TCREUR_Public/151020.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, October 20, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 207



TAKKO FASHION: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' CCR, Outlook Stable
TANTALUS RARE: Applies For Insolvency Proceedings in Germany


GREECE: Lawmakers Pass First Austerity Bill Under Bailout Program
PIRAEUS BANK: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'D'


ICELAND: Unlikely to Accept Terms of Bank Creditor Deal


AERCAP IRELAND: S&P Rates US$400-Mil. Unsec. Notes Due 2020 'BB+'
HARVEST CLO XIV: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes


STABILUS SA: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3, Then Withdraws Rating


MACEDONIA REPUBLIC: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


* S&P Takes Rating Actions on 41 Tranches in 25 Portuguese RMBS


ALROSA OJSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Default Ratings
BALTIC FINANCIAL: S&P Puts 'B/B' Ratings on CreditWatch Negative
KARELIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Issuer Default Ratings
KOMI REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Default Ratings
RUSSIAN FEDERATION: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings

TAMBOV REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Default Ratings
YAROSLAVL REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Default Ratings


FONCAIXA PYMES 6: DBRS Assigns CCC(low) Rating to Series B Notes


TRUSTBUDDY AB: Files for Bankruptcy, Halts Operations


MRIYA AGRO: Renews Leasing Programs with Local Banks

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CAPARO: To Enter Administration, 1,800 Jobs Affected
CHELFHAM MILL SCHOOL: To Go Into Liquidation
KEEPMOAT: S&P Affirms 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
GT LAW: Quantuma Appointed as Administrators
JO HAND: Bounces Back After SSI Disaster Forces Liquidation

* UK: Retailers' Risk of Insolvency Drops, R3 Report Shows



Undercurrent News reports that Stuhrk Delikatessen Import has
filed for bankruptcy.

The report relates that the insolvency will be carried out in
self-administration, and will affect some 100 employees. It has
largely been down to a fine of EUR1.1 million levied against the
Stuhrk family in 2014, over illegal price agreements, the report

This price fixing scheme was the same one, which brought Heiploeg
International down in 2014, after which it was snapped by
Parlevliet & Van der Plas, according to Undercurrent News. It
received a EUR27.08 million fine from the European Commission for
involvement in the price fixing cartel for North Sea shrimp, along
with Klaas Puul and two smaller firms: Kok International Seafood,
also of the Netherlands, and Stuhrk.

The report notes that Klaas Puul, the second largest supplier of
North Sea shrimp behind Heiploeg, received full immunity from
fines under the EC's 2006 leniency notice, as it was the first to
provide information about the cartel.

Undercurrent News says Stuhrk's bankruptcy comes as a blow to the
region of Dithmarschen, particularly as it is not the only such
manufacturer to go under recently. Last year competitor Busumer
Feinkost also sank into insolvency, the report notes.

Stuhrk Delikatessen Import is a caviar producer and manufacturer
of various specialty products for German retailers.

TAKKO FASHION: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' CCR, Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC+' long-term
corporate credit rating on German apparel retailer Takko Fashion
S.a.r.l.  The outlook is stable.

S&P also raised its issue rating on Takko Luxembourg 2 S.C.A.'s
EUR525 million senior secured notes to 'CCC+' from 'CCC'.  The
recovery rating is now at '4', versus '5' previously, indicating
S&P's expectation of average recovery in the higher half of the
30%-50% range in the event of a payment default.

In the first quarter of the current shortened fiscal year ending
Jan. 31, 2016, Takko Fashion generated a 4.1% rise in its like-
for-like sales, compared with the same period one year earlier.
This marks the third consecutive quarter of performance
improvement. After like-for-like sales declines of 10.3% and 8.6%,
respectively, in the second and third quarters of fiscal 2015, the
company posted a 0.5% improvement in the fourth quarter.

As a result of Takko Fashion's better revenue performance,
combined with disciplined operating expenditure and capital
expenditure management, cash on the balance sheet plus
availability of amounts under the revolving credit facility (RCF)
rose to EUR80 million as of July 31, 2015, compared with EUR58
million on April 30, 2015.  In addition, S&P estimates headroom
under the company's financial covenants at about 15% over the
coming 12 months, leading S&P to revise up its liquidity
assessment to "adequate" from "less than adequate."

Still, S&P has affirmed its 'CCC+' rating on Takko Fashion based
on S&P's view that, absent significant improvements, the company's
financial commitments are unsustainable in the long-term.

Takko Fashion has highly volatile revenues.  In the first quarter
of the current fiscal year, monthly revenues swung between
negative 14% and positive 18% year-on-year.  This is about four
times the market average, as calculated by trade magazine
Textilwirtschaft and market research company GfK.  This low
visibility and high volatility make financial planning fairly
difficult and can quickly lead to unexpected shortfalls in the
company's profitability and liquidity needs.

S&P estimates that Takko Fashion's adjusted EBITDA in the quarter
ending April 30, 2016, will likely decline in a year-on-year
comparison due to the tough comparison base with the year-earlier
quarter.  Consequently, S&P thinks the company will need to
generate a fairly significant rise in its adjusted EBITDA in the
current and the next quarter to offset this likely shortfall.

However, even if Takko Fashion raises its company-adjusted EBITDA
over the coming quarters, covenant thresholds will rise from the
beginning of 2016.  Under S&P's base case, it estimate covenant
headroom at about 15%.  This headroom could shrink significantly
due to the company's highly volatile revenues and profitability.

Furthermore, Takko Fashion faces cash interest expenses that
consume about 60% of the company's reported EBITDA.  Consequently,
S&P forecasts neutral to small levels of free operating cash flow
over the coming two years.  S&P considers that any unexpected
shortfall in cash flows will need to be covered by either existing
cash or availability under the RCF.  These two sources combined
amounted to EUR80 million as of July 31, 2015, which S&P regards
as low for a company with annual revenues of approximately
EUR1.1 billion.

S&P continues to assess Takko Fashion's business risk profile as
"weak."  This reflects the company's reliance on discretionary
spending from mid- to lower-income families and its positioning in
the price-competitive value retail clothing market.  In addition,
weather conditions have a strong effect on Takko Fashion's sales,
adding to the group's volatile profitability.  The company is
exposed to changes in fashion trends, leading to a frequent risk
of inventory write-downs.

On the positive side, fashion trends are slightly less important
in the value segment than in higher-price segments of the apparel
industry.  Also, S&P regards competition from online retailing as
less severe in the discount and value segment, as there is
generally less room to optimize costs.

S&P assesses Takko Fashion's financial risk as "highly leveraged"
due to its private equity ownership and its weak credit metrics.
Both of S&P's core leverage ratios -- debt to EBITDA and funds
from operations (FFO) to debt -- strongly indicate an assessment
in this highest financial risk category.  S&P estimates that Takko
Fashion's adjusted FFO to debt will average about 5% and its
adjusted debt to EBITDA should reach about 7.5x-8.0x.  On a fully
Standard & Poor's-adjusted basis, EBITDA interest coverage is
approximately 1.5x-1.7x, also consistent with S&P's assessment of
Takko Fashion's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged."

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- An overall stable German economic environment, with real
      consumer spending rising by 2.2% and 1.6% year on year in
      2015 and 2016, respectively.

   -- A reduction of about 1% per year in the number of stores
      between April 30, 2015, and April 30, 2017, and positive
      like-for-like sales growth of 1.5%-2.0% per year over the
      same period.  This should translate into group revenue
      growth of 0.5%-1.0% annually.

   -- Reported EBITDA margin rising from 7.1% as of April 30,
      2015, to 8.0-8.5% in fiscals 2016 and 2017, owing to tight
      control of rental expenses.

   -- A company-adjusted EBITDA margin of 10.0%-10.5% and a
      Standard & Poor's adjusted EBITDA margin of 22%-23%.  The
      covenant-relevant company-adjusted EBITDA should stand at
      about EUR110 million.

   -- Working capital needs of EUR10 million-EUR20 million in the
      12 months to April 30, 2016, and between zero and
      EUR10 million in the subsequent 12 months to April 30,

   -- Capital expenditures of about EUR30 million per year.

   -- Broadly neutral free operating cash flow for the 12 months
      to April 30, 2016, and EUR5 million-EUR15 million in the 12
      months ending April 30, 2017.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these Standard &
Poor's-adjusted credit measures for Takko Fashion for the 12
months ending April 30, 2016, and April 30, 2017:

   -- FFO to debt of about 5%.
   -- Debt to EBITDA of 7.5x-8.0x.
   -- EBITDA interest coverage of 1.5x-1.7x.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Takko Fashion will
maintain its market position and increase its like-for-like sales.
Combined with continued strict operating expenditure and capital
expenditure management, S&P foresees an improvement in the
covenant-relevant company-adjusted EBITDA to about EUR110 million
and neutral to slightly positive reported free operating cash flow
in the coming 12 months.

S&P could consider an upgrade if Takko Fashion improved its
operating performance over the coming several quarters on a
sustainable basis.  In particular, higher-than-expected like-for-
like sales growth rates could lead the company-adjusted EBITDA to
rise above S&P's expectations.  An upgrade would also hinge on
S&P's expectation of the company's sustainably positive free
operating cash flow generation.

S&P could consider a downgrade if adverse market circumstances or
other factors lead to a further severe deterioration in Takko
Fashion's revenues, EBITDA, and cash flows.  This would likely
result in the company breaching its financial covenants while
weakening its liquidity.

TANTALUS RARE: Applies For Insolvency Proceedings in Germany
Tantalus Rare Earths AG announced on Oct. 16, 2015, that its
management has decided to file an application for insolvency
proceedings at the Munich Local Court.

The open payables at Tantalus Rare Earths AG amounted to
EUR1,518,534 at the date of the application.

As previously communicated, the Company has actively looked for a
funding solution after the non-payment of an investor during a
private placement in April 2015. Despite these efforts, the
funding has not been obtained for the moment. The Management Board
will together with the preliminary supervisor continue to search
for a funding solution in the best interest of all shareholders
and other stakeholders.

The group's subsidiaries and especially the operations in
Madagascar are not directly impacted by this measure.

Tantalus Rare Earths AG -- is a
Germany-based exploration company, engaged in the development of
rare earths in Madagascar. Tantalus's shares are quoted on the
'Primarmarkt' of the Dusseldorf Stock Exchange.


GREECE: Lawmakers Pass First Austerity Bill Under Bailout Program
Stelios Bouras at The Wall Street Journal reports that Greece's
lawmakers on Oct. 16 approved the first bill containing tough
austerity measures and economic overhauls agreed under its new
bailout program.

After a week-long debate, the bill, which includes stricter
pension rules, tax hikes and tougher fines for tax evasion, was
passed by the majority of Greece's 300 lawmakers, the Journal

According to the Journal, under the deal Greece struck with its
international creditors, which foresees up to EUR86 billion
(US$97.6 billion) in fresh loans, the omnibus bill -- so-called
because it wraps a number of proposed reforms into one bill --
will pave the way for the disbursement of the next EUR2 billion in
bailout funds.

Despite the harsh austerity measures included in this set of
proposed measures, the bill was supported by the country's
coalition government, the Journal notes.

The law includes a gradual increase of the retirement age and
higher penalties for those granting early retirements, the Journal
says.  It also includes a tighter legal framework for tax evasion,
changes in the legal framework for the settlement of tax arrears
and foresees the facilitation of the gas market's liberalization,
the Journal states.

A second, more difficult, set of economic and financial overhauls
is expected to be tabled and voted on in parliament by mid-
November to unlock a EUR1 billion second tranche of funding, the
Journal relays.

This is expected to include more painful measures including
increasing taxation for farmers, further pension reductions and
arrangements for privatizations, according to the Journal.

PIRAEUS BANK: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'D'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
counterparty credit rating on Greece-based Piraeus Bank S.A. to
'D' from 'SD'.

S&P also lowered its issue ratings on the bank's senior unsecured
debt to 'D' from 'CCC-' and its subordinated debt ratings to 'D'
from 'C'.

The downgrades follow Piraeus' announcement on Oct. 15 of the
launch of a tender offer to exchange securities from holders of
its additional Tier 1 (AT1) debt, Tier 2 debt, and senior debt
instruments with either equity or cash.  This constitutes a
"distressed exchange" under S&P's criteria because it implies that
investors will receive less value than the promise of the original
securities.  This is because the issuer offers to exchange the
securities for an instrument of lower ranking in the issuer's
capital structure and/or pay a significant discount in case of a
cash exchange.  Additionally, S&P thinks the offer is not purely
opportunistic, according to our criteria.

Therefore, following the launch of the offer, and taking into
account the capital controls which are still in place in Greece,
S&P considers that Piraeus is in default on most of its on-
balance-sheet financial obligations, according to its methodology.
Combined, the securities subject to the offer amount to
approximately EUR592.7 million.

The specific amounts are:

   -- EUR16.2 million outstanding of AT1 notes (ISIN

   -- EUR211.2 million outstanding of Tier 2 notes (ISIN
      XS0261785504); and

   -- EUR365.2 million outstanding of senior notes (ISIN

S&P's rating on the bank's preferred stock is already 'D'.

The offer is being conducted in two phases.  First, on Oct. 15,
2015, the bank offered to exchange the securities with
nontransferable receipts.  In the next phase, which is expected to
take place on Nov. 9, 2015, each nontransferable receipt will
receive either equity or cash equal to the then-current market
value of the instruments being exchanged.


ICELAND: Unlikely to Accept Terms of Bank Creditor Deal
Omar Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News report that Iceland is
unlikely to accept the latest offer from bank creditor groups
trying to withdraw their claims from the island without incurring
an exit tax.

According to Bloomberg, two officials close to the matter, who
asked not to be identified by name because the talks are private,
said the ISK334 billion (US$2.7 billion) put forward by committees
representing creditors in Kaupthing, Glitnir and LBI is still too
far off the combined US$3.8 billion the government is using in its
calculations.  The people, as cited by Bloomberg, said policy
makers may be willing to accept a smaller amount if other terms
are agreed on.

Prime Minister Sigmundur D. Gunnlaugsson says time is now running
out for bank creditors -- many of them hedge funds based in the
U.K. and the U.S. -- to strike a deal that will let them sidestep
a 39% exit tax, Bloomberg relays.  That levy would cost creditors
in the three failed banks a combined US$5.1 billion, the
government has estimated, Bloomberg notes.

Iceland, Bloomberg says, needs to reach an agreement with
creditors in its three failed banks in order to move ahead with
plans to remove capital controls that have been protecting its
financial markets since the end of 2008.  The government offered
bank creditors the option of making a so-called stability
contribution to avoid the exit tax, Bloomberg states.  To be
eligible, creditors need to come up with a proposal that policy
makers agree to before the end of the year, Bloomberg relates.


AERCAP IRELAND: S&P Rates US$400-Mil. Unsec. Notes Due 2020 'BB+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB+' issue-level
rating and '3' recovery rating to AerCap Ireland Capital Ltd. and
AerCap Global Aviation Trust's (both of which are wholly owned
subsidiaries of, and guaranteed by, AerCap Holdings N.V.)
US$400 million senior unsecured notes due 2020.  The '3' recovery
rating indicates S&P's expectation that lenders would receive
meaningful (50%-70%; lower end of the range) recovery of their
principal in the event of a payment default.  The companies will
use the proceeds from this issuance for general corporate
purposes, including the acquisition of aircraft and debt

S&P's ratings on Netherlands-based aircraft lessor AerCap Holdings
N.V. reflect its position as one of the two largest aircraft
lessors and the company's increased -- albeit
declining -- debt leverage following its May 14, 2014, acquisition
of competitor International Lease Finance Corp.  S&P assess the
company's business risk profile as "satisfactory" and its
financial risk profile as "significant."

The positive outlook reflects S&P's expectation that AerCap's
credit metrics will continue to improve because of its strong cash
flow and asset sales, despite the company's US$750 million of
share repurchases in 2015.  S&P would likely raise its rating on
the company if its debt-to-capital ratio declines to the mid-70%
area and its funds from operations (FFO)-to-debt ratio remains
above 10%, both of which could occur by the end of 2015.

Although unlikely, S&P could revise its outlook on the company to
stable if it repurchased a larger-than-expected amount of its
shares or if it acquired a large debt-financed aircraft portfolio,
causing its debt-to-capital ratio to return to the 80% area.


AerCap Holdings N.V.
Corporate Credit Rating                BB+/Positive/--

Ratings Assigned
AerCap Ireland Capital Ltd.
AerCap Global Aviation Trust
US$400 Mil. Snr Unscrd Notes Due 2020  BB+
  Recovery Rating                       3L

HARVEST CLO XIV: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned these
provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Harvest CLO XIV
Designated Activity Company:

  EUR139,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
   due 2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  EUR100,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
   due 2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  EUR5,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  EUR32,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  EUR10,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  EUR23,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  EUR25,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

  EUR24,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

  EUR12,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.


Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2028.  The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure.  Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, 3i Debt Management
Investments Limited, has sufficient experience and operational
capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Harvest CLO XIV Designated Activity Company is a managed cash flow
CLO.  At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of secured senior
obligations and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of senior
unsecured obligations, second-lien loans and mezzanine
obligations.  The portfolio is expected to be approximately 70%
ramped up as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly
of corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.  The
remainder of the portfolio will be acquired during the six month
ramp-up period in compliance with the portfolio guidelines.

3iDM will manage the CLO.  It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
improved and credit impaired obligations, and are subject to
certain restrictions.

In addition to the nine classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR 42,000,000 of subordinated notes.  Moody's
will not assign ratings to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty.  The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit
conditions that may change.  3iDM's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the notes'

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section
2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in September 2015.  The
cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.  In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of 0 occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche.

Moody's used these base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR 400,000,000
Diversity Score: 38
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.95%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 44.5%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Moody's has analyzed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries.  As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below.  Following the effective date, and given
the portfolio constraints, only up to 10% of the pool can be
domiciled in countries with foreign currency government bond
rating below A3.  Given this portfolio composition, there were no
adjustments to the target par amount, as further described in the

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the provisional rating assigned
to the rated notes.  This sensitivity analysis includes increased
default probability relative to the base case.  Below is a summary
of the impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in
terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of
the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3220 from 2800)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0
Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0
Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0
Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1
Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3640 from 2800)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1
Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3
Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3
Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3
Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in September 2015.


STABILUS SA: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3, Then Withdraws Rating
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Corporate Family Rating
of Stabilus S.A. to Ba3 from B1 and changed the outlook to stable
from positive.

Subsequent to the rating action, Moody's has withdrawn all ratings
assigned to Stabilus for its own business reasons.


The rating upgrade was prompted by (1) the strong revenue growth
Stabilus has continued to show during the first nine months of its
FY2015, coupled with (2) the consistent generation of double-digit
EBITA Margins and (3) benefits from the early refinancing of the
company's 2018 bonds with cheaper bank debt in June 2015.

"Being the market leader in the production of gas springs for
automotive and industrial applications with a market share of
approximately 70% Stabilus is confronted with a technological
change towards electro mechanical systems providing additional
comfort to the end customer.  While being challenged by a
different competitive landscape in that business Stabilus has
proven being able to generate a steady flow of new customer wins
as indicated by revenue growth in excess of 50% in that business,"
commented Oliver Giani, Moody's lead analyst for the European
automotive supplier industry.  "The rating upgrade reflects
Moody's acknowledgement that this has been achieved while the
company was able to sustainably deliver investment grade like
EBITA Margins."

The Ba3 CFR is mainly supported by (i) Stabilus' very strong
market position for gas springs across most geographical regions
and end market applications in a very consolidated market
environment, (ii) the high barriers to entry to Stabilus' markets
through (a) the capital intensity of the business, which would
require sizeable investments to replicate the company's business
model, (b) the long standing customer relationships of Stabilus
with major auto OEMs and industrial customers, (c) the very
consolidated nature of the gas spring market, which would leave
very little market space for new entrants, and (d) the economies
of scale required to be able to be profitable in a price
competitive market, which would make it difficult for new entrants
to penetrate the market on a small scale and which is reflected by
the high profitability with an EBITDA margin of 18.2% (June 2015
LTM), (iii) the group's geographically diversified and large scale
production base with a high level of automation in high labor cost
countries, and (iv) its exposure to non-automotive related
applications accounting for one third of total turnover, which
should help reducing somewhat the dependency on the automotive
industry for Stabilus.

The rating of Stabilus remains constrained by (i) the group's
relatively small size with revenues of EUR584 million as of June
2015, and the limited product diversification, (ii) a geographical
concentration on developed economies with Europe and the Americas
accounting for 88% of turnover notwithstanding that some of the
turnover realized in Europe is ultimately exported by customers of
Stabilus to emerging markets, (iii) the group's exposure to
cyclical end industries, and (iv) its capital intensity due to the
high automation level of its production asset base notwithstanding
that Stabilus' capital expenditures have been significantly above
depreciation levels over the last six years to June 30, 2015.  The
increased market share of various designs of automated tailgate
opening systems is a threat to core gas spring applications.
Stabilus has entered the market of automated tailgate systems
already back in 2002 and since refined the product offering and is
selling these systems under the product name Powerise.  However,
the appearance of automated tailgate systems has also opened the
market to new competitors, which are not competing with Stabilus
in gas springs.  This is also highlighted by the lower market
share of Stabilus in the Powerise market.  The rating incorporates
the expectation that Stabilus will further grow its market share
in Powerise going forward.  Stabilus' leverage of 3.0x debt/EBITDA
positions the company solidly in the Ba3 rating category.

Stabilus' liquidity profile for the twelve months period ending in
June 2016 is considered to be solid.  Estimated liquidity needs of
EUR90 million, primarily comprising of capital expenditures,
working capital needs and working cash required to run the
business, are well covered by approximately EUR72 million funds
from operations, EUR26 million cash on hand, and full availability
under the company's EUR50 million revolving credit facility.

The stable outlook incorporates Moody's expectation that Stabilus'
operating performance and cash flow generation will be sustained
at the levels seen since FY 2013/14.  It also assumes that the
capital structure of the group will stabilize around current
levels assuming limited external growth activities and taking into
account the announced dividend policy with a 20-40% payout ratio.

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

Established in 1934, Stabilus S.A. is a leading manufacturer of
gas springs, hydraulic vibration dampers and electromechanical
opening and closing systems for the automotive industry and other
industrial/consumer products applications.  Stabilus operates 11
manufacturing plants in nine countries, employs around 4,055
people.  During the twelve month period ended in June 2015,
Stabilus generated revenues of EUR584 million and an EBITDA of
EUR105 million (as adjusted by Moody's).


MACEDONIA REPUBLIC: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Republic of Macedonia.  The outlook is stable.


The ratings on Macedonia reflect S&P's view of its relatively low
income and wealth levels (S&P anticipates per capita GDP will
amount to $4,500 in 2015), weak checks and balances between
political institutions, and limited monetary policy flexibility
arising from the country's fixed exchange rate regime.  The
ratings are supported by moderate -- albeit rising -- external and
public debt levels.

Since 2010, export activity, alongside expansionary fiscal policy,
has supported the economy and helped trim unemployment, which
remains very high, however, at 26.8% as of June 30, 2015.  The
central bank's accommodative monetary policy, increased bank
lending and, more recently, low inflation, have supported private
consumption growth, although the strength of the underlying
recovery, independent of loose monetary and fiscal conditions, is
more doubtful.  S&P expects that over the next four years, growth
will be supported by ongoing public projects, foreign direct
investment flows into Macedonia, as well as continued net export
growth.  S&P has, however, lowered its 2015-2018 average growth
forecast to just below 3% (from 3.4%) to reflect a tighter fiscal
stance, which S&P believes the authorities would have to adopt to
be compliant with their fiscal rule.  The rule, due to come into
effect in 2017, would limit the general government deficit to 3%
of GDP and public sector debt to 60% of GDP.

The Macedonian government has struggled with fiscal discipline
over the past five years, and 2015 is the fifth successive year in
which the general government deficit is set to exceed its initial
target.  Fiscal consolidation is likely to be slower than
envisaged by the proposed fiscal rule.  S&P forecasts the general
government deficit will amount to 4% of GDP in 2015 before
narrowing to 3.2% in 2018.  The difference between S&P's
expectation and that of the Macedonian authorities arises from its
lower expectation for real GDP growth, as well as the government's
recent track record of missing its fiscal targets.  It has not met
targets both due to budgeted revenue projections and government
expenditure overruns.  The electoral calendar will also likely
influence fiscal outcomes.  Under an EU and U.S.-brokered deal
that ended Macedonia's political crisis (centered on mass illegal
surveillance), early elections will be held in April 2016,
following a three-month period under an interim bipartisan
government after the current coalition steps down.

S&P expects general government debt will more than double to 43%
of GDP in 2015, from 20% in 2008, while the stock of guarantees to
public-sector enterprises will likely quadruple to an estimated 8%
of GDP over the same time period because the government has
increased off-balance-sheet financing.  Despite the early
repayment of its outstanding debt to the International Monetary
Fund earlier this year, Macedonia's general government debt will
continue to rise through to 2018 because deficits will likely
remain debt financed.  S&P anticipates gross general government
debt will rise to 47% of GDP in 2018, while the stock of
guaranteed debt is set to increase toward 10% of GDP as public
entities such as the Public Enterprise for State Roads draw on
loans for infrastructure spending.  This will bring the stock of
public sector debt (excluding nonguaranteed debt of state-owned
public enterprises) to 57% of GDP and very close to the 60% of GDP
threshold under the proposed fiscal rule.

Seventy-five percent of government debt is denominated in foreign
currency, which increases the vulnerability of the government's
balance sheet to any potential foreign-exchange movements.  S&P
expects that this ratio could rise further, based on its
understanding that the debt management office's strategy envisages
a greater proportion of financing through external debt issuance.
Furthermore, S&P thinks the share of commercial government debt
held by nonresidents will rise from just under 50% currently.  The
banking system holds, on average, about 12% of its assets in
government securities and central bank bills.  As such, S&P thinks
the system would struggle to materially increase its creditor
share of the domestic government bond market.

With the public sector borrowing increasingly abroad, Macedonia's
external indebtedness has been on a rising trajectory.  S&P
estimates gross external debt will rise to more than 95% of 2015
current account receipts (CARs), an increase of 20 percentage
points since 2011.  S&P anticipates external borrowing, and to a
lesser extent foreign investment flows, will continue to finance
the current account deficit.  The latter will widen over 2015-2018
as investment-related imports pick up.

S&P considers the checks and balances between Macedonia's
institutions to be weak.  In its 2014 progress report on
Macedonia, the EU highlighted deteriorating media freedom and
problems related to the independence of the judiciary.  In S&P's
opinion, fiscal slippages and the weakening quality of public
finances since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis also point to
a loose framework for vetting the cost of public procurement, as
well as current public expenditure.

Macedonia has been an EU candidate since 2005, but a dispute with
Greece over its constitutional name continues to hamper progress
in its accession talks.  Although negotiations are underway to
reach a resolution, S&P's forecast through 2018 does not
incorporate the benefits of accession.

The Macedonian denar is pegged to the euro.  At an estimated
$2.4 billion, Macedonia's foreign reserves cover the monetary base
about 2x, implying strong backing for the pegged currency regime.
At the same time, net reserves (excluding the foreign currency
needed to convert the monetary base into euros) cover external
short-term debt by remaining maturity 0.6x, which is lower than
for many peers and suggests that external vulnerabilities inherent
to a fixed exchange-rate regime remain. The exchange rate regime
restricts monetary policy flexibility. However, central bank
measures have succeeded in lowering overall euro-ization in
Macedonia, bringing foreign currency-denominated deposits and
claims below 50% of total deposits and claims.

Since 2012, the central bank has eased monetary policy, with three
cuts to its key interest rate as well as to reserve requirements,
to incentivize lending.  It has also stipulated lower reserve
requirements for denar-denominated liabilities, compared with
those denominated in foreign currency, to engineer more lending
and deposit-taking activity in the domestic currency.  This effort
has successfully reduced the share of foreign currency-denominated
and indexed loans and deposits to below 50%.  Rather exceptionally
for the region, bank lending in Macedonia -- including to
corporations -- has continued to grow briskly, increasing by about
9% in 2015.

Although the banking system seems well capitalized, profitable,
and funded by domestic deposits, the two largest subsidiaries
operating in Macedonia have Greek and Slovenian parents -- the
National Bank of Greece S.A. and Nova Ljubljanska Banka.  If
either one or both parent banks were to come under pressure to cut
exposure to or sell their subsidiaries in noncore markets, S&P
could see a liquidity squeeze for their Macedonian subsidiaries
and associated external outflows.  It appears, however, that the
Macedonian regulatory and supervisory framework has appropriate
policies in place to address liquidity risks associated with
potential withdrawals by parent banks.  In addition, the central
bank this year imposed temporary capital flow measures aimed at
preventing corporate entities from borrowing domestically only to
lend on to Greek entities.


The stable outlook balances the risks S&P sees from rising public
and external indebtedness against Macedonia's economic prospects,
benefiting from recurrent investment inflows over the next four

S&P could raise its ratings on Macedonia if reforms directed
toward higher and broader-based growth were matched with improved
effectiveness and accountability of public institutions.

S&P could lower its ratings if large fiscal slippages were to
challenge public debt sustainability, raise sovereign borrowing
costs, and substantially increase external obligations, given the
constraints of the exchange-rate regime.  S&P could also lower the
ratings if it saw off-budget activities increasing significantly
and an increasing probability of contingent liabilities on the
government's balance sheet.  In addition, if parents of
systemically important banks operating in Macedonia were to cut
exposure to their subsidiaries, heightening pressure on both
banking sector liquidity and external finances, S&P could consider
a negative rating action.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the monetary assessment had improved.
All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating


                                       Rating         Rating
                                       To             From
Macedonia (Republic of)
Sovereign credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency           BB-/Stable/B   BB-/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment  BB             BB
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency           BB-            BB-


* S&P Takes Rating Actions on 41 Tranches in 25 Portuguese RMBS
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services on Oct. 16, 2015, raised its
credit ratings on 37 tranches in 24 Portuguese residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions.  At the same time,
S&P has placed on CreditWatch developing its ratings on three
tranches in two transactions and removed from CreditWatch negative
and affirmed its rating on one tranche in one transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's Sept. 18, 2015 raising of its
unsolicited long-term sovereign ratings on the Republic of
Portugal to 'BB+' from 'BB'.

Under S&P's updated criteria for rating single-jurisdiction
securitizations above the sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS
criteria), it has applied a hypothetical sovereign default stress
test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient credit and
structural support to withstand a sovereign default and so repay
timely interest and principal by legal final maturity.

The upgrades and affirmation follow the application of S&P's RAS
criteria.  These criteria designate the country risk sensitivity
for RMBS as "moderate".  Under these criteria, the transactions'
notes can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign
rating, if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a
minimum of a "severe" stress.  However, if all six of the
conditions in paragraph 44 of S&P's RAS criteria are met, S&P can
assign ratings up to a maximum of six notches (two additional
notches of uplift) above the sovereign rating, subject to credit
enhancement being sufficient to pass an "extreme" stress.

"For the ratings that we have today placed on CreditWatch
developing, we were presented with a definitive plan to remedy the
downgrade within an extended 30-day remedy period.  As the
extended remedy period has expired and the respective transaction
parties have not implemented remedy actions, in line with our
current counterparty criteria, we have placed these ratings on
CreditWatch developing as we may lower or raise them.  We will
continue to monitor the progress of the transaction parties in
implementing the remedy plans," S&P said.

S&P will aim to resolve the CreditWatch placements in the coming
weeks, once it has reviewed the transactions in conjunction with
any remedy actions (or the absence thereof) that have been taken.
S&P expects to resolve all of these CreditWatch placements by
January 2016.


ALROSA OJSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian diamond producer OJSC ALROSA's
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured rating
at 'BB'. ALROSA's Short-Term IDR has been affirmed at 'B'. The
Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is Stable.

The affirmation of the IDR and the Outlook reflects ALROSA's
resilience to ongoing pressure on the diamond market since early
2015 when major players repetitively announced price and volumes
cuts. ALROSA mitigates this pressure with a strong cost position
underpinned by weak rouble, and positive free cash flow (FCF)
generation. This contributed to the reduction of FFO gross
adjusted leverage to 1.7x from 2.4x during 1H15. The Stable
Outlook also reflects a good liquidity position as of 1H15 with
less than 20% of total debt due in 2H15 and 2016 against a RUB43bn
cash cushion and positive FCF.


Outperformance in 2014 and 2015

ALROSA outperformed our previous expectations in both 2014 and
1H15. Outperformance in 2014 was largely driven by the strong
diamond market in 1H14 and the weaker rouble in 4Q14. Better-than-
expected performance in 1H15 was largely due to lower oil prices,
which led to a rebased USD/RUB rate and to ALROSA's higher margins
and strong FCF. As a result, ALROSA's net debt dropped by 20% to
RUB141bn during 1H15 despite the fact that 95% of debt is dollar-

"We expect ALROSA to deliver a strong performance in 2015 with
revenue peaking at RUB271bn and EBITDA margin exceeding 50% on the
back of the structurally rebased rouble. This is despite
conservatively assumed mid-teens cost inflation, 5% average rough
diamond price cut and 10% sales volumes reduction in 2015 yoy. A
capex-to-sales ratio of around 14% and a 35% dividend payout
ratio, should result in the FCF margin over 20% and leverage
staying within 2x during 2015-2016. Should market pressure be
materially stronger than our expectations, this could drive
leverage back to 2x or above."

Market Pressure Ongoing

In mid-2015 ALROSA and DeBeers, the largest rough diamond
producers, cut diamond prices by 6% and 9%, respectively, compared
to end-2014. This followed DeBeers' announced intent to cut 2015
production by 3 mln carats (2% of global output) to support
diamond prices. We believe that market pressure will continue, so
conservatively assume a 5% annual average rough diamond price cut
in 2015 and a further 7% reduction in 2016. Since 2016, high
single-digit cost inflation, price pressure, strengthening rouble
and softly growing sales volumes will result in single-digit
revenue reduction at ALROSA towards RUB248bn by 2017, and its
EBITDA margin shrinking by 4pp-5pp per year over the rating

A low capex-to-sales ratio of 11%-13% and 35% dividend payout
ratio will moderate the FFO decrease from its 2015 peak levels,
and result in 7%-8% FCF margin and 1.4x-1.6x leverage over the
next two years. This is subject to the absence of a more adverse
and short-term diamond market contraction.

Gas Asset Disposal Uncertain

The timing and cash-flow impact of ALROSA's plans to divest its
non-core assets to Russian oil major Rosneft are uncertain. We
therefore do not incorporate the sale into our forecasts. If
realised, this will likely to have neutral-to-positive effect on
ratings subject to the transaction terms and conditions.

Diamond Industry Risks

The diamond industry can be characterized by significant volume
risks, which are applicable even to the cost leaders like ALROSA.
For instance, the 2008-2009 financial crisis led to a 45% decline
in ALROSA's sales in 2009 (excluding state-financed sales).
ALROSA's response was the 55% capex reduction and minimal
dividends for both 2009-2010, which led to leverage recovery to
below the 2007 level by 2010.

"While we expect ALROSA to remain exposed to diamond market
shocks, its medium-term ability to reduce capex and dividends to a
significant extent provides stability of ALROSA's long-term
financial profile. In this respect, medium-term and prolonged
market pressure appears to be more manageable for ALROSA compared
to short-term, but less expected, market shocks."

One-Notch Uplift for State Support

"We continue to assess the level of the Russian state support to
ALROSA on a regular basis. The Russian Federation (BBB-/Negative)
and the Republic of Sakha (BBB-/Negative) hold 44% and 25% of
ALROSA's voting shares, respectively, and control its board of
directors and top management. "

Moderate strategic but weak legal ties with the parents are
reflected in a single-notch uplift from ALROSA's standalone rating
of 'BB-'. The company benefited from state support during 2008-
2009 when the Russian State Depository for Precious Metals and
Stones purchased around 40% of 2009 diamond sales, and state-owned
Bank VTB refinanced ALROSA's short-term debt.

Two-Notch Discount for Corporate Governance

"We apply a standard two-notch discount due to ALROSA's higher-
than-average systemic risks stemming from its operations
concentrated in Russia. ALROSA's standalone profile sits at the
'BB+' level, excluding the two-notch corporate governance discount
and one-notch state support. The rating is underpinned by its
leading position in the rough diamond market globally, strong
reserves base, robust cost position, recent deleveraging and
adequate liquidity. The standalone rating remains constrained by
ALROSA's limited product diversification and its exposure to a
cyclical single end-market (retail jewellery)."


Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for ALROSA include:

-- Average diamond selling price to decline at 6% CAGR in 2015-
    2016 and flat thereafter;

-- Rebased but strengthening USD/RUB, modest sales volume growth
    to lead to sales peaking in 2015 and single-digit decline

-- EBITDA margin to exceed 50% in 2015 and drift towards 40% by

-- No M&A deals, 12%-14% capex/sales and 35% dividend payout
    ratio to result in positive FCF and FFO adjusted gross
    leverage within 1.4x-1.6x in 2016-2017.



Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to positive rating action include:

-- FFO adjusted gross leverage below 2x on a sustained basis;
-- Better clarity regarding the scale and longevity of the
    current diamond market downturn.


Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action include:

-- Reduced support from the Russian Federation;
-- FFO adjusted gross leverage above 3x on a sustained basis;
-- EBITDAR margin below 25% (FY14: 43%).


At end-1H15, ALROSA had only RUB10 billion (5% of total) debt due
in 2H15 and RUB24 billion (13%) due in 2016, both well covered by
a RUB43 billion cash cushion and positive free cash flow. This is
a step-up improvement in its debt maturity profile since early
2014 when above 45% of ALROSA's debt was falling due within two
years from the end-1Q14.

BALTIC FINANCIAL: S&P Puts 'B/B' Ratings on CreditWatch Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Russia-based Baltic
Financial Agency Bank (BFA), as well as its 'ruBBB+' Russia
national scale rating, on CreditWatch with negative implications.

S&P believes that BFA is exposed to Transaero Airlines, a Russian
air carrier which, S&P understands, is experiencing significant
challenges meeting its obligations.  S&P understands that, since
the government-owned Aeroflot Airlines dropped its bid for 75%
plus one share of Transaero, the risk of a disorderly bankruptcy
of the latter has increased substantially.

"We believe that should BFA have to fully provision its exposure
to Transaero, which would effectively increase its cost of risk to
about 5% in 2015, this would result in its risk-adjusted capital
(RAC) ratio dropping to 4.7%-4.9% over the next 12-18 months.  Our
forecast is based on our expectation that the bank's assets will
expand 17%-20% in 2016 and its net interest margin (NIM) will
recover to 3.5%-4.5% in 2016 from about 0.5%-0.6% in 2015.  This
NIM recovery is likely to be fueled by recovery of the carry on
the bond portfolio.  We believe, however, that additional
provisions, should they arise, will not result in BFA being
incompliant with regulatory requirements, with its regulatory
capital adequacy ratio remaining above 12% if the bank were to
provision its exposure to Transaero at the moment," S&P said.

S&P notes, however, that it currently has no information on the
potential development of Transaero restructuring or bankruptcy or
BFA's shareholders' potential efforts to recapitalize the bank
should it incur unexpected losses.  S&P is consequently putting
its ratings on CreditWatch negative.

S&P aims to resolve its CreditWatch on BFA within the next three
months once it has better clarity on the bankruptcy or
restructuring of Transaero's debt, losses incurred by Transaero's
senior unsecured creditors, and BFA's shareholders' plans, if any,
to boost the bank's capital.

S&P may lower the rating on BFA if S&P believes the bank's RAC
ratio will remain below 5.0% (contrary to our earlier assumptions
of 5.3%), a level S&P would consider to be weak, in the next 12-18
months, which may come from higher-than-anticipated credit costs
for 2015.

S&P may affirm the ratings if BFA does not incur material
additional losses on its largest exposures or if S&P sees the
bank's shareholders injecting additional capital into the bank
sufficient to maintain a RAC ratio above 5%.

KARELIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Republic of Karelia's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B+'
and its National Long-term rating at 'A(rus)'.

The agency has also affirmed the republic's Short-term foreign
currency IDR at 'B'. The Outlook on the Long-term IDRs and
National Long-term rating is Stable. Karelia's outstanding senior
unsecured domestic bonds have also been affirmed at 'B+' and at

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged baseline scenario
regarding Karelia's weak fiscal performance along with the
republic's stabilized credit metrics that are commensurate with
its ratings.


The 'B+' rating reflects Karleia's weak fiscal performance,
material direct risk, and weak liquidity amid a deteriorated
macro-economic environment in Russia. The ratings also factor in
our expectations of weak operating performance in 2015-2017 and a
negative current balance due to increasing interest expenses. We
do not expect its direct debt (bank loans and bonds) to increase
significantly in 2015-2016, remaining at about 45%-50% of current
revenue (2014: 42%).

"We do not expect restoration of the republic's operating surplus
until 2016, estimated at about 1%. The potential rebound in fiscal
performance would be driven by expected taxation recovery and opex
restraint. Karelia's fiscal performance was hit in 2013 by the
introduction of consolidated groups of taxpayers for large
corporations. That led to a 15% yoy decline in taxes in 2013 and
only a 5% annual growth of taxation in 2014."

Fitch expects Karelia's deficit before debt variation to reach 13%
of total revenue in 2015 before gradually declining to less than
10% in 2016-2017. The narrowing of deficit by 2017 is likely to be
driven by restored profitability of the republic's key tax payers.
The republic's interim deficit before debt variation shrank to 8%
of total revenue at end-July 2015 from 11% a year earlier. The
republic's expenditure is rigid with inflexible current transfers
exceeding 80% of opex in 2013-2014. Karelia's ability to reduce
capex is also limited, which was down only at 10% of total revenue
in 2014 (2013: 12%).

The republic's direct debt (in nominal terms) may increase up to
RUB14 billion in 2016 from RUB10.5 billion in 2014. The increase
is in part attributed to budget loans, as Karelia received RUB3.9
billion worth of federal budget loans with subsidized rates in
June 2015, replacing some of its bonds and bank loans maturing in
2015. We expect Karelia's interest charges to increase to up to 7%
of operating revenue over the medium term, from 4% in 2014, due to
greater volatility of the domestic debt capital markets.

Karelia's tax base has historically been sound; however, fiscal
changes introduced in 2012-2013 by the federal government have had
a profound negative effect on its fiscal capacity. In addition
prospects for a swift recovery of Russia's economy remain weak; in
its restated macro forecast Fitch expects the national economy to
contract 4% yoy in 2015, compared with the 3.5% contraction
forecasted previously.

Russia's institutional framework for subnationals is a
constraining factor on the republic's ratings. Frequent changes in
allocation of revenue sources and assignment of expenditure
responsibilities between the tiers of government limit the
republic's forecasting ability and negatively affect its fiscal
capacity and financial flexibility. Fitch expects the region's
dependence on financial support from the federal government to
increase in 2015-2017.


The republic's inability to sustainably curb growth of direct risk
above 80%-85% of current revenue, and a negative operating balance
for two years in a row, would lead to a negative rating action.

A positive rating action could result from stabilised fiscal
performance with operating surpluses leading to sufficient
coverage of interest costs.

KOMI REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has revised Russian Republic of Komi's Outlook to
Negative from Stable and affirmed its Long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB', National Long-term
rating at 'AA-(rus)' and Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.

Fitch has also affirmed the region's senior unsecured domestic
bonds' Long-term local currency rating at 'BB' and National Long-
term rating at 'AA-(rus)'.

The revision of Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that the
republic's current balance will not be restored to surplus amid a
persistently difficult economic environment in Russia and will in
turn lead to further debt growth over the medium term.


The Outlook revision reflects the following rating drivers and
their relative weights:


Fitch no longer expects the republic to restore its current
balance within the next two years, which is likely to remain in
negative territory during this period (2014: -6%). Fitch expects
tax revenue to stagnate over the medium term amid the economic
downturn. The completion of major gas pipeline construction
projects has had a negative impact on personal income tax proceeds
through lower employment. Corporate income tax collection is also
decelerating due to a weakened economy, although for oil & gas
companies this is partly offset by the depreciation of the rouble
as some of their costs are based in local currency.

Fitch forecasts Komi's budget deficit to remain substantial, at
above 10% of total revenue in 2015-2017. This will likely increase
debt to above 60% of current revenue by end-2015 and possibly 75%
by end-2017. During 8M15 Komi's direct risk further increased to
RUB34.6 billion from RUB28 billion at end-2014, following the
issue of a RUB5 billion bond (RUB11 billion registered).

In Fitch's view Komi's exposure to refinancing risk is exacerbated
by volatile interest rates in domestic markets. As of September 1,
2015, 56% of direct risk is due in 2015-2016, which may put
additional stress on the republic's debt servicing over the medium
term. Immediate refinancing needs by end-2015 (RUB9.4 billion, or
27% of direct risk) are covered by RUB8.4 billion open credit
lines and RUB3 billion cash reserves accumulated by Komi as of
September 1, 2015.

Fitch expects the proportion of subsidized budget loans to double
by end-2015 to 23% of direct risk (2014: 11%), which Fitch views
positively. This is because budget loans have marginal 0.1%
interest rates and lead to reduced interest payments. Komi
contracted RUB10 billion budget loans for 8M15.


Komi has a strong economy and its gross regional product per
capita exceeded the national median by more than 2x in 2013. The
republic's economy is weighted towards the natural resources
sector, which exposes the region to commodity prices fluctuation
and potential changes in fiscal regulation.

The top 10 taxpayers contributed about 50% of the republic's
consolidated tax revenue in 2014. The list of major taxpayers
includes PJSC LukOil (BBB-/Negative/F3), PJSC Gazprom (BBB-
/Negative/F3), and Rosneft.

Fitch forecasts the Russian economy to shrink 4% in 2015, due to
weak oil prices and sanctions imposed by the US and EU. Komi's
government forecasts the local economy to shrink 2.5% in 2015.


Growth in direct risk to above 70% of current revenue, coupled
with negative operating balances on a sustained basis and a
reduced capacity to obtain affordable funding for its debt
refinancing needs, will lead to a downgrade.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and
short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings and its 'BBB-
/A-3' long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings
on Russia.  The outlook on both the local currency and foreign
currency long-term ratings remains negative.

S&P also affirmed the long-term national scale rating on Russia at


The ratings are supported by Russia's net external asset position
and the government's low net debtor position, both of which S&P
expects to be maintained in 2015-2018.  The ratings remain
constrained by S&P's view of Russia's relatively weak political
institutions and economic income and growth prospects, which S&P
believes impede the economy's competitiveness and business and
investment climates.

"We project Russia's real GDP per capita growth will average less
than that of economies with comparable levels of economic wealth
over our 2015-2018 rating horizon.  We project that the economy
will expand by about 0.4% annually in 2015-2018, below the average
2.4% of the previous four years.  We see this muted projected
growth partly as a legacy of a secular economic slowdown that had
already begun before the geopolitical developments in Ukraine.  It
also reflects a lack of external financing due to the introduction
of economic sanctions and the sharp decline in oil prices," S&P

S&P assumes in its base case that the sanctions on Russia will
remain in place over S&P's forecast horizon, absent a resolution
of the conflict in Ukraine.  However, the situation remains fluid
and, should sanctions ease, one possible consequence could be a
modest medium-term boost to the Russian economy.

Ruble depreciation will subdue GDP per capita in dollar terms: S&P
forecasts it at US$8,700 in 2015, down from US$14,500 in 2013.
S&P also expects that declining domestic purchasing power, as a
result of exchange rate depreciation and rising inflation, will
hamper Russia's growth prospects.

Balance-of-payment pressures have hit the economy following the
decline in the Brent oil price to just over US$50 per barrel in
October 2015 (the Urals oil price currently trades at about a US$2
per barrel discount to Brent) from a peak of US$114 per barrel in
June 2014.  Russia is experiencing a severe terms-of-trade shock.
S&P nevertheless expects that Russia's current account will remain
in surplus of about 6% of GDP over 2015-2018, thanks to import
compression (a consistent drop in import demand) and a reduction
in the deficit on the income balance due to falling debt interest
payments.  The current account surplus has increased over the
first nine months of the year to US$50 billion, compared with
US$44 billion over the same period of 2014.  Russia's external
debt stock has declined to US$522 billion as of Sept. 30, 2015,
from US$681 billion a year earlier, as international capital
market financing to the country remains restricted, in S&P's view,
following the imposition of sanctions.  External interest
payments, reflected in the income balance, have fallen sharply as
a result.  Russia maintains a net external asset position.  S&P
expects liquid external assets held by the public and banking
sector to exceed Russia's external debt by about 35% of current
account receipts (CARs) over 2015-2018.

The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) modified its exchange rate regime
on Nov. 10,2014, moving to a freer float, with foreign currency
interventions permissible in case of financial stability threats.
This change should afford the CBR greater ability to conserve
reserves.  Historically, there has usually been a strong
correlation between the external value of the ruble and oil prices
and this has held true over the past 12 months.

"In our view, balance-of-payment pressures center on the financial
account.  Private-sector net capital outflows averaged US$57
billion annually over 2009-2013 and increased to US$153 billion in
2014.  However, these outflows totaled US$45 billion in the first
three quarters of 2015, compared with US$77 billion over the same
period in 2014.  Nevertheless, in our view, stress could mount for
Russian corporations and banks that have foreign currency debt
service requirements without a concomitant foreign currency
revenue stream.  That said, the CBR has been providing substantial
foreign currency liquidity to domestic banks via repo operations,
which has affected the central bank's headline reserves.  We note
that the CBR's reverse foreign currency liquidity operations with
resident banks increased to US$27 billion in September 2015 from
US$23 billion at the end of December 2014," S&P said.

"We estimate Russia's gross external financing requirement for
2015 at just over 70% of CARs plus usable reserves.  Our figure
for CBR-usable reserves deducts foreign currency investments made
by the CBR on behalf of the government (about US$146 billion in
2014) from the bank's reported foreign currency reserves (US$386
billion).  By this definition, we forecast reserve coverage of
current account payments at more than seven months.  We no longer
subtract the memorandum items reported in the international
investment position in Russia's international reserves (the CBR's
foreign currency swaps; funds received under repos with
nonresidents; and reverse foreign currency liquidity operations
with resident banks) because we understand that these are already
netted out of the headline reserves number.  The impact on our
external ratios is minimal," S&P said.

The fiscal rule introduced in 2013 to reduce the pro cyclicality
of fiscal policy has been suspended.  The rule capped government
spending based on historical Urals oil prices, while allowing for
a central government deficit of less than 1% of GDP.  The three-
year backward-looking average oil price would have suggested a
reference oil price for the 2016 budget of US$87, well above the
current price of around US$50.  In S&P's view, the government's
suspension of the rule is prudent, given current circumstances.

Ruble depreciation supports the central government's fiscal
position because about one-half of its revenues come from
hydrocarbons and are priced in U.S. dollars.  The general
government posted a deficit of 1.2% of GDP last year.  However,
S&P expects the deficit to widen to 4.4% of GDP in 2015.  This
incorporates S&P's expectation that the central government balance
will reach 3% of GDP, local and regional governments will post a
deficit of about 0.7% of GDP, and the social security system will
post a deficit of 0.7% of GDP in relation to one-off transfers to
be made from the state pay-as-you-go pension system to the non-
state second-pillar pension system.  This transfer between pension
systems relates to the government's redirecting of pension
contributions from the second-pillar, funded pension schemes to
the unfunded, pay-as-you-go system since 2013.

S&P estimates that, to date, the capital support that the
government has committed to the banking sector in various forms
exceeds Russian ruble (RUB) 2.5 trillion (3% of GDP; about US$40
billion).  This includes funds provided to state-related banks,
funds under a RUB900 billion recapitalization program committed in
2014, and funds for financial rehabilitation activity through the
Deposit Insurance Agency.  At the same time, S&P thinks that the
government support in the future will likely be more selective and
available predominantly to systemically important banks.

The draft budget for 2016 is to be presented to parliament by
Oct. 25, 2015.  It will be for one year only, instead of the usual
three-year budget framework, as the government feels that the high
level of uncertainty related to forecasting the oil price at this
time heightens the margin for error.

"We view the modest general government net debt position as a
rating strength, as we do the government's low interest burden as
a percentage of revenues.  The central government's Reserve Fund
and National Wealth Fund together totaled about 13% of GDP in
2014.  We adjust the level of these assets downward by about 2
percentage points of GDP, due to what we consider non-liquid
investments. In our opinion, the central government will
progressively liquidate a substantial portion of these assets to
fund upcoming fiscal deficits and to increase its support to the
economy and the financial system.  We project the government's net
debt position will rise to 11% of GDP by 2018," S&P said.

S&P believes that Russia's financial system has weakened and
therefore limits the CBR's ability to transmit monetary policy.
In S&P's opinion, the CBR faces difficult monetary policy
decisions while it targets inflation of 4% by 2017 and at the same
time supports sustainable GDP growth.  These challenges result
from the inflationary effects of exchange-rate depreciation and
sanctions from the West, as well as the counter-sanctions imposed
by Russia.

S&P anticipates that asset quality in the financial system will
deteriorate, given the weaker ruble, restricted access of key
areas of the economy to international capital markets due to
sanctions, and economic recession in 2015.  The full extent of
asset quality deterioration may not be immediately apparent in
reported figures, however, due to temporary measures introduced by
the CBR that allow Russian banks to apply more favorable exchange
rates when valuing foreign currency-denominated assets and
implement more flexible provisioning policies.

In December 2014, the CBR increased its key interest rate by 750
basis points over five days to 17%.  This was to stem the sharp
depreciation of the ruble and curb inflation.  The CBR has since
reduced its key rate to 11% to support economic growth.  The ruble
is currently trading around RUB62 to the dollar, having fallen to
about RUB69 at the end of January 2015, and compared with about
RUB35 in mid-2014.  The interest rate on interbank loans increased
substantially in December 2014, to well above the key rate,
although it has since moderated.  S&P sees such movements in
financial instrument rates as strong indicators of a weak monetary
transmission mechanism.  S&P expects that credit to the economy
will be curtailed, which will likely further undermine growth.
Given the pass-through of more expensive imports to domestic
prices generally, S&P now expects inflation to be about 15% in

S&P views Russia's institutional and governance effectiveness as a
rating weakness.  Political power is highly centralized with few
checks and balances, in S&P's opinion.  S&P do not currently
expect that the government will be able to effectively tackle the
long-standing structural obstacles to stronger economic growth
(perceived corruption, the weak rule of law, the state's pervasive
role in the economy, and the challenging business and investment
climate) over S&P's 2015-2018 forecast horizon.


The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that, over the next 12
months, fiscal buffers could deteriorate faster than it currently
expects.  S&P could also lower the ratings if geopolitical events
were to result in foreign governments' significantly tightening
the sanctions regime applied to Russia.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Russia's financial
stability and economic growth prospects were to improve.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating


                                   Rating          Rating
                                   To              From
Russian Federation
Sovereign credit rating
  Foreign Currency                 BB+/Neg./B      BB+/Neg./B
  Local Currency                      BBB-/Neg./A-3 BBB-/Neg./A-3
  Russia National Scale               ruAAA/--/--  ruAAA/--/--
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment BB+          BB+
Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency                       BBB-         BBB-

TAMBOV REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Tambov Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+'
with Stable Outlooks, and its Short-term foreign currency IDR at
'B'. The agency has also affirmed the region's National Long-term
rating at 'AA(rus)' with a Stable Outlook.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged baseline scenario
regarding Tambov's stable budgetary performance, moderate direct
risk and growing economy amid a national economic downturn.


The ratings reflect the region's solid operating performance, high
cash balance, moderate, albeit increasing, direct risk and high
refinancing pressure. The ratings also factor in the modest size
of the economy, resulting in reliance on transfers from the
federal budget.

Fitch projects stable budgetary performance for Tambov in 2015-
2017 with an operating margin of 10% (2014: 10.5%) and a deficit
before debt variation of 5% of total revenue (2014: 5%). This will
be supported by expansion of the region's tax base and steady flow
of transfers from the federal budget. Tax revenue is likely to
grow 5%-7% pa over the medium term due to the development of the
agricultural sector and processing industry.

Fitch projects Tambov's self-financing capacity will remain strong
in 2015-2017. About 80% of capex will be funded by the region's
current balance and capital transfers from the federal government.
A substantial part of the transfers is earmarked for the
agricultural sector to support domestic food production amid a
lasting embargo on imported food products. The remaining 20% of
capex will be funded by the region's cash balance and new
borrowings that will fuel modest growth of direct risk over the
medium term.

Fitch expects the region's direct risk to remain moderate at about
40% of current revenue (2014: 32%) in 2015-2017. At 1 September
2015, direct risk amounted to RUB11.3 billion (end-2014: RUB10.3
billion) and comprised 63% bank loans and 37% budget loans. The
latter included a RUB2.6bn short-term treasury loan that will be
refinanced by market debt by year-end.

As of October 1, 2015, 45% of its direct risk will mature in 2015-
2016 and another 50% is due in 2017-2018. Fitch does not expect
the region to have any difficulties in rolling over its maturing
debt with local banks. However, volatile interest rates on the
domestic market may put pressure on its current margin over the
medium term. As of October 1, 2015, Tambov had a high RUB7.1
billion cash balance that Fitch views as credit- positive. The
region could use some of this liquidity to refinance maturing
direct risk.

Tambov's economy has been growing at a faster rate than the
national economy, supported by investments in the economy. During
2011-2014 the region's cumulative growth was about 40% versus
national growth of 10%. Nevertheless, Tambov's wealth metrics
remain modest, and its GRP per capita was 83% of the national
median in 2013. This has led to a weaker tax capacity than its
regional peers. Federal transfers constitute a significant
proportion of Tambov's budget, averaging about 50% of operating
revenue annually in 2010-2014, which limits the region's revenue


A continuous budget deficit leading to growth of direct risk above
50% of current revenue, accompanied by high refinancing pressure,
would lead to negative rating action.

An upgrade is unlikely given the pressure on the sovereign's IDRs
(BBB-/Negative). However, direct risk declining towards 20% of
current revenue and an operating margin at above 15% on a
sustained basis accompanied by a Russian economic recovery, could
lead to an upgrade.

YAROSLAVL REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Yaroslavl Region's Long-
term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at
'BB', Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B' and National Long-
term rating at 'AA-(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long-term IDRs and
National Long-term rating are Negative.

The region's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds have been
affirmed at Long-term local currency 'BB' and National Long-term

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged baseline scenario
regarding Yaroslavl region's budgetary performance. The Negative
Outlook reflects pressure on the region's current balance amid
increased interest rates and a weakened operating balance.


The ratings reflect the region's moderate direct risk and
diversified economy, but also the weak institutional framework for
Russian sub-nationals. The ratings also take into account the
slowdown of the national economy, which place a strain on the
region's budgetary performance.

Fitch expects the region's operating margin to increase to 4% in
2015 from 0.6% in 2014, supported by limited opex growth and
increasing current transfers from the federal government. The
region's tax proceeds are likely to see slow growth and be close
to 2014's levels.

The agency forecasts the region's current balance will return to
positive territory in 2015, but will remain close to zero over the
medium-term. Increasing share of subsidized budget loans in the
region's debt structure provides relief from high interest rates
on domestic market debt. In 2014 the current balance further
deteriorated to a negative 3.3% of current revenue from a negative
1.7% in 2013.

Cutbacks in capex and a strengthened operating balance will help
the deficit shrink over the medium term. Fitch expects the budget
deficit before debt will narrow to 6% of total revenue in 2015
after a high average 13% in 2013-2014, and further to 4%-5% in
2016-2017. The region aims to achieve a balanced budget in 2016,
which Fitch considers as unlikely due to rigid operating spending
and a sluggish national economy.

Fitch expects the region's direct risk to grow to 65% of current
revenue over the medium term (2014: 56%). Positively, the region's
debt structure is shifting towards a higher proportion of
subsidized federal budget loans. In 2015 the region received
RUB6.8 billion of federal budget loans to replace part of its
market debt. The budget loans bear 0.1% interest rates and have a
three-year maturity. We forecast the proportion of budget loans in
the region's debt portfolio to increase to 35% by the beginning of
2016, from 15% a year ago.

Yaroslavl's refinancing needs in 2015 are close to zero. However,
during 2016-2017 the region faces refinancing pressure from 68% of
total direct risk. The region plans to re-enter the domestic bond
market in 2016 with new bond issues to refinance maturing

Yaroslavl possesses a diversified industrialized economy with
wealth metrics that are in line with the national median. The
economy mostly relies on various sectors of the processing
industry, which provides a wide tax base. In 2014 the regional
economy grew 1.3% yoy, outpacing weak national growth of 0.6%. The
administration expects the local economy to shrink 3.2% in 2015,
which is close to Fitch's forecast of a national GDP decline of


Inability to restore the current balance to positive territory or
a sharp increase of direct risk to above 70% of current revenue,
driven by short-term debt, could lead to a downgrade.


FONCAIXA PYMES 6: DBRS Assigns CCC(low) Rating to Series B Notes
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings to the following
notes issued by Foncaixa PYMES 6, FT (the Issuer):

  -- EUR 918.4 million Series A Notes: A (low) (sf) (the Series A

  -- EUR 201.6 million Series B Notes: CCC (low) (sf) (the Series
     B Notes, together, the Notes)

The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized by a
portfolio of term loans and drawn amounts on credit lines
originated by Caixabank, S.A. (Caixabank or the Originator) to
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and self-employed
individuals based in Spain. As of September 21, 2015, the
transaction's provisional portfolio included 32,613 loans and
credit lines to 28,734 obligors, totalling EUR1,196.5 million. The
portfolio results from the outstanding balance of three previous
Caixabank's transactions which were called on October 9th:
Foncaixa Aut¢nomos 1, FTA; Foncaixa PYMES 3, FTA and Foncaixa

At closing, the Originator will select the final portfolio of
EUR1,120 million from the above-mentioned provisional pool.

The rating on the Series A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
Legal Maturity Date in July 2050. The rating on the Series B
addresses the ultimate payment of interest and the ultimate
payment of principal on or before the Legal Maturity Date in July

The provisional pool is moderately exposed to the top three
industry sectors by DBRS industry definition which include
"Business Equipment & Services", "Building & Development" and
"Retailers (except food & drug)", representing 16.4%, 14.9% and
7.6% of the portfolio outstanding balance, respectively. The
provisional portfolio exhibits low obligor concentration; however,
the largest obligor represents 1.48% of the outstanding balance.
The largest ten obligor groups represent 5.8% of the outstanding
balance. The top three regions for borrower concentration are
Catalonia, Madrid and Andalusia, representing approximately 27.5%,
14.3% and 9.9%, of the portfolio balance, respectively.

The above ratings are provisional. Final ratings will be issued
upon receipt of executed versions of the governing transaction
documents. To the extent that the documents and information
provided by Foncaixa PYMES 6, FT, GestiCaixa, S.G.F.T., S.A. and
Caixabank, S.A. to DBRS as of this date differ from the executed
versions of the governing transaction documents, DBRS may assign
lower final ratings to the Notes or may avoid assigning final
ratings to the Notes altogether.

These ratings are based upon DBRS's review of the following items:

-- The transaction structure, the form and sufficiency of
    available credit enhancement and the portfolio

-- At closing, the Series A Notes benefit from a total credit
    enhancement of 22%, which DBRS considers to be sufficient to
    support the A (low) (sf) rating. The Series B Notes benefit
    from a credit enhancement of 4%, which DBRS considers to be
    sufficient to support the CCC (low) (sf) rating. Credit
    enhancement is provided by subordination and the Reserve

-- The Reserve Fund will be allowed to amortize after the first
    two years if certain conditions -- relating to the
    performance of the portfolio and deleveraging of the
    transaction -- are  met. The Reserve Fund cannot amortize
    below EUR 22.4 million.

-- The transaction parties' financial strength and capabilities
    to perform their respective duties and the quality of
    origination, underwriting and servicing practices.

-- An assessment of the operational capabilities of key
    transaction participants.

-- The ability of transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
    assumptions and repay investors according to the approved
    terms. Interest and principal payments on the Series A Notes
    will be made quarterly on the 25th day of January, April,
    July and October, with the first payment date being on 25
    January 2016.

-- The soundness of the legal structure and the presence of
    legal opinions which address the true sale of the assets to
    the trust and the non-consolidation of the special-purpose
    vehicle, as well as consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria
    for European Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

DBRS determined these ratings as follows, as per the principal
methodology specified below:

-- The probability of default (PD) for the Originator was
    determined using the historical performance information
    supplied; however, the mentioned data covers the five years
    from 2010 until 2015, and 50.3% of the portfolio balance was
    originated before 2010. DBRS determined the PD combining the
    historical performance information supplied for the portion
    of the portfolio originated after 2010 and the PDs that DBRS
    used for the original transactions for the portfolio
    originated before 2010. DBRS assumed a combined annualized PD
    of 2.25%.

-- The assumed weighted-average life (WAL) of the portfolio was
    4.5 years.

-- The PD and WAL were used in the DBRS Diversity Model to
    generate the hurdle rate for the target ratings.

-- The recovery rate was determined by considering the market
    value declines (MVDs) for Spain, the security level and type
    of the collateral. For the Series A Notes, DBRS applied the
    following recovery rates: 54.9% for secured loans and 16.3%
    for unsecured loans. For the Series B Notes, DBRS applied the
    following recovery rates: 65.6% for secured loans and 21.5%
    for unsecured loans.

-- The break-even rates for the interest rate stresses and
    default timings were determined using the DBRS cash flow


TRUSTBUDDY AB: Files for Bankruptcy, Halts Operations
TrustBuddy AB on Oct. 19 disclosed that it has filed for

As previously communicated, an investigation initiated by the new
management of TrustBuddy AB has indicated serious misconduct
within the company.  Since the announcement, the Board of
Directors and management have evaluated all available options in
order to find a viable solution for all stakeholders.

Further investigation has revealed that the situation is
increasingly complex and it will not be possible to continue
operations in any form.  The Board of Directors concludes that the
company is insolvent.  To ensure fair treatment of all
stakeholders, the Board of Directors, with great disappointment,
has decided to file for bankruptcy.  The District Court in
Stockholm has appointed Lars-Henrik Andersson of Lindahl law firm
to handle the process going forward.

The services of the company will continue to be closed, and the
trading in the share will not be resumed.

Simon Nathanson, Chairman of the Board of TrustBuddy AB, comments:

"As a result of the misconduct, our ongoing discussions with
stakeholders, lack of liquidity and inability to operate a
regulated operation, TrustBuddy cannot move forward with the
business.  The decisive action will give all stakeholders the
opportunity to receive fair treatment in a structured process. The
Board of Directors and management will continue to support the
process going forward in any way we can."

Lars-Henrik Andersson, Lindahl law firm, comments:

"My immediate focus will be to fully understand the critical
questions of the business in order to find the best way to
safeguard the interests of the creditors and other stakeholders.
One action is to immediately take control over all assets of the
company.  I am looking forward to an efficient cooperation with
the current board and management of TrustBuddy."

TrustBuddy AB is a Sweden-based lending facilitation company that
operates a peer to per (P2P) Internet community where users can
borrow and lend money.


MRIYA AGRO: Renews Leasing Programs with Local Banks
Kateryna Choursina and Daryna Krasnolutska at Bloomberg News
report that Mriya Agro Holding Plc Chief Executive Officer Simon
Cherniavsky said the company has renewed leasing programs with
local banks, in a sign that its finances are on the mend after
last year's default on about US$1.2 billion in debt.

Mr. Cherniavsky said Mriya, which is raising financing for
tractors and equipment amid a rush to complete winter planting,
restored a US$1.25 million leasing agreement with Raiffeisen Bank
Aval, Bloomberg relates.  The deal is a sign of renewed trust in
the company, said the chief executive, who was appointed in
February, Bloomberg notes.

Mriya's bondholders and lenders opened a six-month US$25 million
working capital facility in June to finance the harvesting and
planting of wheat, rapeseed and other crops, Bloomberg recounts.

Mr. Cherniavsky, as cited by Bloomberg, said the 2015 harvest has
already been contracted for export as the company has to repay
debt to creditors by the end of the year via such instruments.

                     Debt Restructuring

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 21,
2015, Interfax-Ukraine related that Mriya Agroholding plans to
finish talks on debt restructuring with its creditors by 2016.  In
August 2014, Mriya reported arrears worth US$9 million of interest
earnings and nearly US$120 million of debt held under the
company's obligations, Interfax-Ukraine disclosed.  Mriya's total
debt equaled US$1.3 billion when the company's bankruptcy was
announced, Interfax-Ukraine noted.

Mriya Agro Holding is a Ukrainian agriculture company.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CAPARO: To Enter Administration, 1,800 Jobs Affected
Alan Jones at Press Association reports that Caparo is understood
to be set to go into administration, with the loss of around 1,800

According to Press Association, the cuts would hit several parts
of the UK, including the West Midlands.

The firm, which is owned by Labour peer Lord Paul, produces a
number of steel products, Press Association discloses.

CHELFHAM MILL SCHOOL: To Go Into Liquidation
North Devon Gazette reports that a North Devon school at the
centre of an abuse investigation is to go into liquidation.

Staff at Chelfham Mill School who had not already resigned during
the initial lay-off period have received letters informing them of
their redundancy, the Gazette understands, according to North
Devon Gazette.

In July, education watchdog Ofsted suspended the school's
registration to operate amid a police investigation into abuse
claims, the report relates.

Last month, school principal Katy Roberts had said the private
residential school, for boys aged seven to 18 with emotional and
behavioral problems, hoped to re-register following the conclusion
of the investigation, the report notes.

The report relays that one member of staff told the Gazette: "It's
a shame that after nearly 60 years the school has to close.

"As we understand, it there has been no real progress with the
investigation and as of the end of August no-one had even been
interviewed.  Local police have said it was a 'low priority," the
report quoted the staff as saying.

"That has been a knock-on effect-people need to earn money to
live; they can't be laid off forever," the staff added.

KEEPMOAT: S&P Affirms 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-' long-term
corporate credit rating on U.K.-based regeneration services and
housing developer Keepmoat (Keystone JVco Ltd.).  The outlook is

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+' issue rating on Keepmoat's
GBP75 million super senior RCF due 2019.  The recovery rating
remains at '1', indicating S&P's expectation of very high recovery
(90%-100%) in the event of a default.

S&P has also affirmed its 'B-' issue rating on the group's GBP263
million senior secured notes due 2019.  S&P has revised its
recovery rating to '3' from '4' to reflect its view of recovery in
the lower half of the 50%-70% range.

The rating affirmation reflects S&P's assessment of Keepmoat's
business risk profile as "weak" and its financial risk profile as
"highly leveraged," as defined in S&P's criteria.  The company
operates in a cyclical and fragmented market, characterized by low
margins and low barriers to entry.  S&P also notes Keepmoat's
reliance on government spending and initiatives, with the majority
of its customers either public-sector or nonprofit entities.  In
addition, Keepmoat has some exposure to building materials and
other associated cost increases because its contracts are mostly
at fixed prices.  However, S&P understands these risks are partly
offset by back-to-back contracts with suppliers and

Keepmoat has a good position in the housing regeneration market,
supported by its large scale, but it lacks international presence.
In S&P's view, Keepmoat's integrated service offering also
provides some competitive advantage over smaller players.
Keepmoat's multiyear contracts and long-standing customer
relationships with local authorities and housing associations
provide a certain degree of visibility over revenues in the
regeneration segment.  In the homes segment, S&P believes Keepmoat
is more reliant on the evolution of market prices.  S&P forecasts
an increase in working capital requirements, due to the company's
increasing focus on the homes segment.

The expected change in turnover mix will likely therefore keep
margins stable overall in the near term, reflecting the increased
focus on the house segment, offset by increased new build housing
in the regeneration business, which will reduce the overall share
of the traditional refurbishment activities.

The stable outlook on Keepmoat reflects S&P's expectation of a
progressive increase in revenue, with broadly stable adjusted
EBITDA margins of 5.5% to 6%.  While S&P anticipates that the
markets in which Keepmoat operates will remain fragmented and
competitive, S&P considers that Keepmoat's broad service offering
should support its market position in the U.K.

S&P also assumes that Keepmoat's liquidity will remain "adequate,"
as per S&P's criteria.  Over the next 12 to 24 months, S&P
anticipates that Keepmoat's FFO cash interest coverage will stay
well above 2x.

S&P could lower the ratings if Keepmoat's FOCF became
significantly negative, which, absent external funding, would
weaken the company's liquidity position.  The most likely trigger
for this would be a substantial decrease in EBITDA compared with
S&P's current base case.  However, S&P do not consider this
scenario to be likely.

S&P could consider raising the rating if it was to see a solid
improvement in the stability and amount of FOCF.  In S&P's view,
this would most likely occur if Keepmoat's EBITDA base increases
materially, with the company able to control working capital

GT LAW: Quantuma Appointed as Administrators
Marcel LeGouais at InsolvencyNews reports that GT Law Solicitors,
the trading name of First Stop Legal Services, has filed for
administration in the latest of a string of legal firm

Andrew Hosking -- -- and Simon Bonney
-- -- of business recovery specialist
Quantuma were appointed joint administrators to First Stop Legal
Services on October 9, InsolvencyNews says.

The report relates that the appointment came just a week after
both Bonney and Hosking were appointed as joint administrators of
another law firm -- Jeffrey Green Russell.

According to the report, the administrators of First Stop Legal
Services secured the transfer of cases and eight staff to three
other law firms -- two of which were IC Law in Liverpool and
Pilkington Shaw in Liverpool.

There were eight redundancies and it's understood that former
managing director/solicitor Gordon Tucker will join another law
firm in the coming weeks, the report states.

InsolvencyNews recalls that GT Law was referred to the Solicitors
Regulation Authority (SRA) earlier this year regarding its
representation of claimants in a failed personal injury case.

The report says the class action lawsuit, representing more than
16,000 people, was brought to the high court by claimants seeking
compensation for health problems, that they claimed related to a
fire in Merseyside, at a chipboard plant owned by the Sonae
Industria company.

But in Saunderson & Ors v Sonae Industria (UK), the judge
dismissed the claims, saying the legal process had "preyed on
human susceptibility and vulnerability," the report notes.

According to the report, GT Law's administration emerged as many
law firms were being hit by the September 30 deadline for the
renewal of professional indemnity insurance (PII) -- the cover
that effectively permits legal firms to practice.

It's believed that this deadline may have affected both Jeffrey
Green Russell and GT Law in the lead up to their administrations,
InsolvencyNews relates.

Mishcon de Reya provided insolvency advice to GT Law, and Pinsent
Masons provided insolvency advice to JGR, the report adds.

JO HAND: Bounces Back After SSI Disaster Forces Liquidation
Jamie Hardesty at reports that Jo Hand bounces back
after SSI disaster forces company liquidation Teesside
entrepreneur Jo Hand, whose recruitment business was forced into
liquidation by the closure of the SSI steelworks in Redcar, is
launching a new company which begins trading today.

Determined to help as many former steelworks employees into jobs
as possible, Jo is bouncing back with a new enterprise - Jo Hand
Recruitment and Consultancy, according to

The report notes that Jo revealed: "The closure of SSI has been
devastating for Teesside and in particular their employees and
families.  The company owed us more than ├║500k so we had no
alternative but to go into liquidation which saw a number of our
contractors lose their jobs."

"I am a proud to be part of the Teesside business community who
has worked damned hard to build up a successful company over the
past 10 years so it was no easy decision.  There was no
alternative but the support I have had has been overwhelming which
is why I am able to start afresh.  All our clients have come with
us and indeed some have even given us extended contracts to get
back up and running and continue to be profitable," the report
quoted Ms. Hand as saying.

"We want to help as many of those made redundant as a result of
SSI's closure into work as we can -- so far we have placed 25 into
a variety of engineering, contract cleaning and administrative
roles," Ms. Hand added.

The report relays that Ms. Hand continued: "Up until the troubles
at SSI things were looking much more positive not just for our
business but the local economy in general."

"I have decided to come out fighting, rebuild the business from a
strong base, continue to employ my staff and as many contractors
as possible and of course to continue helping our clients fill
their vacancies with excellent candidates.  My philosophy is not
just about the sales, it is about looking after people by giving
the best service so that if they need to come to an employment
agency again, they will come back to us," Ms. Hand said, the
report notes.

"The fact that every client who worked with us previously has
shown us so much support is testament to that and I am determined
to repay their faith in us by continuing to exceed their
expectations," Ms. Hand added.

* UK: Retailers' Risk of Insolvency Drops, R3 Report Shows
---------------------------------------------------------- reports that the proportion of retail businesses
at risk of insolvency has dropped for the sixth month in a row,
figures reveal.

But the report by the R3 association of business recovery
professionals shows that more than 30% of businesses across the
south-east face a 'higher than normal risk' risk of insolvency,
the report says.

According to the report, R3 southern committee chairman Andrew
Watling said the figures were promising. quotes Mr. Watling saying that: "Now that
students are returning to the region's cities, we will see
increased spend both on the high streets and online.

"However, this busy period can often mask problems that will rear
their heads in the new year when trade traditionally drops again.

"For any businesses having a hard time, we urge them to seek
professional advice before it's too late."


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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