TCREUR_Public/150814.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, August 14, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 160



MEINL BANK: Fitch Lowers Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'


TEREOS UNION: Fitch Publishes 'BB' Issuer Default Rating


FORCE TWO: Moody's Withdraws 'C' Ratings on Two Note Classes
IMTECH DEUTSCHLAND: Insolvency Administrator in Talks to Get Loan
TALISMAN-4 FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Ratings on 7 Note Classes


GREECE: Lenders to Review Latest Bailout in October


MECCANICA HOLDINGS: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' CFR, Outlook Stable


KAZKOMMERTSBANK: Fitch Lowers IDRs to 'B-', Outlook Negative


ROYAL IMTECH: Declared Bankrupt, Mulls Sale of Marine/Nordic Unit


AK BARS: Fitch Corrects August 11 Rating Release

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ANGLESEY: Goes Into Administration Following Financial Woes
BOWOOD FARMS: Enters Administration, Ceases Trading


* BOOK REVIEW: BOARD GAMES - Changing Shape of Corporate Power



MEINL BANK: Fitch Lowers Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Austria-based Meinl Bank AG's Long-
Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B-' from 'B' and its
Viability Rating (VR) to 'b-' from 'b'.  Both ratings have been
placed on RWN.

The rating action reflects Fitch's view that the bank's franchise
will likely weaken as a result of the request by the Austrian
Financial Market Authority (FMA) to replace the bank's two
management board members within three months.  The RWN reflects
the possibility that further regulatory action could damage the
bank's viability further.



The downgrade primarily reflects Fitch's view that Meinl Bank's
management and strategy are under pressure from regulatory
demands to replace its management board and put in place remedial
action following a regulatory review completed in July 2015.  The
review identified serious shortcomings at the bank and the FMA
has expressed concerns about the management board's ability to
run the bank according to regulatory requirements.

The RWN reflects Fitch's view that the bank's viability could
become uncertain if it fails to meet the regulatory demands,
which could put its banking license at risk.  Fitch believes that
it will be challenging for a bank of Meinl Bank's size to
implement the necessary corrective actions quickly.  The RWN also
reflects uncertainty about the potential need to adapt the bank's
business model to fulfill the FMA's requirements.

Fitch believes that the outcome of the review has potential
negative implications on Meinl Bank's franchise.  Even if the
bank's owners manage to appoint a suitable management team within
the next three months, we expect the necessary corrective actions
to divert significant management capacity from day-to-day
operations in the short term.

Given that the bank's resources are already limited, potential
adverse reactions from clients could require heightened
management attention to defend the bank's franchise.  The
departure of the bank's long-standing board members, who have
been instrumental in building up relationships with business
partners, could permanently erode the bank's client base.

The reputation risk resulting from the FMA's allegations could
create substantial pressure on revenues, and operating expenses
are likely to rise as the bank will likely have to increase
investments in systems and controls.  This would further burden
the bank's weak performance, which is weighed down by recurring
litigation issues over the past few years.


The affirmation of the Support Rating at '5' and Support Rating
Floor at 'No Floor' reflects our view that the EU's Bank Recovery
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution
Mechanism (SRM) are now sufficiently progressed to provide a
framework for resolving banks that is likely to require senior
creditors participating in losses, if necessary, instead of or
ahead of a bank receiving sovereign support.

BRRD, which was implemented into Austrian legislation with effect
from 1 January 2015, includes minimum loss absorption
requirements before resolution financing or alternative financing
(eg, government stabilization funds) can be used.  Austria is one
of the first EU countries to have implemented the BRRD's bail-in



Fitch expects to resolve the RWN once there is more clarity on
the bank's measures and timing to implement the FMA's
requirements. Failure to do so is likely to trigger a downgrade,
potentially by more than one notch, particularly if the
withdrawal of the bank's license becomes likely and if Fitch
believes that this would put the bank's senior creditors at risk.

The ratings could be affirmed at the current level if the bank
manages to comply with the regulator's requirements and clarifies
its management structure, particularly if the FMA's intervention
results in more robust organization, risk management, corporate
governance and adherence to regulatory requirements.

Moreover, an affirmation would be contingent on concrete
indications that the bank's franchise has suffered no lasting
damage as a result of the negative publicity surrounding the
FMA's intervention.


Any upgrade of the Support Rating and upward revision of the
Support Rating Floor would be contingent on a positive change in
the sovereign's propensity to provide support.  This is highly
unlikely in our view.

The rating actions are:

Meinl Bank AG

  Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'B-' from 'B' and placed on RWN
  Short-term IDR: 'B' placed on RWN
  Viability Rating: downgraded to 'b-' from 'b' and placed on RWN
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'


TEREOS UNION: Fitch Publishes 'BB' Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has published French sugar company Tereos Union de
Cooperatives Agricoles a Capital Variable's (Tereos) Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB' with Stable Outlook.  Fitch
has also published its senior unsecured rating of 'BB' on Tereos
Finance Group 1's EUR500 million bond due 2020.

The IDR of 'BB' reflects Tereos's strong business profile that is
offset by its weak credit metrics.  The company's strong market
position is supported by well-invested assets, access to some of
the higher-yielding sugarbeet regions in Europe and
diversification in terms of geography and raw materials
processed. The cooperative ownership profile also contributes to
Tereos's conservative financial policies.

The current low point in the price cycle of the world sugar
market, which is compounded by a transition to a new pricing
environment in the European Union, results in a challenging
operating environment for the sector.  Therefore the ratings
factor in our expectation that Tereos's credit metrics will
bottom out in the financial year ending March 2016 (FY16) before
gradually recovering thereafter.


Strong Business Profile

Tereos's IDR is underpinned by the company's strong business
profile for the 'BB' category, both in operational scope and
position in commodity markets with potential for long-term
growth. At its core, Tereos is a top three player in the European
sugarbeet industry.  Due to its strong market shares and cost
competitiveness, Fitch expects the group to benefit from the
post-2017 deregulated European sweeteners market.  Geographic and
product diversification as well as efforts to increase efficiency
also support Tereos's business risk profile.

Successful Diversification: Sugarcane and Cereals

Tereos's diversification into the highly cost competitive
Brazilian sugar market and into cereals through its 69%-owned
subsidiary Tereos Internacional (TI; 55% of FY15 group EBITDA)
should aid resilience against the current downward commodity
cycle.  The Brazilian sugarcane operations have benefited from a
large capacity and efficiency investment program, which Fitch
expects to boost the unit's contribution to group EBITDA and cash

The company's cereals unit revenues and profits (17% of FY15
group EBITDA) is exposed to muted performance over the next three
years due to the challenging European sweetener and ethanol
markets environment.  However, the unit should see lower
volatility as a result of the ongoing cost savings measures,
improved raw materials and geographical diversification and an
increased sales mix towards higher-margin products.

