TCREUR_Public/150911.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Friday, September 11, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 180

                            Headlines

A U S T R I A

KOMMUNALKREDIT AUSTRIA: Moody's Still Reviews Ba3 Deposit Rating


A Z E R B A I J A N

BANK TECHNIQUE: Moody's Withdraws Caa2 Deposit Ratings


F R A N C E

TAURUS 2015-3: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Class F Notes


I R E L A N D

BOYERS: Fitzwilliam Opts to Close Business, 80+ Jobs at Risk


I T A L Y

FCA BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Counterparty Ratings; Outlook Pos.
INTESA SANPAOLO: Fitch Rates Add'l. Tier 1 Securities BB-(EXP)
REITALY FINANCE: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating to Class E Notes
* ITALY: To Recapitalize Three Banks Under Special Administration


L U X E M B O U R G

FINDUS COS.: Fitch Plans to Withdraws Ratings
MALLINCKRODT INT'L: Moody's Rates US$750MM Notes Offering 'B1'
MALLINCKRODT INT'L: S&P Rates Proposed US$750MM Notes 'BB-'


N E T H E R L A N D S

ABN AMRO: Fitch Assigns BB+(EXP) Rating to Add'l Tier 1 Notes
DRYDEN 39: Moody's Rates EUR13 Million Class F Notes 'B2'
DRYDEN 39: S&P Assigns B- Rating to EUR13MM Class F Notes
EA PARTNERS: Fitch Assigns B-(EXP) Rating to Proposed Notes


P O L A N D

KOMPANIA WEGLOWA: Gov't May Use TF Silesia to Rescue Business


S L O V E N I A

T-2: Majority Owner Challenges Receivership


S W E D E N

NATIONAL ELECTRIC: Makes Last Payment to 106 Creditors


U K R A I N E

TERRA BANK: Court Arrests Bank's Head of Supervisory Council


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ARROW GLOBAL: S&P Affirms B+ Counterparty Rating, Outlook Stable
CABOT FINANCIAL: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B+'
DALKEITH TRANSPORT: Bought Out of Administration by Palletways
EGRET FUNDING I: Moody's Rates EUR12.2MM Class E Notes 'B1(sf)'
ELLI INVESTMENTS: Moody's Lowers Corp. Family Rating to Caa3

SMILES ENGINEERING: Creditors to Face Nearly GBP900K Shortfall
VEDANTA RESOURCES: S&P Puts 'BB-' CCR on CreditWatch Negative


X X X X X X X X

* Company Insolvencies in Western Europe Expected to Drop in 2015
* BOOK REVIEW: The Financial Giants In United States History


                            *********



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KOMMUNALKREDIT AUSTRIA: Moody's Still Reviews Ba3 Deposit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the ongoing rating review
to review with direction uncertain from review for downgrade for
the Aa3 rating on the covered bonds issued by Kommunalkredit
Austria AG (the issuer; deposits Ba3 on review direction
uncertain, adjusted baseline credit assessment b3 on review
direction uncertain, Counterparty Risk (CR) Assessment Ba2 (cr)
on review direction uncertain). The review for downgrade was
initiated on June 23, 2014 and extended as the issuer announced
that its owner, Finanzmarktbeteiligung Aktiengesellschaft des
Bundes (FIMBAG), signed a share purchase agreement with a buyer
consortium leading to a proportionate demerger according to the
Austrian Demerger Act (Spaltungsgesetz).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The review with direction uncertain reflects upside and downside
risks to the current Aa3 rating level. On August 28, 2015, the
issuer published its interim report and stated that all contracts
regarding the demerger process have been signed and approved by
the shareholders of Kommunalkredit Austria AG and KA Finanz AG at
an extraordinary shareholder meeting on July 27, 2015. However,
the regulatory approvals are still outstanding.

The partial sale of Kommunalkredit Austria has uncertain
implications for creditors. The issuer's standalone credit
profile is characterized by highly concentrated exposures, the
growing short-term orientation of its funding profile and
improving regulatory capital ratios, despite high leverage. The
issuer's long-term debt and deposit ratings, as well as the
bank's baseline credit assessment, Counterparty Risk Assessment
and subordinated debt are under review with direction uncertain,
reflecting (1) the lack of visibility as to the impact on the
bank's standalone profile of the planned, but yet to be fully
substantiated, asset and liability split; and (2) the need to
re-assess government support for the future obligors of debt
issued by Kommunalkredit Austria or its successor entities. For
further information, see "Credit Opinion: Kommunalkredit Austria
AG", published on August 14, 2015.

Covered bond investors are exposed to additional uncertainty as
the issuer announced its intention to split its covered bond
program with issuances totaling EUR3.8 billion. As part of the
issuer's demerger process, the issuer intends to transfer assets
and covered bonds; about EUR2.7 billion of covered bonds are
intended to be transferred to KA Finanz AG; there is also some
uncertainty on the selection criteria that will be applied for
the asset and covered bond split between the two entities.
Further, the demerger gives the issuer the option to terminate
with a notice period of three months a contract that commits it
currently to hold 28% minimum over-collateralization. For further
information, see "Demerger of Kommunalkredit Allows Lower Over-
Collateralisation of Covered Bonds, a Credit Negative", published
on March 19, 2015.

KEY RATING ASSUMPTIONS/FACTORS

Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) to
determine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond. COBOL
determines expected loss as (1) a function of the probability
that the issuer will cease making payments under the covered
bonds (a CB anchor event); and (2) the stressed losses on the
cover pool assets following a CB anchor event.

The CB anchor for this program is CR assessment plus 1 notch. The
CR assessment reflects an issuer's ability to avoid defaulting on
certain senior bank operating obligations and contractual
commitments, including covered bonds. Moody's may use a CB anchor
of CR assessment plus one notch in the European Union or
otherwise where an operational resolution regime is particularly
likely to ensure continuity of covered bond payments.

The cover pool losses for this program are 28.3%. This is an
estimate of the losses Moody's currently models following a CB
anchor event. Moody's splits cover pool losses between market
risk of 19.9% and collateral risk of 8.5%. Market risk measures
losses stemming from refinancing risk and risks related to
interest-rate and currency mismatches (these losses may also
include certain legal risks). Collateral risk measures losses
resulting directly from cover pool assets' credit quality.
Moody's derives collateral risk from the collateral score, which
for this program is currently 17.0%.

The over-collateralization in the cover pool is 33.5%, of which
the issuer provides 28.0% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC
level consistent with the Aa3 on review direction uncertain
rating target is 28.5%, of which the issuer should provide 21.5%
in a "committed" form (numbers in nominal value terms). These
numbers show that Moody's is relying on to a minor degree on
"uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on Moody's most recent
modelling (based on data, as per June 30, 2015). For further
details on cover pool losses, collateral risk, market risk,
collateral score and TPI Leeway across covered bond programs
rated by Moody's please refer to "Moody's Global Covered Bonds
Monitoring Overview", published quarterly.

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator"
(TPI), which measures the likelihood of timely payments to
covered bondholders following a CB anchor event. The TPI
framework limits the covered bond rating to a certain number of
notches above the CB anchor.

For Kommunalkredit Austria's public sector covered bonds, Moody's
has assigned a TPI of High.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The CB anchor is the main determinant of a covered bond program's
rating robustness. A change in the level of the CB anchor could
lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the covered bonds. The TPI
Leeway measures the number of notches by which Moody's might
lower the CB anchor before the rating agency downgrades the
covered bonds because of TPI framework constraints.

Based on the current TPI of "High", the TPI Leeway for this
program is zero notches. This implies that Moody's might
downgrade the covered bonds because of a TPI cap if it lowers the
CB anchor by one notch all other variables being equal. A
downgrade could also occur if the level of over-collateralization
were to decrease. On the other side, Moody's might upgrade the
covered bonds if the CB anchor were to improve and the over-
collateralization were to remain at the current level. A
multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain circumstances, such as (1) a country ceiling or sovereign
downgrade capping a covered bond rating or negatively affecting
the CB Anchor and the TPI; (2) a multiple-notch downgrade of the
CB Anchor; or (3) a material reduction of the value of the cover
pool, for example because of a reduction in over-
collateralization.

RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds" published in August 2015.



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BANK TECHNIQUE: Moody's Withdraws Caa2 Deposit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Bank Technique OJSC's
following ratings:

-- Long-term local-currency deposit rating of Caa2

-- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating of Caa2

-- Short-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Not
    Prime

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment of Caa1(cr)

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment of Not Prime(cr)

-- Baseline credit assessment (BCA) of caa3

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment of caa3

At the time of the withdrawal, the long-term bank deposit ratings
carried a negative outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

Headquartered in Baku, Azerbaijan, Bank Technique reported total
assets of AZN568.5 million, total shareholders' equity of AZN49.8
million and net income of AZN1.3 million, according to audited
International Financial Reporting Standards as of June 30, 2014.



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TAURUS 2015-3: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following provisional
ratings to the debt issuance of TAURUS 2015-3 EU Designated
Activity Company (Taurus 2015-3 EU):

  EUR73.8M A Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  EUR17.5M B Notes, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

  EUR19.3M C Notes, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

  EUR23M D Notes, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf

  EUR21.4M E Notes, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

  EUR21.675M F Notes, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Moody's has not assigned provisional ratings to the Class X Notes
of the issuer.

Taurus 2015-3 EU is a true sale transaction backed by two
floating rate loans secured by 62 predominantly secondary light
industrial properties located in France, Germany and the
Netherlands. The loans were granted by Bank of America Merrill
Lynch International Limited (BAML) to refinance existing debt.
BAML will retain 5% of both loans, but will have no voting rights
under the loan agreement and will not be consulted with regards
to any potential waivers or amendments.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are based on (i) Moody's assessment of the
real estate quality and characteristics of the collateral, (ii)
analysis of the loan terms and (iii) the expected legal and
structural features of the transaction.

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default
probability of the securitized loans (both during the term and at
maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment of the collateral.
Moody's derives from these parameters a loss expectation for the
securitized loan. Moody's default risk assumptions are low for
both loans.

In Moody's view, the key strengths of the transaction include (i)
low term default risk due to the strong income profile of both
loans, (ii) high levels of diversity with the 62 assets spread
over three countries and the largest tenant in either loan
accounting for no more than 8.4% of rental income (iii) strong
loan covenants which are set at a high enough level for Moody's
to give credit to them, and (iv) experienced sponsorship and
asset management from Starwood and M7 and their joint MStar
platform.

Challenges in the transaction include (i) the secondary quality
collateral backing both loans, (ii) the high leverage and lack of
amortization, resulting in increased refinancing risk at both
loan maturities, and (iii) a non-sequential principal paydown
structure where credit enhancement increases due to asset sales,
loan prepayments or repayments not fully offsetting potential
adverse credit selection in an increasingly concentrated pool.

Moody's loan to value ratios (LTV) are 86.8% for Bilux and 86.3%
on the securitized Teif loan, rising to 95.6% on the Teif whole
loan. Moody's overall property grade is 3.2 signifying secondary
to poor secondary collateral. Moody's property grade is on a
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the best and 5 the worse.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating EMEA CMBS Transactions published in July 2015.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2014-16 Central Scenarios published in March 2014.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivity

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's-rated structured finance security may vary if certain
input parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.

Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA Large Multi-
Borrower securitization are calculated by stressing key variable
inputs in Moody's primary rating model. Moody's principal
portfolio model inputs are Moody's loan default probability
(Moody's DP) and Moody's modeling value (Moody's Model Value). In
the Parameter Sensitivity analysis, we assumed the following
stressed scenarios: Moody's Model Value decreased by -20%
and -40% and Moody's DP increased by 50% and 100%. The parameter
sensitivity outcome ranges from 0 to 7 notches for Class A, 1 to
10 notches for Class B, 1 to 9 notches for Class C, and 1 to 8
notches on Class D, 1 to 7 notches on Class E, and 1 to 4 notches
on class F.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Main factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of
the ratings are (i) a decline in the property values backing the
underlying loans, (ii) an increase in the default probability
driven by declining loan performance or increase in refinancing
risk, (iii) an increase in the risk to the notes stemming from
transaction counterparty exposure (most notably the account bank,
the liquidity facility provider or borrower hedging
counterparties).

Main factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of
the ratings are generally (i) an increase in the property values
backing the underlying loans, or (ii) a decrease in the default
probability driven by improving loan performance or decrease in
refinancing risk.

The rating for the Notes addresses the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal at par on, or before, the final legal
maturity date. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction; other non-credit risks have not
been addressed but may have significant effect on yield to
investors. Moody's ratings do not address the payments of Note
Premium Payments as defined in the Offering Circular.



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BOYERS: Fitzwilliam Opts to Close Business, 80+ Jobs at Risk
------------------------------------------------------------
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that Noel Smyth's
Fitzwilliam Finance Partners blamed the fact that it could not
find a retailer willing to take on Dublin department store,
Boyers, for its decision to close the business.

Fitzwilliam on Sept. 9 disclosed that it plans to close the store
on Jan. 31, throwing a question mark over the future of 48 direct
jobs and a further 30 to 35 positions with various concessions,
The Irish Times relates.

Management was set to meet unions Siptu and Mandate on Sept. 10,
The Irish Times discloses.  There are indications at least some
staff can be redeployed to Boyers's sister company Arnotts, The
Irish Times notes.

At the same time, Fitzwilliam says it will honor any redundancy
deal done with the unions and has set up a separate bank account
to ensure the cash is there to meet any commitments, The Irish
Times relays.

Mr. Smyth, as cited by The Irish Times, said the closure of
Boyers was regrettable but "unfortunately, unavoidable".
Fitzwilliam is a property company and had been trying to find a
retailer to take on and run Boyers, but could not, despite
talking to a number of potential partners, The Irish Times
relates.

Boyers is the unfashionable older sister in the Arnotts group and
has been struggling for some time, The Irish Times states.
Although the retailer's accounts do not break out figures for the
North Earl Street store, it is said to be losing money and cannot
compete with nimble local rivals such as the Primark-owned
Penneys, according to The Irish Times.

Fitzwilliam, The Irish Times says, will be putting the Boyers
building on North Earl Street up for sale after the doors close
in January.



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FCA BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Counterparty Ratings; Outlook Pos.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
outlook on Italy-based institution FCA Bank SpA to positive from
stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'BB+/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that FCA Bank will
continue its track record of revenue stability and earnings
growth, while maintaining resilient asset quality, over the next
one to two years.  S&P also consider that FCA Bank's operating
performance and asset quality have remained relatively resilient
despite broader pressures in the Italian banking industry.

S&P expects average outstanding loans to increase by 5% per year
in 2015 and 2016 on the back of increasing car sales in Europe
(combined sales for FiatChyslerAutomobile [FCA] and Jaguar Land
Rover increased by 13% year on year in the first six months of
2015).  In addition, S&P believes FCA Bank will continue to
benefit from its ability to consolidate new partnerships with
other carmakers, outside the FCA group, to add new brands.  As
for the other European auto captive finance companies, FCA Bank's
business production remains correlated to the highly cyclical
automotive sector and the commercial performance of FCA.
Nevertheless, in S&P's view these developments could help FCA
Bank to further enhance the quality and stability of its revenue
base.

S&P expects FCA Bank to grow its assets while maintaining credit
losses at the level of its international peers, as has been the
case in recent years.  S&P also expects FCA Bank's credit losses
to range between 55 and 60 basis points over the next two years.

S&P forecasts that FCA Bank's risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio
will sustainably exceed 10% over the next 18-24 months (compared
to 9.1% calculated as of December 2014).  This reflects S&P's
expectation that such growth will translate into stronger core
earnings, coupled with a dividend payout of around 50%.  As such,
S&P's projected RAC factors in earnings retention of EUR130
million-EUR140 million per year in 2015-2016.

Finally, S&P expects that FCA Bank will be able to finance its
growth, taking into account the committed funding and liquidity
support of its parent Credit Agricole (CASA), even in the event
of stress.  S&P continues to consider FCA Bank a "moderately
strategic" subsidiary of CASA. As such, the long-term rating on
FCA Bank is one notch higher than its stand-alone credit profile.

The positive outlook indicates S&P could raise the ratings on FCA
Bank over the next one to two years if the bank continues to
deliver predictable revenue growth in the context of an improving
operating environment, while maintaining resilient asset quality
and increasing its RAC ratio sustainably above 10%.  A
continuation of these trends could result in an improvement in
S&P's assessment of FCA Bank's business position relative to
peers in the Italian banking sector, as well as entities within
international captive finance.

S&P could revise the outlook back to stable if, contrary to its
expectations, it perceives that the bank's RAC will not
sustainably exceed 10% over the next two years, or if the
expected continuation of favorable operating trends falters.


INTESA SANPAOLO: Fitch Rates Add'l. Tier 1 Securities BB-(EXP)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.'s (IntesaSP)
forthcoming issue of perpetual USD additional Tier 1 capital
securities an expected rating of 'BB-(EXP)'.

The final rating is contingent on receipt of final documentation
conforming to information already received.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The notes are CRD IV-compliant, perpetual, deeply subordinated,
fixed-rate additional Tier 1 debt securities, issued under Intesa
SP's USD25 billion medium term note program.  The notes have
fully discretionary interest payments and are subject to write-
down on breach of a 5.125% consolidated or unconsolidated common
equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio.

The notes are rated five notches below IntesaSP's 'bbb+'
Viability Rating (VR) - twice for loss severity relative to
senior unsecured creditors and three times for incremental non-
performance risk relative to IntesaSP's VR.  The notching for
non-performance risk reflects the instruments' fully
discretionary interest payment, which Fitch considers the most
easily activated form of loss absorption.  Under the terms of the
notes, the issuer will not make an interest payment (in full or
in part) if it has insufficient distributable items.  The 5.125%
trigger only refers to a write-down of the notes.

The rating considers IntesaSP's transitional Basel III CET1 ratio
at June 30, 2015, of 13.4% as well as its projected capital
trajectory.  This current ratio provides IntesaSP with over
EUR23 billion of CET1 buffer from the 5.125% CET1 ratio trigger.
However, in Fitch's opinion, non-performance in the form of non-
payment of interest would likely be triggered before this,
possibly if the bank breaches its Pillar 2 CET1 capital
requirement of 9% as established by the European Central Bank.
The current CET1 ratio provides it with a buffer of over EUR12
billion from this requirement.  Fitch believes that IntesaSP's
current CET1 ratio provides a sufficient buffer to limit the
notching for non-performance risk to three notches.

The principal write-down can be reinstated and written up at full
discretion of the issuer if a positive net income (unconsolidated
or consolidated) is recorded.  Fitch has assigned 50% equity
credit to the securities, reflecting the agency's view that the
5.125% trigger is not so distant to the point of non-viability,
which limits the instrument's "going concern" characteristics.
It also reflects the notes' full coupon flexibility, their
permanent nature and the subordination to all senior creditors.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating of the securities is sensitive to a change in the VR.
The rating is also sensitive to a change in their notching, which
could arise if Fitch changes its assessment of their non-
performance relative to the risk captured in IntesaSP's VR.  This
could reflect a change in capital management or flexibility or an
unexpected shift in regulatory buffers and requirements, for
example.

Intesa Sanpaolo is rated:

  Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR): 'BBB+' with a Stable
  Outlook

  Short Term IDR: 'F2'

  Viability Rating: 'bbb+'

  Support Rating: '5'

  Support Rating Floor: 'No Floor'


REITALY FINANCE: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned REITALY Finance S.r.l.'s notes final
ratings:

  EUR70 mil. class A1: 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR39.3 mil. class A2: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable'
  EUR0.2 mil. class X1: NR
  EUR0.1 mil. class X2: NR
  EUR33.3 mil. class B: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR12.4 mil. class C: 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR17.7 mil. class D: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR9.3 mil. class E: 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable

The class A1 and A2 notes rank pari passu until the earlier of
loan maturity, the transfer of the loan to special servicing or
an enforcement of the note security after which the class A1
ranks senior.

The transaction is the securitization of a single EUR191.5
million commercial real estate loan advanced by Goldman Sachs
International Bank (GS, or the originator) to an Italian fund
which is secured by a portfolio of 25 Italian real estate assets.
GS has retained 5% of the loan.

The collateral falls into five sub-portfolios: (i) five large
retail assets with exposure to a cinema operator; (ii) five cash-
and-carry assets; (iii) three retail galleries; (iv) five retail
boxes; and (v) seven smaller retail units.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Riskier Leisure Exposure

Over half the portfolio value comprises centers which are either
entirely turned over to, or anchored by, tenants in the
entertainment sector.  Fitch considers the risk profile of
leisure to be higher than retail, as the financial performance of
the former is subject to macroeconomic stress and underlying
consumer behavior is more discretionary and may be influenced by
changing tastes and technology.  Re-fitting former leisure space
to appeal to retailers may also prove challenging.

