TCREUR_Public/150806.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, August 6, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 154

                            Headlines

F R A N C E

VALLOUREC: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'BB+/B' CCR


G R E E C E

GREECE: Needs EUR100-Bil. Debt Writedown as Depression Looms


I R E L A N D

EATON VANCE: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to BB+
IARNROD EIREANN: Loss of Train Contract May Prompt Bankruptcy


K A Z A K H S T A N

BANK OF ASTANA: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B/B'


N E T H E R L A N D S

CADOGAN SQUARE: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Class E Notes


P O L A N D

KOMPANIA WEGLOWA: Plans to Sign Standstill Agreement with Lenders
PBG SA: Majority of Creditors Back Debt Restructuring Deal


P O R T U G A L

LUSITANO MORTGAGES: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to B
NAVIGATOR MORTGAGE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to BB


R U S S I A

SAFEGUARD OF THE FUTURE: Put Under Provisional Administration
SVYAZINVESTNEFTEKHIM OAO: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDRs to 'BB+'


S P A I N

AVANZA SPAIN: S&P Keeps 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative


U K R A I N E

UKRAINE: Latest Debt Offer Unacceptable for Creditors


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AFREN PLC: Investors' Stakes Expected to Be Wiped Out
BARCLAYS PLC: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to Addt'l Tier 1 Securities
HELLERMANNTYTON GROUP: S&P Puts 'BB' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
INDEPENDENT INSURANCE: UK Liquidators Obtain Permanent Injunction
SANTANDER ASSET: S&P Maintains 'BB' Rating on CreditWatch Neg.

THRONES 2015-1: Fitch Corrects August 3 Rating Release


                            *********



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F R A N C E
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VALLOUREC: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'BB+/B' CCR
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on France-
based seamless steel tube producer Vallourec to negative from
stable and affirmed the 'BB+/B' long- and short-term corporate
credit ratings.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' long-term issue rating
on the group's senior unsecured debt.  The '3' recovery rating
remains unchanged, reflecting S&P's expectation for recovery in
the higher half of the 50%-70% range.  S&P also affirmed its 'B'
issue rating on the group's commercial paper program.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's more pessimistic assumptions
regarding the depth of the trough in demand for Vallourec's
products and the pace and intensity of subsequent improvement.
As such, S&P sees limited headroom for the current ratings on
Vallourec.  S&P thinks that improved demand in 2016 and 2017--on
the back of the end of the destocking and a likely increase in
the oil price -- and cost savings might not be enough to maintain
credit metrics in line with the current ratings, including funds
from operations (FFO) to debt at least at 20% in 2016.

S&P has changed its projections on EBITDA to slightly negative
for full-year 2015 (in line with the company's guidance), from
less than EUR200 million, and to EUR400 million-EUR500 million in
2016, from at least EUR500 million.  This is backed by S&P's
assumption that the margin can improve by about 10% in 2016.
This compares with EBITDA margins of about 15% and reported
EBITDA of close to EUR900 million in 2014.  While S&P places more
weight on future years' performance, it would view negative
EBITDA in 2015 as a deterring factor.

In addition, S&P has slightly lowered its projection on capital
expenditures (capex) and working capital needs.  S&P now assumes
that working capital inflows in 2015 will reach about EUR500
million (up approximately EUR100 million-EUR200 million from
S&P's previous expectation) and capex of about EUR300 million in
2015 (EUR50 million below S&P's previous expectation).  However,
S&P thinks that these shifts will not be sufficient to fully
offset our above-mentioned assumption of a deterioration of
EBITDA.

In line with S&P's expectations, it notes that Brazil-based
Petrobras -- one of Vallourec's largest clients -- has announced
that its long-term investment plan in its core pre-salt offshore
projects, unlike its other divisions, are unaffected by its large
capex cuts.  Still, in the aftermath of the wide-reaching
investigations of corruption at Petrobas, some of its key
contractors have filed for bankruptcy and created hurdles that
have delayed Petrobras' plans.  S&P sees a risk for further
delays, which could dampen the demand growth for Vallourec S&P
anticipates in 2015-2016.  Demand should increase in 2017-2018,
as Petrobras ramps up its hefty capex to achieve its production
targets.

S&P recognizes that Vallourec is taking active steps to
accelerate its multiyear "Valens" cost-savings plan, which should
have a notable effect in 2016 and a full impact in 2017.  S&P
thinks that execution risks will be limited.

S&P views Vallourec's business risk profile as "fair," which
takes into account the group's strong market positions in the
concentrated premium oil country tubular goods pipe industry,
high barriers to entry given its premium products, sound
geographic diversification, and relative client concentration, as
well as its exposure to the oil and gas industry.  Oil and gas is
inherently cyclical, competitive, and capital intensive, with
long lead times to increase capacity.  Furthermore, S&P takes
into account Vallourec's sharply declining EBITDA margin in 2015
and the uncertainty about improvement over the next couple of
years.

S&P assess Vallourec's financial risk profile as "significant,"
despite S&P's expectation of negative FFO to debt in 2015,
assuming this metric will markedly rise in 2016 and exceed 20%
over 2013-2017 on a weighted-average basis.  S&P also factors in
its assumption of positive free operating cash flows (FOCF)
(after capex) but negative discretionary cash flows (after capex
and dividends) on average over 2013-2017.

S&P applies a one-notch uplift to its anchor on Vallourec to
incorporate S&P's "positive" comparable ratings analysis.  This
indicates S&P's view that Vallourec's business risk profile is at
the upper end of our "fair" category, thanks to the group's
robust global market positions and our assumption that EBITDA
margins will improve markedly after 2015.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view of limited headroom on
the credit metrics commensurate with the current ratings.  This
is due to the potentially weaker-than-previously assumed global
demand for Vallourec's products in the next several quarters,
which could result in negative FFO and an increase of FFO in 2016
insufficient to maintain the ratings at the current level.  S&P
also takes into account its assumption that the group's "Valens"
multiyear cost-saving plan will be implemented on time and
successfully, as well as S&P's expectation of broadly neutral or,
at worst, limited negative FOCF in 2015-2016, thanks partly to
large working capital inflows.

S&P might consider a downgrade if FFO to debt doesn't reach 20%
in 2016 and fails to rise materially thereafter.  This could
occur if global demand (including from the U.S., Brazil, and the
Middle East) for Vallourec's products does not improve as
substantially or as quickly as S&P currently assumes, or if
timely cost-saving targets were not met.  No increase in oil
prices, negative EBITDA or EBITDA below S&P's expectations, an
EBITDA margin sustainably below 10%, or negative FOCF would
constrain the ratings.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it foresees that FFO to
debt will be at least 20% by the end of 2016.  This would likely
be supported by positive EBITDA for full-year 2015 and at least
EUR450 million in 2016, better visibility on demand, an EBITDA
margin of at least 10% after 2015, significant cost reductions,
and higher oil prices.



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G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: Needs EUR100-Bil. Debt Writedown as Depression Looms
------------------------------------------------------------
Szu Ping Chan at The Telegraph reports that Greece needs a debt
write-down of almost EUR100 billion (GBP70 billion) if the
country is to stand a chance of clawing its way out of a
"prolonged and severe depression".

In a stark analysis, the National Institute of Economic and
Social Research (NIESR) laid bare the impact of VAT hikes and
strict budget targets that it said could become "self-defeating",
The Telegraph relates.

As Greek bank shares saw a third of their value wiped-off for a
second day, NIESR's analysis showed Greece's economy will slump
back into recession this year and next, The Telegraph discloses.

By the end of 2016, the economy is forecast to be 30% smaller
than at its peak in 2007 and 7% smaller than before it joined the
euro in 2001, The Telegraph notes.

"We don't see Greece getting back to the level it was when it
joined the euro in 2001, let alone anywhere near where it was
before this crisis struck, so this is a prolonged and severe
depression for Greece," The Telegraph quotes Jack Meaning,
research fellow at NIESR, as saying.

According to The Telegraph, economists said Greece's creditors
would need to write-off or restructure EUR95 billion of its
EUR320 billion debt pile, or around 55% of gross domestic product
(GDP), in order to reduce its debt stock to around 130% of GDP,
from a projection of 186.9% this year.

NIESR said this would make an International Monetary Fund (IMF)
debt target of 120% of GDP by 2020 -- which it considers to be
the maximum sustainable level -- "at least possible", The
Telegraph relates.

The think-tank's forecasts showed the economy is expected to
contract by 3% in 2015 and 2.3% in 2016, remaining in recession
until the second half of 2016, according to The Telegraph.

Under current projections, Greece's economy is not expected to
get back to its pre-euro size until the first half of 2023, The
Telegraph says.

Experts at Fathom Consulting warned that forcing Greece to
implement more belt tightening would asphyxiate the economy while
proving fruitless for the country's creditors, The Telegraph
relays.

"Greece has been in recession these last four or five years, and
it's going to remain in recession for the next four or five years
if this deal is accepted, and the recession is likely to get
worse," The Telegraph quotes Erik Britton, a director at Fathom
as saying.  "They are already at riot levels of unemployment,
curfew levels of unemployment, political instability levels of
unemployment, and they're staring down the barrel of another five
years of that or worse."

Mr. Britton warned that Greece's creditors would not receive "one
cent" of bail-out cash if the third bail-out program was
approved, The Telegraph notes.



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I R E L A N D
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EATON VANCE: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to BB+
--------------------------------------------------------
The upgrades follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the
transaction using data from the trustee report dated June 2015
and the application of S&P's relevant criteria.

Since the end of the reinvestment period in June 2013, the class
A and VFN notes have partially amortized.  The most junior notes
(the class E notes) have also amortized.

The portfolio is well diversified, in S&P's view, with more than
200 obligors, with an average exposure of 0.48%.  S&P has
observed that the portfolio's credit quality has remained the
same since its April 24, 2014 review.

The percentage of 'CCC' rated assets (debt obligations of
obligors rated 'CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') in the portfolio has
decreased to 1.24% from 1.25% since S&P's previous review (as a
percentage of performing assets).  As a result of less 'CCC'
rated assets, the same weighted-average rating as in S&P's
previous review, and the shorter time to maturity, scenario
default rates (SDRs) are lower than in S&P's previous review.

The SDRs represent the stressed level of cumulative asset
defaults commensurate, in S&P's view, with economic stresses
assumed at different rating levels.  The SDRs at a given rating
level will increase or decrease with changes in the underlying
collateral characteristics of the portfolio, including changes in
obligor ratings and maturity composition, issuer, industry, and
country concentrations.

Defaulted assets in the underlying portfolio have also decreased
since S&P's previous review -- to EUR3.9 million from EUR4.1
million.  All classes of notes are passing their
overcollateralization tests, as they were at S&P's previous
review.

Eaton Vance CDO VII has a dual-currency liability structure.  The
term notes and the variable funding notes fund both the euro-
denominated assets and the U.S. dollar-denominated assets to
create a natural hedge.  To address the risk arising from
defaults on euro- and U.S. dollar-denominated assets, the issuer
entered into option swaps at closing with Citibank N.A.  As the
downgrade provisions in the options agreement do not comply with
S&P's current counterparty criteria, the maximum rating that the
counterparty can support is no higher than one notch above the
long-term rating on the counterparty.

For rating scenarios above this level, S&P's cash flow analysis
has to show that the available credit enhancement for the notes
is sufficient to withstand losses, if the counterparty fails to
perform and the transaction is exposed to foreign currency risk.
S&P's cash flow analysis indicates that its ratings on the class
A, B, C, and VFN notes would not be affected by the
nonperformance of the option provider.

The portfolio's reported weighted-average spread on euro-
denominated assets has fallen to 3.48% from 3.75% since S&P's
previous review.  The weighted-average spread on U.S. dollar-
denominated assets has also decreased to 3.07% from 3.25% over
the same period.  Based on the trustee report data, S&P has
observed that approximately 60% of the assets are U.S. dollar-
denominated and the rest are euro-denominated.

S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes at each rating
level.  The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the maximum level of
gross defaults, based on its stress assumptions, that a tranche
can withstand and still fully pay interest and repay principal to
the noteholders.  S&P used the portfolio balance that it
considers to be performing, the reported weighted-average spread,
and the weighted-average recovery rates calculated in accordance
with S&P's corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
criteria.

S&P applied various cash flow stress scenarios using its standard
default patterns and timings for each rating category assumed for
each class of notes, combined with different interest stress
scenarios as outlined in S&P's criteria.

S&P also applied high and low correlation and lower recovery
sensitivity tests to the notes at each rating level.  In addition
to S&P's cash flow analysis, it also performed its supplemental
tests, which are intended to address both event risk and model
risk.  These tests assess whether a CDO tranche has sufficient
credit enhancement (not counting excess spread) to withstand
specified combinations of underlying asset defaults based on the
ratings on the underlying assets, with a predefined recovery
rate.

S&P's ratings on the class A, B, and VFN notes address the timely
payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal.  S&P's
ratings on the class C to E notes address the ultimate payment of
principal and interest.

Due to the deleveraging of the class VFN, A, and E notes, the
available credit enhancement for all classes of notes has
increased.  S&P's cash flow analysis indicates that the available
credit enhancement for all classes of notes is commensurate with
higher ratings than previously assigned.  S&P has therefore
raised its ratings on all classes of notes in this transaction.

Eaton Vance CDO VII is a cash flow CDO transaction that
securitizes a portfolio of senior secured leveraged loans,
second-lien loans, collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), and
mezzanine loans.  The transaction closed in April 2006 and Eaton
Vance Management is the manager.

RATINGS LIST

Eaton Vance CDO VII PLC
EUR260 mil, US$174 mil secured floating-rate deferrable notes

                                Rating         Rating
Class     Identifier            To             From
A-1       27829EAB7             AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
A-2       27829EAC5             AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
VFN       27829EAA9             AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
B-1       27829EAD3             AAA (sf)       AA (sf)
B-2       27829EAE1             AAA (sf)       AA (sf)
C-1       27829EAF8             AA+ (sf)       A (sf)
C-2       27829EAG6             AA+ (sf)       A (sf)
D-1       27829EAH4             BBB+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)
D-2       27829EAJ0             BBB+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)
E-1       27829EAK7             BB+ (sf)       B- (sf)
E-2       27829EAL5             BB+ (sf)       B- (sf)


IARNROD EIREANN: Loss of Train Contract May Prompt Bankruptcy
-------------------------------------------------------------
Suzanne Lynch and Martin Wall at The Irish Times report that the
Irish Government has warned state-owned train operator Irish Rail
(Iarnrod Eireann) is likely to face bankruptcy if it loses the
right to run services as a result of proposed changes to the way
the EU rail sector is run.

Iarnrod Eireann's contract for operating train services is due to
expire in 2019 and the EU Commission has been pressing for
changes which would see the sector opened up to tenders from
competitors, The Irish Times relates.

According to The Irish Times, the government is strongly
resisting any such move and has privately warned Brussels that if
the State-owned operator lost out in a tender process, the
company would more than likely face bankruptcy.

The government fears such a development could leave it having to
repay more than EUR150 million in debts owed by Iarnrod Eireann,
The Irish Times discloses.

It is understood there are also fears that rolling stock worth
millions of euro could end up in the hands of a receiver in the
event of the State company going bankrupt, The Irish Times
states.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


BANK OF ASTANA: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B/B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had raised its
long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Bank of
Astana JSC to 'B/B' from 'B-/C'.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'kzBB' Kazakhstan national
scale ratings on the bank.

The upgrade reflects the diversification of Bank of Astana's
funding profile over the past 12 months, in line with S&P's
expectations.  In S&P's view, the structure of the bank's funding
profile is now similar to that of regional peers.  Bank of Astana
has repaid debt to Astana-Finance JSC, attracted key state
companies as corporate depositors, and increased retail deposits
after its retail deposit license was reinstated in April 2014.
As a result, S&P now regards its funding as "average" rather than
"below average," as defined in its criteria.  Bank of Astana's
stable funding ratio was 135.7% as of year-end 2014, supporting
our assessment.

As S&P expected, Bank of Astana was able to replace Kazakhstani
tenge (KZT) 46 billion (about US$307 million) in funding from
Astana-Finance as of midyear 2014 with state, corporate, and
retail customer deposits, funding under government support
programs (13% of total funding), interbank funding, and a debut
domestic senior unsecured debt to be placed in August.  As a
result, Astana-Finance's deposit had reduced to KZT704 million as
of midyear 2015.

Nevertheless, the bank's funding base remains concentrated,
showing a high dependence on state companies, which account for a
major share of corporate deposits.  Concentration is a common
feature in the Kazakh banking system, however.

Retail deposits comprised 12% of Bank of Astana's deposit base as
of midyear 2015, which is lower than at regional peers.  S&P
expects the share of retail deposits to rise over the next two
years because the bank plans to attract employees of its
shareholders' companies.  Although in Kazakhstan, retail
depositors are more costly and confidence sensitive than
corporate depositors, S&P believes the increase in retail
deposits would enhance the bank's funding diversification and
granularity.  Bank of Astana's license to collect retail deposits
and open accounts as reinstated on April 1, 2014, after being
revoked from Astana-Finance in 2010.

To address tight tenge liquidity in the market, the bank obtained
a $15 million (KZT2.8 billion) one-year foreign currency swap
from the National Bank of Kazakhstan in November 2014, which it
expects to repay from liquid assets.  The bank's assets and
liabilities in foreign currency were well matched as of midyear
2015: KZT26.5 billion equivalent in deposits against KZT28
billion equivalent in loans.

The bank has registered a KZT50 billion medium-term notes program
and is currently leading negotiations to place a debut KZT20
billion 9.5% issue maturing in 2020, which should improve its
debt maturity profile.

S&P's view of other bank-specific factors has not changed.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Bank of
Astana's financial profile will remain generally unchanged over
the next 12 months.  In particular, S&P expects the bank to
maintain capital and liquidity at current levels and further
diversify its lending and funding profiles.  S&P also expects
that the shareholders will continue their track record of making
capital injections to support the bank's growth strategy.

S&P could take a negative rating action if the bank's loan growth
significantly exceeds its forecast or the shareholders' planned
capital injection is delayed, weakening the bank's loss-
absorption capacity, with S&P's forecast risk-adjusted capital
ratio declining below 10%.  Any emerging funding pressures, in
terms of availability and/or cost; a significant increase in
nonperforming loans; and substantially higher provisions would
also erode the bank's creditworthiness and could trigger a
downgrade.

Rating upside is limited over the outlook horizon.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CADOGAN SQUARE: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
action on these classes of notes issued by Cadogan Square CLO III
B.V.:

  EUR342.65 mil. (current outstanding balance of EUR 106.17 mil.)
   Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR36.1 mil. Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 9, 2014, Upgraded
   to Aaa (sf)

  EUR27.5 mil. Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 9,
   2014 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  EUR30 mil. Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2023, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on July 9,
   2014, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  EUR18.75 mil. Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2023, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on July 9, 2014,
   Affirmed B1 (sf)

Cadogan Square CLO III B.V., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans managed by Credit
Suisse Asset Management Limited.  The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in January 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is the
result of the substantial deleveraging over the last two payment
dates in January and July 2015.

Class A notes have paid down by approximately EUR93.4 million
(27.2% of closing balance) since the July 2014 payment date, as a
result of which over-collateralization (OC) ratios of all classes
of rated notes have increased significantly.  As per the trustee
report dated July 2015, Class A/B, Class C, Class D, and Class E
OC ratios are reported at 153.42%, 133.05%, 116.22%, and 107.70%
compared to July 2014 levels of 136.68%, 124.37%, 113.25%, and
107.25%, respectively.  These reported OC ratios do not take into
account the pay-down of Class A notes on the payment dates in
July 2015 and July 2014 respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR243.66 million, defaulted par of EUR 10.46
million, a weighted average default probability of 22.04%
(consistent with a WARF of 3040 over a weighted average life of
4.52 years), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
47.17% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 30
and a weighted average spread of 4.13%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 93.1% of the portfolio exposed to first-lien
senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default,
while the 2.9% non-first-lien loan corporate assets would recover
15%, and the 4.0% of structured finance assets would recover
4.6%. In each case, historical and market performance and a
collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
Feb. 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were unchanged for Classes A and B, and within one to two
notches notch of the base-case results for Classes C, D and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to these:

  1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

  2) Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty.  Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices.  Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

  3) Liquidation value of long-dated assets: Approximately 3.4%
of the portfolio is comprised of assets that mature after the
maturity date of the transaction ("long dated assets").  These
include one loan and two structured finance assets.  For these
long dated assets, Moody's assumed a weighted average liquidation
value of 24.9% in its analysis.  Any volatility between the
assumed liquidation value and the actual liquidation value may
create additional performance uncertainties.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


KOMPANIA WEGLOWA: Plans to Sign Standstill Agreement with Lenders
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Konrad Krasuski at Bloomberg News, citing Puls Biznesu newspaper,
reports that Kompania Weglowa plans to sign an agreement with its
lenders "soon" to defer debt repayment for several months.

According to Bloomberg, Kompania needs the standstill agreement
due to lack of cash reserves.

Kompania Weglowa is a Polish coal producer.


PBG SA: Majority of Creditors Back Debt Restructuring Deal
----------------------------------------------------------
Minda Alicja at PAP reports that PBG SA managed to bring the
required majority of creditors on board for the debt
restructuring deal.

"The judge . . . said that although the official results will be
known on August 25, judging by the voting in the past three days
it was safe to say that most of the creditors were in favor of
the deal," an individual present at the court proceedings told
PAP.  "The judge congratulated the company representatives and
the creditors on the voting results."

The voting on the debt restructuring deal took place on
August 3 to 5, PAP relates.

PBG has been in a debt restructuring process since June 2012, PAP
notes.

PBG SA is Poland's third largest builder.  PBG secured court
bankruptcy protection for debt restructuring proceedings in June
2012, after signing a stand-down agreement with its banking
creditors in May.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


LUSITANO MORTGAGES: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to B
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Lusitano Mortgages No. 4 PLC.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Lowered to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'A- (sf)', to 'BB (sf)' from
      'BBB (sf)', and to 'B (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' its ratings on
      the class A, B, and C notes, respectively; and

   -- Affirmed its 'B- (sf)' rating on the class D notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Portuguese residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria), S&P placed those
ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received as
of the April 2015 payment date.  S&P's analysis reflects the
application of its RMBS criteria.

Credit enhancement has increased since S&P's previous review.

Class         Available credit
               enhancement (%)
A                        13.76
B                         9.17
C                         5.31
D                         0.49

This transaction features an amortizing reserve fund, which
currently represents 0.49% of the outstanding balance of the
notes and is at 22.5% of its required level.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days at 1.48% are on average
in line with S&P's Portuguese RMBS index.  The transaction's
performance has been improving since Q2 2012.  Prepayment levels
remain low and the transaction is unlikely to pay down
significantly in the near term, in S&P's opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show an increase in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and an increase in the weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) for each rating level.

Rating level    WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
AAA                31.92       28.25
AA                 23.85       23.69
A                  19.57       15.50
BBB                14.30       11.50
BB                  9.13        8.91
B                   7.64        6.72

The increase in the WAFF is mainly due to the consideration of
the original loan-to-value ratios in the default calculations.
The increase in the WALS is mainly due to the application of
S&P's revised market value decline assumptions.  The overall
effect is an increase in the required credit coverage for each
rating level.

Following the application of S&P's RMBS criteria and considering
its criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above
the sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the class of notes
can attain under its RMBS criteria.

In this transaction, S&P's unsolicited long-term rating on the
Republic of Portugal (BB/Positive/B) constrains S&P's rating on
the class A notes.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for
RMBS as "moderate".  Under S&P's RAS criteria, this transaction's
notes can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign
rating, if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a
minimum of a "severe" stress.  However, as all six of the
conditions in paragraph 44 of the RAS criteria are met, S&P can
assign ratings in this transaction up to a maximum of six notches
(two additional notches of uplift) above the sovereign rating,
subject to credit enhancement being sufficient to pass an
"extreme" stress.

Lusitano Mortgages No. 4's class A notes can support the stresses
that S&P applies at a 'A' rating level under its RMBS criteria.
Additionally, S&P considers that the available credit enhancement
for the class A notes is sufficient to pass an severe stress but
not an extreme stress.  Consequently, S&P can assign ratings on
the class A notes up to a maximum of four notches above the
sovereign rating.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'BBB+ (sf)' from
'A- (sf)' its rating on the class A notes.

S&P's analysis indicates that the available credit enhancement
for the class B and C notes is no longer sufficient to support
their currently assigned ratings.  S&P has therefore lowered to
'BB (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' and to 'B (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' its
ratings on the class B and C notes, respectively.

The available credit enhancement for the class D notes is
commensurate with S&P's currently assigned rating and it do not
expect this class of notes to experience interest shortfalls in
the next 12 months.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'B- (sf)'
rating on the class D notes.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 8% for one- and three-year
horizons.  This did not result in S&P's rating deteriorating
below the maximum projected deterioration that it would associate
with each relevant rating level, as outlined in S&P's credit
stability criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Portuguese residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when it applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and sluggish house price appreciation for the
remainder of 2015 and 2016.

On the back of the weak macroeconomic conditions, S&P doesn't
expect the performance of the transactions in its Portuguese RMBS
index to significantly improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include weak economic growth and high unemployment.  On the
positive side, S&P expects interest rates to remain low.

Lusitano Mortgages No. 4 is a Portuguese RMBS transaction, which
closed in September 2005.  It securitizes a pool of first-ranking
mortgage loans that Novo Banco originated.  The mortgage loans
are mainly located in the Lisbon region and the transaction
comprises loans granted to prime borrowers.

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating            Rating
            To                From

Lusitano Mortgages No. 4 PLC
EUR1.21 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

A           BBB+ (sf)         A- (sf)
B           BB (sf)           BBB (sf)
C           B (sf)            B+ (sf)

Rating Affirmed

D           B- (sf)


NAVIGATOR MORTGAGE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to BB
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'A (sf)' and
'BBB+ (sf)' credit ratings on Navigator Mortgage Finance No.1
PLC's class A and B notes, respectively.  At the same time, S&P
has lowered to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' its rating on the class
C notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Portuguese residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria), S&P placed those
ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received in
April 2015.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of its RMBS
criteria.

This transaction features a nonamortizing reserve fund, which
currently represents 9.52% of the outstanding balance of the
notes.

Since reaching their peak 2009 and 2012 (4.54%), the level of
severe arrears in this transaction has rapidly decreased over the
past few quarters and are now more aligned with other Portuguese
deals that S&P rates.  Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days
at 1.61% are now in line with S&P's Portuguese RMBS index.  S&P's
arrears analysis also shows that this transaction has
historically underperformed both the Portuguese RMBS index as a
whole and its peers within its group.  Prepayment levels remain
low and the transaction is unlikely to pay down significantly in
the near term, in S&P's opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show a decrease in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and an increase in the weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) for each rating level.

Rating level    WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
AAA                15.44       17.05
AA                 11.83       14.35
A                   9.58       10.16
BBB                 7.16        9.86
BB                  4.88        7.45
B                   4.03        6.37

The weighted-average original-loan-to-value (OLTV) ratio is
relatively high, with 59% of the outstanding pool balance having
an OLTV ratio of above 70%.  This means that, in line with S&P's
RMBS criteria, most of the pool is penalized, as the weighted-
average OLTV ratio is above the 73% threshold.  At the same time,
seasoning offsets the negative effect of the weighted-average
OLTV ratio to the WAFF.  This is because S&P's RMBS criteria give
greater credit to well-seasoned pools.  The transaction has a
weighted-average seasoning of 185 months, which means that all of
the loans will have a 0.5x adjustment.

The increase in the WALS is mainly due to the assumption of the
minimum projected losses of 4.00% at the 'AAA' rating level and
0.35% at the 'B' level, the application of S&P's revised market
value decline assumptions, and the indexing of our valuations
under S&P's RMBS criteria.  The overall effect is an increase in
the required credit coverage for each rating level.

Following the application of S&P's RMBS criteria and considering
its criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above
the sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the class of notes
can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for
RMBS as "moderate".  Under S&P's RAS criteria, this transaction's
notes can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign
rating, if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a
minimum of a "severe" stress.  However, as all six of the
conditions in paragraph 44 of the RAS criteria are met, S&P can
assign ratings in this transaction up to a maximum of six notches
(two additional notches of uplift) above the sovereign rating,
subject to credit enhancement being sufficient to pass an
"extreme" stress.

As S&P's unsolicited long-term rating on the Republic of Portugal
is 'BB', its RAS criteria cap at 'A (sf)' the maximum potential
rating in this transaction for the class A notes.  The maximum
potential rating for all other classes of notes is 'BBB+ (sf)'.

The class A notes can support the stresses that S&P applies at a
'AAA' rating level.  Therefore, S&P considers that all six
conditions in paragraph 44 of the RAS criteria are met and that
available credit enhancement for the class A notes is sufficient
to pass an extreme stress.  Consequently, S&P can assign a rating
on the class A notes up to a maximum of six notches above the
sovereign rating.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'A (sf)' rating
on the class A notes.

The class B notes can support the stresses that S&P applies at a
'AA' rating level.  However, as it is not the senior-most
tranche, not all of the six conditions in paragraph 44 of the RAS
criteria are met.  Consequently, S&P can assign a rating on the
class B notes up to a maximum of four notches above the sovereign
rating. The class B notes can achieve a 'BBB+ (sf)' rating under
S&P's RMBS criteria.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'BBB+ (sf)'
rating on the class B notes.

The class C notes can no longer support the stresses that S&P
applies at a rating level higher than that on the sovereign.
Consequently, S&P can assign a rating to the class C notes up to
the sovereign rating.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'BB (sf)'
from 'BBB (sf)' its rating on the class C notes.

On June 9, 2015, S&P took various rating actions on certain U.K.
and German commercial banks following the introduction of well-
formed bank resolution frameworks in these countries, the ongoing
regulatory impetus to have systemic banks hold sizeable buffers
of bail-in capital that the authorities could use to recapitalize
them, and the associated reduced prospects for extraordinary
government support.  S&P's rating actions included the downgrade
of Deutsche Bank AG, a counterparty for Navigator Mortgages No.1.

Deutsche Bank AG (BBB+/Stable/A-2) is the swap counterparty and
liquidity facility provider for this transaction.  The remedy
actions outlined in the swap and liquidity facility documents are
not in line with S&P's current counterparty criteria.  However,
S&P's current ratings are based on its cash flow analysis without
giving benefit to Deutsche Bank as a counterparty for this
transaction.  Consequently, S&P's ratings in this transaction are
de-linked from its long-term issuer credit rating on Deutsche
Bank as the swap counterparty and liquidity facility provider.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 8% for one- and three-year
horizons.  This did not result in S&P's rating deteriorating
below the maximum projected deterioration that it would associate
with each relevant rating level, as outlined in S&P's credit
stability criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Portuguese residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when it applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and sluggish house price appreciation for the
remainder of 2015 and 2016.

On the back of the weak macroeconomic conditions, S&P don't
expect the performance of the transactions in our Portuguese RMBS
index to significantly improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include weak economic growth and high unemployment.  On the
positive side, S&P expects interest rates to remain low.

Navigator Mortgage No.1 is a Portuguese RMBS transaction, which
closed in June 2002 and securitizes a pool of first-ranking
mortgage loans. Banco Nacional de Credito Imobiliario originated
the pool, which comprises loans backed by properties in Portugal.

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
          To                From

Navigator Mortgage Finance No.1 PLC
EUR250 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

C         BB (sf)           BBB (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A         A (sf)
B         BBB+ (sf)



===========
R U S S I A
===========


SAFEGUARD OF THE FUTURE: Put Under Provisional Administration
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1928, dated August 3,
2015, the Bank of Russia cancelled license to carry out pension
provision and pension insurance of JSC Non-Governmental Pension
Fund Safeguard of the Future.

The reasons to take this decision were as follows:

   -- violation of requirements stipulated by Federal Law No.
      75-FZ, dated 7 May 1998, "On Non-Governmental Pension
      Funds" (hereinafter, Law No. 75-FZ) when managing pension
      savings by the Fund;

   -- repeated violations within a year of requirements for the
      dissemination, submission or disclosure of information
      stipulated by federal laws and regulations of the Russian
      Federation.

Due to cancelling of the license, by its Order No. OD-1929, dated
August 3, 2015, the Bank of Russia appointed a provisional
administration to manage the joint-stock company Non-Governmental
Pension Fund Safeguard of the Future.

The Bank of Russia shall reimburse the pension savings to the
insured persons in the amount and in the manner stipulated by the
laws of the Russian Federation.


SVYAZINVESTNEFTEKHIM OAO: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDRs to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Tatarstan government-owned
investment holding company OAO Svyazinvestneftekhim's (SINEK)
Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' and Short-term foreign currency IDR
to 'B' from 'F3'. The Outlooks on the Long-term IDRs are
Negative.

The downgrade follows the repayment of the notes issued by Edel
Capital S.A., which were guaranteed by the Republic of Tatarstan
(RoT: BBB-/Negative). SINEK used a combination of internal funds
and borrowing from a related party, AK BARS Bank (ABB, BB-
/Negative, Viability Rating b-), to fund the repayment. Fitch
previously noted that if SINEK's prospective debt was not
guaranteed by the RoT, Fitch would rate SINEK using a top down
approach one notch below the rating of its parent. Fitch views
SINEK's ties with its owner as strong. These include 100%
ownership by RoT, strong tangible sub-sovereign support, and the
influence exerted by the Tatarstan government on SINEK and its
portfolio of companies. The Negative Outlook on SINEK mirrors the
Outlook on RoT.

Fitch has also withdrawn Edel Capital S.A.'s USD250m loan
participation notes' foreign currency senior unsecured rating,
because the notes have been repaid.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Top Down Approach

SINEK holds stakes in the largest corporations in Tatarstan and
we view its operational and strategic ties with its sole owner as
strong. However, without direct legal ties in the form of a debt
guarantee, we notch down SINEK's ratings from its parent to
account for the structural subordination of SINEK creditors and
the holding's exposure to ABB. SINEK's ratings were previously
aligned with RoT's ratings due to the debt guarantee.

Speculative Grade Standalone Profile

SINEK's standalone profile is supported by stable, albeit
concentrated, dividends from investment grade rated OAO Tatneft
(BBB-/Negative; approximately 70% of total dividend income).
SINEK's credit profile is constrained by weaker companies in its
portfolio (ABB), which have received support from the holding in
the past and the fact that SINEK's cash is mainly held at ABB. We
therefore consider SINEK's standalone profile to be in the 'BB'
rating category.

ABB's Weak Credit Profile

Fitch views the probability of the RoT providing support for ABB
as only moderate, and therefore notches down the bank's ratings
from its parent, the RoT by three notches. The notching reflects
the region's currently indirect and somewhat non-transparent
ownership, some concerns over RoT's financial flexibility and
ability to provide capital support in a timely fashion and ABB's
weak asset quality, as ABB is still heavily exposed to highly
risky corporate lending and non-core assets. Fitch expects ABB
will be supported in 2015 with cash injections from the
government or its agencies. We understand that SINEK is not
expected to provide direct funding to the bank in 2015.

Contingent Liabilities

In July 2012, ABB issued USD600 million of bonds, half of which
were purchased by a subsidiary of SINEK. At the discretion of
ABB's investor holding the remaining bonds, SINEK may be obliged
to repurchase up to USD50m annually between 2015 and 2017 of the
bonds placed by the bank in 2012. We view the potential cash
outflow as manageable for SINEK depending also on the size of
capex and donation spending. The notes issued by ABB currently
trade below par value and we conservatively assume SINEK will be
obliged to repurchase the notes in 2015-2017.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that may lead to positive rating
action include:

-- An upgrade of RoT's ratings.

Negative: Future developments that may lead to negative rating
action include:

-- A downgrade of RoT's ratings.
-- Direct and material support provided to SINEK's portfolio
    companies resulting in a significant deterioration of SINEK's
    financial profile.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Tatneft remains a key dividend contributor.
-- Donation spending varies between USD40m and USD50m annually.
-- Strategic and operational ties with RoT remain strong, legal
    ties to weaken as prospective debt will not be guaranteed.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

At end-2014, short-term debt USD275.3 million and included USD257
million international bonds and a loan from RoT's Ministry of
Finance. Cash on balance sheet at end-2014 totalled USD27
million, while deposits were USD100.8 million. Deposits are held
mainly at ABB. In 2014, SINEK disposed of its holding in one of
the portfolio companies and the transaction has supported its
liquidity as part of the proceeds was received in 2015. In March
2015, SINEK's cash and deposit balance amounted to RUB14.9
billion (USD245 million).



=========
S P A I N
=========


AVANZA SPAIN: S&P Keeps 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services kept on CreditWatch with
negative implications its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating
on the bus service provider Avanza Spain S.A.U and the 'B' long-
term issue ratings on the US$315 million 7.5% senior secured
notes due 2018 issued by AG Spring Finance Ltd.  S&P subsequently
withdrew the ratings at the issuer's request.  S&P also withdrew
its 'CCC+' long-term issue ratings on Avanza's EUR175 million
9.5% senior notes due 2019 issued by AG Spring Finance II Ltd.

Avanza's tender offer to repurchase its outstanding bonds expired
on April 27, 2015.  The tender offer received was for 81.6% of
the senior secured notes and 87.9% of the senior notes, and
included the removal of the key information covenants from the
finance agreements.  It is difficult for S&P to assess the impact
of the completion of this transaction for its ratings analysis
due to limited amount of information.

The withdrawal follows consultation with the issuer, and reflects
the lack of adequate information for S&P to maintain its
surveillance.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRAINE: Latest Debt Offer Unacceptable for Creditors
-----------------------------------------------------
Natasha Doff and Marton Eder at Bloomberg News report that the
latest debt-restructuring offer from Ukraine's government
wouldn't be acceptable to the nation's bondholders.

According to Bloomberg, a person with knowledge of the
negotiations said a four-member creditor committee led by
Franklin Templeton will fully review the proposal, submitted by
Ukraine's government on Aug. 4, and aim to hold a call or meeting
early next week to respond and discuss.

The comments suggest the gap between the two sides remains wide
as time runs out to reach a deal before the first bond matures on
Sept. 23, Bloomberg notes.

Ukraine's Finance Ministry said it wants bondholders represented
at the "highest level" at a meeting in London on today, Aug. 6,
calling this week "decisive" in reaching a US$19 billion
restructuring deal, Bloomberg relates.

The other members of the group, which owns about $8.9 billion of
Ukraine's Eurobonds, are BTG Pactual Europe LLP, TCW Investment
Management Co. and T. Rowe Price Associates Inc., Bloomberg
discloses.

While the two sides have held direct meetings since signing
confidentiality agreements last month, they still need to bridge
their differences on the size of a principal reduction needed to
meet the country's restructuring targets under a US$17.5 billion
International Monetary Fund loan, Bloomberg states.

Ukraine asked creditors for a 40% principal reduction in June,
Bloomberg relays, citing a person with knowledge of the offer.

                   "Significant Uncertainty"

The Wall Street Journal's Ian Talley reports that the IMF warned
on Aug. 4 Ukraine's bailout faces "significant uncertainty" even
if the government is able to secure a debt-restructuring deal.

But even if Kiev seals a debt-relief deal, the IMF, as cited by
the Journal, said the continuing conflict with Russian-backed
separatists in the east of the country, as well as questionable
growth and export prospects could thwart the program.

"Risks to the outlook remain exceptionally high," the Journal
quotes the IMF's economists as saying, largely pointing to the
threat of the conflict escalating.  The IMF has had to repeatedly
cut its forecasts for the country over the last two years, saying
in July it expects the country's economy to contract by 9% this
year, the Journal relays.  The conflict ravaged Ukraine's already
weak economy, sending the exchange rate into a nose dive,
depleting emergency cash reserves and forcing a much tougher
budget belt-tightening than originally expected, the Journal
discloses.

"We see tentative signs of macroeconomic stabilization,"
Nikolay Gueorguiev, the IMF's mission chief for Ukraine's
bailout, as cited by the Journal, said.  Mr. Gueorguiev said the
exchange rate is stabilizing, the central bank is building up
reserves, deposits are gradually increasing and the state
accounts are becoming more sustainable, the Journal notes.

According to the Journal, one unresolved issue is how the IMF and
Ukraine will treat the US$3 billion in bonds Russia lent to the
country right before Moscow-backed President Viktor Yanukovych
fled the country in early 2014 in the face of mass protests.

Under the IMF's rules, the fund can't lend to a country that owes
debt to official creditors, such as the Russian government, the
Journal states.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AFREN PLC: Investors' Stakes Expected to Be Wiped Out
------------------------------------------------------
Guy Chazan at The Financial Times reports that investors
expecting to retrieve any value from their holdings in Afren plc,
the scandal-hit oil explorer that entered administration last
week, are likely to be sorely disappointed.

According to the FT, people familiar with the company are
predicting its stakes in key assets such as the Ebok and Okoro
oilfields in Nigeria will be taken over by either the Nigerian
government or its local business partners.

Shareholders were due to vote in July on a rights issue and the
issuance of new shares, key elements of the bailout plan, the FT
relates.  But Afren called off the vote, and told investors they
would have to stump up another US$250 million to keep the company
afloat, the FT relays.  They refused, the FT notes.

"The bondholders had thrown a lot of money at the problem, but
just ran out of patience," the FT quotes one person familiar with
the company as saying.

On July 31, the company called in administrators, the FT relates.

According to the FT, in a statement the company said that
discussions with lenders, bondholders and partners had "failed to
deliver support for a revised refinancing and restructuring
proposal that would result in Afren being able to pay its debts
as they fall due".

Now, investors could be wiped out, the FT says, citing people
familiar with the company.

Afren's negotiating position is weak because, unlike its
partners, it does not own its underlying assets, instead
controlling them through technical service contracts or so-called
"farm-in" agreements, the FT sates.

"If you default in Nigeria, the assets go to the government or to
the indigenous partners who have the license," the FT quotes
Stephane Foucaud, an oil analyst at brokerage FirstEnergy Capital
as saying.

                         About Afren plc

Afren plc, a London-based company specializing in oil and gas
exploration and production, filed a Chapter 15 bankruptcy
petition (Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 15-11452) on July 2, 2015, in
the United States, to seek recognition of its restructuring
proceedings in England.  Judge Kevin Gross presides over the U.S.
case.  L. John Bird, Esq., and Jeffrey M. Schlerf, Esq., at Fox
Rothschild LLP, serve as counsel to the Debtor in the U.S. case.


BARCLAYS PLC: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to Addt'l Tier 1 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had assigned its
'B+' long-term issue rating to the proposed fixed-rate resetting
perpetual subordinated contingent convertible additional Tier 1
securities to be issued by Barclays PLC (Barclays).  The rating
is subject to S&P's review of the notes' final documentation.

In accordance with S&P's January 2015 criteria for rating hybrid
capital instruments, the 'B+' issue rating reflects S&P's
analysis of the proposed instruments and S&P's assessment of the
unsupported group credit profile (GCP; the group's intrinsic
creditworthiness) of Barclays group.  The issue rating stands six
notches below the 'bbb+' unsupported GCP of Barclays and reflects
these:

   -- One notch for subordination.

   -- Two notches for non-payment risk and its regulatory Tier 1
      status.  One notch under step 1c of the criteria,
      reflecting the proposed issue's mandatory contingent
      capital clause leading to common equity conversion and
      principal write-down.

   -- One notch for distance to the 7% regulatory, going-concern
      contingent trigger above 300 basis points (bps).

   -- One final notch reflecting structural subordination as a
      holding company issue.

Once the securities have been issued and confirmed as part of the
issuer's Tier 1 capital base, S&P expects to assign
"intermediate" equity content to them under its criteria.  This
reflects S&P's view that they can absorb losses on a going-
concern basis through discretionary coupon cancellation, they are
perpetual, and there is no coupon step-up.


HELLERMANNTYTON GROUP: S&P Puts 'BB' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB' long-term
corporate credit rating and all issue-level ratings on U.K.-based
cable management solutions provider HellermannTyton Group PLC on
CreditWatch with positive implications.

The CreditWatch placement follows HellermannTyton's announcement
that it has received an all-cash offer from Michigan-based parts
supplier Delphi Automotive PLC (Delphi) for US$1.85 billion,
including the assumption of debt.  Delphi plans to finance the
transaction with debt and cash.  S&P expects that Delphi's debt-
to-EBITDA metric will remain below 2.0x after this transaction,
which is in line with S&P's expectations for the current rating.

The recommended transaction is a subject to shareholder approval
and to a U.K.-court-sanctioned scheme of arrangement under Part
26 of the Companies Act 2006, expected in the fourth quarter of
2015.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch placement when the acquisition
of HellermannTyton closes.  At that time, S&P would expect to
have enough information to determine the level of uplift to S&P's
corporate credit rating on HellermannTyton, as a result of its
ownership by a higher rated entity.  S&P will evaluate issue-
level ratings once final details become available, but note that
the instrument could be refinanced as part of the transaction.


INDEPENDENT INSURANCE: UK Liquidators Obtain Permanent Injunction
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
approved the motion of Dan Yoram Schwarzmann and Mark Charles
Baten, the joint provisional liquidators of Independent Insurance
Company Limited, for entry of a permanent injunction and order
pursuant to Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code giving effect in
the United States to the scheme of arrangement between the
Company and its scheme creditors pursuant to Part 26 of the
United Kingdom Companies Act 2006.

Copies of the order and the scheme are available upon request at
the office of the petitioners' United States counsel at:

Chadbourne & Parke LLP
Attn: Howard Seife, Esq.
      Fancisco Vasquez, Esq.
1301 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Tel: (2120 408-5100
Email: hseife@chadbourne.com
       fvazquez@chadbourne.com


SANTANDER ASSET: S&P Maintains 'BB' Rating on CreditWatch Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it maintained its
'BB' long-term counterparty credit rating on Jersey-based
Santander Asset Management Investment Holdings Ltd. (SAM) on
CreditWatch with negative implications.  The 'BB' issue ratings
on the company's senior secured debt also remain on CreditWatch
negative.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B' short-term
counterparty credit rating on SAM.

The ratings on SAM remain on CreditWatch pending finalization of
the transaction structure and further details on the merger plan
with Pioneer Investments.

S&P intends to resolve the CreditWatch by October 2015, by which
time S&P expects to have reviewed the final terms and integration
plans, although it expects regulatory approvals to take a few
more months.  At the time of the resolution, S&P will assess the
financing structure and the degree to which any additional debt
is factored into the current rating level.  S&P will also assess
management and governance under the new structure and integration
risks associated with the merger.


THRONES 2015-1: Fitch Corrects August 3 Rating Release
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings issued a corrected version of its Aug. 3 rating
release on Thrones 2015-1 plc notes.

Fitch has assigned Thrones 2015-1 plc's notes expected ratings,
as follows:

Class A: 'AAA(EXP)sf', Outlook Stable
Class B: 'AA(EXP)sf', Outlook Stable
Class C: 'A(EXP)sf', Outlook Stable
Class D: 'BBB(EXP)sf', Outlook Stable
Class E: 'BB-(EXP)sf', Outlook Stable

Final ratings are contingent on the receipt of final documents
conforming to the information already received.

The transaction is a GBP302 million securitization of non-
performing and re-performing UK mortgage loans originated by
multiple non-conforming UK lenders (13 in total). The major
proportions were originated by Future Mortgages (49.0%), Victoria
Mortgages (14.5%) and Heritable (14.0%), and subsequently
purchased by Mars Capital Finance Limited (Mars).

The expected ratings are based on Fitch's assessment of the
underlying collateral, available credit enhancement, the
origination and underwriting procedures used by the originators,
the servicing capabilities of Mars and the transaction's
financial and legal structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Non-performing and Re-performing Loans

The majority of loans in the portfolio (72.1%) have been three-
months plus (3m+) in arrears at some point during the past five
years; 51.5% have been 3m+ during the past two years and 25.5% of
loans in the pool are currently in 3m+ arrears. Given the
relatively recent instances of high arrears in the pool, the
agency has based its foreclosure frequency assumptions on the
worst arrears suffered by each loan in the preceding two-year
period.

Analysis of Claw-back Risk

The pool consists of loans originated from a total of 13
different non-conforming originators, many of which are now
insolvent or liquidated. Fitch has reviewed the portfolio
acquisition history and relationships between the buying and
selling parties and the agency believes the potential risk of
assets being clawed-back into the respective insolvency estates
is remote.

Detailed Pool Review

Fitch performed an extended review of the mortgage portfolio due
to the high level of expected losses and the unrated nature of
the representations and warranties provider. The review included
an extended file review of over 50 loans. In addition, a 100%
audit was conducted by a third party on key loan attributes such
as legal title, loan balances and valuations. The review showed
that in general, the key information was present and no material
errors were identified.

Updated Valuations

Mars provided updated drive-by valuations for all loans in the
portfolio. The updated valuations were used by Fitch as the basis
for deriving its foreclosure frequency and recovery rate
assumptions. Historical repossession data showed the updated
valuations to be more accurate than indexed original valuations.
Fitch views the use of the updated valuations as core to its
analysis, especially given that the agency expects very high
levels of defaults to occur.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Material increases in the frequency of defaults and loss severity
on defaulted receivables could produce loss levels greater than
Fitch's base case expectations, which in turn may result in
negative rating actions on the notes. Fitch's analysis revealed
that a 30% increase in the weighted average (WA) foreclosure
frequency, along with a 30% decrease in the WA recovery rate,
would imply a downgrade of the class A notes to 'BBBsf' from
'AAAsf'.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Mars has provided most of the key fields required for the loan-
level analysis. However, it was unable to provide CCJ data for
453 cases and could not provide prior arrears data for a further
464 cases. Where the data was not provided, the agency has
assumed that the loans were all set to the highest class of
CCJs/prior arrears. This increased the default probabilities for
any loans where the data was missing.

The agency typically calculates the sustainable (sLTV) using the
balance at the time of the most recent advance and the valuation
corresponding to that date. For every loan it has purchased, Mars
also conducts a drive-by 'audit' valuation. Given that the
portfolio comprises loans from multiple originators and due to
the loans being very seasoned, Fitch chose to use the drive-by
valuations as the basis for determining the sLTV and the current
LTVs in its analysis. The agency has deemed this approach
specifically relevant to the Thrones loan pool, on account of the
very high foreclosure frequencies and the consequent reliance on
recovering proceeds from sold possessions.

Fitch reviewed the results of a third party assessment conducted
on the asset portfolio information, which indicated no adverse
findings material to the rating analysis.

The collateral review of the mortgage portfolio also involves
reviewing loan-by-loan loss severity information on the
originator's sold repossessions, during which, the agency
determines the originator's experienced loss severity rate and
quick sale adjustment (QSA). Fitch received a limited sample of
loan-by-loan repossession data for 49 buy-to-let and 47 owner-
occupied properties. The calculated QSA was 6.2%, which is far
lower than Fitch's criteria assumptions, but this figure is based
upon '90-day' drive-by valuations, which are intended to
represent value of a property to be sold within 90 days after the
repossession date. Given the fairly limited size of the sample
provided, the agency assumed a QSA of 10%, which included a
cushion.

Overall and together with the assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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