European Sugar Price Adjustment

Similar to other European sugar processors, Tereos's European
sugarbeet business has suffered a sharp contraction.  Its EBITDA
more than halved between FY13 and FY15, following a steep decline
in EU quota sugar prices largely linked to the intervention of
the European Commission in 2013.

Fitch believes the end of the European sugar quota regime in 2017
will cause quota sugar prices to converge towards international
prices, which Fitch expects to only marginally recover from their
current low levels over the next two to three years as global
stock-to-use ratios slowly decline.  In this context, the 'BB'
rating factors in our expectation that Tereos's consolidated
EBITDA will decrease by approximately 40% to 50% between FY14 and
FY16 (FY15 vs. FY14: down 38%).

European Sugar Export Cap

European sugar processors currently are unable to compensate low
prices with increases in sales volumes due to stagnant European
demand and regulatory constraints on foreign exports until
September 2017.  However, as the third-largest European sugarbeet
player and one of the most efficient, once the cap is lifted,
Tereos should benefit from its ability to source increased
volumes of sugarbeet from some of the most efficient farmers in
Europe and expand its sales volumes in Europe and via exports.

Expected Profit Trough

Tereos's underlying profitability, measured as readily marketable
inventories (RMI)-adjusted EBITDA/gross profit (thus eliminating
price fluctuations), should remain below 40% until at least FY17
due to volume constraints in its sugarbeet division.  Beyond
2017, Tereos's profitability should benefit from management's
ongoing initiatives to improve the group's competitiveness and,
with the removal of the EU sugar regime, better flexibility on
sugar beet prices as well as sugar production growth in Europe.

Beyond these considerations, Fitch believes that the extent of
the recovery of the company's European and international EBITDA
generation capacity remains partly reliant on the final
configuration of the European sweeteners industry and the timing
and pace of recovery in world sugar prices.

Weak Credit Metrics; Anticipated Improvement

Fitch projects Tereos's RMI-adjusted funds from operations (FFO)
gross leverage to peak in FY16, at above 5.0x (FY15: 4.8x) as a
result of reduced FFO and RMI value, in conjunction with limited
scope for debt reduction.  Fitch also expects negative annual
free cash flow (FCF) until FY17 as subdued profits would not be
fully offset by an expected decline in capex driven by the end of
the sugarcane and cereals investment cycles.

Although the expected deterioration would not be consistent with
the current IDR, Fitch expects Tereos's credit metrics to
subsequently improve on a combination of a modest upturn in
commodity prices, a strengthened business profile and an increase
in sugar export volumes.  Fitch expects FCF to turn neutral to
positive from FY18 and RMI-adjusted FFO gross leverage to
decrease to below 4.0x in the same year, consistent with levels
for a 'BB' rating.

Adequate Financial Flexibility

Tereos's weak credit metrics is partially mitigated by adequate
financial flexibility.  The latter is supported by strict
financial discipline in shareholder distributions and M&A
spending, adequate liquidity management and healthy RMI-adjusted
FFO fixed charge cover throughout the downward commodity cycle.

Since the recent downturn in sugar prices, cooperative owners
have demonstrated their financial support to Tereos by accepting
a sharp reduction in price complements (which Fitch treats as
dividends) to EUR5 million paid cash in FY15 from EUR57 million
in FY14.  Fitch assumes these will remain subdued so long as
sugar prices are low.

Tereos's weak internal liquidity score, defined as unrestricted
cash + RMI + accounts receivables divided by total current
liabilities (0.7x at FYE15), is compensated by comfortable access
to diversified sources of external funding.  Fitch expects
Tereos's RMI-adjusted fixed charge cover to reach a low point in
FY16 at 3.7x (TI: 3.2x).  These levels remain comfortable for the

Parent-Subsidiary Linkage

Despite limited but growing operational and financial
integration, Tereos France's (TF) and Tereos's influential
control as well as their legal and strategic ties with TI are
very strong, making the parent and its subsidiary intrinsically
linked.  The development of TI has been promoted by Tereos's
cooperative owners through their financial support.  This signals
a strategy to allocate resources towards international
diversification while enabling greater resilience against
increasingly volatile commodity markets.

Senior Unsecured Rating Aligned with IDR

The 2020 EUR500 million senior unsecured notes issued by Tereos
Groupe Finance 1 are guaranteed on an unsecured basis by Tereos,
and are therefore subject to structural subordination not only to
debt at TF but also at the TI level.  TI's debt is non-recourse
to TF's assets; therefore Fitch excludes it from the amount of
debt ranking above the senior unsecured notes in the payment
waterfall in case of default.

However, due to cross-default provisions linking together the
debt of TI's subsidiaries, TI, TF and Tereos, Tereos's senior
unsecured notes' rating depends not only on TF's and Tereos's
probability of default and the potential level of debt ranking
ahead of them, but also on TI's probability of default.

Average Recovery Prospects

Due to the strong linkages between TF, Tereos and TI, the senior
unsecured notes rating is derived from the consolidated group's
IDR of 'BB'.  Usually, for issuers rated in the 'BB' category (a
transitional territory between investment-grade and highly
speculative), prior-ranking debt constituting 2x-2.5x EBITDA
indicates a high likelihood of subordination and lower recoveries
for unsecured debt.

Although Fitch expects a sharp fall in EBITDA from the sugarbeet
business, the rating agency believes the level of senior secured
(or other form of prior-ranking) debt leverage at TF is unlikely
to rise beyond 2.0x within the next three years.  Fitch believes
TF (or Tereos) is unlikely to increase its debt to support other
group entities.  In addition, existing committed debt ranking
ahead of the senior unsecured notes relates to TF's EUR400
million revolving credit facility (RCF), which exclusively funds
working capital needs throughout the year.  Based on historical
intra-year working capital needs, average intra-year outstanding
RCF amounts are unlikely to rise beyond 2.0x TF's EBITDA.
Therefore the senior unsecured notes are rated at the same level
as the group's IDR.


Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer

   -- Further decrease in revenues in FY16 mainly driven by
      falling European sugar prices and weakening of the
      Brazilian real against the euro.

   -- Profit trough (EBITDA margin around 8.5%) in FY16, and
      gradual improvement thereafter.

   -- Annual capex at between EUR300 million and EUR350 million.

   -- Low price complements (dividends) paid to cooperative
      members so long as sugar prices stay low.

   -- Mildly negative FCF annually over FY15-FY17; consistently
      positive from FY18.


Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

   -- Strengthening of profitability (excluding price
      fluctuations), as measured by RMI-adjusted EBITDAR/gross
      profit, reflecting reasonable capacity utilization rates in
      the sugarbeet business and overall increased efficiency

   -- At least neutral FCF while maintaining strict financial

   -- FFO gross leverage (RMI-adjusted) consistently below 3.5x
      at Tereos group level and 4.0x at TI level.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Inability to sustainably maintain cost savings derived from
      its efficiency programs or excessive idle capacity in
      different market segments, leading to RMI-adjusted
      EBITDAR/gross profit remaining weak

   -- Inability to return to a level of approximately USD0.5bn
      consolidated FFO (FY15: USD422m) and to improve
      profitability and cash flow generation

   -- Reduced financial flexibility reflected in FFO fixed charge
      cover (RMI-adjusted) below 3.0x,

   -- FFO gross leverage (RMI-adjusted) sustainably above 4.5x at
      Tereos group level (5.0x at TI level).


FORCE TWO: Moody's Withdraws 'C' Ratings on Two Note Classes
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings of two
classes of notes issued by Force Two Limited Partnership:

   EUR11.9 million D Notes (currently EUR9.8M outstanding),
   Withdrawn (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2013 Downgraded to
   C (sf)

   EUR9.7 million E Notes, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Nov 29,
   2013 Downgraded to C (sf)

Force Two Limited Partnership, issued in May 2007, is a German
SME cash-flow collateralized debt obligation backed by a static
portfolio of German profit participations ('Genussrechte')
scheduled to mature in January 2014.

IMTECH DEUTSCHLAND: Insolvency Administrator in Talks to Get Loan
Maria Sheahan at Reuters reports that Imtech Deutschland's
insolvency administrator said the insolvency of Royal Imtech's
German arm last week was triggered by the parent company's
failure to pay the unit EUR21 million (US$23 million) it owed.

Royal Imtech filed for protection from its creditors on Aug. 11,
five days after the German unit made a similar filing,
overwhelmed by accounting fraud in Germany that triggered three
years of operating losses and major asset writedowns, Reuters

"Due to the Dutch company's current financial problems and the
protection from creditors it has filed for we do not expect this
outstanding payment can be realised promptly," Reuters quotes
Peter-Alexander Borchardt of Hamburg-based law firm
Reimer Rechtsanwaelte, as saying in a statement on Aug. 12.

Mr. Borchardt, as cited by Reuters, said his team was in
negotiations to obtain a loan and banks had released a high
single-digit million euro sum of previously frozen funds.

He said Imtech Deutschland is still servicing 960 construction
sites and many sub-contractors are supporting the company by
showing up for work, Reuters relates.

TALISMAN-4 FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Ratings on 7 Note Classes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Talisman-4 Finance plc's notes and
withdrawn them:

  EUR30.1 mil. class A (XS0263096389) affirmed at 'Dsf'; Recovery
   Estimate (RE) 100%; rating withdrawn

  EUR39.4 mil. class B (XS0263098161) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE 20%;
   rating withdrawn

  EUR39.4 mil. class C (XS0263098914) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   rating withdrawn

  EUR3.8 mil. class D (XS0263099722) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   rating withdrawn

  EUR0 mil. class E (XS0263100835) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   rating withdrawn

  EUR0 mil. class F (XS0263101304) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   rating withdrawn

  EUR0 mil. class G (XS0263101569) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   rating withdrawn

The transaction is a securitization of originally eight
commercial mortgage loans secured on assets located in Germany.
As of the January 2015 interest payment date, only one loan
(DT12) remained. This loan, which was originally secured by 12
properties, failed to repay at maturity in July 2013 and has been
in special servicing since.


Fitch is withdrawing the ratings of Talisman-4 Finance plc as the
issuer has defaulted.]  Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide
ratings or analytical coverage for Talisman-4 Finance plc.


Not applicable


No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing.  The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


GREECE: Lenders to Review Latest Bailout in October
Michele Kambas and Tom Koerkemeier at Reuters report that the
European Union moved to keep Greece on a tight rein after its
latest bailout, with sources saying the EUR85 billion
(US$94.83 billion) deal will be reviewed by lenders in October
and any discussion of debt relief will only come at a later

Greece was forced to accept tougher terms than were initially on
offer and its creditors want to be sure that reforms are being
carried out as promised, Reuters relates.  Germany, for one, said
the agreement lacked clarity on Greece's policy direction,
Reuters notes.

"There will be a strong first review of the implementation of
measures in October," Reuters quotes an EU source as saying.

At the same time, rescue funds for Greek banks will be placed in
a special account and the lenders will receive fresh equity only
after a "stress test" is finished by the end of October, several
sources told Reuters.

An initial EUR10 billion will be made available "immediately" to
shore up confidence in Greek banks, while authorities conduct a
detailed asset quality review that is expected to take several
months, Reuters discloses.

Greek banks will also have to submit viable business plans to
European authorities before fresh support is disbursed and will
only receive cash once authorities sign off on the plans, Reuters

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on Greek integrated telecommunications
operator Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A. (OTE) and
removed it from CreditWatch, where S&P placed it with negative
implications on July 1, 2015.  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term corporate
credit rating on OTE.

S&P also affirmed its 'B' issue ratings on the senior unsecured
debt issued by OTE's wholly owned financing vehicle, U.K.-based
OTE PLC, and removed them from CreditWatch negative.

The affirmation primarily reflects S&P's view that the likelihood
that Greece will be leaving the eurozone, a so-called "Grexit,"
has declined to less than 50% within S&P's forecast horizon to
2018.  This is following the consent, in principle, from the
Eurogroup (the finance ministers of the EU) to a new three-year
loan program for Greece via the European Stability Mechanism.
However, S&P still estimates the risk of a Grexit at higher than
one in three, which, along with the potential consequences for
domestic nonsovereign entities with foreign currency debt,
constrains the long-term rating on OTE at 'B'.

OTE generates about 75% of its revenues and about 80% of its
EBITDA in Greece.

S&P continues to assess OTE's stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
at 'bb-', assuming that Greece will remain in the eurozone.  S&P
do not factor into its assessment of OTE's SACP additional
support from the company's 40% shareholder, Deutsche Telekom AG

S&P's assessment of OTE's SACP incorporates S&P's view of "very
high" country risk and currently weak economic conditions in
Greece.  S&P currently expects a real GDP decline of about 3% in
2015 and flat GDP growth in 2016.  Furthermore, OTE faces
constrained consumer, government, and corporate spending, adverse
regulation, and fierce competition.  This is only partly offset
by OTE's leading domestic market positions in mobile and fixed-
line services and S&P's expectation that the company will
continue to undertake cost-cutting measures that will support its
operating margins, despite falling revenues.

