TCREUR_Public/150916.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

         Wednesday, September 16, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 183

                            Headlines

B E L G I U M

LSF9 BALTA: S&P Assigns 'B' CCR & Rates EUR290MM Sr. Notes 'B'


G E R M A N Y

PRIME 2006-1 FUNDING: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to D
* GERMANY: Corporate Insolvencies Decline in H1 2015


G R E E C E

* Moody's: Greek RMBS Performance Remained Stable in 2Q


I R E L A N D

SLIABH BHREANDAIN: Several Buyers Interested in Kerry Spring


N E T H E R L A N D S

DALRADIAN EUROPEAN III: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X Notes


P O R T U G A L

BANCO ESPIRITO: Novo Banco Sale Faces Delay After Talks Collapse
ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL: Moody's Rates EUR750MM Hybrid Notes 'Ba2'
ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL: Fitch Rates Sub. Hybrid Securities 'BB'
SAGRES STC: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B-(sf)'


R U S S I A

FINANCIAL REINSURANCE: Bank of Russia Suspends Licenses
GIVA INSURANCE: Bank of Russia Suspends Insurance Licenses


S L O V E N I A

SCT: Former Owner Faces Personal Bankruptcy


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: S&P Affirms 'B+' Ratings, Outlook Stable


U K R A I N E

OSCHADBANK JSC: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'RD' Then Upgrades to 'CCC'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AMDIPHARM MERCURY: S&P Puts 'B+' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
BSS: Owes More Than GBP6.4 Million to Pension Scheme
GELDARDS COACHES: Goes Into Administration Following Major Fire
MCCLURE NAISMITH: Creditors Unlikely to Recover "Small" Dividend
REDCAR: May Go Into Administration After Missed Debt Repayments


                            *********



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B E L G I U M
=============


LSF9 BALTA: S&P Assigns 'B' CCR & Rates EUR290MM Sr. Notes 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating to LSF9 Balta Investments S.a.r.l.
(Balta), a holding company of Belgium-based rugs and carpet
manufacturer Balta.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' long-term issue rating to
LSF9 Balta Issuer S.A.'s EUR290 million senior secured notes and
S&P's 'BB-' long-term issue rating to the EUR40 million super
senior revolving credit facility (RCF).  S&P has assigned a
recovery rating of '4' to the notes, indicating its expectation
of average (30%-50%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment
default.  S&P assigned a recovery rating of '1' to the RCF,
indicating its expectation of very high (90%-100%) recovery in
the event of a payment default.

These ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings S&P
assigned to LSF9 Balta Investments on July 20, 2015.

The rating on Balta reflects S&P's assessments of the group's
"weak" business risk profile and "highly leveraged" financial
risk profile.  The combination of these assessments leads to an
anchor of 'b' or 'b-' under S&P's corporate criteria.  S&P
selected an anchor of 'b' based on our view that Balta's Standard
& Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA and EBITDA interest coverage
ratios are relatively strong compared with "highly leveraged"
peers.

S&P's base-case assumptions for Balta have not changed materially
since S&P assigned the preliminary ratings on July 20, 2015.  S&P
continues to project that Balta's adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio
will be in the 4.5x-5.0x range over the next 12-18 months, and
that its adjusted EBITDA interest coverage will exceed 2.5x.  S&P
also expects that Balta's free operating cash flow (FOCF) will be
relatively low in absolute terms at less than EUR15 million,
owing to capital expenditures over 2015 and 2016.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Balta's strong market
positions in its niche markets, combined with benefits drawn from
past years' efficiency gains and cost savings, will enable it to
generate growing revenues and EBITDA over the next 12-18 months.
The stable outlook also reflects S&P's view that Balta's adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA ratio will be around 4.5x-5x over the next 12-18
months and that its adjusted EBITDA interest coverage will exceed
2.5x.  These are relatively strong levels for the 'B' rating,
although S&P anticipates that Balta's FOCF will be relatively low
in absolute terms at less than EUR15 million owing to large capex
in 2015 and 2016.

A positive rating action would depend on Balta's financial risk
profile strengthening as a result of continuous profitable growth
and a consistently improving operating cash flow base.  S&P
considers that an upgrade would depend on Balta's adjusted debt-
to-EBITDA ratio being less than 4.5x on a sustainable basis and
FOCF steadily increasing on the back of more moderate capex, all
else being equal.

S&P could take a negative rating action if Balta's credit ratios
weaken to the extent that the EBITDA interest coverage falls
below 2x, or if internally generated liquidity weakens through
lower profitability or a greater-than-expected increase in capex
or working capital.  In S&P's view, the most likely cause of
pressure on the operating performance of the group would be a
loss of customers or due to a prolonged economic slowdown across
Europe, constraining revenues.



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G E R M A N Y
=============


PRIME 2006-1 FUNDING: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to D
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D(sf)' from
'CC(sf)' its credit rating on PRIME 2006-1 Funding Limited
Partnership's class E notes.

The downgrade reflects the issuer's failure to repay the
remaining note principal balance on Aug. 31, 2015, the legal
final maturity date.

S&P's ratings in PRIME 2006-1 Funding Limited Partnership address
the timely payment of interest and the repayment of principal no
later than the legal final maturity date.  The issuer did not
fully repay the notes on Aug. 31, 2015.

In S&P's most recent review of the transaction on April 27, 2015,
it noted that the recovery proceeds from the defaulted assets in
the transaction were unlikely to be sufficient to fully repay the
class E notes' principal on the legal final maturity date.

PRIME 2006-1 Funding Limited Partnership is a German transaction
backed by a static portfolio of profit participation agreements.


* GERMANY: Corporate Insolvencies Decline in H1 2015
----------------------------------------------------
Alliance News reports that German business insolvencies declined
in the first half of the year, a report released by Destatis
showed.

Local courts registered 11,558 business insolvencies, which was a
decrease of 3.9% compared with the same period of last year, the
report relays.

In relation to the business insolvency requests, the prospective
debts owed to creditors amounted to EUR8.9 billion in the first
half of 2015. In the first six months of 2014, it totaled EUR14.6
billion, Alliance News discloses.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


* Moody's: Greek RMBS Performance Remained Stable in 2Q
-------------------------------------------------------
The performance of the Greek residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) market was stable in the three months ended
July 2015, according to the latest indices published by Moody's
Investors Service.

The 90+ day delinquencies of Greek RMBS transactions rose
modestly to 7.3% of the current balance in July 2015, from 6.9%
in April 2015.

The index of cumulative defaults remained at 2.5% of the original
pool balance in July 2015, compared to April 2015.

The prepayment rate index increased slightly to 1.5% in July
2015, from 1.3% in April 2015.

The outstanding pool balance of Greek RMBS transactions decreased
by 2.6% in the quarter, to EUR2,095 million in July 2015 from
EUR2,150 million in April 2015, with 6 outstanding repaying
deals.

On July 3, 2015, Moody's downgraded and placed on review for
downgrade the ratings on 14 notes and placed on review for
downgrade the ratings on five notes in eight Greek structured
finance transactions. This follows the July 1, 2015 actions in
which Greece's country ceiling was downgraded to Caa2 from B3 and
Greece's sovereign rating was downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2.
Greece's sovereign rating remains on review for downgrade.



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I R E L A N D
=============


SLIABH BHREANDAIN: Several Buyers Interested in Kerry Spring
------------------------------------------------------------
Aodhan O'Faolain and Ray Managh at The Irish Times report that
several parties are interested in acquiring the troubled bottled
mineral water company Kerry Spring Water, the High Court heard on
September 7.

In July, the High Court appointed insolvency practitioner Myles
Kirby as provisional liquidator of Sliabh Bhreandain Teo, trading
as Kerry Spring, which runs its manufacturing facility at
Ballyferriter, Dingle, Co Kerry.  According to the report, the
company had sought the appointment of a liquidator stating that
it had a deficit of EUR1.1million and was clearly insolvent.

Mr. Justice Michael White on Sept. 7 confirmed Mr. Kirby's
appointment as liquidator and formally ordered the winding up of
the company, the report says.

The Irish Times relates that Solicitor Gavin Simons of Amoss
Solicitors, for the company, told the court there were several
parties interested in acquiring the business.

According to the Irish Times, Mr. Simons said that, since his
appointment Mr. Kirby had, in the interest of all parties,
continued to run the business as a going concern. He said Mr
Kirby hoped a sale would be concluded by the end of the month,
the report relays.

Previously, the court heard the company had sought the
appointment of a liquidator on a number of grounds, including the
fact that one of its main customers, Dunnes Stores, had decided
to stop ordering from Kerry Spring Water, says the Irish Times.

This had "a devastating effect" on the company, which had more
than 35 employees, the report states.

The report says the court had heard that Dunnes Stores had made
its decision out of a common problem of an odour from the bottled
water and had claimed there had been several complaints about
this.

The court heard there was no health and safety issue and it was
Kerry Spring Water's view that the Dunnes Stores decision to
discontinue its orders had been a disproportionate act, adds the
Irish Times.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DALRADIAN EUROPEAN III: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
actions on the following classes of notes issued by Dalradian
European CLO III B.V.:

  EUR36M (current balance EUR20.3M) Class B Deferrable Secured
Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
Feb 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR27M Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2015 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf)

  EUR28.125M Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

  EUR16.875M (current balance EUR12.066M) Class E Deferrable
Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on Feb 27, 2015 Affirmed B1 (sf)

  EUR6.5M Class X Combination Notes due 2023, Affirmed Ba3 (sf);
previously on Feb 27, 2015 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Dalradian European CLO III B.V., issued in March 2007, is a
multi-currency collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a
portfolio of mostly high-yield senior secured European loans
managed by Elgin Capital LLP, a wholly owned subsidiary of N M
Rothschild & Sons Limited. Pursuant to full redemption of the
Class A-1 Variable Funding Notes in October 2014, non-Euro assets
in the portfolio are unhedged. As per the July 31, 2015 trustee
report, the unhedged assets amount to GBP 5.9 million and USD
13.4 million respectively.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
the result of further deleveraging since the last rating action
in February 2015 which was based on the December 2014 report.
Rated liabilities paid down by EUR 37.8 million on the April 2015
payment date, resulting in an increase in over-collateralization
(OC) ratios across the capital structure. As per the trustee
report dated July 2015, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E OC
ratios are reported at 495.07%, 212.29%, 133.10%, and 114.74%
compared to December 2014 levels of 229.71%, 156.83%, 117.88, and
106.53%, respectively.

Over this period, the reported average credit quality of the
portfolio as measured by the weighted average rating factor
(WARF) worsened a little from 2330 to 2435, the diversity score
reduced from 17 to 13, and the weighted average spread held
steady at around 3.8%.

The rating of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class X
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the issue date minus the aggregate of
all payments made from the issue date to such date, either
through interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds of EUR79.79 million and
GBP14.48 million, a weighted average default probability of 19.2%
(consistent with a WARF of 2650 over a weighted average life of
4.68 years), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
48.10% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 12
and a weighted average spread of 3.81%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% on 94.57% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default, and 15% on the 5.43% exposed to non-first-lien loan
corporate assets. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were unchanged for Classes B and C, and within one notch of
the base-case results for Classes D and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

* Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

* Around 11% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed large
concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate as
described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates
in Rated Transactions," published in October 2009 and available
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461

* Foreign currency exposure: As noted earlier, there are
unhedged GBP and USD assets in the portfolio. Volatility in
foreign exchange rates will have a direct impact on interest and
principal proceeds available to the transaction, which can affect
the expected loss of rated tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO ESPIRITO: Novo Banco Sale Faces Delay After Talks Collapse
----------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Wise, Martin Arnold and Arash Massoudi at The Financial
Times report that Portugal is preparing to cancel a multibillion-
euro auction of Novo Banco, the so-called good bank carved out of
the ruins of Banco Espirito Santo, after failing to strike a deal
with Chinese and US bidders.

According to the FT, people familiar with the talks said the sale
of the country's third-largest lender is expected to be delayed
until after next month's election in Portugal and the results of
European Central Bank stress tests of Novo Banco due later this
year.

"It's better to make a good sale at the right time than to
dispose of Novo Banco in a hurry, resulting in higher costs for
the financial system," the FT quotes Antonio Pires de Lima,
Portugal's economy minister, as saying.

Lisbon will have to apply for an extension to the two-year
deadline for selling Novo Banco if the sale process drags on
beyond August 2016, the FT notes.

According to the FT, any funding shortfall found by the ECB
stress test, which is expected to be completed within weeks, is
likely to be addressed by Novo Banco raising money via an initial
public offering or the sale of a minority stake.

Of three shortlisted bidders for Novo Banco, two Chinese groups
-- Anbang Insurance and Fosun International -- declined to
increase their initial binding offers, which were considered too
low by the Bank of Portugal, the FT relays, citing people
familiar with the talks.

People familiar with the process said the Chinese groups had
attached too many conditions to their bids, including on the
amount of capital they would put in to meet the demands of the
ECB stress test, the FT notes.

"The Bank of Portugal will close this auction and begin a new
one, but only after the ECB stress tests determine how much fresh
capital Novo Banco needs," the FT quotes Luis Marques Mendes, a
former leader of the ruling Social Democrat party, as saying on
Portuguese television.

There were "at least two big Spanish banks" interested in
participating in the new sales process and potentially "a
European group" considering merging Novo Banco with Portugal's
Banco BPI, Mr. Marques Mendes, a commentator seen as close to
government circles, as cited the FT, said.

Portuguese bankers have also been pressing the government to
postpone the sale, the FT states.

Novo Banco received EUR4.9 billion in fresh capital from
Portugal's bank resolution fund, which was boosted by a EUR3.9
billion state loan for the purpose, the FT relates.  The fund is
owned by all the country's banks and is Novo Banco's sole
shareholder, the FT discloses.

According to the FT, if the sale of Novo Banco fails to raise the
EUR4.9 billion book value of its equity capital, any shortfall
would have to be borne proportionately by all Portuguese banks.

                   About Banco Espirito Santo

Banco Espirito Santo is a private Portuguese bank based in
Lisbon, Portugal.  It is 20% owned by Espirito Santo Financial
Group.


ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL: Moody's Rates EUR750MM Hybrid Notes 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive Ba2 long-term
rating to the EUR750 million 5.375% Fixed to Reset Rate
Subordinated Notes due 2075 (the Hybrid) issued by EDP - Energias
de Portugal, S.A. (EDP, Baa3 stable). The outlook on the rating
is stable, in line with that of EDP's senior unsecured debt
ratings.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba2 rating assigned to the Hybrid is two notches below EDP's
senior unsecured issuer rating of Baa3, reflecting the features
of the Hybrid. The instrument has a long-dated maturity (60
years), is deeply subordinated and EDP can opt to defer coupons
on a cumulative basis.

In Moody's view, the Hybrid has equity-like features that allow
it to receive basket 'C' treatment (i.e., 50% equity or "hybrid
equity credit" and 50% debt for financial leverage purposes).

EDP's Baa3/Prime-3 ratings take into account the company's
strategic position as Portugal's largest utility, and that its
diversified business and geographical mix helped moderate
earnings volatility notwithstanding the difficult domestic
operating environment in the euro periphery. They also factor in
(1) that the Portuguese economy has been on an improving trend
since early 2014, after three years of contraction; (2) signs
that the tariff deficit borne by Portugal's electricity system is
gradually stabilizing, and the lower likelihood that further
regulatory cuts will be needed; (3) the continued support of its
strategic shareholder, China Three Gorges Corporation; and (4)
the group's solid liquidity.

The rating incorporates a number of risks, which include: (1) the
negative effect of the continuing drought on the profitability,
liquidity and capitalization of the group's Brazilian operations;
(2) the residual risk that a change in economic and market
conditions (and therefore variables including the pace of
electricity demand recovery, access tariff increases, and the
level of renewable energy system costs) causes the tariff deficit
to resume growing beyond 2015, and reduces the appetite for
monetization of receivables; and (3) the group's relatively high
dividend payout and leverage. Overall, however, the Baa3 reflects
our view that these risks are manageable, and can be accommodated
at an investment grade rating.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on EDP's ratings is based upon EDP's continued
and consistent delivery of EBITDA growth, capital discipline and
deleveraging in accordance with its strategic plan, such that
RCF/net debt is sustainably in the low double digits and FFO/net
debt in the mid-teens by 2015/16.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

As the Hybrid rating is positioned relative to another rating of
EDP, a change in either (1) Moody's relative notching practice or
(2) the Baa3 senior unsecured rating of EDP, could affect the
Hybrid rating.

The ratings could be upgraded in the event that improving
conditions were to be reflected in more rapid and extensive de-
leveraging than currently contemplated, such as would be
reflected in RCF/net debt in the mid-teens and FFO/net debt of
around 20% on a sustainable basis.

The ratings could be downgraded if deleveraging were to be
significantly delayed or there were a significant downturn in the
company's operating environment, as would be evidenced by RCF/net
debt and FFO/net debt in single digits and the low-teens
respectively.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Unregulated
Utilities and Unregulated Power Companies published in October
2014. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a
copy of this methodology.

EDP - Energias de Portugal, S.A. based in Lisbon, Portugal, is
the country's largest vertically integrated utility. The company
also has interests in Spain, Brazil and the US. It is active in
the renewables sector through EDP Renovaveis, S.A. In 2014, EDP
had revenues of EUR16.3 billion.


ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL: Fitch Rates Sub. Hybrid Securities 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned EDP - Energias de Portugal, S.A.'s
(EDP, BBB-/Stable) deeply subordinated hybrid securities a final
rating of 'BB'.  The securities qualify for 50% equity credit.

The rating reflects the highly subordinated nature of the notes,
which Fitch considers to have low recovery prospects in a
liquidation or bankruptcy scenario.  The equity credit reflects
the equity-like characteristics of the instruments including
subordination, maturity in excess of five years and deferrable
interest coupon payments.  Equity credit is limited to 50% given
the notes' cumulative interest coupon, a feature considered more
debt-like in nature.

Fitch understands from the company that hybrid capital will be a
long-term strengthening tool for EDP's capital structure.  The
EUR750 million hybrid capital has a limited weight relative to
total debt.  The hybrid proceeds are being used for general
corporate purposes.

The notes' rating and assignment of equity credit are based on
Fitch's hybrid methodology, "Treatment and Notching of Hybrids in
Non-Financial Corporate and REIT Credit Analysis".

KEY RATING DRIVERS FOR THE NOTES

Deep Subordination and Deferral Option

The notes are rated two notches below EDP's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating given their deep subordination and consequently,
the lower recovery prospects in a liquidation or bankruptcy
scenario relative to the senior obligations of the issuer, and
the deferral option.

50% Equity Treatment

The securities qualify for 50% equity credit as they meet Fitch's
criteria with regard to deep subordination, remaining effective
maturity of at least five years, full discretion to defer coupons
for at least five years and limited events of default.  These are
key equity-like characteristics, affording EDP greater financial
flexibility.

The interest coupon deferrals are cumulative, which results in
50% equity treatment and 50% debt treatment of the hybrid notes
by Fitch.  This is a feature similar to debt-like securities and
reduces the company's financial flexibility.  According to
Fitch's criteria, the agency would reduce the equity credit of
50% to 0% five years before the effective remaining maturity
date.

Effective Maturity Date

While the notes maturity is 2075, Fitch treats the day on which
the replacement language expires as an effective maturity date.
Under the instrument's terms, this date coincides with the second
step-up date.  From this date, the coupon step-up is within
Fitch's aggregate threshold rate of 100bps, but the issuer will
no longer be subject to replacement language.  The replacement
language discloses the company's intent to redeem the instrument
at any call date, up to the second step-up date, with the
proceeds of a similar instrument.

The second step-up date is defined as 2036 for five-year and a
half non-call hybrid, if the issuer is rated below investment
grade by another rating agency 30 days before the first call
date. Otherwise, the second step-up date would be 2041 for five-
year and a half non-call hybrid.

Early Redemption

The issuer has the option to redeem the notes on the first call
date in 2021, five years after the first call date and on any
coupon payment date thereafter.  In addition, there are
extraordinary call rights in case of adverse changes to tax or
rating agency treatment as well as a call right in case of
minimum outstanding amounts and a change of control or gross-up
event.

The change of control, if followed by an event-driven downgrade,
is designed to trigger an interest rate increase of 500bps as a
way to compensate the creditors.  However, the issuer would have
the right to redeem the notes in this instance.  Fitch's view is
that the change of control provision cannot force an event of
default as redemption is designed as an option for the issuer and
not a right of the creditor, while the 500bps increase is within
the limit according to our methodology.

Full Ability to Defer

EDP can opt to defer coupons on a cumulative basis without any
constraint at a given time.  The company will be obliged to make
a mandatory settlement of deferred interest payments if it
chooses to pay cash dividends or make other distributions on
junior instruments, including parity securities interest payment,
or repurchase of share capital or equally ranked securities.

KEY RATING DRIVERS FOR EDP

Resilient Operations

EDP's 1H15 results confirmed the resilience of the business model
and the benefits of diversification, with a 1% yoy increase in
recurring EBITDA.  This is despite weaker generation in Iberia
and Brazil than in 1H14, markedly due to less rain, and positive
impact on USD-based earnings from a weaker EUR/USD foreign
exchange.  Fitch expects funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net
leverage to be 5x in 2015, after including the positive impact
for the 50% equity content on its EUR750m hybrid issue, which is
within our leverage guidelines.  The leverage forecast also
reflects successful tariff deficit (TD) monetization and good
progress in EDP's disposal plan.

High Share of Regulated EBITDA

EDP's business profile benefits from a high share of regulated or
contracted activities (91% of EBITDA in 1H15; 89% in 2014)
compared with European utilities peers.  However, by 2017 when
most long-term contracted revenues in Portugal are liberalized,
EDP's exposure to full merchant risk in Iberia will increase to
25% of total EBITDA from 11% in 2014.  Long-term contracted
generation in Iberia will be at a low 1% of total volume until
the PPA/CMEC contracts are terminated, or long-term contracted
plants are transferred to the liberalized market.

Iberian Tariff Deficit on Track

Fitch expects the total stock of electricity tariff deficit (TD)
in Portugal to have peaked in 2014 (EUR5.3 billion) and to be
stable in 2015 before shrinking.  Fitch forecasts EDP's
regulatory receivables will be flat in 2015, before declining on
the back of an underlying improving trend and EDP's active TD
securitization. Fitch expects no TD in Spain in 2014 and a
surplus in 2015.

In a financially more balanced and sustainable electricity system
Fitch would expect regulatory and political risk to decrease but
further intervention cannot be ruled out while economic recovery
in Spain and Portugal remains fragile.  Fitch has assumed that
measures implemented to address the TD issue will remain in
place, including extending the extraordinary energy sector tax in
Portugal.

Higher Visibility on Investments

EDP is on course to dispose of its EUR2 billion of minorities to
China Three Gorges (EDP's main shareholder, A+/Stable), including
co-investments, of which EUR1.3 billion has been committed or
completed.  In addition, the EUR700 million asset rotation plan
is over 70% completed.  These will help reduce leverage and capex
needs.

EDP's management strategy for 2014-2017 is to cut capex, focus on
favorable markets such as North America for renewables and cost-
competitive generation technologies such as new hydro assets in
Portugal and contracted capacity (PPAs) in Brazil.  This strategy
is in line with management's low-risk approach to cope with a
complex market, both domestically and internationally.

Debt Reduction Strategy

One of the key targets of EDP's 2014-2017 management strategy is
to reduce net debt (adjusted by regulatory receivables) to EBITDA
to about 3.0x in 2017 from 4.0x in 2013.  The company expects
this improvement to come from lower net investments and new
capacity additions.

Fitch's rating case shows FFO adjusted net leverage trending
below 5x from 2015 from 5.6x in 2013.  Fitch's leverage
calculation does not deduct outstanding TD receivables from net
debt until these receivables have been monetized, for instance
through TD securitization.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- EBITDA at EUR3.7 billion in 2015 and low single-digit CAGR
      for 2015 to 2017, driven by wind & hydro organic growth and
      efficiency improvements.
   -- Average capex EUR1.3 billion per year for 2015-2017
   -- Stable dividends of EUR0.185 per share (floor)
   -- Around EUR500 million of additional disposals up to 2017.
   -- Excess free cash flow (FCF) (after dividends) deployed for
      de-leveraging.
   -- Stable Portuguese regulatory receivables on balance sheet
      for 2015 before moderately declining in 2016 and 2017.
      This implies EDP will continue with TD securitization over
      the same period.  No new TD in Spain.
   -- New EUR750 million hybrid issue with 50% of equity content
      in 2015, improving FFO adjusted net leverage by 0.1x.  No
      coupon deferral in 2015-2017.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: An upgrade of the issuer is unlikely in the short term
unless leverage improves sooner than 2016.  Other future
developments that may lead to positive rating action include:

   -- A sustained return to positive FCF driven by stronger
      recovery of demand and prices on the Iberian electricity
      market.
   -- The consolidation of the new regulatory framework both in
      Spain and Portugal showing a sustainable narrowing of the
      TD in both countries.
   -- FFO adjusted net leverage trending towards 4.5x and FFO
      interest coverage above 4.0x on a sustained basis.

Negative: Future developments that may lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Slower-than-expected deleverage leading to FFO adjusted net
      leverage above 5.0x and FFO interest coverage below 3.5x on
      a sustained basis.
   -- Substantial deterioration of the operating environment or
      further government measures that substantially reduce cash
      flows.
   -- A downgrade of the sovereign by three notches to 'B+',
      which would likely lead to a one-notch downgrade of EDP's
      Long-term ratings, although this is a remote possibility
      given the positive trajectory of Portugal's sovereign
      rating (BB+/Positive).

LIQUIDITY

As of end-June 2015 committed facilities plus cash on hand
amounted to EUR5 billion, versus debt maturities of EUR4.3
billion up to 2016.  Fitch expects the company to generate
moderate positive FCF in 2015 and 2016.  During 1H15 EDP
refinanced high-cost bank debt and extended average debt maturity
to 4.6 years.  EDP's liquidity is sufficient to cover its
refinancing needs over the next 24 months.

FULL LIST OF RATINGS

EDP - Energias de Portugal, S.A.
  Long-term IDR of 'BBB-', Outlook Stable
  Short-term IDR of 'F3'
  Senior unsecured rating of 'BBB-'
  Subordinated hybrid capital securities assigned rating of 'BB'

EDP Finance BV
  Long-term IDR of 'BBB-', Outlook Stable
  Short- term IDR of 'F3'
  Senior unsecured rating of 'BBB-'

Hidroelectrica del Cantabrico, S.A.
  Long-term IDR of 'BBB-', Outlook Stable
  Short- term IDR of 'F3'


SAGRES STC: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B-(sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BBB+ (sf)' and
'BB (sf)' credit ratings on SAGRES STC - Douro Mortgages No.1's
class A and B notes, respectively.  At the same time, S&P has
lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' and to 'B- (sf)' from
'BB- (sf)' its ratings on the class C and D notes, respectively.

Upon publishing its updated criteria for Portuguese residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria), S&P placed those
ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that it has received as
of June 2015.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of its
RMBS criteria.

Credit enhancement, excluding loans in arrears for more than 12
months, has remained stable since S&P's previous review.

Class         Available credit
               enhancement (%)
A                         6.01
B                         3.99
C                         2.15
D                         0.61

This transaction features an amortizing reserve fund, which
currently represents 1.60% of the outstanding balance of the
notes and is at its target level.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days at 0.52% are on average
lower for this transaction than S&P's Portuguese RMBS index.
Total arrears peaked at 1.8% in June 2012. Since 2013, arrears
have decreased and have stabilized at about 1.1%.  Arrears remain
below the Portuguese RMBS delinquency index.  In March 2015,
there was a slight increase in arrears to 1.5%, but this has come
down to 1.1% on the latest payment date.  Defaults are defined as
mortgage loans in arrears for more than 360 days in this
transaction.  Cumulative defaults, at 1%, are also lower than in
other Portuguese RMBS transactions that S&P rates.  Prepayment
levels remain low and the transaction is unlikely to pay down
significantly in the near term, in S&P's opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show an increase in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and an increase in the weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) for each rating level.

Rating level     WAFF (%)   WALS (%)
AAA                 15.01      16.18
AA                  11.09      13.23
A                    8.98       8.32
BBB                  6.57       6.15
BB                   4.13       4.80
B                    3.40       3.71

The increase in the WAFF is mainly due to the geographic
concentration and the use of the weighted-average original loan-
to-value (OLTV) ratio in the WAFF calculation.  A penalty of
1.25x is applied on 56.55% of the pool as province concentration
in Cavado, Grande Lisboa, Setubal, Grande Porto, Oeste, and
Alentejo Litoral exceeds the limit set by the RMBS criteria.  In
addition to this, 23.06% of the pool is located in Lisbon, which
attracts a 1.10x penalty unless the previous 1.25x province
penalty is already applied.  At the same time, seasoning
partially offsets the negative effect of geographic concentration
and the weighted-average OLTV ratio.  This is because S&P's
updated criteria give greater credit to well-seasoned pools.
Douro Mortgages No. 1 has a weighted-average seasoning of 12.08
years, which means that most of the loans will have a 0.5x
adjustment.

The increase in the WALS is mainly due to the application of
S&P's revised market value decline assumptions and the indexing
of its valuations under its RMBS criteria.  The overall effect is
an increase in the required credit coverage for each rating
level.

Following the application of S&P's RMBS criteria, its current
counterparty criteria, and considering its criteria for rating
single-jurisdiction securitizations above the sovereign foreign
currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P has determined that its
assigned rating on each class of notes in this transaction should
be the lower of (i) the rating as capped by S&P's RAS criteria,
(ii) the rating that the class of notes can attain under S&P's
RMBS criteria, and (iii) the rating as capped by S&P's current
counterparty criteria.

In this transaction, S&P's unsolicited long-term rating on the
Republic of Portugal (BB/Positive/B) constrains its ratings on
the class A and B notes.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for
RMBS as "moderate".  Under S&P's RAS criteria, this transaction's
notes can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign
rating, if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a
minimum of a "severe" stress.  However, as not all of the
conditions in paragraph 44 of the RAS criteria are met, S&P
cannot assign any additional notches of uplift to the ratings in
this transaction.

The class A notes have sufficient available credit enhancement to
withstand the stresses that are commensurate with a 'BBB+' rating
level under S&P's RMBS criteria.  These notes can withstand the
severe stress under S&P's RAS criteria, and are consequently
eligible for a four-notch rating uplift above the sovereign.  S&P
has therefore affirmed its 'BBB+ (sf)' rating on the class A
notes.

The class B notes fail S&P's RAS stress, and are therefore
ineligible for a rating uplift above its rating on the sovereign.
They have sufficient available credit enhancement to withstand
the stresses that are commensurate with a 'BB' rating level under
S&P's RMBS criteria.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'BB (sf)'
rating on the class B notes.

Banco BPI S.A. (BB-/Negative/B) provides an interest rate swap to
the transaction.  In S&P's analysis of the class A and B notes,
it do not give credit to this swap.  Under S&P's current
counterparty criteria, if it deems a swap provider to be
ineligible, the rating on any supported class of notes is capped
at the long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on the swap provider.
Consequently, S&P's ratings on the class A and B notes are
delinked from the ICR on the swap provider.

The available credit enhancement for the class C and D notes is
insufficient to withstand any additional stresses under S&P's RAS
criteria and it can therefore apply no uplift above the sovereign
rating.  However, S&P believes that their available credit
enhancement is commensurate with 'B+ (sf)' and 'B- (sf)' ratings,
respectively, based on S&P's RMBS criteria.  S&P has therefore
lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' and to 'B- (sf)' from
'BB- (sf)' its ratings on the class C and D notes, respectively.
In S&P's analysis of the class C and D notes, it gives credit to
the swap.  Thus, the ratings on these classes of notes are weak-
linked to the ICRs on the swap providers.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 8% for one- and three-year
horizons.  This did not result in S&P's rating deteriorating
below the maximum projected deterioration that it would associate
with each relevant rating level, as outlined in S&P's credit
stability criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Portuguese residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when it applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and sluggish house price appreciation for the
remainder of 2015 and 2016.

On the back of the weak macroeconomic conditions, S&P doesn't
expect the performance of the transactions in its Portuguese RMBS
index to significantly improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include weak economic growth and high unemployment.  On the
positive side, S&P expects interest rates to remain low.

SAGRES STC - Douro Mortgages No.1 is a Portuguese RMBS
transaction, which closed in November 2005 and securitizes first-
ranking mortgage loans.  Banco BPI originated the pool, which
comprises loans backed by properties in Portugal.

RATINGS LIST

SAGRES STC - Douro Mortgages No.1
EUR1.509 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Securitisation
Notes

Class       Rating            Rating
            To                From

Ratings Affirmed

A           BBB+ (sf)
B           BB (sf)

Ratings Lowered

C           B+ (sf)           BB (sf)
D           B- (sf)           BB- (sf)



===========
R U S S I A
===========


FINANCIAL REINSURANCE: Bank of Russia Suspends Licenses
-------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2392 dated September 10,
2015, suspended the reinsurance licenses of Financial Reinsurance
Company, LLC.

The decision is taken due to the insurer's failure to duly follow
a Bank of Russia instruction, namely, its non-compliance with the
requirements of financial sustainability and solvency in terms of
securing insurance reserves, procedure and conditions to invest
capital and insurance reserve funds.  The decision becomes
effective the day it is published in the Bank of Russia Bulletin.

Suspended license of the insurance agent shall mean a prohibition
on entering into insurance contracts, and also on amending
respective contracts resulting in increase in the existing
obligations of the insurance agent.


GIVA INSURANCE: Bank of Russia Suspends Insurance Licenses
----------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2393 dated September 10,
2015, suspended insurance and reinsurance licenses of GIVA
Insurance Company, LLC.

The decision is taken due to the insurer's failure to duly follow
Bank of Russia instructions, namely, its non-compliance with the
requirements of financial sustainability and solvency in terms of
securing insurance reserves, procedure and conditions to invest
capital and insurance reserve funds.  The decision becomes
effective the day it is published in the Bank of Russia Bulletin.

Suspended license of the insurance agent shall mean a prohibition
on entering into insurance contracts, and also on amending
respective contracts resulting in increase in the existing
obligations of the insurance agent.

The insurance agent shall accept applications on the occurrence
of insured events and perform its obligations.



===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


SCT: Former Owner Faces Personal Bankruptcy
-------------------------------------------
STA reports that Slovenia's Ljubljana District Court launched on
Sept. 14, 2015, a procedure to put Ivan Zidar, SCT's former boss,
into personal bankruptcy.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter on June 17, 2011,
Slovenia Times reported that the District Court launched
receivership proceedings at SCT, which withdrew its proposal for
debt restructuring following months of efforts to stave off
bankruptcy.

SCT is a construction company based in Slovenia.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: S&P Affirms 'B+' Ratings, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B+' ratings on
Spanish engineering and construction company Abengoa S.A.  The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B+' issue rating on the
senior unsecured notes issued by Abengoa, Abengoa Finance S.A.U.,
and Abengoa Greenfield, S.A.  The recovery rating on these notes
remains unchanged at '4', indicating S&P's expectation of average
(30%-50%) recovery prospects for noteholders in the event of a
payment default.  S&P's recovery expectations are in the lower
half of this range.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that, despite revising its
capex upward for fiscal 2015 (ending Dec. 31, 2015), Abengoa
still exhibits "adequate" liquidity under S&P's criteria.  S&P
notes that management continues to press on with plans to raise
funds and bolster liquidity via a EUR650 million rights issue and
asset disposal program.

Abengoa recently revised upward its capex projections for the
remainder of fiscal 2015.  This relates primarily to flagship
projects in South America, where it has become more challenging
for Abengoa to secure further tranches of nonrecourse debt
finance to continue building.  S&P understands that Abengoa has
therefore decided to complete these projects with its own cash
and then refinance the assets once they are operational; this is
why it is undertaking credit-positive cash raising measures
(including the rights issue and asset disposals).

On the other hand, the higher capex has weakened Abengoa's
ratios -- specifically OCF to debt -- much more than S&P had
previously assumed.  This is why S&P is revising the financial
risk profile to "highly leveraged" from "aggressive."

S&P continues to assess Abengoa's business risk as "fair,"
despite the fact that it excludes the concession business.  S&P's
view of Abengoa's competitive position also benefits from reputed
technical abilities and proprietary technology, especially in the
solar power generation business.

S&P assess Abengoa's management and governance as "fair."
Management continues to execute and deliver on numerous
initiatives as it works toward a more asset-light business model.
However, S&P notes that its communication with the investor
community has been poor in the past.  S&P continues to view
Abengoa's corporate structure as complex.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Muted 1% economic growth in the eurozone, where the group
      generates 25% of its total revenues, but stronger growth in
      the U.S. of 2.4% and in Asia-Pacific of 5.7%.

   -- A strong E&C backlog of EUR8.6 billion (2x of 2014 division
      revenues) and increasing revenues from the concession
      business, albeit partially offset by muted performance of
      the Bioenergy segment.

   -- Corporate EBITDA to EUR0.9 billion-EUR0.95 billion in 2015.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these core credit
measures, which are on the border of the "aggressive" and "highly
leveraged" financial risk profile categories:

   -- Debt to EBITDA of just less than 5x.
   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 11%-12%.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Abengoa will continue
to successfully execute projects and dispose of assets as
management moves toward an "asset light" business model.

S&P considers ratings upside to be limited at this stage given
the element of execution risk associated with the planned EUR650
million rights issue and asset sales.  Also, increased capex and
significantly negative OCF to debt means that the group's
financial risk profile will likely remain "highly leveraged" for
the next 12-18 months.  S&P is also mindful that project funding
conditions in some of Abengoa's key markets, such as Brazil, have
become tougher and that this trend may continue over the medium
term.

Absent the completion either of the rights issue or the planned
asset sales, Abengoa's liquidity will come under pressure just
after S&P's 12-month rating horizon.  In this case, S&P could
lower its ratings on the group.  S&P could also consider a
downgrade if the group were to financially support any concession
assets.

S&P could also lower the rating if future working capital demands
and/or capex rose higher than S&P's base case, resulting in
Abengoa's liquidity position weakening to "less than adequate".



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


OSCHADBANK JSC: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'RD' Then Upgrades to 'CCC'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded JSC State Savings Bank of Ukraine's
(Oschadbank) Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' (Restricted Default) from 'C' and then upgraded it
to 'CCC'.  The rating actions follow the completion of the bank's
external debt restructuring.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

Fitch downgraded Oschadbank's Long-term and short-term foreign
currency IDRs to 'RD' from 'C' following the completion of the
restructuring of its USD700 million and USD500 million eurobonds
due in March 2016 and March 2018, respectively.  The
restructuring terms included the extension of these bonds'
maturity and increase in coupon rates.  In accordance with
Fitch's distressed debt exchange (DDE) criteria, a DDE is deemed
to have occurred if a restructuring imposes a material reduction
in terms (including extension of maturity) compared with the
original contractual terms of an entity's financial obligations,
and the restructuring is conducted to avoid bankruptcy,
insolvency or intervention proceedings, or a payment default.
The downgrade of Oschadbank's IDR reflects Fitch's view that the
bank's debt restructuring terms meet these criteria.

The affirmation of the bank's Viability Rating (VR) at 'ccc', the
upgrade of the foreign currency Long-term IDR to 'CCC' and the
assignment of 'CCC' ratings to the new senior unsecured debt
issues reflect Fitch's assessment of the bank's standalone credit
profile following its debt restructuring.  In particular, the
debt exchange (which affected USD1.2 billion of eurobonds,
accounting for 20% of end-1H15 liabilities) has contributed to a
significant lengthening of the bank's external debt maturity
profile, thereby reducing refinancing risks.  In Fitch's view,
the bank's foreign currency liquidity at end-1H15 (comprising
cash and equivalents and short-term interbank placements) was
sufficient to meet near-term wholesale funding maturities even
prior to the restructuring. However, Fitch also notes that
stability of the bank's highly dollarized deposit base is key to
maintaining FX liquidity.

The bank's VR and IDRs also consider its (i) reasonable liquidity
in local currency, underpinned by holdings of unpledged
government securities eligible for refinancing with the National
Bank of Ukraine (15% of end-1H15 assets); (ii) stabilization
trends in deposit funding, supported by the growing share of
public sector accounts (16% at end-1Q15; end-2014: 10%); (iii)
reasonable 95% coverage by specific reserves of non-performing
loans (NPLs; loans more than 90 days overdue; end-1H15: 25% of
loans); and (iv) the bank's compliance with prudential capital
requirements (end-8M15: regulatory capital ratio of 13.9% vs.
minimum level of 10%).

The ratings remain constrained by the highly stressed operating
environment, and resultant pressure on the bank's credit metrics
and performance.  Credit risks are also heightened by the large
borrower concentrations and the material share of FX lending (43%
of net loans), mostly to effectively unhedged borrowers, whose
debt servicing capacity has been significantly constrained by the
recent large hryvnia (UAH) devaluation.  Most of these exposures
either became NPLs or have been restructured to contribute to the
large stock of restructured/rolled-over exposures (end-1H15: 50%
of loans, including a restructured loan, 15% of loans, to NJSC
Naftogas of Ukraine; CC).  These were only modestly provisioned,
creating potential for significant future increases in credit
losses.  Recovery prospects will depend on the performance of the
domestic economy and the stability of the UAH.

The large exposure to the sovereign through government debt
holdings (domestic debt, mostly UAH-denominated, and so not part
of the expected sovereign debt restructuring) and public sector
more generally (together at 5.5x Fitch Core Capital at end-1Q15)
results in a significant correlation between the credit profiles
of Oschadbank and the sovereign.

Additional loss absorption capacity is limited.  At end-8M15, the
bank could have increased its impairment reserves by only 5%
without breaching regulatory capital requirements.  Pre-
impairment profit was negative in 2014-1Q15, meaning that
Oschadbank is likely to need further capital support if
performance does not improve and recognition of asset quality
problems continues.  The latter is also likely as a result of the
regulatory asset quality review and capital stress test, which is
expected to be finalised in the coming weeks.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The bank's Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'No Floor' reflect Fitch's view of the Ukrainian
authorities' still limited ability to provide support to the
bank, in particular in foreign currency, in case of need, as
indicated by the sovereign's 'C' Long-term foreign currency IDR.
However, the propensity to provide support to the bank remains
high, in our view, in particular in local currency, given the
bank's 100% state ownership, policy role, high systemic
importance, and the track record of capital support for the bank
under different governments.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, VR, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

The bank's VR, IDRs and senior debt ratings would not be
downgraded in case of a further sovereign downgrade/debt
restructuring, as the bank's low ratings already reflect very
high levels of credit risk.  However, the bank's IDRs and debt
ratings could be downgraded in case of transfer and
convertibility restrictions being imposed, which would restrict
its ability to service its obligations.

The bank's ratings are also likely to be downgraded if further
deterioration in asset quality results in capital erosion,
without sufficient support being provided by the authorities, or
if deposit outflows sharply erode the bank's liquidity, in
particular in foreign currency.  Stabilization of the sovereign's
credit profile and the country's economic prospects would reduce
pressure on the ratings.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The SR could be upgraded and the SRF revised upwards if Fitch
markedly revises its view of the authorities' ability to provide
timely support to the bank, in particular, in foreign currency.
However, this is unlikely in the near term, given the country's
weak external finances and expected sovereign external debt
restructuring.

The rating actions are:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'RD' from 'C';
   then upgraded to 'CCC'

  Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'

  Cancelled senior unsecured debt of SSB No.1 PLC [XS0594294695,
   XS0906434872]: affirmed and withdrawn at 'C', Recovery Rating
   'RR4'

  Newly issued senior unsecured debt of SSB No.1 PLC
   [XS1273033719, XS1273034444, XS1273034360]: assigned at 'CCC',
   Recovery Rating 'RR4'

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'RD' from 'C';
   then upgraded to 'C'

  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'ccc'

  National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA-(ukr)'; Outlook
   Stable



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AMDIPHARM MERCURY: S&P Puts 'B+' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch with
negative implications its 'B+' long-term corporate credit rating
on U.K.-based pharmaceutical company Amdipharm Mercury Debtco
Ltd. (AMCO) and its 'B+' issue ratings on AMCO's senior
facilities.

S&P is placing its corporate credit rating and issue ratings on
CreditWatch following the recent announcement that Concordia
Healthcare Corp. has reached a definitive agreement to acquire
AMCO for US$3.3 billion.

S&P's 'B' rating on Concordia is not affected by the acquisition
as the acquisition is consistent with S&P's expectation that it
would make acquisitions to expand its product portfolio.

Although the acquisition meaningfully expands Concordia's size,
scale, breadth of product offerings, and geographic reach, S&P
continues to assess its business risk profile as "weak," given
its relatively small scale and short track record compared with
its higher-rated peers.

Concordia will use a mix of debt and equity to fund acquisitions,
but S&P estimates that pro forma leverage will increase
significantly to about 6x-7x over the next year, from under 5x as
of June 30, 2015.  That said, this level remains in line with
S&P's assessment of its financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged."

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch placement upon successful
completion of the acquisition by Concordia, which is expected to
be in the fourth quarter of 2015.

S&P expects to align its corporate credit rating on AMCO with
that on Concordia.


BSS: Owes More Than GBP6.4 Million to Pension Scheme
----------------------------------------------------
David Ainsworth at Civil Society reports that helpline charity
BSS, which went into administration in July with the potential
loss of more than 400 jobs, owes more than GBP6.4 million to its
pension scheme.

The charity owes a total of GBP7.65 million, most of it to its
pension fund, Civil Society relays, citing a statement of
affairs.  However it expects to raise only GBP2.49 million from
the sale of its assets, leaving a shortfall of GBP5.16 million,
Civil Society notes.

The charity was a member of two different defined benefit pension
schemes -- its own scheme and the Scottish Voluntary Sector
Pension Scheme, a multi-employer scheme, Civil Society discloses.

The statement of affairs includes payments of only GBP133,000 on
employee arrears of wages and holiday pay, according to Civil
Society.

At the time of administration, it was originally announced that
parts of the charity would continue to operate and administrators
have refused to confirm whether the entire charity will close and
enter liquidation, Civil Society recounts.  A statement of
administrators' proposals has been filed with Companies House but
has not yet been made public, Civil Society states.

In its most recent accounts, for the period to March 2014, the
charity, as cited by Civil Society, said it had faced an
extremely difficult trading environment, and had made
considerable redundancies.

BSS employed 436 people, according to its most recent accounts,
and ran helplines and contact centers for charities and others,
according to Civil Society.


GELDARDS COACHES: Goes Into Administration Following Major Fire
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nick Hill at BDaily reports that Geldards Coaches Limited was
forced to appoint joint administrators of Begbies Traynor in
Leeds on Sept. 11.

In August 2015, there was a fire at the company's premises off
Whitehall Road in Farnley, which destroyed half of a coach repair
workshop and damaged three vehicles, BDaily recounts.

"Unfortunately, it is commonplace for companies subjected to a
major fire not to survive and this is the case here," BDaily
quotes Bob Maxwell, one of the joint administrators appointed to
the company, as saying.

The administrators are now looking for a buyer for the business,
BDaily discloses.

Geldards Coaches Limited is a West Yorkshire coach company.  The
largest privately owned bus company in the region, Geldards
Coaches was founded in 1991 and has a fleet of around 50 vehicles
and 50 staff, according to BDaily.


MCCLURE NAISMITH: Creditors Unlikely to Recover "Small" Dividend
----------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Latham at Herald Scotland reports that creditors of McClure
Naismith, which went into administration last month, are unlikely
to recover much more than a "small dividend" when the company's
affairs are finally wound up.

Tom MacLennan of FRP Advisory said that McClure Naismith, one of
Scotland's oldest commercial law practices, owed around GBP2
million to suppliers, the HMRC and its bank when it went into
administration two weeks ago, but the full extent of the firm's
debts would only become clear once landlord and employee claims
(such as redundancy payments in lieu of notice) had been
resolved, Herald Scotland relates.

That process would likely take several months, at which point the
total debt of the company would likely be "substantially" more
than the GBP2 million of debt already accounted for, Herald
Scotland says.

Of McClure Naismith's 135 person workforce, 95 have now found new
jobs since the firm went into administration, Herald Scotland
discloses.

In addition to those who have found new jobs, 13 staff have been
retained by the administrators to help with transitional matters,
Herald Scotland notes.

According to Herald Scotland, McClure Naismith's Glasgow
headquarters are expected to be vacated by the end of the month.

A creditors' meeting is expected to be held in Edinburgh or
Glasgow in late October, Herald Scotland states.  It is likely to
be around 18 months before the administration of the firm is
settled, Herald Scotland relays.

McClure Naismith is a Glasgow-based law firm.


REDCAR: May Go Into Administration After Missed Debt Repayments
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Marlow at The Telegraph reports that Redcar, one of the UK's
biggest steel plants, is locked in a desperate bid for survival
following a series of missed debt repayments to its banks.

According to The Telegraph, the Thai owners of the historic
Redcar plant on Teesside failed to pay back several loans
totaling around GBP80 million to lenders in June and were given a
short-term stay of execution until the end of September to find
the money.

Failure to stump up the cash could result in the 160-year-old
site, which employs more than 2,000 workers and 1,000 contractors
in a region where unemployment is among the highest in the
country, being put into administration after a long battle with
huge losses, The Telegraph says.  It is understood PwC is on
stand-by to handle any insolvency, The Telegraph notes.

A total of four loans were scheduled to be settled at the end of
June but Sahaviriya Steel Industries, which rescued Redcar in
2011, failed to meet any of them, The Telegraph discloses.  The
majority of SSI's 11 banks agreed to extend the repayment for
three months and SSI then immediately entered into a fresh set of
negotiations to try to get another stay of execution until the
end of the year, The Telegraph relays.

The company's perilous financial situation was laid bare in its
most recent quarterly financial statement, which covered the
period to the end of June and was filed with the Thai stock
exchange on Aug. 15, The Telegraph states.  As of that date, the
company had only managed to obtain a letter of intent from its
lenders, rather than any firm agreement for a second extension,
according to The Telegraph.

Debt negotiations of this nature are always complicated but the
number of lenders SSI has -- and the failure to get all of them
to agree to the first extension -- is likely to make discussions
particularly difficult, The Telegraph states.

The stock exchange document also reveals SSI had to borrow around
GBP30 million in the form of an interest-free loan from an
unnamed company director, The Telegraph relates.

Redcar has struggled consistently with big losses since being
mothballed by previous owners Tata Steel in 2010, The Telegraph
recounts.  A year later, faced with imminent closure, SSI rescued
the operations in a GBP290 million deal and relit the furnace in
April 2012, The Telegraph relays.  However, the plant has been
reliant on continued financial backing from its parent and the
support of a handful of senior banks ever since, The Telegraph
notes.

It racked up losses of GBP194 million in 2013, had bank loans
totaling US$792 million and the Thai owners pumped in US$121
million, the latest in a series of cash injections.  It is
thought SSI has ploughed as much as รบ1bn into the company.

Redcar owns the second-largest blast furnace in Europe, which at
full capacity is capable of turning out up to 400 slabs of steel
a day and 3.5m tons a year.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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