TCREUR_Public/151009.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, October 9, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 200

                            Headlines

B E L G I U M

NYRSTAR: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'B-' CCR


C R O A T I A

HRVATSKA ELEKTROPRIVREDA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Negative


F R A N C E

* French Cooperative Banks Build Capital in Tough Times


G E R M A N Y

PATERNOSTER HOLDING: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Rating to B2
S-CORE 2008-1: S&P Affirms Then Withdrwas D Rating on Cl. E Notes


G R E E C E

GREECE: Tsipras Vows to Negotiate Debt Terms Following Victory


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO XV: Moody's Assigns (P)B2(sf) Rating to Class F Debt
BALLYBAY ESTATES: Cerberus Calls in Receivers to Recover Loan
FASTNET SECURITIES 2: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to BB-
LANSDOWNE MORTGAGE 1: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to CCC+
LANSDOWNE MORTGAGE 2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to CCC-


L A T V I A

LATVIJAS KRAJBANKA: Former Executives Face Criminal Prosecution


L U X E M B O U R G

ALTICE US: S&P Affirms Preliminary 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

BALLARPUR INDUSTRIES: S&P Revises Outlook & Affirms 'B' CCR
CADOGAN SQUARE II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on 2022 Notes
HEMA BV: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'B' CCR
JUBILEE CDO I-R: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to B2(sf)


P O R T U G A L

AZOR MORTGAGES: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to B-
BANCO BPI: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings


R U S S I A

RUSSIAN STANDARD: Tariko Seeks Approval of Restructuring Plan


U K R A I N E

UKRAINE: Must Tackle Budget Issues to Get Next Bailout Tranche


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ABENGOA YIELD: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB'
ARKEX LIMITED: Cash Flow Woes Prompt Administration
HONOURS PLC: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'Bsf'
JAMISON & GREEN: Owes Creditors GBP600,000, Accounts Show


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Competitive Strategy for Health Care Organizations


                            *********


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B E L G I U M
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NYRSTAR: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'B-' CCR
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised the outlook to
negative from stable on Belgium-based integrated zinc producer
Nyrstar.  S&P affirmed the 'B-' long-term corporate credit
rating.

S&P also affirmed the 'B-' issue rating on the EUR350 million
senior unsecured notes due 2018.  The recovery rating is
unchanged at '4'.  The recovery prospects are in the higher half
of the 30%-50% range.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view of the risk that
Nyrstar's liquidity position may have materially weakened by May
2016, when it faces the repayment of the EUR415 million notes.
S&P understands, though, that the company is working on several
potential action plans.  S&P's outlook revision is also to be
seen in the context of much lower zinc prices and important
negative free cash flows on the back of Nyrstar's largescale
capex.  In S&P's view, Nyrstar should be able to meet the
repayment of the notes due May 2016, without introducing of new
facilities. However, the company's financial flexibility will be
reduced materially.

Zinc prices have dropped by 20% since the beginning of the year
to just US$0.75 per pound (/lb), after touching US$0.7/lb
recently, reflecting the potential slowdown in the Chinese
economy.  That said, S&P still believes that zinc fundamentals
will improve, with upside for zinc prices in 2016.  This will
come after two mines -- with an annual capacity of more than 600
kilotonnes (kt) -- are closed, which is expected by the end of
the year.

In the first half of 2015, Nyrstar reported EBITDA of EUR168
million, a material improvement from EUR110 million in first-half
2014.  The improvement was supported mainly by the devaluation of
the euro and the Australian dollar against the U.S. dollar, as
well as higher zinc treatment charges.  On the other hand, the
company's mining division has continued to post poor results.  As
of now, two mines out of the company's nine are idled.  While
existing zinc prices persist, the mining division will remain a
burden on the company's results, in S&P's view.  S&P understands
that the new CEO is prioritizing a turnaround of this division.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, it projects Nyrstar's Standard &
Poor's-adjusted EBITDA to be EUR290 million-EUR300 million in
2015 and EUR330 million-EUR350 million in 2016, compared with
EUR237 million in 2014.  These assumptions underpin S&P's
estimations:

   -- Zinc prices of $0.85/lb for the rest of 2015 and US$0.95/lb
      for 2016.  Currently zinc is traded at US$0.75/lb, which,
      if this persists, could trim S&P's 2015 EBITDA forecast by
      EUR10 million-EUR30 million.  Zinc production in the metal
      processing division of around 1.1 million tonnes.

   -- Zinc treatment charges of US$220/dry metric ton (dmt) in
      2015 and about US$200/dmt in 2016.

   -- Peak capex of EUR440 million in 2015, tapering somewhat in
      2016.  This notably includes the Port Pirie lead smelter
      project, which is scheduled to be commissioned in 2016.
      Small EBITDA contribution from Port Pirie in 2016.  Despite
      the recent drop in metal prices, the company still expects
      the project to generate attractive returns.

   -- No dividends or material acquisitions.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, it forecasts funds from
operations (FFO) of about EUR150 million in 2015, improving to
about EUR200 million in 2016.  However, if the existing
prepayment agreement were not extended, and capex remained heavy,
S&P expects the company's FOCF would be about minus EUR0.5
billion in the next 18 months till the end of 2016.  S&P expects
Nyrstar's ratio of FFO to debt to be around 10% in 2015 and in
2016, supporting S&P's current "highly leveraged" financial risk
profile assessment.

S&P's adjusted debt is materially higher than the company's
reported debt, including the silver prepay agreements (in June
2015 the outstanding balance was about EUR240 million), EUR100
million of asset retirement obligations; and EUR40 million in
outstanding factoring, among other items.  Also, S&P do not
deduct cash from debt under its methodology, also bearing in mind
that most cash will be used to fund capex.

The negative outlook reflects the potential weakening in the
company's liquidity position in the coming quarters with the
repayment of its EUR415 million notes due May 2016, combined with
much lower zinc prices and negative FOCF stemming from Nyrstar's
ongoing large scale capex.

While S&P believes the company should be able to meet its
maturity in April 2016, the use of existing cash sources and
relying on its BBF would see its financial flexibility
deteriorate materially. Another risk factor would be higher than
expected negative FOCF and/or persistently low zinc prices.  A
lack of management measures to improve the liquidity position in
the coming months could lead S&P to downgrade Nyrstar by one
notch.

S&P may revise the outlook to stable if the company secures new
funds to help meet maturities and expected FOCF deficits in 2016.
The rating could also stabilize if zinc prices started to clearly
trend upward, to reach or surpass our price assumptions.



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HRVATSKA ELEKTROPRIVREDA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term corporate credit rating on Hrvatska Elektroprivreda
d.d. (HEP), the 100% state-owned, vertically integrated, Croatian
electricity utility.  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' issue rating on its
senior unsecured debt.  S&P is also assigning its 'BB-' issue
rating to the proposed bond issuance.

The affirmation reflects S&P's unchanged view of HEP's stand-
alone credit profile (SACP) of 'b+' and "high" likelihood of
extraordinary government support, leading to a one-notch uplift
to the SACP.  S&P's unchanged view of HEP's SACP, despite
improving credit measures, reflects that improvements would only
be temporary and could significantly weaken if HEP decides to go
ahead with the potential large investment in a new thermal plant.
Therefore, S&P applies a "negative" financial policy modifier,
which lowers its anchor outcome of 'bb' by one notch.

In addition, S&P sees HEP's continued "less than adequate"
liquidity position as a factor constraining the SACP and the
ratings.

"We have revised HEP's financial risk profile to "significant"
from "aggressive" on the back of improving credit metrics, both
on a historical and forecast basis.  HEP's credit metrics have
benefitted from very favorable hydrological conditions, declining
electricity import prices, and decreasing procurement costs for
natural gas, as HEP has renegotiated its gas supply contracts.
Its financial risk profile is, however, constrained by our
forecast that HEP will generate negative discretionary cash flows
after 2015.  In addition, credit metrics are exposed to the
uncertainty of the extent of potential regulatory tariff
reductions.  This also means that we use the standard volatility
table when assessing credit measures, as we view HEP's regulatory
framework as relatively unpredictable," S&P said.

"In addition, we believe that a decision to invest in the new
thermal power plant, Plomin, could weaken HEP's balance sheet.
We might consolidate the investment if HEP bears the economic
burden through power purchase agreements or any other direct or
reputational links.  We understand that HEP is planning to
conclude the transaction agreement with its strategic partner
Marubeni by the end of 2016 and begin construction in 2017.
Taking into account our view that HEP is not likely to sustain
the strengthened credit measures, we are revising down our 'bb'
anchor by one notch to reflect our negative view of the company's
financial policy.  We will, however, reassess the potential
constraints on credit metrics once there is more certainty about
the contractual and financial arrangements for the project,
including its cost estimate," S&P noted.

S&P's view of HEP's business risk profile as "fair" is
constrained by what S&P sees as high regulatory risk.  This
mainly stems from unpredictable tariff setting in the absence of
a regulatory track record.  This results in what S&P views as
HEP's relatively weaker competitive position compared to many
regulated utility peers in Western Europe.

HEP's profitability improved from below-average levels due to
favorable hydro conditions and lower procurement costs.  However,
profitability remains relatively volatile because of its reliance
on hydrological output, fluctuating commodity prices, and the
need to procure electricity abroad to meet Croatia's needs.
These constraints are somewhat offset by HEP's de facto monopoly
position in Croatia's electricity market along the value chain.
Furthermore, HEP has an important role as a public provider to
tariff customers who have not exercised their right to switch
supplier.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Decreased income after 2015 due to lower volumes of sold
      electricity, resulting from a projected increased share of
      suppliers outside the HEP Group and the projected
      termination of contracts for household gas supply in late
      Q1 2017;

   -- Declining EBITDA in 2016 due to poorer hydrological
      conditions;

   -- Intensifying competitive pressure on margins and customer
      volumes;

   -- Normal hydrological conditions after 2015 from exceptional
      levels in the last two years;

   -- Investments of between Croatian kuna (HRK) HRK3.1 billion-
      HRK4.1 billion, including 50% of planned investments in NPP
      Krsko (S&P understands that about HRK500 million in 2015
      and HRK370 million in 2016 is not committed.);

   -- Potential dividend payout in 2015.  S&P sees a risk of
      continuing dividends in case of lower investments than
      budgeted; and

   -- Investment to accelerate the construction of new energy
      facilities from 2015, as well as the replacement of
      existing ones, which will improve future operating
      efficiency.