The negative outlook reflects that S&P could lower the rating on
OTE by one or more notches if S&P believed that the likelihood of
a Grexit had increased to 50% or more.

S&P could also lower the rating if materially weaker economic
conditions in Greece had significantly adverse implications for
OTE's operating prospects or liquidity, or if S&P believed that
OTE's FOCF generation prospects had substantially weakened.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the currently "very
high" country risk moderated.  Furthermore, S&P could affirm the
long-term rating on OTE even if it lowered the current long-term
sovereign credit rating on Greece for other reasons than an
increasing likelihood of a Grexit if, at the same time, S&P
assessed OTE's SACP as at least 'b'.

S&P could raise the long-term rating on OTE if S&P considered
that the likelihood of a Grexit had moderated sustainably to less
than 33% and S&P assessed OTE's SACP as at least 'b+'.  S&P could
also raise the rating if it observed that DT's commitment to OTE
had strengthened.  Stronger support could take the form of a
substantial increase in DT's stake in OTE or other explicit forms
of financial support.


MECCANICA HOLDINGS: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' CFR, Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service affirmed its ratings for Finmeccanica
S.p.A. and wholly-owned US subsidiary Meccanica Holdings USA
Inc. -- including the Ba1 senior unsecured debt ratings -- and
revised the rating outlook to Stable from Negative.

"The rating affirmation reflects our expectation that the company
will continue to evidence modest improvements in profitability
and cash flow measures driven by ongoing restructuring
initiatives and balance sheet strengthening following the recent
debt tender and permanent repayment ahead of forthcoming non-core
asset divestitures" said Russell Solomon, Senior Vice President
and Moody's lead analyst for Finmeccanica. "In addition to the
assumed successful completion of the transportation assets sale
to Hitachi later this year, stabilization of the rating outlook
explicitly incorporates our expectation that Finmeccanica will
maintain sufficient liquidity to fully accommodate its normal
course business seasonality and associated working capital
volatility, particularly during the multi-year period in which
its free cash flow generating capability is restored to more
acceptable levels for the rating category," Mr. Solomon added.

The following represents Moody's ratings and the specific rating
actions for Finmeccanica and its subsidiaries:

Issuer: Finmeccanica S.p.A.

Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed Ba1-PD

Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed Ba1

Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba1

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debentures, Affirmed Ba1 (LGD4)

Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Meccanica Holdings USA, Inc.

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba1 (LGD4)

Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative


The ratings broadly reflect high financial risk associated with
the company's moderately leveraged balance sheet, modest
profitability measures and coverage levels, and a weak free cash
flow profile. This has been driven by a multi-year period of weak
operating performance as partially spurred on by persistently
tough defense markets, heightened competition and general
macroeconomic weakness in certain business areas. Balancing these
risks, however, are the company's large size and scope of
business operations, solid liquidity and implicit support from
the Government of Italy.

While Finmeccanica's firm-wide restructuring programs coupled
with ongoing portfolio optimization initiatives should continue
to yield gradual improvements in operating performance over the
next several years, earnings and cash flows are likely to remain
comparatively weak for the rating category. Macroeconomic
headwinds -- particularly in the company's core European
markets -- and the impact of lingering fiscal constraints on
defense budgets, more broadly, are expected to persist. But
material deterioration from current levels is not expected, and
modest improvements are in fact expected over the medium to
longer term rating horizon. Moody's expects that Moody's-adjusted
debt to EBITDA for Finmeccanica will trend towards 4x by the end
of 2015 and 3.5x in 2016, from about 5.0x at June 2015. Free cash
flow should transition from an essentially breakeven profile this
year to US$200 million or more annually as the cash consumptive
transportation assets are finally sold off before year-end 2015,
with incremental proceeds realized therefrom coupled with reduced
cash outlays and related savings from ongoing restructuring
initiatives expected to be utilized to effect further
deleveraging of the balance sheet over the ensuing period.

With over EUR12 billion of estimated revenue proforma for the
transportation assets divestiture and an operating profit base
that is expected to approach EUR1 billion in 2016 (Moody's-
adjusted basis), Finmeccanica's scale characteristics solidly
underpin its relative positioning within the rating category. The
company remains a critical Tier 1 contractor on several important
aerospace and defense platforms -- including Eurofighter and
F-35 -- and is a leading manufacturer of helicopters with a broad
global installed base. Reasonably high-level revenue
predictability is afforded by a sizeable backlog of nearly EUR30
billion, with good diversity of revenue streams in both
commercial and military applications. Although the June 2015 cash
balance of EUR611 million is more modest than historical cash
levels that have regularly exceeded EUR1 billion, Moody's expects
that Finmeccanica's fully available EUR2 billion revolver coupled
with increased funds from operations will be sufficient to
support ongoing working capital investment and capital
expenditure requirements. The absence of material maturities
until 2017 also lends support to the company's ratings and the
stable rating outlook.

Ongoing implicit support from the Italian sovereign state also
notably underpins Finmeccanica's ratings, as reflected in the
one-notch of uplift (relative to the ba2 fundamental stand-alone
baseline credit assessment) ascribed to the company's Ba1
corporate family rating and its Ba1 senior unsecured debt
ratings. The Government of Italy (Baa2 stable) controls
Finmeccanica's Board of Directors and holds an approximate 30%
economic interest in the company as of May 2015. The level of
default dependence between Finmeccanica and Italy is deemed to be
moderate, and the level of support from the sovereign is also
currently considered moderate.

The stable rating outlook reflects our expectation of modest but
steady improvement in the company's cash flow and profitability
measures as Finmeccanica continues to execute on its
restructuring and portfolio optimization initiatives. The rating
could be pressured if the pending sale of the cash consumptive
Transportation assets fails to close, or if we observe the
emergence of a financial policy that does not prioritize debt
reduction such that leverage above 5x is expected to persist on a
sustained basis. The rating could warrant consideration for
potential upward adjustment if the company's credit profile
improves more quickly than anticipated, as indicated by (among
other things) leverage trending towards 3.5x or lower and
operating profit margins trending towards the high-single-digit
percentage range, on a sustained basis and as accompanied by
maintenance of a strong liquidity profile.