Varying Property Quality

Although the property portfolio is underpinned by several large,
well-located and good quality assets, there is also some exposure
to highly over-rented property as well as secondary/tertiary
assets that are dilapidated and in need of remedial work.  The
weaker components offer little in the way of recovery in Fitch's
investment-grade stress scenarios.

Re-letting Risk Present

Almost half the contracted rental income expires by loan maturity
in 2020.  While not unusual, the asset manager may struggle to
stabilize the lease profile over time; however, cash trapping
triggered by declining lease terms provides an incentive for this
to occur in the short term.  While there is a risk of a reduction
in demand for the subject properties over time, the threat of new
supply from development activity is mitigated by current property
values being (in aggregate) 30% less than the reinstatement
(construction) value.

Balanced Cost Structure

The borrower's indemnity for loan enforcement costs may not cover
fees from a non-enforced remedy; its unrated bank account risks
one-off loss of interest.  While commingling risk is accounted
for in Fitch's analysis, since the issuer traps 1% loan penalty
interest from loan default, both exposures are mitigated.  The
loan also provides for a step-up in payments once its balance
falls below EUR40m, mitigating back-ended issuer fixed costs.

KEY PROPERTY ASSUMPTIONS (all by net rent)

  'Bsf' weighted average (WA) capitalization (cap) rate: 7.7%
  'Bsf' WA structural vacancy: 22.3%
  'Bsf' WA rental value decline: 3.4%

  'BBsf' WA cap rate: 8.3%
  'BBsf' WA structural vacancy: 25.5%
  'BBsf' WA rental value decline: 6.1%

  'BBBsf' WA cap rate: 8.9%
  'BBBsf' WA structural vacancy: 28.6%
  'BBBsf' WA rental value decline: 9.3%

  'Asf' WA cap rate: 9.5%
  'Asf' WA structural vacancy: 31.8%
  'Asf' WA rental value decline: 14.9%

Fitch estimates a 'B' LTV of 79%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The change in model output that would apply if the capitalization
rate assumption for each property is increased or decreased by a
relative amount is as follows:

Original rating class A1/A2/ B/ C/ D/ E:
'A+sf'/'Asf'/'BBBsf'/'BBB-sf'/'BBsf'/'BB-sf'
Increase capitalisation rates by 10% class A1/ A2/ B/ C/ D/ E:
'A+sf'/'BBB+sf'/'BBsf'/'BB-sf'/'Bsf'/'Bsf'
Increase capitalisation rates by 20% class A1/ A2 B/ C/ D/ E:
'A+sf'/ 'BBBsf'/'BB-sf'/'Bsf'/'CCCsf'/'CCCsf'

The change in model output that would apply if the rental value
decline and vacancy assumption for each property is increased or
decreased by a relative amount is as follows:

Increase RVD and vacancy by 10% class A1/ A2/ B/ C/ D/ E: 'A+sf'/
'BBB+sf'/ 'BB+sf'/ 'BB-sf'/ 'B+sf'/ 'B+sf'
Increase RVD and vacancy by 20% class A1 / A2/ B/ C/ D/ E:
'A+sf'/ 'BBBsf'/'BBsf'/'BB-sf'/'Bsf'/'CCCsf'

The change in model output that would apply if the capitalization
rate, rental value decline and vacancy assumptions for each
property is increased or decreased by a relative amount is as
follows:

Deterioration in all factors by 10% class A1/ A2/ B/ C/ D/ E:
'A+sf'/ 'BBB-sf'/'B+sf'/'Bsf'/'CCCsf'/'CCCsf'
Deterioration in all factors by 20% class A1/ A2/ B/ C/ D/ E:
'Asf'/ 'BB+sf'/'Bsf'/ CCCsf/'CCCsf'/'CCCsf'

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch reviewed the results of a third party assessment conducted
on the asset portfolio information, which indicated no adverse
findings material to the rating analysis.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


* ITALY: To Recapitalize Three Banks Under Special Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Giselda Vagnoni at Reuters reports that Italy is working on a
plan to recapitalize three small lenders under special
administration by raising cash through a fund financed by healthy
banks.

According to Reuters, the banks are Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara
(Carife), Banca Marche and Banca Popolare dell'Etruria e del
Lazio, all of which were placed under special administration by
the Bank of Italy because of serious capital shortfalls.

A financial source told Reuters on Sept. 4 the amount to be
raised had not yet been decided but another person familiar with
the matter, and data from some of the banks involved, pointed to
a requirement of at least EUR1.4 billion (US$1.6 billion).

The financial source, as cited by Reuters, said holders of
subordinated bonds issued by the three lenders could be asked to
take part in the fund raising by converting the notes into
shares.

The move comes after Prime Minister Matteo Renzi's government
pushed through a reform of Italy's cooperative banking sector to
promote mergers and make them more efficient, Reuters notes.

Italy, Reuters says, is also seeking to put in place a mechanism
to save ailing banks before European "bail-in" rules come into
force next year, as the rules will allow losses from failing
banks to be pushed onto bondholders and even large depositors.

A Carife shareholder meeting in July approved a EUR300 million
euro capital increase reserved for the so-called Fondo
Interbancario, a fund which is financed by all Italian banks and
is meant to shield current account holders from losses of up to
EUR100,000 each if a bank collapses, Reuters recounts.

The financial source said the same fund was considering taking
stakes in Banca Marche and Popolare dell'Etruria, Reuters
relates.

According to Reuters, a source familiar with the matter said
Banca Marche needs about EUR1 billion in new capital.  Popolare
Etruria posted a loss of EUR126 million in the first nine months
of 2014 -- the last available data before it was placed under
special administration in February, Reuters notes.

The bank could need as much as EUR500 millio in new funds,
Reuters says, citing some newspaper reports.

The chairman of Intesa Sanpaolo's supervisory board said the bank
is ready to take part in the rescue of the weaker lenders, but
will not buy any, Reuters relays.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


FINDUS COS.: Fitch Plans to Withdraws Ratings
---------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to withdraw its ratings of Findus Pledgeco
S.a.r.l., Findus Bondco S.A. and Findus PIK S.C.A. after a 30-day
period beginning on Sept. 9, 2015.  Fitch will continue to
maintain coverage of Findus prior to withdrawal.

Findus has chosen to stop participating in the rating process.
Fitch reserves the right in its sole discretion to withdraw or
maintain any rating at any time for any reason it deems
sufficient.  Fitch may elect to maintain coverage based on
investor feedback.  Fitch will only provide ratings where it has
sufficient information to rate the issuer or transaction.

This advance notice is provided to permit further investor
feedback to Fitch and for the benefit of users in managing their
use of Fitch's ratings.

Fitch rates Findus:

Findus Pledgeco S.a.r.l.
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR): 'B-'; Rating Watch
Evolving (RWE)

Findus Bondco S.A.
Senior secured: 'B+'; RWE

Findus PIK S.C.A.
Long-term IDR: 'CCC'; RWE
Senior PIK notes: 'CC'; RWE


MALLINCKRODT INT'L: Moody's Rates US$750MM Notes Offering 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of Mallinckrodt
International Finance S.A., including the Ba3 Corporate Family
Rating and the Ba3-PD Probability of Default Rating. Moody's
assigned a B1 rating to the proposed US$750 million notes
offering that will be used, in part, to fund the US$1.325 billion
acquisition of Therakos, Inc.(B3, review for upgrade). The rating
outlook is stable.

Moody's assigned the following ratings of Mallinckrodt
International Finance S.A.:

  New US$750 million Senior Unsecured Notes (with subsidiary
  guarantees), B1 (LGD4)

Moody's affirmed the following ratings of Mallinckrodt
International Finance S.A.:

  Corporate Family Rating, at Ba3

  Probability of Default Rating, at Ba3-PD

  Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, at Ba1 (LGD2)

  Senior Unsecured Notes (with subsidiary guarantees) at B1
  (LGD4)

  Senior Unsecured Notes (without subsidiary guarantees) B2
  (LGD6)

  Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating, at SGL-3

The rating outlook is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's affirmation of the Ba3 Corporate Family Rating reflects
the overall modest impact that the acquisition of Therakos will
have on Mallinckrodt's credit profile. With less than US$200
million of revenue, the Therakos assets will represent around 5%
of Mallinckrodt's total revenue, and the acquisition does not
significantly change Mallinckrodt's scale, diversity or business
risk profile. Moody's forecasts that adjusted debt to EBITDA for
the fiscal year ending September 2015 will rise to 4.4x from 3.5x
with the acquisition of Therako but will decline to the 4.0x
range or below within the next 12-18 months due to growth in
EBITDA. Further, the receipt of approximately US$270 million of
divestiture proceeds from the sale of the CMDS (Contrast Media
and Delivery Systems) business, as well as cash generation will
also provide opportunities for deleveraging.

While the overall impact of the Therakos acquisition is modest,
the deal is credit negative as it comes just several months
following the close of the US$2.3 billion acquisition of Ikaria.
The rapid pace of acquisitions increases integration and
execution risk and also reduces transparency into fundamental
operating performance. Further, Mallinckrodt's recent financial
results showed a marked slowing in growth of its main franchises,
raising questions about the company's ability to sustainably grow
acquired assets. With little in the way of internal research and
development, Mallinckrodt must expand use of its existing
products in order to drive organic growth.

Mallinckrodt's Ba3 Corporate Family Rating is supported by the
company's significant scale and Moody's expectation of growth and
limited competitive threats in the company's key business areas,
which generally have high barriers to entry. The rating is also
supported by Moody's expectation for strong cash flow, creating
the potential for rapid deleveraging. However, Moody's
anticipates that cash flow will be deployed more towards the
acquisition of EBITDA-generating assets rather than debt
repayment.

The Ba3 reflects the potential for operating volatility caused by
Mallinckrodt's high-risk nuclear products business and its
concentration of profits in Acthar and opioids, both of which
also carry exogenous risks. In addition, the ratings are
constrained by Mallinckrodt's aggressive appetite for
acquisitions that will likely lead to increased leverage from
time to time, and risks inherent in a rapidly evolving business
strategy. Given a limited internal research and development
pipeline, Moody's expects Mallinckrodt to pursue additional
acquisitions to drive growth. Further, Mallinckrodt tends to be
attracted to assets that it views as being "undervalued",
generally as a result of high perceived market risk.

The affirmation of the SGL-3 Speculative-Grade Liquidity Rating
reflects our expectation that the company will use substantial
cash and revolver borrowings to fund the Therakos acquisition.
This is mitigated by our expectation of good cash flow and
receipt of divestiture proceeds which will replenish liquidity
over the coming quarters.

