TCREUR_Public/151027.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, October 27, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 212



MINSK CITY: S&P Affirms 'B-' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable


CYPRUS: Fitch Hikes Long-term Issuer Default Ratings to 'B+'


SCOUT24 HOLDING: Moody's Assigns B1 CFR, Outlook Stable
TALISMAN-6 FINANCE: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Notes Classes to D


GREECE: Has Two Weeks to Implement Missing Overhauls
NAVIOS HOLDINGS: Moody's B2 CFR Buoyed by Mild Dry-Bulk Rate Hike


VALLAURIS II: Moody's Raises Rating on Class IV Notes to Ba2


ASTANA FINANCE: Foreign Representative Wants Ch. 15 Case Closed


AMSTERDAM TRADE: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Ratings to B2


BANK ROSSIYSKIY: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
BANK SOVETSKY: DIA to Oversee Provisional Administration
DORIS BANK: Bank of Russia Revokes Banking License
EUROCOMMERCE PJSC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
GREENFIELDBANK JSC: Placed Under Provisional Administration

INGOSSTRAKH INSURANCE: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Counterparty Rating
IZHEVSK CITY: Fitch Withdraws 'B+/B' Issuer Default Ratings
KEMEROVO REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Default Ratings
KHAKASSIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Issuer Default Ratings
KHARKOV CITY: Fitch Affirms 'C' Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR

MARI EL REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Ratings
MOSCOW REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
UDMURTIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Ratings

* Russia's Economy May Increase Mortgage Arrears, Moody's Says


ABENGOA SA: KMPG Detects EUR250-Mil. Cash Deficit in Accounts
EUSKALTEL SA: Moody's Assigns B1 CFR, Outlook Stable
EUSKALTEL SA: S&P Assigns 'BB-' CCR & Rates EUR300MM Loan 'BB-'
GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Notes


FERREXPO PLC: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC', Outlook Negative
UNICOMBANK PJSC: Deposit Fund May Pay UAH33.228MM to Depositors

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

EDU UK BONDCO: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'B-' CCR
JAGUAR LAND: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT FC Issuer Default Rating
VOUGEOT BIDCO: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Remains Stable
VOYAGE BIDCO: Fitch Assigns 'B' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
* UK: Scottish Business Failures Fall to Pre-Recession Levels



MINSK CITY: S&P Affirms 'B-' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-' long-term
issuer credit rating on the City of Minsk, the capital of Belarus.
The outlook is stable.


The rating on Minsk reflects S&P's long-term sovereign credit
rating on the Republic of Belarus (B-/Stable/B).  S&P caps its
rating on Minsk at the level of the long-term rating on Belarus
because S&P thinks that the institutional and financial framework
for local and regional governments (LRGs) in Belarus doesn't allow
its LRGs to be rated above the sovereign.

S&P considers that Minsk, like other Belarusian LRGs, lacks
financial autonomy to resist significant sovereign interventions
with high dependence on taxes shared with the sovereign.  The
central government also imposes spending mandates that local
governments cannot refuse to finance.  In addition, since 2014,
Minsk has been obliged to contribute about 15%-20% of its revenues
to the central budget for equalization purposes.

S&P nevertheless revised its assessment of Minsk's stand-alone
credit profile (SACP) to 'bb-' from 'b+', mainly reflecting S&P's
expectation that the city will maintain a strong debt service
coverage ratio in the next 12-24 months.  This is owing to the
city's structurally exceptional internal liquidity position, with
a high level of cash reserves and a gradual debt repayment

The SACP is not a credit rating. Instead, it is a measure of an
LRG's intrinsic creditworthiness, were its rating not constrained
by the rating on the sovereign.

S&P's view of Minsk's SACP reflects S&P's assessment of Belarus'
very volatile and underfunded Belarus institutional framework for
LRGs, which underpins the city's very weak budgetary flexibility,
its weak economy by international standards, weak management, and
high contingent liabilities.  Factors supporting the rating are
the city's very low debt burden, strong liquidity, and average
budgetary performance.

The institutional framework under which Belarusian regional
governments operate limits the predictability and flexibility of
Minsk's financial policy.

The central government defines the rate and basis of most taxes,
thus constraining the city's ability to modify revenues.  It also
sets norms for regional spending through centrally set social
standards, limits regions' budget deficits, and authorizes all
borrowing.  Furthermore, the central government can negatively
interfere in LRGs' public finances, and the LRGs cannot oppose
such decisions.

As Belarus' largest administrative, financial, and commercial
center, Minsk is wealthier and more diversified than other
Belarusian regions.  S&P expects this will continue to support its
budgetary performance.  Although the city's wealth levels are
modest by international standards, the city's GDP per capita
exceeds the national average by 1.2x.

Minsk's budgetary performance is average.  S&P's assessment is
based on the city's very strong financial indicators mitigated by
their pronounced volatility, coupled with significant
underspending accumulated over years under the central
government's requirement for zero budgetary deficits.  In S&P's
experience, central government interference leads to significant
volatility in the city's operating balances.  In S&P's base-case
scenario, it factors in some revenue slowdown and the compulsory
contribution of about 20% of the city's revenues to the central
budget in 2015 and 2016.  Therefore, S&P anticipates a sizable
drop in operating margins to 23% of operating revenues in 2015-
2017 from an exceptionally strong average of 42% in 2012-2014.

Minsk maintains high capital spending, both directly and via
municipal companies.  It has committed to an ambitious housing
construction program and investment in health care and transport
infrastructure.  This puts pressure on the city's flexibility as
regards capital spending.

Minsk has consistently reported surpluses after capital accounts
because of the national fiscal consolidation rules that banned
LRGs from having budget deficits in 2011-2014.  However, the rule
was lifted this year, and S&P expects the city to post a modest
deficit after capital accounts, stemming in particular from
infrastructure needs that were underfunded in previous years.

S&P assumes in its base case that the ban on deficits will be
introduced again in 2016 and remain in force thereafter.

Owing to the very modest or zero deficits after capital accounts,
Minsk has accumulated cash reserves.  Therefore, the city is
likely to borrow only starting in 2017 according to S&P's base
case.  This will keep tax-supported debt very low, at below 20% of
operating revenues until 2018.  S&P includes Minsk's guarantees in
our calculations of direct debt, as the city is responsible for
the principal payments on them.  The guarantees account for 75% of
the city's direct debt, half of which are denominated in foreign
currency.  However, this is counterbalanced by exceptionally high
operating balances that cover Minsk's direct debt severalfold.

S&P regards Minsk's contingent liabilities as high: Minsk owns or
has a stake in more than 150 government-related entities (GREs).
Most of the city's utilities and transport enterprises operate
under artificially low tariffs and depend on timely and adequate
compensation from the city's budget.  S&P estimates that the
potential support to the GRE sector in the event of stress might
exceed 15% of Minsk's operating revenues.

According to S&P's criteria, it views Minsk's management quality
as weak compared with the international average, but similar to
the quality in most LRGs in the Commonwealth of Independent
States.  Systemic constraints make the city's annual and long-term
budget planning only modestly reliable, and also weaken its
revenue, expenditure, and GRE management.


S&P has revised its assessment of Minsk's overall liquidity
position to strong from adequate, as S&P's criteria define the
terms.  This is based on Minsk's structurally exceptional internal
debt service coverage ratio mitigated by the city's limited access
to external liquidity owing to the weak domestic banking system.

S&P expects that Minsk's net average cash will cover debt service
falling due within the next 12 months by more than 300%.  In the
debt service, apart from direct debt repayment, S&P also includes
the redemption of city-guaranteed bank loans of municipal
companies and leasing payments of its transport company.

S&P conservatively applies a 50% haircut to Minsk's cash reserves,
as the city places them on deposit in domestic banks the short-
term ratings of which are lower than 'A-3'.  Even using this lower
figure, however, S&P still anticipates that the city's average
cash position will comfortably cover its debt service in 2015-

S&P views Minsk's access to external liquidity as limited, despite
S&P's current placement of Belarus' banking system in group '10'
of S&P's Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA), where
'1' indicates the lowest risk and '10' the highest.  S&P believes
that Minsk's exceptional debt service coverage ratio is based on
the city's structurally very strong capacity to generate internal


The stable outlook on Minsk mirrors that on Belarus.  S&P would
revise its outlook on Minsk to negative, all else being equal, if
S&P revised the outlook on Belarus to negative.

Apart from a sovereign downgrade, and in accordance with S&P's
criteria, it would lower its rating on Minsk if the SACP
deteriorated to below 'b-'.  However, given that the SACP is at
'bb-', S&P currently do not envisage a realistic downside scenario
under which Minsk's SACP would weaken to below 'b-'.

S&P could raise the rating on Minsk within the next 12 months if
S&P was to raise the ratings on Belarus and the city continues to
perform in line with its base-case scenario.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating


                                Rating        Rating
                                To            From
Minsk (City of)
Issuer credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency    B-/Stable/--  B-/Stable/--


CYPRUS: Fitch Hikes Long-term Issuer Default Ratings to 'B+'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Cyprus's Long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'B+' from 'B-'. The
Outlooks are Positive. The issue ratings on Cyprus's senior
unsecured foreign and local currency bonds have also been upgraded
to 'B+' from 'B-'. The Country Ceiling has been raised to 'BB+'
from 'BB-' and the Short-term foreign currency IDR has been
affirmed at 'B''.


The upgrade of Cyprus's IDRs reflects the following key rating
drivers and their relative weights:


Cyprus has established a track record of fiscal consolidation and
over-performance on its fiscal targets. In 2014, Cyprus achieved
an almost balanced general government position (excluding a one-
off EUR1.5bn capital injection to the cooperative banking sector)
compared with a deficit of 8.5% of GDP originally projected by
Fitch in June 2013, when the agency downgraded Cyprus's Long-term
foreign currency IDR to 'B-'. The positive momentum has carried
over to 2015 and the budget has remained in slight surplus as of
end-July 2015, with Fitch now projecting a deficit of 1% of GDP
for 2015 and surpluses of 0.2% and 1% for 2016 and 2017,

General government gross debt (GGGD) is now expected by Fitch to
peak at less than 108% of GDP this year, before falling to around
100% in 2017. This compares with a peak of over 130% projected by
Fitch in June 2013. At more than double the 'B' median of 43% for
2015, the GGGD ratio is still high and reduces Cyprus's fiscal
scope to absorb domestic or external shocks. The stock of
government guarantees is also sizeable at 17% of GDP, although
over half is already included in the reported GGGD stock.

Cyprus is back on track in its IMF-EU program following delays in
the fifth and sixth reviews that were pending the implementation
of the foreclosure law, finally passed in May 2015. The seventh
review took place in July and enabled the disbursement of EUR625m
in funding.

The foreclosure law, along with a new insolvency framework, lies
at the heart of the banking sector efforts to reduce its
exceptionally high stock of non-performing exposures (NPEs). A
significant program hurdle was overcome in removing all
restrictions on capital flows in April, ending two years of
controls. Deposits have been broadly stable since then, although
non-resident deposits (30% of total) declined temporarily in the
run-up to the Greek crisis this summer. While direct financial
links between Greek-owned subsidiary banks and Greece have been
reduced significantly, the sector remains vulnerable to Greece
mainly via investor confidence.


Growth during 2015 turned positive for the first time since Q111,
leading to an upward revision in Fitch's forecast for 2015 to
growth of 1.5% from a decline of 0.8%. Fitch estimates a smaller
cumulative loss in output since 2013 at 7.5%, compared with 14%
projected by Fitch in June 2013. Growth has been supported by
domestic demand, which in turn is buoyed by lower oil prices and
an improvement in sentiment. Tourist arrivals were up 14% yoy in
September, despite a decline in arrivals from Russia. The labor
market is improving but remains weak; unemployment was still above
15% in August compared with less than 4% in 2008.

Cyprus's 'B+' IDRs also reflect the following key rating drivers:

There are still significant risks to creditworthiness posed by
Cyprus's continued deep economic and financial adjustment.

The environment for banks remains challenging, in particular with
regard to exceptionally weak asset quality. The stock of
consolidated sector NPEs was 47.4% of gross loans in August, the
highest of all Fitch-rated sovereigns. Unreserved problem loans
for the sector (ie gross NPEs minus system-wide provisions) stood
at EUR18.8 billion, or 107% of GDP for the same period.

Implementation risks around banking reforms remain high as the
process is dependent on the political will to confront debtors,
which could wane in the run-up to parliamentary elections in May
2016. Though evidence is emerging of a pickup in restructuring and
NPE stock stabilization, along with improved capitalization and
liquidity, any corresponding decline in NPEs will only emerge
gradually. With assets of almost 5x GDP, the banking sector weighs
on the overall credit profile of Cyprus by rendering it more
vulnerable to external shocks. Uncertainty in Greece, a global
economic downturn, or deterioration in the Russian economy could
undermine Cyprus's adjustment.

At 108% of GDP as of 1Q15, Cyprus's net external debt (NXD)
reflects a highly indebted private sector (external private sector
debt was over 350% of GDP in 1Q15). The NXD figure was revised up
by over 60% of GDP following a shift of external statistics
compilation to the BPM6 framework in June 2014. Ship owners are
now counted as Cypriot economic units irrespective of the location
of their activities, which increases the NXD position owing to the
capital-intensive nature of the shipping industry (debt-financed
real assets).

The current account deficit has narrowed to 5% of GDP in 2014 from
14% in 2008, and will continue to shrink according to Fitch
projections, albeit gradually to around 3.5% by 2017. Cyprus's
weak external position implies that further economic rebalancing
may be in prospect over the medium term.

Debt management operations aimed at improving the debt profile
should help ease market access during the post-program period.
Market conditions allowing, Cyprus plans to issue another eurobond
before end-2015 to further lengthen maturities and to increase its
cash buffer. A EUR860bn bond redemption due in November is already
covered by the country's sizeable cash position (close to EUR2bn
or 11% of GDP), while maturities are moderate until 2019, with
just over EUR500m of medium- and long-term debt falling due in
2016, EUR284m in 2017, and EUR20m in 2018.


Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to an upgrade include:

-- Further signs of a stabilization in the banking sector,
    including a pickup in loan restructurings

-- A sustained track record of market access at affordable rates

-- Continued adherence to fiscal adjustment targets, leading to
    a decline in the government debt- to-GDP ratio

-- Further track record of economic recovery and narrowing of
    the current account deficit.

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to a negative rating action:

-- Re-intensification of the banking crisis in Cyprus

-- A weakening in the pace of fiscal consolidation, resulting in
    a less favorable trajectory in the debt-to-GDP ratio

-- A return to recession or deflation, which would have adverse
    consequences for public debt dynamics.

-- A lack of market access, putting pressure on government and
    banking system liquidity


In its debt sensitivity analysis, Fitch assumes a primary surplus
averaging 2% of GDP, trend real GDP growth averaging 1.7%, an
average effective interest rate of 3.3% and GDP deflator inflation
of 1.5%. On the basis of these assumptions, the debt-to-GDP ratio
would peak at almost 108% in 2015, and edge down to 87% by 2024.

Gross debt-reducing operations in the EU-IMF program such as
privatization (EUR1.4 billion by 2018) and a mooted asset swap for
a government loan held by the Central Bank of Cyprus (up to EUR1
billion) are not considered in Fitch's assessment of Cyprus's debt
dynamics. Our projections also do not include the impact on growth
of future gas reserves off the southern shores of Cyprus, the
benefits from which are several years into the future, although
now less speculative.

Fitch assumes that there will be no material escalation in
developments between Russia and Ukraine that would lead to a
significant external shock to the Cypriot economy. Russians
accounts for around 20% of the total tourism market share, and a
sizeable share of foreign deposits in banks.

The European Central Bank's asset purchase program should help
underpin inflation expectations, and supports our base case that,
in the context of a modest economic recovery, the eurozone will
avoid prolonged deflation.

Fitch's base case is that Greece will remain a member of the
eurozone, though it recognizes that 'Grexit' is a material risk.
Cyprus is among the most vulnerable to a 'Grexit' shock. However,
its ties to Greece have been reduced significantly. Cypriot banks
no longer hold any Greek government bonds and are no longer
exposed to the Greek private sector, owing to the fire-sale of the
Greek operations of Cypriot banks in March 2013. The subsidiaries
of the big four Greek banks in Cyprus have also been ring-fenced.
Fitch considers that Cyprus remains vulnerable to Greece mainly
via investor confidence.


SCOUT24 HOLDING: Moody's Assigns B1 CFR, Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B1 corporate family
rating and a B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to Scout24
AG (Scout24), the parent company of Scout24 Holding GmbH.

Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a B1 rating to each of the
EUR595 million senior secured Term Loan B (TLB), EUR400 million
senior secured Term Loan C (TLC) and the EUR50 million senior
secured Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) assigned at Scout24 AG.
The outlook on all ratings is stable.


Scout24's B1 corporate family rating (CFR) takes into account (1)
Scout24's modest scale; (2) the high group leverage and (3) future
revenue and EBITDA growth largely dependent on IS24's ability to
continue to increase prices and its change to a membership-based

These negatives are partially offset by (1) Scout24's strong and
defensible market position; (2) limited but increasing competitive
threats, especially in the German real estate business; (3) high
level of recurring subscription-based revenues; (4) track record
of solid and consistent growth over the past years; (5) favorable
industry dynamics for the online classifieds business in Germany;
and (6) positive free cash flow generation.

The rating action was prompted by the conversion of the company's
legal status to AG and the successful completion of an Initial
Public Offering (IPO) on 1st October 2015 on the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange.  The free float equates to 35.9% of the company's share
capital (assuming full exercise of the greenshoe option).  The IPO
equates to a market capitalization for the business of EUR3,228
million.  As part of the offering, Scout24 received proceeds of
EUR228 million, of which EUR214 million was used to prepay,
partially, TLB and TLC.

Following prepayment, Moody's expects pro forma adjusted leverage,
based on LTM management unaudited figures for June 2105, to reduce
to 4.5x; down from 5.7x prior to the transaction.  Leverage is
expected to continue to reduce through EBITDA growth and improved
cash flow in 2016.  The company has also stated a new financial
policy in which it details an expectation that dividends are not
likely to be paid until net leverage (on a management basis) falls
below 2.5x.

The group has a good liquidity position given the presence of an
undrawn EUR45.6 million RCF (reduced 15th April 2015 from EUR50
million), which Moody's considers to be adequate to manage the
group's operational cash requirements.  Cash balances as at 31
December 2014 were EUR19 million, having funded the acquisitions
of Eresnet GmbH in Q2 2014 and FLOWFACT AG in Q4 2014 through cash
from the balance sheet.  As at 30th June 2015, management reported
an unaudited cash balance of EUR45 million.  Moody's expects the
Group will maintain adequate headroom under the net leverage
financial covenant at all times.  Given the stated policy of no
dividend distribution whilst net leverage remains above 2.5x (as
calculated by management) Moody's does not expect shareholder
distributions in the next year.

The B1 rating on the TLB, TLC and the pari passu RCF is at the
same level as the CFR and reflects the fact that Scout24 has an
all-senior secured debt structure.  Moody's has applied a 65%
recovery rate to the debt structure which results in a probability
of default rating of B2-PD.


The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Scout24 will
be able to maintain its leading positions in its core markets and
successfully implement its new membership-based pricing strategy.

The outlook also incorporates Moody's assumption that the Group
will continue to reduce its leverage through EBITDA growth and
will not embark on any transforming acquisitions or adopt an
aggressive financial policy with regard to shareholder


Upward ratings pressure could be exerted if (i) revenues continue
to grow steadily and EBITDA margins improve on a sustained basis;
(ii) Moody's adjusted debt/ EBITDA moves towards 4.0x; and (iii)
Moody's adjusted Retained Cash Flow / Net Debt increases towards

Conversely downward ratings pressure could develop if (i) Moody's
adjusted debt/ EBITDA exceeds 5.0x on a sustained basis; (ii)
Moody's adjusted Retained Cash Flow / Net Debt is below 10%; or
(iii) the liquidity profile significantly weakens.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in December 2014.

Scout24 is a leading European online classifieds platform with a
focus on real estate and car classifieds.  The Group operates two
key online market place verticals.  It is present in 8 European
countries (including the core market, Germany) and has language
versions for 10 additional countries.  ImmobilenScout24, Germany's
market leading online real estate classifieds portal, is Scout24's
largest business vertical.  AutoScout24 which is the second
largest business vertical, is an online car, and motorbike
classifieds platform and holds market leading position in Italy,
Belgium and the Netherlands, and ranks second in terms of market
position in Germany.

TALISMAN-6 FINANCE: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Notes Classes to D
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services taken took various credit
rating actions in Talisman-6 Finance PLC.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised its rating on the class A notes;
   -- Affirmed its ratings on the class B, C, and F notes; and
   -- Lowered its ratings on the class D and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the five remaining
loans, in light of the upcoming legal final maturity of the notes.


The whole loan balance is EUR127.5 million, with the securitized
loan being EUR102 million.  The loan is in special servicing after
defaulting at maturity in July 2012.  The borrower filed for
insolvency in January 2013.

The loan is currently secured by 11 retail, warehouse, and land
properties in Germany.

The current reported whole loan interest coverage ratio (ICR) is
2.57x and the whole loan loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is 123%, based
on a February 2013 valuation of EUR103.8 million.

S&P has assumed losses on the loan in its expected base-case
rating stress scenario.


The securitized balance is EUR55 million.  The loan failed to
repay at maturity in January 2012 and entered special servicing at
that time.  The special servicer is currently employing a
consensual work-out strategy.

The loan is currently secured by two office properties in Germany.
The current reported ICR is 2.95x and the LTV ratio is 115%, based
on a February 2013 valuation of EUR48.6 million.

S&P has assumed losses on the loan in its base-case rating stress


The whole loan balance is EUR33.9 million, and the securitized
loan is EUR12.0 million.  The loan entered special servicing in
January 2013 due to a maturity default after a two-year extension.
The special servicer extended a 13th standstill extension until
June 13, 2014 to the borrower to allow for an agreement between
them on a consensual workout strategy.

The loan is currently secured by two retail properties in Germany,
which REWE Group (BBB-/Stable/A-3) occupies.

The current ICR has not been reported, but the securitized LTV
ratio is 343%, based on a May 2013 valuation of EUR4.5 million.

S&P has assumed losses on the loan in its base-case rating stress


The Mango loan has an outstanding balance of EUR45.6 million.  The
assets securing this loan have been sold and S&P believes that the
outstanding balance will be applied to the junior classes of notes
as principal losses.


S&P's ratings on Talisman-6 Finance's notes address the timely
payment of interest and repayment of principal not later than the
legal maturity date in October 2016.

In S&P's view, the creditworthiness of the class A notes has
improved following loan repayments.  However, S&P has limited its
upgrade on this class of notes to 'B (sf)' because S&P considers
that the transaction remains exposed to timing risks relating to
the repayment of principal no later than the legal final maturity
date, which is in one year.  S&P has therefore raised to 'B (sf)'
from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the class A notes, in line with S&P's
credit stability criteria.

S&P's ratings on the class B and C notes reflect its view that
these classes of notes are vulnerable to principal losses and
credit deterioration in the near term.  S&P has therefore affirmed
its 'CCC (sf)' and 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on the class B and C notes,

S&P has lowered its ratings on the class D and E notes as
principal losses were applied to these classes of notes on the
October 2015 interest payment date.  Therefore, S&P has lowered to
'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' its ratings on the class D and E notes.

S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class F notes because
its rating on these notes already reflects S&P's principal loss
expectations and previous interest shortfalls.

Talisman-6 Finance closed in April 2007 with notes totaling
EUR1.076 billion.  The notes have a legal final maturity date of
October 2016 and a current balance of EUR260 million.


Talisman-6 Finance PLC
EUR1.076 Billion Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Class                       Rating
                   To                   From

Rating Raised

A                  B (sf)               B- (sf)

Ratings Lowered

D                  D (sf)               CC (sf)
E                  D (sf)               CC (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B                  CCC (sf)
C                  CCC- (sf)
F                  D (sf)


GREECE: Has Two Weeks to Implement Missing Overhauls
Nektaria Stamouli at The Wall Street Journal reports that Greece's
new bailout program is already slipping behind schedule as the
country's foreign creditors visit Athens for negotiations over
disputed austerity measures.

Under the EUR86 billion (US$97.6 billion) bailout plan, agreed in
August after months of diplomatic brinkmanship between Greece and
the eurozone, Athens was supposed to enact dozens of economic-
policy overhauls by mid-October to unlock to first of its aid
loans, the Journal says.

According to the Journal, only a fraction of the overhauls have,
however, been implemented so far, and Greece is disputing the need
for many of the tougher austerity measures, arguing that better-
than-expected economic growth will reduce the need for tax hikes
and spending cuts.

Talks beginning on Oct. 21 between Greece and the troika of
bailout inspectors from the European Commission, International
Monetary Fund and European Central Bank are expected to highlight
disagreements over pension cuts, taxes on farmers and private
schools, and home-repossession rules, the Journal notes.

The release of Greece's next, EUR2 billion aid loan could now take
weeks longer than Athens hoped, the Journal states.  Greek
officials say they need up to two weeks to implement missing
overhauls, the Journal relays.

NAVIOS HOLDINGS: Moody's B2 CFR Buoyed by Mild Dry-Bulk Rate Hike
Moody's Investors Service said in a report published that expected
improvement in dry-bulk rates and contribution from subsidiaries
and affiliates underpin the maintenance of Navios Maritime
Holdings, Inc.'s (Navios Holdings) corporate family rating at B2
with a negative outlook, despite the company having reached
triggers for a downgrade to B3.

"While weaker dry-bulk rates drove Navios Holdings' leverage to
8.2x in June 2015, which is above the 7x trigger for a downgrade
to B3, we have kept its rating at B2 because of some improvements
anticipated in dry-bulk rates in 2016, which will help its
financial profile to recover," says Marie Fischer-Sabatie, a
Moody's Senior Vice President and author of the report.

Dry-bulk rates have risen slightly in late Q2 and Q3 2015 and
Moody's expects that further improvements are likely in 2016 on
the back of heavy scrapping and a high proportion of new vessel
delivery postponements.

Navios Holdings' credit profile is supported by contributions from
subsidiary Navios South American Logistics Inc (NSAL, B2 stable),
whose financial performance has been more stable, and by a
dividend flow received from affiliates Navios Maritime Acquisition
Corporation (Navios Acquisition, B2 stable) and Navios Maritime
Partners L.P. (Ba3 negative).

While Navios Holdings' liquidity is currently adequate, with a
large cash balance of $180 million at June 2015 and limited
liquidity needs over the next 12 months, Moody's would downgrade
the company's rating to B3 if dry-bulk rates do not improve as
expected in the coming quarters or if its liquidity profile


VALLAURIS II: Moody's Raises Rating on Class IV Notes to Ba2
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Vallauris II CLO PLC:

  EUR25.4 mil. Class III Mezzanine Deferrable Interest Floating
   Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
   March 31, 2015, Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  EUR8.9 mil. Class IV Mezzanine Deferrable Interest Floating
   Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
   March 31, 2015, Affirmed B1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed these notes:

   EUR52.3 mil. (current balance EUR 0.3M) Class II Senior
    Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
    on March 31, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Vallauris II CLO PLC, issued in July 2006, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of mostly
high yield European senior secured loans managed by Natixis Asset
Management.  This transaction's reinvestment period ended in July


The upgrades to the ratings are primarily the result of the
substantial deleveraging that has occurred since last rating
action in March 2015.

Over the last two payment dates Class II notes have amortized
approximately by EUR39.6million or 75.8% of its initial balance.
As a result the over-collateralization (OC) ratios have increased.
As per the trustee report dated September 2015, the Class II,
Class III, and Class IV OC ratios are reported at 294.5%, 138.6%
and 116.9% compared to February 2015 levels of 206.4%, 126.2% and
111.1%, respectively.  These OC ratios do not reflect the
September 2015 payment date report.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR61.7 million,
defaulted par of EUR14.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.1% (consistent with a WARF of 2631), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.1% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 6 and a weighted average
spread of 4.0%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in September 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
were unchanged for the Class II and Class III and within one notch
of the base-case results for Class IV.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
   portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
   conditions and have a significant impact on the notes'
   ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of
   high loan prepayment levels or collateral sales by the
   collateral manager or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-
   and-extend restructurings.  Fast amortization would usually
   benefit the ratings of the notes beginning with the notes
   having the highest prepayment priority.

  Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
   have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
   collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell z
   defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
   the market price or the recovery rate to account for potential
   volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's
   expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'

  Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
   depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few
   large obligors, especially when they default.  Because of the
   deal's low diversity score of 6 and lack of granularity,
   Moody's supplemented its typical Binomial Expansion Technique
   analysis with a simulated default distribution using Moody's
   CDOROM software and an individual scenario analysis.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


ASTANA FINANCE: Foreign Representative Wants Ch. 15 Case Closed
Daniyar Bazarbekovich Bekturganov, as the duly appointed and
authorized foreign representative of JSC "Astana-Finance," which
was subject to a special judicial restructuring proceeding taking
place in the Republic of Kazakhstan asks the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York to close the Debtor's
Chapter 15 case.

The closing of the case is without prejudice to the right to
reopen the case in the future.

The foreign representative is represented by:

         Alex R. Rovira, Esq.
         Brian J. Lohan, Esq.
         Andrew P. Propps, Esq.
         787 Seventh Avenue
         New York, New York 10019
         Tel: (212) 839-5300

                       About Astana Finance

JSC "Astana Finance", a financial-services company based in
Kazakhstan, is seeking court protection from its U.S. creditors
while it carries out its $1.9 billion restructuring plan in
Kazakhstan.  AF seeks recognition of pending proceedings before
the specialized financial court of Almaty, Kazakhstan, as "foreign
main proceeding".

Marat Duysenbekovich Aitenov, as foreign representative, signed a
Chapter 15 bankruptcy petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 12-4113).
The petition was filed Oct. 1, 2012.  The Debtor is estimated to
have at least $500 million in assets and at least $1 billion in

Bankruptcy Judge Allan L. Gropper oversees the Chapter 15 case.
Alex R. Rovira, Esq., at Sidley Austin LLP, represents the Foreign
Representative as counsel.

AF was established as a Kazakhstan government funded body on
Dec. 18, 1997, as the State Enterprise Fund of Economic and Social
Development of Akmola Special Economic Zone in accordance with the
law of Kazakhstan in Astana, Kazakhstan by a decision of the
Administrative Council of Akmola Special Economic Zone.  AF now
acts primarily as the parent company for a group of companies
providing banking and financial services, including a Kazakhstan
bank, JSC Bank Astana Finance.

AF said in court filings that its financial position suffered both
directly and indirectly as a result of the global financial
crisis.  Specifically, the global financial crisis had a negative
impact on the ability of borrowers to repay loans made by AF and
its subsidiaries and on the prices of residential and commercial
real estate in Kazakhstan over which such loans are secured.  As
of Dec. 31, 2009, 62.9% of the loan portfolio of AF's group of
companies was comprised of loans for real estate development and
construction and retail mortgage loans.  In addition, the global
capital markets suffered severe reductions in liquidity, greater
volatility and general widening of spreads which resulted in a
significantly reduced availability of funding for Kazakhstan
borrowers such as AF.

As a consequence of the negative impact on AF of these events, on
several occasions between 2009 and 2011 the credit ratings of AF
were downgraded and were eventually withdrawn in 2011, and AF's
shares were delisted from the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange in October

AF has submitted a plan that sets out the terms and procedures for
the restructuring and/or cancellation of the indebtedness and
indebtedness guarantees of AF and its subsidiaries.  The principal
amount of indebtedness to be restructured was approximately $1.9
billion (such amount subject to change because of disputed claims
which are in the process of independent adjudication pursuant to,
and in accordance with, the restructuring plan). Claim forms for
the bulk of the debt were submitted.  Only approximately 15% of
the value of the debt was not covered by claim forms, but the debt
will be discharged and canceled in accordance with the terms of
the restructuring plan.

AF has creditors in the United States: (i) the Export-Import Bank
of the United States, an export credit agency; (ii) certain
beneficial owners of notes privately placed inside and outside the
United States; and (iii) certain holders of notes placed
exclusively outside the United States pursuant to Regulation S
only who subsequently purchased Eurobonds in the secondary market.


AMSTERDAM TRADE: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Ratings to B2
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Amsterdam Trade Bank
N.V.'s local- and foreign-currency long-term deposit ratings to B2
from Ba3, as well as the bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA)
to caa3 from b2.  The adjusted BCA was downgraded to b3 from b1.
The outlook on the long-term deposit ratings is negative.  Moody's
has also downgraded the bank's long-term Counterparty Risk (CR)
assessment to Ba3(cr) from Ba1(cr).  The Not-Prime local- and
foreign-currency short-term deposit ratings, as well as the Not-
Prime(cr) short-term CR assessment, are unaffected by the actions.

Following this rating action, Moody's will withdraw Amsterdam
Trade Bank's ratings for its own business reasons.


The downgrade of Amsterdam Trade Bank's BCA to caa3 reflects
Moody's understanding that the bank's asset quality has undergone
further severe deterioration, resulting from its substantial
exposures to financially distressed corporate borrowers in Ukraine
and Russia.  Moody's expects the bank to report significant net
losses and a sharp deterioration of its capital base in 2015,
which is likely to be mitigated by capital support from its
shareholders.  Amsterdam Trade Bank stated in its 2014 annual
report, which provides the bank's most recent public information
and was published on July 31, 2015, that the first half of 2015
had revealed that additional loan loss provisions were required
related to developments and events which occurred in 2015.  The
rating agency understands that this trend has continued in recent
months and as a result, has positioned its BCA at caa3.  Moody's
believes that there is a very high probability of support in the
event such support were required.

In 2014, Amsterdam Trade Bank reported a net loss of EUR36 million
following substantial loan loss provisions representing 752 bps of
average gross loans.  As a result, the bank's common equity tier
one capital decreased to EUR245 million at year-end 2014 from
EUR300 million at year-end 2013, while its Tier 1 ratio decreased
to 14.1% from 15.4%.  Problem loans increased to 23% in 2014 from
8% in 2013.  At year-end 2014, Amsterdam Trade Bank reported total
exposures to Ukraine of EUR310 million, which included bank
exposures totalling EUR72 million.  As at the same date, the
credit exposure to Ukraine represented approximately 119% of Tier
1 capital.  The bank's exposure to Russia was EUR390 million at
year-end 2014, or 150% of Tier 1 capital.  Moody's understands
that the exposures to Ukraine and Russia substantially decreased
in 2015.  Moody's believes that these credit trends have continued
and that the balance of risks for Amsterdam Trade Bank's asset
quality remains on the downside because of the severe economic
contractions currently experienced in Russia and Ukraine, which
are exacerbated by the US and EU sanctions on Russian entities and
individuals.  The significant borrower concentrations in the
bank's loan book and the uncertainty surrounding the quality and
availability of collateral in regions experiencing material stress
entail further significant negative pressure on asset quality.

The downgrade of Amsterdam Trade Bank's deposit ratings to B2 is
driven by (1) the downgrade of the bank's BCA to caa3; (2) three
notches of uplift from the BCA stemming from Moody's view that
support from the bank's ultimate shareholders is very likely; and
(3) one notch of uplift under Moody's Advanced Loss Given Failure
framework given the bank's large volume of junior deposits and
EUR119 million of subordinated debt as of December 2014, resulting
in a low loss-given-failure rate expected for the bank's deposits.
The negative outlook on the deposit ratings is driven by Moody's
expectation of ongoing deterioration of the bank's asset quality.

Moody's assessment of the likelihood of support from Amsterdam
Trade Bank's ultimate shareholders, either through its Russian
parent Alfa-Bank (deposits Ba2 negative, senior unsecured Ba2
negative, BCA ba3) or through other entities, is reflected in a
very high probability of affiliate support, resulting in three
notches of uplift from the BCA.  Moody's recognizes that Amsterdam
Trade Bank's ultimate shareholders have clearly indicated their
willingness to inject capital into the bank if required, and
indeed have recently done so.  Moody's does not assume any
government support from the Dutch government (Aaa stable) in
Amsterdam Trade Bank's long-term deposit ratings.


A downgrade of Amsterdam Trade Bank's BCA to 'ca' would be
triggered by Moody's expectation of the bank's imminent non-
viability on a standalone basis, resulting in the need for
extraordinary support to avoid default, or in expectation of rated
obligations of the bank suffering a loss as a consequence of
further asset quality deterioration affecting the bank's
capitalization and/or liquidity position.  A downgrade of
Amsterdam Trade Bank's BCA would likely result in a downgrade of
the bank's long-term ratings, albeit depending on the degree of
support provided by the bank's shareholders.

Given the current negative outlook on the bank deposit ratings,
Moody's considers that an upgrade of the long-term ratings and the
BCA is unlikely in the near term.  Ultimately a renewed business
model coupled with a reduced risk profile could lead to a higher


Moody's will withdraw the rating for its own business reasons.


BANK ROSSIYSKIY: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
Due to the ruling of the Arbitration court of the city of Moscow
(case No. A40-151915/15), dated October 13, 2015, on finding
insolvent (bankrupt) of credit institution BANK ROSSIYSKIY KREDIT,
OJSC, and the appointment of a liquidator, in compliance with
Clause 3 of Article 18927 of the Federal Law "On the Insolvency
(Bankruptcy)", the Bank of Russia took a decision (Order No. OD-
2896, dated October 23, 2015) to terminate from October 26, 2015,
the activity of the provisional administration of BANK ROSSIYSKIY
KREDIT, appointed by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-1775, dated July
24, 2015, "On Appointing Provisional Administration to Manage the
Moscow-based Credit Institution BANK ROSSIYSKIY KREDIT, open
joint-stock company, or OJSC BANK ROSSIYSKIY KREDIT Due to the
Revocation of its Banking Licence".

BANK SOVETSKY: DIA to Oversee Provisional Administration
Due to the revealed signs of unstable financial position of Saint
Petersburg-based CJSC Bank Sovetsky, threatening its creditors'
("depositors") interests, the Bank of Russia decided to appoint
the state corporation Deposit Insurance Agency to perform the
functions of the provisional administration of CJSC Bank Sovetsky
from October 23, 2015.

The powers of the Bank's management, its management bodies and the
Bank's shareholders connected with participation in the authorized
capital, including the right to summon general shareholders
meeting, are suspended.

One of the top priority objectives of the provisional
administration is to inspect the financial position of the credit

DORIS BANK: Bank of Russia Revokes Banking License
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2893 dated October 23,
2015, revoked the banking license from the Moscow-based credit
institution Commercial Bank Doveriye, Ravnopraviye i
Sotrudnichestvo, limited liability company, or CB DORIS BANK LLC
(Registration No. 1679) from October 23, 2015.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's failure
to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, equity (capital) adequacy ratios below 2 per cent,
decrease in equity (capital) below the minimal amount of the
authorized capital established as of the date of the state
registration of the credit institution, and taking into account
the application of measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)".

With its poor asset quality CB DORIS BANK LLC failed to adequately
assess the risks assumed.  Due credit risk assessment as requested
by the supervisory authority revealed that the bank fully lost its
equity (capital).

The management and owners of the credit institution did not take
measures to normalize its activities.  Under these circumstances,
Bank of Russia performed its duty on the revocation of the banking
license from the credit institution in accordance with Article 20
of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2894, dated February 23,
2015, appointed a provisional administration to CB DORIS BANK LLC
for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under
Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".
In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit
institution's executive bodies are suspended.

CB DORIS BANK LLC is a member of the deposit insurance system. The
revocation of banking license is an insured event envisaged by
Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On Insurance of Household Deposits with
Russian Banks" regarding the bank's liabilities on deposits of
households determined in accordance with the legislation.  The
said Federal Law stipulates the insurance premium as one hundred
per cent reimbursement of the entire deposit to bank depositors,
including individual entrepreneurs, but not more than 1.4 million
rubles in aggregate per depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of November 1, 2015, CB
DORIS BANK LLC ranked 341st by assets in the Russian banking

EUROCOMMERCE PJSC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2889, dated October 23,
2015, revoked the banking license from the Moscow-based credit
institution PJSC CB EUROCOMMERCE from October 23, 2015.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's failure
to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, repeated violations within a year of the requirements
of Articles 6 and 7 (except for Clause 3 of Article 7) of the
Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation (Laundering) of
Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of Terrorism' and
the related Bank of Russia regulations, capital adequacy below 2%,
decrease in equity capital below the minimal amount of the
authorized capital established as of the date of the state
registration of the credit institution, and repeated application
within a year of supervisory measures envisaged by the Federal Law
"On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)".

In the framework of the supervision over the activity of PJSC CB
EUROCOMMERCE the Bank of Russia revealed that the bank
considerably underestimated the credit risks and presented
unreliable statements.  The assessment of the credit risk revealed
complete loss of capital by the bank.

Besides, PJSC CB EUROCOMMERCE did not comply with the legislation
and Bank of Russia regulations on anti-money laundering and the
financing of terrorism in terms of timely and detailed
notification of the authorized body.  The bank's rules of internal
controls on anti-money laundering and the financing of terrorism
did not comply with Bank of Russia regulations. The bank's
activity was aimed at large-scale dubious transit operations.

The management and owners of the bank did not take measures to
normalize its activities.  In these circumstances, pursuant to
Article 20 of the Federal Law 'On Banks and Banking Activities',
the Bank of Russia revoked the banking license from the credit

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2890 dated October 23,
2015, appointed a provisional administration to PJSC CB
EUROCOMMERCE for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies are suspended.

PJSC CB EUROCOMMERCE is a member of the deposit insurance system.
The revocation of banking license is an insured event envisaged by
Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On Insurance of Household Deposits with
Russian Banks" regarding the bank's obligations on deposits of
households determined in accordance with the legislation.  This
Federal Law provides for the payment of insurance indemnity to the
bank's depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the
amount of 100% of their balances but not exceeding the total of
1.4 million rubles per depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of October 1, 2015, PJSC
CB EUROCOMMERCE ranked 251st by assets in the Russian banking

GREENFIELDBANK JSC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2891 dated October 23,
2015, revoked the banking license of credit institution JSC
Greenfieldbank from October 23, 2015.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- due to the credit institution's failure to
comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia regulations,
all capital adequacy ratios being below 2 percent, capital
decrease below the authorized capital minimal volume established
by the Bank of Russia as of the date of the state registration of
the credit institution and the repeated application within a year
of measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of
the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)".

JSC Greenfieldbank implemented high-risk lending policy connected
with the placement of funds into low-quality assets.  As a result
of meeting the supervisor's requirements on creating provisions
adequate to the risks assumed, the credit institution lost its
capital.  At the same time the credit institution did not comply
with supervisor's restrictions and bans on carrying individual
banking operations.  Besides, the credit institution was involved
in dubious transit transactions in significant amounts carried out
by its customers.

Both management and owners of the credit institution did not take
any effective measures to bring its activities back to normal.
Under these circumstances, the Bank of Russia performed its duty
on the revocation of the banking license of the credit institution
in accordance with Article 20 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2892, dated October 23,
2015, appointed a provisional administration to JSC Greenfieldbank
for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under
Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".
In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit
institution's executive bodies are suspended.

JSC Greenfield is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by legislation.  The said
Federal Law prescribes insurance indemnity to be paid to bank's
depositors including individual businessmen in the amount of 100
percent of the remaining balance but not more that 1.4 million
rubles overall per depositor.

As of October 1, 2015, JSC Greenfieldbank was ranked 333rd by
assets in the Russian banking system.

INGOSSTRAKH INSURANCE: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Counterparty Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' long-term
insurer financial strength and counterparty credit ratings and
'ruAA+' Russia national scale rating on Russia-based Ingosstrakh
Insurance Co.  The outlook is negative.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view of the group's resilient and
improving balance sheet amid Russia's suboptimal industry and
economic conditions.

Ingosstrakh materially improved its operating performance, capital
adequacy, and liquidity levels in 2014 and 2015 to date.  S&P
revised its capital and earnings assessment upward to moderately
strong because the better operating performance and subsequently
improved capital adequacy exceeded S&P's expectations, despite
challenging economic conditions in Russian.  Ingosstrakh reported
net income of Russian ruble (RUB) 2.4 billion as of Dec. 31, 2014,
with earnings continuing on a similar trend as of June 30, 2015.
However, these material improvements in earnings and capital
adequacy continue to be weighed on by Ingosstrakh's very high risk
profile and the weighted-average credit quality of assets, which
remains within the 'bb' category despite improvements in the
investment portfolio in 2015.

S&P notes that underwriting performance improved as of June 30,
2015, with the net combined ratio below 100% (signifying an
underwriting profit).  Operating profits continued to be primarily
supported by gains from exchange differences on translating
foreign operations (these amounted to more than RUB7 billion in
2014, with the trend continuing in 2015).

Ingosstrakh's capital adequacy ratio, strengthened by the improved
quality of its investment portfolio, is close to the 'BBB'
benchmark a year earlier than S&P forecasts.  As of Dec. 31, 2013,
the capital adequacy ratio was 15%-50% below S&P's 'BBB'
benchmark.  S&P's base case is that Ingosstrakh will not pay
dividends for 2015-2017.

For 2015-2017, S&P expected these trends to continue, although at
more normalized level.  S&P anticipates capital adequacy
stabilizing above the 'BBB' benchmark, supported by net income in
excess of RUB3.4 billion in 2015 and at a more normalized level
averaging above RUB2 billion annually in 2016-2017.  S&P expects
net combined ratios at around 95% for 2015-2017 on average, due to
management actions to reduce the unprofitable motor portfolio
after losses in 2013.

Against S&P's expectations, Ingosstrakh recently announced an
unplanned RUB2 billion recapitalization of its subsidiary bank
Soyuz, which S&P considers moderately strategic to its parent.
S&P has therefore revised its risk position assessment of
Ingosstrakh to very high risk, as in S&P's view this introduces
potential volatility in the capital and earnings assessment or
liquidity level if any further unplanned capital injections take
place.  S&P also factors into its very high risk position
assessment its concern that, if reinsurance support from European
reinsurers lessens due to the challenging operating environment in
Russia, this may add to the volatility in capital and earnings.
S&P's base-case expectation, however, is that European reinsurers
will continue to support Ingosstrakh.

Despite the improvements in liquidity in 2014, which have been
maintained as of June 30, 2015, S&P continues to assess liquidity
as adequate due to S&P's uncertainty regarding whether this trend
is sustainable--particularly if any further unplanned capital
repatriation or any unexpected deterioration in the credit quality
of the investment portfolio takes place.  Ingosstrakh now passes
both capital and liquidity foreign currency sovereign stress
tests, although only by a small margin.

S&P continues to assess Ingosstrakh's business risk profile as
fair, limited by S&P's assessment of insurance industry and
country risk as high, and its financial risk profile as less than
adequate, constrained by the 'bb' weighted-average credit quality
of its assets.

The overall group credit profile (GCP) is 'bb+', including
Ingosstrakh's bank subsidiary Soyuz, whose stand-alone credit
profile (SACP) S&P assess at 'b-'.  The GCP reflects S&P's view of
the bank as a moderately strategic and reasonably successful
investment of Ingosstrakh, which is well capitalized.  S&P
excludes the value of Soyuz in our capital model and factor risks
stemming from the bank into Ingosstrakhs's 'bb+' SACP--primarily
in the capital and earnings and risk position assessments.

The rating on Ingosstrakh remains constrained by the foreign
currency sovereign credit rating on Russia.  Improvements in
operating performance and capital adequacy have enabled the
company to pass the capital foreign currency sovereign stress
tests, but S&P considers that the improvement in liquidity levels
may not be sufficiently permanent for S&P to consider that the
liquidity test has been successfully passed.

The negative outlook primarily reflects the outlook on Russia.

S&P may lower the ratings if it lowers the ratings on Russia,
unless Ingosstrakh is able to pass both capital and liquidity
foreign currency sovereign stress tests at that time.

S&P may also lower the ratings if Ingosstrakh materially exceeds
its net retention levels per risk or is unable to obtain
sufficient reinsurance cover for the risks it is writing.

S&P could also lower the ratings on Ingosstrakh if its operating
performance or capital adequacy materially deteriorates against
S&P's expectations due to, for example, material unplanned capital
injections into bank Soyuz or the payment of dividends.

S&P could also lower the ratings if, against its expectations, the
liquidity ratio deteriorates below 100%.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the company is able to
pass both capital and liquidity foreign currency sovereign stress

IZHEVSK CITY: Fitch Withdraws 'B+/B' Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Russian City of Izhevsk's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'B+'
and National Long-term rating of 'A(rus)', both with Stable
Outlooks, and its Short-term foreign currency IDR of 'B'.


The ratings were withdrawn as the issuer has chosen to stop
participating in the rating process.

Therefore, Fitch will no longer have sufficient information to
maintain the ratings. Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide
ratings or analytical coverage for Izhevsk.

KEMEROVO REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Kemerovo Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-'
and its Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'. The agency has
also affirmed the region's National Long-term rating at 'A+(rus)'.
The Outlooks on the Long-term ratings are Stable.

Fitch has also affirmed the region's senior unsecured debt at
Long-term local currency 'BB-' and at National Long-term

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged base line scenario
regarding the region's marginally positive operating balance and
gradually growing direct risk, in line with the region's ratings.


The 'BB-' rating reflects the region's volatile budgetary
performance and high deficit before debt in 2012-2014 that led to
rapid debt increase albeit from a low base. The rating also
reflects the region's undiversified economy with a developed tax
base that is exposed to the economic cycle, weak institutional
framework and our expectation of a stagnant local economy
following the negative national trend. Positively, the rating
takes into account Kemerovo's low contingent risk.

Fitch expects the region's operating balance to consolidate at low
positive values during 2015-2017, but the current balance to
remain negative. Budgetary performance will be underpinned by
growth of tax proceeds due to improved financials of mining and
metallurgical companies, which are the largest taxpayers in the

In 2014, the operating balance returned to positive territory,
driven by a 50% increase in transfers and modest recovery of
corporate income tax. The latter was driven by the improving
earnings of local exporters following the stabilisation of prices
of key commodities and the depreciation of the rouble.

Fitch expects Kemerovo's direct risk to grow to 70%-75% of current
revenue by end-2017, which is still consistent with the region's
ratings. We also expect the deficit before debt to narrow due to
cuts in capex limiting debt growth. The wide deficit before debt
during 2012-2014 had resulted in a rapid rise in direct risk to
RUB51bn (57% of current revenue) at end-2014, from RUB19bn (21%)
in 2011.

Immediate refinancing risk is moderate; as at 1 October the
region's debt comprised 37% subsidised budget loans, which are
likely to be rolled over by the federal government. Another 48%
direct risk is three-year bank loans. The maturity profile of
these budget and bank loans is distributed between 2015 and 2018,
with moderate concentration in 2018.

The region's obligations/liabilities also include a long-term bank
loan from Vnesheconombank (VEB: BBB-/Negative/F3), which
represented 12% of direct risk as of 1 October 2015. VEB extended
credit facilities to private companies in the 1990s, which
Kemerovo assumed as an aggregated loan in the mid-2000s. The loan
is denominated in US dollars and exposes the region to unhedged
foreign-currency risk. The risk is, however, mitigated by a low 1%
annual interest rate and the long maturity to 1 January 2035,
which takes the immediate pressure off the region's debt servicing

Kemerovo has low contingent risk stemming from public sector
entities' financial debt and issued guarantees. In late 2011, the
region imposed a moratorium on new guarantees issuance and as of 1
October 2015 the region had no outstanding guarantees.

The region has a concentrated economy weighted towards coal mining
and ferrous metallurgy. This provides an extensive tax base for
the region's budget, accounting for 79% of operating revenue in
2014. However, this also means a large portion of the region's tax
revenues depends on companies' profits, resulting in high revenue
volatility through the economic cycle given its less diversified

Kemerovo demonstrated close to zero GRP growth in real terms in
2014, following the deterioration of the national economic


An improvement in the operating balance to 6%-8% of operating
revenue and maintenance of a debt payback ratio (direct risk to
current balance) below 10 years on a sustainable base could lead
to an upgrade.

The inability to maintain a positive operating balance on a
sustained basis or an increase in direct risk above 90% of current
revenue could lead to a downgrade.

KHAKASSIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Republic of Khakassia's Long-
term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at
'BB', Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B' and National Long-
term rating at 'AA-(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long-term IDRs and
National Long-term rating are Negative.

The republic's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds have
been affirmed at 'BB' and 'AA-(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged baseline scenario
regarding Khakassia's weak budgetary performance and rising debt.
The Negative Outlook reflects the republic's continuously large
budget deficit and its inability to restore its current balance to
surplus over the medium-term.


The ratings reflect a weak institutional framework for Russian
subnationals, Khakassia's low operating balance and growing direct
risk accompanied by high refinancing pressure. The ratings also
take into account the slowdown of the national economy, which
could place a strain on the republic's tax base.

Fitch expects the republic's current balance to remain negative in
2015-2017 (2014: -4.8%) as a slightly improving operating balance
will not be sufficient to cover increased interest payments. We
expect Khakassia's operating margin to be a low 2%-4% over the
medium term (2014: negative 0.6%), supported by increased revenues
from the power generation sector and higher profits of export-
oriented taxpayers buoyed by a weaker rouble.

Fitch forecasts deficit before debt variation to average a
substantial 12% of total revenue in 2015-2017 (2014: 13%) as the
region's capacity to scale back its capex is low. We project that
more than 60% of capex (2014: 68%) are rigid during 2015-2017 as
they will be funded by earmarked transfers from the federal
budget. Low manoeuver on capex, coupled with rigid operating
expenditure, result in Khakassia's limited budget flexibility. The
on-going deficit will lead to continued direct risk growth. We
expect Khakassia's direct risk to approach 90% of current revenue
by end-2017, up from 61% in 2014.

In Fitch's view the republic is exposed to significant refinancing
pressure. In 2015-2016, Khakassia faces RUB7.6bn maturing debt
(54% of direct risk as of 1 September 2015). Fitch expects most
maturities to be financed by market debt (bank loans and bonds).
In Fitch's view, the republic has adequate access to market
funding that mitigates refinancing risks and insufficient coverage
of interest payments by the operating balance. However, increased
reliance on market debt exposes the republic to volatile interest
rates and may put further stress on its current balance.

During 8M15 Khakassia's direct risk profile shifted towards market
debt due to reduced support from the federal budget, a move which
Fitch views as credit-negative. As of 1 September 2015 subsidised
budget loans were RUB1.6bn, down from RUB3bn or 11% of the
region's direct risk (end-2014: 28%).

Khakassia's economy is concentrated in the hydro-power generation,
mining and non-ferrous metallurgy sectors. The 10 largest
taxpayers contributed 44.5% to the republic's tax revenue in 2014
(2013: 43.6%). Taxes provided 71% of operating revenue in 2014,
which makes the region's budget prone to volatility. Fitch
forecasts Russia's national economy to contract 4% in 2015, which
could negatively affect Khakassia's tax base.


Inability to restore a positive current balance and to narrow the
budget deficit to below 10% of total revenue could lead to a

KHARKOV CITY: Fitch Affirms 'C' Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Ukrainian City of Kharkov's Long-
term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'C', Long-
term local current IDR at 'CCC' and Short-term foreign currency
IDR at 'C'. Fitch has also affirmed the city's National Long-term
rating at 'A+(ukr)' with a Negative Outlook.

The ratings are constrained by the ratings of Ukraine (Restricted
Default/CCC) that is in default on its sovereign eurobond
obligations (see 'Fitch Downgrades Ukraine's Foreign-Currency IDRs
to 'Restricted Default' dated 6 October 2015). .


In Fitch's assessment the weak institutional framework governing
Ukrainian subnationals remains a constraint on the city's ratings.
The framework is characterized by frequent changes to allocation
of revenue and expenditure assignment and a lack of clarity and
sophistication. This hinders the long-term development and budget
planning of local and regional governments in Ukraine.

The City of Kharkov is currently free from external debt
obligations. In our baseline scenario we project the city's
budgetary performance to remain satisfactory in 2015-2017 with an
operating balance at 10% of operating revenue (2014: 9.8%) and a
close to zero budget deficit (2014: 4.4%). The overall weakness of
the national debt capital markets limits the city's access to
funding, in turn allowing the city to maintain a balanced budget.

Fiscal performance may be hindered over the medium term by the low
predictability of fiscal changes and a volatile economy in
Ukraine. In 2015 the central government made significant
amendments to the Ukraine's budget and tax codes, which could
sharply increase 2015 operating revenue. Fitch also expects the
city's tax capacity over the medium term to be negatively affected
by Ukraine's recession. Fitch has revised its forecasts for
Ukraine to a 9% contraction in 2015 compared with a previously
expected 5% decline.

Fitch expects the city's net overall risk to remain low at 10% of
current revenue (2014: 12%) in 2015-2017, due to forecasted
balanced budgets. In April 2015, Kharkov fully repaid its
outstanding debt (2014: UAH294 million) and Fitch expects no new
borrowings up to year-end. The city's liquidity position improved
with accumulated cash balance doubling to UAH1 billion at
September 1, 2015.

Kharkov's exposure to contingent risk has increased as public
sector debt almost doubled during 2011-2014 and peaked at UAH417
million by end-2014. Most of the city's public sector entities
(PSEs) are loss-making and depend on subsidies to sustain
operations. In 2014, compensating subsidies and capital injections
granted to PSEs totalled UAH285 million, or 6% of the city's
operating revenue. It should be noted that disclosure of PSE's
performance in 2015 is limited and our assessment is therefore
based on historical data.


The city's ratings are constrained by the sovereign. A downgrade
on the sovereign's Long-term local currency IDR would lead to a
corresponding action on the city's IDR. In the absence of a
sovereign downgrade, significant deterioration of Kharkov's credit
profile could also lead to a negative rating action.

A sovereign upgrade would be reflected in the City of Kharkov's
ratings. However, the rating will likely remain low, given high
country risks and Ukraine's 'CCC' Country Ceiling.

MARI EL REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Mari El Republic's Long-
term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at
'BB', with Stable Outlooks, and its Short-term foreign currency
IDR at 'B'.

The agency has also affirmed the republic's National Long-term
rating at 'AA-(rus)' with Stable Outlook. Mari El's outstanding
senior unsecured domestic bonds have been affirmed at 'BB' and

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged baseline scenario
regarding the republic's ability to record satisfactory fiscal
performance and maintain moderate direct risk commensurate with
its ratings in the medium term.


The 'BB' rating reflects the republic's moderate direct risk with
limited exposure to refinancing risk and satisfactory fiscal
performance. The ratings also factor the republic's modest
economic profile amid a deteriorating macroeconomic environment in

Fitch expects Mari El to continue posting stable fiscal
performance in 2015-2017, with an operating surplus of 8%-9%
(2014: 7%). This will be driven by prudent management aimed at
cost control and an expected steady increase in operating revenue
of 5% over the medium term. The latter would be driven by modest
growth of tax revenue from processing industries.

The republic's interim deficit before debt variation narrowed to
1.4% of total revenue by end-8M15 from 9.5% a year earlier. We
expect the full year deficit to remain below 10% of total revenue
over the medium term (2014: 9.6%), driven by an expected reduction
in capex to 13% of total spending (2010-2014: average 22%).

Fitch expects Mari El's direct risk to increase up to RUB13
billion in 2017, driven by budgeted deficits, while in relative
terms to stabilize at below 60% of current revenue in 2015-2017
(2014: 47%). The republic's direct risk increased to RUB10.7
billion in 2014 from RUB8.7 billion a year earlier. The region's
debt profile shifted last year to include a larger proportion of
budget loans of 42% of debt stock (2013: 13%).

Fitch does not expect the proportion of direct debt (bank loans
and bonds) in the republic's debt stock to exceed 40% of current
revenue by 2017, partially offsetting increased costs of borrowing
due to interest rate volatility. The increased use of federal
budget loans to refinance matured bonds and bank loans in 2015 is
positive for the credit profile, by allowing the region to limit
growth of direct debt and save on debt servicing (budget loans
carry 0.1% interest per annum).

Exposure to refinancing risk is moderate. Refinancing needs are
limited to the repayment of domestic bonds totalling RUB1.4
billion coming due in October and December 2015. This is offset by
RUB1.3 billion worth of federal budget loans, received in
September 2015, to repay maturing debt obligations.

Mari El's interim cash position improved to RUB675 million at end-
8M15 from RUB111 million in 2014. The republic maintains
sufficient cash balances to cover occasional cash mismatches.
Interim liquidity is also supported by the use of short-term
treasury loans at subsidized rates.

Mari El's socio-economic profile is historically weaker than the
average Russian region. Its per capita gross regional product was
30% lower than the national median in 2012-2013, which is
exacerbated by a weak economic environment in Russia. The
republic's government in its restated macro-economic forecast
expects economic growth of 2.4%-2.9% in 2015-2017, against 3%-3.5%


The ratings could be positively affected by an improved budgetary
performance leading to deficit before debt decreasing below 5% of
total revenue, coupled with an extension of the debt maturity

Conversely, a downgrade or revision of the Outlook to Negative
could result from sustained deterioration of operating performance
with an operating margin below 5%, coupled with weaker debt
coverage (2013: eight years) exceeding average debt maturity
(2013: four years) over the medium term.

MOSCOW REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Moscow Region's Long-term foreign
and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+' with
Stable Outlooks and its Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.
The agency has also affirmed the region's National Long-term
rating at 'AA(rus)' with a Stable Outlook.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged baseline scenario
regarding Moscow region's stable budgetary performance, strong
self-financing capacity and low debt.


The ratings reflect the region's satisfactory operating
performance, low debt, strong liquidity and wealth and economic
indicators that are above the national median. The ratings also
factor in a weak institutional framework and an extensive public
sector that exposes the region's budget to large contingent

Fitch projects the region's operating balance to consolidate at 8%
of operating revenue over the medium term, in line with 2014
performance. Fitch does not expect operating margin to recover to
its historically high 17% in 2011-2013 due to stagnating tax
revenue and on-going pressure on operating expenditure, which are
mostly socially-oriented. Its operating balance should remain
sufficient to cover interest payments and maturing debt in 2015-

Fitch forecasts Moscow Region to record a deficit before debt
variation of 5% of total revenue (2014: 1.5%) as the region
continues its investment in infrastructure and maintains capex at
an average 15% of total expenditure in 2015-2017 (2014: 14%). A
significant 95% of the capex will be funded by the region's strong
current balance, capital transfers from the federal budget and
cash balance.

Fitch expects direct risk to stabilize at about 30% of current
revenue (2014: 30.5%) over the medium term, supported by the
region's strong self-financing capacity. At end-September 2015,
debt composed of RUB64 billion three- to five-year bank loans and
RUB33 billion budget loans due in 2015-2034.

Refinancing needs are concentrated in 2017-2018 when about 80% of
direct risk will mature. Fitch does not expect Moscow Region to
have any issues with refinancing its maturing debt due to its low
levels of debt and the region's sound access to bank loans through
Sberbank of Russia (BBB-/Negative/F3).

Fitch takes a positive view of the region's sound RUB94bn cash
balance as of end-September 2015. The region places its temporary
available liquidity in bank deposits and earns additional interest
for the budget (9M15: RUB5.4 billion). Fitch projects the region's
cash balance to be depleted by capex at end-2015 but to remain
sound at RUB40 billion.

Moscow Region directly and indirectly controls an extensive public
sector, consisting of more than 100 companies. This puts pressure
on budget expenditure through administrative expenses and
subsidies. However, Fitch does not consider risk from the sector
to be significant due to the large size of the region's budget and
prudent debt management.

The region has a well-diversified economy based on services and
processing industries. The region's proximity to the City of
Moscow supports its wealth and economic indicators being above the
national median. In 2013, GRP per capita was 37% above the
national median and in December 2014 average salary was 54% over
the national median. Fitch forecasts 4% contraction of national
GDP in 2015, and expects the region to also face a slowdown of
activity although its economic indicators should remain strong.


Sharp growth of direct risk to above 50% of current revenue,
coupled with deterioration of operating performance resulting in
weak debt coverage, could lead to a downgrade.

Restoration of the operating margin to the historical high of
above 15%, accompanied by sound debt metrics with direct risk-to-
current balance (2014: 4.7 years) below the weighted average debt
maturity profile (2014: three years) accompanied by a Russian
economic recovery, could lead to an upgrade.

UDMURTIA REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Republic of Udmurtia's Long-
term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at
'BB-', Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B' and National Long-
term rating at 'A+(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long-term IDRs and
the National Long-term rating are Negative.

The republic's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds have
been affirmed at 'BB-' and 'A+(rus)'.

The affirmation and Negative Outlook reflect Fitch's unchanged
baseline scenario regarding the region's rapidly growing direct
risk and its inability to restore its current balance to positive
territory over the medium-term.


The ratings reflect Udmurtia's weak operating performance, rapid
growth of direct risk and high interest expenses. The ratings also
take into account the fall in oil prices and slowdown of the
national economy, which place a strain on the republic's tax base.

Fitch expects Udmurtia's operating margin will remain weak at near
zero in 2015-2016 (2014: negative 3.7%), reflecting the
contraction of the regional economy and rigid operating spending.
During 8M15 corporate income tax proceeds decreased 7.5% yoy,
mainly due to a muted performance of the oil extraction sector.
Fitch expects tax revenue in Udmurtia to increase only 1% yoy in
2015, which is lower than the republic's estimations.

Fitch expects the republic will narrow its budget deficit to 10%-
12% of total revenue over the medium-term, from a peak of 21% in
2014. The deficit shrinkage will be supported by limiting both
capex and operating expenditure. However, the budget deficit will
continue to result in direct risk growth.

We forecast Udmurtia's direct risk to approach 100% of current
revenue by end-2017. In 2014 direct risk increased to 75.4% of
current revenue, from 63.1% in 2013. Interest expenses are
expected to grow further to 7% of operating revenue in 2015 from
4% in 2014 and will remain under pressure in 2016-2017. This will
keep current margin weak at a negative 6%-7% over the medium-term
(2014: negative 8%).

Udmurtia is exposed to refinancing pressure as 63% of total direct
risk matures in 2015-2017. In 4Q15 the republic faces RUB3.7bn of
repayments (9% of direct risk as of 1 October 2015). Immediate
maturities are expected to be covered by a combination of bond
issuance, bank credit facilities and budget loans.

In September 2015 the republic issued a new RUB3bn bond, which has
an amortising repayment structure with maturity in 2020. The
regional administration will also receive RUB1.2bn of additional
budget loans in 4Q15, which usually have three-year maturity and
bear a negligible 0.1% interest rate. Currently Udmurtia does not
have any open credit lines, but plans to contract them in October-
December 2015 to cover the budget deficit.

The republic has a diversified industrial economy, which is
dominated by the oil extraction, metallurgy, machine building and
military sectors. This helps to smooth business cycles and keeps
Udmurtia's wealth metrics in line with the national median. In
2014 the republic's GRP contracted 0.2%, weaker than the national
average growth of 0.6%. Fitch expects national GDP to shrink 4%
yoy in 2015, eroding the republic's tax proceeds.


An inability to restore the current balance to positive territory
and to ease high refinancing pressure could lead to a downgrade.

* Russia's Economy May Increase Mortgage Arrears, Moody's Says
If a further drop in oil prices exerts downward pressure on
Russia's weakened economy, arrears in structured mortgage deals
could accelerate at a faster rate, says Moody's Investors Service
in a special report published recently.

"Russian property values are decreasing significantly in US dollar
terms due to the rouble's devaluation.  This will increase the
loss severity on defaulting loans denominated in foreign
currencies.  On the other hand, losses will be more contained for
rouble-denominated mortgage loans, owing to low loan-to-value
ratios in loan portfolios and stable nominal house prices in
rouble terms", states Maria Divid, an Assistant Vice President --
Analyst at Moody's and co-author of the report.

"The low proportion of US dollar-denominated mortgages alleviates
the impact of the rouble's depreciation on Russia's housing
market.  Having said that, macroeconomic pressure may cause
borrowers' real incomes to fall, unemployment may increase and
borrowers' ability to pay their debt will weaken, which may
increase mortgage arrears", explains Ms. Divid.

Moody's says the weak economy has pushed up arrears in deals
backed by Russian mortgages (residential mortgage-backed
securities; RMBS) and in other asset-backed securities (ABS).
Delinquencies of 60 days and above increased by 10% or more in the
first half of 2015 in about two-thirds of the outstanding RMBS
transactions Moody's rates (based on reported delinquency levels,
which do not include repurchased loans).  Moody's rates 39
outstanding Russian RMBS and two Russian ABS deals.

The rating agency's research says that RMBS deals from less
creditworthy originators and that comprise loans denominated in US
dollars are more susceptible to performance pressure.  Moody's
observes that deals from less creditworthy originators will suffer
more, and the disparity in deal performance will become more

While Moody's current expected loss assumptions capture default
and loss projections, particularly weak performance from less
creditworthy originators might prompt the rating agency to revisit
its assumptions.

"Our overall expected loss assumptions still reflect our
expectations regarding defaults and losses in Russian mortgage
deal portfolios.  But for weaker originators, the worsening
performance of the portfolios may impact our assumptions.
However, most of the outstanding transactions have benefited from
deleveraging that may offset the effect of an assumption
increase", projects Ms. Divid.


ABENGOA SA: KMPG Detects EUR250-Mil. Cash Deficit in Accounts
Luca Casiraghi and Macarena Munoz at Bloomberg News report that
KPMG detected a EUR250 million (US$283 million) cash deficit in
Abengoa SA's accounts.

According to Bloomberg, El Confidencial, citing people familiar
with the situation, said Abengoa's creditors commissioned KPMG to
analyze its accounts and are concerned because the deficit is
greater than when they agreed to a right issue.

Shareholders approved Abengoa's plan to sell EUR650 million of new
stock by the end of the year, Bloomberg, relates.

"KPMG is one of the firms that are engaged by Abengoa within the
context of the Capital Increase and the Comprehensive Action
Plan," Bloomberg quotes an e-mailed statement from the company as
saying.  "The report mentioned in the article is one of the
reports that includes projections based on several scenarios and
should not be read outside the context of a broad action plan."

Abengoa SA is a Spanish renewable-energy company.

EUSKALTEL SA: Moody's Assigns B1 CFR, Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a first-time B1 corporate
family rating and a B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to
Euskaltel, S.A., the leading cable operator in the Basque Country
(Spain).  Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a B1 rating and Loss
Given Default (LGD) assessment of LGD3 to the company's EUR1.4
billion senior bank facility.  The outlook for all ratings is

The rating assignment follows the company's acquisition of R Cable
y Telecomunicaciones Galicia, S.A. (R Cable), the leading cable
operator in Galicia (Spain), for an Enterprise Value of EUR1.19
billion.  In order to fund this deal, the company plans to issue
EUR255 million of new equity, use existing cash on the balance
sheet of EUR35 million, and upsize its senior bank facility by
EUR900 million.

"The assigned B1 rating balances Euskaltel's modest scale relative
to rated peers and its high initial leverage, against more
positive factors such as its solid and entrenched market position
in core regions, as well as its strong cash flow generation
capacity, which should allow the company to reduce debt quickly,"
says Iv†n Palacios, a Moody's Vice President - Senior Credit
Officer and lead analyst for Euskaltel.



The assigned B1 rating considers (1) Euskaltel's moderate size and
concentration in two regions of Spain; (2) its high initial
leverage; (3) the flexibility embedded in its loan documentation
that allows the company to target potential future acquisitions;
(4) the intense competition in its core markets; (5) its lack of
key premium content to support its pay-TV offering; (6) the
structural challenges facing its Business division and its mobile
offering; and (7) its unhedged exposure to potential interest rate

At the same time, the rating positively reflects (1) Euskaltel's
leading market positions in its core regions; (2) favorable trends
in the Spanish telecoms market, supported by a strong
macroeconomic recovery and market repair benefits derived from
consolidation; (3) the cost and capex synergy potential of its
integration with R Cable; (4) the quality of its fully invested
network that leads to stronger-than-average margins, lower capex
needs and healthy cash flow generation; and (5) Moody's
expectation that the company will reduce debt in accordance with
its leverage target of net reported debt/EBITDA between 3.0x and

Euskaltel has recently expanded into Galicia through the
acquisition of R Cable.  Following this transaction, which is
pending anti-trust clearance and approval from Euskaltel's
Shareholders Meeting, the company will almost double its revenues
and achieve some degree of geographical diversification, although
scale and diversity will remain modest compared with similarly
rated peers.

After this acquisition, the company is strategically positioned to
drive regional cable consolidation.  With initial leverage of 5.2x
(as adjusted by Moody's), the B1 rating allows some capacity for
Euskaltel to pursue additional growth initiatives, including debt-
funded M&A.  Euskaltel's loan facility allows the company to
increase reported net debt/EBITDA up to 5.5x (over an 18 month
period) in order to fund potential deals.  However, Moody's
believes that another acquisition is unlikely within the next 12
to 18 months, as the company focuses on integrating R Cable and
reducing debt towards its public target of between 3.0x and 4.0x.

Euskaltel and R Cable benefit from a modern and fully-enabled
DOCSIS 3.0 network with the broadest high-speed coverage in their
footprint, reaching 85% and 51% of households respectively vs.
Telefonica's approximately 30% fiber coverage in those regions.
This high-quality network leads to lower maintenance expenses and
therefore higher margins, lower capex and stronger cash flow
generation than peers.  With strong operating cash flows, reduced
tax payments and a cheap cost of funding, Euskaltel's ability to
reduce debt is stronger than for other cable peers.

The company should benefit from the expected recovery in the
Spanish telecoms sector, with higher prices and lower churn driven
by market consolidation and favorable macroeconomic trends.  These
price increases will allow the Spanish telecom sector to return to
revenue growth in 2015 and 2016, following a period of intense
competitive pressure and resulting revenue contraction.  However,
competitive intensity could increase if Telefonica accelerates
fibre deployment in the Basque Country and Galicia, such that it
can offer its premium content package, which is stronger than
Euskaltel's, to a broader base of customers.


The B1 rating on the EUR1.4 billion senior bank facility is in
line with the CFR, given that it is the largest portion of debt in
the capital structure.

Given that Euskaltel has an "all-bank" capital structure, the
assumption for the group's family recovery rate is 65% instead of
Moody's standard 50%.  Under an "all-bank" structure, recoveries
for lenders in the event of a default are typically higher than in
a "bank-bond" structure.  As a result, Euskaltel's PDR is one
notch lower than the CFR, at B2-PD.


The outlook on the rating is stable, reflecting Moody's
expectation that the company will focus on deleveraging according
to its business plan, whilst it integrates R Cable and benefits
from the improving operating conditions in its core markets.  The
stable outlook factors in Moody's expectation that the company
will deleverage quickly and maintain a debt/EBITDA ratio (as
adjusted by Moody's) between 4.5x and 5.5x.


Upward pressure on the rating could develop if the company
delivers on its business plan, such that its adjusted debt/EBITDA
ratio drops below 4.5x on a sustained basis.  This decrease in
leverage would likely be reliant on the company maintaining a
conservative approach to any further acquisitions, such that its
deleveraging profile is not compromised.

Downward pressure could be exerted on the rating if Euskaltel's
operating performance weakens as a result of pricing pressures or
market share losses reducing cash flow generation, or if the
company increases debt as a result of acquisitions or shareholder
distributions such that its adjusted debt/EBITDA rises and remains
above 5.5x.  A weakening in the company's liquidity profile could
also exert downward pressure on the rating.


The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Pay
Television - Cable and Direct-to-Home Satellite Operators
published in April 2013.

Euskaltel, S.A., headquartered in Derio (Bizkaia, Spain), is the
cable operator in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country.
In 2014, Euskaltel generated revenues of EUR321 million and EBITDA
of EUR156 million.  The company has been listed on the Spanish
Stock Exchange since July 2015.  In October 2015, the company
announced it had reached an agreement for the 100% acquisition of
R Cable, bringing its combined revenues and EBITDA to EUR565
million and EUR266 million, respectively.  Euskaltel is either
ranked first or second in terms of subscriber market shares in
broadband, pay-TV and fixed telephony businesses in the Basque
Country, but ranks third in mobile.  R Cable ranks first across
all segments and services in its footprint.

EUSKALTEL SA: S&P Assigns 'BB-' CCR & Rates EUR300MM Loan 'BB-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB-' corporate
credit rating to Spain-based cable operator Euskaltel S.A.  The
outlook is stable.

In addition, S&P assigned its 'BB-' issue rating to Euskaltel's
proposed EUR300 million senior secured loan.  The recovery rating
is '3', indicating S&P's expectation of substantial (50%-70%)
recovery prospects, in the higher half of the range, in the event
of a payment default.

The rating reflects S&P's assessment of Euskaltel's business risk
profile as "fair" and its financial risk profile as "aggressive."

Euskaltel plans to issue EUR900 million of senior secured loans,
which, combined with a EUR255 million capital increase and EUR35
million of cash, will be used to fund the acquisition of Spanish
regional cable company, R Cable y Telecomunicaciones Galicia S.A.

Euskaltel and R Cable both have solid market positions as the
dominant providers of fixed telecom services in their geographic
areas, and are also the most rapidly growing mobile services
operators.  This is reflected in high market shares compared with
competitors, including incumbent operator Telefonica.  S&P
considers that Euskaltel's fully upgraded DOCSIS 3.0 cable network
gives it a competitive advantage over its direct competitors,
which offer relatively limited optical fiber to the home (FTTH)
coverage.  Euskaltel also benefits from strong brand recognition
for its service.  In S&P's view, these advantages have enabled
Euskaltel's revenue generating units (RGUs) to continue to grow,
despite difficult conditions in the Spanish telecommunications
market in recent years.

Customer retention, and thus Euskaltel's competitive position, are
also supported by its ability to offer bundled services that
include mobile telephony and its strong presence in the corporate
segment.  S&P sees potential for further RGU growth over the
medium term via increased bundles and network expansion.  There is
also potential for growth through the increased penetration of
pay-TV and broadband in the market.  Lastly, Euskaltel benefits
from solid operating efficiency, as reflected in its strong EBITDA
margins of more than 45% for the combined company including R
Cable, and proven track record of improving its profitability
during a period of declining revenues.

These factors are somewhat constrained by the highly competitive
telecom market in the Basque country and Galicia.  Euskaltel faces
competition from far larger integrated carriers, including
Telefonica, Orange, and Vodafone.  All of these could increase
their fiber coverage in Euskaltel's regions, thereby increasing
the network-based competition, and are able to deploy their
national mobile networks to market quadruple play offers.

Euskaltel's financial risk profile reflects S&P's expectation that
its Standard & Poor's-adjusted leverage will decline to well below
5x in 2016 and to about 4x in 2017.

The stable outlook indicates that S&P anticipates that Euskaltel
will rapidly reduce leverage over the short term to less than 4.5x
through improved market conditions, merger-related cost
efficiencies, and free cash flow generation.

It also reflects the limited risk that the company will increase
leverage on the balance sheet over the medium term, given its
declared financial policy.

S&P does not expect to lower ratings over the next 12 months as
that would require significant underperformance compared with
S&P's base-case scenario; in particular, margins declining by more
than 200 basis points.

S&P could lower the rating if adjusted leverage remains
sustainably higher than 4.5x with no short-term prospect of a
reduction in leverage, and FOCF to debt declines to less than 5%.

S&P also does not expect to raise the ratings over the next 12

Over the longer term, S&P could raise the rating if it assess the
combined company's business positioning more favorably, for
example, if it is successful in improving its EBITDA margins to
more than 50% while keeping very low churn rate, despite
increasing fiber coverage by its competitors.  S&P would also
expect the company to maintain adjusted leverage at about 4x and
free cash flow to debt approaching 10%.

GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the rating of
the Generalitat de Catalunya to stable from positive and affirmed
its rating at Ba2/NP.

The outlook change to stable reflects the rating agency's view
that the Generalitat de Catalunya's fiscal consolidation efforts
could be relaxed going forward, owing to the absence of plans for
new fiscal consolidation measures as a result of the region's
focus on independence aspirations, making a potential rating
upgrade less likely.  Moody's also notes that the region will
continue to receive strong support from the central government via
the Fondo de Liquidez Autonomico (FLA) to meet its debt



The change in the outlook of Catalunya's rating to stable from
positive mainly reflects the potential for relaxation of the
Generalitat de Catalunya's fiscal consolidation efforts going
forward given the region's focus on independence aspirations,
which weakens the probability of a potential rating upgrade for
the region.

Moody's notes the absence of fiscal consolidation measures in the
electoral programme of Junts pel S°, the political party that won
September's elections, given that the unique element included in
its political agenda was Catalunya's roadmap to independence.
This together with the region's very weak fiscal position, makes
it difficult for Catalunya to implement new measures to continue
the path of fiscal consolidation going forward.

Moody's expects this will impact Catalunya's finances and outweigh
the positive impact from the country's improving medium-term
economic prospects, captured by Spain's positive outlook.

It notes that the central government has provided the Generalitat
de Catalunya with liquidity support through the FLA since its
creation in 2012, and the debates regarding independence have not
impacted the cash flows between the central government and the
region.  As a result, Moody's expects that Catalunya will continue
to receive funds from the central government.


Moody's notes that Catalunya's fiscal position is very weak and
will likely continue to be weak in the next two-to-three years.
Catalunya's financial ratios have historically underperformed
those of its national peers, with lower operating margins and
higher financing deficits than the median of its national peers.
However, FLA's conditionality is helping the region to fiscally
consolidate and improve its credit profile.  In this context,
Catalunya managed to reduce its deficit in ESA terms to -2.65% of
regional GDP in 2014, from -4.15% of regional GDP in 2011.  The
region's net direct and indirect debt to operating revenue ratio
was 302% in 2014, compared with 203% for rated regions.  In June
2015, Catalunya had the highest debt stock among Spanish regions
with EUR67.9 billion, representing 33.9% of regional GDP, well
above the average of 23.7% for its peers.  Owing to Catalunya's
high financing needs in 2015, of around EUR11 billion, debt levels
will continue to increase.

While Catalunya benefits from high levels of government support
through cheap funding, Moody's notes that this factor alone is
unlikely to be able to bring its debt burden down unless fiscal
consolidation measures are constantly implemented, for which the
region is responsible.  This supports the three notches
differential between the regional rating (Ba2 stable) and the
central government's (Baa2 positive).


Given the change in Catalunya's outlook to stable from positive,
an upgrade in the region's rating is unlikely in the next 12 to 18
months.  However, significant improvements in its own fiscal and
financial performance could lead to upward rating pressure in the

In contrast, downward pressure on the rating could occur if
Catalunya's policy changes reverse the recovery plan and the
fiscal trajectory.  In addition, a downgrade of the sovereign
rating, or any indication of weakening government support, would
likely lead to a downgrade in Catalunya's rating.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 33,711 (2014 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

  Real GDP growth (% change): 1.4% (2014 Actual) (also known as
   GDP Growth)

  Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): -1% (2014 Actual)
   Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -5.8% (2014 Actual) (also
   known as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: 1% (2014 Actual) (also known as
  External Balance)

External debt/GDP: [not available]

Level of economic development: Very High level of economic

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
  recorded since 1983.

On Oct. 21, 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Catalunya, Generalitat de.  The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's fiscal or financial
strength, including its debt profile, has materially decreased.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this rating action, if applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) and Viability Rating (VR) of Credit Suisse AG (Credit
Suisse) at 'A' and 'a', respectively. At the same time, Fitch has
affirmed the ratings of Credit Suisse's holding company (Credit
Suisse Group AG; CSGAG) and Credit Suisse's subsidiaries.

The Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs of Credit Suisse and Credit
Suisse New York branch have been revised to Positive from Stable.
The Outlooks on Credit Suisse's rated subsidiaries as well as on
CSGAG's Long-Term IDR are Stable.

The revision of Credit Suisse's Outlook to Positive follows the
publication of Credit Suisse's revised strategy on October 21,
2015, which includes a CHF6 billion capital raise, a restructuring
of the investment bank and revised leverage ratio targets.

The Positive Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that following
the announced capital increase and based on the bank's current
capital planning, a substantial junior debt buffer is likely to be
freed up that could benefit senior creditors at the parent bank in
the event of group resolution. This assumes that the strategic
plan does not fall significantly off course and requires the
capital being raised to absorb earnings shortfalls. Credit
Suisse's qualifying junior debt includes significant amounts of
internally downstreamed total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) debt
issued by Credit Suisse's parent, CSGAG, as well as junior debt at
both CSGAG and Credit Suisse.

Once qualifying junior debt buffers are fully in place, we believe
that the risk of default on senior obligations, as measured by the
Long-Term IDR, is lower than the risk of Credit Suisse failing, as
measured by its VR. While junior debt buffers at CSGAG will also
be substantial, Fitch excludes external TLAC, a reference
obligation for CSGAG's IDRs, in Fitch's calculation. Consequently,
CSGAG's Long-Term IDR is unlikely to benefit from an uplift, which
is reflected in its Stable Outlook.

Revised leverage and capital requirements for Switzerland's global
systemically important banks (G-SIBs), announced on 21 October
2015, will ensure that junior debt buffers remain permanently in
place irrespective of the banks' capital management. By end-2019,
Swiss G-SIBs will have to maintain a common equity Tier 1 (CET1)
leverage ratio of 3.5% (current requirement: 2.4%), Tier 1
leverage ratio of 5% and TLAC buffers of 5% of leverage exposure.
The banks' risk-weighted CET1 ratio requirement will remain
unchanged at 10% while the Tier 1 requirement (CET1 plus Tier 1
high-trigger capital instruments) will increase to 14.3%. Going-
concern and gone-concern (TLAC) buffers combined will have to
amount to 28.6% of risk-weighted assets.

Following the announced capital increase, management expects
Credit Suisse's pro forma CET1 leverage to stand at 3.6% and
Tier 1 leverage at 4.7%.



Credit Suisse's VR, a reflection of the bank's standalone
strength, is primarily driven by the bank's business model and
capital/leverage position. On balance, Credit Suisse's revised
strategy -- if executed well -- is likely to be neutral or mildly
positive for its VR. The VR remains sensitive to a successful
execution of its strategic plan, notably with regards to cost-
saving targets and anticipated revenue improvement.

Key elements of the revised strategic plan are supportive of the
bank's VR. These include the capital increase and the relative
shift in capital allocation towards its more stable domestic and
solid assets and wealth management businesses -- at the expense of
its investment bank.

However, the VR will remain constrained by the company profile as
long as securities businesses continue to represent a substantial
proportion of earnings and capital allocation. This is currently
planned once the allocation of investment banking to the new Asia-
Pacific segment is included. The additional volatility investment
banking brings to Credit Suisse's risk profile and earnings base
in relation to higher-rated universal banks was evidenced in the
bank's 3Q15 results released on 21 October.

Transfers of leverage exposure (CHF106 billion or around 10% of
end-3Q15 total leverage exposure) and risk-weighted assets (CHF47
billion or 16% of total risk-weighted assets) largely from prime
services and macro businesses to a newly established strategic
resolution unit are substantial but winding down these positions
will take time.

Credit Suisse's goal to reduce its annual operating cost base by
around CHF2 billion (net of CHF1.5 billion growth-related
investment) by end-2018 will improve the group's financial
flexibility in the medium- to long-term. However, restructuring
costs (CHF1.3 billion in the three years to end-2018) and costs-
to-achieve (CHF0.7 billion to CHF1.2 billion) will weigh on Credit
Suisse's profitability in the short- to medium-term.

3Q15 results were below average with a quarterly return on equity
of 7% (11% for 9M15) and highlight the reliance of Credit Suisse's
investment bank on a fairly limited range of business lines within
its fixed income sales and trading division (now global markets).
While its equity division performed well in the quarter (revenue
up 3% yoy) and the decline in its underwriting and advisory
division (down 30% yoy) was broadly in line with global trading
and universal bank (GTUB) peers, revenue in its large fixed income
sales and trading division were down sharply by 42% yoy. Many
fixed-income revenue drivers, notably securitized products, credit
and emerging markets, were hit by particularly challenging
operating conditions in the quarter.

Revenue in Credit Suisse's private banking and wealth management
division was also down (negative 7% qoq; negative 6% yoy) largely
due to lower transaction- and performance-based revenue. However,
net new money flows in the quarter remained sound (CHF17.3 billion
of which CHF10.5 billion in wealth management) and operating
expenses (excluding litigation charges) were well-controlled (flat
qoq and yoy).

The pre-tax loss in Credit Suisse's non-core divisions was
sizeable in the quarter (CHF106 million in its private banking
non-core and CHF407m in its investment banking non-core unit) and
remained negatively affected by high litigation expenses.

The planned capital increase will bring Credit Suisse's risk-
weighted capital and leverage ratios more in line with its GTUB
peer group and will strengthen its core capitalization. Its end-
2017 leverage ratio targets include a small buffer above the
revised Swiss leverage ratio requirements. (3.5%-4.0% CET1
leverage ratio compared to 3.5% minimum requirement; 5.0%-6.0%
Tier 1 leverage ratio compared to a 5% requirement.)

Credit Suisse's VR also reflects the bank's sound risk controls
and underwriting standards, strong domestic asset quality and
adequate funding and sound liquidity profile. It factors in our
expectation that the bank will be able to continue running a
central liquidity model despite increasing regulatory demands on
legal entity-specific liquidity requirements. Similar to its GTUB
peers, we expect the bank to remain exposed to significant
litigation and conduct risks.


The Positive Outlook on Credit Suisse's Long-term IDR reflects our
expectation that following the capital increase, Credit Suisse's
common equity capitalization will be sufficiently strong to
support its 'a' VR without explicitly considering the significant
subordinated debt layers Credit Suisse has built up in recent
years. This will mean that the subordinated debt layer will be
available to support a one-notch uplift of Credit Suisse's Long-
term IDR relative to its VR.

In addition, the revised Swiss leverage and TLAC requirements
provide transparency around regulatory expectations and ensure
that subordinated debt and internal TLAC buffers are likely to
remain in place.

CSGAG has issued around CHF13 billion of senior TLAC in the eight
months to end-August 2015. This has been downstreamed on a
subordinated basis (including a contractual subordination clause)
to Credit Suisse (London branch). As a result, qualifying junior
debt, i.e. existing subordinated debt (excluding legacy
subordinated debt that is likely to be called) and internal TLAC
buffers available to Credit Suisse senior creditors at end-3Q15
amounted to around 11% of fully-loaded risk-weighted assets,
according to our calculations.

"We believe that these resources could be made available to
protect senior obligations from default in case of failure, either
under a resolution process or as part of a private sector solution
(such as a distressed debt exchange) to avoid a resolution

"Absent such a private sector solution, we would expect a
resolution action being taken on Credit Suisse when it comes close
to breaching minimum capital requirements. Currently, we assume
this to be at a CET1 ratio of around 6% (after high-trigger
capital instruments but before low-trigger capital instruments
have been triggered). We then assume that the regulator would
require Credit Suisse to be recapitalized to a CET1 ratio of at
least 14.3%. This assumes a restoration of its 10% minimum CET1
ratio as well as its 4.3% Tier 1 high-trigger capital buffer
(since the bank post a resolution action would not be in a
position to issue capital instruments in the market)."

"Our view of the regulatory intervention point and post-resolution
capital needs taken together suggest a junior debt buffer of at
least 9% of risk-weighted assets could be required to restore
viability without hitting senior creditors."


The SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors of both
the holding and the operating banks can no longer rely on
receiving full extraordinary support from the sovereign in the
event that Credit Suisse becomes non-viable. In Fitch's view,
Swiss legislation and regulation to address the 'too big to fail'
problem for the two big Swiss banks are now sufficiently
progressed to provide a framework for resolving banks that is
likely to require senior creditors participating in losses, if
necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving sovereign


Credit Suisse Group AG's Long-Term IDR is based on its VR and is
equalized with Credit Suisse's. This reflects its role as the bank
holding company and modest double leverage at holding company
level (at end-2014 around 106% according to our calculation, well
within our usual notching threshold of 120%).

TLAC-eligible senior unsecured debt issued by an SPV and
guaranteed by CSGAG is rated in line with the IDR of the


Subordinated debt and other hybrid securities issued by Credit
Suisse, CSGAG and by various issuing vehicles are all notched down
from the VRs of Credit Suisse or Credit Suisse Group AG in
accordance with Fitch's assessment of each instrument's respective
non-performance and relative loss severity risk profiles, which
vary considerably.


Credit Suisse International (CSI) is a UK-based wholly owned
subsidiary of Credit Suisse Group AG, and Credit Suisse (USA) Inc.
(CSUSA) is the group's main US-based broker-dealer. Fitch views
these entities as core to Credit Suisse's strategy and their IDRs
are equalized with Credit Suisse's. The IDRs of Credit Suisse New
York branch are at the same level as those of Credit Suisse as the
branch is part of the same legal entity without any country risk

The Positive Outlook on Credit Suisse New York branch reflects our
view that senior creditors of the branch would be treated
identically to senior creditors of the parent bank. The Stable
Outlooks on CSI and CSUSA take into account that the amount of
junior debt buffers to be downstreamed to those entities and the
timing of this are unclear at this stage.

CSI is incorporated as an unlimited liability company, which
underpins Fitch's view that there is an extremely high probability
that it would receive support from its parent, if needed.

In 2007, CSUSA's parent companies (Credit Suisse and CSGAG) issued
full, unconditional and several guarantees for the company's
outstanding SEC-registered debt securities, which in Fitch's
opinion demonstrates the important role of the subsidiary and the
extremely high probability that it would be supported, if needed.



Key rating sensitivities for Credit Suisse's VR largely relate to
the execution of its new strategic plan (including executing on
the announced cost measures), the relative weight of investment
banking activities within its business mix and overall risk
profile and the development of litigation- or conduct-related

"We believe Credit Suisse will remain reliant on its securities
business franchise, which limits upside potential for its VR. This
is despite a likely drop in capital allocated to investment
banking activities under the revised plan. "

Downside risk to Credit Suisse's VR is also limited. However, one
or several of the following developments could put pressure on
Credit Suisse's VR.

-- Any significant slippage in implementing cost savings
    measures announced as part of its strategic plan as well as
    insufficient revenue improvements, notably in its relatively
    capital-intensive global markets (formerly its sales and
    trading division) as well as Asia-Pacific divisions.

-- Higher-than-expected earnings volatility in its restructured
    investment bank or increasing reliance on its strong
    leveraged loans and securitized products business.

-- Any significant slippage in progressing towards its revised
    Swiss leverage and TLAC requirements.

-- Higher-than-expected litigation or conduct costs leading to
    additional related charges in a given quarter in excess of
    two quarters' pre-tax profit.


As Credit Suisse's IDRs and VR are currently equalized, its Long-
Term IDR is primarily sensitive to changes in its VR. In resolving
the Positive Outlook on Credit Suisse's (and its New York
branch's) Long-Term IDRs, we will, in particular, assess the
permanence of qualifying junior debt buffers available to senior
creditors following the capital increase as well as Credit
Suisse's general capital planning under the revised Swiss leverage

A failure to execute well on the restructuring that threw capital
targets off course or a material reduction in the size of the
qualifying junior debt buffer would lead to a revision of the
Outlook back to Stable or further negative rating action. The
Outlook is also sensitive to changes in assumptions on the Swiss
authorities' resolution intervention point, post-resolution
capital needs for the Swiss GTUBs and the development of
resolution planning more generally.


Any upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks. This is highly unlikely in our view, though not


Similar to Credit Suisse's IDRs, CSGAG's IDRs are equalized with
Credit Suisse's VR and therefore primarily sensitive to a change
in its VR. The Stable Outlook on CSGAG's Long-Term IDR reflects
our view that qualifying junior debt buffers at the CSGAG level
are unlikely to be sufficient to allow us to notch up over the
outlook time horizon that given Switzerland's single-point-of-
entry approach to bank resolution.

CSGAG's SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that support from the
Swiss authorities for the holding company is possible, but cannot
be relied on. This is primarily because of the holding company's
low systemic importance on a standalone basis but also taking into
account progress with Swiss legislation and regulation addressing
'too big to fail' banking groups. As the SRF is 'No Floor', the
holding company's Long-term IDR is driven solely by its VR and is
therefore primarily sensitive to the same drivers as Credit
Suisse's VR.

TLAC senior notes are rated in line with Credit Suisse Group AG's
Long-term IDR and are therefore primarily sensitive to a change to
the Long-Term IDR, in particular increasing double leverage (see


Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital ratings are primarily
sensitive to a change in the VRs of Credit Suisse or CSGAG. The
securities' ratings are also sensitive to a change in their
notching, which could arise if Fitch changes its assessment of the
probability of their non-performance relative to the risk captured
in the issuers' VRs. This may reflect a change in capital
management in the group or an unexpected shift in regulatory
buffer requirements, for example.


As CSI's and CSUSA's IDRs are equalized with Credit Suisse's, they
are primarily sensitive to changes in the parent's IDR. The
subsidiaries' IDRs are also sensitive to changes in the parent's
propensity to provide support, which Fitch currently does not

More clarity about the ultimate TLAC prepositioning requirements
at these entities could lead us to revise the Outlook on CSI and
CSUSA to Positive from Stable assuming we view local TLAC buffers
as sufficient to provide additional senior creditor protection.

The rating actions are as follows:

Credit Suisse:
Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Revised to Positive from
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior unsecured debt (including programme ratings): affirmed at
Senior market-linked notes: affirmed at 'Aemr'
Subordinated lower Tier 2 notes: affirmed at 'A-'
Subordinated notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'
Tier 1 notes and preferred securities: affirmed at 'BBB-'

Credit Suisse Group AG
Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior unsecured debt (including programme ratings): affirmed at
Senior market-linked notes: affirmed at 'Aemr'
Subordinated notes: affirmed at 'A-'
Additional Tier 1 notes: affirmed at 'BB+'
Preferred stock (ISIN XS0148995888): affirmed at 'BBB'

Credit Suisse International:
Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A', Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior unsecured debt (including debt issuance and CP programme
ratings): affirmed at 'A'/'F1'
Dated subordinated notes: affirmed at 'A-'

Credit Suisse (USA) Inc.:
Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A', Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior unsecured debt (including programme ratings): affirmed at
Commercial paper programme: affirmed at 'F1'
Subordinated notes: affirmed at 'A-'

Credit Suisse NY (branch):
Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A', Outlook Revised to Positive from
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Senior unsecured debt (including programme ratings): affirmed at
Commercial paper programme: affirmed at 'F1'
Senior market-linked notes: affirmed at 'Aemr'

Credit Suisse Group Funding (Guernsey) Limited
Senior unsecured notes (with TLAC language): affirmed at 'A'/'F1'

Credit Suisse Group (Guernsey) I Limited
Tier 2 contingent notes: affirmed at 'BBB-'

Credit Suisse Group (Guernsey) II Limited
Tier 1 buffer capital perpetual notes: affirmed at 'BB+'

Credit Suisse Group (Guernsey) IV Limited
Tier 2 contingent notes: affirmed at 'BBB-'


FERREXPO PLC: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC', Outlook Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered to 'CCC'
from 'CCC+' its long-term corporate credit rating on Ukrainian
iron ore producer Ferrexpo PLC.  The outlook is negative.

S&P also lowered the long-term issue rating on Ferrexpo's senior
unsecured notes due in 2019 to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'.

The downgrade follows the deterioration in Ferrexpo's liquidity
position since S&P's last review in July 2015.  This deterioration
is explained by the company's inability to exercise the option to
draw additional US$150 million under its pre-export finance (PXF)
facility.  It is also due to a reduction in Ferrexpo's cash
balance after a maturity of about $50 million and a dividend of
US$19 million.

In addition, Bank F&C (owned by Ferrexpo's main shareholder),
where the company held US$175 million, became insolvent in
September 2015.  While S&P's previous rating assumed no access to
these funds, the insolvency increases lenders' uncertainty and
nervousness.  This is currently reflected by a yield to maturity
of more than 25% on Ferrexpo's bonds.

"Under our base-case scenario, we project that Ferrexpo's Standard
& Poor's-adjusted EBITDA will be US$230 million-US$250 million in
2015 and Us$150 million-US$200 million in 2016.  These
assumptions, together with capital expenditure (capex) of
US$50 million-US$60 million, translate into positive free
operating cash flow of US$60 million-US$70 million.  We estimate
that as of Sept. 30, 2015, the company only has about US$80
million-US$100 million in cash (of which the majority is held
outside Ukraine), and maturities of about US$200 million, in the
coming 12 months.  In our view, unless Ferrexpo reaches an
agreement with the banks, which matches its cash flows with a more
comfortable maturity table, the company could run out of funds by
mid-2016.  Under our base-case scenario, we expect Ferrexpo's
adjusted debt to be around $950 million by the end of 2015," S&P

S&P previously took some comfort from Ferrexpo's discretionary
option to increase its long-term secured PXF facility, due in
2018, by US$150 million on top of the existing US$350 million
facility.  S&P understands that the option expired in early August
2015 after the company failed to attract additional lenders.

S&P understands that Ferrexpo has started negotiations with the
banks, but is yet to reach a preliminary agreement.

According to S&P's criteria, it may view a loan rescheduling or
modification as a de facto restructuring and tantamount to
default.  This would be the case if lenders receive less value
than the original value of the loan -- for example, if the tenor
is extended without appropriate compensation (maybe through an
amendment fee or an adequate interest rate increase), or if the
interest or principal is reduced.

That said, S&P is not able to form a clear view of the nature of
the potential agreement--and therefore the rating implications --
based on the preliminary stage of the discussions.

On a positive note, S&P recently raised the sovereign rating on
Ukraine to 'B-', as well as the transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment to 'B-' from 'CCC+'.  The rating on Ferrexpo was
previously capped at one notch above the T&C assessment.  This cap
is not applicable following the current rating action.  However,
if the company addresses the existing liquidity issues
successfully, and if geopolitical risk in Ukraine eases, S&P could
raise the rating on Ferrexpo up to 'B', before being capped by the
T&C assessment on Ukraine.

The negative outlook on the long-term corporate credit rating on
Ferrexpo reflects the risk of the company defaulting by mid-2016,
unless it reaches an agreement with the banks to roll over its
debt.  S&P understands that negotiations are taking place, but it
is premature to assume a refinancing deal.

S&P could lower the rating if the company does not reach
refinancing agreements with its lending banks regarding the coming

Under a slightly less likely scenario, if the company reached an
agreement that met S&P's criteria of a distressed exchange, S&P
could lower the ratings to 'SD'.  After the completion of such an
exchange, S&P would raise the rating on Ferrexpo, taking into
account the improved liquidity and more comfortable debt maturity.

S&P could take a positive rating action if the company improves
its liquidity position, under which its future cash flows match
its debt maturity profile.

UNICOMBANK PJSC: Deposit Fund May Pay UAH33.228MM to Depositors
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the Individuals' Deposit Guarantee
Fund said it may pay UAH33.228 million to the depositors of
insolvent Unicombank, while the total obligations of the bank to
its clients as of October 15 amounted to UAH35.639 million.

According to the report, the fund has also started seeking
investors for the bank, to whom it offers the alienation of all or
part of the bank's assets and liabilities in favor of the
receiving bank, the creation and sale of a transition bank with
the transfer of its assets and liabilities, or the sale of the
bank as a whole.

In addition, the possible alienation of the insolvent bank's
obligations to the receiving bank is foreseen with the possibility
of premium payment to the receiving banks, Interfax-Ukraine

The report says the fund will accept from potential investors to
participate in the tender until November 2.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 23,
2015, UNICOMBANK PJSC has been declared insolvent due to the total
loss of liquidity, reads NBU Board Resolutiono No. 704, dated
October 15, 2015.

Up until December 2014, UNICOMBANK PJSC was incorporated and
operated in Donetsk.  Then, in accordance with applicable laws and
regulations, it was re-incorporated outside the ATO area, in Lviv.
However, a substantial part of its assets and collateral were left
behind in Donetsk Oblast. The debtors have ceased servicing loans
and all inflows of funds to the bank have all but halted.

On October 6, 2015, UNICOMBANK PJSC was declared a problem bank.
Nonetheless, the bank's owners did not bother to take any measures
to support its liquidity, improve its financial standing and
remedy breaches of the NBU regulations.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

EDU UK BONDCO: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'B-' CCR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on EDU UK
Bondco (Study Group) PLC to negative from stable.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'B-' long-term corporate credit rating on
the company.

S&P also affirmed its 'B-' issue rating on Study Group's senior
secured debt.  The '4' recovery rating on this debt remains
unchanged, reflecting meaningful recovery prospects in the higher
half of our 50%-70% range for creditors in the event of a payment

The outlook revision primarily reflects S&P's expectation that
Study Group's liquidity will weaken as a result of significant
headroom tightening under the group's financial covenant to below
10% by year-end 2015 and the ensuing likely covenant breach by the
end of December 2016, if the company does not take mitigating
actions.  S&P has therefore revised down its assessment of the
group's liquidity to "less than adequate" from "adequate."  In
S&P's view, liquidity has deteriorated following the acquisition
of Endeavour Learning Group Pty Ltd (ELG) in Australia and tighter
covenant testing levels.  S&P recognizes that Study Group's year-
to-date operational performance has been strong, and the group has
increased its revenues and EBITDA.  Study Group reported revenue
and EBITDA growth of about 17% and 6%, respectively, in the first
half of 2015.

"We continue to assess Study Group's business risk profile as
"weak."  Our assessment is constrained by the stiff competition in
and seasonality of language-education business, and the group's
exposure to government changes in immigration and visa policies
toward international students.  Our assessment takes into account
increasing demand for higher education globally and benefits from
the group's solid relationships with partner universities and
track record to renew the partnerships.  The recent acquisition of
ELG, an Australian provider of health-related training and
education, extends the group's offering into health-, fitness-,
and beauty-related higher education and makes it more attractive
for domestic and international students," S&P said.

S&P assesses Study Group's financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged."  S&P expects that the Standard & Poor's adjusted
credit metrics for Study Group will remain in this category in
2015-2017.  Under S&P's base-case scenario, it calculates an
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 10.0x in 2015 and
approximately 9.5x-10.0x in 2016-2017, including the subordinated
preference certificates (SPCs), which S&P views as debt-like under
its criteria.  Excluding the SPCs, S&P forecasts Study Group's
adjusted leverage ratios at between 5.5x and 6.0x over 2015-2017.

Study Group's financial risk profile remains constrained by the
group's high debt and private equity ownership.  S&P anticipates
some deleveraging -- excluding the SPCs -- following growth in
Study Group's EBITDA.  In addition, S&P estimates Study Group's
reported EBITDA-interest-coverage ratio, on a weighted-average
basis, at 1.5x-2.0x in 2015 and 2016, which translates into
Standard & Poor's adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of 1.1x
(weighted average, including payment-in-kind interest on SPCs),
which is in line with S&P's "highly leveraged" category.  S&P
notes that these constraints are partly offset by the noncash
interest feature of the SPCs, which provides some financial
flexibility for Study Group to meet its debt-service requirements.

Under S&P's base case for Study Group, S&P assumes:

   -- GDP growth of 2.5%-2.8% in the U.K. and 2.4%-2.9% in
      Australia (which accounted for about 50% and 40% of 2014
      revenues, respectively) and 6.1%-6.8% in China (about 30%
      of new enrollments) in 2015-2017;

   -- Annual revenue growth of about 16% in 2015 on the ELG
      acquisition and overall growth in enrollment and revenue
      growth of about 3%-4% in 2016-2017;

   -- An improving reported EBITDA margin to 12.5% on average in
      2015-2017, versus about 11.7% in 2014, owing to revenue
      growth and cost efficiencies;

   -- Capital expenditures of about ú15 million in 2015, then
      declining to about GBP12 million-GBP13 million in 2016-

   -- Less than GBP10 million working capital inflow per year;

   -- No further acquisitions and no shareholder remuneration in

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
for Study Group:

   -- An adjusted leverage ratio, including SPCs, in the 9.5x-
      10.0x range in 2015-2017 and the same ratio, excluding
      SPCs, in the 5.5x-6.0x range in 2015-2017; and

   -- Adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of approximately 1.1x
      (weighted average) over 2015-2017.

The negative outlook on Study Group reflects S&P's expectation
that Study Group's covenant headroom will be tight at the end of
2015 and there could be a covenant breach by the end of 2016, if
the group does not take action to restore the covenant headroom
(such as a covenant waiver).  In S&P's base case, it also factors
in an adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 9.9x on a weighted-average
basis over 2015-2017.  Additionally, S&P's base case incorporates
reported EBITDA interest coverage of about 2x in 2015-2016, which
translates into adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of about 1.1x on
a weighted-average basis over 2015-2017.  S&P views these ratios
as commensurate with the 'B-' rating on the group.

S&P could take a negative rating action on Study Group if S&P
thinks that liquidity will weaken further as a result of further
tightening in the group's financial covenant headroom, and
management doesn't take any action to prevent the covenant breach.
In addition, S&P could lower the ratings if the group posted
weaker earnings growth and faced a prolonged period of negative
free operating cash flow generation, or if EBITDA interest
coverage weakens to outside the level S&P views as commensurate
with the 'B-' rating.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the covenant headroom is
restored to 15% as a result of the management's plan to address
the covenant tightening in the short term, while operational
performance remains at least in line with S&P's base case.  Such a
revision would also derive support from Study Group's reported
EBITDA interest coverage ratio at 1.5x-2x on a sustainable basis
(which translates into an adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of at
least 1.0x), while the group maintains modest, albeit positive,
free cash flow.

JAGUAR LAND: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT FC Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Jaguar Land Rover Automotive plc's
(JLR) Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDRs) and
senior unsecured ratings at 'BB-'. The Outlook is Positive.

The affirmation of the ratings reflects Fitch's expectation that
JLR will continue to maintain sound profitability and a strong
financial profile, despite a period of heavy investment to
transition to become a higher volume premium manufacturer. Fitch
expects the launch of new models and replacement of old models in
2016 to support its sales volumes and profitability, even though
the company is facing challenges on several fronts, including
weakening sales volumes in its largest market, China. As such, the
Outlook remains Positive.


Sound Profitability: Fitch expects JLR to maintain EBIT margins of
8% in the financial year ending March 31, 2016 (FY16) and FY17,
despite heightened competition, increased costs associated with
elevated capex, and falling demand in China and emerging markets.
Fitch expects profitability will be supported by the company's
core Land Rover products as well as the roll-out of new/refreshed
products in 2016, including the new Evoque convertible, all-new
Jaguar XF and Jaguar SUV, F-PACE.

In FY15, EBIT margin widened to 12.4% (FY14: 11.7%) on a favorable
product/volume mix and continued robust demand for premium
vehicles globally. However, EBIT margins fell to 10.1% in 1QFY16
(1QFY15: 15.9%) due to weaker product mix and lower sales volumes
in China. JLR's FY16-17 profitability could be eroded by slowing
volume growth in the hitherto-robust developed markets, larger-
than-expected volume declines in China and emerging markets,
and/or weak sales momentum for new/refreshed products to be rolled
out in 2016.

Flat Volume Growth in FY16: Under Fitch's base case scenario,
Fitch expects JLR's retail volume growth to be flat from FY15
(when retail volumes rose by 6% from FY14 to 462,209 vehicles),
with growth in the UK, Europe, and North America offsetting
weakness in China and emerging markets. In 1QFY16, double-digit
volume growth in the developed markets offset a drop in China and
continued weakness in emerging markets.

Limited Scale, Product Diversity: JLR's scale and range of
products are smaller than its premium segment peers, which raise
the risk of volatility in earnings and cash flow, and constrain
its business profile. However, JLR's current heavy investments, if
successfully executed, will increase its product breadth and
volume over the medium term.

Elevated Capex from Expansion Phase: Fitch expects the company's
investments in capacity expansion, engine manufacturing, vehicle
architecture and new technologies to meet carbon dioxide emission
requirements will contribute to negative free cash flow in
FY16-17. Fitch has assumed capex of GBP3.6 billion in FY16 (FY15:
GBP2.9 billion) and at least GBP3 billion in FY17, with continued
modest dividends under our base case scenario.

Robust Financial Profile, Liquidity: Fitch expects JLR to maintain
a strong financial profile and ample liquidity buffer in FY16-17.
Fitch expects FFO-adjusted gross leverage and FFO-adjusted net
leverage to remain below 1.5x and 0.5x respectively (FY15: 0.7 and
-0.1 respectively).

Geographic Diversification: JLR's efforts over the last five years
have helped it to achieve a more balanced geographic mix.
Currently 55% of sales by volume are to developed markets and 45%
to developing markets. JLR's growth in China has been rapid and it
is the fourth-largest automaker in the premium segment by volumes
after Audi, BMW and Mercedes. China formed 25% of JLR's retail
sales volumes in FY15. As a result, the company is
exposed -- in the short-term -- to weak or falling demand for
premium vehicles stemming from a slowdown of the Chinese economy.
Competition has also intensified among premium automakers, causing
further margin pressure. However, Fitch remains positive on the
long-term growth potential of the market, in which the company is

Fuel Efficiency Requirements: Tightening carbon dioxide emission
requirements in both developed and developing countries remain a
challenge for JLR, as its product portfolio is currently weighted
towards larger, less fuel-efficient SUVs. A successful broadening
of its product line to include more compact, fuel-efficient models
(such as the Jaguar XE) would reduce its exposure to the risk of
evolving environmental legislation.


Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer

-- Flat retail sales volume growth in FY16;
-- EBIT margin of around 8% in FY16;
-- Capex of GBP3.6bn in FY16;
-- Continued modest dividends of around GBP150m in FY16


Positive: Future developments that may collectively or
individually lead to a rating upgrade include:

-- Sustained positive FCF, combined with EBIT margin of at least
-- A strengthening of the product portfolio (breadth and volume)
    and successful implementation of the current expansion phase,
    a key part of which is the successful launch and execution of
    the Jaguar XE compact sedan model.

Negative: Future developments that may collectively or
individually lead to a change in the Outlook to Stable include:

-- Failure to strengthen the breadth and volume of the product
-- Significant deterioration in key credit metrics including
    FFO-adjusted net leverage above 2.5x and or a material
    weakening of JLR's liquidity position;
-- Problems with operational execution and/or decreasing market


Jaguar Land Rover Automotive plc

  Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-', Outlook

  Senior unsecured rating affirmed at 'BB-'

VOUGEOT BIDCO: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Remains Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating on U.K.-based cinema operator
Vougeot Bidco PLC (Vue).  The outlook remains stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its issue rating on the super
senior secured GBP50 million revolving credit facility (RCF) at
'BB-' and the recovery rating at '1', indicating S&P's expectation
of a very high recovery (90%-100%) in the event of a payment
default.  S&P also affirmed the 'B' issue rating on the GBP300
million fixed rate senior secured notes and the EUR360 million
floating rate senior secured notes.  The '4' recovery rating on
these notes indicates S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%)
recovery in the event of a default, in the higher half of the

The affirmation reflects S&P's assessment of the company's "fair"
business risk profile, and its "highly leveraged" financial risk
profile, underpinned by S&P's Financial Sponsor-6 assessment of
Vue's financial policy.

Following S&P's review of the full documentation, it has revised
our treatment of about GBP600 million of Vue's subordinated
shareholder loans and preference shares (together: shareholder
instruments), all of which are subordinated and do not require
payment of interest in cash.  S&P has added this amount to its
adjusted debt calculation.  This change has not affected S&P's
assessment of the company's financial risk profile or liquidity.

At the same time, S&P includes the debt raised by Vougeot Midco
outside Vougeot Bidco's restricted group to finance the
acquisition of JT Bioscopen in August 2015, in S&P's calculation
of consolidated leverage and coverage metrics.

S&P estimates that as of financial year ending Nov. 28, 2015,
Vue's debt will mainly comprise about GBP560 million senior
secured fixed- and floating-rate notes and about GBP600 million of
the shareholder instruments provided by the company's
shareholders.  S&P adds a further GBP70 million on account of the
TJB acquisition financing at Midco.  S&P's adjusted debt estimate,
in addition to the aforementioned instruments, includes about
GBP1.1 billion of obligations under operating leases pro forma for

Due to S&P's assumption of limited reported FOCF generated over
the medium term, S&P believes that Standard & Poor's-adjusted
credit metrics for Vue are likely to remain in its "highly
leveraged" financial risk profile category in the next two-to-
three years.

S&P continues to assess Vue's business risk profile as "fair"
under S&P's criteria, at the stronger end of the category.  In
S&P's opinion, the limiting factors are Vue's exposure to
customers' assessment of the film slate, to adverse weather
conditions, and competition from other entertainment providers
(such as sports events and theme parks) -- all of which can have a
strong impact on the group's operating performance.  S&P also
thinks that the sector is highly competitive and exposed to
technology advances that are spawning new entertainment
alternatives, such as video-on-demand and over-the-top television.

These weaknesses are partly offset by the industry's limited
correlation with economic cycles and typically low level of
maintenance capital expenditure (capex), which are largely
discretionary, in S&P's view.  Vue's modern and technologically
advanced portfolio of theaters compares well with those of its
peers.  In addition, its operating efficiency is the highest among
peers with an adjusted EBITDA margin of about 35% or more over the
forecast period to 2017.  S&P sees Vue's geographic
diversification and increasing scale as another supporting factor.

On a Standard & Poor's-adjusted basis, for 2015, S&P estimates
that Vue's debt-to-EBITDA ratio will be 9.5x-10.0x while the
EBITDA-to-interest ratio will be about 1.3x.  These ratios are
7.0x-7.5x and over 5x, respectively, excluding shareholder
instruments.  At the same time, S&P anticipates that, excluding
the effect of operating leases, EBITDA will cover cash interest by
2.0x-2.5x underpinned by S&P's reported EBITDA forecast of GBP105
million-GBP110 million.

Under S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Improvement in admissions due to a strong film slate in
      2015 and 2016.

   -- Annual revenue growth of 5%-7% in the period of fiscal 2015
      to fiscal 2017 (ending November), in line with the trend
      demonstrated over the nine months ended on Aug. 31, 2015
      and pro-forma for the full-year contribution of Space and
      JTB. This corresponds to about 25%-30% growth in fiscal
      2015 on an as-reported basis due to limited contribution of
      Space to financial year 2014 numbers.

   -- Full consolidation of JTB.

   -- EBITDA margin growth by about 100-200 basis points due to
      higher admissions, administrative cost control measures,
      and tight management of rent costs offsetting a dilutive
      effect of integration of Space and higher film rental

   -- Capex of about GBP25 million in 2015 (net of landlord
      contributions) and in the range of GBP40 million-GBP50
      million thereafter.

   -- No further acquisitions.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of over 10.0x in 2015, decreasing
      to 9.5x in 2016 (about 7.5x and 7x, respectively, excluding
      shareholder instruments).

   -- Cash pay and overall leverage moderately reducing over the
      next few years due to an increase in consolidated EBITDA.

   -- Reported EBITDA cash interest coverage (excluding the
      effect from the operating lease obligations and shareholder
      instruments) remaining above 2.0x in the wake of EBITDA

   -- Reported FOCF of about GBP5 million-GBP10 million in 2015,
      increasing to about GBP10 million-GBP20 million thereafter.

The stable outlook for the next 12 months reflects S&P's
expectation that Vue's operating performance will continue
benefitting from the strong film slate in 2015 and 2016, supported
by contribution from local content in Vue's international markets.
S&P also anticipates that the financing arrangement related to JTB
acquisition will not rely on Vue's liquidity due to restrictive
covenants in the RCF and bond documentation.  S&P considers its
forecast of GBP105 million-GBP110 million EBITDA in 2015, on a
reported basis, and more than GBP100 million in the next 12
months, to be commensurate with the 'B' rating.  S&P's outlook
further assumes that the company will generate positive FOCF and
maintain its "adequate" liquidity, as per S&P's criteria.

S&P could lower the rating if, over the next 12 months, Vue was
unable to generate at least GBP100 million EBITDA excluding the
effect of S&P's adjustments.  This could stem from an unexpectedly
weak film slate, accompanied by an inability to cut costs or
unfavorable foreign currency effects.  Vue's inability to generate
FOCF on a reported basis or a weakening of its liquidity position
could also trigger a downgrade.  Likewise, a negative rating
action could follow an inability to refinance the debt raised to
finance the JTB acquisition in a timely manner.  A significant
increase in leverage resulting from the company's aggressive
pursuit of growth via debt-funded acquisitions could also put
pressure on the ratings.

S&P sees limited upside potential for the rating because of the
relatively high level of leverage over the next 12 months and
S&P's FS-6 assessment of its financial policy.  However, S&P could
raise the rating on Vue if strong operating performance led to an
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio approaching 5x.  Any upgrade would
depend on the tangible evidence of the company exercising a less
aggressive financial policy, sustainably generating material FOCF,
and maintaining a liquidity position at least "adequate", as S&P's
criteria defines the term.

VOYAGE BIDCO: Fitch Assigns 'B' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has assigned a Long-Term Issuer Default Rating of
'B' to Voyage Bidco Limited (Voyage). Fitch affirms and withdraws
the rating on Voyage Holding Limited at 'B' as it has been
replaced by Voyage Bidco Limited (BidCo) rated 'B' as the highest
consolidated entity within the restricted group. Fitch also
affirms the senior secured and second lien notes for Voyage BondCo
plc at 'BB'/'RR1'/100% and 'CCC+'/'RR6'/8% respectively. The
Outlook is Stable.

The rating reflects Voyage's position as the largest independent
provider of support to people with learning disabilities in the
UK, its focus on high acuity care and its relative resilience to
local authorities funding pressure. Factors constraining the
rating are its high leverage, high dependence on local authority
funding, tightening regulation and rising staff costs.

The ratings do not reflect the announced introduction of a
National Living Wage from April 2016. Indeed Britain's biggest
care home providers are currently in discussions with the
government and local authorities to address the unsustainable
funding gap that will result from the increase in wages. The
November 2015 British government spending review is expected to
address this issue.


Solid Market Positioning

Voyage's IDR is supported by its positioning as the largest
independent provider of support to people with learning
disabilities in the UK. Occupancy levels tend to be high at over
90%, with average lengths of stay of around nine years due to the
high acuity, non-discretionary nature of the services it provides.
The UK learning disabilities market is a highly fragmented market
dominated by independent providers.

Focus on High Acuity

The ratings also reflect Voyages' focus on high acuity non-
discretionary services, which is relatively resistant to the
funding cuts of local authorities and the associated trend towards
less costly options such as supported living and domiciliary care.

Downstream Challenges

Voyage is constrained by its high dependence on local-authority
funding which accounts for almost 82% of revenue. Fitch expects
sub-inflation fee uplifts funded by local authorities to remain
unchanged over the rating horizon due to budget constraints,
leading to stretched margins.

Relatively Weak Credit Metrics

Fitch expects funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage of
around 6.5x at financial year ending March 31, 2016 (FY16)
pointing towards low headroom under our rating guidance, although
we expect this to improve to around 6.2x by FY18. Fitch also
expects FFO fixed charge coverage of around 1.8x over the rating
horizon, which is slightly below the median of 2.0x for its
rating. A significant portion of Voyage's cash flow generation is
used to pay interest on the notes and expenses related to
maintenance capex.

Recovery Prospects

In its recovery analysis, Fitch adopted the liquidation value
approach as the resultant enterprise value is higher than the
going concern enterprise value, primarily derived from the group's
freehold and long leasehold properties. Fitch believes that a 30%
discount on the assets' latest market valuation dated May 2014 is
fair in a distress case.

The recovery expectation for the senior secured notes is high at
'RR1'/100% while the recovery expectation on the second lien notes
is 'RR6'/8%.


Fitch's expectations are based on the agency's internally
produced, conservative rating case forecasts. They do not
represent the forecasts of rated issuers individually or in
aggregate. Key Fitch forecast assumptions include the following.

-- Group revenue increasing by around 1% year-on-year for FY16-18
driven by stable occupancy rates together with increase in average
weekly fee of around 1% each year in the registered homes
division, which generated about 76% of Voyage's revenues at FY15.

-- Group EBITDA margins declining at 20.3% in FY16 and remaining
almost stable thereafter mainly due to an increase in agency costs
in FY16.

-- Capex of around 6% of sales. Capex is essentially maintenance
capex which is necessary for the reputation and the occupancy rate
of the business.
-- Continued positive free cash flow generation of around 3.5% of



Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to positive rating action include:

-- FFO adjusted leverage of 6.0x (net 5.0x) or below on a
    sustained basis;
-- FFO fixed charge coverage above 2.5x;
-- Sustained FCF generation of GBP 20m or more translating into
    FCF margin in the high single digits as percentage of sales.


Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action include:

-- FFO adjusted leverage above 7.0x (net 6.5x);
-- FFO fixed charge coverage below 1.5x;
-- Free cash flow margin below 3% on a sustained basis.


Liquidity is satisfactory with no debt maturity until 2018. In
2014, Voyage increased headroom under its revolving credit
facility to GBP45 million from GBP30 million maturing in August
2018. As per the end of June 2015, the company had a cash balance
available of GBP12 million together with GBP45m of fully undrawn
revolving credit.

Voyage's GBP222 million senior secured notes mature in August
2018. Its GBP50 million second lien notes mature in February 2019.


Voyage Bidco Limited
-- Long Term IDR: Assigned new rating of 'B';

Voyage Holding Limited
-- Long Term IDR: Affirmed and Withdrawn IDR of 'B';

Voyage Care BondCo PLC
-- Senior secured notes: Affirmed at 'BB'/'RR1'/100%;
-- Second lien notes: Affirmed at 'CCC+'/'RR6'/8%;

* UK: Scottish Business Failures Fall to Pre-Recession Levels
Gareth Mackie at The Scotsman, citing figures from accounting firm
KPMG, reports that the number of Scottish companies going out of
business has fallen to pre-recession levels.

Between July and September, there were 177 corporate insolvency
appointments, a fall of 30% compared to the same period a year
earlier and down 17% on the previous quarter, The Scotsman

However, the number of administrations -- which typically affect
larger organizations -- increased by 27% year-on-year to 19, The
Scotsman notes.

In contrast, liquidations, which tend to affect smaller
businesses, decreased by 34% from a year earlier to 158, The
Scotsman discloses.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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