Headquartered in Rome, Italy, Finmeccanica is one of Italy's
largest industrial groups with principal operations in aerospace
and defense and a recipient of about half of the country's annual
defense outlays.


KAZKOMMERTSBANK: Fitch Lowers IDRs to 'B-', Outlook Negative
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Kazakhstan-based Kazkommertsbank's
(KKB) Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) to 'B-' from 'B' and its Viability Rating (VR) to 'b-'
from 'b'.  The Outlook is Negative.

Fitch has also downgraded BTA Bank's Long-term IDRs to 'CCC' from
'B-' and withdrawn the entity's ratings.  The ratings of KKB's
Russian subsidiary Moskommertsbank (MKB) were also withdrawn.


The downgrade of KKB's VR, which drives the downgrade of Long-
term IDRs and senior debt rating, reflects negative revisions in
Fitch's view of the volume of the bank's problem exposures and
their recovery prospects, and a significant weakening in the
bank's pre-impairment performance.  The ratings also take into
account the moderate loss absorption capacity offered by the
bank's capital.  However, the ratings are supported by KKB's
moderate refinancing and liquidity risks, and a track record of
significant debt repayments in a challenging environment.

The revision in Fitch's view of KKB's asset quality is driven
primarily by (i) a recent large transfer of mostly land and real
estate loans, the majority of which were reported as performing,
by KKB to its subsidiary BTA, which afterwards ceded its banking
license and will operate as a distressed asset management company
once it is divested by KKB in the near future; and (ii) KKB's
resultant exposure to BTA, equal to 3.5x KKB's end-1H15 Fitch
Core Capital (FCC).

Other factors that contribute, albeit to a lesser extent, to
Fitch's negative view of KKB's asset quality prospects are i) a
currently more challenging operating environment for asset
recoveries, including real estate assets, as a result of the
moderate slowdown in the Kazakh economy; and (ii) the absence of
bad loan purchases from KKB's balance sheet by the Kazakh
authorities (although fair value gains on long-term funding
provided by the Problem Loan Fund (PLF) has helped to finance
some write-offs).

Asset quality remains weak in KKB's retained loan book,
notwithstanding the transfer of problem assets to BTA and sizable
write-offs (equal to KZT600 billion, or 20% of loans) in 2014.
At end-1H15, KKB's adjusted non-performing loan (NPL) ratio was a
high 30% of gross loans, excluding exposure to BTA.  Net of total
loan impairment reserves, NPLs represented 20% of KKB's FCC.  In
addition, KKB has significant exposures in its largest performing
real estate loans, which Fitch views as high-risk.

Capital ratios declined in 2014 and 1H15, due to risk-weighted
asset (RWA) growth, weak internal capital generation and share
repurchases, including from the National Welfare Fund Samruk
Kazyna (SK).  The FCC/ RWA ratio was a modest 11% at end-1Q15.
Fair-value gains on PLF funding (equal to 2pts of RWA) have
supported capital since end-1Q15, although these have been
partially offset by further impairment charges (which were
substantial in regulatory accounts in 2Q15).

Core profitability has weakened as a result of increases of
interest accrued on loans but not received in cash and higher
operating expenses.  Pre-impairment profit, adjusted for
uncollected loan interest income and large derivative losses,
declined to close to zero in 1Q15, compared with 0.6% of average
gross loans in 2014 and 2% in 2013.  Fitch expects the bank to be
loss-making at the pre-impairment level, net of interest accrued
on the BTA exposure, in the medium term, given the current
balance sheet and cost structures.

KKB's liquidity position is currently a moderately supportive
factor for its ratings given its high level of liquid assets, the
bank's status as the largest deposit taker in Kazakhstan with a
20% market share, the absence of onerous covenants on wholesale
obligations and moderate upcoming debt repayments.  Liquid assets
(mostly, cash with the National Bank of Kazakhstan), boosted by
PLF funding injection, were equal to a high 35% of the bank's
customer deposits or 25% of its total liabilities at end-1H15,
although a significant share of these may be used to finance
credit growth.  Its upcoming USD294 million eurobond repayment,
due in November 2015, is equal to a small 7% of liquid assets at


Fitch has affirmed the bank's '5' SR and revised its SRF to 'No
Floor' from 'B-'.  The SRF revision reflects our opinion that
solvency support for the bank from the Kazakh authorities, in an
amount sufficient to address the bank's asset quality problems,
cannot be relied upon.  At the same time, Fitch believes that
moderate capital assistance (as evidenced by the PLF
contribution) and continued regulatory forbearance remain
possible, and liquidity support, at least in local currency, is


The downgrade of the subordinated and perpetual debt ratings
reflects that on KKB's VR.  This is because the respective debt
are notched down by once and twice from the bank's VR, reflecting
weak recovery prospects in case of default.


The downgrade of BTA reflects its disposal by KKB, and the
entity's weak asset quality and capitalization.  The Rating Watch
Positive (RWP) on BTA's ratings had reflected the potential an
upgrade of the bank in case of a merger, or closer integration
with, KKB.  As a result, BTA is no longer considered to be
relevant to Fitch's analytical coverage, leading to the

Fitch has withdrawn MKB's ratings without affirmation because the
issuer has chosen to stop participating in the rating process,
and Fitch will therefore no longer have sufficient information to
maintain the ratings.

Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for


The Negative Outlook on KKB's Long-term IDRs reflects the
potential for these ratings and the bank's VR to be downgraded in
case of a further weakening of the bank's capitalization
resulting from (i) negative pre-impairment profitability (net of
accrued interest); or (ii) increased provisioning requirements on
problem exposures.

The Outlook could be revised to Stable if the capital position
stabilizes as a result of reasonable performance or further
moderate capital support from the Kazakh authorities.  Any
downgrade of KKB's Long-term IDRs and VR would also be reflected
in changes in the bank's debt ratings.


The ratings are sensitive to the same considerations that would
affect KKB's VR.

The rating actions are:


  Long-Term foreign and local currency IDRs: downgraded to 'B-'
   from 'B'; Outlook Negative
  Short-Term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'
  Viability Rating: downgraded to 'b-' from 'b'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'B-'
  Senior unsecured long-term debt rating (including that of
  Kazkommerts International BV): downgraded to 'B-' from 'B';
  Recovery Rating 'RR4'
  Senior unsecured short-term debt rating: affirmed at 'B'
  Subordinated debt rating: downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B-';
   Recovery Rating 'RR5'


  Perpetual debt rating: downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC'; Recovery
   Rating 'RR6'

BTA Bank

  Long-Term foreign and local currency IDRs: downgraded to 'CCC'
   from 'B-'; removed from RWP; withdrawn
  Short-Term foreign and local currency IDRs: downgraded to 'C'
   from 'B'; withdrawn
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'ccc'; withdrawn
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'; removed from RWP; withdrawn


  Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'CCC'; withdrawn
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'C'; withdrawn
  National Long-term rating: 'B(rus)'; withdrawn
  Viability Rating: 'ccc'; withdrawn
  Support Rating: '5'; withdrawn


ROYAL IMTECH: Declared Bankrupt, Mulls Sale of Marine/Nordic Unit
Royal Imtech N.V. related that, upon the request of
administrators, the Rotterdam District Court has declared it
bankrupt ('failliet') as of August 13, 2015.  In addition, Imtech
Capital B.V., Imtech B.V. and Imtech Group B.V. also have been
declared bankrupt as of August 13, 2015.  The administrators
during the suspension of payments have been appointed as trustees
in bankruptcy.  Royal Imtech N.V. was granted suspension of
payments ('surseance van betaling') on August 11, 2015.

Royal Imtech also disclosed that its Marine and Nordic divisions
have been set outside of the group under the control of Imtech's
financiers with a view to a sale of those divisions or parts
thereof to third parties to ensure as much as possible the
continuation of their businesses and the continued employment of
their 7,300 employees.  The company has been informed by the
financiers that it is envisaged that Imtech Marine will be sold
to Pon Holdings and Parcom Capital and that a sales process for
the Nordic division is ongoing and expected to be concluded in
the short term.

As of August 13, 2015, no companies of the Imtech group other
than the companies mentioned above and Imtech Germany are subject
to insolvency proceedings.  Royal Imtech has been assured by the
trustees in bankruptcy that they are geared to preserve as many
Imtech group companies as possible in the interests of all
creditors, employees and other stakeholders.  Royal Imtech has
been informed by the financiers that a number of parties have
expressed a genuine interest to take over viable parts of the

It is noted that as Imtech's divisions, including Marine and
Nordic have been pledged to Imtech's financiers, the financiers
are entitled to all proceeds of any sale or other transaction in
relation to those companies.  It is not envisaged that Royal
Imtech and its shareholders will enjoy financial benefit from any
such current or future transactions.

To facilitate the process set out above and transactions to
further secure as much as possible the interests of creditors and
jobs of as many employees as possible, it is conceivable that
Imtech subsidiaries will be granted suspension of payments or
will be declared bankrupt.  The trustees in bankruptcy will
decide whether and when such steps will be taken.

                     Statement From Administrators

Administrators Paul Peters and Jeroen Princen have been appointed
only at Royal Imtech N.V.

The current Board of Management and divisional directors remain
fully and exclusively authorised to manage those divisions. They
determine how they will use the financial resources available at
the operating companies to continue the business. The
administrators of Royal Imtech N.V. hope that the jobs at those
divisions will be preserved in close cooperation between Imtech's
directors and Imtech's financiers. The banks are at this time the
material owners of the Imtech divisions. The administrators are
at this time not aware of any termination of the group financing
on the part of the banks.

The administrators of Imtech N.V. hope that the following steps
will be possible in the very near future:

-- That the banks, as the holders of security interests, will
    receive an unconditional bid from a buyer;

-- That sufficient clarity is provided that said buyer has
    secured the working capital financing for the divisions to be

-- That the banks holding security interests pertaining to the
    shares in the divisions declare that they will accept the bid
    from said buyer unconditionally;

-- That said buyer and the banks will provide insight into the
    valuation of said divisions to be acquired that were used for
    the bid and the acceptation of the bid. This is particularly
    true with respect to the three major Dutch banks that are
    reportedly not only financing Imtech N.V. but also hold 47%
    of the shares and that guaranteed Imtech N.V.'s share issue
    last year;

-- Imtech N.V.'s banks should provide complete clarity on
    whether or not they will provide a special short-term loan
    facility to the operating companies that are currently not
    subject to creditor protection, and more specifically those
    located in the Netherlands, which a proposed buyer does not
    intend to buy from the banks;

-- Because Imtech N.V. has been granted creditor protection, the
    Board of Management and the Supervisory Board must evaluate a
    bid from a buyer that has the approval of the financiers with
    security interests and must also cooperate in the private
    sale desired by the banks of shares in the divisions a buyer
    wishes to acquire.

    The administrators are not aware at this time whether the
    Board of Management and the Supervisory Board are willing to
    cooperate in this regard;

-- After receiving the opinion of the Board of Management and
    the Supervisory Board of Imtech N.V., the administrators will
    evaluate the bid from the buyer and the proposal from the
    banks as holders of security interests at the earliest
    opportunity. The administrators have asked the court-
    appointed bankruptcy judges to come to Amsterdam today;

-- The balance sheet of Imtech N.V. currently shows an amount of
    EUR 1 billion in goodwill. If the banks waive the debts of
    the companies to be acquired vis-a-vis a buyer, the goodwill
    in fact increases for this new shareholder in the Imtech
    divisions. Just hours after being appointed, the
    administrators currently have insufficient insight to
    determine how the capitalised goodwill and the claims from
    the banks of more than EUR 1.2 billion relate to any bids
    that may be received;

-- Imtech N.V. and the banks have agreed to additional
    securities during the pre-pack administration. The
    administrators consider this to be incorrect at this time and
    believe that it is to the disadvantage of the other
    creditors. The administrators hope that the banks will now
    waive the security rights vested on August 5, 2015.

The administrators Mr. Princen and Mr. Peters, related in an Aug.
12, 2015 statement, that they have every confidence that an
agreement can be reached between the banks and a buyer on the
above matters in the very near future. They will provide further
information as soon as this is deemed appropriate.


AK BARS: Fitch Corrects August 11 Rating Release
Fitch Ratings issued a correction on its August 11, 2015, rating
release on AK Bars Bank.

This announcement corrects the version published last Aug. 11,
which incorrectly stated the amount of high-risk assets in AK
Bars Bank and the volume of Eurobond issue of SINEK.

Fitch has affirmed the Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) of Ak Bars Bank (ABB) and Almazergienbank (AEB) at
'BB-'.  The Outlooks are Negative.



ABB's and AEB's IDRs, National and senior debt ratings reflect
Fitch's view of potential support the banks may receive, in case
of need, from the regional authorities.  At end-1H15, ABB was 51%
jointly owned by the Republic of Tatarstan (RT; BBB-/Negative)
and the RT-controlled Svyazinvestneftekhim (SINEK; BB+/Negative).
AEB is 87%-owned by the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) (Sakha;

Fitch's view of potential support is based on the majority
ownership, operational control over the banks (the authorities'
representatives sit on boards), and the track record of support
(including planned/received capital injections in August 2015).
For ABB, the ratings also consider the bank's significant (around
40%) market share in RT, and for AEB its limited size relative to
Sakha's budget.

Fitch expects ABB to receive a RUB9.8 billion equity injection
(equal to 32% of end-2014 equity) from the RT-controlled
President State Housing Fund in August 2015.  As a result, the
stake held by RT and public sector bodies will increase to 64%,
reducing previous risks from the indirect non-transparent
ownership.  ABB has also received RUB12.1 billion of Tier 2
capital from Russia's Deposit Insurance Agency.  In July 2015,
AEB received a RUB0.9 billion equity injection (40% of end-2014
equity) from Sakha to support the bank's loan expansion, mostly
in the region's infrastructure projects.

However, Fitch views the probability of support as only moderate
in each case, and therefore notches down the banks' ratings from
their respective parents.  The three-notch difference mainly
reflects Fitch's view that the local authorities have limited
financial flexibility to provide support in a necessary volume
and in a timely manner.  The notching also reflects AEB's limited
systemic importance in its home region, while for ABB it reflects
corporate governance risks related to the bank's large related-
party and relationship lending and holdings of non-core assets
(equal to a combined 4.2x Fitch core capital (FCC) at end-2014),
which could make support costly and less politically acceptable.

The affirmation of the banks' National Long-term ratings with
Stable Outlooks reflects Fitch's view that the banks'
creditworthiness relative to other Russian banks would be
unlikely to change significantly in case of a downgrade of their
respective shareholders, as the ratings of RT and Sakha are
likely to change in tandem with the ratings of the Russian


ABB's 'b-' VR reflects weak asset quality, due to a significant
share of high-risk assets, tight and vulnerable capitalization,
and negative pre-impairment profitability.  On the positive side,
the VR reflects stable funding and the bank's significant local

ABB reported 4% of non-performing loans (NPLs: loans over 90 days
overdue) and 1% of restructured loans at end-2014.  NPLs were
1.6x covered by reserves.  However, asset quality is vulnerable
due to significant high-risk corporate or relationship lending
and investment property exposures (most of which are reported as
performing and not restructured) totaling RUB116 billion or 420%
of FCC at end-2014.  The amount of high-risk exposures increased
notably relative to end-2013 due to new lending, revaluation of
foreign currency loans and Fitch's reassessment of the risks of
certain projects and the bank's relations with some borrowers,
which previously were considered lower risk and/or unrelated.

The exposures viewed by Fitch as high risk include:

   -- RUB53 billion (1.9x of FCC) of weakly-secured loans to
      investment companies with weak financial profiles, some of
      which, in Fitch's view, could be used to conceal/refinance
      other problem and/or related party exposures.

   -- RUB28 billion (1x of FCC) of long-term project finance
      construction projects in RT, which could be related to
      ABB/RT's administration.

   -- RUB22 billion (0.8x of FCC) of other related-party loans
      and/or high risk exposures, including a relationship loan
      to a local electronics retailer, and weakly-performing
      wholesalers and development companies.

   -- RUB13 billion (0.5x of FCC) of investment property/non-core
      assets, mostly comprising land and commercial real estate
      in RT.

Fitch believes the nature and origination of these exposures are
risky and that their recoverability may be lengthy/questionable.
According to management, RUB27 billion of loans to investment
companies were repaid in 1H15, but Fitch believes these
repayments could have been partially refinanced through other
exposures.  Also the bank's related-party exposure is likely to
have increased, as it refinanced a part of SINEK's USD250 million
Eurobond due in August 2015.

Also of some concern was interbank placement of brokerage nature
of RUB11.5 billion (0.4x of FCC) at end-2014, although, according
to management, this was repaid in 1H15.

ABB's capital is weak, as reflected by the low 6.8% FCC ratio at
end-2014, and is further undermined by the high-risk assets.
Fitch does not expect ABB's capital to improve significantly by
end-2015, as most of the upcoming RUB9.8 billion equity injection
will be consumed by losses (the RUB4 billion loss in 1H15 could
widen to RUB6 billion for full year 2015, according to Fitch's

Liquidity and refinancing risks seem manageable, as the bank had
RUB67 billion of highly liquid assets at end-1H15, which is
sufficient to repay the USD500 million eurobond in 4Q15.
Customer funding has been resilient during recent market stress,
and is viewed as fairly sticky by Fitch.


AEB's VR factors in the banks limited local franchise,
concentrated loan book, moderate profitability and
capitalization, but decent quality of the loan book and
reasonable liquidity supported by funding from quasi-sovereign

NPLs were moderate, at 6% of gross loans at end-2014, and around
9% were restructured.  Loan impairment reserves fully covered the
NPLs.  Fitch views the quality of the restructured loans as
moderate, as the loans are currently performing and reasonably
collateralized.  According to management, around 30% of end-2014
NPLs were recovered during 1H15.  The retail loan performance was
also satisfactory, supported by predominant lending to employees
of corporate clients and participation in government-subsidized
mortgage programs.

AEB's regulatory Tier 1 ratio was a solid 11.5% on Aug. 1, 2015,
(after a RUB900 million injection in July).  Fitch considers that
the bank's capitalization is not under significant pressure from
asset quality, but may subsequently decrease gradually due to
planned rapid growth.  The pre-impairment profitability of 4% of
average loans provides a moderate additional cushion.

Funding is supported by deposits from quasi-sovereign entities,
which are relatively stable.  The refinancing risks are limited
in the near term.  The bank's cushion of highly liquid assets was
sufficient to cover 17% of customer deposits at end-1H15.



ABB's and AEB's support-driven ratings could be downgraded if
either (i) their regional parents are downgraded; or (ii) the
propensity to provide support reduces, for example, as a result
of the manifestation of corporate governance risks in ABB or
progress with attraction of a new investor to AEB and the
subsequent dilution of Sakha's stake.

The Outlook on ABB could be revised to Stable, thereby
potentially reducing the notching between RT and ABB to two
notches, if the bank considerably reduces the amount of high-risk
assets or the authorities provide sufficient equity to offset the
risks associated with them.  Upside potential for AEB's ratings
is limited due to Sakha's plan to dilute its stake in the bank.


Downward pressure on the banks' VRs could stem from a marked
deterioration in asset quality, resulting in capital erosion, in
the absence of appropriate support.

AEB's VR could be upgraded if the bank' capitalization and
franchise strengthens and profitability improves.  An upgrade of
ABB's VR would require significant reduction of high-risk assets
and/or capital strengthening.


ABB's 'old-style' (without mandatory conversion triggers)
subordinated debt is rated two notches below its Long-term IDR.
The rating differential reflects one notch for incremental non-
performance risk (in Fitch's view, the risk of default on
subordinated debt could be moderately higher than on senior
obligations in a stress scenario) and one notch for potential
loss severity (lower recoveries in case of default).  Any changes
to the bank's Long-term IDR would likely impact the subordinated
debt rating.

The rating actions are:


  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BB-',
   Outlook Negative
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'A+(rus)', Outlook
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
  Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BB-'
  Senior unsecured debt National rating: affirmed at 'A+(rus)'

AK BARS Luxembourg S.A:

  Senior unsecured debt long-term rating: affirmed at 'BB-'
  Senior unsecured debt short-term rating: affirmed at 'B'
  Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'B'


  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB-',
   Outlook Negative
  Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
  National Long-term rating affirmed at 'A+(rus)', Outlook Stable
  Viability Rating affirmed at 'b'
  Support Rating affirmed at '3'

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ANGLESEY: Goes Into Administration Following Financial Woes
Tom Davidson at Daily Post reports that more than a dozen members
of staff at a crisis-hit Anglesey care home have been made
redundant after it was plunged into administration.

At least 40 residents are still at the Sant Tysilio care home
near Llanfairpwll, leaving relatives concerned about a potential
closure of the home, Daily Post discloses.

Family members received a letter informing them of the financial
difficulty last week, Daily Post relates.

The letter, seen by the Daily Post, explains Alix Partners have
been made administrators of the privately-run home.

According to Daily Post, they have appointed Careport Advisory
Services Limited to run the home until a buyer is found.

BOWOOD FARMS: Enters Administration, Ceases Trading
Tom White at Press Association reports that Bowood Farms, a
controversial halal slaughterhouse that was secretly filmed
allegedly mistreating lambs, has gone into administration.

The company hit the headlines when animals rights group Animal
Aid released hidden camera footage allegedly showing animals
being abused, Press Association relays.

As a result, a Food Standards Agency investigation was launched
into the footage, Press Association discloses.

According to Press Association, a statement released on Aug. 13
said the company had ceased trading and all the staff had been
made redundant.

"K G Murphy, P Deyes and J M Titley -- -- of Leonard Curtis were
appointed as joint administrators of Bowood Farms Limited t/a
Bowood Yorkshire Lamb on August 5, 2015," Press Association
quotes a spokesman for Leonard Curtis, an insolvency specialist,
as saying.

"Prior to our appointment, the company had ceased to trade and
all employees have subsequently been made redundant.

"The Joint Administrators are actively seeking interested parties
for the property and assets."

Bowood Farms is based in Thirsk, North Yorkshire.


* BOOK REVIEW: BOARD GAMES - Changing Shape of Corporate Power
Author: Arthur Fleischer, Jr.,
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and
Miriam Z. Klipper
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 248 pages
List Price: $34.95
Order your personal copy today at
A ruling by the Delaware Supreme Court on January 29, 1985 was a
wake-up call to directors of U. S. corporations. On this date,
overruling a lower court decision, the Delaware Supreme Court
ruled that the nine board members of Chicago company Trans Union
Corporation were "guilty of breaching their duty to the company's
shareholders." What the board members had done was agree to sell
Trans Union without a satisfactory review of its value. The
guilty board members were ordered by the Court to pay "the
difference between the per share selling price and the 'real'
market value of the company's shares."

Needless to say, the nine Trans Union directors were shocked at
the guilt verdict and the punishment. The chairman of the board,
Jerome Van Gorkom, was a lawyer and a CPA who was also a board
member of other large, respected corporations. For the most part,
it was he who had put together the terms of the potential sale,
including setting value of the company's stock at $55.00 even
though it was trading at about $38.00 per share. News of the
possible sale immediately drove the stock up to $51.50 per share,
and was commented on favorably in a "New York Times" business
article. Still, Van Gorkom and the other directors were found
guilty of breaching their duty, and ordered by Delaware's highest
court to pay a sum to injured parties that would be financially
ruinous. This was clearly more than board members of the Trans
Union Corporation or any other corporation had ever bargained

It was more than board members had ever conceived was possible
without evidence of fraud or graft.

The three authors are all attorneys who have worked at the
highest levels of the legal field, business, and government.
Fleischer is the senior partner of the law firm Fried, Frank,
Harris, Schriver & Jacobson at the head of its mergers and
acquisitions department.

He's also the author of the textbook "Takeover Defenses" which is
in its 6th edition. Hazard is a Professor of Law and former
reporter for the American Bar Association's special committee on
the lawyers' ethics code; while Klipper has been a New York
assistant district attorney prosecuting corporate and financial
fraud, and also a corporate attorney on Wall Street. Using the
Trans Union Corporation case as a watershed event for members of
boards of directors, the highly-experienced legal professionals
lay out the new ground rules for board members. In laying out the
circumstances and facts of a number of cases; keen, concise
analyses of these; and finding where and how board members went
wrong, the authors provide guidance for corporate directors, top
executives, and corporate and private business attorneys on
issues, processes, and decisions of critical importance to them.
Household International, Union Carbide, Gelco Corp., Revlon, SCM,
and Freuhauf are other major corporations whose merger-and
acquisitions activities resulted in court cases that the authors
study to the benefit of readers. The Boards of Directors of these
as well as Trans Union and their positions with other companies
are listed in the appendix. Many other corporations and their
board members are also referred to in the text.

With respect to each of the cases it deals with, BOARD GAMES
outlines the business environment, identifies important
individuals, analyzes decisions, and discusses considerations
regarding laws, government regulations, and corporate practice.
In all of this, however, given the exceptional legal background
of the three authors, the book recurringly brings into the
picture the legalities applying to the activities and decisions
of board members and in many instances, court rulings on these.
Passages from court transcripts are occasionally recorded and
commented on.

Elsewhere, legal terms and concepts -- e. g., "gross
nonattendance" -- are defined as much as they can be. In one
place, the authors discuss six levels of responsibility for board
members from "assure proper result" through negligence up to
fraud. Without being overly technical, the authors' legal
experience and guidance is continually in the forefront. Needless
to say, with this, BOARD GAMES is a work of importance to board
members and others with the responsibility of overseeing and
running corporations in the present-day, post-Enron business
environment where shareholders and government officials are
scrutinizing their behavior and decisions.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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