The senior secured debt is rated Ba1, reflecting a one notch
downward override from the LGD template implied rating due to
Moody's expectation that over time Mallinckrodt may add more
secured debt to its capital structure. The secured debt benefits
from guarantees from Mallinckrodt plc, the parent company and
reporting entity, and operating subsidiaries and a first lien on
assets of the borrower, the parent, and US subsidiaries
(excluding certain principal properties). Certain unsecured notes
(including the proposed offering) are rated B1 as they have
guarantees from operating subsidiaries. The company's earlier
series of senior unsecured notes due 2018 and 2023, are rated B2
as they are not guaranteed by operating subsidiaries, and hence
are structurally subordinated to the liabilities of subsidiaries.

Moody's could upgrade the ratings if the company sustains good
organic growth and strong predictable free cash flow while
maintaining debt/EBITDA below 3.0x. An upgrade to Ba2 would also
require a significant improvement in liquidity.

Conversely, if Moody's expects Mallinckrodt to sustain
debt/EBITDA above 4.0 times the ratings could be downgraded. This
scenario could arise if Mallinckrodt faces an unexpected decline
in one of its key products or if the company pursues additional
large, debt-funded acquisitions. Further, any weakening of
liquidity could lead to a downgrade.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Pharmaceutical Industry published in December 2012.

Luxembourg-based Mallinckrodt International Finance SA is a
subsidiary of Dublin, Ireland-based Mallinckrodt plc
(collectively "Mallinckrodt"). Mallinckrodt is a specialty
biopharmaceutical and medical imaging company. Revenues for the
12 months ended June 26, 2015 were approximately US$3.5 billion.


MALLINCKRODT INT'L: S&P Rates Proposed US$750MM Notes 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB-' issue-level
rating to the proposed US$750 million of senior unsecured notes
co-issued by Mallinckrodt International Finance S.A. and
Mallinckrodt CB LLC and guaranteed by parent Mallinckrodt PLC.
Proceeds will be used to partly fund parent Mallinckrodt PLC's
purchase of Therakos Inc.  The recovery rating is '4', reflecting
S&P's expectation of average (30% to 50%, at the lower end of the
range) recovery in the event of payment default.

The 'BB-' issue-level ratings and '4' recovery ratings on the
US$900 million 5.75% senior unsecured notes due August 2022,
US$700 million 4.875% senior unsecured notes due April 2020, and
US$700 million 5.5% senior unsecured notes due April 2025 are
unchanged.

The 'B' issue-level rating and '6' recovery rating on the US$300
million 3.50% senior unsecured notes due April 2018 and the
US$600 million 4.75% senior unsecured notes due April 2023 are
also unchanged.  Lower recovery ratings on those tranches of
senior unsecured notes reflect the guarantee from parent
Mallinckrodt PLC and the absence of guarantees from its
subsidiaries.  Those tranches are effectively subordinated to the
rest of Mallinckrodt's senior unsecured notes.

Lastly, the 'BB+' issue-level rating and '1' recovery rating on
Mallinckrodt's senior secured debt remain unchanged after the
company increased the size of its secured revolving credit
facility to US$500 million.

S&P's corporate credit rating on Mallinckrodt is 'BB-' and the
outlook is negative.

S&P's ratings on Mallinckrodt reflect its expectation that the
company will sustain leverage between 4x and 5x over the longer
term, despite a higher acquisition-related level of leverage over
the next year.

S&P's ratings also reflect the company's ability to manufacture
complex generic products, good geographic and product diversity,
and meaningful barriers to entry.  These factors are partially
offset by the company's relatively small size, weak late-stage
pipeline within its branded segment, ongoing pricing pressures in
the generic pharma segment, and below-average profitability
compared with peers.

In S&P's opinion, the acquisition of Therakos bolsters
Mallinckrodt's hospital-based platform (within its branded
specialty business) that also includes Ofirmev and INOMAX.  At
the same time, S&P don't view the acquisition as a significant
enough event to alter its view of the company's business risk at
this time given Therakos' limited addressable market, reliance on
one therapy (extracorporeal electrophoresis), and the need to
offset some lost diversity with the pending sale of its contrast
media and delivery systems (CMDS) imaging business.

RATINGS LIST

Mallinckrodt PLC
   Corporate Credit Rating             BB-/Neg./--

New Ratings

Mallinckrodt International Finance S.A.
Mallinckrodt CB LLC
$750 Mil. Senior Unsecured Notes*     BB-
   Recovery Rating                     4L

*Guaranteed by Mallinckrodt PLC.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ABN AMRO: Fitch Assigns BB+(EXP) Rating to Add'l Tier 1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ABN AMRO Bank NV's upcoming issue of
additional Tier 1 notes an expected rating of 'BB+(EXP)'.

The final rating is contingent upon final documents conforming to
the information already received.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The notes will be CRD IV-compliant perpetual non-cumulative
additional Tier 1 instruments.  The notes are subject to
automatic write-down if ABN AMRO Group's consolidated common
equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio falls below 7% or ABN AMRO Bank's
standalone CET1 falls below 5.125%, and any coupon payments may
be cancelled at the discretion of the bank.

The expected rating is five notches below ABN AMRO Bank's
Viability Rating (VR).  This reflects (i) two notches for loss
severity in light of notes' deep subordination; and (ii) three
notches for additional non-performance risk relative to the VR
given high write-down trigger and fully discretionary coupons.
ABN AMRO Group's consolidated phased-in CET1 ratio (where the 7%
trigger applies) was 14.2% (fully-loaded CET1 ratio of 14.0%) at
end-June 2015.

Fitch expects the Dutch regulator to impose restrictions on
interest payments on the notes should ABN AMRO capital approach
the estimated Pillar 1 limit of 10% CET1 phased in by 2019 (4.5%
minimum CET1 plus 2.5% capital conservation buffer plus 3%
systemic risk buffer).  Given ABN AMRO's solid capital position,
the current level of distributable items and Fitch's expectations
for their evolution, we have limited the notching for non-
performance to three notches.

Given the securities are perpetual, their deep subordination,
coupon flexibility and going concern mandatory write down of the
instruments, Fitch has assigned 100% equity credit.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The notes' rating will likely move in tandem with ABN AMRO Bank's
VR.  The latter is sensitive to a weakening of the bank's earning
generation or asset quality affecting its capital or access
to/cost of wholesale funding.  The notes' rating is also
sensitive to changes in Fitch's assessment of their non-
performance risk relative to that captured in the bank's VR.


DRYDEN 39: Moody's Rates EUR13 Million Class F Notes 'B2'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by Dryden 39 Euro
CLO 2015 B.V. (the "Issuer" or "Dryden CLO"):

EUR221,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR16,895,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029,
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR36,400,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR12,320,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029,
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR25,650,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

EUR1,350,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

EUR22,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

EUR24,000,000 Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

EUR13,000,000 Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2029. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Pramerica
Investment Management Limited ("Pramerica"), has sufficient
experience and operational capacity and is capable of managing
this CLO.

Dryden 39 Euro CLO 2015 B.V. is a managed cash flow CLO. At least
90% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and
senior secured floating rate notes and up to 10% of the portfolio
may consist of unsecured loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine
obligations and high yield bonds. The bond bucket gives the
flexibility to Dryden CLO to hold bonds if Volcker Rule is
changed. The portfolio is expected to be 100% ramped up as of the
closing date and to be comprised predominantly of corporate loans
to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

Pramerica will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the nine classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer issued EUR42.5m of subordinated notes, which are not
rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Pramerica's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
February 2014. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR400,000,000

Diversity Score: 43

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.10%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 41%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Moody's has analyzed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries. As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below. For countries which are not member of the
European Union, the foreign currency country risk ceiling applies
at the same levels under this transaction. Following the
effective date, and given the portfolio constraints and the
current sovereign ratings in Europe, such exposure may not exceed
15% of the total portfolio. As a result and in conjunction with
the current foreign government bond ratings of the eligible
countries, as a worst case scenario, a maximum 15% of the pool
would be domiciled in countries with A3 local or foreign currency
country ceiling. The remainder of the pool will be domiciled in
countries which currently have a local or foreign currency
country ceiling of Aaa or Aa1 to Aa3. Given this portfolio
composition, the model was run with different target par amounts
depending on the target rating of each class as further described
in the methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the
exposure size to peripheral countries and the target ratings of
the rated notes and amount to 2.00% for the Class A-1, and A-2
notes, 1.25% for the Class B-1, and B-2 notes, 0.50% for the
Class C-1 and C-2 and 0% for Classes D, E, and F.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the definitive rating assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3220 from 2800)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3640 from 2800)

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes: -4

Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3


DRYDEN 39: S&P Assigns B- Rating to EUR13MM Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its credit ratings to
Dryden 39 Euro CLO 2015 B.V.'s class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C-1, C-
2, D, E, and F notes.  At closing, Dryden 39 Euro CLO 2015 also
issued an unrated subordinated class of notes.

S&P has assigned its ratings following its assessment of the
transaction's capital structure and the collateral portfolio's
credit quality, a cash flow analysis, and a review of the
transaction documents.  The portfolio at closing was diversified,
primarily comprising broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans and senior secured bonds.  Therefore, S&P has
conducted its credit and cash flow analysis by applying its
criteria for corporate cash flow collateralized debt obligations.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used the target par amount of
EUR400 million, the covenanted weighted-average spread of 4.10%,
the covenanted weighted-average coupon of 6.00%, and the
covenanted weighted-average recovery rates at each rating level.

S&P's analysis also shows that the available credit enhancement
for each rated class of notes is sufficient to withstand the
defaults applicable under the supplemental tests (not counting
excess spread) outlined in S&P's corporate CDO criteria.

S&P considers that the transaction's documented replacement and
remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate its exposure to
counterparty risk under S&P's current counterparty criteria.

Following the application of S&P's criteria for non-sovereign
ratings that exceed EMU sovereign ratings, it considers the
transaction's exposure to country risk to be limited at the
assigned rating levels, as the concentration of the pool
comprising assets in countries rated lower than 'A-' does not
exceed 10% of the aggregate collateral balance.

The transaction's legal structure is bankruptcy remote, in line
with S&P's European legal criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, it believes its ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class
of notes.

Dryden 39 Euro CLO 2015 is a European cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction, securitizing a portfolio of
primarily senior secured loans and bonds issued by speculative-
grade European borrowers.  Pramerica Investment Management Ltd.
is the collateral manager.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Assigned

Dryden 39 Euro CLO 2015 B.V.
EUR415.12 Million Floating- And Fixed-Rate Notes (Including
EUR42.50 Million Subordinated Notes)

Class                 Rating          Amount
                                    (mil. EUR)

A-1                   AAA (sf)        221.00
A-2                   AAA (sf)         16.90
B-1                   AA (sf)          36.40
B-2                   AA (sf)          12.32
C-1                   A (sf)           25.65
C-2                   A (sf)            1.35
D                     BBB (sf)         22.00
E                     BB (sf)          24.00
F                     B- (sf)          13.00
Subordinated          NR               42.50

NR--Not rated.


EA PARTNERS: Fitch Assigns B-(EXP) Rating to Proposed Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned EA Partners I B.V's proposed notes an
expected senior secured rating of 'B-(EXP)' with a Stable
Outlook. The Recovery Rating is 'RR4'.

EA Partners I B.V. will on-lend the proceeds from the notes'
issue to respective obligors (defined as debt obligations).
These notes are secured over assets that represent senior
unsecured claims to the respective obligors.  The rating reflects
our view of the credit profiles of the obligors and is
constrained at 'B-(EXP)' by obligors of the weakest credit
quality.  EA Partners I B.V. is a private company with limited
liability established solely for the purpose of this transaction,
and whose sole shareholder is a foundation.

The assignment of the final rating is contingent on the receipt
of final documents conforming to information already received.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Unsecured Claims

The proceeds from the notes' issue will represent separate debt
obligations of seven obligors, including Etihad Airways PJSC (up
to USD245 million or 18.85% of total), Air Berlin PLC (up to
USD245 million), Jet Airways (India) Limited (up to USD210
million equivalent), Alitalia Societa Aerea Italiana S.p.A. (up
to USD245 million), Air SERBIA, a.d. Belgrade (up to USD105
million), Air Seychelles Limited (up to USD40 million) and Etihad
Airport Services LLC (up to USD210 million). On-lending of
proceeds from this transaction's secured notes will create back-
to-back senior unsecured claims upon the relevant obligors, which
rank behind each obligor's other prior-ranking, including secured
debt.

Weakest Obligor Credit

The rating of the notes reflects Fitch's view of the
creditworthiness, and the senior unsecured ranking, of the
obligors including Fitch's assessment of their links with their
respective parents.

Given the transaction's recourse to each obligor on a several
basis, the rating is constrained at the 'B-(EXP)' level by
obligors of the weakest credit quality.  This is due to the sole
cash flow for the service and repayment of the proposed notes
being the individual cash flow streams from the obligors under
their respective loans.  Failure of any obligor to make interest
or principal payments under its respective debt obligation, which
remains uncured following the re-marketing of the respective debt
obligation and/or through the liquidity pool, may lead to an
event of default under the notes and their acceleration.  This
transaction's noteholders are thus exposed to the underlying
creditworthiness of each individual obligor.

Obligors' Credit Quality Varies

In addition to Etihad Airways, the other obligors are either
Etihad Airways' subsidiaries (eg Etihad Airport Services) or its
equity airline partners (eg Air Berlin, Air Serbia, Air
Seychelles, Alitalia, Jet Airways).  These and its other equity
airline partners are key to Etihad's growth strategy, which aims
at establishing a global network with competitive operational
scale and diversity.

The credit quality of the obligors varies substantially -- from
that of Etihad Airways (A/Stable) whose rating incorporates
strategic, operational and, to a lesser extent, legal ties with
its sole shareholder Abu Dhabi (AA/Stable), to that of obligors
with the weakest credit quality -- which has constrained the
proposed notes' rating.  While the obligors with the weakest
profiles also benefit from the shareholder support of their
minority parent, Etihad Airways, their standalone profiles remain
weak largely due to weak credit metrics.

Liquidity Pool

The proposed transaction contains a liquidity pool, its only
cross-collateralized feature (excluding its ratchet account
component, which is not cross-collateralized), which is available
to service the interest or principal on the notes, if an obligor
fails to pay an interest or principal on its respective debt
obligation when due.

However, the amount of the liquidity pool is limited to 4.75% of
initial amounts raised.  Fitch estimates that this amount
captured is sufficient to cover around nine months of interest
payments under the proposed notes.  It also represents 12 months
of interest payments for all obligors, except for the stronger
Etihad Airways and Etihad Airport Services.  If over 25% of the
initial deposits, which account for most of the liquidity pool,
is drawn to cure a default of an obligor to pay interest on its
debt obligation, this may trigger the re-marketing of the
respective debt obligation.  Contractually, the liquidity pool
does not have to be replenished if it is used to service the
notes.

Cross Default

The notes do not have a cross-default provision, which means that
a default by one obligor under its debt obligation does not
constitute an event of default under other debt obligations
incurred under this transaction by other obligors.  However,
events of default under each debt obligation include a customary
cross-default provision which states that a failure by the
respective 'obligor or any of its material subsidiaries to pay
any of its own financial indebtedness when due' will lead to an
event of default under the debt obligations of this obligor but
not of any other obligor other than in the case of Etihad Airways
and Etihad Airport Services as described below.

Theoretically, upon an uncured event of default by one of the
weakest entities, after use of the liquidity pool and no take-up
under the re-marketing mechanism, the notes are in default and
can be accelerated.  Noteholders would look to non-defaulted
entities to meet their obligations under this transaction but any
shortfall resulting from the defaulted entity would not be an
obligation of these other transaction parties.

Etihad Airport Services is considered a material subsidiary of
Etihad Airways under this transaction's documentation.
Therefore, an uncured failure by Etihad Airport Services to make
payments under this transaction's debt obligation will constitute
an event of default under Etihad Airways' debt obligation under
this transaction.  Etihad Airways or any other non-defaulting
obligor may also provide support to other obligors by purchasing
their debt obligations through the 're-marketing event', if it
takes place upon default of another obligor on its payments under
the debt obligation.  However, this can be exercised at Etihad
Airways' or any other non-defaulting obligor's discretion and is
not an obligation under this transaction.

This lack of a legal obligation to support other entities
underpins this transaction's rating approach based on the credit
profile of the weakest obligors rather than on the stronger
entities supporting the weakest.

Foundation-Owned Issuer

The issuer is a private company with limited liability
incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands and has no
authorized share capital.  Stichting EA Partners I, a foundation
incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands, is the sole
shareholder of the issuer.  The issuer was established for the
purpose of the issue of the notes and lending of the notes'
proceeds to the seven obligors.  Stichting has contributed
additional equity to the issuer of EUR2 million, which was in
turn provided by Air Berlin.

Proceeds for Refinancing and Capex

The purpose of the proposed transaction is to provide a financing
platform to the airline, cargo and ground services businesses
that are part of Etihad's partner network.  Air Berlin and Air
Seychelles plan to use the proceeds of their debt obligations
mostly for refinancing purposes whereas Etihad Airways, Etihad
Airport Services, Air Serbia, Jet Airways and Alitalia intend to
use the proceeds mainly to finance capex and/or working capital
and for other general corporate purposes.

FX Risk

The debt obligation of Jet Airways will be denominated in Indian
rupee while the debt obligations of other obligors and the notes
will be denominated in USD.  FX risk is expected to be mitigated
through a hedge transaction that the issuer is to enter into with
a bank.

Average Recovery Prospect

Fitch assess the recovery (given default) prospect of the notes
as average (31%-50%, 'RR4') based on the average of our
assessment of the recovery prospects of the obligors and their
respective country caps.  Recovery prospects can be supported by
successful re-marketing of performing debt obligations at higher
than par.

KEY RATING ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- The proceeds from the notes' issue will be on-lent to seven
      obligors.

   -- This transaction's notes are secured over assets that
      represent senior unsecured claims to respective obligors.

   -- The notes do not have a cross-default provision.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

   -- The improvement of the credit quality of the obligors with
      the weakest credit profiles

   -- Improvement of the recovery prospects for the senior
      unsecured creditors of the obligors of the weakest credit
      quality, unless there are limitations due to country-
      specific treatment of Recovery Ratings.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- The deterioration of the credit quality of the obligors
      with the weakest credit profiles

   -- Worsening of the recovery prospects to below-average for
      the senior unsecured creditors of the obligors of the
      weakest credit quality.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


KOMPANIA WEGLOWA: Gov't May Use TF Silesia to Rescue Business
-------------------------------------------------------------
Anna Koper and Adrian Krajewski at Reuters report that an
official agenda for a cabinet meeting on Sept. 7 showed Poland's
treasury ministry wants to transfer part of its stakes in gas
group PGNiG, insurer PZU and utility PGE into state-run
investment fund TF Silesia.

A treasury spokesman declined to comment on the reason for such a
move, Reuters notes.  Local media, however, said the government
wants to use TF Silesia, among other state entities, to rescue
state-controlled Kompania Weglowa, which is on the brink of
bankruptcy due to high costs and falling coal prices, Reuters
relates.

The treasury spokesman did not specify what size of stakes would
be transferred, Reuters discloses.  In return, the fund would
issue new shares to the government as under Polish law the
treasury cannot just transfer stakes into the fund, Reuters
relays.

Kompania Weglowa is a Polish coal producer.



===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


T-2: Majority Owner Challenges Receivership
-------------------------------------------
Slovenska Tiskovna Agencija reports that Garnol, T-2's majority
owner, filed on Sept. 9, 2015, a petition with the Constitutional
Court challenging a decision by the Ljubljana Higher Court to
send the Company into receivership and has asked the court to
suspend the implementation of the Aug. decision on receivership
pending its final ruling in the case.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter on Aug. 12, 2015,
STA reported that the Ljubljana District Court put T-2 into
receivership.

STA adds that the Company was sent into receivership at the
request of the Bank Asset Management Company.

According to STA, Garnol claims that: (i) the Higher Court had
failed to present it with the creditors' appeal to give it the
chance to respond to the allegations, thus denying it the right
to a fair trial; (ii) the court had applied reform insolvency
legislation retroactively, changing the legislative framework and
conditions under which compulsory settlement was endorsed by 75%
of the creditors; and (iii) there is an absence of economic
reasons for receivership.

Citing Garnol, STA relates that the Company had EUR245 million in
assets and EUR61.9 million in capital at the end of 2014.  The
report states that before the procedure was launched, the Company
had planned net revenues to the tune of EUR64.4 million and a net
profit of EUR3.3 million for the year, which would be up 13% and
385% on 2014.

T-2 is one of Slovenia's biggest broadband and IPTV providers.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


NATIONAL ELECTRIC: Makes Last Payment to 106 Creditors
------------------------------------------------------
Simon Warburton at just-auto reports that National Electric
Vehicle Sweden says it is now debt free after making the second
and last payment to 106 creditors on Sept. 9.

NEVS exited reorganization in April this year with a composition
proposal approved by 98% of creditors, just-auto relates.

This May, NEVS unveiled the city of Tianjin and State Research
Information Technology as its new shareholders, just-auto
recounts.

The injection from the new investors has been implemented as
planned, just-auto discloses.

                          About NEVS

National Electric Vehicle Sweden AB (NEVS) is a Swedish holding
company.  NEVS is majority owned by British Virgin Islands-
registered, Hong Kong-based, National Modern Energy Holdings
Ltd., an energy company with operations in China, Macau, and Hong
Kong.  NEVS bought bankrupt carmaker Saab in 2012.

On August 29, 2014, NEVS convinced a Swedish court to grant it
creditor protection while it buys time to finalize negotiations
for funding.

On April 15, 2015, NEVS exited bankruptcy protection after
securing a write-down of debt owed to suppliers.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


TERRA BANK: Court Arrests Bank's Head of Supervisory Council
------------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the Holosiyevsky District Court of
Kyiv has arrested head of the supervisory council of insolvent
Terra Bank (Kyiv) Serhiy Klymenko for up to 60 days and bail has
been set at UAH15 million, while the Kyiv prosecutor's office has
stated it suspects member of the bank supervisory council Yulia
Obletsova of committing a criminal offense, according to the
Individuals' Deposit Guarantee Fund.

"These citizens are suspected of embezzling the depositors' funds
(Part 5 of Article 191 of the Criminal Code) within the intention
bringing the bank to bankruptcy. The matter concerns the
embezzlement of property in especially large amounts (more than
UAH 1 billion) by abuse of official position," the fund said, the
news agency relays.

It emphasized that the criminal case was opened after the
relevant statements of the fund and its interim administrator at
Terra Bank, Interfax-Ukraine relates.

"It has been established that Klymenko, using his official
position, in January-February 2014 withdrew substantial funds,
attracted by the bank from individuals, to a number of false
companies in the form of unsecured loans. These operations have
all the signs of fraud, as these companies had no collateral
required by loan agreements and did not perform economic
activities," the fund, as cited by Interfax-Ukraine, said.

The fund said in its report, Klymenko and his partners have
repeatedly tried to impede the investigation and make attempts to
avoid justice. In this regard, it was decided to detain the
suspect and apply for his arrest in court, adds Interfax-Ukraine.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ARROW GLOBAL: S&P Affirms B+ Counterparty Rating, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised to stable from
negative its outlook on U.K.-based purchaser of distressed
consumer debt, Arrow Global Group PLC (Arrow Global).  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+' counterparty credit rating on
Arrow Global and its 'BB-' senior secured issue rating on the
senior secured debt issued by funding entity Arrow Global
Finance.  The recovery rating remains unchanged at '2' (it is now
in the lower half of the range, where previously it was in the
higher half).

The outlook revision follows improving leverage metrics in the
first half of 2015, supported by a sound financial performance,
and reflects S&P's assumption that management will not materially
increase leverage from current levels.  It also reflects the
progress Arrow Global has made in integrating CapQuest, another
U.K.-based purchaser of distressed debt, acquired last year for
GBP158 million.

In S&P's base-case scenario for Arrow Global, it assumes
sustained average annual growth in adjusted EBITDA of about 25%
in 2015 and 2016, and a slowdown in growth in total debt after a
material increase in the past 12 months on the back of the
acquisition of CapQuest and some smaller Portuguese entities.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- A ratio of gross debt to Standard & Poor's adjusted-EBITDA
      trending down more comfortably to 3x-4x in 2015 and 2016
      (where EBITDA includes portfolio amortization [a noncash
      item]).  Adjusted EBITDA coverage of gross cash interest
      expenses well within 3x-6x in 2015 and 2016.

As of Dec. 31, 2014, adjusted debt was GBP421 million, including
the impact of several analytical adjustments in S&P's debt
calculations; in particular, S&P excludes reported cash and add
the present value of future lease payments, calculated using a 7%
discount rate.  S&P notes that adjusted debt has increased by
close to GBP60 million in the first half of 2015.  This followed
sustained portfolio purchases and the acquisition of two
Portuguese entities, Whitestar and Gesphone, which were financed
by drawing on the existing revolving credit facility (RCF).

S&P's assessment of Arrow Global's "weak" business risk profile
is unchanged and remains constrained by S&P's view of the
regulatory risks that the U.K. debt purchasing industry faces.
Although S&P considers that the group has an adequate risk
control framework to manage current regulatory and operational
risks, it notes the potential for future uncertainties following
the industry's oversight being passed to the Financial Conduct
Authority.

The benefits of Arrow Global's acquisition of CapQuest have yet
to fully materialize, in S&P's view.  However, S&P notes that the
CapQuest integration could eventually support Arrow Global's
business risk profile.  In S&P's view, Arrow Global's transition
toward being both an in-house and outsourced collections model--
having previously operated solely under an outsourced collection
model--could enhance its collection capabilities and support the
growth of fee income related to collection activities for third
parties, thereby improving revenue-base stability.

The recovery rating on the senior secured bonds remains at '2',
reflecting S&P's continued expectation of substantial (70%-90%;
lower half of the range) recovery if a payment default occurs.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that leverage and debt-
servicing metrics will remain in line with its current assessment
of the financial risk profile.  S&P's base case is predicated on
continued growth in total collections, further synergies from the
CapQuest integration and the total amount of debt growing slower
than cash-flow generation.

S&P could raise its ratings on Arrow Global if the company
continues to demonstrate that it will gradually reduce its
leverage after the spike last year, which was linked to the debt-
funded acquisition of CapQuest.  This could lead S&P to remove
the one notch downward adjustment it currently factors into the
ratings, based on S&P's assessment of its financial policy.
Although less likely at this stage, S&P could also raise the
ratings if it saw greater diversification in the franchise,
supporting the future stability of earnings, for instance with a
material increase in fee income generated in collection services
for third parties.

S&P could lower the ratings if it saw a material increase in
leverage tolerance levels by management, a failure in Arrow
Global's control framework, or adverse changes in the regulatory
environment.


CABOT FINANCIAL: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term
counterparty credit rating on U.K.-based debt purchaser Cabot
Financial Ltd. to 'B+' from 'B'.  The outlook is stable.

S&P also affirmed the 'B+' issue rating on Cabot Financial
(Luxembourg) S.A.'s senior secured term notes and revised down
the recovery rating on the notes to '3' (higher half of range)
from '2' (lower half of range).  A recovery rating of '3'
reflects S&P's expectation of meaningful (50% to 70%; higher half
of the range) recovery if a payment default occurs.

The upgrade reflects S&P's view that Cabot's increased earnings
capacity and subsequent growth in total collections will lead to
an improvement in leverage and debt-servicing metrics in the
second half of 2015 and in 2016.  It also reflects S&P's
expectation that Cabot's ratio of gross debt to Standard & Poor's
adjusted-EBITDA will remain below 5x.

S&P's base-case operating scenario factors in Cabot's:

   -- Improving earnings capacity given a growing backbook of
      debt portfolios.

   -- Better collection capabilities through its association with
      majority owner U.S.-based debt purchaser Encore Capital
      Group and the recently completed migration of the Marlin
      and Cabot accounts to a single operating platform.

   -- Alternative avenues for revenue generation following the
      company's investment in enhancing its collections through
      litigating non-paying accounts on its backbook.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Around GBP50 million investment in litigation-enhanced
      capabilities in 2015, decreasing to around GBP20 million in
      2016.

   -- Increased adjusted-EBITDA growth in 2016, given the lagged
      impact of realizing returns on recent investments and
      portfolio acquisitions.

   -- Compared with 2014, gross debt to be 20%-25% higher in 2015
      following the use of a GBP90 million senior secured bridge
      facility and the drawdown of its revolving credit facility
      (RCF) to fund a large portfolio acquisition.

   -- Interest expense to pick up in 2015, and increase slightly
      in 2016.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- A ratio of gross debt to Standard & Poor's adjusted-EBITDA
      of 4x-5x.  Adjusted EBITDA to interest expense of 2x-3x
      (EBITDA for both credit measures is gross of portfolio
      amortization [a noncash item]).

As of Dec. 31, 2014, adjusted debt was GBP774 million, including
the impact of several analytical adjustments in S&P's debt
calculations; in particular, S&P do not net reported cash from
gross debt, and we add the present value of future lease
payments, calculated using a 7% discount rate.  S&P notes that as
of June 30, 2015, adjusted debt increased to around GBP954
million. This followed the acquisition of a significant portfolio
through the purchase of midsize debt purchaser, dlc, which was
financed via a GBP90 million senior secured bridge facility and
drawing GBP88 million under the existing RCF.

S&P's assessment of Cabot's "weak" business risk profile is
unchanged and remains constrained by S&P's view of the regulatory
risks that the U.K. debt purchasing industry faces.  Although S&P
considers that the group has an adequate risk control framework
to manage current regulatory and operational risks, S&P notes the
potential for future uncertainties following the industry's
oversight being passed to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
In S&P's view, the FCA could apply a more stringent, conduct-
focused risk agenda and enforce closer regulations and tougher
sanctions, if deemed necessary.  S&P considers that these risks
are notable for Cabot given its relatively monoline business
focus on debt purchasing and limited geographical diversification
outside the U.K.

Supportive factors for Cabot's business risk profile continue to
be its leading position in the U.K. distressed receivables
purchase market and relatively long track record relative to
rated peers.  S&P views Cabot's established relationships with a
variety of debt sellers as a positive for the rating and note its
solid pricing processes and track record of predicting actual
collections.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the company's
leverage and debt-servicing metrics will remain in line with
S&P's current assessment of the financial risk profile.  S&P's
base case is predicated on an increase in Cabot's earnings
capacity, continued growth in total collections, and the company
not materially increasing its debt.

S&P could lower the rating if it believed that Cabot were unable
to sustainably maintain stronger credit ratios.  Such a scenario
could unfold if S&P saw signs of a return to a more aggressive
financial policy, for example raising additional debt to fund a
large debt-financed acquisition.  Specifically, S&P could lower
the rating if Cabot's leverage or debt-servicing metrics breached
the thresholds S&P's criteria ascribe to an "aggressive"
financial risk profile, namely:

   -- A ratio of gross debt to Standard & Poor's-adjusted EBITDA
      plus portfolio amortization (a noncash item) above 5x; or

   -- An adjusted EBITDA coverage of gross cash interest expenses
      below 2x.

S&P could also lower the rating if it witness material declines
in total collections, or an unanticipated rise in costs, which
reduce the group's earnings capacity.

At this time, S&P considers an upgrade unlikely.  S&P could
consider raising the rating if Cabot demonstrates further
significant deleveraging well beyond S&P's existing expectations.
S&P could also raise the rating if Cabot establishes diverse
geographical and business revenue streams, to the extent that
reducing concentrations help mitigate the regulatory and
operational risks present in the U.K.


DALKEITH TRANSPORT: Bought Out of Administration by Palletways
--------------------------------------------------------------
Carol Millett at MotorTransport reports that Palletways bought
Dalkeith Transport and Storage for the second time this year,
after it went into administration in August.

Dalkeith has been acquired twice in two months by Palletways,
MotorTransport relates.

The pallet network bought Dalkeith on July 27 but was forced to
put it into administration on Aug. 21, MotorTransport discloses.

Dalkeith Transport and Storage is a Scottish haulage company


EGRET FUNDING I: Moody's Rates EUR12.2MM Class E Notes 'B1(sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
actions on the following classes of notes issued by Egret Funding
CLO I Plc:

  EUR288.75MM (current outstanding balance of EUR 32.7) Class A
  Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on Dec 31, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR30.2MM (current outstanding balance of EUR 28.2M) Class B
  Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on Dec 31, 2014 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  EUR24.6MM Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
  Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 31, 2014 Upgraded to A2
  (sf)

  EUR23.1MM Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
  Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 31, 2014 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

  EUR12.25MM (current outstanding balance of EUR 10.85M) Class E
  Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed B1 (sf);
  previously on Dec 31, 2014 Affirmed B1 (sf)

Egret Funding CLO I Plc, issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by
Lyxor Asset Management UK LLP. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in December 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of Class C notes is primarily a result of the
significant deleveraging of the Class A Notes and the subsequent
increase in the overcollateralization ratios ("OC ratios"). Class
A has paid down by EUR81.1 million (88.7% of closing balance)
since October 2014. As a result of this deleveraging, the
overcollateralization ratios (or "OC ratios") of the Class A/B
and Class C Notes have materially increased. As per the trustee
report dated June 2015, the OC ratios of Classes A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E are 209.72%, 149.40%, 117.63%, 106.95%,
versus 145.7%, 124.18%, 109.06%, 103.16% respectively as at
October 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR129.4
million, defaulted par of EUR10.5 million, a weighted average
default probability of 23.9% (consistent with a WARF of 3522 over
a weighted average life of 4.2 years) a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 42.4% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 15 and a weighted average spread of 3.47%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 72.7% of the portfolio exposed to first-lien
senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default,
8.8% exposed to non-first-lien loan corporate assets would
recover 15%, and 17.5% exposed to structured finance assets would
recover 26.03%. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Moody's notes that after this analysis was completed, the July
2015 trustee report has been issued. There is no material change
in key portfolio metrics such as WARF, diversity score, and
weighted average spread as well as OC ratios for Classes B, C, D
and E from their June 2015 levels.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 3%; the model generated outputs
that were unchanged for Classes A and B, and within one notch of
the base-case results for Classes C, D, and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

(1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

(2) Around 25% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed
large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate
as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions", published in October 2009 and
available at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461.

(3) Recovery on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

(4) The transaction has significant concentrations to senior CLO
tranches in the portfolio, whose credit quality has improved
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report,
the CLO securities in the portfolio currently amount to about
EUR22.7 million, accounting for approximately 17.5% of the
performing par.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


ELLI INVESTMENTS: Moody's Lowers Corp. Family Rating to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Corporate Family
Rating (CFR) and Probability of Default Rating (PDR) of Elli
Investments Limited ('Four Seasons Health Care', 'FSHC', or 'the
Company') to Caa3 and Caa3-PD from Caa1 and Caa1-PD respectively.
At the same time, Moody's has downgraded to B2 from B1 the rating
of the Super Senior Bank Facility and to Caa3 from B3 the rating
of the Senior Secured Notes; both of these instruments are
borrowed at Elli Finance (UK) plc. The Caa3 rating of the
Unsecured Notes borrowed at Elli Investments Limited has also
been downgraded to Ca. The outlook is negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects Moody's expectation that earnings and cash
flow in the remainder of 2015 and through 2016 will continue to
be depressed. Given limited prospects for significant and rapid
improvement in recent earnings trends, notwithstanding a gradual
move towards higher value care offerings, Moody's believes that
there could be substantial cash burn in the coming 12 months,
raising its concerns surrounding liquidity depletion and
probability of default.

In the first half of 2015, the company reported EBITDA at GBP20.8
million, which compared with GBP33.4 million in the prior year.
The main causes of this decline continued to include the shortage
of qualified nurses across the sector, which has continued to
drive up wage costs for all care providers in the sector at a
rate that is not being fully offset by overall fee increases. The
impact of rising costs is being intensified by the necessity to
recruit agency personnel and Moody's expects that, in the absence
of material fee rate growth most notably from local authorities,
minimum and living wage increases recently announced (which will
come into effect from April 2016) will exacerbate these trends
further, both over the coming quarters and beyond.

While embargoes on resident admissions have been gradually
reducing and recently reached a two year low, and longer term
demand is supported by favorable demographic trends, in the first
quarter of FY2015 the Company also reported that, due to the
sector-wide and nationally high winter mortality rate, occupancy
rates in its care homes had fallen from 87.6% (at FYE2014) to
85.7% and that recovery would be slow. This latter point was
exemplified by a further contraction in quarter two care home
occupancy to 84.9%.

In December 2014, FSHC announced that it had reached an agreement
with its banks to revise the covenants for its GBP40 million
Revolving Credit Facility ('RCF') to a super senior leverage
covenant of 1.2x as opposed to the previous gross leverage test
of 7.5x (measured as total group debt/EBITDA). Following this
announcement, the RCF was converted to term debt, while a GBP50
million equity contribution was also moved from outside to inside
the Restricted Group. These measures secured a further source of
liquidity, such that cash resources of GBP51.3 million were held
at the end of June 2015. However, notwithstanding this positive
feature, Moody's expects that substantial cash depletion over the
coming quarters will stem from: 1) bi-annual interest payments on
the Senior Secured Notes and Unsecured Notes of c.GBP26 million,
or GBP52 million p.a., as well as interest payable on the Super
Senior Bank Facility; and 2) high levels of ongoing maintenance
capex, of around GBP30 million per annum based on FY2014 numbers.

In addition, while the Company has completed the operational
segmentation process of its homes, Moody's notes that the
deployment of some related capex is still underway and that
significant development capex is planned in line with the
Company's strategic development aims of moving towards more
remunerative private pay and higher dependency care. However,
Moody's also notes the mitigating factor that actual commitments
associated with development spend are limited at any one point in
time, which provides some flexibility. In addition, to an extent,
planned maintenance capex spend may be offset by the targeted
disposal of non-performing / non-strategic homes and the sale of
investment properties which could support liquidity. Overall,
however, given Moody's expectation of continued weakening in
FSHC's earnings profile, it believes that the Company's
substantial cash commitments could result in it consuming
available liquidity rapidly.

Structural Considerations

The revised GBP40 million Super Senior Bank Facility, which
matures in December 2017, retains the same security as
previously, such that it remains senior to both the Senior
Secured Notes due 2019 and the Unsecured Notes due 2020. The
credit facility and the GBP350 million Senior Secured Notes are
borrowed at Elli Finance (UK) plc and benefit from pari-passu
ranking guarantees from all material FSHC group entities, which
must represent a minimum of 80% of all the group assets and
EBITDA. While both instruments benefit from a pledge of
essentially all group assets, primarily comprising PPE and
investment properties with a combined balance sheet value of
around GBP820 million, the B2 rating assigned to the Super Senior
Bank Facility (Loss Given Default (LGD) of 1) is a reflection of
the instrument's super seniority in the event of an enforcement
of the collateral, with only the remaining proceeds to be applied
to the Senior Secured Notes (Caa3, LGD 3). The Ca (LGD 5) rating
on the GBP175 million Unsecured Notes, issued at Elli Investments
Limited, reflects their junior ranking behind a sizable portion
of the FSHC group's secured debt and the subordinated nature of
its guarantees.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook primarily reflects Moody's concern that
lower profitability and cash generation will exert substantial
pressure on the Company's overall liquidity in the coming 12
months, thereby increasing default probability.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

In light of the action and negative outlook, upward pressure on
the rating is unlikely currently, however could be considered if
the Company reverses the recent negative earnings trend,
resulting in EBITDA -maintenance capex / interest rising to above
1.0x on a sustainable basis, a stable liquidity profile and no
covenant concerns. Given the rating positioning, the rating would
likely be downgraded in the event that liquidity becomes further
depleted.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Healthcare Service Providers published in December 2011.

Four Seasons Health Care is a leading provider of health and
social care services in the UK. In FY2014, it reported revenues
of circa GBP713 million, operating around 22,500 beds through
about 470 care homes and facilities. Following the acquisition of
several homes from the former Southern Cross portfolio in 2011,
FSHC became the largest independent provider of elderly care
services in the UK. Elli Investments Limited is an intermediate
holding company of FSHC Group Holdings Limited, while the
ultimate owner is Elli Capital Limited, which is owned by private
equity firm Terra Firma.


SMILES ENGINEERING: Creditors to Face Nearly GBP900K Shortfall
--------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Ord at Insider reports that the taxman and a North East
investment fund look set to bear the brunt of a near GBP900,000
shortfall as part of the administration of a Newcastle-
headquartered engineer. Smiles Engineering (North East) Ltd's
insolvency resulted in jobs being cut after it "lost a major
contract and was unable to recover," the report says.

The business was founded more than 35 years ago and specialised
in rebuilding engines for bus and commercial fleet owners, which
saved fuel, improved reliability and extended the service life of
the vehicle.

But Steven Philip Ross and Ian William Kings of Baker Tilly
Restructuring and Recovery were appointed as administrators on
June 26, 2015 and the company has since ceased trading, Insider
relates.

Now, a statement of affairs filed by the administrators details
the sums owed in light of the collapse, according to Insider.

Insider, citing the administrators report, discloses that
unsecured creditors are owed GBP874,024. However, they look set
to recoup just GBP7,586, meaning a shortfall of about GBP866,438
is expected.  Of that total, HM Revenue & Customs is owed about
GBP217,953.

NEL Fund Managers, which backed the company in both 2013 and 2014
through its Finance for Business North East Growth Fund, is owed
about GBP245,030.

At the time of the administration, a spokesman from Baker Tilly
told Insider: "The company lost a major contract and was unable
to recover. A rescue deal was sought but a suitable buyer could
not be found in time.

"Eighteen people have been made redundant as a result of the
close down of the business," Baker Tilly said, relays Insider.


VEDANTA RESOURCES: S&P Puts 'BB-' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had placed its
'BB-' foreign currency long-term corporate credit rating on
Vedanta Resources PLC and the 'BB-' long-term issue ratings on
the company's guaranteed notes and loans on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  Vedanta is a London-headquartered oil and
metals company with most of its operations in India.

"The CreditWatch placement reflects our view that Vedanta's
proposed merger of subsidiary Cairn India Ltd. with intermediate
holding company Vedanta Ltd. is critical for the company to
withstand a weakness in commodity prices," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Mehul Sukkawala.  However, the completion of the
merger is uncertain, in S&P's view.  Vedanta's cash flows have
deteriorated more than S&P expected owing to a recent decline in
commodity prices.  At the same time, the company is seeking to
arrange funds to refinance its US$2 billion debt due in mid-2016
and avoid a potential breach of its financial covenants over the
next three months.

The decline in commodity prices in recent months has lowered the
company's cash flows.  Oil prices remain weak, aluminum (both
London Metals Exchange prices and the physical premium) prices
have weakened significantly, and zinc prices have softened.  The
lower prices have a material impact on Vedanta because zinc
accounts for the largest share of the company's EBITDA, and S&P
expects aluminum to become a large contributor to EBITDA
following the company's planned ramp-up at Jharsuguda (a smelter
in Orissa) and subsidiary Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd. (Balco).

S&P believes Vedanta will continue to ramp up its Jharsuguda
operations although it has postponed the ramp-up of Balco
operations by nine to 12 months.  It has also pushed some of the
capital expenditure to fiscal 2018 (year ended March 31) from
fiscal 2017.  Nevertheless, S&P expects the company's financial
ratios to remain in line with a "highly leveraged" financial risk
profile in fiscal 2017.

Vedanta's proposed merger will strengthen the company's financial
ratios if it can overcome the challenges surrounding the deal.
The merger could strengthen the company's financial ratios to
levels in line with an "aggressive" financial risk profile in
fiscal 2017.  However, uncertainty remains over the conclusion of
the merger until a shareholders' vote, which S&P believes would
happen in the latter half of the December quarter in 2015.

S&P has revised its assessment of Vedanta's liquidity to "less
than adequate" from "adequate" to reflect S&P's view that the
company will not have adequate headroom under its financial
covenant related to the ratio of net debt to EBITDA for the 12
months ended Sept. 30, 2015.  S&P believes the covenant headroom
will be about 5% as compared with our requirement of 15% headroom
for an "adequate" liquidity assessment.

S&P expects Vedanta to meet the covenant testing for Sept. 2015
as it is seeking to reduce net debt by lowering working capital.
The covenant headroom will likely improve by March 2016 with
continuing generation of positive free operating cash flows and
some improvement in operating performance.  In addition, S&P
believes that Vedanta has good banking relationships, which
should help the company to tie-up refinancing over the next two
to three months for the US$2 billion maturities in mid-2016.
These factors along with the potential for successful completion
of the merger have resulted in S&P revising its assessment of
comparable rating analysis to "positive" from "neutral."

"We aim to resolve the CreditWatch placement after Cairn India
shareholder's vote on the proposed merger is complete," said
Mr. Sukkawala.  "We could affirm the rating if shareholders vote
in favor of the merger.  However, a negative vote could result in
a downgrade."

The CreditWatch resolution could be triggered if rating pressure
increases on account of: (1) a change or delay in the proposed
merger; or (2) weaker operating and financial performance and
covenant headroom than S&P expects due to lower commodity prices
or a change in regulations.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Company Insolvencies in Western Europe Expected to Drop in 2015
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Coface on Sept. 10 disclosed that company insolvencies in Western
Europe have experienced two successive storms.  The subprime
crisis, which made insolvencies jump by an average of +11% in the
twelve countries studied was, unsurprisingly, followed by further
shock waves, with increases of +8% in 2012 and +5% in 2013. Today
the skies have begun to clear.  The average drop of 9% observed
in 2014 will continue with -7% in 2015.   While insolvencies
continue to increase in Italy and Norway, they are seeing the
positive impact of the timid recovery in the eurozone in ten
other countries (Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the
Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom and Sweden).

Contrasting Decreases Depending on the Country

Although there is a marked improvement in 10 of the 12 countries
studied (with the exception of Norway and Italy), the dynamics
differ across countries and current insolvency levels are not yet
comparable to pre-crisis levels.  Indeed, most countries have not
yet returned to their 2008 levels.  This is all the more
noticeable in the southern European countries of Italy, Portugal
and Spain, where the continuing high levels of unemployment are
dampening growth potential.

However, the outlook is improving, mainly due to private
consumption: the eurozone's GDP increased by 0.3% in Q2 2015,
confirming the recovery.  Coface forecasts that growth in the
eurozone is expected to reach 1.5% in 2015 and 1.6% in 2016,
following on from 0.9% in 2014.

The zone's importing countries have also benefited from the
depreciation of the euro and the fall in oil prices.  However, a
close watch should be kept on risks linked to slower growth in
emerging countries.

Another fly in the ointment is the low level of investment in the
eurozone.  In this area too, pre-crisis levels have not been
reached (19.5% of GDP in 2014 against 23% in 2007).  Despite more
favorable financing conditions related to the fall in interest
rates, investment has not really kicked off again.  Poor dynamism
in relation to anticipated demand is discouraging business
investment.  As the rate of use of businesses' capacities fell
due to the crisis, this is also delaying productive investment.
However, there has been a modest recovery since the beginning of
the year, thanks to private consumption and an improved business
climate.

2015 in line with 2014

For 2015, the business failure forecasting model developed by
Coface economists predicts a further decrease, on average of
around 7%, for the twelve Western European countries in the
sample.

This model includes such variables as business climate,
investment and the number of building permits issued.

The conditions for growth resuming in the eurozone will be
particularly favorable for the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal.
The expected drops will be less marked in Germany (-2%) and in
France (-3%).

Italy and Norway, the two countries still in the red in 2014,
will remain there in 2015.  Business liquidations will continue
to increase, for different reasons.  In Italy (where they are
estimated to increase by +7% in 2015, following +11% in 2014),
the insolvency risk is accentuated by the omnipresence of small
businesses, less secure than other categories, as well as a
slight recovery.  In Norway, the world's seventh largest oil
exporter, the increase in insolvencies (+6% in 2014 and 2015) is
in line with the fall in oil prices.


* BOOK REVIEW: The Financial Giants In United States History
------------------------------------------------------------
Author: Meade Minnigerode
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 260 pages
List Price: $34.95
Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/tJWvs2

The financial giants were Stephen Girard, John Jacob Astor, Jay
Cooke, Daniel Drew, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jay Gould, and Jim
Fisk.

The accomplishments of some have made them household names today.
But all were active in the mid 1800s. This was a time when the
United States, having freed itself from Great Britain only a few
decades earlier, was gaining its stride as an independent nation.
The country was expanding westward, starting to engage in
significant international trade, and laying the foundations for
becoming a major industrial power. Astor, Vanderbilt, Gould, and
the others played major parts in all these areas. During the
Civil War in the first half of the 1860s, some became leading
suppliers of goods or financiers to the Federal government.

Minnigerode's focus is the highlights of the life of each of the
seven. Along with this, he identifies each one's prime
characteristics contributing to his road to fortune and how his
life turned out in the end. Not all of the men managed to keep
and pass on the fortunes they amassed. They are seen a "financial
giants" not only because they made fortunes in the early days of
American business and industry, but also for their place in
laying out the groundwork for American business enterprise,
innovation, and leadership, and for the notoriety they had in
their day.

Minnigerode summarizes the style or achievement of each man in a
single word or short phrase. Stephan Girard is "The Merchant
Banker"; Cornelius Vanderbilt, "The Commodore." "The Old Man of
the Street" summarizes Daniel Drew"; with "The Wizard of Wall
Street" summarizing Jay Gould. Jim Fisk is "The Mountebank."

Jay Cooke, "The Tycoon," was to be "known throughout the country
for his astonishingly successful handling of the great Federal
loans which financed the Civil War." After the War, one of the
leaders of the Confederacy remarked that the South was really
defeated in the Federal Treasury Department thus, even on the
enemy side, giving recognition to Cooke's invaluable work of
enabling the Federal government to meet the huge costs of the
War. After the War, having earned the reputation as "the foremost
financier in the country," Cooke became involved in many large
financial ventures, including the building of a railroad to link
the East and West coasts of America. In this railroad venture,
however, Cooke and his banking firm made a fatal misstep in
investing in the Northern Pacific railway. The Northern Pacific
turned out to be a house of cards. When Cooke's firm was unable
to meet interest payments it owed because of money it had put
into the Northern Pacific, the firm went bankrupt; and this
caused alarm in the stock market and financial circles.

The roads to wealth of the "financial giants" were not smooth.
Like others amassing great wealth, they had to take risks. The
tales Minnigerode tells are not only instructive on how
individuals have historically made fortunes in business and the
characteristics they had for this, but are also cautionary tales
on the contingency of great wealth in some circumstances. Jim
Fisk, for instance, a larger-than life character "jovial and
quick witted [who was also] a swindler and a bandit, a destroyer
of law and an apostle of fraud," was presumably killed by a
former business partner. Unlike Cooke and Fisk, Cornelius
Vanderbilt and John Jacob Astor built fortunes that lasted
generations. Vanderbilt - nicknamed Commodore - starting in the
New York City area, built ships and established domestic and
international merchant and passenger lines. With the government
coming to depend on these with the rapid growth of commerce of
the period and the Civil War for a time, Vanderbilt practically
had monopolistic control of private shipping in the U.S. Astor
made his fortune by developing trade and other business in the
upper Midwest, which was at the time the sparsely-populated
frontier of America, rich in natural resources and other
potential with the Great Lakes and regional rivers as a means for
transportation.

Although the social and business conditions in the early and mid
1800s when the U.S. was in the early stages of its development
were unique to that period, by concentrating on the
characteristics, personalities, strategies, and activities of the
seven outstanding businessmen of this period, Minnigerode
highlights business traits and acumen that are timeless. His
sharply-focused, short biographies are colorful and memorable.
This author has written many other books and worked in the
military and government.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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