TCREUR_Public/150917.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, September 17, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 184

                            Headlines

G R E E C E

GREECE: EU Officials Race to Restructure Banking System


H U N G A R Y

ERSTE BANK: Moody's Changes Ratings Outlook to Stable
FHB MORTGAGE: Moody's Lowers Deposit Ratings to Caa1
KERESKEDELMI & HITEL: Moody's Changes Ratings Outlook to Stable


I R E L A N D

EUROCREDIT CDO V: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to B1
STH 500: Director Seeks to Avert Administration of Business


I T A L Y

INTESA SANPAOLO: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to Tier 1 Capital Notes


L U X E M B O U R G

HELLAS TELECOMM: Noteholders Trustee Can Rework $565MM PE Suit


N E T H E R L A N D S

HALCYON STRUCTURED 2006-I: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes to Ba1


N O R W A Y

BAYERNGAS NORGE: S&P Affirms 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable


P O R T U G A L

LUSITANO MORTGAGES: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to BB


R U S S I A

CB INTERCOMMERZ: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
EVRAZ GROUP: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' IDR, Outlook Stable


S P A I N

SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 9: Moody's Lowers Cl. C Notes Rating to Ca


U K R A I N E

EAST-INDUSTRIAL: NBU Withdraws Banking License & Liquidation


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BLUESTONE SECURITIES 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on D Debt
BRIGHTHOUSE GROUP: Moody's Hikes CFR to B1, Outlook Stable
GLOBAL MARITIME: Case Summary & 50 Largest Unsecured Creditors
HARBOURVEST SENIOR: Liquidators Announce 2nd Interim Distribution
HARLEY CURTAIN: Enters Administration Following Cash Woes

LOTUS F1: Gastaldi Optimistic Despite Financial Woes
NEW FRONTIER: Director Disqualified For 14 Years
PRIMA HOTEL: Administrators Put Crowne Plaza Hotel Up for Sale
SPIRIT ISSUER: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Notes, Outlook Pos.


                            *********


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G R E E C E
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GREECE: EU Officials Race to Restructure Banking System
-------------------------------------------------------
Jim Brunsden at The Financial Times reports that eurozone
officials are racing to restructure Greece's banking system
before new rules kick in that could wipe out corporate deposits
with potentially disastrous effects for the Greek economy.

That rush has been complicated by this weekend's snap
parliamentary elections, which, if recent polling is accurate,
could produce no clear winner, the FT notes.  Prolonged
negotiations over a governing coalition in Athens would put at
risk an impending deadline to repair the banking system, the FT
says.

When eurozone negotiators agreed Greece's bailout in August, they
bowed to the insistence of Mario Draghi, European Central Bank
president, that bank deposits should not be touched, the FT
recounts.  At the time, Greece's creditors were considering
raiding accounts at the country's four largest banks to help find
the EUR25 billion potentially needed to shore up and fully reopen
a financial sector nearly destroyed by a run on deposits and
economic turmoil, the FT relays.

But now EU authorities find themselves in a bind: if they are to
keep their promise not to touch deposits, they must complete the
bank restructuring in little more than three months -- before
separate EU rules on bank bailouts come into effect on
Jan. 1, the FT states.

Under those rules, any eurozone bank that accepts government
financial assistance must first "bail in" creditors totaling 8%
of the bank's liabilities, the FT discloses.  In effect, that
means first wiping out shareholders, then lower-priority
bondholders and, if that is not enough, senior bondholders and
deposits over EUR100,000, according to the FT.

EU officials say they are desperate to get a Greek
recapitalization deal done before the 8% rule kicks in, the FT
notes.

The window to complete the restructuring is narrow, the FT says.
By comparison, banks were given nine months to cover their
capital shortfalls after EU-wide stress tests were carried out
last year, the FT states.

But officials working on the bank restructuring believe the short
timeline is workable, according to the FT.  The ECB is in the
middle of a high-speed asset-quality review and stress test to
determine how much recapitalization the Greek banks actually
need, with a goal of finishing it by October, the FT says.



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H U N G A R Y
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ERSTE BANK: Moody's Changes Ratings Outlook to Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on Erste Bank
Hungary Zrt.'s (EBH) long-term deposit ratings to stable from
negative. Concurrently, the rating agency affirmed EBH's caa2
baseline credit assessment (BCA), b3 adjusted BCA, B3/Not Prime
long-term and short-term bank deposit ratings and Ba3(cr)/Not
Prime(cr) Counterparty Risk Assessment.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The stable outlook on EBH's ratings reflects the gradual
stabilization of the bank's credit profile, albeit at a weak
level. Operating conditions for Hungarian banks will likely
improve over the next 12 to 18 months, amid relatively strong
economic growth and as a result of moderation in the government's
unfavorable stance towards banks. The improvements in the
operating environment will help EBH return to profitability and
stabilize its asset quality and capitalization.

EBH's caa2 BCA reflects weak asset quality and profitability, but
also satisfactory capital adequacy and liquidity.

In 2014, Hungary adopted a law requiring banks to compensate
retail borrowers for any extra charges on loans denominated in
both foreign and domestic currency. The implementation of the law
requires banks to make compensation payments to their retail
borrowers or to offset the compensation amounts with the
borrowers' overdue obligations. Subsequently, in November 2014,
the Hungarian government decided to convert foreign currency-
denominated retail mortgages into Forints at the prevailing
market exchange rate. EBH reported a loss of HUF101.4 billion in
2014, largely driven by HUF105.5 billion of compensation charges
to retail borrowers. Despite a decline in the volume of problem
loans in 2014, the share of such loans rose to 27.1% of gross
loans at year-end 2014 from 26% at year-end 2013, as the bank's
loan book continued to contract.

The pressure on capital adequacy stemming from loan loss charges
and compensation provisions for retail borrowers was eased
following a HUF95 billion capital increase in 2014. As a result
the bank's capitalization was little changed with a reported Tier
1 ratio of 11.8% at year-end 2014. EBH's liquidity also remains
stable with liquid assets accounting for around a third of the
total assets at year-end 2014.

EBH's long-term deposit ratings of B3 are underpinned by the
bank's BCA of caa2, as well as Moody's assumption of high
parental support from the bank's parent, Austria's Erste Group
Bank (Baa2 Positive /P-2, BCA ba1). This support assumption
results in two notches of uplift for the deposits ratings from
the BCA.

-- WHAT CAN CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

A significant improvement in bank's financial fundamentals, in
particular its asset quality and profitability, would have a
positive impact on EBH's ratings.

A material erosion of the bank's capital from loan book
deterioration could result in downward rating pressure.


FHB MORTGAGE: Moody's Lowers Deposit Ratings to Caa1
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded FHB Mortgage Bank Co.
Plc.'s (FHB) baseline credit assessment (BCA) to caa2 from caa1,
Adjusted baseline credit assessment to caa2 from caa1, long-term
deposit ratings to Caa1 from B3 and Counterparty Risk Assessment
to B2(cr) from B1(cr). Concurrently, Moody's affirmed the Not
Prime short-term deposit ratings and the Not Prime(cr)
Counterparty Risk Assessment.

The outlook on the long-term deposit ratings was changed to
stable from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of FHB's ratings was driven by the material
weakening of the bank's credit profile, reflected in sizable
losses in 2014 and H1 2015, modest capitalization and high asset
risk that could require significant loan loss provisions.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the bank's
financial fundaments will stabilize, albeit at a weak level, in
the next 12 to 18 months.

In 2014, Hungary adopted a law requiring banks to compensate
retail borrowers for any extra charges on loans denominated in
both foreign and domestic currency. The implementation of the law
requires banks to make compensation payments to their retail
borrowers or offset the compensation amounts with the borrowers'
overdue obligations. This measure had an adverse impact on bank's
profitability in 2014 as the charges against the compensation
payments amounted to HUF23.6 billion and were the main driver
behind the overall HUF16.2 billion loss for 2014.

According to Moody's, FHB's profit generating capacity remains
weak as it reported HUF5.3 billion loss for H1 2015, which is
equivalent to a negative return on assets of 1.4%. The loss was
stemming from lower net interest income, high provisioning and
operating expenses. In the next 12 to 18 months the bank's
profitability will likely remain constrained by declining
interest margin and still high loan loss provisions.

The share of problem loans in gross loans decreased to 18% at
end-H1 2015 from 20.1% at end-H1 2014, according to the bank's
financial statements. The modest reduction in problem loans was
mainly driven by the settlements with retail borrowers as the
balance of delinquent loans contracted. The level of problem
loans will likely remain high and require significant loan loss
provisions in the next 12 to 18 months. As of end-H1 2015 loan
loss reserves accounted for 50.9% of the bank's gross loans. FHB
reported a Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of 7.87% as of end-H1 2015,
down from 8.61% as of end-H1 2014.

As of end-H1 2015, customer deposits accounted for half of the
bank's total liabilities with the rest comprised of mortgage
bonds, senior unsecured bonds and interbank borrowings. FHB holds
adequate liquidity reserves with liquid assets to total assets at
43% as of end-H1 2015.

FHB's long-term deposit ratings of Caa1 are based on the bank's
standalone credit strength, and also take into account our
advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis. The LGF analysis
results in one notch uplift for the deposit ratings from the BCA
of caa2.

-- WHAT CAN CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

A significant improvement in bank's financial fundamentals, in
particular its asset quality and profitability, could have
positive rating implications.

A material erosion of the bank's capital from loan book
deterioration or a significant decline in revenues could result
in downward rating pressure.


KERESKEDELMI & HITEL: Moody's Changes Ratings Outlook to Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on Kereskedelmi
& Hitel Bank Rt.'s (K&H) long-term deposit ratings to stable from
negative. Concurrently, the rating agency affirmed K&H's b2
baseline credit assessment (BCA), ba3 adjusted BCA, Ba3/Not Prime
long-term and short-term deposit ratings and Baa3(cr)/Prime-3(cr)
Counterparty Risk Assessment.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The stable outlook on K&H's ratings reflects the stabilization of
the bank's credit profile, in particular its profitability, loan
book quality and capitalization. K&H's b2 BCA reflects bank's
good franchise, adequate revenue generating capacity, as well as
good liquidity and satisfactory capital levels.

In 2014, Hungary adopted a law requiring banks to compensate
retail borrowers for any extra charges on loans denominated in
both foreign and domestic currency. The implementation of the law
requires banks to make compensation payments to their retail
borrowers or offset the compensation amounts with the borrowers'
overdue obligations. In 2014, K&H booked HUF65.6 billion of
provisions against the compensation payments, which was the main
driver of the bank's HUF28.3 billion loss for the year.
Nevertheless, in 2014 the bank's revenue generating capacity
remained relatively strong, with net interest income growing by
6% year-on-year, mainly owing to reduced funding costs. Asset
risk receded modestly during 2014, as the reported non-performing
loan (NPL) ratio declined to 15.85% as of end of December, down
from 18% at the previous year-end.

The loss reported in 2014 negatively affected K&H's
capitalization, with the bank's reported Tier 1 ratio declining
to 11.7% as of December 2014 from 13.3% as of December 2013. The
bank's return to profitability, supported by modest growth in
lending, should lead to a moderate improvement in capital
adequacy over the next 12 to 18 months. K&H's liquidity remains
stable with liquid assets accounting for 29.82% of the total
assets at end-H1 2015.

K&H's Ba3 long-term deposit ratings are based on its b2 BCA and
Moody's assumption of high parental support from the bank's
parent, Belgium's KBC Bank N.V (A2 Positive/P-1, BCA baa2). This
support assumption results in two notches uplift for the deposit
ratings from the BCA.

-- WHAT CAN CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

A substantial improvement in bank's operating environment leading
to a strengthening of its financial fundamentals, in particular
loan book quality and capital adequacy, could positively affect
K&H's ratings.

A weakening of the bank's loan portfolio or a decline in capital
adequacy could result in a rating downgrade. A significant
deterioration in K&H's retail or corporate franchise impairing
its revenue generating capacity could also have negative rating
implications.



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I R E L A N D
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EUROCREDIT CDO V: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Eurocredit CDO V PLC :

EUR36M Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 9,
2014 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR27M Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 9,
2014 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

EUR24M (Current Balance: EUR14,819,741.70) Class E Notes,
Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2014 Affirmed B2 (sf)

EUR6M Class V Combo Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
Dec 9, 2014 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Moody's affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued by
Eurocredit CDO V PLC:

EUR42M (Current Balance: EUR 32,889,528.87) Class B Notes,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2014 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Eurocredit CDO V PLC, issued in September 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. It is predominantly composed of
senior secured loans. The portfolio is managed by Intermediate
Capital Managers Limited. The transaction's reinvestment period
ended in September, 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades of the notes are primarily a result of the
redemption of the senior Notes and subsequent increases of the
overcollateralization ratios (the "OC ratios") of all Classes of
Notes. Moody's notes that the Classes A-1, A-2 and A-3 Notes have
redeemed in full. As a result of the deleveraging the OC ratios
of the remaining Classes of Notes have increased significantly.
According to the August 2015 trustee report, the Classes A/B, C
and D OC ratios are 213.17%, 145.75%, 117.80% and 106.59%
respectively compared to levels just prior to the payment date in
March 2015 of 168.21%, 131.86%, 113.47% and 105.34%. The OC
ratios will have increased further after the September 2015
payment date.

The rating of the combination Notes addresses the repayment of
the rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. The
rated balance at any time is equal to the principal amount of the
combination note on the issue date minus the sum of all payments
made from the issue date to such date, of either interest or
principal. The rated balance will not necessarily correspond to
the outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR121.4
million, a weighted average default probability of 24.62%
(consistent with a WARF of 3536), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 48.37% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 19 and a weighted average spread of 3.68%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% for the 95.34% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan corporate
assets upon default. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it lowered the weighted average spread by 30 basis
points; the model generated outputs that were within one notch of
the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

* Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

* Around 22.77% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed
large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate
as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions," published in October 2009 and
available at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461.

* Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

* Foreign currency exposure: The deal has exposure to non-EUR
denominated assets. Volatility in foreign exchange rates will
have a direct impact on interest and principal proceeds available
to the transaction, which can affect the expected loss of rated
tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


STH 500: Director Seeks to Avert Administration of Business
-----------------------------------------------------------
Alan Erwin at The Irish Times reports that representatives of a
Belfast businessman battling to stop his companies being put into
administration are working in shifts 20 hours a day to listen to
thousands of hours of taped phone calls.

Counsel for Gareth Graham also revealed that concerns around the
process already raised with the National Crime Agency, the PSNI
and US law enforcement bodies are also set to be referred to
authorities in the Irish Republic, The Irish Times relates.

Mr. Graham is a director and major shareholder in STH 500 and
Lehill Properties, which own a variety of commercial and
residential premises in Belfast, The Irish Times discloses.  The
firms' loans were among those transferred over to the National
Asset Management Agency, The Irish Times notes.

Last year, US investment fund Cerberus snapped up NAMA's entire
Northern Ireland portfolio, Project Eagle, in a deal worth more
than GBP1 billion, The Irish Times recounts.

Mr. Graham is now locked in a court fight to try to win back
control of his companies, The Irish Times relays.  He is
challenging Cerberus' right to put them into administration,
claiming his businesses were financially strong and never missed
a repayment, The Irish Times says.

Earlier this month, he appeared before a Stormont inquiry into
the sale of NAMA's Northern Ireland loan book, The Irish Times
relates.  According to The Irish Times, Mr. Graham told the
committee he has recorded business phone calls, which allegedly
show an "ingrained culture of inappropriate and possibly illegal
conduct" across political, banking, legal and accountancy
sectors.

In court on Sept. 15, his lawyers asked a judge for another two
weeks to complete an examination of the tapes before they have to
lodge points of claim to support his argument about impropriety
in the process, The Irish Times discloses.

Opposing the move, David Dunlop, for Cerberus entity Promontoria
Eagle, urged the judge to press on with the case as it currently
stands, The Irish Times relays.

But with a trial hearing in the case not due to take place until
January, Mr. Justice Horner agreed to give Mr. Graham's lawyers
the two weeks to file their claims, The Irish Times notes.



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I T A L Y
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INTESA SANPAOLO: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to Tier 1 Capital Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had assigned its
'B+' long-term issue rating to the perpetual additional Tier 1
(AT1) capital notes to be issued by Intesa Sanpaolo
(BBB-/Stable/A-3).

S&P understands from the terms and conditions that the AT1 notes
will comply with the EU's latest Capital requirement directive
(CRD IV), which is the EU implementation of Basel III.  S&P also
understands that the notes will rank senior to ordinary shares,
but will be subordinated to more senior debt, including Intesa
Sanpaolo's Tier 2 debt.

In accordance with S&P's methodology on hybrid capital, it is
assigning the AT1 notes a 'B+' rating, four notches below the
issuer credit rating (ICR) on Intesa Sanpaolo.  S&P usually
derives the hybrid rating for banks based in Italy by notching
down from the bank's stand-alone credit profile (SACP).  That
said, as the ICR on Intesa Sanpaolo is currently lower than its
SACP, S&P derives the hybrid rating by notching down from the
lower of the two.

As such, S&P calculates this four-notch difference:

   -- One notch to reflect subordination risk.
   -- Two additional notches to take into account the risk of
      non-payment at the full discretion of the issuer and its
      likely inclusion in Tier 1 regulatory capital.
   -- One notch as the instruments allow for full or partial
      temporary write-down.

S&P do not apply any additional notching because it do not
consider the 5.125% mandatory conversion trigger as a going-
concern trigger.

For Italian banks, S&P sees the risk of potential restriction in
the payment of coupons on AT1 notes when common equity Tier one
ratios fall within the capital conservation buffer -- set at 7%
from Jan. 1, 2015 -- comprising a minimum requirement (4.5%) and
a capital conservation buffer (2.5%).  S&P understands that the
regulator could add an additional institution-specific
countercyclical buffer to banks, including Intesa Sanpaolo.  As
such, should the bank's future common equity Tier 1 ratio fall
within the countercyclical buffer, it could be subject to the
maximum distributable amount, which could result in coupon
nonpayment.  For Intesa Sanpaolo, we believe that the risk of
nonpayment is mitigated by S&P's expectation that the bank will
maintain resilient profitability over the next two years.  S&P
also observes that Intesa Sanpaolo's common equity Tier 1 was
13.4% as of June 2015.

S&P intends to assign "intermediate" equity content to the notes,
once the regulator approves them, for inclusion in the bank's
regulatory Tier 1 capital.  The instruments meet the conditions
for intermediate equity content under S&P's criteria as they are
perpetual, with a call date expected to be five or more years
from issuance.  In addition, they do not contain a coupon step up
and have loss-absorption features on a going-concern basis due to
the bank's flexibility to suspend the coupon at any time.



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L U X E M B O U R G
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HELLAS TELECOMM: Noteholders Trustee Can Rework $565MM PE Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Zalesin at Bankruptcy Law360 reported that the trustee for
Hellas Telecommunications SARL noteholders can rework its $565
million suit over an alleged scheme in which private equity
backers TPG Capital LP and Apax Partners LLP enriched themselves
while driving Hellas into insolvency, a New York federal judge
said on Sept. 11, 2015.

In a brief order following a Sept. 11 hearing, U.S. District
Judge J. Paul Oetken denied without prejudice two motions to
dismiss Wilmington Trust Co.'s complaint, which seeks to collect
$565.4 million after a New York state judge entered a judgment
for that amount.

                About Hellas Telecommunications

In February 2007, Hellas Telecommunications was purchased from
TPG Capital LP and Apax Partners by the Italian
telecommunications giant Weather Group.  The Company later
suffered liquidity problems and commenced administration
proceedings in the U.K. in November 2009.  The administrators
sold 100% of the shares of Wind Hellas to the existing owners,
the Weather Group.  An order placing the Company into liquidation
was entered on Dec. 1, 2011.

Andrew Lawrence Hosking and Carl Jackson, as Joint Liquidators
petitioned for the Chapter 15 protection for the Company (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Case No. 12-10631) on Feb. 16, 2012.  Bankruptcy Judge
Martin Glenn presides over the case.

The Debtor estimated assets and debts of more than $100,000,000.
The Debtor did not file a list of creditors together with its
petition.

The petitioners are represented by Howard Seife, Esq., at
Chadbourne & Parke LLP.



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HALCYON STRUCTURED 2006-I: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Halcyon Structured Asset Management
European CLO 2006-I B.V.:

  EUR15M (Current balance outstanding approx. EUR 10.5M) Class D
  Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Upgraded to
  A1 (sf)

  EUR20M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015
  Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Halcyon Structured Asset Management European CLO 2006-I B.V.,
issued in June 2006, is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield senior secured
European loans. The portfolio is managed by Halcyon Structured
Asset Management L.P. The transaction's reinvestment period ended
in July 2011.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades to the ratings are primarily the result of the
substantial deleveraging that has occurred since last rating
action in April 2015 (based on February 2015 trustee data).

Over the last two quarterly payment dates, the Class B and C
notes fully repaid their outstanding amounts of EUR8.4 million
and EUR30.0 million, respectively. The Class D Notes have
amortized approximately by EUR4.5 million or 29.9% of initial
balance. As a result the over-collateralization (OC) ratios have
increased. As per the trustee report dated August 2015, the Class
D and Class E OC ratios are reported at 422.8% and 145.7%
compared to February 2015 levels of 155.1% and 112.8%,
respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR54.5 million
and GBP1.0 million, defaulted par of EUR1.2 million, a weighted
average default probability of 35.6% (consistent with a WARF of
5560), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.5% for
a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 10 and a
weighted average spread of 3.3%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% of the 84.3% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan corporate
assets upon default. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were unchanged for the Class D and within two notches of the
base-case results for Class E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

* Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

* Around 42% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed large
concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate as
described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates
in Rated Transactions", published in October 2009 and available
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461.

* Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

* Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction
maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on
the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

* Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors, especially when they default. Because of the deal's low
diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented its
typical Binomial Expansion Technique analysis with a simulated
default distribution using Moody's CDOROM(TM) software and an
individual scenario analysis.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===========
N O R W A Y
===========


BAYERNGAS NORGE: S&P Affirms 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Norway-
based oil and gas exploration and production company Bayerngas
Norge A.S. to stable from negative.  S&P affirmed its 'B+' long-
term corporate credit rating on the company.

The outlook revision and affirmation reflect S&P's view that
Bayerngas Norge will continue to cover its liquidity needs,
including sizable capital expenditures, throughout the cycle.
S&P bases its view on the strong commitment of its parent and
main shareholder, Stadtwerke MÃ…nchen Gasbeteiligungs GmbH & Co.
KG (SWM; not rated), to provide timely additional funding if
needed. SWM demonstrated its support in August 2015 with a
material debt to equity conversion of about EUR250 million.  S&P
considers the parent's extended track record of continued
financial commitment to Bayerngas Norge -- even under difficult
market conditions in the oil and gas sector -- as a key rating
support.  S&P's assumption that the shareholder will provide
further loans or new equity enabling the company to achieve its
long-term production target and meet its capital expenditure
requirements is critical to S&P's assessment.  In particular, S&P
forecasts capital expenditures will be about Norwegian krone
(NOK) 4.0 billion (about EUR450 million) in 2015 and between
NOK3.0 billion and NOK3.5 billion in 2016, which cannot be
covered by funds from operations (FFO) since S&P expects it to be
negative.

S&P's 'ccc+' assessment of the company's stand-alone credit
profile (SACP), which factors in the ongoing shareholder support,
remains unchanged.

S&P's view of Bayerngas Norge's business risk profile takes into
account the company's various business considerations.  This
includes the company's activity in a cyclical, competitive, and
capital-intensive industry, characterized by large investments
for exploration and development, with uncertain, distant returns
on investment.  S&P's assessment also incorporates the small
scale of Bayerngas Norge's production and its modest reserves
base by global standards. Bayerngas Norge produced 16.7 thousands
of barrels of oil equivalent per day (Kboepd) in 2014.  As of
Jan. 1, 2015, the company had reserves of 111 million barrels of
oil equivalent.  Bayerngas Norge's production is concentrated in
a few producing fields, all of which are in Norway except for
Clipper South and Babbage, both in the U.K., and the company is
not currently the operator of any of its fields.  In addition,
Bayerngas Norge has sizable capital expenditures (standing at
NOK3.4 billion in 2014) and will remain so in the coming years,
owing to its aggressive growth strategy.

Offsetting these risks, in S&P's view, is the prospect of further
production growth in the long term, mainly thanks to Bayerngas
Norge's potential to augment its resource base, and the company's
major presence in Norway.

Bayerngas Norge has an established regulatory framework and
stable taxation regime in its domestic market, even though
upstream taxation remains high at 78%, and it could be subject to
change.

S&P anticipates that the company's production will decline in
2015 to between 10 Kboepd and 15 Kboepd.  S&P also forecasts that
oil will account for approximately one-third of Bayerngas Norge's
total revenues, given that oil prices should be lower compared to
previous years, and because of steady or increasing gas
production at the Trym and Clipper South fields while the
company's oil fields deplete.

S&P views the company's weak credit metrics and its strategy to
develop its assets as a rating constraint.  S&P treats the
shareholder loans as debt, mostly due to its understanding that
Bayerngas Norge's production does not meet SWM's expectations,
although S&P notes that a portion has been converted to equity.
The development entails substantial capital expenditures,
continuing material negative free cash flow, high debt,
additional financing needs over the next few months, and,
critically, dependence on the shareholders' funding support.  S&P
notes that Bayerngas Norge is exposed to commodity prices and
currency risk. This is because it does not have any hedging
instruments in place, and there is a currency mismatch between
its U.S. dollar- and Norwegian krone-denominated cash flows and
euro-denominated debt.

S&P foresees that Standard & Poor's adjusted FFO to debt will be
neutral or slightly negative in 2015-2016.  This is predominantly
due to Bayerngas Norge's substantial amount of debt to develop
its assets and S&P's assumption of depressed oil prices.  S&P
expects a relatively sound adjusted EBITDA margin of at least
70%.  In S&P's calculations, it assumes a 78% tax rate
(comprising "special tax" of 51%, plus "ordinary tax" of 27%) on
Bayerngas Norge's upstream oil and gas activities in Norway, as
well as a reduction of up to 30% against the tax base for capital
expenditures on new fields approved before May 5, 2013 (the tax
rate is 22% for projects approved after this date).  S&P also
takes into consideration a tax refund in relation to 78% of
Bayerngas Norge's exploration costs in the prior year.

S&P forecasts that Bayerngas Norge's free operating cash flow
(FOCF) will remain materially negative after capital investments
in the next couple of years.  S&P do not factor into its base
case any acquisitions, because it thinks that the company will
focus on developing existing assets rather than expanding through
acquisitions.

S&P expects debt, which consists only of shareholder loans, to
remain high despite potential further conversion into equity.
Moreover, S&P projects that Bayerngas Norge will need additional
funding from its shareholders to execute its capital expenditures
plan.  S&P understands that the shareholders' existing loans,
totaling EUR722 million after recent debt to equity conversion,
are fully drawn.  S&P anticipates that the shareholders will very
likely increase their loan or equity funding, but the exact
timing remains uncertain.  Still, S&P's assumption that
sufficient and timely financial support will prevail is core to
S&P's overall assessment.  S&P anticipates that Bayerngas Norge's
ability to finance its capital expenditures and meet its
financial obligations will, however, not be impaired in the near
term.

S&P applies three notches of uplift to the 'ccc+' SACP to reflect
likely support from the shareholders in the event of financial
distress, based on S&P's view that Bayerngas Norge is a
strategically important subsidiary to SWM.

The uplift is mainly based on SWM's ownership of just below 90%
of Bayerngas Norge (directly and through subsidiary Bayerngas
GmbH), its full consolidation of Bayerngas Norge, and Bayerngas
Norge's importance to SWM's long-term strategy.  S&P considers
that Bayerngas Norge could increase its production so that SWM in
turn has higher gas production and can diversify its energy
sources within the next several years, which is increasingly
relevant in the context of increased political tensions in
Russia.  Moreover, S&P thinks that SWM is unlikely to sell
Bayerngas Norge, given the high capital that the shareholders
have already invested in the company.

However, S&P's view of the strength of the relationship between
Bayerngas Norge and SWM under S&P's parent-subsidiary criteria is
weakened by two considerations:

   -- Ongoing or extraordinary support is not unlimited.
      Although S&P assumes that the shareholders will likely
      continue to provide financial support, Bayerngas Norge
      effectively must become largely self-financing at some
      stage.

   -- SWM does not currently benefit greatly from Bayerngas
      Norge's gas production, nor is it in need of this gas.  The
      benefit of Bayerngas Norge providing for SWM's gas needs is
      therefore low, whereas Bayerngas Norge's funding needs
      remain sizable.  Potentially, the likelihood of support in
      the event of financial distress at Bayerngas Norge could
      increase if Bayerngas Norge raised production in the
      future.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that SWM will
continue to provide financial support on an ongoing basis and in
case of distress, despite challenging market conditions
characterized by low oil prices.  S&P thinks that an injection of
new loans or new equity of at least NOK3 billion will enable
Bayerngas Norge to manage liquidity and fund its sizable capital
expenditures program over the 12 months started July 1, 2015.
S&P projects that FFO to debt will be neutral or slightly
negative in 2015-2016 on the back of daily production of between
10 Kboepd and 15 Kboepd.

Downside rating pressure could arise if S&P sees indications of
weaker support or negative intervention from the shareholders.
More specifically, S&P could revise down its assessment of
exceptional support from the group, leading potentially to a
multiple-notch downgrade if the shareholders fail to inject
NOK3 billion of cash in the near term, resulting in a
deterioration of liquidity, or if S&P assess Bayerngas Norge's
funding strategy as unsustainable.  Downward rating pressure
could also stem from decreased production or markedly increased
costs compared with S&P's base case.

S&P sees an upgrade as remote given Bayerngas Norge's very weak
credit metrics amid challenging market conditions.  However, S&P
could consider a positive rating action if it foresees pronounced
improvement in credit measures, coupled with S&P's view that the
capital structure can fund the company's production plan.  This
would hinge on no sign of deterioration in shareholder support or
liquidity, and it would likely be alongside a material
improvement in market conditions and in the company's production
level.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


LUSITANO MORTGAGES: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to BB
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Lusitano Mortgages No. 5 PLC.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Lowered to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' and to 'B (sf)' from
      'B+ (sf)' its ratings on the class A and B notes,
      respectively; and

   -- Affirmed its 'B- (sf)' and 'CCC (sf)' ratings on the
      class C and D notes, respectively.

Upon publishing, S&P's updated criteria for Portuguese
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria), it placed
those ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received as
of the April 2015 payment date.  S&P's analysis reflects the
application of its RMBS criteria.

Credit enhancement, based on nondefaulted loans, has increased
since S&P's previous review.

Class         Available credit
               enhancement (%)
A                         7.90
B                         4.06
C                         0.83
D                        (3.21)

This transaction features an amortizing reserve fund, which has
been completely depleted since the October 2012 payment date.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days at 1.20% are in line
with S&P's Portuguese RMBS index.  The transaction's performance
has been improving since Q2 2012.  Prepayment levels remain low
and the transaction is unlikely to pay down significantly in the
near term, in S&P's opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show an increase in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and an increase in the weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) for each rating level.

Rating level    WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
AAA                51.82       24.48
AA                 39.29       21.20
A                  32.35       15.14
BBB                23.98       12.07
BB                 15.33       10.04
B                  12.74        8.22

The increase in the WAFF is mainly due to the consideration of
the original loan-to-value ratios in the default calculations.
The increase in the WALS is mainly due to the application of
S&P's revised market value decline assumptions.  The overall
effect is an increase in the required credit coverage for each
rating level.

Following the application of S&P's RMBS criteria and considering
its criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above
the sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the class of notes
can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria.

In this transaction, S&P's unsolicited long-term rating on the
Republic of Portugal (BB/Positive/B) constrains S&P's rating on
the class A notes.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

"Our RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for RMBS
as "moderate".  Under our RAS criteria, this transaction's notes
can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign rating,
if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a minimum of a
"severe" stress.  However, as all six of the conditions in
paragraph 44 of the RAS criteria are met, we can assign ratings
in this transaction up to a maximum of six notches (two
additional notches of uplift) above the sovereign rating, subject
to credit enhancement being sufficient to pass an "extreme"
stress," S&P said.

Lusitano Mortgages No. 5's class A notes can support the stresses
that S&P applies at a 'BBB' rating level under its RMBS criteria.
However, S&P considers that the available credit enhancement for
the class A notes is not sufficient to pass a severe stress under
S&P's RAS criteria.  Consequently, S&P cannot assign ratings on
the class A notes above the sovereign rating.  S&P has therefore
lowered to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' its rating on the class A
notes.

S&P's analysis indicates that the available credit enhancement
for the class B notes is no longer sufficient to support their
currently assigned rating.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'B (sf)'
from 'B+ (sf)' its rating on the class B notes.

The available credit enhancement for the class C and D notes is
commensurate with S&P's currently assigned ratings.  S&P do not
expect the class C notes to experience interest shortfalls in the
next 12 months.  S&P's rating on the class D notes is based on
the undercollateralization they are experiencing.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its 'B- (sf)' and 'CCC (sf)' ratings on the
class C and D notes, respectively.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 8% for one- and three-year
horizons.  This did not result in S&P's rating deteriorating
below the maximum projected deterioration that it would associate
with each relevant rating level, as outlined in S&P's credit
stability criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Portuguese residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and sluggish house price appreciation for the
remainder of 2015 and 2016.

On the back of the weak macroeconomic conditions, S&P don't
expect the performance of the transactions in its Portuguese RMBS
index to significantly improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include weak economic growth and high unemployment.  On the
positive side, S&P expects interest rates to remain low.

Lusitano Mortgages No. 5 is a Portuguese RMBS transaction, which
closed in September 2006.  It securitizes a pool of first-ranking
mortgage loans that Novo Banco originated.  The mortgage loans
are mainly located in the Lisbon region and the transaction
comprises loans granted to prime borrowers.

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To                From

Lusitano Mortgages No. 5 PLC
EUR1.412 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

A           BB (sf)           BBB+ (sf)
B           B (sf)            B+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C           B- (sf)
D           CCC (sf)



===========
R U S S I A
===========


CB INTERCOMMERZ: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-/C' foreign
and local currency long- and short-term counterparty credit
ratings on Russia-based bank CB Intercommerz Ltd.  The outlook is
negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'ruBBB-' Russia national scale
rating on the bank.

The affirmation factors in S&P's anticipation that Intercommerz's
capitalization will be weak over S&P's 12-18 month rating
horizon, pressured by higher anticipated and historical loan
growth than the Russian banking sector average and elevated
economic risks. Moreover, the bank will likely receive only
limited support from its owners via an expected capital increase.

S&P's view of Intercommerz's capital and earnings as "weak,"
versus "moderate" previously, incorporates S&P's revised
projections for the bank's Standard & Poor's risk-adjusted
capital (RAC) ratio before adjustments for diversification.
Currently, S&P thinks its RAC ratio for Intercommerz will stay in
the 3.8%-4.5% range over the next 12-18 months compared with
between 5% and 6% previously.  S&P's assumptions include annual
loan growth of 20% for 2015 and 10% for 2016-2017.  The bank's
statutory capital ratio is low -- at 10.87% as of Aug. 1, 2015 --
versus the regulatory minimum of 10%.  Also, its cushion for
provisioning is limited, in S&P's opinion (6.5% loan loss
provisions to gross loans stood at 6.5% in 2014 versus 7%-8% on
average for peers).  A capital increase of up to Russian ruble
(RUB) 500 million (USD7.4 million) planned late in 2015 should
nevertheless underpin the bank's capital base.  However, the
final amount and timing of the capital increase is yet to be
confirmed.

S&P's starting point in assigning the long-term ratings on
Intercommerz is the bank's 'bb-' anchor, which S&P bases on its
view of economic and industry risks in the Russian banking
system.

As regards other major rating factors, S&P assess the bank's
business position as "moderate," reflecting its developing
franchise and S&P's expectation of further progress in improving
corporate governance in 2015.  S&P expects that the bank's
ownership structure will become more straightforward and
transparent.  S&P regards Intercommerz's risk position as "weak"
due to S&P's view of the bank's high growth, soft collateral
policy, and currency risk, as well as high single-name exposure.
S&P views Intercommerz's funding position as "average,"
reflecting the bank's limited reliance on wholesale funding and
currently comfortable stable funding ratio.  S&P also notes that
its statutory liquidity ratios are well above the minimum. S&P
considers Intercommerz's liquidity to be "adequate."

S&P assess Intercommerz's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at
'ccc+', versus 'b-' previously.  In S&P's view, however,
Intercommerz is not currently at risk of nonpayment and is able
to satisfy its financial obligations.  Consequently, the bank
currently does not meet S&P's definition of a 'CCC+' rating under
its criteria.  Therefore, S&P includes a one-notch positive
adjustment in its 'B-' long-term rating on Intercommerz.

S&P notes that Intercommerz's retail and corporate deposits were
generally stable at the end of 2014 and so far in 2015, whereas
many midsize Russian banks experienced significant deposit
outflows.  As of July 1, 2015, liquid assets (cash, short-term
deposits, and bonds) accounted for 10.6% of total assets,
resembling levels reported by peers.  The bank restored its bond
portfolio in 2014, after liquidating it in 2013, to increase its
liquidity cushion amid domestic market tensions.  Still,
Intercommerz's funding position remains confidence-sensitive and
could suffer from a systemwide flight to quality to large state-
owned institutions from midsize private banks.

The negative outlook on Intercommerz reflects S&P's opinion that
the negative trends it sees in both economic and industry risk
for Russian banks could weaken the bank's credit quality,
particularly its liquidity and capital position.

If S&P observed a heightened squeeze on Intercommerz's liquidity
and significant deterioration in S&P's funding and liquidity
metrics for the bank, it would consider a negative rating action.
Weakening of the bank's statutory capital and capital adequacy
ratio -- stemming from increased credit costs or the inability of
shareholders to provide additional capital on time -- could also
lead to a downgrade.

S&P could consider revising the outlook on Intercommerz to stable
if S&P saw an improvement in Russian banks' operating
environment. However, S&P considers the possibility of a positive
rating action to be remote under the current conditions.


EVRAZ GROUP: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' IDR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based Evraz Group SA's and
holding company Evraz plc's Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
at 'BB-'.  The ratings of Evraz's 82% owned subsidiary, Russian
coal company OAO Raspadskaya, have also been affirmed at 'B+'.
The Outlook on all ratings is Stable.  Evraz Group's senior
unsecured rating of 'BB-' has also been affirmed.

The rating affirmation reflects Evraz's proven ability to
generate positive free cash flow (FCF) through the steel market
cycle.  This was again demonstrated in 1H15, when despite
challenging market conditions, Evraz's financial performance
remained strong (USD992 million EBITDA, 19% EBITDA margin).
Fitch expects this trend to continue in 2H15, assisted by the
favorable foreign exchange impact on rouble-denominated costs.

Fitch expects that the company will continue using a significant
portion of its FCF for further debt reduction.  Funds from
operations (FFO) adjusted gross leverage was reduced to 3.5x in
2014 from 5.2x in 2013.  Despite the expectation of further
absolute debt reduction in 2015 the company's FFO leverage will
increase to 3.9x due to market-related drop in EBITDA in the
current difficult market environment.  Thereafter, leverage
metrics should show a downward trend although will remain higher
than its main Russian peers.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Rouble Devaluation Boosts Earnings

Difficult market conditions impacted Evraz's financial
performance in 1H15 (15% decrease in EBITDA yoy due to 28% fall
in revenues). However, EBITDA margin in 1H15 rose to 19% (+3
points yoy), assisted by the favorable foreign exchange impact on
rouble-denominated costs.  Overall costs decreased 31% yoy or
USD1.6 bil., mostly due to RUB/UAH devaluation but also to cost
efficiency measures.  Fitch expects this trend to continue in
2H15, resulting in USD1.8 bil. EBITDA and USD650 million-USD700
million FCF.  Fitch expects that the company will use a
significant portion of this (USD350 million-USD400 million) for
further debt reduction.

Mixed Outlook for Key End-Markets

Evraz's key domestic Russian end-markets are construction (34% of
1H15 production volumes) and railway products (8%).  Around 50%
of Russian production is exported in the form of semi-finished
products.  The near-term outlook for the Russian construction
market is weak with forecasts of a 15% yoy fall in demand in
2015. Actual Evraz volumes to date supplied to the construction
market have seen a 10% decline.  Demand for railway products was
also negatively impacted (-31%) following a drop in demand from
Russian railcars producers and slower rail sales to other CIS
countries (ex. Russia).  Demand for rails in Russia was stable,
with only a 5% yoy decline, supported by steady demand for
maintenance from Russian Railways.

In contrast, demand for railway products in North America remains
robust.  Among other North American markets the order book for
large diameter energy pipes remains solid, while -- in line with
its competitors -- Evraz's OCTG sales continue to suffer from an
inventory overhang in the market and the substantial reduction in
capex by E&P companies.

Challenging Price Environment

The significant decline since 3Q14 in steel input costs (iron
ore, coking coal and energy prices) and more evidence of
deteriorating demand from China have put steel prices under
pressure globally. Separately, the negative outlook for the
Russian economy (sanctions, oil prices, etc) has triggered a
steep depreciation of the rouble, hurting domestic steel
products' prices in dollar terms (prices of Evraz's domestic
finished products dropped 24% on average in 1H15 yoy).  Fitch
expects this dynamic to continue in 2H15 (in line with 1H15)
despite higher price inflation as a result of the weaker rouble.

Raspadskaya Ratings Linked to Evraz

Stronger ties between Evraz plc and Raspadskaya developed after
Evraz increased ownership to 82% in January 2013.  The companies
have since merged several support departments, such as treasury,
logistics and other operations to increase synergies.  Evraz also
refinanced all of Raspadskaya's bank debt in 3Q13.  Evraz remains
a top-three offtaker for Raspadskaya, which plays a crucial part
in Evraz's integration into coal.  Despite these factors a one-
notch differential remains appropriate and reflects the absence
of formal downstream corporate guarantees for Raspadskaya's debt
from Evraz.

High Raw Material Self-Sufficiency

Evraz Group benefits from high self-sufficiency in iron ore and
coking coal, including supplies of coal from its subsidiary
Raspadskaya.  Consequently, it is better placed across the steel
market cycle to control the cost base of its upstream operations
than less integrated Russian and international steel peers.  The
cash cost of slab production at Evraz's Russian steel mills is
estimated to have fallen by around 50% in absolute terms since
2012, reflecting a combination of operating cost efficiencies and
the fall in value of the rouble, which have enabled the company
to maintain full plant capacity utilization.

Corporate Governance

Fitch regards Evraz's corporate governance as reasonable compared
with its Russian peer group, but Fitch continues to notch down
the rating by two notches relative to international peers.  This
notching-down factors in our view of company-specific corporate
governance practices but also the higher-than-average systemic
risks associated with the Russian business and jurisdictional
environment.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- USD/RUB exchange rate: 63 in 2015, 60 in 2016 and 2017
   -- Slight decrease in steel sales volumes in 2015 (-2.6%),
      progressive recovery thereafter (+1% in 2016 and +2.4% in
      2017 and 2018)
   -- Steep decrease in coal sales volume in 2015 (-8%), steady
      growth thereafter (+2% in 2016-2018)
   -- Sharp decrease in prices of steel products and coal in 2015
      (-22% for steel and -13% for coal), steady increase
      thereafter
   -- USD587 mil. capex in 2015, USD600m each in 2016 and 2017
   -- No dividends payments in the forecasted period, no share
      buybacks

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Evraz plc/ Evraz Group SA

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

   -- Further absolute debt reduction with FCF; FFO gross
      leverage moving sustainably below 3.0x
   -- FFO-adjusted net leverage sustained below 2.5x
   -- Sustained positive FCF
   -- Operational performance in Russia remaining within
      expectations including the Russian construction market
      declining 10% 2015 and being flat in 2016

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- FFO-adjusted gross leverage above 4.0x by end-2016 or
      sustained above 3.5x
   -- FFO-adjusted net leverage sustained above 3.0x
   -- Persistently negative FCF
   -- Failure to extend debt maturities falling due in 2017 and
      2018

OAO Raspadskaya

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

   -- Stronger operational and legal ties with Evraz, including a
      corporate guarantee of Raspadskaya's debt, which could lead
      to the equalization of the companies' ratings.
   -- A positive rating action on Evraz plc, which could lead to
      a corresponding rating action on Raspadskaya.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Evidence of weakening operational and legal ties between
      Evraz and Raspadskaya
   -- A negative rating action on Evraz plc, which could lead to
      a corresponding rating action on Raspadskaya.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Evraz Group SA

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Stable
      Outlook
   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
   -- Senior unsecured rating affirmed at 'BB-'

Evraz plc

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Stable
      Outlook
   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'

OAO Raspadskaya

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B+'; Stable
      Outlook
   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
   -- Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'B+'; Stable
      Outlook
   -- Senior unsecured rating affirmed at 'B+'/RR4
   -- National long-term rating affirmed at 'A(rus)'; Stable
      Outlook



=========
S P A I N
=========


SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 9: Moody's Lowers Cl. C Notes Rating to Ca
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of FTA
Santander Hipotecario 9's classes A, B and C notes. These rating
actions follow Moody's review of the recent structural changes to
FTA Santander Hipotecario 9 and concluded that these amendments
have negative impact on the ratings of all the classes of notes:

Issuer: FTA SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 9

   EUR487.5M A Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
   Jul 10, 2015 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   EUR162.5M B Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
   Jul 10, 2015 Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

   EUR117M C Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 10,
   2015 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The structural amendments relates to a reduction of the size of
the reserve fund from 18.0% of the initial amount of classes A
and B notes at closing to 5.0% of the outstanding amount of the
classes A and B notes. The reserve fund was funded by the
issuance of the class C notes. Consequently, class C has
amortized to EUR28.6 million equal to 5.0% of the outstanding
amount of classes A and B.

The size of the class A has decreased to EUR395.7 million which
represent 69% of the classes A and B notes. The amortization on
the class A was on an extraordinary payment date, as described in
the amendment. Simultaneously, there has been an increase in the
size of the class B to EUR177.8 million which represent 31% of
the classes A and B notes. Class A and Class B will not benefit
from sufficient credit enhancement to maintain the rating of the
notes.

In reaching this conclusion, Moody's has taken into consideration
the characteristics of the mortgage pool, the current level of
credit enhancement and the level of credit enhancement that will
be present in the transaction after the amendments have taken
place, together with the amount of liquidity within the
transaction given by the new reserve fund level. However, Moody's
opinion addresses only the credit impact associated with the
amendment, and Moody's is not expressing any opinion as to
whether the amendment has, or could have, other non-credit
related effects that may have a detrimental impact on the
interests of note holders and/or counterparties.

The key collateral assumptions have not been updated as part of
this restructuring. The performance of the underlying asset
portfolio remains in line with Moody's assumptions.

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
to key transaction counterparties, including the roles of
servicer and account bank provided by Banco Santander S.A.
(Spain) (A3/P-2 CRA).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.

The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time, but rather how the initial rating of the security
might have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

At the time the deal was restructured, the model output indicated
that the Series A notes would have achieved an Aa3 if the
expected loss was as high as 19.8% and the MILAN CE was 34.0% and
all other factors were constant.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach To Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published in
January 2015.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage. Please see Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN
Framework for further information on Moody's analysis at the
initial rating assignment and the on-going surveillance in RMBS.

Moody's will continue monitoring the ratings. Any change in the
ratings will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest with respect of
the classes A and ultimate payment of principal by the legal
final maturity. Moody's ratings only address the credit risk
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

TRANSACTION FEATURES

The transaction is a securitization of Spanish prime mortgage
loans originated by Banco Santander S.A. (Spain) (A3/P-2 CRA) to
obligors located in Spain. The portfolio consists of high Loan To
Value ("HLTV") mortgage loans secured by residential properties
including a high percentage of renegotiated loans (17%).

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) further reduction in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is better than
Moody's expected, (3) deleveraging of the capital structure and
(4) improvements in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is worse than
Moody's expects, (3) deterioration in the notes' available credit
enhancement and (4) deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


EAST-INDUSTRIAL: NBU Withdraws Banking License & Liquidation
------------------------------------------------------------
The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a decision on withdrawal
of the banking license and liquidation of East-Industrial
Commercial Bank PJSC.  On September 9, 2015, the National Bank of
Ukraine Board issued Resolution No. 595 to this effect.
Given the intensification of the anti-terrorist operation in
Luhansk, East-Industrial Commercial Bank PJSC temporarily
suspended its operations from July 18, 2014.  As a result, the
National Bank of Ukraine blocked initial payments effected
through the system of electronic payments (the SEP), effective
from July 21, 2014, and temporarily removed this bank from the
register of SEP participants, effective from November 11, 2014.
In accordance with Law of Ukraine No. 629-VIII of July 16, 2015,
On Amendments to Certain Legal Acts of Ukraine on streamlining
the household deposit guarantee scheme and the resolution of
insolvent banks, the National Bank of Ukraine shall adopt a
decision on "withdrawal of the banking license and liquidation of
the banks that are incorporated in the territory covered by the
anti-terrorist operation and have ceased their operations and
participation in the system of electronic payments of the
National Bank of Ukraine".

East-Industrial Commercial Bank PJSC has not been re-incorporated
outside the ATO area and has failed to resume participation in
the system of electronic payments, which led the National Bank of
Ukraine to adopt a decision on withdrawal of the banking license
and liquidation of this bank.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BLUESTONE SECURITIES 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on D Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all tranches in Bluestone Securities
Plc, Series 2006-01 (BS 2006), and upgraded 4 and affirmed 2
tranches in Bluestone Securities Plc, Series 2007-01 (BS 2007).

The Bluestone series are securitizations of UK non-conforming
residential mortgage loans originated by Amber and Beacon
Homeloan Limited.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sufficient Credit Enhancement
The available credit enhancement (CE) allows Fitch to affirm all
ratings in BS 2006 and class D notes' rating in BS 2007.  Also,
the increase of CE levels in BS 2007 supports an upgrade of the
class A2, Az, B and C notes.

The credit support is provided by the collateral assets as well
as by reserve funds, which remain fully funded in both
transactions. Fitch expects CE for BS 2007 to increase further as
the notes amortise sequentially.

Diverging Asset Performance

The original balance of loans whose collateral has been
repossessed are reported at 14.5% of the original pool balance in
BS 2006, up 40bps since June 2014, while realised losses are
unchanged at 3.9%.  In BS 2007, repossessions increased 1.13pp to
13.3% over the same period, while losses went up 20bps to 3.6%.
Late arrears (loans with more than 3 monthly installments
overdue) are reported at 12.7% of the outstanding portfolio
balance in both series.  Compared to June 2014, it represents a
3.2pp and a 1.3pp rise in BS 2006 and BS 2007 respectively.

Fitch notes that the Bluestone deals currently perform worse than
the UK Non-Conforming RMBS Index, whose late arrears,
repossessions and realized losses are reported at 9.7%, 10.5% and
2.9% respectively.  The worse-than-average performance of these
deals can be explained by the fact that the collateralized assets
were originated in 2006 and 2007.  House price decline from the
peak negatively affects the borrowers' willingness to repay their
mortgages and leads to a higher weighted average loss severity
(27.5% in BS 2006 and 29.9% in BS 2007 as compared to 25%
reported on the Index).

Currency Swap Counterparty Downgraded Below Minimum IDR in BS
2007

Following the downgrade of Unicredit Bank AG (Unicredit) to
'A-/F2', the bank must post collateral in order to support
'AAAsf' rated notes.  Fitch confirms that the collateral amount
posted by Unicredit is sufficient to satisfy the agency's
criteria.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

With 100% borrowers on variable-rate mortgages, an increase in
interest rates could lead to performance deterioration of the
underlying assets given the weaker profile of non-conforming
borrowers in these pools and, consequently, downgrades of the
notes if defaults and associated losses exceed Fitch's stresses.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing.  The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

The rating actions are:

Bluestone Securities plc Series 2006-1(Bluestone 2006):

  Class A1 (ISIN XS0264881508) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable

  Class A2 (ISIN XS0264881920) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable

  Class B (ISIN XS0264882654) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

  Class C (ISIN XS0264882902) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

  Class D (ISIN XS0264883207) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable

  Class E (ISIN XS0264883546) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
   Estimate (RE) of 95%

Bluestone Securities plc Series 2007-1 (Bluestone 2007):

  Class A2 (ISIN XS0300920237) upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AA+sf';
   Outlook Stable

  Class Az (ISIN XS0300920583) upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf';
   Outlook Stable

  Class B (ISIN XS0300920823) upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'BBB-sf';
   Outlook Stable

  Class C (ISIN XS0300921128) upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BB-sf' ';
   Outlook Stable

  Class Da (ISIN XS0300921474) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE of 95%

  Class Db (ISIN XS0301241039) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE of 95%


BRIGHTHOUSE GROUP: Moody's Hikes CFR to B1, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the corporate family
rating (CFR) of BrightHouse Group PLC to B1 from B2 and the
Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to B1-PD from B2-PD.
Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded the rating of BrightHouse's
GBP220 million senior secured notes due 2018 to B1 from B2. The
outlook on all ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action concludes the review of BrightHouse's ratings
initiated on June 16, 2015.

The upgrade reflects primarily the reduction in leverage as a
result of the change in lease methodology. It also reflects the
improvement in the company's credit metrics since the initial
rating assignment in April 2013 due to a strong track record of
growth and deleveraging, as a result of its organic growth as
well as new store openings. Moody's adjusted leverage at 4.2x LTM
June 2015 was significantly below opening leverage of 5.8x for
the full financial year ended March 2013 ('FY2013') pro-forma for
the refinancing and also below Moody's upgrade trigger of 4.5x.
The improvement includes the c. 0.8x impact from a lower lease
multiple applied since June 2015. The rating action also assumes
that the company's performance will not be significantly
negatively affected by the outcome of the ongoing Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) authorization process.

The B1 CFR reflects (i) BrightHouse's well-established leading
position in the UK rent-to-own market supported by over 300
branches over the UK; (ii) fairly unique product offering,
notably product rentals over three years with the right to
purchase at the end of the contract, differentiating it from most
mainstream retailers; (iii) strong historical rent-to-own
industry growth supported by limited disposal income of consumers
and limited competition from other forms of credit financing
which we expect to continue, although at a slower pace as the
market matures.

The rating is constrained primarily by (i) the company's small
scale in the context of the broader retail market and competition
from low cost and online retailers; (ii) regulatory risk arising
from the increased scrutiny by the FCA who took over the
regulation of the sector from the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in
April 2014; and (iii) credit risk given the company's customer
base of low-income households with poor credit history, so far
well managed.

Moody's expects BrightHouse's growth prospects to be supported by
a resumed new store rollout of around 20 stores a year (including
satellite stores), positive LFL growth of existing stores which
amounted to 4.7% LTM June 2015 and a roll-out of fully
transactional online proposition. The full impact of the online
proposition is yet to be assessed as it is likely to result in
some cannibalization of physical stores sales offset by an
increase in new customers. Compared to traditional retailers
BrightHouse's physical presence in stores seem to be more
important given the relatively loyal customer base and the
importance of building customer relationships.

BrightHouse, among other companies who wish to continue offering
consumer credit, is going through an authorization process with
the FCA. The growth and continuity of BrightHouse's business
depend very much on the success of its authorization process and
regulatory evolution within the rent-to-own industry. The outcome
of the process is uncertain and includes a range of possible
consequences, some of which could be negative for BrightHouse's
business. On the positive side, BrightHouse has been proactively
tackling changes in the regulatory regime by increasing
compliance monitoring resources, enhancing transparency of the
cost structure of its products, and pursuing its application for
the FCA authorization. From April 2015 the company unbundled the
cost of insurance from its Single Price Agreement introduced in
September 2013. Moody's understands that this change did not have
a significant negative impact on the company's performance.

Moody's assesses BrightHouse's liquidity profile as adequate. As
of June 2015, the company reported cash on balance sheet of
GBP26 million (including GBP5 million restricted cash). Liquidity
is supported by the fully undrawn GBP25 million Revolving Credit
Facility (RCF). The company has no near-term debt liabilities,
until the maturity of the RCF in November 2017, while the GBP220
million notes mature in 2018. The RCF contains a financial
covenant of net debt-to-EBITDA, falling from 6.8x as of June 2013
to 4.1x as of March 2016 which Moody's expects to be met with a
sufficient headroom.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The capital structure includes GBP220 million senior secured
notes and GBP25 million RCF. The GBP220 million senior secured
notes due 2018 are issued at BrightHouse Group PLC (UK), which is
also the borrower of the RCF. The B1 rating of the notes, at the
same level as the CFR, reflects the limited amount of debt
ranking ahead. The notes and the RCF share the same security.
However, based on the terms of an inter-creditor agreement, while
the liens securing the notes will rank equally with the liens
that secure the RCF, in the event of enforcement of the
collateral, holders of the notes will receive proceeds only after
the lenders under the RCF have been repaid in full.

RATING OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that BrightHouse will continue to exhibit strong sales growth
supported by positive LFL of the existing stores and new store
openings. The stable outlook also assumes that the FCA
authorization will be obtained in due course without a
significant negative impact on the business.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The positive pressure could be exerted if Moody's adjusted
leverage declined below 3.5x and EBITA/Interest expense increased
above 2.0x.

Conversely, there could be downward pressure if Moody's adjusted
leverage were to rise sustainably and substantially towards 4.5x
or EBITA/Interest expense declined below 1.5x or if its cash flow
generation deteriorated so that RCF / Net debt declined
significantly below 10%.

CORPORATE PROFILE

BrightHouse Group PLC, based in Watford, is a leader in the rent-
to-own market in the United Kingdom. For the last twelve months
ended June 30, 2015, the company reported revenues of GBP358
million, with 303 stores as of June 30, 2015.


GLOBAL MARITIME: Case Summary & 50 Largest Unsecured Creditors
--------------------------------------------------------------
Debtor affiliates filing separate Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petitions:

Debtor                                                 Case No.
------                                                 --------
GMI USA Management, Inc.                               15-12552
21 Whitefriars Street
London, UK EC4Y 8JJ
United Kingdom

Global Maritime Investments Cyprus Limited             15-12553

Global Maritime Investments Holdings Cyprus Limited    15-12554

GMI Resources (Singapore) PTE Limited                  15-12555

Global Maritime Investments Vessel Holdings PTE Ltd    15-12556

Type of Business: Dry Bulk Shipping

Chapter 11 Petition Date: September 15, 2015

Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court
       Southern District of New York (Manhattan)

Debtors' Counsel: John P. Melko, Esq.
                  Michael K. Riordan, Esq.
                  GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL, LLP
                  1000 Louisiana, Suite 3400
                  Houston, TX 77002-5007
                  Tel: (713) 276-5727
                  Fax: (713) 276-6727
                  Email: jmelko@gardere.com
                         mriordan@gardere.com

Debtors'          AMA CAPITAL PARTNERS
Financial
Advisor:

Estimated Assets: $1 million to $10 million

Estimated Debts: $100 million to $500 million

The petition was signed by Justin Knowles, chief restructuring
officer.

Consolidated List of Debtors' 50 Largest Unsecured Creditors:

   Entity                          Nature of Claim   Claim Amount
   ------                          ---------------   ------------
Draco Shipping PTE Ltd.              Contractual      $2,600,000
80 Robinson Rd #02-00
Singapore 068898
Singapore

Pegasus Shipping PTE Ltd.            Contractual      $2,600,000
2 Beach Rd.
Singapore 199589
Singapore

ADM Investor Services Limited        Trade Debt       $1,890,349
4th Flr Millennium Bridge House
2 Lambeth Hill London
EC4V 3TT
United Kingdom

OW Supply & Trading                  Trade Debt       $1,620,745
Stigsborgvej 60, PO Box 215
Norresundby, DK99400
Denmark

Dynamic Oil Trading (S)              Trade Debt         $663,120
Pte Ltd.
600 North Bridge Rd
#11-09-10 Parkview Sq
Singapore 188778
Singapore

EDF Trading                          Trade Debt         $464,887
80 Victoria St.
Cardinal Place, 3rd Flr
London, SW1E 5JL
United Kingdom

Southport Agencie Inc.               Trade Debt         $357,798
2700 LakeVilla Dr. Ste. 180
Metairie, Louisiana 70002

Calisto Trading Inc.                 Trade Debt         $341,891
Trust Co. Complex,
Ajeltake Rd
Ajeltake Island
Majuro, MH96960
Marshall Islands

Chimbusco Europe BV                  Trade Debt         $330,201
Weena 280
Weena 200 Bldg 8th Flr.
Rotterdam, 3012
Netherlands

Jia Foison Shipping Co., Ltd.        Trade Debt         $264,175
7 Flr, EIB Cenre 40
Bonham Strand
Hong Kong

Gard P&I (Bermuda) Ltd.              Trade Debt         $258,447
PO Box 789 Stoa
Arendal, No-4809
Norway

Mardinik Shipping Co. Ltd.           Trade Debt         $217,528

Kumiai Navigation (Pte) Ltd.         Trade Debt         $213,728

Ifchor SA                            Trade Debt         $193,586

D/S Norden AS                        Trade Debt         $190,956

Arrow Chartering UK Ltd.             Trade Debt         $159,809

Southport Agencie Inc.               Trade Debt         $139,429

Gains Inc.                           Trade Debt         $137,487

Jia Da Shipping Co., Ltd.            Trade Debt         $134,827

Cosco Bulk Carriers Co., Ltd.        Trade Debt         $129,106

Aegean Breeze Shipping Ltd.          Trade Debt          $94,697

Thurlestone Shipping (Singapore)     Trade Debt          $93,598
Pte Ltd.

F.H. Bertling Chartering & Ship      Trade Debt          $87,547
Management

Agencia Maritime Nabsa S.A.          Trade Debt          $86,524

M/S Mercator Lines (Singapore)       Trade Debt          $74,020
PTE Ltd.

MUR Shipping BV                      Trade Debt          $70,671

Pacific Bulk Cape Company Ltd.       Trade Debt          $66,587

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.          Trade Debt          $62,373

Moore Stephens LLP                   Trade Debt          $54,429

Bunge S.A.                           Trade Debt          $52,145

Norvic Shipping North America Inc.   Trade Debt          $47,600

Waterfront Shipping & Trading Ltd.   Trade Debt          $47,411

Pacnav SA Panama                     Trade Debt          $41,362

Hong Kong Grace Shipping Co. Ltd.    Trade Debt          $40,951

E.A. Gibson Shipbrokers Ltd.         Trade Debt          $40,724

Monson Agencies Pte Ltd.             Trade Debt          $40,521

Bancosta (UK) Ltd.                   Trade Debt          $37,282

Sulnorte Servicos Maritimos Ltda.    Trade Debt          $31,527

Simpson Sence Young                  Trade Debt          $24,180

China Shipping (HK) Maritime Inc.    Trade Debt          $21,585

Bay-Houston Towing Co.               Trade Debt          $20,607

ICAP Shipping Ltd. Dry               Trade Debt          $20,498

Freight Investor Services Ltd.       Trade Debt          $13,952

D. Oltman (Hamburg)                  Trade Debt          $13,079

ADM Intermara                        Trade Debt          $11,753

Bernhard von Blomberg                Trade Debt          $11,357

Maersk Broker (UK) Ltd.              Trade Debt          $10,864

LBH Australia Pty Ltd.               Trade Debt          $10,058

Moore Stephens (Limassol) Ltd.       Trade Debt           $9,165

Raffles Shipping Group               Trade Debt           $8,477


HARBOURVEST SENIOR: Liquidators Announce 2nd Interim Distribution
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The liquidators of Harbourvest Senior Loans Europe Limited
announced their intention to make a second interim liquidation
distribution of GBP0.00446 per Sterling Share in issue.

The Second Interim Distribution will be effected pro rata to the
holdings of Sterling Shares on the register at the close of
business on Sept. 11, 2015.

The distribution will be paid on Sept. 18, 2015. Payment will be
made to certified and non-certificated holders by way of Sterling
cheques drawn upon a UK clearing bank posted to the Shareholder's
registered address as at the Record Date.

At an extraordinary general meeting of the Company held on
Nov. 27, 2014, shareholders passed resolutions to wind up
Harbourvest Senior Loans Europe Limited and appointed Ashley
Paxton and Linda Johnson of KPMG Channel Islands Limited as joint
liquidators.


HARLEY CURTAIN: Enters Administration Following Cash Woes
---------------------------------------------------------
Crowborough Life reports that Harley Curtain Wall Ltd. has been
placed under administration.

Julie Palmer -- julie.palmer@begbies-traynor.com -- and
Simon Campbell -- simon.campbell@begbies-traynor.com -- from
business rescue and recovery specialist Begbies Traynor were
jointly appointed to handle the administration of the company on
Sept. 8, Crowborough Life relates.

According to Crowborough Life, a total of 11 people employed by
the firm have been made redundant and various assets have been
sold to Harley Facades Ltd., which was incorporated in 2010.

"Unfortunately, after reviewing all options we were left with
little choice but to close the business.  The firm had entered
difficulty due to cashflow difficulties," Crowborough Life quotes
Julie Palmer, Regional Managing Partner at Begbies Traynor, as
saying.

Harley Curtain reported revenue of GBP6.4 million in 2014.

Harley Curtain Wall Ltd. is a Crowborough construction business
that provided curtain walling -- an outer skin for modern high
rise residential and office complexes.


LOTUS F1: Gastaldi Optimistic Despite Financial Woes
----------------------------------------------------
Mail Online reports that Lotus deputy team principal
Federico Gastaldi is confident his team will survive the
remainder of the Formula One season despite their financial woes.

The cash-strapped Enstone outfit is in discussions with engine
supplier Renault over a potential buyout, Mail Online relays.

According to Mail Online, the team is also due in the High Court
on Friday, Sept. 18, over a claim by Her Majesty's Revenues and
Customs to place them into administration.

But speaking ahead of this week's race in Singapore, Mr. Gastaldi
urged the team's fans to remain positive, Mail Online notes.

"I can confirm that the team is very much alive but we have been
going through a very strenuous workout program this season,"
Mail Online quotes Mr. Gastaldi as saying.

Mr. Gastaldi also welcomed the potential return of Renault, who
last ran their own team in 2010, as a works manufacturer to the
sport, Mail Online relates.

Lotus is an Enstone-based Formula One team.


NEW FRONTIER: Director Disqualified For 14 Years
------------------------------------------------
Charles Howard Denbigh, a director of New Frontier Advisory Ltd
(NFA), a London-based company which traded in rare earth metals
and carbon credits has given an undertaking to the Secretary of
State for Business, Innovation & Skills to be disqualified as a
director for a period of 14 years for selling rare earth metals
and carbon as an investment on the basis they would increase in
value, when the investments were wholly unsuitable.

Mr. Denbigh's disqualification from Sept. 15, 2015, means that he
cannot promote, manage, or be a director of a limited company
until 2029.

Commenting on this case Paul Titherington, Official Receiver in
the Public Interest Unit, said:

"Mr. Denbigh should have known that the carbon credits and rare
earth metals his company was selling, and the price his company
charged for those products, meant that they were wholly
unsuitable as an investment. Anyone showing such blatant
disregard for commercial morality should expect to be banned from
running any limited company for a lengthy period time.

"The disqualification regime exists to protect the public. The
Insolvency Service will pursue those who misuse companies to
deprive members of the public of their hard earned money."

This disqualification follows investigation by the Official
Receiver at the Public Interest Unit, a specialist team of the
Insolvency Service, whose involvement commenced with the winding
up of the company in the public interest following an
investigation by Company Investigations -- part of the Insolvency
Service -- into the affairs of the company.

The Official Receiver's investigation uncovered that between 2011
and 2012 NFA cold called members of the public to sell them
alternative investments charging two to three times the price it
had paid its supplier for the carbon credits and four times the
price it had paid its supplier for rare earth metals. NFA made
sales totalling GBP2.5 million and achieved a gross profit of at
least GBP1.7 million.

As early as 2010, it was apparent that HM Revenue & Customs; the
Financial Conduct Authority; the Registries and the carbon credit
market's own self-regulating authorities considered that there
was no viable exit strategy for the carbon credits sold by NFA at
the time and that, even if there was, members of the public had
no access to it. Even if there was a viable exit strategy, the
price NFA was charging for the carbon credits meant that the
carbon credits could not be sold without financial loss.

The rare earth metals sold by NFA to members of the public were
wholly unsuitable as an investment as there was and remains no
market for rare earth metals without industry certification and
in the quantities sold by NFA.

The petition to wind up the company was presented by the
Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills in the
public interest following an investigation conducted by Company
Investigations (Live), another specialist unit within the
Insolvency Service which uses powers under the Companies Act 1985
(as amended) to conduct confidential enquiries into the
activities of live limited companies in the UK on behalf of the
Secretary of State for Business, Innovations & Skills (BIS).

The winding up order against New Frontier Advisory Ltd was made
on May 1, 2014.


PRIMA HOTEL: Administrators Put Crowne Plaza Hotel Up for Sale
--------------------------------------------------------------
Edinburgh News reports that the four-star Crowne Plaza hotel in
Royal Terrace, in the shadow of Calton Hill, has been put up for
sale following the collapse of its parent company Prima Hotel
Group.

According to Edinburgh News, the luxury hotel was one of five
others that entered into administration when Prima Hotel Group
collapsed in May following what was believed to be a failure to
meet its debt commitments.

Now the sprawling property has been put on the market by joint
administrators at AlixPartners, with JLL Hotels and Hospitality
Group appointed to complete the sale,
Edinburgh News discloses.

The Crowne Plaza hotel boasts a club lounge, swimming pool and
gym, plus landscaped gardens and 100 bedrooms, Edinburgh News
notes.

Prima Hotels Ltd. is a Greater Manchester-headquartered luxury
hotel group.


SPIRIT ISSUER: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Notes, Outlook Pos.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Spirit Issuer plc's notes at 'BB'.
The Outlooks is Positive.  Spirit is a whole business
securitization of managed pubs and leased and tenanted pubs
located across the UK.

The affirmation reflects Spirit's healthy revenue growth,
supported by extensive but targeted investments in its mostly
branded pub estate, its strict cost control and its continued
disposal of weaker tenanted pubs.  The transaction's financial
performance has been in line with Fitch's expectations.

The Positive Outlook reflects our expectation of continued
managed growth and further stabilization within the tenanted
estate over the next two years.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Industry Profile: Midrange

The operating environment is viewed as 'weaker'.  While the pub
sector in the UK has a long history, trading performance for some
assets has shown significant weakness in the past.  The sector is
highly exposed to discretionary spending, strong competition
(including from the off-trade or various forms of home or other
entertainment), and other macro factors such as minimum wages,
utility costs and changes in regulation with the statutory pub
code introducing in 2016 the market rent-only option (MRO) in the
tenanted/leased segment.  MRO breaks the traditional tied-model
that requires tenants to buy drinks from the pubcos, usually in
exchange for lower rent.  Last but not least, the implementation
of national living wage could put margins under pressure.

The barriers to entry are viewed as 'midrange'.  Licensing laws
and regulations are moderately stringent, and managed pubs and
tenanted pubs (ie, non-full repairing and insuring) are fairly
capital-intensive.  Switching costs within the drinking-eating
out market; however, are generally viewed as low, even though
there may be some positive brand and captive market effects.

The sustainability of the sector is viewed as 'midrange', with
the strong pub culture in the UK expected to persist, thereby
taking a large portion of the eating-drinking-out market.  In
relation to demographics, mild forecast population growth in the
UK is a credit-positive.

Company Profile: Midrange

Financial performance is viewed as 'midrange'.  Over the past
five years, the managed estate has achieved an EBITDA per pub
CAGR of 9.1%, in addition to a peer-leading like-for-like (LFL)
sales growth of 3.5% on average.  In relation to the tenanted
estate both absolute and per pub performance has been fairly
weak; however, this weakness is mitigated to some extent by
Spirit's low exposure to the tenanted model, with total
securitized EBITDA contribution from the tenanted estate at 21%.
In addition, the tenanted estate has started to show signs of
stabilization.

The company's operations are viewed as 'midrange'.  Recently-
branded pubs represent a significant portion of total securitized
pubs.  Spirit has limited pricing influence but it is a fairly
large operator within the pub sector.  Its acquisition by Greene
King could support further extraction of economies of scale.
While operating leverage has been increasing over the last few
years as a result of a growing food offer, the change in strategy
is viewed favorably given that the food-led approach has led to
revenue growth.  Management has demonstrated a good track record
since the closing of the securitization, implementing sensible
and effective strategies in a timely manner (increasing food
offer, brand development, reducing tenanted model exposure).

Transparency is viewed as 'midrange' with the more transparent
managed business (self-operated) representing 79% and 60% of the
securitized group by EBITDA and estate, respectively.
Historically management has demonstrated some ability to adapt to
industry changes with the extensive rollout of branding and food
led offers to mitigate the declining performance of the tenanted
model.

Dependence on operator is viewed as 'midrange'.  Operator
replacement is not straightforward but is possible within a
reasonable period of time (several alternative operators
available).  Centralized management of the managed and tenanted
estates and common supply contracts result in close operational
ties between both estates.

Asset quality is viewed as 'midrange'.  The pubs are considered
to be well-maintained following the recent completion of a three-
year GBP200m investment program in relation to the managed
estate. Assets are also well-located (significant portion in
London and the south-east); however, Spirit has a significant
portion of managed pubs on leasehold, with an annual lease
expense of around GBP30 million.  The secondary market is fairly
liquid (extensive disposal programs across the industry have been
absorbed).

Debt Structure Class A: Stronger

The debt profile is viewed as 'midrange' for the class A notes.
The majority of principal (around 80%) is to be repaid via
scheduled amortization, with the class A6 and A7 notes due to be
paid down via cash sweep under Fitch' base case (although they
also benefit from back-ended scheduled amortization).

Debt service increases gradually until 2028, meaning it is not
very well aligned with the industry risk profile; however, it
gradually reduces from 2028 to 2036.  As a result of the mismatch
between the scheduled amortization profile of the class A6 and A7
notes and the class A1 and A3 swaps, under-hedging is set to
increase gradually up to 100% by 2033.  However, floating-rate
risk is mitigated by the cash sweep as prepayments eliminate
under-hedging to a maximum of 10% in 2018 and in full by 2020
under Fitch's base case.

The security package is viewed as 'stronger' for the class A
notes with comprehensive first ranking fixed and floating charges
over the issuer's assets and ultimately over all of the operating
assets.

The structural features are viewed as 'stronger'.  All standard
whole business securitization legal and structural features are
present, and the covenant package is comprehensive.  The
financial covenant level is fairly high (with debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) at 1.3x) and the restricted payment
condition, calculated using synthetic debt service, is set
currently at 1.45x DSCR, higher than industry levels.  The
liquidity facility reduces in line with principal, meaning it
falls below the usual 18 months peak debt service coverage (to
around 15 months by 2020) and is not available for the last two
years of the transaction.  This is credit-negative but mitigated
by debt then being fully repaid through cash sweep under Fitch
base case scenario.

TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE

The transaction's trailing-12-month (TTM) EBITDA as of March 7,
2015, is in line with Fitch's expectations, growing 3.1% (on an
adjusted 52-week basis) to GBP160.6 mil.

Growth has been primarily driven by the managed estate.  Spirit
Group's LfL sales growth of the managed division (a proxy for
securitized group) has been strong, reflecting an improvement in
both drink and food sales.  In FY14, LfL sales were 4.4% up (on a
52-week basis) yoy and 10.8% over the last three years.  Growth
continued, although at slower pace, in 1HFY15 with 1.5% LfL
increase due to a general slowdown in consumer spending on
going/eating-out.  On a per pub basis, annual EBITDA of the
securitized managed estate increased 27% to GBP200k over the last
three years catching up and now being in the territory of
immediate peers (Greene King at GBP192k or Marston's at GBP210k).

The performance of the leased and tenanted estate is showing
encouraging signs of stabilization.  On a per pub basis,
performance continued to improve during the year (by 1.6%) as
smaller, weaker pubs were disposed of.  Spirit Group's LfL net
income (a proxy for securitized group) was up 4.2% in FY14 and
2.3% in 1HFY15.  Notably, Spirit has consistently reduced its
reliance on the tenanted estate, with securitized group leased
and tenanted EBITDA contribution declining to 21% in March 2015
from 33% in May 2009.  This is credit-positive, given the
perceived weakness of the tenanted model.

Under Fitch's base case, EBITDA 21-year CAGRs (to legal final
maturity of the notes in 2036) are mildly positive and negative
for the managed and tenanted divisions respectively.  Combined
EBITDA is forecast to grow gradually, while free cash flow (FCF)
is expected to decline slightly due to increasing maintenance
expenditure and tax expenses (as interest payments reduce over
the life of the transaction).  These forecasts result in FCF
DSCRs (lease adjusted) to legal final maturity improving
marginally versus the most recent projections in September 2014
to 1.37x.

As the transaction features an uneven debt profile and will face
increased debt service from 2020 and subsequently in 2027-28,
Fitch also monitors the minimum of the average/median over the
first 14 years of the transaction given the overall lower
coverage during this period.  On this basis the forecast FCF DSCR
is just 1.31x.

Peers

Spirit's closest peers are Marston's, Greene King and M&B.  The
transaction is well aligned with its peers in terms of FCF DSCR
and leverage metrics relative to rating levels but is heading
towards the higher end of 'BB' category.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive - Improvement in Fitch's base case FCF DSCR above 1.4x
due to continued strong performance of the managed division, in
addition to further stabilization in the tenanted performance
could trigger an upgrade.

Negative - Deterioration of the forecast FCF DSCR below 1.2x
could put the ratings under pressure.  This could be a result of
a change in consumer behavior e.g. as result of an increase in
drink driving alcohol limit in England & Wales or MRO/national
living wage having a materially larger negative effect than
currently expected.

SUMMARY OF CREDIT

Spirit is a whole business securitization of 635 managed pubs and
424 leased and tenanted pubs located across the UK owned and (in
the case of the managed pubs) operated by Spirit Pub Company plc
(Group) and its subsidiaries.  The securitized pubs represent
around 87% of group's pub portfolio and are considered a
reasonably representative sample of the total estate.  The group
was acquired by Greene King in June 2015.

The rating actions are:

  GBP29.5 mil. Class A1 notes due 2028: affirmed at 'BB';
   Outlook Positive

  GBP186.6 mil. Class A2 notes due 2031: affirmed at 'BB';
   Outlook Positive

  GBP51.6 mil. Class A3 notes due 2021: affirmed at 'BB';
   Outlook Positive

  GBP207.7 mil. Class A4 notes due 2027: affirmed at 'BB';
   Outlook Positive

  GBP158.5 mil. Class A5 notes due 2034: affirmed at 'BB';
   Outlook Positive

  GBP101.3 mil. Class A6 notes due 2036: affirmed at 'BB';
   Outlook Positive

  GBP58.4 mil. Class A7 notes due 2036: affirmed at 'BB';
   Outlook Positive


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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