S&P considers HEP to be a government-related entity (GRE), and
believes there is a "high" likelihood that the Croatian
government (BB/Negative/B) would provide extraordinary support to
HEP in the event of financial distress.

Furthermore, HEP has managed to extend about HRK900 million under
three framework facilities to three years of availability from
one.  These facilities remain mostly unused as of June 30, 2015.
S&P do not count these arrangements as liquidity sources, under
its criteria, as they do not contain committed lending terms.
HEP also maintains a EUR50 million factoring line, which it can
use to pay suppliers.

The negative outlook on HEP reflects that on the sovereign and
the possibility that a one-notch downgrade of Croatia could lead
S&P to lower the rating on HEP by a similar margin.  Under S&P's
criteria for GREs, a downward revision of the SACP by one notch
is unlikely to affect the rating on HEP, all else being equal.
If S&P lowers the SACP by two notches, it would translate to a
lower rating on HEP of one notch.

S&P would consider revising the SACP downward if HEP's credit
metrics weaken, depending on if and how HEP invests in Plomin.
S&P could also reassess its view of the "high" likelihood of
extraordinary state support that it currently assumes if there is
no evidence of government support for the project.

Negative pressure on the SACP could build if HEP's liquidity
position deteriorates--for example, if the negative discretionary
cash flow exceeds S&P's base-case scenario due to more ambitious
investment levels, higher dividends than S&P anticipates, or
deteriorating market conditions.  S&P would also view covenant
breaches as a weakening factor for HEP's credit quality, although
S&P views these as unlikely at present.  The SACP might also
deteriorate if HEP's business risk profile weakens, for example,
from a loss of retail market share due to competition or delayed
or insufficient tariff increases.

S&P would revise the outlook back to stable if it takes a similar
action on Croatia.

S&P could also revise the outlook to stable if it raises the SACP
by one notch.  An upward revision of HEP's SACP could depend on a
continued, sustainable improvement in the company's liquidity
profile to a level that S&P considers "adequate" under its
criteria.  S&P would take a positive view of:

   -- Timely prefunding of any committed investment projects;
   -- Extension and a staggering of debt maturities; and
   -- Maintenance of sufficient headroom, under committed back-up
      liquidity facilities, to cover unexpected cost overruns.

S&P could also revise the SACP upward by removing the "negative"
financial policy modifier, if S&P believes that leverage will not
become materially higher than its base case, which does not
consider an investment in Plomin.



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F R A N C E
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* French Cooperative Banks Build Capital in Tough Times
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French cooperative banking groups continue to build up capital
through strong retention of earnings despite tough conditions for
their core domestic retail banking business, says Fitch Ratings.
Credit Agricole, Groupe BPCE and CM11-CIC represent around 60% of
the French banking sector.

Fitch believes the cooperative status of these groups is key to
their ability to build up capital because they are not subject to
excessive market pressure to deliver high returns, which helps
them contain dividend and member payout ratios.  CM11-CIC's
shares are not quoted on any stock exchange and only minority
stakes are quoted in the BPCE and Credit Agricole groups.  Only
28% of shares in Natixis, Groupe BPCE's specialized financial
services subsidiary, and 43% of shares in Credit Agricole S.A.,
Credit Agricole's central body, are quoted.

French banks, like many European peers, are finding it hard to
boost revenues due to weak credit demand and low interest rates,
as is the case.  The domestic loan book of most French banks has
been stagnating for two years, reflecting weak economic prospects
in France.

Net interest margins have held up well as banks reduced funding
costs, but this trend is unlikely to continue because households
are fiercely lobbying to reduce rates on their fixed-rate housing
loans.  Housing loans represent around 40% of total domestic
lending in France and a high proportion of them are now repricing
downwards.  Banks are also finding that they have limited
flexibility to reduce remuneration rates on deposits.  This is
because interest rates paid on widely held Livret A savings
deposits are still higher than market rates.  Livret A rates,
which act as a benchmark for rates on other savings products and
deposits, were recently cut to an annual 0.75% from 1%.

France's cooperative banking groups generated an operating return
on average equity of 9%-10% over the past four years.  This is
low compared to similarly rated peers and usually below peers
rated 'A+' or higher.  But these performance indicators reflect
modest risk appetites and relatively limited cyclical earnings
volatility at the cooperatives.



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PATERNOSTER HOLDING: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Rating to B2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service lowered to B2, from B1 the corporate
family rating (CFR) and to B2-PD, from B1-PD the probability of
default rating (PDR) of Paternoster Holding III GmbH ("the
Issuer"), the indirect parent company of Wittur International
Holding GmbH. Concurrently, Moody's has lowered to Caa1, from B3
the instrument rating of the Issuer's EUR225 million 8-year
Senior Notes and to B1, from Ba2 the rating of the EUR195 million
7-year Term Loan B (Term Loan) and the Revolving Credit Facility
raised by Paternoster Holding IV GmbH, a fully owned subsidiary
of the Issuer. Today's rating action concludes the review for
downgrade initiated by Moody's on 11 August 2015.

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The downgrade primarily reflects the company's recent debt-
financed acquisition of Sematic at a time of heightened
uncertainty for the global elevator industry," says Scott
Phillips, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst and lead
analyst for Wittur. "A weaker outlook for growth in China may
affect the company's ability to deleverage to levels commensurate
with previous expectations" added Mr Phillips.

On October 6, Wittur announced that its EUR 210 million
acquisition of Italy-based elevator component manufacturer,
Sematic, is intended to be debt financed. The company seeks to
raise EUR180 million through an incremental Term Loan B while the
remainder will come from existing liquidity.

Moody's believes that the transaction will improve the business
risk profile of the company by: (1) strengthening Wittur's
leading position in the outsourced elevator components market;
(2) reducing the group's reliance on the Asian new-build market
through greater exposure to the European and North American
aftermarket and modernization business; and (3) reducing overall
customer concentration via a more diversified customer base and
higher share of independents. Over time, the rating agency also
believes the deal will generate operational synergies that will
grow EBITDA, although any benefits within our ratings time
horizon will likely be offset by one-off restructuring costs.
Nevertheless, the increase in indebtedness means that leverage
(as measured by Moody's adjusted gross debt / EBITDA) will
increase to above 6x in 2016 and will remain close to this level
in 2017. This means that Wittur's group leverage is now unlikely
to reach our previously expected level of 5.5x over the next few
quarters. Notwithstanding the improvement to the group's business
risk profile, Moody's believes that the elevated leverage of the
group of above 6x pro forma for the acquisition is more
commensurate with a B2 rating.

Wittur delivered strong financial results in the first half of
2015. Nevertheless, with over 40% of the group's revenues and
orders derived from its operations in China, the group ranks as
one of the most exposed companies in the rated European
manufacturing universe to a slowdown in economic activity in the
region. While Wittur's major customers in China (Kone and
Schindler) have continued to report growth in order intake in H1-
15 and a significant foreign exchange tailwind likely points
toward continued growth for the rest of 2015, they have also
warned of a softer market conditions for new orders in China,
which may negatively affect the company in 2016 and beyond.
Moody's believes that a weaker growth outlook could inhibit the
ability of Wittur to maintain a level of growth that would allow
leverage to fall towards 5.5x within 12-18 months.

The B2 CFR takes into consideration: (1) the group's track record
for healthy profit margins and free cash flow generation over the
last three years; (2) longstanding relationships with the major
elevator manufacturers which in some case date back to the
1980's; (3) exposure to the mature markets of Europe and North
America which are relatively stable and driven by a higher
proportion of aftermarket sales; and (4) positive sector
fundamentals such as population growth, increasing levels of
urbanization and the positive effects of regulation.
Nevertheless, these positive factors are offset by: (1) the
group's limited product offering, partly mitigated by scale
advantages following the Sematic acquisition; (2) a highly
concentrated customer base with the four main western elevator
manufactures accounting for around two-thirds of group revenue;
(3) the company's high exposure to the predominantly new-build
market in China; and (4) a high level of leverage, anticipated to
be close to or above 6x in 2016 and 2017.

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that positive free
cash flow will underpin a gradual improvement in key financial
metrics. Furthermore, liquidity for the group is expected to be
adequate with sufficient headroom under financial covenants
throughout the forecast period.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Based on the revised capital structure of the group, the relative
proportion of senior secured debt has increased in relation to
total debt. Accordingly, the rating on the senior secured debt is
now one notch higher than the CFR (versus a two notch difference
in the former capital structure), at B1. The rating on the senior
notes, however, remains two notches below the CFR at Caa1. While
Moody's does not expect the terms of the new financing to be
modified, a change in the relative amounts of debt could affect
the individual instrument ratings.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- UP/DOWN

Given the recent downgrade to B2, Moody's believes a rating
upgrade to be unlikely in the short-term. Nevertheless, Moody's
could consider an upgrade if Wittur is able to continue to
deliver mid-single digit organic revenue growth (in H1-2016 and
beyond, excluding currency effects) combined with a debt / EBITDA
that is close to, or approaching 5x. Conversely, the ratings
could be downgraded if leverage increases to above 6.5x debt /
EBITDA on a sustained basis or if there is a further
deterioration in Wittur's main growth markets, most notably Asia.
A deterioration of liquidity could also result in a downgrade.

Based in Germany, Wittur is a private-equity-owned manufacturer
of elevator components. The company produces and sells elevator
components such as automatic elevator doors, lift cars, safety
components, drives, elevator frames and complete elevators.
Wittur had revenues of EUR522 million in 2014 and around 3,250
employees. In December 2014, funds advised and managed by Bain
Capital agreed to acquire Wittur from Triton and Capvis. The
transaction was closed on 31 March 2015.


S-CORE 2008-1: S&P Affirms Then Withdrwas D Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'D (sf)' credit
rating on S-CORE 2008-1 GmbH's class E notes.  S&P has
subsequently withdrawn its rating at the issuer's request.

The rating actions reflect S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from June 30, 2015 trustee report, the
application of S&P's relevant criteria, and the request from the
issuer to withdraw its rating on the class E notes.  The class E
notes are undercollateralized.  In S&P's view, these notes will
not repay the entire principal amount due at maturity.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on this class of notes
before withdrawing it.

S-CORE 2008-1 is a cash securitization of senior unsecured
payment claims of the issuer against German small and midsize
enterprises (SMEs) under certain corporate promissory notes
("Schuldscheindarlehen") originated and serviced by Deutsche Bank
AG.



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GREECE: Tsipras Vows to Negotiate Debt Terms Following Victory
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kerin Hope at The Financial Times reports that Alexis Tsipras has
pledged to steer Greece back to economic growth in the second
half of next year but said he would try to negotiate softer terms
with the country's creditors on energy liberalization and social
policies.

The Greek premier won an unexpectedly solid victory in a snap
election held last month, the FT recounts.  In his first big
policy speech since his election, Mr. Tsipras, as cited by the
FT, said in parliament on Oct. 5 that debt relief would be a
priority for the new Syriza-led government after it legislates a
new EUR4.3 billion package of fiscal and structural reforms in
the coming weeks.

In contrast with the fiery anti-austerity rhetoric of his first
days in office last January, a subdued Mr. Tsipras said he was
"fully aware the new (bailout) agreement has difficult points
... VAT increases, tax hikes for farmers and changes in the
pension system, all these will create problems", the FT relates.

But he vowed to "do everything we can to find alternatives or
ways of moderating the negative consequences (of reforms)", the
FT notes.

Successfully implementing the latest economic reform package is a
condition for opening negotiations with creditors, possibly early
next year, on a limited restructuring of Greece's mountainous
debt which is projected to reach 197.7% of national output in
2016, the FT states.

The premier said Greece would propose an extension of loan
maturities, a reduction of interest rates on debt and a
conversion to stable interest rates, the FT relays.

According to the FT, the government would also revive a proposal
put forward by former finance minister Yanis Varoufakis earlier
this year to link debt servicing payments to growth in national
output, and at the same time, seek an extension of the grace
period on debt repayments.



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AVOCA CLO XV: Moody's Assigns (P)B2(sf) Rating to Class F Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Avoca CLO
XV Limited:

  EUR291,200,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  EUR5,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
  2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  EUR49,400,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  EUR10,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
  2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  EUR30,700,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2028, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  EUR27,100,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2028, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

  EUR34,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
  2028, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

  EUR16,300,000 Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
  2028, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2028. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, KKR Credit
Advisors (Ireland) ("KKR Credit Advisors"), has sufficient
experience and operational capacity and is capable of managing
this CLO.

Avoca CLO XV is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 93% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans or senior secured
bonds, and up to 7% of the portfolio may consist of senior
unsecured loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and
high yield bonds. The portfolio is expected to be 70% ramped up
as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe. The
remainder of the portfolio will be acquired during the six month
ramp-up period in compliance with the portfolio guidelines.

KKR Credit Advisors will manage the CLO. It will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk obligations, and are subject
to certain restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR53.1 million of subordinated notes which
will not be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

KKR Credit Advisors will acquire and hold 50% of the outstanding
shares in the Issuer. The remaining 50% of the Issuer's
outstanding shares will be held by a charitable trust. However,
in a typical CLO transaction 100% of the Issuer's shares would be
held by a charitable trust. As a result, certain structural
mitigants have been put in place to ensure that Avoca CLO XV will
remain bankruptcy remote from KKR Credit Advisors (for example,
covenants to maintain a majority of independent directors in
Avoca CLO XV, covenants to maintain that Avoca CLO XV and KKR
Credit Advisors are operated as separate businesses, and a share
charge given by KKR Credit Advisors over its shares in the Issuer
securing it's observance of such covenants).

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. KKR's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
September 2015. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR500,000,000

Diversity Score: 37

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2820

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.0%

Weighted Average Coupon : 5.6%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analyses, which were important
components in determining the provisional rating assigned to the
rated notes. These sensitivity analyses include increasing the
default probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary
of the impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in
terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms
of the number of notch difference versus the current model
output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher
expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3243 from 2820)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3666 from 2820)

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -2


BALLYBAY ESTATES: Cerberus Calls in Receivers to Recover Loan
-------------------------------------------------------------
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that US company
Cerberus has appointed receivers to Ballybay Estates, one of the
companies whose debts it bought through the National Asset
Management Agency's Project Eagle sale, to recover a EUR7 million
loan.

New York-based Cerberus Capital Management's EUR1.6 billion
purchase of the Project Eagle loans is caught in a row over
claims that a number of Belfast political and business figures
were to receive payment as a result of the deal, The Irish Times
notes.  The company itself denies any wrongdoing, The Irish Times
states.

According to The Irish Times, official documents just filed show
Cerberus recently appointed Jon Anderson and Andrew Lennon of
Colliers International in Belfast to Ballybay Estates in Tullow,
Co Carlow.

Promontoria Eagle, the Irish subsidiary used by Cerberus to buy
Project Eagle, appointed the receivers on foot of a EUR7 million
loan, originally given by Bank of Ireland, that is secured
against the company's main asset, a site in Rathoe, Co Carlow,
The Irish Times relates.

The company has planning permission for 33 new houses and some
commercial buildings on the 10-hectare site, which it bought with
the aid of the Bank of Ireland loan, The Irish Times says.
Accounts show that by June last year Ballybay valued the property
at EUR1 million, The Irish Times discloses.

At the weekend, Cerberus confirmed it had reached agreements with
borrowers responsible for 96% of the EUR6 billion worth of unpaid
loans it had acquired as a result of the deal, The Irish Times
relays.


FASTNET SECURITIES 2: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to BB-
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Fastnet Securities 2 PLC's class A2 and B notes.  At the same
time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class C and D notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Irish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria), it placed those
ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction information that S&P has received as of Aug.
2015. S&P's analysis reflects the application of its Irish RMBS
criteria.

In S&P's opinion, although the current outlook for the Irish
market is relatively positive, S&P's outlook for the Irish
residential mortgage market calls for starting conditions that
are not benign.  S&P has therefore increased its expected 'B'
foreclosure frequency assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P
applies its RMBS criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these
assumptions on the fact that although the Irish economy has
significantly improved in terms of house price appreciation and a
fall in unemployment, the stock of nonperforming loans remains
high, restructuring arrangements are increasing, and unemployment
levels, though expected to fall further, remain high.

Credit enhancement for the class A2 notes, excluding loans with
arrears greater than nine monthly payments, has increased to
6.0%, from 4.1% in S&P's previous full review.

This transaction features a reserve fund, which currently has
been drawn upon and now represents 95% of its required amount
(EUR70 million).

In S&P's analysis, it has assumed that all loans that are
delinquent for more than nine monthly payments have defaulted.
Recoveries on such defaulted loans--which vary according to the
rating level--are only realized at the end of the 42-month
foreclosure period.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days, at 11.49%, are on
average lower for this transaction than for other Irish RMBS
transactions that S&P rates.  Generally, severe delinquencies
have been decreasing over the past two years as the macroeconomic
environment in Ireland improves.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show a decrease in both the weighted-
average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and in the weighted-average
loss severity (WALS) for each rating level.

  Rating level       WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
  AAA                34.18       31.18
  AA                 26.06       28.36
  A                  20.25       22.92
  BBB                16.38       20.15
  BB                 11.67       18.25
  B                   9.39       16.51

The decrease in the WAFF is mainly due to the use of original
loan-to-value (OLTV) ratio in the WAFF calculation (as opposed to
current loan-to-value ratio), seasoning credit for performing
loans greater than six years being higher than previously
applied, and lower arrears levels.  The decrease in the WALS is
mainly due to the application of S&P's updated indexation
methodology, coupled with the recent appreciation in house prices
in Ireland. The overall effect is a decrease in the required
credit coverage for each rating level.

In this transaction, S&P has not applied its criteria for rating
single-jurisdiction securitizations above the sovereign foreign
currency rating as none of S&P's ratings in this transaction are
above its long-term rating on the Republic of Ireland
(A+/Stable/A-1).

Taking into account the results of S&P's updated credit and cash
flow analysis and the recent positive performance, S&P considers
the available credit enhancement for the class A2 and B notes to
be commensurate with higher ratings than those currently
assigned. S&P has therefore raised to 'BB- (sf)' from 'B (sf)'
and from 'B- (sf)' its ratings on the class A2 and B notes,
respectively.

S&P's analysis also indicates that the available credit
enhancement for the class C and D notes is commensurate with the
currently assigned ratings.  S&P has therefore affirmed its
'B- (sf)' ratings on the class C and D notes.

S&P's current counterparty criteria constrain its ratings on all
classes of notes at 'BB- (sf)', the long-term issuer credit
rating on Permanent TSB PLC (BB-/Stable/B), as bank account and
swap provider, due to the breach of the documented replacement
trigger.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 16% for one- and three-year
horizons.  This did not result in S&P's rating deteriorating
below the maximum projected deterioration that it would associate
with each relevant rating level, as outlined in S&P's credit
stability criteria.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to decline slowly
alongside economic growth, high but diminishing unemployment, and
uncertainty surrounding repossessions.  On the positive side, S&P
expects interest rates to remain low and house prices to continue
increasing (albeit at a reduced rate).

Fastnet Securities 2 is an Irish RMBS transaction, which closed
in June 2006 and securitizes a pool of first-ranking mortgage
loans originated by Permanent TSB.  The mortgage loans are owner-
occupied and 31% are located in Dublin.

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To                From

Fastnet Securities 2 Ltd.
EUR2.15 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A2          BB- (sf)          B (sf)
B           BB- (sf)          B- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C           B- (sf)
D           B- (sf)


LANSDOWNE MORTGAGE 1: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to CCC+
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on Lansdowne Mortgage
Securities No. 1 PLC's class A2, M1, and M2 notes.  At the same
time, S&P has affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its
ratings on the class B1 and B2 notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Irish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria), S&P placed those
ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received as
of May 2015.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of its RMBS
criteria.

In S&P's opinion, although the current outlook for the Irish
market is relatively positive, its outlook for the Irish
residential mortgage market calls for starting conditions that
are not benign.  S&P has therefore increased its expected 'B'
foreclosure frequency assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when it
applies its RMBS criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these
assumptions on the fact that although the Irish economy has
significantly improved in terms of house price appreciation and a
fall in unemployment, the stock of nonperforming loans remains
high, restructuring arrangements are increasing, and unemployment
levels, though expected to fall further, remain high.

Credit enhancement, excluding loans with arrears greater than
nine monthly payments, has decreased for all classes of notes
since S&P's previous full review.

  Class         Available credit
                 enhancement (%)
    A2                (62.89)
    M1               (102.70)
    M2               (129.29)
    B1               (161.20)
    B2               (169.24)

This transaction features a nonamortizing reserve fund, which is
at 70.6% of its target level.

In S&P's analysis, it has assumed that all loans that are
delinquent for more than nine monthly payments have defaulted.
Recoveries on such defaulted loans--which vary according to the
rating level--are only realized at the end of the 42-month
foreclosure period.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days, at 69.10%, are on
average much higher for this transaction than for other Irish
RMBS transactions that S&P rates.  Generally, severe
delinquencies have been stable over the past two years as the
macroeconomic environment in Ireland improves.  Prepayment levels
remain low and the transaction is unlikely to pay down
significantly in the near term, in S&P's opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show a decrease in both the weighted-
average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and in the weighted-average
loss severity (WALS) for each rating level.

Rating level    WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
AAA                 26.0        26.2
AA                  22.4        23.6
A                   18.6        18.7
BBB                 15.2        16.3
BB                  12.2        14.5
B                   10.6        13.0

The decrease in the WAFF is mainly due to the use of the
weighted-average original loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in the WAFF
calculation (as opposed to the use of the weighted-average
current LTV ratio), changes to the benefit S&P gives to seasoning
(114 months), and lower arrears levels, which S&P modeled due to
its nine months in arrears assumption.  The decrease in the WALS
is mainly due to the application of S&P's updated indexation
methodology, coupled with a marked appreciation in house prices
in Ireland since S&P's September 2012 review.  The overall effect
is a decrease in the required credit coverage for each rating
level.

Following the application of S&P's RMBS criteria and considering
its criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above
the sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the class of notes
can attain under its RMBS criteria.

In this transaction, none of S&P's ratings are constrained by its
long-term rating on the Republic of Ireland (A+/Stable/A-1).

S&P considers that the class A2, M1, and M2 notes are
undercollateralized.  To reflect this, S&P has lowered to
'B- (sf)' from 'B (sf)' its rating on the class A2 notes, and to
'CCC+ (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its ratings on the class M1 and M2
notes.

The class B1 and B2 notes are severely undercollateralized.
However, the presence of a reserve fund and the low losses
expectation, given the current level of repossessions, should be
sufficient to mitigate any interest shortfalls in the next 12
months.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'CCC (sf)' ratings on the
class B1 and B2 notes.

On March 20, 2015, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings
on all classes of notes following the cancelation of the
liquidity facility and the payment of an indemnity amount by the
issuer to Barclays Bank PLC, acting as liquidity facility
provider.  Barclays Bank has not claimed any new additional
indemnity amounts.  Additionally, the current available cash
reserve and the excess spread in the transaction adequately
mitigate the liquidity risk that arose following the cancelation
of the liquidity facility, in S&P's view.  S&P has therefore
removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on all classes of
notes in this transaction.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 16% for one- and three-year
horizons.  This did not result in S&P's rating deteriorating
below the maximum projected deterioration that S&P would
associate with each relevant rating level, as outlined in its
credit stability criteria.

Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No. 1 is an Irish nonconforming
RMBS transaction, which closed in April 2006 with loans
originated by Start Mortgages.

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To                From

Lansdowne Mortgages Securities No. 1 PLC
EUR370.05 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Fixed- And
Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2          B- (sf)           B (sf)/Watch Neg
M1          CCC+ (sf)         B- (sf)/Watch Neg
M2          CCC+ (sf)         B- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

B1          CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
B2          CCC (sf)/Watch Neg


LANSDOWNE MORTGAGE 2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to CCC-
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit rating on Lansdowne Mortgage
Securities No. 2 PLC's class B notes.  At the same time, S&P has
affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on the
class A2, M1, and M2 notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Irish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria), it placed those
ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received as
of May 2015.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of its RMBS
criteria.

"In our opinion, although the current outlook for the Irish
market is relatively positive, our outlook for the Irish
residential mortgage market calls for starting conditions that
are not benign. We have therefore increased our expected 'B'
foreclosure frequency assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when we
apply our RMBS criteria, to reflect this view.  We base these
assumptions on the fact that although the Irish economy has
significantly improved in terms of house price appreciation and a
fall in unemployment, the stock of nonperforming loans remains
high, restructuring arrangements are increasing, and unemployment
levels, though expected to fall further, remain high," S&P said.

Credit enhancement, excluding loans with arrears greater than
nine monthly payments, has decreased for all classes of notes
since S&P's previous full review.

Class         Available credit
               enhancement (%)
A2                     (99.02)
M1                    (120.25)
M2                    (136.16)
B1                    (162.71)

This transaction features a non-amortizing reserve fund, which is
at 58.07% of its target level.

In S&P's analysis, it has assumed that all loans that are
delinquent for more than nine monthly payments have defaulted.
Recoveries on such defaulted loans -- which vary according to the
rating level -- are only realized at the end of the 42-month
foreclosure period.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days, at 68.3%, are on
average much higher for this transaction than for other Irish
RMBS transactions that S&P rates.  Generally, severe
delinquencies have been stable over the past two years as the
macroeconomic environment in Ireland improves.  Prepayment levels
remain low and the transaction is unlikely to pay down
significantly in the near term, in S&P's opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show a decrease in both the weighted-
average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and in the weighted-average
loss severity (WALS) for each rating level.

Rating level       WAFF(%)     WALS(%)
AAA                 32.7        35.4
AA                  28.1        32.5
A                   22.7        27.0
BBB                 18.8        24.1
BB                  14.4        22.1
B                   12.1        20.2

The decrease in the WAFF is mainly due to the use of the
weighted-average original loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in the WAFF
calculation (as opposed to the use of the weighted-average
current LTV ratio), changes to the benefit S&P gives to seasoning
(106 months), and lower arrears levels, which S&P modeled due to
its nine months in arrears assumption.  The decrease in the WALS
is mainly due to the application of S&P's updated indexation
methodology, coupled with a marked appreciation in house prices
in Ireland since S&P's September 2012 review.  The overall effect
is a decrease in the required credit coverage for each rating
level.

Following the application of S&P's RMBS criteria and considering
its criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above
the sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the class of notes
can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria.

In this transaction, none of S&P's ratings are constrained by its
long-term rating on the Republic of Ireland (A+/Stable/A-1).

S&P considers that the class A2, M1, and M2 notes are
undercollateralized.  However, the presence of a reserve fund and
the low losses expectation given the current level of
repossessions should be sufficient to mitigate any interest
shortfalls in the next 12 months.  S&P has therefore affirmed its
ratings on these classes of notes.

The class B notes are severely undercollateralized.  To reflect
this, S&P has lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' its rating
on the class B notes.

On March 20, 2015, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings
on all classes of notes following the cancelation of the
liquidity facility and the payment of an indemnity amount by the
issuer to Barclays Bank PLC, acting as liquidity facility
provider.  Barclays Bank has not claimed any new additional
indemnity amounts.  Additionally, the current available cash
reserve and the excess spread in the transaction adequately
mitigate the liquidity risk that arose following the cancelation
of the liquidity facility, in S&P's view.  S&P has therefore
removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on all classes of
notes in this transaction.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 16% for one- and three-year
horizons.  This did not result in S&P's rating deteriorating
below the maximum projected deterioration that it would associate
with each relevant rating level, as outlined in S&P's credit
stability criteria.

Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No. 2 is an Irish nonconforming
RMBS transaction, which closed in December 2006 with loans
originated by Start Mortgages.

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To                From

Lansdowne Mortgages Securities No. 2 PLC
EUR525.05 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Fixed- And
Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

B           CCC- (sf)         CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2          B- (sf)/Watch Neg
M1          CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
M2          CCC (sf)/Watch Neg



===========
L A T V I A
===========


LATVIJAS KRAJBANKA: Former Executives Face Criminal Prosecution
---------------------------------------------------------------
Xinhua News Agency reports that Latvian law enforcement
authorities have launched a criminal prosecution against five
individuals for leading Latvijas Krajbanka, or the Latvian
Savings Bank, in bankruptcy.

Aiga Eiduka, a spokeswoman for the specialized public
prosecutor's office for organized crime and other offences,
declined to elaborate, saying the suspects had not yet been
officially informed about the prosecution they are facing, Xinhua
News relates.

The spokeswoman, as cited by Xinhua News, said a separate probe
against a sixth suspect in the case is still ongoing.

According to Xinhua News, although the prosecutor's office did
not disclose the names of the suspects, it has been reported that
the Latvian State Police were seeking prosecution against the
bank's former CEO Ivars Prieditis, former owner Vladimir Antonov,
as well as former members of the bank's management board.

They are facing criminal prosecution for embezzling about
EUR90 million worth of the bank's assets, abuse of office power,
money laundering and accounting violations, Xinhua News
discloses.

                 About Latvijas Krajbanka

Headquartered in Riga, Latvia, AS Latvijas Krajbanka provides
commercial banking services to businesses and private individuals
in Latvia and the markets of the Commonwealth of Independent
States.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, AS Latvijas Krajbanka had 115
customer service centers and 190 automated teller machines.  AS
Latvijas Krajbanka is a subsidiary of AS banka Snoras.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 10,
2012, Baltic Business News said the Riga District Court on
May 8 decided to start the bankruptcy procedure of Latvijas
Krajbanka.  The move was initiated by Krajbanka's insolvency
administrator SIA KPMG Baltics, BBN disclosed.  The company
believes that it is impossible to revive the bank without state
support, which is not coming, BBN noted.

Latvian regulators halted Krajbanka's operations on Nov. 21,
2011, after discovering LVL167 million (US$301 million) was
missing, Bloomberg News recounted.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


ALTICE US: S&P Affirms Preliminary 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it affirmed its 'B'
preliminary corporate credit rating and all preliminary issue-
level ratings on Luxembourg-based Altice US Holding I S.ar.l
(Altice US).  The outlook is stable.

"The ratings affirmation follows our 90-day review of Altice US's
preliminary ratings," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Michael Altberg.  "There have been no changes to the proposed
capital structure since we initially assigned our preliminary
rating on May 26, 2015," he added.

Altice US is an escrow financing entity and wholly owned
subsidiary of Altice N.V., which raised debt at its subsidiaries
in advance of the Cequel purchase, and continues to hold the
proceeds in escrow until the deal closes.  As stated in S&P's
May 20, 2015 research update, it will lower its corporate rating
on Cequel Communications to 'B' from 'B+' upon close of the
transaction.  In addition, at close of the transaction, Altice US
subsidiaries will merge with and into the existing Cequel
entities and S&P will likely withdraw the preliminary ratings on
Altice US.

On Sept. 17, 2015, Altice N.V. signed a definitive agreement to
acquire U.S. cable and telecommunications provider Cablevision
Systems Corp. for US$17.7 billion including assumed debt.  Both
Cequel and Cablevision will be separate unrestricted subsidiaries
of Altice with distinct capital structures and recovery
prospects. However, over time S&P would expect further
operational and structural integration among the entities, which
could include a longer term consolidation of the capital
structures.  From a credit perspective, S&P views the companies
as having similar risk profiles, both with pro forma leverage
before synergies in the mid- to high-7x area, common management,
and financial policy. Currently S&P assess the standalone credit
profile of each entity, and then apply its group ratings
methodology to determine the issuer credit rating in the context
of each subsidiary's relationship to the ultimate parent, Altice
N.V. (B+/Negative/--). Similar to Cequel, S&P views Cablevision
as "strategically important" to Altice and do not impute any
uplift to the rating. Longer term, and potentially prior to an
eventual consolidation of the two capital structures, S&P could
financially consolidate the Cequel and Cablevision entities for
purposes of determining the corporate credit ratings on them.

The stable rating outlook reflects S&P's expectation that despite
high pro forma leverage, Altice US will continue to benefit from
growth in high-speed data, voice, and business customers over the
next few years.  In addition, while capital spending will remain
elevated in 2015 and 2016 due to network investments, the company
should continue to generate healthy FOCF that could support
leverage reduction to around 7x in 2016 barring unexpected
events.

Longer term, S&P could lower the rating if cost cutting
initiatives impair the company's competitive position and lead to
increased customer churn and a decline in penetration rates.  In
addition, S&P could downgrade the company if liquidity narrows
due to unexpected events or the adoption of a more aggressive
financial policy.

While an upgrade is unlikely over the next 12 months, S&P could
raise the rating in the longer term if Altice US is able to
reduce and maintain leverage comfortably below 7x on a sustained
basis without impairing operational performance.  An upgrade
would also entail greater comfort around Altice's acquisition
strategy in the U.S., especially as U.S. assets become more
integrated over time.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


BALLARPUR INDUSTRIES: S&P Revises Outlook & Affirms 'B' CCR
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised the outlooks on
Ballarpur Industries Ltd. (BILT) and its core subsidiary Bilt
Paper B.V. to positive from stable.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit ratings on BILT and
its subsidiary.  S&P then withdrew all the ratings at BILT's
request.

The outlook revision followed BILT's announcement on Sept. 24,
2015, that it plans to sell its entire stake in its Malaysian
unit Sabah Forest Industries for an enterprise valuation of
US$500 million.  The positive outlook at the time of withdrawal
reflected S&P's view that BILT will use the majority of the
proceeds from the sale to repay its debt, leading to a material
improvement in its leverage.  S&P expects BILT's ratio of funds
from operations (FFO) to debt to improve to about 12% in fiscal
2016 (year ending March 31, 2016) and about 16% in fiscal 2017,
from about 5% in fiscal 2015.

At the time of the withdrawal, the ratings affirmation reflected
BILT's continued stable operating performance and ability to
manage its debt maturities.  S&P expects the company to maintain
an EBITDA margin of 17%-18% and manage its banking relationships
to roll over its debt maturities.

S&P would have upgraded BILT after the completion of the proposed
stake sale if the company's planned debt repayment led to an FFO-
to-debt ratio of more than 12% over the next 12 months.  An
upgrade would have assumed no sizable and debt-funded capital
spending, shareholder distribution, or acquisitions.  The upgrade
would have also indicated S&P's expectation that BILT would
continue to prudently manage its liquidity.

S&P could have revised the outlook to stable if: (1) BILT faced
roadblocks in completing the asset sale; (2) the company used a
significant portion of the sale proceeds for shareholder
distribution, such that the expected improvement in leverage
seemed unlikely over the next 12 months; or (3) its liquidity or
operating performance was weaker than we expected.

S&P assess Bilt Paper, BILT's majority-owned subsidiary, as core
to BILT.  S&P therefore equated its rating on Bilt Paper with
that on BILT.


CADOGAN SQUARE II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on 2022 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
following classes of notes issued by Cadogan Square CLO II B.V.:

EUR281.3M (current balance EUR 25.5M) Class A-1 Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
Mar 4, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR31.5M Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR33.8M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR31.9M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2015
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

EUR27.9M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

EUR10.6M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cadogan Square CLO II B.V., issued in June 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans managed by Credit
Suisse Asset Management Limited. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in August 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
the result of deleveraging on the August 2015 payment date.

Class A notes have paid down by approximately EUR45.3 million
(16.1% of closing balance) since the last rating action in March
2015, as a result of which over-collateralization (OC) ratios of
all classes of rated notes have increased significantly. As per
the trustee report dated August 2015, Class A/B, Class C, Class
D, and Class E OC ratios are reported at 200.87%, 148.65%,
121.12%, and 113.15% compared to February 2015 levels of 155.83%,
129.38%, 112.65%, and 107.38%, respectively. These Feb 2015
reported OC ratios do not take into account the pay-down of Class
A notes on the payment date in February 2015.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds of EUR186.35 million,
defaulted par of EUR 2.28 million, a weighted average default
probability of 25.68% (consistent with a WARF of 3483 over a
weighted average life of 4.56 years), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 47.02% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 23 and a weighted average spread of 4.08%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery rates
for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF
CDOS". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be
considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Moody's notes that shortly after this analysis was completed, the
September 2015 trustee report has been issued. There is no
material change in key portfolio metrics such as WARF, diversity
score, and weighted average spread as well as OC ratios for
Classes B, C, D, and E from their August 2015 levels.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in September 2015. Please see the Credit Policy page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were unchanged for Classes A-1, A-2 and B, and within one
notch of the base-case results for Classes C, D and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

2) Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Around 19% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed large
concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate as
described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates
in Rated Transactions," published in October 2009 and available
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461.

4) Liquidation value of long-dated assets: Approximately 2.4% of
the portfolio is comprised of assets that mature after the
maturity date of the transaction ("long dated assets"). These
include one loan and one structured finance asset. For these long
dated assets, Moody's assumed a weighted average liquidation
value of 30.2% in its analysis. Any volatility between the
assumed liquidation value and the actual liquidation value may
create additional performance uncertainties.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


HEMA BV: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'B' CCR
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Netherlands-based general merchandise and food retailer Hema B.V.
to negative from stable.  S&P affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on the company.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB' issue ratings on the company's EUR80
million super senior revolving credit facility (RCF) due 2018 and
left the recovery rating unchanged at '1+'.  S&P also affirmed
its 'B' issue ratings on the EUR250 million senior secured
floating-rate notes and EUR315 million senior secured fixed-rate
notes (both due 2019).  The recovery ratings on these notes
remain at '3', with recovery expectations in the lower half of
the 50%-70% range.

S&P affirmed at 'CCC+' its issue rating on the EUR150 million
senior unsecured notes due 2019 and the recovery rating at '6'.
The notes were issued by special-purpose vehicles HEMA Bondco I
B.V. and HEMA Bondco II B.V., both owned by Dutch Lion B.V.,
Hema's parent company.  The proceeds of the notes were on-lent to
Hema.

The outlook revision follows lower profit margins in the first
six months of the year, stemming from higher markdowns aimed at
reducing excess inventory accompanied by negative foreign
exchange results and an unfavorable sales mix.  The negative
outlook reflects S&P's view of Hema's weakening profitability and
its forecast that its credit metrics may now fall short of the
levels S&P considers commensurate with the current rating.  The
action also reflects S&P's opinion that if Hema's new management
is not able to turn around the operations and restore its EBITDA
margins and free cash flow generation, S&P could revise down its
assessment of Hema's business risk profile.

The rating affirmations follow Hema's announcement of its first-
half 2015 results.  The company reported a second consecutive
quarter of positive like-for-like sales growth in the core market
in The Netherlands.  Overall top-line growth was 5.5% in first-
half 2015, compared to -0.9% last year.  Broadly speaking, the
restoration of sales growth resulted from the new management
team's initiatives aimed at clearing excess stock at reduced
prices, and was also supported by new store openings, last year's
remodeling of the Dutch stores, introduction of the new
"Favourites" gift assortment, and improving market conditions in
The Netherlands.

Even though there were positive developments in terms of top-line
growth, particularly in The Netherlands, Hema's EBITDA margin
continues to fall, to 6.6% on a reported basis for the 12 months
ending Aug. 2, 2015, from 9.2% for the same period in 2014.  The
2015 drop includes exceptional expenses relating to legal costs
regarding the franchise arbitration; consulting expenses for the
new business plan; remodeling costs in Belgium; and exceptional
stock clearing expenses.  As a result of declining EBITDA, the
leverage ratios continue to deteriorate; for example, Standard &
Poor's-adjusted debt to EBTIDA worsened to 12.7x for the 12
months to Aug. 2, 2015, from 10x in the previous 12-month period.

S&P expects that a gradual economic recovery in the core Dutch
market, where the company has a solid position and has taken
various measures to protect its sales and profitability --
including changes in its management to focus on cost reductions
and stabilizing revenue -- could somewhat support the company's
operating performance.  Although S&P anticipates the clearance of
stock will support the company's top-line growth, investment in
price reductions and promotional activity will continue
depressing margins in 2015-2016.  That said, S&P anticipates that
financial leverage will remain very high.  As a result, S&P
expects Hema's adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will be above 12x
(including S&P's operating-lease adjustment, shareholder loan,
and a payment-in-kind [PIK] facility) in 2015-2016.

"The rating on Hema is primarily constrained by our view of the
company's "highly leveraged" financial risk profile and our
assessment of the company's financial policy as "financial
sponsor-6," based on Hema's private equity ownership.  We include
in our debt adjustments the loans provided by the shareholder,
Lion Capital, which have a principal amount of EUR269.6 million.
In addition, we also include senior PIK notes due 2020 with a
principal amount of EUR85 million, issued by Dutch Lion B.V., in
our adjusted debt calculation.  Although we consider that these
facilities have certain equity characteristics, are non-cash-
paying, and subordinated, we treat them as debt-like under our
criteria.  However, although we view the shareholder loan and the
PIK facility as debt-like, we recognize their cash-preserving
function, especially supported by the company's prudent financial
policy regarding shareholder returns.  Excluding these debt-like
instruments, Hema's leverage would be in the upper end of the
6.5x-7.5x range over the next three years," S&P said.

"We recognize that some of Hema's Standard & Poor's-adjusted
credit ratios are better than its unadjusted ratios.  In
particular, our lease adjustments tend to inflate adjusted funds
from operations (FFO) to cash interest coverage, given Hema's
operating lease structure.  We therefore complement our analysis
with other ratios, such as EBITDAR coverage, which measures an
issuer's cash-interest and lease-related obligations (defined as
reported EBITDA including rent cost coverage of cash interest
plus rent).  Hema's unadjusted EBITDAR coverage, which is around
1.1x-1.2x, also indicates a highly leveraged financial risk
profile," S&P added.

"Our assessment of Hema's business risk profile as "fair"
incorporates our view that the company is well-positioned as the
leading general merchandise retailer in its core markets in The
Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.  In addition, given its
strong brand recognition, leading niche market positions, and
strong track record of operations over many decades, Hema should
be able to maintain its market position even under intensifying
competition from local and international retail chains," S&P
said.

The company sells almost all products under the Hema brand.  On
the one hand, this supports Hema's bargaining power with
suppliers, resulting in a solid gross margin even in difficult
economic times.  On the other hand, it exposes Hema's gross
margin to adverse trends in currency or raw materials prices.

The major factors constraining Hema's business risk profile are
its operations in highly fragmented and competitive markets and
still-limited geographic diversification, as it generates over
70% of EBITDA in The Netherlands, which is only starting to show
some signs of recovery.  In addition, S&P considers that the
nonfood retail segment faces strong price competition, high
seasonality, and volatility based on the discretionary nature of
purchases. However, Hema's focus on basic low-cost clothing
somewhat mitigates these risks.  Recent issues with overstocking
and subsequent efforts aimed at the reduction of excess
inventories resulted in declining profit margins and weaker
overall operating efficiency.  Accordingly, S&P assess the
company's business risk profile at the lower end of the "fair"
category.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- An overall improving economic environment in The
      Netherlands (real GDP to rise by 1.9% in 2015 and 2.2% in
      2016) and Belgium (real GDP to rise by 1.3% in 2015 and
      1.6% in 2016).

   -- Low-single-digit top-line growth in financial years 2015
      and 2016, based on new management initiatives and new store
      openings and effects from last year's initiatives to
      refurbish and remodel stores.

   -- Lower margins compared with last year in financial year
      2015, due to the new management's strategy to clear the
      excess stock from prior periods at lower prices.  S&P
      foresees improvement in margins by the end of financial
      2016.

   -- Operating-lease commitments, which represent S&P's largest
      adjustment to reported debt, apart from the shareholder
      loan and PIK notes, will continue to increase in line with
      business growth.

   -- Negative free cash flow generation for financial 2015 due
      to lower earnings and capital expenditure (capex) of about
      EUR30 million.  Flat to slightly positive free operating
      cash flow (FOCF) by the end of financial 2016.

   -- No material liabilities or negative outcome arising from
      the arbitration process with franchisees.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
at the end of the next two financial years ending Jan. 31, 2016,
and 2017:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA (including shareholder loans, PIK
      notes, and operating-lease adjustments) above 12x (6.5x-
      7.5x excluding the shareholder loan and PIK notes) in both
      years.

   -- EBITDAR coverage ratio (which we use as the key
      supplementary ratio) of 1.1x and 1.2x.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's concerns that operational
pressures and declining profitability could undermine Hema's
competitiveness and weaken its credit metrics beyond the levels
S&P considers adequate for the current ratings.

Although S&P forecasts that HEMA's adjusted debt to EBITDA will
remain above 12x, S&P thinks it will be able to maintain an
EBITDAR coverage ratio of more than 1x.

S&P could lower the rating if management cannot successfully turn
around its operations or if the company does not maintain its
profitability levels, as this could affect not only its credit
metrics, but also the business risk profile.  S&P could downgrade
Hema if the company's business risk profile comes under strain
due to sustained weak trading, accompanied by a significant drop
in sales, margins, or market share.

More specifically, we would also consider a downgrade if S&P do
not see a path for Hema to achieve a neutral FOCF position over
the next 12-18 months.  If management is not able to reverse the
negative FOCF trend, S&P could revise its liquidity assessment
down to "less than adequate" or EBITDAR coverage might fall below
1x.

If Hema's financial policy toward shareholder remuneration became
more aggressive, S&P could also considers a downgrade.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Hema succeeds in
reversing the currently negative profitability trends and
sustainably improves its competitive position and operating
performance via various management initiatives.  The company
could also benefit from a gradual improvement in the housing
market and consumption prospects in The Netherlands.

An outlook revision to stable could also occur if--on the back of
a sustained improvement in trading and margins--Hema begins to
generate positive FOCF on a consistent basis and sustainably
improves the headroom under its EBITDAR coverage ratio to above
1.5x.


JUBILEE CDO I-R: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to B2(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
following notes issued by Jubilee CDO I-R B.V.:

EUR594 Million (current balance: EUR384.2M) Class A Senior
Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on Sep 16, 2014 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

EUR74.25 Million Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2024, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2014 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

EUR72 Million Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2014
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

EUR43.2 Million Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2014
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

EUR33.75 Million Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2024, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2014
Affirmed B3 (sf)

EUR8 Million Class Q Combination Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A1
(sf); previously on Sep 16, 2014 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Jubilee CDO I-R B.V., issued in May 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield
senior secured European loans. The portfolio is managed by
Alcentra Limited. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
July 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
significant amount of deleveraging of the Class A notes following
amortization of the underlying portfolio since the last rating
action in September 2014

The Class A notes have paid down by approximately EUR209 million
(35.18% of its original balance) since the last rating action. As
a result of the deleveraging, over-collateralization has
increased. As of the trustee's September 2015 report, the Class
B, Class C, Class D and Class E have an over-collateralization
ratio of 137.0%,118.4% ,109.5% and 103.4% respectively compared
to the 126.1%, 113.8%, 107.6% and 103.1% in the last rating
action.

The ratings on the combination notes address the repayment of the
rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. For the
Class Q, the rated balance at any time is equal to the principal
amount of the combination note on the issue date minus the sum of
all payments made from the issue date to such date, of either
interest or principal. The rated balance will not necessarily
correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported by the
trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR607.5 million and principal proceeds balance
of EUR22.9 million, defaulted par of EUR22.5 million, a weighted
average default probability of 31.71% over a 4.5 year WAL
(consistent with a 10 year WARF of 3171), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 46.98% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 30 and a weighted average spread of
3.9%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 3%; the model generated outputs
were within one notch of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

-- Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

-- Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

-- Around 12.9% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


AZOR MORTGAGES: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to B-
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Azor Mortgages PLC.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on
      the class A notes;

   -- Raised its rating on the class B notes; and

   -- Lowered its rating on the class C notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Portuguese residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria), S&P placed those
ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

S&P's current counterparty criteria cap its ratings in Azor
Mortgages at its long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on the
liquidity facility provider, Barclays Bank PLC (A-/Stable/A-2),
as the replacement language in the transaction documents is not
in line with S&P's methodology.

On Feb. 18, 2015, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its rating
on Azor Mortgage's class A notes following its Feb. 3, 2015,
CreditWatch negative placement of S&P's ICR on Barclays Bank, the
liquidity facility provider.

On June 9, 2015, S&P lowered by one notch its long-term ICR on
Barclays Bank to 'A-' from 'A'.  This downgrade resulted in a
breach of the documented draw to cash trigger, set at 'A-1'. The
rating actions considered the cash flow analysis without giving
credit to the liquidity facility support.  Consequently, S&P has
delinked its ratings on the class A, B, and C notes from the
liquidity facility provider.  S&P has therefore removed from
CreditWatch negative its rating on the class A notes.

The bank account provider minimum eligible rating trigger was
breached in June 9, 2015, following S&P's lowering to 'BBB+' from
'A' of its long-term ICR on Deutsche Bank AG was appointed as the
new bank account provider.  Following this amendment, the ICR on
the bank account provider is now in line with S&P's current
counterparty criteria.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received as
of the June interest payment date (IPD).  S&P's analysis reflects
the application of its updated RMBS criteria.

Credit enhancement has increased to 68.3%, from 61.7% in S&P's
previous review.

Class         Available credit
             enhancement (%)[1]
A                         68.3
B                         25.0
C                          4.5

[1]Based on the performing balance.

This transaction features an amortizing reserve fund, which
currently represents 10.46% of the outstanding balance of the
mortgage assets.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days at 1.53% are on average
higher for this transaction than our Portuguese RMBS index.
After peaking in 2009 at 6.0%, the level of total arrears in this
transaction has decreased to 2.88%.  Nevertheless, this
represents an increase compared with the 1.7% reached in
September 2014. Prepayment levels remain low and the transaction
is unlikely to pay down significantly in the near term, in S&P's
opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show a decrease in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and in the weighted-average loss
severity (WALS) for each rating level.

Rating level      WAFF (%)     WALS (%)
AAA                  24.19        12.86
AA                   18.85        10.34
A                    15.88         6.28
BBB                  12.48         4.50
BB                    9.04         3.40
B                     7.93         2.54

The decrease in the WAFF is mainly due to greater credit given to
well-seasoned pools and a lower adjustment applied to the
province concentration, which offset the higher adjustments
applied to the original loan-to-value ratio.  The decrease in the
WALS is mainly due to the indexed current loan to value ratio and
the application of lower market value decline assumptions.  The
overall effect is a decrease in the required credit coverage for
each rating level.

Following the application of S&P's RMBS criteria and considering
its criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above
the sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the class of notes
can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria.

In this transaction, S&P's unsolicited foreign currency long-term
sovereign rating on the Republic of Portugal (BB+/Stable/B)
constrains its ratings on the class A and B notes.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

"Our RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for RMBS
as "moderate".  Under our RAS criteria, this transaction's notes
can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign rating,
if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a minimum of a
"severe" stress.  However, as all six of the conditions in
paragraph 44 of the RAS criteria are met, we can assign ratings
in this transaction up to a maximum of six notches (two
additional notches of uplift) above the sovereign rating, subject
to credit enhancement being sufficient to pass an "extreme"
stress," S&P said.

Under S&P's RMBS criteria, the class A notes have sufficient
available credit enhancement to withstand its stresses at a 'AAA'
rating level.  However, S&P's RAS criteria constrain its rating
on the class A notes at 'A+ (sf)', which is six notches above
S&P's rating on the sovereign.  S&P has therefore raised to 'A+
(sf)' from 'A (sf)' its rating on the class A notes.

Similarly, the class B notes have sufficient available credit
enhancement to withstand S&P's stresses at a 'AA-' rating level
under S&P's RMBS criteria.  However, S&P's RAS criteria constrain
its rating on the class B notes at 'BBB (sf)', which is two
notches above its rating on the sovereign.  S&P has therefore
raised to 'BBB (sf) from 'BB (sf)' its rating on the class B
notes.

Finally, the class C notes can only support the stresses that S&P
applies at a 'B-' rating level.  S&P has therefore lowered to
'B- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' its rating on the class C notes.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 8%.  In one stress scenario, these
additional arrears are split equally between the one-month and
three-month buckets.  In the second scenario, S&P applies an
increase of 8%, but it assumes that all of the loans have missed
three monthly payments.  This did not result in S&P's rating
deteriorating below the maximum projected deterioration that it
would associate with each relevant rating level, as outlined in
S&P's credit stability criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Portuguese residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when it applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and sluggish house price appreciation for the
remainder of 2015 and 2016.

On the back of the weak macroeconomic conditions, S&P don't
expect the performance of the transactions in its Portuguese RMBS
index to significantly improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include weak economic growth and high unemployment.  On the
positive side, S&P expects interest rates to remain low.

Azor Mortgages is a Portuguese RMBS transaction, which closed in
November 2004.  It securitizes a pool of first-ranking mortgage
loans which Banco Comercial dos Acores S.A., a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Banif Group, originated.  The mortgage loans
are mainly in the Azores Islands (Portugal).

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating                 Rating
            To                     From

Azor Mortgages PLC
EUR281 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A           A+ (sf)                A (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Raised

B           BBB (sf)               BB (sf)

Rating Lowered

C           B- (sf)                BB (sf)


BANCO BPI: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'BB-/B' long- and short-term counterparty credit rating on
Portugal-based Banco BPI S.A. (BPI) and its core subsidiary,
Banco Portugues de Investimento S.A.  The outlook remains
negative.

The affirmation follows the announcement of a plan approved by
BPI's board of directors to spin off BPI's African activities.
S&P understands that a newly created holding company (NewCo) will
absorb about 20% of BPI group's assets, including a 50.1% stake
in BPI's Angolan subsidiary, Banco de Fomento de Angola (BFA),
and a 30% stake in Mozambican BCI.  The deal will not generate
any capital gain for BPI and the shares of NewCo will be granted
to current BPI shareholders, while the two entities will be
completely separated.

S&P views the proposed spinoff positively as it aims to address
the group's excessive single-borrower concentration in Angola, as
highlighted by the ECB back in December 2014.

Furthermore, unlike a partial sale of BFA, S&P believes this
solution would ease negative pressure on the bank's risk profile
and in turn stabilize BPI's creditworthiness, while also taking
into account the improving operating environment S&P sees in
Portugal.

On the other hand, the current plan would also pose challenges
for BPI.  Specifically, it would materially reduce the bank's
geographical diversification and profitability.  In turn, this
could put pressure on management to accelerate the turnaround of
its weakly profitable domestic business.  Moreover, S&P
calculates that without its African activities, BPI would have a
risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio in the range of 4.2%-4.7%,
below the current consolidated level.  Excluding Angolan
activities, the group's funding and liquidity metrics would
diminish -- although remaining in line with domestic peers, given
BFA's relatively liquid balance sheet.

Moreover, the board's plan would need to follow a complex process
and tight timetable for approval.  The next event in the process,
expected on Nov. 15, will be BPI's shareholder meeting, convened
to approve the proposed spinoff.  In addition, BPI would also
require approval for the demerger from BFA and BCI's minority
shareholders; local regulators in Portugal, Angola, and
Mozambique; and the opinion of Portuguese tax authority.

S&P also understands that BPI could still consider other options
to comply with regulatory requirements, such as a partial
disposal of its stake in BFA.  Additionally, some of BPI's
creditors also have the right to oppose the demerger and could
eventually request a reimbursement.

The negative outlook on BPI reflects the risk of meaningful
changes to BPI's shareholder structure.  After Caixabank's failed
bid for majority control of BPI, diverging opinion on the bank's
strategic direction has become evident.  S&P believes that this
might either lead to significant strategic changes or an impasse,
either of which could eventually have negative implications for
S&P's view of BPI's business profile.

Until S&P has more clarity on whether the board's proposed
spinoff will be approved, the negative outlook continues to
reflect S&P's view that BPI's creditworthiness could weaken based
on the measures it may take to comply with stricter regulatory
requirements related to its Angolan subsidiary.

At this stage, S&P believes that these near- to medium-term risks
outweigh the longer-term benefits of economic recovery in
Portugal and the potential improvement of the banking industry's
funding profile.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if BPI manages to address
the short-term risks outlined above by implementing the plan
presented by the board, or if it finds alternative solutions that
would strengthen the bank's risk profile while supporting the
turnaround of the bank's business model in Portugal.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


RUSSIAN STANDARD: Tariko Seeks Approval of Restructuring Plan
-------------------------------------------------------------
Vladimir Kuznetsov and Ryan Chilcote at Bloomberg News report
that Russian vodka tycoon Roustam Tariko is asking dissenting
bondholders at his retail lender to accept a restructuring plan
he says will free up RUR30 billion (US$470 million) needed for
the bank to survive in the nation's first recession in six years.

Mr. Tariko's is Russian Standard Bank JSC under pressure as
borrowers struggle to repay debt and demand for new loans
shrinks, Bloomberg notes.

"The bank has found itself in some kind of an ideal storm,"
Mr. Tariko said in an interview with Bloomberg Television on
Oct. 6.  "The cost of funding grew dramatically, and the
purchasing power of Russian consumers went down."

According to Bloomberg, the key to the bank's survival is a plan
to restructure US$550 million of Eurobonds that come due in 2020
and 2024.

Mr. Tariko's current offer, which includes a payment of 10% of
the face value of the notes in cash, has been rejected by a group
of note holders who say they've amassed the 25% blocking stake
required to stymie approval of the plan at a vote on Oct. 16,
Bloomberg relays.

"I believe the majority of problems we have resolved," Bloomberg
quotes Mr. Tariko as saying, referring to the bank's strategy and
business operations.

Under Russian Standard's offer, investors will receive the 10%t
payment plus accrued interest in cash, Bloomberg states.
Holders will get new seven-year Eurobonds guaranteed by a 49%
stake in the bank with a pay-in-kind coupon of 13% until the bank
is profitable, Bloomberg discloses.

Russian Standard Bank is one of the largest Russian banks and the
country's leading consumer lender.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRAINE: Must Tackle Budget Issues to Get Next Bailout Tranche
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ian Talleya at The Wall Street Journal reports that the
International Monetary Fund on Oct. 3 said Ukraine must resolve
outstanding budget issues before it gives the green light on the
next payout of bailout cash.

IMF mission chief Nikolay Gueorguiev said Kiev's pro-West
government had reached agreement with the IMF on most of the
budget and policy overhauls needed to complete the latest review
of the emergency loan program, the Journal relates.

"However, as the authorities still need more time to fully flesh
out their policy proposals for 2016 in some areas, discussions
will continue in the coming weeks," the Journal quotes
Mr. Gueorguiev as saying.

The IMF has pledged US$17.5 billion to support Ukraine's economy,
which has been buffeted by an ongoing conflict with Russia-backed
separatists in the country's east and a currency collapse, the
Journal relates.  The Washington-based lender has in turn
demanded tough reforms from Kiev, the Journal notes.

In September, Ukraine's finance minister announced that the
country needed more time to finalize a 2016 budget, the Journal
recounts.  The ministry, as cited by the Journal, said that
several upcoming bills on tax reform, debt restructuring, and
military spending meant the original proposal was likely "to
undergo significant changes."

The IMF cut its forecast for growth again this year, now saying
the economy will contract by 11%, the Journal discloses.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ABENGOA YIELD: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its corporate credit
rating on Abengoa Yield PLC's to 'BB' from 'BB+'. The outlook is
stable.

"At the same time, we lowered the issue-level rating on ABY's
senior secured debt to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'. The recovery rating on
the secured debt remains '1', indicating very high recovery for
debtholders in a default event. We also lowered the issue-level
rating on the company's senior unsecured debt to 'BB' from 'BB+'.
The recovery rating on the unsecured debt remains '3', indicating
meaningful (higher half of the 50%-70% range) recovery for
debtholders in a default scenario."

"The rating actions reflect our view that challenging market
conditions will limit ABY's ability to raise external capital,
leading to credit measures that are weaker than our initial
expectations," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Nora
Pickens.

Capital market risk is compounded by ABY's high proportion of
debt with short-term maturities (weighted average maturity of
three years). The company has a limited operating track record,
and the "yieldco" business model remains unproven and has come
under market pressure in recent months. Particularly in this
context, we also view the departure of ABY's CEO and CFO in
recent months as a weakness."

"Despite the challenging market conditions and higher debt
balances, we believe that ABY's underlying projects continue to
generate stable dividend streams that comfortably service debt at
the parent level. The stable outlook reflects our expectation
that ABY will maintain adequate liquidity and successfully manage
its underlying businesses such that consistent dividends easily
cover debt service at the holding level and POCF to debt remains
about 30% to 35%."

"A negative rating action could occur if ABY's underlying
businesses perform well below expectations, the company doesn't
proactively manage its debt maturity profile, or it pursues
acquisitions that would result in a more volatile distribution
stream, causing POCF to debt and POCF to interest to fall below
25% and 4x, respectively."

"A positive rating action is unlikely, but could occur over time
if ABY establishes a greater track record of conservatively
financing its growth initiatives throughout different market
conditions."


ARKEX LIMITED: Cash Flow Woes Prompt Administration
---------------------------------------------------
Arkex Limited disclosed that on September 23, 2015, Ernst &
Young's Tom Lukic and Angela Swarbrick were appointed as Joint
Administrators of the Company.  The affairs, business and
property of the Company are being managed by the Joint
Administrators who contract as agents of the Company without
personal liability.

Mr. Lukic, joint administrator, said: "In the period leading up
to the Administration, the company's cash flow came under severe
pressure due to a downturn in demand for the its services given
the challenging conditions in the wider oil and gas sector.

"We are currently exploring options available but regrettably
have had to make a number of redundancies.  We will continue to
support all employees affected by redundancy at this difficult
time, including helping them to make claims for amounts owing to
them from the Redundancy Payments Service."

Arkex Limited is a geophysical service company for the oil & gas
exploration industry specializing in providing Full Tensor
Gravity Gradiometry Surveys (FTG).


HONOURS PLC: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on Honours Plc, a
securitisation of student loans originated in the UK by the
Student Loans Company Limited (SLC).  The rating actions are as
follows:

Class A1 notes affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2 notes affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B notes affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class C notes affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
from Stable
Class D notes downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Portfolio Deterioration

Arrears have risen to 8.2% at end-September 2015, from 6.5% a
year ago.  Fitch believes this is primarily due to a significant,
7% reduction in the official deferment income threshold in
September 2014, pushing more loans than usual into repayment
status.  Those loans that failed to pay then will in our view
remain delinquent as they regain deferment status under the
deferment threshold of September 2015; as such they will likely
not receive compensation by the UK government upon cancellation.

Class D Notes Most Affected

The rating of the class D notes is most affected by the
portfolio's deterioration, given their limited credit enhancement
(CE) of 4.8% of the non-defaulted loan balance.  Removing the
delinquent loans from the considered asset balance, CE for the
class D notes would fall to minus 3.7% of the non-defaulted asset
balance.  Fitch still expects the class D notes to be fully
repaid due to recoveries on defaulted loans and excess spread.
The rating downgrade nonetheless reflects the significant
reduction in the buffer for these notes.

Rising Expenses

Rising senior expenses add pressure to the most junior notes'
ratings.  According to the issuer, the extra costs borne by the
transaction in the few months to September 2015 are connected to
the replacement of counterparties (servicer, transaction account
provider) as well as certain regulatory constraints.  There is
some uncertainty as to when these extra costs will abate, and
whether the remuneration of the new servicer will rise.  This is
reflected in the Negative Outlook on the class C and D notes.

Servicing Transition Under Way

According to the issuer, a suitable replacement for Capita
Customer Services Ltd (Capita) has been identified and agreements
are being finalized.  The process of migration is planned for
completion by Jan. 29, 2016, when the termination of Capita's
appointment takes effect.  The risk that servicing transfer is
not complete by then is in our view adequately mitigated by the
transaction's large liquidity support.  The liquidity facility
provided by Danske bank (A/F1/Stable) amounts to around 16% of
the outstanding class A notes.

Model Assumptions

Fitch uses a dedicated model to support its analysis of UK
student loans such as those of Honours.  Fitch assumes a base
rate of default on loans in repayment status of 12% and a base
recovery rate of 25%.  Loans that went delinquent in the year to
date are assumed to regain deferment status under the 2015/16
deferment threshold, and do not receive any cancellation payments
from the government.

The portfolio of loans in deferment status is otherwise assumed
to exit deferment (or "restate") at a rate of 5% per year over an
average remaining duration of nine years; the 5% rate is in line
past performance until the deferment threshold revision for
2014/15 took effect.  Taking also into account the cost of
carrying defaults under rising Libor, Fitch expects excess spread
to cover for about 5% of deficiencies on the loan portfolio.
Fitch applied default rate multiples of 3.5x and recovery
haircuts of 40% from the base assumptions to arrive at 'AA+'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch has tested the sensitivity of the model output to the share
of loans in deferment status (SLDS), as well as the lifetime
average gross excess spread (GES).  Excess spread includes extra
cash revenue proceeds net of recoveries on the defaulted
portfolio, as well as accrued and capitalized interest on
deferred loans.  The impact of a change in SLDS and GES on the
rating model output:

  GES 1%, SLDS 81% (expected case): Class A: 'AA+', Class B: 'A-'
   (with marginal shortfall at A), Class C: 'BBB-' (with marginal
   shortfall at BBB), Class D: 'B'.

  GES 0.8%, SLDS 81%: Class A: 'AA+', Class B: 'A-', Class C:
   'BB+', Class D: 'CCC'.

  GES 0.6%, SLDS 81%: Class A: 'AA+', Class B: 'BBB+', Class C:
   'BB', Class D: 'CCC'.

  GES 1%, SLDS 76%: Class A: 'AA+', Class B: 'A-', Class C:
  'BB+', Class D: 'B-'.

  GES 1%, SLDS 71%: Class A: 'AA+', Class B: 'BBB+', Class C:
   'BB+', Class D: 'CCC'.

  GES 0.8%, SLDS 76%: Class A: 'AA+', Class B: 'BBB+', Class C:
   'BB', Class D: 'CCC'.

  GES 0.6%, SLDS 71%: Class A: 'AA', Class B: 'BBB', Class C:
   'B+', Class D: 'CCC'.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.

Fitch has not reviewed the results of any third party assessment
of the asset portfolio information or conducted a review of
origination files as part of its ongoing monitoring.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


JAMISON & GREEN: Owes Creditors GBP600,000, Accounts Show
---------------------------------------------------------
Margaret Canning at Belfast Telegraph reports that the
administration of Jamison & Green, which collapsed in July after
nearly a century in business, will cost creditors nearly
GBP600,000, according to an update by administrators.

In July, Jamison & Green's own directors Andrew Acheson and
Patrick Hirst asked creditor Keys Commercial Finance to appoint
insolvency experts to run the company, which employed eight
staff, Belfast Telegraph relates.

All staff were made redundant and the company stopped trading,
Belfast Telegraph discloses.

According to Belfast Telegraph, the company's assets were
estimated at GBP428,261 in the administrator's statement of
affairs filed recently at Companies House, but were estimated to
realise just GBP221,800.

Employees were also owed GBP23,710 in arrears of wages and unpaid
holiday pay, Belfast Telegraph says.   Non-preferential
creditors -- a category which includes trade suppliers -- are
owed GBP598,513, Belfast Telegraph notes.  And finance firm Keys
Commercial Finance is owned GBP163,150 under the terms of a
floating charge, Belfast Telegraph states.  Bank of Ireland is
also owed GBP75,000 under its charge over premises on Donegall
Quay, according to Belfast Telegraph.

According to an earlier report filed by KPMG in August, the
administration came about due to "declining sales, a lack of cash
flow, increased creditor pressure and uncertainty over the future
viability" of the company, Belfast Telegraph relays.

The firm has faced increased competition from big operators like
B&Q and its sister company, Screwfix, Belfast Telegraph states.

Jamison & Green was set up in 1916 and sold and distributed tools
and hardware products.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Competitive Strategy for Health Care Organizations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Authors: Alan Sheldon and Susan Windham
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 190 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Francoise C. Arsenault
Order your personal copy today at http://bit.ly/1nqvQ7V

Competitive Strategy for Health Care Organizations: Techniques
for Strategic Action is an informative book that provides
practical guidance for senior health care managers and other
health care professionals on the organizational and competitive
strategic action needed to survive and to be successful in
today's increasingly competitive health care marketplace. An
important premise of the book is that the development and
implementation of good competitive strategy involves a profound
understanding of change. As the authors state at the outset:
"What may need to be done in today's environment may involve
great departure from the past, including major changes in the
skills and attitudes of staff, and great tact and patience in
bringing about the necessary strategic training."

Although understanding change is certainly important in most
fields, the authors demonstrate the particular importance of
change to the health care field in the first and second chapters.
In Chapter 1, the authors review the three eras of medical care
(individual medicine, organizational medicine, and network
medicine) and lay the groundwork for their model for competitive
strategy development. Chapter 2 describes the factors that must
be taken into account for successful strategic decision-making.
These factors include the analysis of the environmental trends
and competitive forces affecting the health care field, past,
current, and future; the analysis of the competitive position of
the organization; the setting of goals, objectives, and a
strategy; the analysis of competitive performance; and the
readaptation of the business, if necessary, through positioning
activities, redirection of strategy, and organizational change.
Chapters 3 through 7 discuss in detail the five positioning
activities that are part of the model and therefore critical to
the development and implementation of a successful strategy:
scanning; product market analysis; collaboration; restructuring;
and managing the physician. The chapter on managing the physician
(Chapter 7) is the only section in the book that appears dated
(the book was first published in 1984). In this day of physician-
owned hospitals and physician-backed joint ventures, it is
difficult to envision the physician in the passive role of "being
managed." However, even the changing role of physicians since the
book's first publication correlates with the authors' premise
that their model for competitive strategic planning is based
exactly on understanding and anticipating change, which is no
better illustrated than in health care where change is measured
not in years but in months. These middle chapters and the other
chapters use a mixture of didactic presentation, graphs and
charts, quotations from famous individuals, and anecdotes to
render what can frequently be dry information in an entertaining
and readable format.

The final chapter of the book presents a case example (using the
"South Clinic") as a summary of many of the issues and strategic
alternatives discussed in the previous chapters. The final
chapter also discusses the competitive issues specific to various
types of health care delivery organizations, including teaching
hospitals, community hospitals, group practices, independent
practice associations, hospital groups, super groups and
alliances, nursing homes, home health agencies, and for-profits.
An interesting quote on for-profits indicates how time and change
are indeed important factors in strategic planning in the health
care field: "Behind many of the competitive concerns.lies the
specter of the forprofits.

Their competitive edge has lain until now in the
excellence of their management. But developments in the past
halfdecade have shown that the voluntary sector can match the
forprofits in management excellence. Despite reservations that
may not always be untrue, the for-profit sector has demonstrated
that good management can pay off in health care. But will the
voluntary institutions end up making the same mistakes and having
the same accusations leveled at them as the for-profits have? It
is disturbing to talk to the head of a voluntary hospital group
and hear him describe physicians as his potential competitors."


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *