Ward family and
their related companies over the site, the report relays.

In 2008, a 280 acre area of land was sold from the Armstrongs to
Skelwith for GBP7 million, the report discloses.

In 2010, consent was giving to build a hotel on the site and
Skelwith secured a number of investors for the hotel, the report
relays.

The report notes that the Armstrongs are looking to sell the land
to the Ward family to recover what they say is unpaid money to
them and that the land has been undervalued.  Skelwith have
blocked this sale at the High Courts, the report relays.

The Armstongs and Wards are continuing to seek a Court order to
allow the sale of the land to go ahead, the report adds.


SKELWITH LEISURE: Raithwaite Estate Future Hangs in Doubt
---------------------------------------------------------
The Scarborough News reports that the future of the luxury
Raithwaite Estate at Sandsend hangs in doubt after the firm
behind the development went into administration.

KPMG said it was "assessing the financial situation" of the
Estate which is owned by Skelwith Leisure (Raithwaite) Limited --
a subsidiary of The Skelwith Group, according to The Scarborough
News.

The report notes that a new buyer is now being sought for the
development which includes the hotel, holiday cottages and The
Keep annexe over 100 acres.

In the meantime, a spokeperson for KPMG said: "Our initial
priority is to ensure that the business trades as normal, with
clients being unaffected and their commitments being honoured,
while we assess its financial situation and consider our next
steps," the report relates.

Earlier this week, Skelwith Leisure, another subsidiary of the
Skelwith Group, went into provisional liquidation blaming costs
of a legal dispute over the ownership of the land at Flaxby Golf
Course, the report notes.

Prior to the Raithwaite announcement, a Skelwith spokesperson had
said: "Because of the pressure and resources taken up with the
litigation on the Flaxby Golf course site, one Skelwith company,
Skelwith Leisure, has gone into provisional liquidation. We are
working with the liquidator to resolve outstanding issues.  The
current legal dispute and planning process will continue.  This
does not affect other Skelwith companies and projects and we
still own various sites that we will continue to operate and
develop as planned," the report discloses.

The company will do battle with the farming family, the
Armstrongs, who sold the land in 2008 at the High Court after
they became angry with the changes to the masterplan, and a lack
of building work to date, the report notes.

A spokesperson for the Skelwith Group insisted both the High
Court hearing and the planning application for a new town,
complete with 2,213 homes shops, primary school, restaurants and
a doctors’ surgery, will go ahead, the report adds.


WARLORD PRODUCTIONS: Goes Into Liquidation
------------------------------------------
Andrew Penman at Mirror News reports that film production company
Warlord Productions Ltd, which raised GBP6 million from the
public to invest in a new version of Shakespeare's Henry V, has
now been put into compulsory liquidation in the High Court.

The Insolvency Service said that GBP3 million of the money raised
went into the pockets of sales reps and the rest has disappeared,
according to Mirror News.

"This company appeared to be a film production company in name
only as it seemed to do little or no filming or producing," said
David Hill, Chief Investigator at the Insolvency Service, the
report notes.

The report relates that Michael Caine and Ray Winstone were
billed as due to star in Henry 5 -- as the producers called it --
but their agents told me that they have nothing to do with the
project.

Investors said promises of generous returns tempted them to pump
their savings into other film projects including a biblical epic
called Mary Mother of Christ and an animated film called Gummy
Bear, the report relates.  Now they are desperately worried that
these films will never see the light of day, the report notes.

The report discloses that a web of firms behind these projects
include Stealth Media Group Ltd, now in liquidation, and Spice
Factory UK Ltd, which faced being put into compulsory liquidation
last month until that action was suspended.

Michael Cowan was a director of those firms as well as Warlord
Productions, though he claims to have been a director on paper
only, the report relays.  The 50-year-old was also the 100%
shareholder of Warlord, but maybe that was on paper only too, the
report discloses.

The report relays that Mr. Cowan said that the strings were
really pulled by former associate Steven Wilkinson, who says he's
an independent film producer.

The report notes that Det. Con Duncan Lloyd said: "We are
investigating an allegation of fraud involving the running of a
number of companies linked to the film production industry.

"The investigation is at a very early stage and we would urge any
investors who have any concerns about how their money has been
spent to contact us," the report quoted Mr. Lloyd as saying.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Hospitals, Health and People
-------------------------------------------
Author: Albert W. Snoke, M.D.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 232 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Francoise C. Arsenault
Order your personal copy today at

http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/hospitals_health_and_people.
html

Hospitals, Health and People is an interesting and very readable
account of the career of a hospital administrator and physician
from the 1930's through the 1980's, the formative years of
today's health care system. Although much has changed in
hospital administration and health care since the book was first
published in 1987, Dr. Snoke's discussion of the evolution of
the modern hospital provides a unique and very valuable
perspective for readers who wish to better understand the forces
at work in our current health care system.

The first half of Hospitals, Health and People is devoted to the
functional parts of the hospital system, as observed by Dr.
Snoke between the late 1930's through 1969, when he served first
as assistant director of the Strong Memorial Hospital in
Rochester, New York, and then as the director of the Grace-New
Haven Hospital in Connecticut. In these first chapters, Dr.
Snoke examines the evolution and institutionalization of a
number of aspects of the hospital system, including the
financial and community responsibilities of the hospital
administrator, education and training in hospital
administration, the role of the governing board of a hospital,
the dynamics between the hospital administrator and the medical
staff, and the unique role of the teaching hospital.

The importance of Hospitals, Health and People for today's
readers is due in large part to the author's pivotal role in
creating the modern-day hospital. Dr. Snoke and others in
similar positions played a large part in advocating or forcing
change in our hospital system, particularly in recognizing the
importance of the nursing profession and the contributions of
non-physician professionals, such as psychologists, hearing and
speech specialists, and social workers, to the overall care of
the patient. Throughout the first chapters, there are also many
observations on the factors that are contributing to today's
cost of care. Malpractice is just one example. According to
Dr. Snoke, "malpractice premiums were negligible in the 1950's
and 1960's. In 1970, Yale-New Haven's annual malpractice
premiums had mounted to about $150,000." By the time of the
first publication of the book, the hospital's premiums were
costing about $10 million a year.

In the second half of Hospitals, Health and People, Dr. Snoke
addresses the national health care system as we've come to know
it, including insurance and cost containment; the role of the
government in health care; health care for the elderly; home
health care; and the changing role of ethics in health care. It
is particularly interesting to note the role that Senator Wilbur
Mills from Arkansas played in the allocation of costs of
hospital-based specialty components under Part B rather than
Part A of the Medicare bill. Dr. Snoke comments: "This was
considered a great victory by the hospital-based specialists. I
was disappointed because I knew it would cause confusion in
working relationships between hospitals and specialists and
among patients covered by Medicare. I was also concerned about
potential cost increases. My fears were realized. Not only
have health costs increased in certain areas more than
anticipated, but confusion is rampant among the elderly patients
and their families, as well as in hospital business offices and
among physicians' secretaries." This aspect of Medicare caused
such confusion that Congress amended Medicare in 1967 to provide
that the professional components of radiological and
pathological in-hospital services be reimbursed as if they were
hospital services under Part A rather than part of the copayment
provisions of Part B.

At the start of his book, Dr. Snoke refers to a small statue,
Discharged Cured, which was given to him in the late 1940's by a
fellow physician, Dr. Jack Masur. Dr. Snoke explains the
significance the statue held for him throughout his professional
career by quoting from an article by Dr. Masur: "The whole
question of the responsibility of the physician, of the
hospital, of the health agency, brings vividly to mind a small
statue which I saw a great many years ago.it is a pathetic
little figure of a man, coat collar turned up and shoulders
hunched against the chill winds, clutching his belongings in a
paper bag-shaking, tremulous, discouraged. He's clearly unfit
for work-no employer would dare to take a chance on hiring him.
You know that he will need much more help before he can face the
world with shoulders back and confidence in himself. The
statuette epitomizes the task of medical rehabilitation: to
bridge the gap between the sick and a job."

It is clear that Dr. Snoke devoted his life to exactly that
purpose. Although there is much to criticize in our current
healthcare system, the wellness concept that we expect and
accept today as part of our medical care was almost nonexistent
when Dr. Snoke began his career in the 1930's. Throughout his
50 years in hospital administration, Dr. Snoke frequently had to
focus on the big picture and the bottom line. He never forgot
the importance of Discharged Cured, however, and his book
provides us with a great appreciation of how compassionate
administrators such as Dr. Snoke have contributed to the state
of patient care today.

Albert Waldo Snoke was director of the Grace-New Haven Hospital
in New Haven, Connecticut from 1946 until 1969. In New Haven,
Dr. Snoke also taught hospital administration at Yale University
and oversaw the development of the Yale-New Haven Hospital,
serving as its executive director from 1965-1968. From 1969-
1973, Dr. Snoke worked in Illinois as coordinator of health
services in the Office of the Governor and later as acting
executive director of the Illinois Comprehensive State Health
Planning Agency. Dr. Snoke died in April 1988.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *