TCREUR_Public/150813.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, August 13, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 159



PATERNOSTER HOLDING: Moody's Puts B1 CFR on Review for Downgrade


GREECE: Faces Two Years of Recession, ECB to Conduct Stress Tests


ANGLO IRISH: Ex-Chairman Launches Court Action to Avert Trial
DEPFA BANK: Fitch Withdraws B+ Rating on Subordinated Notes
MALLINCKRODT PLC: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Negative
SVG DIAMOND II: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa1


WIND TELECOMUNICAZIONI: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Positive


EXPOBANK AS: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3(cr)' CR Assessments




VIMPELCOM LTD: S&P Affirms 'BB' CCR & Revises Outlook to Positive


AK BARS BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Foreign Currency IDRs
KRAYINVESTBANK: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
NLMK: Moody's Retains Ba1 Rating on Weaker Q2 Financial Results
PROBUSINESSBANK JSCB: Bank of Russia Revokes Banking License
* RUSSIA: Central Bank Governor Steps Up Clamp Down on Banks


NATRA SA: Inks Bridge Financing Agreement, Posts EUR6.6MM Loss


UKRAINE: President OKs Improvements in Insolvent Bank Guidelines
UKREXIMBANK JSC: Fitch Raises LT Foreign Currency IDR to 'CCC'

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

LANDMARK MORTGAGES NO.2: Fitch Hikes Class D Debt Rating to 'CCC'
UNIVERSAL ENGINEERING: Faces Administration, 65 Jobs at Risk
* UK: Late Payments Put SMEs at Risk of Closure, Research Shows



PATERNOSTER HOLDING: Moody's Puts B1 CFR on Review for Downgrade
Moody's Investors Service placed the B1 corporate family rating
(CFR) and the B1-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR) of
Paternoster Holding III GmbH ("PH III" or "the Issuer"), the
(indirect) parent company of Wittur International Holding GmbH
(Wittur) under review for downgrade.  At the same time, Moody's
placed the B3 instrument rating of the Issuer's EUR225 million 8-
year Senior Notes and the Ba2 rating of the EUR195 million 7-year
Term Loan B (Term Loan) and the EUR65 million Revolving Credit
Facility raised by the Paternoster Holding IV GmbH ("PH IV"), a
fully owned subsidiary of the Issuer under review for downgrade
as well.

The rating action reflects the announcement that the company
agreed to merge with Sematic S.p.A. ("Sematic"), a supplier of
elevator components based in Northern Italy, for an undisclosed
sum.  Wittur has not disclosed the terms of the agreement and, in
particular, how it intends to fund the transaction.  However, the
rating agency expects that the proposed transaction could result
in an increase of the company's indebtedness, with the current
owners of Sematic retaining a minority stake in the combined
business.  Sematic manufactures and supplies elevators and
elevator components and had revenues of EUR 155 million in 2014,
according to Wittur.


The rating action is prompted by uncertainties surrounding the
funding of the envisaged acquisition of Semantic and its impact
on Wittur's capital structure, liquidity, operational flexibility
and business profile.  Based on the currently limited disclosure,
Moody's views the transaction as a potential limiting factor to
the achievement of the deleveraging targets factored in the
current ratings in a scenario where a material part of the
consideration were to be funded with incremental debt.

Wittur has delivered strong results in the first quarter of 2015.
In addition and according to available information, Moody's
expects the acquisition of Sematic to strengthen Wittur's
position in the outsourced elevator components market; improve
customer diversification via a more diversified customer base and
higher share of independents; increase geographic diversification
mainly via higher exposure to European aftermarket and
modernization business, and access to US markets.  Moody's
expects to conclude the rating review within the next three to
six months.  The acquisition of Sematic is expected to close in
the next six months, according to Wittur.

Moody's review will focus on (i) an evaluation of the funding
structure of the proposed transaction; (ii) Wittur's leverage and
liquidity position upon completion of the transaction; (iii) an
evaluation of the integration risk associated with the
transaction as well as related synergy benefits and improvement
in profitability to be expected from a Wittur and Sematic
combination; (iv) the impact of the acquisition on the business
risk profile of the company.  The review will also revisit the
company's financial policy including potential for additional M&A
activity in the near to medium term.  If a potential downgrade
was to be concluded after further review, the downgrade of
Wittur's B1 rating would likely be limited to one notch only.

Wittur's ratings could be downgraded as a result of (i)
deteriorating liquidity, (ii) material setbacks in achieving
targeted synergies; (iii) sustained negative free cash flow
(after dividends and capex) and (iv) any additional material
acquisition. Ratings could also be downgraded if Wittur's
leverage (as measured by Moody's Debt/EBITDA ratio) were expected
to exceed 5.5x in 2015 and/or 5.0x in 2016.

Upward pressure on the ratings could develop if Wittur's leverage
was expected to improve well below 5.0x on an ongoing basis
combined with material free cash flow generation translating into
a Free Cash Flow/Debt ratio (Moody's definition) above 10%.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Manufacturing Companies published in July 2014.  Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Based in Germany, Wittur is a private-equity-owned manufacturer
of elevator components.  The company produces and sells elevator
components such as automatic elevator doors, lift cars, safety
components, drives, elevator frames and complete elevators.
Wittur had revenues of EUR522 million in 2014 and around 3,250
employees.  In December 2014, funds advised and managed by Bain
Capital agreed to acquire Wittur from Triton and Capvis.  The
transaction was closed on March 31, 2015.


GREECE: Faces Two Years of Recession, ECB to Conduct Stress Tests
Stelios Bouras at The Wall Street Journal reports that Greece
faces two years of recession as it implements sharp budget cuts
and overhauls mandated by its EUR86 billion (US$94.97 billion)
international bailout program, European Union officials said on
Aug. 12, as Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras expressed
confidence the harsh deal would be completed.

The country's economy is expected to shrink 2.3% this year,
followed by a 1.3% contraction next year, the officials said,
citing the latest estimates from the institutions that have been
negotiating Greece's new aid program, including the European
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, the Journal relates.

European officials released the figures after the Greek
government and the bailout institutions agreed on a 29-page
document that sets out budget cuts and overhaul measures to be
implemented in the next three years, the Journal relays.  The
document, a copy of which has been seen by the Journal,
underlines the difficult battle ahead for the government in
Athens if it wants to hold on to the euro as its currency and pay
off its mounting debts.

By the end of Aug. 13, the Greek parliament needs to pass some 40
new laws, which will make it harder to retire early and easier to
dismiss workers, overhaul tax collection and public wages and
liberalize the country's energy market, to name just a few
examples, the Journal discloses.

Only once that is done will eurozone finance ministers decide
whether Greece can get a first slice of loans from the new
bailout in time to make a EUR3.2 billion payment to the ECB on
Aug. 20, the Journal notes.  The ministers are expected to meet
in Brussels on Aug. 14, the Journal discloses.

The bailout document doesn't set out a path for lifting capital
controls, which have forbidden transfers aboard and limited cash
withdrawals to EUR420 a week since the end of June, the Journal

However, some restrictions on withdrawals and transfers are
likely to remain in place for some time, the Journal notes. Of
the overall bailout, EUR25 billion has been set aside to
recapitalize Greece's banks, hurt by deposit outflows and bad
loans, the Journal notes.  The document says the ECB and the Bank
of Greece will conduct stress tests on the banks, with the aim of
recapitalizing lenders by the end of the year, the Journal

According to the Journal, a big part of the legislation Greece's
parliament has to implement this week and in the coming months is
related to overhauling the country's insolvency system, both for
households and businesses.


ANGLO IRISH: Ex-Chairman Launches Court Action to Avert Trial
Aodhan O'Faolain and Ray Managh at The Irish Times report that
former Anglo Irish Bank chairman Sean FitzPatrick has launched a
High Court action aimed at permanently preventing his trial
before Dublin Circuit Criminal Court from going ahead.

Mr. FitzPatrick is facing a number of charges including making a
misleading, false or deceptive statement to auditors and of
furnishing false information from 2002 to 2007, The Irish Times

The trial has been scheduled to begin on Oct. 5, however he
claims he cannot get a fair trial due to the large volume of
adverse publicity published and broadcast about him, The Irish
Times notes.

Last week, Circuit Court Judge Martin Nolan ruled that the trial
should proceed in October, after he rejected an application made
on behalf of the former banker from Greystones, Co Wicklow for an
adjournment, The Irish Times relays.

Lawyers for Mr. FitzPatrick, who has pleaded not guilty to 27
charges under the 1990 Companies Act, made the application due to
concerns over the publicity surrounding a recent, separate trial
of three Anglo officials, The Irish Times states.

Arising out of the refusal to put back his trial lawyers acting
for Mr. FitzPatrick on Aug. 12 launched High Court judicial
review proceedings against both the DPP and Judge Nolan, The
Irish Times discloses.

According to The Irish Times, Barrister Bernard Condon SC for
Mr. FitzPatrick said his client is seeking orders against the DPP
preventing his prosecution from continuing.  Mr. FitzPatrick also
seeks a declaration from the High Court that allowing his trial
to proceed is contrary to the concept of a fair trial under
Article 38 of the Irish Constitution, The Irish Times says.

In the alternative, Mr. FitzPatrick, who was not present in
court, is also seeking an order preventing his trial from going
ahead on Oct. 5, The Irish Times notes.

Mr. Justice Barton, as cited by The Irish Times, said he was not
prepared to hear Mr. FitzPatrick's application for permission to
bring his challenge in the absence of the other side.  The Judge
directed the application be heard by the High Court in the
presence of the DPP on Friday, Aug. 21, The Irish Times relates.

                        About Anglo Irish

Anglo Irish Bank was an Irish bank headquartered in Dublin from
1964 to 2011.  It went into wind-down mode after nationalization
in 2009.  In July 2011, Anglo Irish merged with the Irish
Nationwide Building Society, with the new company being named the
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC).

The former Irish bank sought protection from creditors under
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on Aug. 26, 2013 (Bankr.
D. Del. Case No. 13-12159).  The former bank's Foreign
Representatives are Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson.  Its
U.S. bankruptcy counsel are Mark D. Collins, Esq., and Jason M.
Madron, Esq., at Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., in Wilmington,

DEPFA BANK: Fitch Withdraws B+ Rating on Subordinated Notes
Fitch Ratings has maintained Ireland-based DEPFA BANK plc's
(DEPFA) and its subsidiary Depfa ACS Bank's Long-term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) on Rating Watch Negative (RWN) and
subsequently withdrawn the ratings.

Fitch is withdrawing the ratings as DEPFA has chosen to stop
participating in the rating process. Therefore, Fitch will no
longer have sufficient information to maintain the ratings.
Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical
coverage for DEPFA.


DEPFA's ratings reflect Fitch's view of a high probability that
FMS Wertmanagement (FMS WM, AAA/Stable), for as long as it
remains DEPFA's owner, and ultimately Germany, would provide
additional extraordinary support to DEPFA, if required, to ensure
that the bank's capital and funding needs are met in the course
of its orderly wind-down.

FMS WM, a wind-down institution, is controlled by Germany
(AAA/Stable) through the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund
(SoFFin). It took over DEPFA in December 2014 following the
German government's decision in May 2014 to stop the
privatization and to continue DEPFA's wind-down with FMS WM as
the new shareholder. DEPFA has not originated any new business
and has been effectively in wind-down since 2009.

Fitch's assessment of the high likelihood of state support for
DEPFA is mainly driven by its ultimate ownership by Germany and
the European Commission's (EC) state aid approval contingent on a
sale or, failing that, a wind-down of DEPFA. We also consider
Germany's limited financial incentive to force losses on senior
creditors due to DEPFA's small volume of senior unsecured debt.

DEPFA's ratings also reflect Fitch's view that Germany's
propensity to support in all circumstances is marginally weakened
by the bank's location in Ireland rather than Germany and its
immaterial relevance for the German economy and financial system.

Although DEPFA is subject to the EU's Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD), Fitch believes that it will not be
applied to DEPFA as long as its orderly wind-down progresses in
line with plans approved by the EC. However, should state aid be
required further to what has been approved by the EC, the bank
may be required to take resolution measures including some bail-
in of senior creditors. DEPFA's Short-term IDR of 'F2' is at the
higher of two possible levels that map to a 'BBB' Long-term IDR
on Fitch's rating scale. This reflects the fairly well-matched
maturities of the bank's assets and liabilities. It also reflects
our view that Germany's incentive for a bail-in of DEPFA's senior
unsecured creditors is especially low in the short-term.

The RWN reflects uncertainty about the next steps FMS WM will
take with DEPFA, in particular whether a detailed wind-down plan
exists that outlines the strategy and timing of the remaining
run-down of DEPFA's balance sheet and details the entity's
liquidation at the end of its wind-down process. We view a well-
articulated wind-down plan under FMS WM's stewardship as
particularly important as DEPFA's recurring operating losses
triggered by its run-down could entail significant bail-in risk
for its senior creditors. A liquidation including the transfer of
assets and liabilities to external third parties could create
risks for senior creditors.

The RWN also reflects the risk of new wind-down plans or any need
for recapitalization prior to completion of the wind-down
requiring new state aid approval from the EC, which could
escalate the pace of wind-down and potentially cause losses that
would require burden-sharing by senior creditors under SRM.

Fitch does not assign a Viability Rating because DEPFA's business
model focused on wind-down would not be viable without external

The alignment of DEPFA ACS Bank's ratings with those of its
parent reflects its high level of integration and our expectation
that FMS WM's support would flow through DEPFA to DEPFA ACS Bank.
It also reflects the reputational risk to Germany of allowing
DEPFA's subsidiary to fail. DEPFA ACS Bank benefits from a
declaration of backing from its parent, expressing DEPFA's
commitment to fulfill DEPFA ACS Bank's contractual obligations in
case of need. We understand from FMS WM that DEPFA ACS Bank will
remain fully owned by DEPFA and continue to be wound down in a
similar way to DEPFA.


The 'B+' rating of XS0229524128, a performing lower Tier 2 debt
security issued by DEPFA, reflects material credit risk if state
support is excluded and lack of financial flexibility for
subordinated instruments. The material short-term credit risk is
driven by potential bail-in of the bank's subordinated debt that
would be triggered by any additional state aid considerations
that may arise when FMS WM details its plans to wind down DEPFA.
The security matures in December 2015 and is the only performing
subordinated security rated by Fitch.

DEPFA's non-performing hybrid securities (DEPFA Funding II, III
and IV LP) are rated 'C' to reflect the non-payment of coupons.
FMS WM repurchased these securities from third-party holders at
prices between about 57% and 60% of their nominal values in May
2015. FMS WM has yet to communicate its intentions with regard to
the notes, in particular whether (and under which conditions) it
intends to transfer them to DEPFA at the repurchase prices to be
redeemed to strengthen DEPFA's capitalization. As long as the
securities remain outstanding, their coupons payments are highly
unlikely to be resumed given that DEPFA is in wind-down.


Not applicable

The rating actions are as follows:


Long-term IDR: 'BBB'/ Rating Watch Negative; withdrawn
Short-term IDR: 'F2'/Rating Watch Negative; withdrawn
Support Rating: '2'/ Rating Watch Negative; withdrawn
Support Rating Floor: 'BBB'/ Rating Watch Negative; withdrawn
Debt issuance program: 'BBB' and 'F2'/Rating Watch Negative;
Senior unsecured debt: 'BBB'/Rating Watch Negative; withdrawn
Market-linked securities: 'BBBemr'/Rating Watch Negative;
Subordinated notes (lower Tier 2, XS0229524128): 'B+/Rating Watch
Negative; withdrawn


Long-term IDR: 'BBB'/Rating Watch Negative; withdrawn
Short-term IDR: 'F2'/Rating Watch Negative; withdrawn
Support Rating: '2'/ Rating Watch Negative; withdrawn
Debt issuance program: 'BBB' and 'F2'/Rating Watch Negative;

DEPFA Funding II LP hybrid capital instruments (XS0178243332):
affirmed at 'C' and withdrawn

DEPFA Funding III LP hybrid capital instruments (DE000A0E5U85):
affirmed at 'C' and withdrawn

DEPFA Funding IV LP hybrid capital instruments (XS0291655727):
affirmed at 'C' and withdrawn

MALLINCKRODT PLC: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' corporate
credit rating on Dublin, Ireland-based Mallinckrodt PLC and
revised the outlook to negative from stable.

S&P will review the issue-level and recovery ratings when more
detail surrounding the financing plan and capital structure
becomes available.

"The rating affirmation reflects Mallinckrodt's recent financial
performance that is exceeding our expectations, giving the
company capacity to fund this acquisition which is larger than we
had factored into our prior expectations," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Michael Berrian.  The affirmation also reflects
S&P's belief that Mallinckrodt will be able to integrate Therakos
into its hospital-focused platform (that also includes products
Ofirmev and INOMAX), enhance cash flow generation, and deleverage
its balance sheet, albeit at a slower pace than S&P had
originally expected.  The incremental debt for Therakos results
in leverage of almost 5x by the end of 2016, up from 4.5x under
S&P's prior base case.  S&P also expects continued strong cash
flow generation, aided by Therakos, although S&P believes the
company's primary use of future cash flow is acquisitions instead
of debt repayment.

The negative rating outlook reflects risk to S&P's base case that
Mallinckrodt will not be able to reduce leverage to less than 5x
by the end of 2016 due to its aggressive acquisition strategy.
This is despite S&P's expectation of double-digit revenue growth,
modest margin expansion, and continued free cash flow generation.

S&P could lower the rating if there is a risk to the expected
improvement in the company's 2016 credit measures.  Such risk
could materialize if the company's operating performance
deteriorates due to increased competition, intensifying pricing
pressures, or disruptions to the integration process of recently
acquired businesses.  Operating performance deterioration that
results in slower revenue growth, and a 300 basis point to 400
basis point margin contraction could result in leverage being
sustained at more than 5x.  In addition, a continued aggressive
financial policy, manifesting through additional debt-financed
acquisitions resulting in over $1 billion in incremental debt
(without acquiring incremental EBITDA) would alter S&P's
expectation for the company's long-term leverage levels and could
lead to a lower rating.

S&P could revise the outlook back to stable if EBITDA growth
meets its base-case expectation and, when coupled with
accumulation of cash (or debt repayment), results in leverage
declining to less than 5x by the end of 2016.

SVG DIAMOND II: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa1
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by SVG Diamond Private Equity II

  EUR76.5 mil. B-1 Notes (currently EUR33.6M outstanding),
   Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 19, 2015, Upgraded to
   Baa3 (sf)

  US$40 mil. B-2 Notes (currently USD17.6M outstanding),
   Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 19, 2015, Upgraded to
   Baa3 (sf)

  US$47.8 mil. C Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
    Jan. 19, 2015, Affirmed B1 (sf)

  EUR43 mil. M-1 Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
   Jan. 19, 2015, Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

  US$20.3M M-2 Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
   Jan. 19, 2015, Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

SVG Diamond Private Equity II Plc, issued in February 2006 is a
private equity collateralized fund obligation backed by private
equity funds.  The portfolio is managed by Aberdeen SVG Private
Equity Advisers Limited.  This transaction is predominantly
composed of buyout funds.


According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes today
is primarily the result of an improvement in the
overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes pursuant to the
amortization of the portfolio.  Classes A-1 and A-2 notes were
repaid in full on the March 2015 payment date, whilst classes B-1
and B-2 notes amortized by approximately EUR58 million (or 56% of
its original balance).

Based on March 2015 financial information, the EUR156 million
outstanding notional of the rated notes are collateralized by a
private equity fund share portfolio valued in EUR379.2 million
and available cash of EUR51.3 million.  Moody's assessed the
coverage provided by the value of the underlying portfolio of
private equity fund shares (NAV) for each class of rated notes to
determine their credit strength, and measured the drop in NAV
that would lead to each class of rated notes realizing a loss.
The current NAV would need to decrease by approximately 83% for
the Class B notes to experience a loss over a 5 year horizon
after taking into account senior expenses and interest payments.

Based on the March 2015 financial information, available cash of
EUR51.3 million is sufficient to cover the reserve account
requirements (78.6 % of EUR51.9 million of unfunded commitments
and six months of senior expenses) leaving around EUR3.5 million
of excess cash to further redeem the class B notes. Per the June
2015 trustee report, cash had increased further to EUR83.7
million.  According to Moody's, the risk of a default on an
interest payment to the rated notes is remote.

The liquidity available to fund ongoing senior expenses, interest
payments and draw-downs on unfunded commitments is at an adequate
level.  Moody's analyzed the total amount of reported draw-downs
and distributions of the PE CFO since closing, which allows us to
also adjust our projections of draw-downs and distributions over
the coming years.  Given the seasoning of the underlying funds,
Moody's expects potential draw-downs to be low over the coming
years, and future distributions from the underlying funds to
continue at a steady pace as private equity funds exit their

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Private equity CFO income depends on the distributions coming
from its underlying investments in the multiple private equity
funds portfolio.  Over the life of the transaction, distributions
will be used to pay operating expenses, unfunded commitments (or
over commitments) and interest on the notes.  Therefore, the
amount and the timing of such distributions are key for the
performance and fulfillments of the fund's obligations.  If the
amount of net cash flow (i.e. distributions minus draw-downs on
unfunded commitments) is lower than expected or the distribution
is delayed, the rating may be negatively impacted, and vice

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's complemented its analysis by considering the aggregated
cash flow projection based on random Internal Rate of Return
(IRR) draws from the student-t distribution in combination with a
J-curve assumption on cash flow distributions.  For each
simulation, the aggregated cash-flows resulting from the asset
modelling is flushed into a simplified waterfall based on the
transaction's documentation.

Stress Scenarios:

In addition to the base case described above, Moody's also
considered a scenario whereby the value of the private equity
fund share portfolio dropped by 25%.  This scenario is supposed
to represent the potential impact of a sudden shock to the
economy. This run generated model outputs that were within one
notch of the base case model results.


WIND TELECOMUNICAZIONI: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Positive
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Wind
Telecomunicazioni SpA to positive from negative.  S&P also
affirmed the 'BB-' long-term corporate credit rating.

The outlook revision follows Vimpelcom's announcement that it has
reached an agreement to form a 50/50 joint venture with CK
Hutchison Holdings Ltd. that will combine their telecom
businesses in Italy -- Wind and 3 Italia.  S&P expects this
transaction to improve Wind's financial risk profile, with
adjusted leverage declining toward 5x, upon closing, from nearly
6x forecast at year-end 2015.  S&P also foresees meaningful
synergies between the two companies relating to networks,
marketing, sales, and overheads.  On a pro forma basis this
should support deleveraging to less than 4.5x adjusted debt to
EBITDA by 2018 and substantially improve Wind's free cash flow

Additionally, S&P thinks that the merger between the two
companies and the ensuing consolidation in the Italian wireless
market will likely support Wind's competitive position.  S&P sees
some potential for the competitive environment to become more
stable following the very fierce pricing competition that saw the
Italian telecoms market shed billions in revenue.

In S&P's view, the combined company would not only benefit from a
leading market share in the mobile market and increased operating
leverage, but also from a greater capacity to invest in its 4G
network coverage due to improved cash flow generation.  Overall,
S&P expects that it would assess the combined company as solidly
within its "satisfactory" business risk profile category.  That
said, S&P expects lower profitability for the combined entity due
to margin dilution from the less-profitable 3 Italia business,
and only gradually increasing EBITDA margins toward 40% through
the execution of the merger synergies.

S&P currently factors in one notch of support from Wind's owner
Vimpelcom, as S&P assess Wind as a "moderately strategic"
subsidiary under S&P's criteria.  After the merger closes, S&P
will reassess Wind's importance to its new shareholders based on
its understanding of the shareholders' long-term plans and
commitment to support the combined entity.

S&P's base case for Wind assumes:

   -- A revenue decline of about 3% in 2015. S&P anticipates that
      data growth will largely offset voice and SMS revenues
      decline.  Revenue decline of about 1%-2% in 2016.

   -- EBITDA margins falling by about 100-150 basis points due to
      declining revenues and the additional costs of the lease of
      the towers previously owned by Wind.

   -- A capex-to-sales ratio of 17%-18%, mainly reflecting
      continued investments in increasing long-term evolution

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Debt to EBITDA of 5.7x-5.9x at year-end 2015, declining to
      5.0x-5.2x post-closing in 2016;

   -- Pro forma leverage of less than 4.5x, assuming successful
      execution of merger-related synergies but noting that the
      full realization of all synergies could take until 2018;

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 10% in 2015,
      increasing toward 20% on successful realization of
      synergies; and

   -- Free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt of about 1%-2% in
      2015, increasing to 3%-4% in 2016 and about 10% upon
      completion of the integration with 3 Italia.

The positive outlook reflects the possibility that S&P could
raise the rating upon completion of the merger, depending on the
operating performance of Wind in the Italian telecoms market and
our assessment of Wind's importance to its new shareholders.

S&P could raise the rating if it sees the Italian wireless market
stabilizing, in line with our base-case scenario, and if S&P sees
meaningful deleveraging at the combined entity to about 4.5x by
year-end 2017 and FOCF to debt increasing to about 10%.

S&P may also raise the rating if it assesses Wind as at least a
"moderately strategic" subsidiary for its new shareholders.  S&P
would need a clearer picture from the new joint shareholders
regarding their long-term intentions and commitment to supporting
the joint venture, amid adjusted debt to EBITDA declining
sustainably to less than 5x and FOCF to debt reaching more than

S&P could revise the outlook back to stable if Wind continues to
post meaningful revenue declines in the mid-to-high single digits
over the next 12 months.  This could result from ongoing fierce
competitive price pressure, which could render S&P's base-case
deleveraging scenario less likely over the medium term.  Upside
may also be limited if Wind's capex remains very high over the
medium term as this would limit its deleveraging capacity and
FOCF to debt ratio.  Likewise, if S&P assess that neither of
Wind's shareholders view the combined entity as a strategic
asset -- that they would likely support -- S&P may revise the
outlook back to stable.


EXPOBANK AS: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3(cr)' CR Assessments
Moody's Investors Service assigned a long and short-term
Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessments) of Ba3(cr)/Not
Prime(cr) to AS Expobank, following the publication of Moody's
revised bank rating methodology on March 16, 2015.



CR Assessments are opinions of how counterparty obligations are
likely to be treated if a bank fails, and are distinct from debt
and deposit ratings in that they (1) consider only the risk of
default rather than expected loss and (2) apply to counterparty
obligations and contractual commitments rather than debt or
deposit instruments.  The CR Assessment is an opinion of the
counterparty risk related to a bank's covered bonds, contractual
performance obligations (servicing), derivatives (e.g., swaps),
letters of credit, guarantees and liquidity facilities.

In assigning the CR Assessment, Moody's evaluates the issuer's
standalone strength and the likelihood, should the need arise, of
affiliate and government support, as well as the anticipated
seniority of counterparty obligations under Moody's Loss Given
Failure framework.  The CR Assessment also assumes that
authorities will likely take steps to preserve the continuity of
a bank's key operations, maintain payment flows, and avoid
contagion should the bank enter a resolution.

The CR Assessment Moody's has assigned to AS Expobank is
positioned at Ba3(cr)/Not Prime(cr), which is one notch above
Expobank's baseline credit assessment (BCA).  While Moody's do
not incorporate any affiliate or government support in AS
Expobank's CR Assessment -- which is in line with our assumptions
for AS Expobank's deposit ratings -- the one-notch uplift
reflects our expectation that the volume of junior depositors
making up the bank's liabilities would provide a substantial
cushion against default on counterparties, even after assuming
significant deposit outflows prior to failure given that most of
the deposits can be withdrawn on demand.


Moody's assessment of a bank's stand-alone creditworthiness is
based on three components; (i) the macro profile which captures
the broad operating environment of the markets where the bank
operates, (ii) the financial profile, which looks at the
intrinsic credit characteristics of the institution and, (iii)
qualitative adjustments reflecting non-financial factors that
drive to the soundness of the financial institution.

Expobank's macro profile (score: 'Weak+') is based on the
geographical location of the bank's deposits, the bulk of which
ultimately originates from Russia and surrounding countries.
Russia's 'Weak+' macro score is driven by weak economic growth,
exacerbated by trade sanctions, and negative asset quality

Expobank's b1 baseline credit assessment (BCA) continues to
reflect the bank's profile, which combines high capitalization
with low credit risk and limited liquidity risk.  However,
earnings and profitability remain relatively unpredictable under
Expobank's business model, as the bank's customer base is narrow,
consisting predominately of Russian companies with international
operations that use Expobank for such transactions as foreign
exchange, payments and money transfers.  Moody's captures this
risk of volatility with a negative qualitative adjustment in our
scorecard.  Directionally, Moody's anticipates a gradual
improvement towards greater diversification of customers and
origins over time, as the bank is deliberately pursuing a
strategy to expand geographically.  It's latest move in this
direction was the opening of a representative office in Hong Kong
earlier this year.


Moody's could position Expobank's BCA at a higher level if the
bank were to (i) materially expand its active customer base, (ii)
widen its range of financial services, and (iii) diversify its
ownership structure.

Downward pressure on Expobank's BCA would likely arise from (i)
heightened credit counterparty risks, (ii) increased credit risk
from lending relative to its currently large equity base, (iii)
wider asset and liability mismatches and/or (iv) a capital
adequacy ratio near the 20% minimum set by the Latvian regulator.


Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of Mallinckrodt
International Finance S.A. including the Ba3 Corporate Family
Rating and the Ba3-PD Probability of Default Rating.  The rating
action follows the announcement that Mallinckrodt will acquire
Therakos, Inc. for $1.325 billion in cash.  The outlook is

Moody's will evaluate the impact, if any, on the instrument
ratings when the final financing terms are announced.

Moody's affirmed these ratings of Mallinckrodt International
Finance S.A.:

  Corporate Family Rating, at Ba3
  Probability of Default Rating, at Ba3-PD
  Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, at Ba1(LGD2)
  Senior Unsecured Notes (with subsidiary guarantees) at
    B1 (LGD4)
  Senior Unsecured Notes (without subsidiary guarantees)
    B2 (LGD6)
  Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating, at SGL-3
  The rating outlook is stable.


Moody's affirmation of the Ba3 Corporate Family Rating reflects
the overall modest impact that the acquisition of Therakos will
have on Mallinckrodt's credit profile.  With less than US$200
million of revenue, the Therakos assets will represent around 5%
of Mallinckrodt's total revenue, and the acquisition does not
significantly change Mallinckrodt's scale, diversity or business
risk profile.  Moody's forecasts that adjusted debt to EBITDA for
the fiscal year ending September 2015 will rise to 4.4x from
3.5x. These metrics are pro forma for the acquisitions of
Therakos and Ikaria (acquired in April 2015).  Moody's projects
debt to EBITDA will decline to the 4.0x range or below within the
next 12-18 months due to growth in EBITDA.  Further, the receipt
of approximately $270 million of divestiture proceeds from the
sale of the CMDS (Contrast Media and Delivery Systems) business,
as well as cash generation will also provide opportunities for

While the overall impact of the Therakos acquisition is modest,
the deal is credit negative as it comes just several months
following the close of the US$2.3 billion acquisition of Ikaria.
The rapid pace of acquisitions increases integration and
execution risk and also reduces transparency into fundamental
operating performance.  Further, Mallinckrodt's recent financial
results showed a marked slowing in growth of its main franchises,
raising questions about the company's ability to sustainably grow
acquired assets.  With little in the way of internal research and
development, Mallinckrodt must expand use of its existing
products in order to drive organic growth.

Mallinckrodt's Ba3 Corporate Family Rating is supported by the
company's significant scale and Moody's expectation of growth and
limited competitive threats in the company's key business areas,
which generally have high barriers to entry.  The rating is also
supported by Moody's expectation for strong cash flow, creating
the potential for rapid deleveraging.  However, Moody's
anticipates that cash flow will be deployed more towards the
acquisition of EBITDA-generating assets rather than debt

The Ba3 reflects the potential for operating volatility caused by
Mallinckrodt's high-risk nuclear products business and its
concentration of profits in Acthar and opioids, both of which
also carry exogenous risks.  In addition, the ratings are
constrained by Mallinckrodt's aggressive appetite for
acquisitions that will likely lead to increased leverage from
time to time, and risks inherent in a rapidly evolving business
strategy.  Given a limited internal research and development
pipeline, Moody's expects Mallinckrodt to pursue additional
acquisitions to drive growth. Further, Mallinckrodt tends to be
attracted to assets that it views as being "undervalued",
generally as a result of high perceived market risk.

The affirmation of the SGL-3 Speculative-Grade Liquidity Rating
reflects that the Therakos acquisition could place pressure on
Mallinckrodt's liquidity position if the company utilizes
substantial cash, revolver borrowings or other short-term debt as
part of the financing.

Moody's could upgrade the ratings if the company sustains good
organic growth and strong predictable free cash flow while
maintaining debt/EBITDA below 3.0x. An upgrade to Ba2 would also
require a significant improvement in liquidity.

Conversely, if Moody's expects Mallinckrodt to sustain
debt/EBITDA above 4.0 times the ratings could be downgraded.
This scenario could arise if Mallinckrodt faces an unexpected
decline in one of its key products or if the company pursues
additional large, debt-funded acquisitions.  Further, any
weakening of liquidity could lead to a downgrade.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Pharmaceutical Industry published in December 2012.

Luxembourg-based Mallinckrodt International Finance SA is a
subsidiary of Dublin, Ireland-based Mallinckrodt plc.
Mallinckrodt is a specialty biopharmaceutical and medical imaging
company. Revenues for the 12 months ended June 26, 2015 were
approximately US$3.5 billion.


VIMPELCOM LTD: S&P Affirms 'BB' CCR & Revises Outlook to Positive
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on The
Netherlands-headquartered global telecommunications operator
VimpelCom Ltd. to positive from stable.  The 'BB' long-term
foreign and local currency corporate credit ratings were

S&P also affirmed its 'BB' issue ratings on the group's senior
unsecured debt.  The '3' recovery ratings on this debt remain
unchanged, reflecting S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery in
the higher half of the 50%-70% range in the event of a payment

The action follows VimpelCom's Aug. 7, 2015, announcement of its
agreement to merge its fully owned Italian subsidiary Wind
Telecomunicazioni S.p.A. with CK Hutchison's subsidiary 3 Italia
S.p.A., through a 50/50 joint venture between VimpelCom and

The outlook revision primarily reflects the moderate improvement
S&P expects in VimpelCom's credit metrics post closing.  In S&P's
view, based on its deconsolidation of the Wind stake and its 50%
ownership in the new merged entity, VimpelCom's credit measures
should strengthen, given Wind's higher leverage relative to that
at VimpelCom, excluding Wind.  Moreover, S&P also anticipates
that Wind's leverage will diminish after the merger because 3
Italia SpA is less leveraged, and the combined entity should
unlock cost synergies over time.

At the same time, the transaction's positive financial
implications will likely be somewhat tempered by a drop in the
contribution of the Italian market to VimpelCom's total revenues
and EBITDA.  The deal will also reduce VimpelCom's geographic
diversity and increase its exposure to markets facing higher
country risks and challenging conditions currently, such as
Russia and Ukraine.  Still, S&P acknowledges that Wind's credit
quality stands to benefit from the transaction.

S&P anticipates under its base case that VimpelCom's total
revenues and EBITDA will likely contract by about 15%-20% year on
year in 2015, mainly owing to negative currency effects, as well
as generally sluggish conditions in Russia in the context of its
economic slowdown and the weak Russian ruble.

S&P continues to assess VimpelCom's business risk profile as
"satisfactory," albeit in the lower end of the category,
supported by its well-established operations in its key markets
in Russia and Italy and its diverse portfolio of assets, and
solid profitability.  These strengths are partly offset by
industry risks, exacerbated by regulation and competition (in
Russia, VimpelCom's market share is well below that of leader
MegaFon), and overall high country risks faced in the group's
geographic portoflio.

S&P continues to assess VimpelCom's financial risk profile as
"significant," constrained by its sizable debt.  This high debt
is partly offset by the group's positive free operating cash flow
(FOCF) generation and its possible gradual deleveraging.

Under S&P's base case, it assumes VimpelCom will post a weaker
operating performance in 2015 -- because of negative currency
swings and weak economic conditions -- followed by stabilization
in 2016. S&P factors in these assumptions:

   -- Organic declines of 1%-2% in Russia and about 3% Italy in

   -- A fall in dollar-denominated revenues of about 15%-20% year
      on year in 2015, exacerbated by a significantly lower
      average ruble-dollar exchange rate compared with 2014, and
      stabilization in 2016;

   -- An adjusted EBITDA margin of about 40%-41% in 2015-2016,
      compared with 42% in 2014;

   -- Capital expenditures (capex) to revenues at approximately
      20%-21% in 2015-2016;

   -- Very low dividends; and

   -- No acquisitions.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit metrics
for VimpelCom:

   -- Standard & Poor's adjusted debt to EBITDA of 2.9x-2.7x in
      2015-2016; and

   -- FOCF to debt of 5%-7% in 2015-2016.

The positive outlook on VimpelCom reflects the possibility that
S&P could raise the rating by one notch if it anticipates
sufficient strengthening in the company's credit metrics, after
factoring in some dilution of its business risk profile, assuming
the transaction closes and depending on its final parameters.  In
S&P's view, the completion of the announced transaction would
lead to adjusted debt to EBITDA below 2.0x in 2016, reflecting
the deconsolidation of Wind, and of about 2.5x pro forma for
VimpelCom's 50% stake in the joint venture.

To consider an upgrade, S&P would also take into account other
important factors, such as:

   -- VimpelCom's operating performance relative to its base-case

   -- S&P's view of VimpelCom's future financial policy;

   -- Any change in S&P's foreign currency sovereign rating on
      Russia, which could cap its rating on VimpelCom; and

   -- VimpelCom's ability to sufficiently strengthen its metrics
      to compensate for the slight dilution to its business risk
      profile that S&P expects post transaction.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if operating performance
falls short of S&P's anticipation, or if S&P considers that
future improvements in VimpelCom's metrics do not sufficiently
compensate other factors, such as our potentially weaker view of
its business risk profile.


AK BARS BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Foreign Currency IDRs
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term foreign currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) of Ak Bars Bank (ABB) and Almazergienbank
(AEB) at 'BB-'. The Outlooks are Negative.



ABB's and AEB's IDRs, National and senior debt ratings reflect
Fitch's view of potential support the banks may receive, in case
of need, from the regional authorities. At end-1H15, ABB was 51%
jointly owned by the Republic of Tatarstan (RT; BBB-/Negative)
and the RT-controlled Svyazinvestneftekhim (SINEK; BB+/Negative).
AEB is 87%-owned by the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) (Sakha; BBB-

Fitch's view of potential support is based on the majority
ownership, operational control over the banks (the authorities'
representatives sit on boards), and the track record of support
(including planned/received capital injections in August 2015).
For ABB, the ratings also consider the bank's significant (around
40%) market share in RT, and for AEB its limited size relative to
Sakha's budget.

Fitch expects ABB to receive a RUB9.8 billion equity injection
(equal to 32% of end-2014 equity) from the RT-controlled
President State Housing Fund in August 2015. As a result, the
stake held by RT and public sector bodies will increase to 64%,
reducing previous risks from the indirect non-transparent
ownership. ABB has also received RUB12.1 billion of Tier 2
capital from Russia's Deposit Insurance Agency. In July 2015, AEB
received a RUB0.9 billion equity injection (40% of end-2014
equity) from Sakha to support the bank's loan expansion, mostly
in the region's infrastructure projects.

However, Fitch views the probability of support as only moderate
in each case, and therefore notches down the banks' ratings from
their respective parents. The three-notch difference mainly
reflects Fitch's view that the local authorities have limited
financial flexibility to provide support in a necessary volume
and in a timely manner. The notching also reflects AEB's limited
systemic importance in its home region, while for ABB it reflects
corporate governance risks related to the bank's large related-
party and relationship lending and holdings of non-core assets
(equal to a combined 3.8x Fitch core capital (FCC) at end-2014),
which could make support costly and less politically acceptable.

The affirmation of the banks' National Long-term ratings with
Stable Outlooks reflects Fitch's view that the banks'
creditworthiness relative to other Russian banks would be
unlikely to change significantly in case of a downgrade of their
respective shareholders, as the ratings of RT and Sakha are
likely to change in tandem with the ratings of the Russian


ABB's 'b-' VR reflects weak asset quality, due to a significant
share of high-risk assets, tight and vulnerable capitalization,
and negative pre-impairment profitability. On the positive side,
the VR reflects stable funding and the bank's significant local

ABB reported 4% of non-performing loans (NPLs: loans over 90 days
overdue) and 1% of restructured loans at end-2014. NPLs were 1.6x
covered by reserves. However, asset quality is vulnerable due to
significant high-risk corporate or relationship lending and
investment property exposures (most of which are reported as
performing and not restructured) totalling RUB105 billion or 380%
of FCC at end-2014. The amount of high-risk exposures increased
notably relative to end-2013 due to new lending, revaluation of
foreign currency loans and Fitch's reassessment of the risks of
certain projects and the bank's relations with some borrowers,
which previously were considered lower risk and/or unrelated.

The exposures viewed by Fitch as high risk include:

-- RUB53 billion (1.9x of FCC) of weakly-secured loans to
    investment companies with weak financial profiles, some of
    which, in Fitch's view, could be used to conceal/refinance
    other problem and/or related party exposures.

-- RUB28 billion (1x of FCC) of long-term project finance
    construction projects in RT, which could be related to
    ABB/RT's administration.
-- RUB22 billion (0.8x of FCC) of other related-party loans
    and/or high risk exposures, including a relationship loan to
    a local electronics retailer, and weakly-performing
    wholesalers and development companies.
-- RUB13 billion (0.5x of FCC) of investment property/non-core
    assets, mostly comprising land and commercial real estate in

Fitch believes the nature and origination of these exposures are
risky and that their recoverability may be lengthy/questionable.
According to management, RUB27 billion of loans to investment
companies were repaid in 1H15, but Fitch believes these
repayments could have been partially refinanced through other
exposures. Also the bank's related-party exposure is likely to
have increased, as it refinanced a part of SINEK's USD250 billion
Eurobond due in August 2015.

Also of some concern was interbank placement of brokerage nature
of RUB11.5bn (0.4x of FCC) at end-2014, although, according to
management, this was repaid in 1H15.

ABB's capital is weak, as reflected by the low 6.8% FCC ratio at
end-2014, and is further undermined by the high-risk assets.
Fitch does not expect ABB's capital to improve significantly by
end-2015, as most of the upcoming RUB9.8 billion equity injection
will be consumed by losses (the RUB4 billion loss in 1H15 could
widen to RUB6 billion for full year 2015, according to Fitch's

Liquidity and refinancing risks seem manageable, as the bank had
RUB67 billion of highly liquid assets at end-1H15, which is
sufficient to repay the USD500 million eurobond in 4Q15. Customer
funding has been resilient during recent market stress, and is
viewed as fairly sticky by Fitch.


AEB's VR factors in the banks limited local franchise,
concentrated loan book, moderate profitability and
capitalization, but decent quality of the loan book and
reasonable liquidity supported by funding from quasi-sovereign

NPLs were moderate, at 6% of gross loans at end-2014, and around
9% were restructured. Loan impairment reserves fully covered the
NPLs. Fitch views the quality of the restructured loans as
moderate, as the loans are currently performing and reasonably
collateralized. According to management, around 30% of end-2014
NPLs were recovered during 1H15. The retail loan performance was
also satisfactory, supported by predominant lending to employees
of corporate clients and participation in government-subsidized
mortgage programs.

AEB's regulatory Tier 1 ratio was a solid 11.5% on August 1, 2015
(after a RUB900 million injection in July). Fitch considers that
the bank's capitalization is not under significant pressure from
asset quality, but may subsequently decrease gradually due to
planned rapid growth. The pre-impairment profitability of 4% of
average loans provides a moderate additional cushion.

Funding is supported by deposits from quasi-sovereign entities,
which are relatively stable. The refinancing risks are limited in
the near term. The bank's cushion of highly liquid assets was
sufficient to cover 17% of customer deposits at end-1H15.



ABB's and AEB's support-driven ratings could be downgraded if
either (i) their regional parents are downgraded; or (ii) the
propensity to provide support reduces, for example, as a result
of the manifestation of corporate governance risks in ABB or
progress with attraction of a new investor to AEB and the
subsequent dilution of Sakha's stake.

The Outlook on ABB could be revised to Stable, thereby
potentially reducing the notching between RT and ABB to two
notches, if the bank considerably reduces the amount of high-risk
assets or the authorities provide sufficient equity to offset the
risks associated with them. Upside potential for AEB's ratings is
limited due to Sakha's plan to dilute its stake in the bank.


Downward pressure on the banks' VRs could stem from a marked
deterioration in asset quality, resulting in capital erosion, in
the absence of appropriate support.

AEB's VR could be upgraded if the bank' capitalization and
franchise strengthens and profitability improves. An upgrade of
ABB's VR would require significant reduction of high-risk assets
and/or capital strengthening.


ABB's 'old-style' (without mandatory conversion triggers)
subordinated debt is rated two notches below its Long-term IDR.
The rating differential reflects one notch for incremental non-
performance risk (in Fitch's view, the risk of default on
subordinated debt could be moderately higher than on senior
obligations in a stress scenario) and one notch for potential
loss severity (lower recoveries in case of default). Any changes
to the bank's Long-term IDR would likely impact the subordinated
debt rating.

The rating actions are as follows:


Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BB-',
  Outlook Negative
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'A+(rus)', Outlook Stable
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BB-'
Senior unsecured debt National rating: affirmed at 'A+(rus)'

AK BARS Luxembourg S.A:

Senior unsecured debt long-term rating: affirmed at 'BB-'
Senior unsecured debt short-term rating: affirmed at 'B';
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'B'


Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB-',
  Outlook Negative
Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
National Long-term rating affirmed at 'A+(rus)', Outlook Stable
Viability Rating affirmed at 'b'
Support Rating affirmed at '3'

KRAYINVESTBANK: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'B/B' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Russia-
based Krayinvestbank.  The outlook is negative.  At the same
time, the 'ruBBB+' Russia national scale rating was affirmed.

S&P affirmed its ratings on Krayinvestbank based on S&P's
expectations that the bank will reduce its real estate exposure
and that the regional government will inject capital into the
bank in 2016, both of which S&P views as critical steps to
stabilizing the bank's business and financial profiles at a time
when economic and industry risks remain elevated in Russia.

The negative outlook reflects the challenges Krayinvestbank faces
due to the deteriorating operational environment in Russia, which
puts pressure on its capitalization and asset quality.

A negative rating action is likely if Krasnodar Krai's
administration fails to commence the capital injection process
before the end of 2015, since S&P considers capitalization will
continue to erode throughout 2015.  A decline in S&P's projected
RAC ratio to below 5%, owing to higher-than-expected credit costs
or losses stemming from the real estate assets, could also result
in a downgrade.

A positive rating action or revision of the outlook to stable is
likely only if S&P sees stabilization of the operational
environment in Russia.  Nevertheless, S&P may revise up its
assessment of Krayinvestbank's SACP by one notch if see that the
divestment from the real estate assets is successful, with
payments ultimately received in cash, and that it enhances the
bank's performance.

NLMK: Moody's Retains Ba1 Rating on Weaker Q2 Financial Results
Moody's Investors Service said that the Ba1 rating (negative
outlook) of NLMK, one the largest steel companies in Russia, is
unaffected by the company's weaker US GAAP financial results for
Q2 2015 quarter-on-quarter, which suffered from weak global steel
prices and a stronger rouble raising costs in US dollar terms.
Efficiency improvements partially offset these factors and the
company still has sufficient headroom within its current rating
category in terms of financial metrics.  Moody's expects the
company to maintain this headroom over the next 12-18 months.

Although NLMK's operating results improved in Q2 2015 due to
seasonally stable demand and a degree of flexibility in geography
of sales and product mix, the company's profitability was
negatively affected by ongoing weak global steel prices and the
appreciation of Russian rouble against the US dollar (the average
exchange rate for the rouble versus the US dollar was stronger by
20% in Q2 compared to Q1).  Exchange rates remain highly volatile
with the rouble's substantial depreciation against the US dollar
in H2 2014 (from RUB34 to RUB68) reversing in February-May 2015
(to RUB49) and then depreciating again (to RUB64) in early

Lower global prices for steel led to NLMK's revenue declining by
3% quarter-on-quarter to US$2.1 billion in Q2.  In the same
quarter the company's reported EBITDA declined by 25% quarter-on-
quarter to US$476 million, and its reported EBITDA margin fell to
22.3% (or by 6.5 percentage points quarter-on-quarter), as the
spreads between steel and raw material prices narrowed (NLMK
sources 100% of its coking coal and around 20% of its iron ore
externally).  In Q2, the cash cost of slab grew by 21% to $238
from $197 (per tonne) on a stronger rouble, which accounts for
almost 80% of costs, and higher raw material prices in rouble
terms in domestic market.  However, both EBITDA and its margin in
H1 2015 were stronger year-on-year (by 5% and 6 percentage
points, respectively), mainly because the positive effect of
rouble depreciation and cost cutting outweighed the negative
effect of global steel market weakening.

NLMK, which has one of the highest shares of revenue generated
from exports (62% in Q2, down from 64% in Q1) among its domestic
peers, is more exposed to reduced profitability on export sales
as the rouble strengthens.  To a certain extent, this was offset
by higher sales volumes to the domestic market (up 10% to 1.5
million tonnes) benefitting from higher domestic steel prices,
improved product mix and efficiency gains.  NLMK continues to
implement measures to improve operating efficiency, which
resulted in US$102 million in savings in H1 2015.

Moody's expects that in H2 2015 domestic steel price premium will
shrink, if not disappear, following the ongoing decline in global
steel prices, as domestic prices generally follow the global
market trends with a time lag of around a quarter.  However,
NLMK's EBITDA generation will be supported by the potentially
weaker rouble, the company's continuing efficiency improvement
efforts, high run rates and established export sales.  As a
result, Moody's expects that NLMK's leverage will not exceed 1.6x
Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA over the next 12-18 months (compared
with 1.4x at year-end 2014), which would remain fairly low for
NLMK's Ba1 rating.

Moody's expects that NLMK will maintain a solid liquidity profile
for the next 12-18 months, supported by US$1.4 billion of cash
and cash equivalents as at June 30, 2015, and access to undrawn
committed credit facilities of US$1.5 billion (almost half of
which is long-term), while short-term debt totaled US$550

NLMK's rating is currently constrained by the company's exposure
to the Russia's weakened credit profile, as captured by Moody's
downgrade of the sovereign rating and Russia's foreign-currency
bond country ceiling to Ba1 from Baa3 with negative outlook on 20
February 2015.  The company's credit profile remains subject to
the Russia's macroeconomic environment, despite high volume of
exports and substantial downstream assets in the US and Europe,
given that most of the company's production facilities are
located within Russia.

NLMK is one of Russia's leading vertically integrated steel
groups.  Based on volumes, the group is a leading global supplier
of slabs and transformer steel and one of the leading suppliers
to the domestic market of high value-added products including
pre-painted, galvanised and electrical steel as well as a variety
of long steel products.  In 2014, NLMK produced 15.9 million
tonnes of crude steel (2013: 15.4 million tonnes) and reported
US$10.4 billion in revenue (2013: $10.9 billion) and $2.4 billion
in EBITDA (2013: US$1.5 billion).  NLMK's key owner is Fletcher
Group Holdings Limited, beneficially owned by Mr. Vladimir Lisin,
chairman of the board of directors.  NLMK's shares are traded in
Russia on the Moscow Stock Exchange, and its global depository
receipts are traded on the London Stock Exchange.

PROBUSINESSBANK JSCB: Bank of Russia Revokes Banking License
Due to the non-compliance by the Moscow-based credit institution
OJSC JSCB Probusinessbank with federal banking laws and Bank of
Russia regulations, capital adequacy below 2%, decrease in equity
capital below the minimal amount of the authorized capital
established as of the date of the state registration of the
credit institution, taking into account the repeated application
over the past year of supervisory measures envisaged by the
Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank
of Russia)", and guided by Article 19, Clause 6 of Part 1 and
Clauses 1 and 2 of Part 2 of Article 20 of the Federal Law "On
Banks and Banking Activities", and Part 11 of Article 74 of the
Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank
of Russia)", the Bank of Russia took a decision (Order No. OD-
2071, dated August 12, 2015) to revoke the banking license
Probusinessbank of from August 12, 2015.

According to Bloomberg News' Olga Tanas and Anna Baraulina, the
Deposit Insurance Agency will hold a tender to choose a bank that
will acquire part of Probusinessbank's property and obligations.

The bank held about RUR27 billion (US$416 million) on individual
accounts as of July 1, Bloomberg relays, citing an analytical
center run by the news service Interfax.

* RUSSIA: Central Bank Governor Steps Up Clamp Down on Banks
Olga Tanas and Anna Baraulina at Bloomberg News report that Bank
of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina is escalating her battle
with banks deemed mismanaged or under-capitalized as part of her
campaign to clamp down on dubious capital transactions and
improve lending practices.

The regulator pulled the licenses of 13 banks last month, the
highest total since Ms. Nabiullina took office in June 2013,
Bloomberg relates.

The regulator, as cited by Bloomberg, said in a statement it
approved plans for the Deposit Insurance Agency to take part in
preventing the bankruptcy of several lenders that were controlled
by financial group Life.

According to Bloomberg, central bank data show the number of
operating lenders in Russia dropped to 741 at the end of June
from 894 two years earlier.

Ms. Nabiullina said June 4, the regulator revoked 145 licenses in
the last two and half years, including 27 in 2015, Bloomberg


NATRA SA: Inks Bridge Financing Agreement, Posts EUR6.6MM Loss
Reuters reports that Natra SA signed bridge financing for
EUR5.2 million (US$5.7 million) as part of the final operation in
a financial restructuring of the group.

The company on Aug. 6 said the financial restructuring contract
was signed by the creditors of the financing contract of 2013,
representing 100% of amount pending amortization and by 100% of
the creditors that provided financing in 2014, Reuters relays.

According to Reuters, Natra and the entities participating in the
financial restructuring will continue to work together on closing
the overall operation, which is expected to take place in the
coming months.

In a separate report, Reuters relates that Natra posted a net
loss of EUR6.6 million in the first half of 2015 compared to a
net loss of EUR11.4 million for the same period last year.  The
company reported net debt EUR163.6 million in the first half of
2015 compared to EUR153.63 million for the same period last year,
Reuters discloses.

Natra SA is a Spain-based holding company principally engaged in
the production and commercialization of cocoa derivates and
chocolate products.


UKRAINE: President OKs Improvements in Insolvent Bank Guidelines
Ukrainian News Agency reports that Ukrainian President
Petro Poroshenko has signed the law that improves the system of
individuals deposit guarantee and the withdrawal of insolvent
banks from the market.

According to Ukrainian News, in particular, the document provides
for establishing criminal responsibility for heads of a bank that
provide false information about depositors, as well as for
willful destruction of depositor databases; requiring banks to
maintain databases of depositors with the possibility of
generating daily information about them.

The document defines the powers of a National Bank of Ukraine-
appointed curator of a bank and prohibits a troubled bank from
using direct correspondent accounts, excluding accounts with the
National Bank of Ukraine, Ukrainian News discloses.

The document also tightens the requirements for classifying a
bank as an insolvent bank: failure by a bank to fulfill 2% of its
obligations to depositors and creditors over a period of five
days (previously 10% of obligations over a period of 10 days),
Ukrainian News notes.

The document extends the period of liquidation of a bank from
three to five years and reduces the period of external
administration of a bank from three months to one month from
2016, Ukrainian News says.

It accelerates the start of payment of the guaranteed
compensation to depositors in the event of liquidation of a bank
by reducing the period of creation and approval of a register of
depositors from three days to one day and from six days to three
days, respectively, Ukrainian News states.

UKREXIMBANK JSC: Fitch Raises LT Foreign Currency IDR to 'CCC'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded JSC The State Export-Import Bank of
Ukraine's (Ukreximbank) Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) to 'CCC' from 'RD' and senior unsecured debt rating
to 'CCC' from 'C'. The upgrades follow the completion of the
bank's external debt restructuring. A full list of rating actions
is at the end of this rating action commentary.



Fitch has downgraded the bank's Viability Rating (VR) to 'f' from
'ccc' and immediately upgraded the VR back to 'ccc'. The
downgrade to 'f' reflects the agency's view that the bank failed
when defaulting on (restructuring) its external debt. This view
is based on Fitch's understanding that the bank probably had
insufficient foreign currency liquidity to continue to service
its external debt -- in particular to repay its USD750 million
eurobond due on April 27, 2015 -- and so would likely have
defaulted because of weaknesses in its standalone credit profile,
even if a debt restructuring had not been imposed by the
Ukrainian authorities. The bank has not made full information
available to Fitch with respect to its foreign currency liquidity
position at the time of its default. However, on the basis of
available data the agency believes it is appropriate to denote
the bank as having failed.

The upgrade of the VR to 'ccc', and Long-term foreign currency
IDR and senior debt rating to 'CCC' reflects Fitch's assessment
of the bank's standalone profile following its external debt
restructuring. Specifically, the upgrade reflects reduced
refinancing risks, as the restructuring of the bank's eurobonds
(with a combined nominal value of USD1,475 million, or 23% of
end-1H15 liabilities under local GAAP) resulted in a significant
lengthening of the external debt maturity profile. At end-1H15,
the bank's foreign currency liquidity (comprising cash and
equivalents and short-term interbank placements) was comfortably
sufficient to meet near-term wholesale funding maturities,
although stability of the bank's highly dollarized deposit
funding is also key to maintaining FX liquidity.

The bank's VR and IDRs are also supported by (i) its reasonable
liquidity in local currency, underpinned by large holdings of
unpledged government securities eligible for refinancing with the
NBU (32% of end-1Q15 assets); (ii) generally sticky customer
funding, in part due to the presence of public sector corporates
(24% of liabilities) in the deposit base; (iii) reasonable 93%
reserve coverage of non-performing loans (NPLs; loans more than
90 days overdue; end-1H15: 35% of loans); and (iv) the bank's
compliance with the prudential capital requirements (end-1H15:
regulatory capital ratio of 12.1% vs. minimum level of 10%).

However, the ratings remain constrained by the highly stressed
operating environment, and resultant pressure on asset quality,
performance and capital. Downside risks to asset quality remain
high given large borrower concentrations, the material share of
FX-lending (74% of net loans) and sizable restructured/rolled-
over exposures (44% of the total), which are only modestly
provisioned. Recovery prospects will depend on the performance of
the domestic economy and improvements in external markets, as
many of these borrowers are exporters. The bank's asset quality
remains highly correlated with the sovereign's credit profile due
to the bank's large exposure to sovereign debt (end-1Q15: 10x
Fitch Core Capital, FCC; this is all domestic debt, both FX and
UAH-denominated, and so not part of the expected restructuring)
and public sector more generally (4x FCC).

Loss absorption capacity is limited. At end-1H15, the bank could
have increased its impairment reserves by 2% only without
breaching regulatory capital requirements. The bank's (core) Tier
1 ratio was a weak 6.8% at end-1H15, with overall regulatory
solvency relying significantly on subordinated debt. Pre-
impairment profit was negative in 2014-1Q15, meaning that
Ukreximbank is likely to need further capital support if
performance does not improve and asset quality remains under


The bank's Support Rating '5' and Support Rating Floor of 'No
Floor' reflect Fitch's view of the Ukrainian authorities' still
limited ability to provide support to the bank, in particular in
foreign currency, in case of need, as indicated by the
sovereign's 'CC' Long-term foreign-currency IDR. However, the
propensity to provide support to the bank remains high, in our
view, in particular in local currency, given the bank's 100%-
state ownership, policy role, high systemic importance, and the
track record of capital support for the bank under different


Ukreximbank's subordinated debt rating has been affirmed at 'C',
the lowest possible issue rating. The two-notch differential
between the bank's VR of 'ccc' and the subordinated debt rating
of 'C' reflects one notch for incremental non-performance risk
(resulting from the flexibility to defer coupons in certain
circumstances, for example if the bank reports negative net
income for a quarter) and one notch for potentially weaker
recoveries due to the instrument's subordination.



The bank's VR, IDRs and senior debt ratings would not
automatically be downgraded in case of a further sovereign
downgrade/debt restructuring, as the bank's low ratings already
reflect very high levels of credit risk. However, the bank's IDRs
and debt ratings could be downgraded in case of transfer and
convertibility restrictions being imposed, which would restrict
its ability to service its obligations. The VR, IDRs and debt
ratings could also be downgraded if the sovereign defaults on its
domestic FX debt, as this may result in the acceleration of the
bank's external debt, which in Fitch's view it would be unlikely
to be able to redeem.

The bank's ratings are also likely to be downgraded if further
deterioration in asset quality results in capital erosion,
without sufficient support being provided by the authorities, or
if deposit outflows sharply erode the bank's liquidity, in
particular in foreign currency. Stabilization of the sovereign's
credit profile and the country's economic prospects would reduce
downward pressure on the ratings.


The SR could be upgraded and the SRF revised upwards if Fitch
markedly revises its view of the authorities' ability to provide
timely support to the bank, in particular, in foreign currency.
However, this is unlikely in the near term, given the country's
weak external finances and expected sovereign external debt


The rating could be upgraded in case of an upgrade of the bank's

The rating actions are as follows:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'CCC' from 'RD'
Senior unsecured debt of Biz Finance PLC: upgraded to
'CCC'/Recovery Rating 'RR4' from 'C'/'RR4'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'C'/'RR5'
Short-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'C' from 'RD'
Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Viability Rating: downgraded to 'f' from 'ccc'; upgraded to 'ccc'
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA-(ukr)'; Outlook Stable

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

LANDMARK MORTGAGES NO.2: Fitch Hikes Class D Debt Rating to 'CCC'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded seven tranches of Landmark
transactions, and affirmed nine others.

The affected transactions are Landmark Mortgages Securities No.1
Plc (LMS 1), No.2 (LMS 2) and No.3 (LMS 3), three UK non-
conforming transactions backed by mixed pools originated by Amber
Home Loans, Infinity Mortgages and Unity Homeloans. A full list
of rating actions follows at the end of this rating action


Strong Credit Enhancement (CE)

These transactions closed in 2006 (LMS 1) and 2007 (LMS 2 and 3)
and are now well-seasoned. As a result CE has built up through
note amortization, resulting in today's upgrades. In addition,
each transaction has a non-amortizing and fully funded reserve
fund (RF), providing 5.7%, 1.7 and 4.1% of CE for LMS 1, 2 and 3
respectively. For LMS 3, the RF is only back at target since July
2015, for the first time in seven years. Note amortization
switched to pro rata for LMS 2, which has accelerated CE growth
for the non-senior notes.

In addition, each transaction has a liquidity facility (LF) that
can no longer amortize following a breach in cumulative loss
triggers. Although the LF no longer provides CE, it still boosts
liquidity across the structures.

Decreasing Arrears Supported by Repossessions

Delinquent loans have been falling in all three transactions with
the portion of loans in arrears by more than three months down at
14.7%, 13% and 6.7% for LMS 1, 2 and 3 respectively as of end-
June 2015, from 19.6%, 17.8% and 9.2% a year ago. However, this
drop is mostly due to an increase in repossession rather than
loans returning to performing status. Cumulative repossessions
are above the Fitch Non-Conforming (NC) index (10.48%) at 15.6%,
19.4% and 14.3% respectively in LMS 1, 2 and 3. Combined with
fairly high loan-to-values (LTVs), this results in larger-than-
average cumulative realised losses at 4.3%, 7.1% and 5.8% for
each of the deals. However, the weighted average loss severities
across all three transactions are stable, ranging from 28.2% (LMS
1) to 41% (LMS 3).

Interest-only Loan Concentration

The transactions all have a large portion of interest-only (IO)
loans (82.4% for LMS 1, 86.7% for LMS 2 and 90.7% for LMS 3) and
a concentration of more than 20% of IO loans maturing within a
three-year period. As per criteria, Fitch carried out a
sensitivity analysis assuming a 50% increase in default
probability for these loans and found that such stresses do not
result in sharp downgrades, due to the protection provided by
current CE levels.

LMS 3 Capped

Following the downgrade of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) on 19 May
2015, the bank can only support a 'Asf'-rating as a direct
support counterparty, as is the case in LMS 3. The highest rating
across LMS 3 is currently 'Asf', and the cap has no rating impact
on any of the rated tranches.


As most of the performance indicators remain worse than the Fitch
NC index, further deterioration could impact weighted average
foreclosure frequency and weighted average recovery rate numbers
and trigger negative rating actions.

In the case of LMS 3, further downgrade in RBS's rating would
lower the current 'Asf' cap and trigger negative rating actions.


No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


The model below was used in the analysis. Click on the link for a
description of the model.

EMEA RMBS Surveillance Model

Landmark Mortgage Securities No.1 plc:

Class Aa (XS0258051191): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
Class Ac (XS0260674725): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
Class B (XS0260675888): upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
Class Ca (XS0258052165): upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
Class Cc (XS0261199284): upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
Class D (XS0258052751): upgraded to 'B+sf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook

Landmark Mortgage Securities No.2 Plc:

Class Aa (XS0287189004): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
Class Ac (XS0287192727): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
Class Ba (XS0287192131): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
Class Bc (XS0287193451): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
Class C (XS02871922141): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
Class D (XS0287192644): affirmed at 'CCC'; Recovery Estimate (RE)

Landmark Mortgage Securities No.3 Plc:

Class A (XS1110731806): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
Class B (XS1110738132): upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
Class C (XS1110745004): upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook
Class D (XS1110750699): upgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate (RE) 60%.

UNIVERSAL ENGINEERING: Faces Administration, 65 Jobs at Risk
ITV reports that Universal Engineering Ltd. is likely to go into
administration, placing 65 jobs at risk.

According to ITV, the company says its attempts to diversify and
develop new business have proven unsustainable because of the
decline in the oil and gas industry.

Six months ago the company announced a GBP2 million investment
was being made by the Welsh Government and the creation of 200
jobs in Llantrisant, ITV recounts.

Universal Engineering Ltd. is an engineering firm based in
Rhondda Cynon Taf.

* UK: Late Payments Put SMEs at Risk of Closure, Research Shows
Tungsten Corporation plc on Aug. 10 disclosed that nearly a
quarter of all small and medium sized businesses in the UK are
facing a potential financial crisis due to late payment of
invoices, according to newly published research.

The average SME is owed GBP40,857 in unpaid invoices, a survey by
Tungsten Corporation revealed, with GBP20,937 of that total

When applied across the UK's 5.2 million SMEs, the total owed
could be as much as GBP212 billion.

Richard Hurwitz, CEO at Tungsten, said: "These figures are a
telling reminder of the challenges faced by SMEs in this country.
An unpaid invoice can mean the difference between a successful
month of trading and a dangerous financial shortfall.  In the
worst case it could lead to insolvency."

Of the 1,000 companies surveyed, 23% responded that late payments
have put them at risk of closure.  The issue was most acute in
the technology sector, where almost a third of all businesses
(32%) had been impacted financially by late payments from

The survey results suggest that the issue spans customer sizes
and types, with 22% of those surveyed saying most of their late
payments were from large businesses, 11% pointing to medium-sized
firms and eight per cent identifying the public sector as being
responsible for late payments.  Some 33% of businesses surveyed
said that there was no clear pattern.

Mr. Hurwitz continued: "The creation of the new role of Small
Business Commissioner shows that the government is taking the
problem seriously, but it's clear that there's work still to be
done to ensure that SMEs are paid in a timely fashion."

"There are many reasons for late payment.  Sometimes buyers will
wait until the last day before the invoice is due only to tell
their supplier that it is missing vital information.  This
creates unnecessary delays.  Advances in technology mean that
many payments can now be processed electronically, which ensures
invoices have all the necessary information, but e-invoicing was
only used by a quarter of the small businesses we spoke to.

"Late payment is a problem to which there are simple, effective
solutions," Mr. Hurwitz added.  "If companies adopt a modern
approach and investigate alternative finance options, coupled
with ongoing government support, we can make these business
practices a thing of the past."

               About Tungsten Corporation plc

Tungsten Corporation (LSE: TUNG) accelerates global trade by
enabling customers to streamline invoice processing, improve
cash-flow management and make better buying decisions from their
detailed spend data.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *