TCREUR_Public/151110.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, November 10, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 222

                            Headlines

A U S T R I A

HETA ASSET: Selects Citigroup, JPMorgan to Manage Tender Offer


A Z E R B A I J A N

AZERBAIJAN BANKS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 4 Private Institutions


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

BH SECURITIES: Moody's Withdraws Ba1.cz Nat'l. Scale Rating


F I N L A N D

UPM-KYMMENE: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Ratings, Outlook Stable


F R A N C E

FAURECIA SA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Rating
HORIZON HOLDINGS I: S&P Assigns 'B+' CCR, Outlook Stable


G E R M A N Y

SCOUT24 AG: S&P Hikes Corp. Credit Rating to B+, Outlook Stable
SOLVIS GMBH: Andlinger & Co Acquires Solar Firm


G R E E C E

GREECE: Fitch Says Bank Recap Not Enough to Restore Stability


H U N G A R Y

HUNGARY: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba1 Rating to Positive
PAPAI HUS: Local Government Commences Liquidation Procedure


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO VIII: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
AVOCA CLO XV: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Class F Notes
CORK STREET: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba2' Rating to Class D Notes
CORK STREET: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EXP)sf' Rating to Class D Debt
HARVEST CLO IV: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Ratings on Two Note Classes


L U X E M B O U R G

PENTA CLO 1: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'


M A L T A

CASSAR AND SCHEMBRI: Court Orders Liquidation Over Debts


N E T H E R L A N D S

HARBOURMASTER CLO 10: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class B2 Notes
MALIN CLO: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes


P O R T U G A L

ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Hybrid Secs.


R O M A N I A

ASESOFT INTERNATIONAL: Enters Insolvency Process


R U S S I A

BANK URALSIB: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
INVESTMENT TRADE: Moody's Hikes Nat'l. Deposit Rating to Caa1.ru
INVESTMENT TRADE: Moody's Hikes Global Deposit Rating to Caa3
RUSSIAN STANDARD: Moody's Confirms B3 National Deposit Rating
RUSSIAN STANDARD: Moody's Confirms LT Caa2 Deposit Ratings

TRANSAERO AIRLINES: MAK Suspends Boeing 737 Flight Certificates


T U R K E Y

TURKEY: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Ratings; Outlook Neg
YUKSEL INSAAT: Investor Group Challenges Restructuring Plan


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AVOCA CLO IV: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Def Notes to 'B+'
BOLTON WANDERERS: Denies Possible Administration
CENTRIX SOFTWARE: Seeks Buyer After Entering Administration
CHICHESTER HONDA: In Administration, Stocks Moved Out of the Shop
CITY LINK: Hopelessly Insolvent Before Christmas, Court Hears

CLIMATE ENERGY: Thrift Energy Hires Firm's Terminated Employees
GLOBO PLC: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'D'
HARLEY CURTAIN: Faces Financial Difficulties Over Contract Issues
INFINIS PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' IDR, Outlook Stable
NYRSTAR: To Raise EUR275-Mil. Via Share Offering to Cut Debt

RANGERS FOOTBALL: Says Ibrox Tax Case Ruling No Impact on Club
THPA FINANCE: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'B'


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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HETA ASSET: Selects Citigroup, JPMorgan to Manage Tender Offer
--------------------------------------------------------------
Alexander Weber at Bloomberg News reports that Austrian
authorities have picked Citigroup Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co.
to manage a planned tender offer for EUR11 billion (US$12.5
billion) of Heta Asset Resolution AG bonds.

Heta is managing the remnants of Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank
International AG, one of the most damaging Austrian bank failures
after the 2008 financial crisis, Bloomberg discloses.  It has
contributed to Austria losing two AAA credit ratings and is
threatening the province of Carinthia with insolvency as the
former Hypo Alpe owner guaranteed bonds exceeding four years of
its tax revenue, Bloomberg states.

According to Bloomberg, two people familiar with the matter said
the banks were picked this week after a pitch that started two
weeks ago.  Bloomberg notes that one of the people said their fee
will be contingent on the bond purchase being successful.

Heta Asset Resolution AG is a wind-down company owned by the
Republic of Austria.  Its statutory task is to dispose of the
non-performing portion of Hypo Alpe Adria, nationalized in 2009,
as effectively as possible while preserving value.



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A Z E R B A I J A N
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AZERBAIJAN BANKS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 4 Private Institutions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term foreign currency Issuer
Default Ratings of Expressbank (EB), Unibank's (Uni) and
Demirbank's (Demir) at 'B', and Atabank (AB) at 'B-'.  The
Outlooks on all four banks are Stable.

At the same time Fitch has downgraded the IDR of Azerbaijan-based
AGBank (AGB) to 'CCC' from 'B-' and removed it from Rating Watch
Negative (RWN).  Fitch placed AGB's ratings on RWN in March 2015
due to a breach of regulatory capital adequacy as a result of a
sharp 34% Azerbaijani manat devaluation against foreign
currencies.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - ALL BANKS IDRS AND VIABILITY RATINGS (VRS)

The affirmation of Uni, Demir, EB and AB's ratings with Stable
Outlooks reflects the only moderate deterioration of their
financial profiles amid weaker commodity-driven economic
environment suffering from an oil price shock.  There are signs
of asset quality deterioration in the banking sector, with
further downside risks stemming from (i) an anticipated reduction
in government spending; (ii) the significant dollarization of
loans (Uni - 48% of end-1H15 loans; Demir - 34%, more moderate at
the other two banks), which should be viewed in context of the
34% local currency devaluation in February 2015; and (iii)
expected seasoning of retail and micro-loan portfolios rapidly
originated in 2013-2014.  However, in the agency's view, these
four bank's solid pre-impairment profits and capital buffers
would be sufficient to cover heightened asset quality risks in
the near term.  Also, some cyclicality in asset quality and
performance is already factored into the banks' relatively low
ratings.

The one-notch higher rating at Uni, Demir and EB relative to AB
reflects the somewhat stronger loss-absorption capacity at these
three banks due to either healthier pre-impairment profitability
(Uni, Demir) or a more solid capital buffer (EB).

The downgrade of AGB's ratings to 'CCC' reflects further
aggravation of deep asset quality problems, negative pre-
impairment profitability on a cash basis, and a significant
weakening of the capital position (the bank uses forbearance for
being incompliant with minimal regulatory capital requirements)
as a result of manat devaluation, which in the currently
difficult operating environment threatens the viability of the
bank's business model.

For Uni and EB, the main credit risk stems from their large
unsecured consumer finance loan books with respective non-
performing loans (NPLs, 90 days overdue) origination (defined as
increase in NPLs plus write offs divided by average performing
loans) surging to 10%-11% in 1H15 from 3%-4% in 2014.  However,
their solid pre-impairment profitability of 12% and 7% of average
loans, respectively, was sufficient to cover these risks.  The
banks' end-1H15 NPLs were 11%, 96% well covered by reserves in
Uni, and 1.4%, 114% covered by reserves in EB.  Credit risks at
EB are also mitigated by it sizeable capital buffer (Fitch Core
Capital (FCC) ratio of 45% at end-1H15), although it is somewhat
undermined by a lumpy related party exposure (67% of end-1H15
FCC).  Uni's capitalization is moderate with an FCC ratio of 11%
at end-1H15.

Demir focuses on SME and micro-loans with small average tickets
and reasonable collateral coverage and therefore its asset
quality has so far been relatively resilient, as reflected in NPL
origination of around 5.5% in 1H15-2014.  This compares with its
pre-impairment profit of 7.2% of average performing loans in
1H15. End-1H15 NPLs were 10%, 70% reserved.  Demir's capital
buffer is only moderate, with the end-1H15 FCC ratio equaling
10%.

AB's NPLs were broadly flat in 1H15 at 6.6% and 32% reserved.
However, its asset quality is potentially vulnerable due to
significant exposure to construction and other project finance
loans (11% of loans) with sizeable grace periods on principal and
a limited track record of loan redemptions.  AB's pre-impairment
profitability (if adjusted by AZN10m translation gain) is rather
modest with 2.9% of average loans.  Capital is adequate, as
expressed by a reasonable 17.5% FCC ratio at end-1H15.

AGB had significant asset quality issues even before the recent
economic slowdown/devaluation with NPLs of 29% at end-1H15 (30%
at end-2014) weakly 40% covered by reserves.  The bank's pre-
impairment profit on a cash basis (net of accrued interest which
is not received in cash) has historically been negative, while
its capital position is extremely weak as expressed by a low 6.6%
FCC ratio at end-1H15 and total regulatory capital ratio (8.6%)
being below the required minimum (the bank has utilized
regulatory forbearance since February 2015).  According to
management, the shareholders are likely to inject AZN5 million by
end-2015 and another AZN5 mil. in 1H16, which is still below an
estimated AZN18 million needed to bring the ratios in compliance.

Net profitability has dampened across the board.  Uni and Demir
posted some losses in 1H15, albeit mostly due to one-off
translation losses, while on a recurring basis Fitch estimates
that both were still above break-even.  EB and AB showed moderate
net profits, as they were less affected by manat devaluation.  AG
incurred a large foreign currency translation loss eating deeply
into its equity.

There was a moderate 6% outflow (after adjusted for a 34%
currency devaluation in February) of retail deposits from the
sector in 1H15 with the reviewed banks being similarly affected.
Dollarisation of deposits increased to 70% at end-1H15 from 40%
at end-2014 resulting in a manat liquidity shortage.  More
importantly, it also resulted in a structural inability to hedge
the short currency position by any other means except issuing
foreign currency loans, increasing future credit risks.  As a
result, many banks in the sector operate with unhedged short FX
positions being exposed to significant one-off translation losses
in case of further manat devaluation.  At end-1H15, the biggest
short FX positions were in AGB (3x regulatory capital), Demir
(46%) and Uni (38%), although Fitch estimates the latter two
banks can withstand at least 30% devaluation before breaching
capital requirements.  In addition, Demir's open short currency
position has subsequently reduced to below 20% the capital at the
beginning of November.  AB and EB have minimal open currency
positions, so are least exposed.

Liquidity buffers are comfortable and sufficient to withstand
moderate deposit outflows, although AZN-denominated liquidity in
the sector is fairly tight at present due to the limited inflow
of AZN-denominated funding.  Refinancing risks are modest with
fairly high loans/deposits ratios at Demir (187% at end-1H15) and
Uni (145%) mainly reflecting funding from local state-related
institutions and IFIs, which is relatively sticky.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - ALL BANKS IDRS AND VRS

Negative rating action could be triggered by significant asset
quality deterioration at any of the banks resulting in
considerable impairment losses should these exceed the pre-
impairment profit and erode capital.  Potential further currency
devaluation could also lead to selective downgrades if it results
in the capital base erosion and/or significant funding outflows.

Positive rating action would require an improvement of operating
environment, moderation of downside asset quality risks, and an
extended track record of reasonable performance through the
credit cycle.  An upgrade of AGB would also require a significant
capital replenishment sufficient to bring the bank in compliance
with regulatory capital adequacy rules.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND RATING SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATINGS
(SRS) and SUPPORT RATING FLOORS (SRFS)

The SRFs of 'No Floor' and Support Ratings of '5' for each of the
banks reflect their relatively limited scale of operations and
market share.  Although Fitch expects some regulatory forbearance
to be available for these banks, in case of need, any
extraordinary direct capital support from the Azerbaijan
authorities cannot be relied upon, in the agency's view.  The
potential for support from banks' private shareholders is not
factored into the ratings.  Fitch believes that the revision of
banks' SR and SRFs is unlikely in the near-term.

The rating actions are:

Unibank:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B', Outlook Stable
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at No Floor

Demirbank:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B', Outlook Stable
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at No Floor

Expressbank:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B', Outlook Stable
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Atabank:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-', Outlook
Stable
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at No Floor

AGBank:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B-';
   Off RWN
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'C' from 'B';
   Off RWN
  Viability Rating: downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b-'; Off RWN
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'



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BH SECURITIES: Moody's Withdraws Ba1.cz Nat'l. Scale Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the Ba1.cz long-term
national scale rating (NSR), of BH Securities, a.s..  At the time
of withdrawal, the aforementioned rating carried a stable
outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.



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UPM-KYMMENE: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Ratings, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and
short-term ratings on Finland-based forest and paper products
group UPM-Kymmene Corp. (UPM).  The outlook is stable.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB+' rating on UPM's senior unsecured
debt. The recovery rating is unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%; higher half of the range)
recovery in the event of a payment default.

The affirmation follows UPM's solid performance in 2015 to date.
In S&P's opinion, this shows that UPM is managing the downturn in
paper markets relatively well and that cash flow generation
remains strong.  Despite low profitability for the European paper
business, S&P assess that UPM's financial credit metrics are now
in line with S&P's "intermediate" financial risk category, up
from "significant" previously.  As management has indicated that
investment levels will fall below the depreciation level in 2016,
S&P thinks that credit metrics could strengthen further in the
coming year.  As a result of these improvements, UPM now has
large headroom under its stated financial policy to maintain
gearing below 90% (currently about 30%).  Still, S&P thinks that
the group's financial policy and strategic plan is somewhat
unclear, and S&P lacks guidance as to whether UPM will maintain
financial risk at this level or whether the group will take
advantage of the currently low gearing to engage in shareholder
friendly actions and increase leverage.  S&P considers event risk
as relatively high and believe it is likely that UPM could engage
in opportunistic mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to complement its
current portfolio.  As a result, S&P applies a one-notch negative
adjustment to the 'bbb-' anchor using the financial policy
modifier, which results in S&P's 'BB+' long-term rating on UPM.

"Without any M&A or extraordinary dividends, we think that UPM
will be able to maintain a ratio of funds from operations (FFO)
to debt above 30% in the coming years, even taking into account
somewhat lower pulp prices and the continued challenging
environment for the European paper business.  The group's
financial risk profile is also supported by our expectation of
positive discretionary cash flow (DCF) generation, low interest
costs, and overall prudent liquidity management.  We view these
strengths as mitigated by the exposure of its pulp and paper
segments to highly volatile and cyclical cash flow generation and
the group's history of recurring periods of pressured credit
metrics," S&P said.

"Our assessment of UPM's business risk profile is supported by
the large and increasing proportion of earnings stemming from its
very profitable pulp and energy operations.  This is derived from
its low-cost production assets of pulp mills in Uruguay and
Finland, its hydropower assets, and its shareholding in Finnish
power generator Pohjolan Voima Oy.  It is further supported by
UPM's position as one of the world's largest forest and paper
products groups, which brings scale and diversification benefits,
and its better-than-average cost position in the paper division.
These strengths are partly offset by the inherent cyclicality
present in several of UPM's business segments, including pulp and
energy, and the structurally challenging operating environment
for its European and North American paper operations," S&P noted.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that UPM's cost-cutting
program and expansionary investments will lead to an improving
business mix, adding stability to UPM's business risk profile.
It further reflects S&P's expectation that UPM's adjusted credit
metrics will remain well above our threshold for the current
financial risk profile (FFO to debt of above 20% and debt to
EBITDA of below 4.0x).

S&P could raise the rating if it thinks that UPM's financial risk
profile has permanently strengthened and that the group has a
financial policy fully in line with maintaining a 'BBB-' rating.
S&P would consider a ratio of FFO to debt of sustainably above
30% as commensurate with a 'BBB-' rating.

Downside pressure to the ratings in unlikely over the coming 12
months, due to S&P's base-case forecast that indicates there will
be large headroom for the rating.  S&P could, however, lower the
rating if it thought that UPM's credit metrics would weaken
significantly from the current level, with FFO to debt falling
below 20%, for example as a result of deteriorating operating
performance and shareholder friendly actions.  Downside rating
pressure could also emerge from a sharp deterioration in group
profitability, with low prospects of returning to the current
levels, leading S&P to revise the business risk profile
downwards, although it thinks that is less likely over the next
two years.



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FAURECIA SA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Faurecia's S.A.'s Long-term Issuer
Default Rating and senior unsecured debt at 'BB-'.  The Outlook
on the Long-term IDR is Stable.

The ratings reflect Faurecia's business profile, which Fitch
considers well positioned in the 'BB' category.  However, the
ratings also incorporate weak financial ratios, which drag the
overall credit profile to the low end of the 'BB' rating
category.

Revenue growth and operating margin strengthened in 2014 and
Fitch expects further improvement in 2015 and 2016.  However,
cash generation and other key credit metrics remain weak for the
rating category.  In particular, we expect free cash flow (FCF)
to increase to only about 1% in 2015 and 2016, from negative 1.1%
in 2014.  Faurecia's financial structure was also commensurate
with the 'B' category at end-2014 although Fitch projects a
gradual decrease of funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net
leverage to just above 2x at end-2015, from 3.1x at end-2014.
This should provide more headroom to the ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improving Profitability, Weak FCF

The operating margin recovered in 2014 and Fitch expects it to
improve further to 4.3% in 2015 although this remains relatively
weak for the group's business.  Fitch projects the operating
margin will increase to about 5% by 2017 which would be more in
line with close peers and the 'BB' rating category.

Cash generation is also improving to levels more commensurate
with the 'BB' category with the funds from operations (FFO)
margin increasing to more than 5.0% in 2015, from 3.9% in 2014
and 2.9% in 2013.  The FCF margin remains weak for the rating
(negative 1.1% in 2014) after adjusting for derecognized trade
receivables that boosted working capital and, in turn cash from
operations (CFO) and FCF, but which Fitch considers as a change
in debt. However, Fitch projects the FCF margin will become
positive in 2015 and increase gradually to about 1.5% in 2017.

Weak Financial Structure

Faurecia's financial structure was commensurate with the 'B'
category at end-2014, including gross and net leverage at 3.8x
and 3.1x, respectively, and CFO on debt around 20%.  However,
positive FCF and higher FFO will strengthen the financial
structure as we expect net leverage to decline to 2.2x at end-
2015 and less than 2.0x at end-2016 and CFO on debt to increase
to more than 40% at end-2016.  Fitch adjusts reported debt for
derecognized trade receivables (EUR742 million at end-2014) and
operating leases (EUR488 million).

Leading Market Positions

Faurecia's ratings are supported by its diversification, size and
leading market positions as the seventh largest global automotive
supplier.  Its large and diversified portfolio is a strength in
the global automotive market, which is being reshaped by the
development of global platforms and concentration among large
manufacturers.  Fitch also believes that the group is well
positioned in some fast-growing segments to outperform the
overall auto supply market, notably by offering products
increasing the fuel efficiency of its customers' vehicles.

Sound Diversification

Faurecia's healthy diversification by product, customer and
geography can smooth the potential sales decline in one
particular region or lower orders from one specific manufacturer.
Its broad industrial footprint matching its customers' production
sites and needs enables Faurecia to follow its customers in their
international expansion.

Weak Linkage with PSA

Fitch applied its Parent and Subsidiary Rating Linkage (PSL)
methodology and assessed that Faurecia has a slightly weaker
credit profile compared with its parent Peugeot SA (51.2% stake
and 67.3% voting rights).  Fitch also deems the legal,
operational and strategic ties between the two entities weak
enough to rate Faurecia on a standalone basis.

Limited Effect from Volkswagen Scandal

Fitch does not foresee any direct and immediate impact from the
Volkswagen emission test manipulations on Faurecia.  However,
longer-term uncertainty remains about the potential consequences
for carmakers and suppliers of a potential shift from diesel to
gasoline engines, hybrid and electric vehicles.  Nonetheless, the
extent and time frame of these effects on the broad auto industry
is unclear at this stage.  In addition, Faurecia's sales to
Volkswagen related to diesel vehicles in the US are not material
in view of Faurecia's total size and we believe that business at
risk from potential lower sales to Volkswagen could be
compensated by higher revenue from other customers.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Faurecia
include:

   -- Revenues to increase by more than 11% in 2015 and
      approximately 4-5% in 2016 and 2017;

   -- Operating margins to trend toward 5% by 2017;

   -- Restructuring cash outflows to remain around EUR70m each
       year over 2015-2017;

   -- Capex of around 4.4% of revenue over 2015-2017;

   -- Dividend pay-out ratio of around 20%;

   -- Conversion of the convertible bonds in 2016.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that could, individually or
collectively, lead to a downgrade include:

   -- Inability to sustain the improvement in profitability and
      cash generation, leading in particular to operating margins
      remaining below 3%

   -- FCF margins remaining below 1%

   -- Inability to sustain the decrease in leverage, leading in
      particular to FFO adjusted net leverage remaining above 3x
      (2014: 3.1x, 2015E: 2.2x, 2016E: 1.6x)

   -- Deteriorating liquidity, notably through difficult or
      expensive refinancing

Positive: Future developments that could, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

   -- Sustained increase of operating margins above 5% (2014:
      3.6%, 2015E: 4.3%, 2016E: 4.6%)

   -- Sustained increase of FCF margins above 2% (2014: -1.1%,
      2015E: 0.8%, 2016E: 1.0%)

LIQUIDITY

Faurecia's liquidity is sound, supported by EUR630m of readily
available cash according to Fitch's adjustments for minimum
operational cash of about EUR0.4 billion at end-2014.  This
covers short-term debt of EUR0.5 billion at end-June 2015.  Total
committed and unutilized credit lines were EUR1.4 billion at end-
June 2015.


HORIZON HOLDINGS I: S&P Assigns 'B+' CCR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it assigned its 'B+'
long-term corporate credit ratings to Horizon Holdings I
(Verallia), the France-based financial holding company for glass
packaging manufacturer Verallia, as well as to its finance
subsidiary Horizon Holdings III S.A.S.  The outlook on these
ratings is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B+' issue and '3' recovery
ratings to the senior secured EUR200 million revolving credit
facility (RCF), EUR1,337 million term loan B, and EUR300 million
senior secured notes issued by Horizon Holdings III S.A.S.  This
reflects S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-70%) for
the secured lenders in the event of a payment default.  S&P
expects recovery prospects to be in the higher half of the range.

S&P also assigned its 'B-' issue rating to the EUR225 million
senior unsecured notes issued by Horizon Holdings I S.A.S., two
notches below the corporate credit rating (CCR).  This reflects
S&P's recovery rating of '6' and its expectation of negligible
recovery (0%-10%) for the unsecured noteholders in the event of a
payment default.

These ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings S&P
assigned on July 16, 2015 and although the various debt tranches
differ from S&P's initial assumptions, total debt remains the
same.

The ratings on Horizon Holdings I and core finance subsidiary
Horizon Holdings III reflect S&P's assessment of Verallia's
business risk profile as "fair" and its financial risk profile as
"highly leveraged."

The acquisition, which places Verallia at an enterprise value of
about EUR2.9 billion, has been financed by the placement of a
EUR1,337 million term loan B, EUR300 million of senior secured
notes, and EUR225 million of senior unsecured notes.  The group
will also utilize EUR250 million of nonrecourse factoring that
S&P treats as debt in our adjustments.  The remainder, around
EUR575 million, is new equity, of which 10% has been provided by
French sovereign investment fund Bpi France Participations, and
90% by Apollo.  This equity has been exchanged for shareholder
loans that S&P believes meet its criteria for equity treatment.
S&P estimates that the group will report Standard & Poor's-
adjusted debt to EBITDA of just over 5x at the close of the
transaction, trending towards 4.7x over the next two years.

Verallia has leading market positions in its core European
markets and longstanding relationships with a broad and
diversified customer base.  It is the third-largest glass
packaging company worldwide, after Owens-Illinois and Ardagh
Glass.  The top three players' margins are similar, but they have
recently come under pressure from smaller regional players who
benefit from a lower cost base, depending on where their
production assets are located. Nevertheless, S&P believes that
industry fundamentals are solid, supported by a significant
exposure to relatively stable food and beverage consumption, and
increasing demand for recyclable and premium packaging.

These strengths are partly offset by Verallia's relatively
undiversified product focus on glass packaging, some margin
pressure due to recent operational issues, and its high
geographic concentration in Europe (the source of approximately
90% of sales in 2014), where the market environment and
macroeconomic demand drivers are still sluggish.

The combination of S&P's "fair" business risk profile and "highly
leveraged" financial risk profile assessments lead to an Anchor -
-
S&P's initial analytical outcome -- of 'b'.  S&P forecasts that
Verallia's credit metrics will be at the top end of the "highly
leveraged" financial risk category, and S&P therefore applies an
upward adjustment to the anchor under its comparable rating
analysis modifier, resulting in the 'B+' rating.

S&P's base case, which has not changed materially since it
assigned the preliminary ratings on July 16, 2015, assumes:

   -- Revenues growth in 2015 and 2016 of approximately 3%-4% as
      a result of organic volume growth and stabilizing pricing
      in Europe; and

   -- Improving margins as a result of cost reduction measures
      and operating leverage through higher capacity utilization,
      resulting in the adjusted EBITDA margin improving to over
      17% over next two years, up from 15.9% in 2014.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Debt to EBITDA of just over 5x for 2015, which S&P
      forecasts will trend downward to around 4.7x over the next
      couple of years, driven by improving earnings;

   -- Relatively stable funds from operations (FFO) to debt at
      around 13%;

   -- Positive discretionary cash flow generation, despite
      significant capital expenditure (capex); and

   -- Sound EBITDA and FFO cash interest coverage of over 4x.

S&P has not included approximately EUR575 million of shareholder
loans in its calculation of the adjusted leverage ratio, as they
satisfy all the requirements to be treated as equity in its
criteria "The Treatment Of Non-Common Equity Financing In
Nonfinancial Corporate Entities."

The outlook on the ratings is stable.  S&P believes that the
growth environment that currently benefits the group's main
markets should continue beyond 2015, resulting in moderate volume
growth and stabilizing prices.  S&P therefore expects that
Verallia should be able to grow revenues and improve its margins
over the rating horizon of 12-18 months, resulting in broadly
stable to slightly improving credit metrics.

S&P could lower the ratings if Verallia were to experience severe
margin pressure, or poorer cash flows, leading to weaker credit
metrics; specifically, debt to EBITDA of more than 5.5x or FFO to
debt of less than 10%.  Rating constraints could also stem from
debt-funded acquisitions or shareholder returns.  S&P could also
consider lowering the ratings following a deterioration of its
assessment of the group's liquidity.

S&P believes that the likelihood of an upgrade is limited at this
stage, because of Verallia's high tolerance for aggressive
financial policies and high leverage owing to the group's
financial sponsor ownership.  An upgrade is therefore more likely
to be driven by an upward reassessment of the group's business
risk profile.  This could be a result of a sustained improvement
in profitability metrics, in particular return on capital over
13% and a track record of low earnings volatility.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


SCOUT24 AG: S&P Hikes Corp. Credit Rating to B+, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on German classified ads operator Scout24 AG to
'B+' from 'B'.  The outlook is stable.

S&P also raised its issue rating on Scout24's senior secured debt
to 'B+' from 'B'.  The recovery rating of '3' reflects S&P's
expectation of meaningful recovery in the lower half of the 50%-
70% range in the event of a payment default.

At the same time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where
S&P placed them with positive implications on Sept. 30, 2015.

The upgrade follows Scout24's successful IPO on the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange on Oct. 1, 2015, and subsequent debt reduction.
Before the IPO, the company converted preference shares that S&P
previously treated as debt into ordinary shares.  The company
collected EUR228 million in gross proceeds from the sale of new
shares as part of the IPO, and it used EUR214 million of the net
proceeds to repay a portion of its term loans.  After the
repayment, the amount outstanding on term loans B and C reduced
to EUR781 million from EUR995 million.  Also, as a result of the
IPO, the shareholding of financial sponsors Hellman & Friedman
and The Blackstone declined to about 50% from 67%, with about 32%
of the shares in free float.

As a result of these changes in the capital structure, S&P has
revised its assessment of Scout24's financial risk profile upward
to "aggressive" from "highly leveraged."  S&P forecasts that
Scout24's Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA will improve,
falling below 5.0x on a sustainable basis, and that adjusted
funds from operations (FFO) to debt will be at about 12% in 2015-
2016.

S&P has also revised its assessment of the company's financial
policy upward to financial sponsor (FS)-5 from FS-6.  This
reflects that Scout24's leverage ratios are now more consistent
with an "aggressive" financial risk profile and S&P's opinion
that the risk of releveraging appears limited.  Following the
reduction of the private-equity sponsors' stake in Scout24 and
the partial debt repayment, S&P thinks that the company's
financial policy will become more predictable and less
aggressive, particularly with respect to shareholder returns.

S&P's 'B+' rating on Scout24 reflects the company's anchor of
'bb-', based on a "fair" business risk profile and an
"aggressive" financial risk profile, combined with a negative
adjustment stemming from S&P's comparable rating analysis.  The
latter reflects S&P's view that Scou24's financial risk profile
is at the weaker end of S&P's "aggressive" category compared with
that of peers'.

S&P continues to regard Scout24's business risk profile as
"fair," owing to the company's well-known brands and dominant
market position in the online real estate classifieds market
through ImmobilienScout24.  S&P believes that Scout24 will
continue to benefit from advertisers' continuous shift toward
online platforms from print media.  These strengths are partly
offset by relatively strong competition in the online classifieds
market and a potential threat from new real estate platforms,
given the company's exposure to risks related to the fast-moving
technological environment.  In S&P's view, Scout24's competitive
position is constrained by AutoScout24's weaker value proposition
in the German cars online classifieds market.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Scout24 will maintain
adjusted leverage below 5x and healthy cash flow generation,
given S&P's assumption of some revenue and EBITDA growth in its
base-case scenario.  The outlook also takes into consideration
Scout24's less-aggressive financial policy after the IPO and the
reduction of the private equity sponsors' shareholding in the
company to about 50% from 67%.

S&P could downgrade Scout24 if the company's leverage were to
increase beyond 5x for a prolonged period, for example, due to a
more aggressive financial policy (including large shareholder
remuneration or acquisitions) or deterioration of operational
performance.  S&P could also lower the rating if the group's cash
generation were to come under pressure.

S&P views an upgrade as remote at present, since it already
factors revenue and EBITDA growth into its base case.  However,
S&P could raise the rating if it believes that adjusted debt to
EBITDA would decline to below 4x as a result of further
deleveraging and the company is committed to this leverage level
or the private equity owners exit and S&P sees ongoing
deleveraging.


SOLVIS GMBH: Andlinger & Co Acquires Solar Firm
-----------------------------------------------
Sun & Wind Energy reports that insolvency proceedings were
initiated against the assets of Solvis GmbH & Co. KG on Oct. 30,
2015.  The creditors' committee has approved the sale of the
company to Andlinger & Company, the report says.

"I am very happy that we have managed to ensure a seamless
transition of business operations and to preserve all jobs at the
Braunschweig location," the report quotes Peter Steuerwald, the
lawyer appointed to be the insolvency administrator, as saying.

According to Sun & Wind Energy, Andlinger's involvement means
that the pioneering solar company Solvis will now have the
necessary resources for future growth. The new company is
financed entirely by equity and is free of debt.

"Our capital investment together with the know-how and the
innovative strength of the Solvis team provides a solid basis for
further development of the company and its product range," the
report quotes Andlinger partner Gerhard Unterganschnigg as saying
in a press release. "In our view, Solvis is a trend-setter for
innovative, sustainable heating systems, and we would like to
explicitly pay tribute to the role that the company has played
together with its reliable installation partners and customers
over the past 25 years."

All employees are to be retained at Solvis GmbH, the report
notes. The previous managing directors Stefan Lindig and Markus
Kube will retain their roles at Solvis.  They emphasise that
Solvis will continue to be a reliable partner for installation
technicians: "Our long-term installation partners and their
customers are very important to us . . . For this reason, we will
continue to honour existing valid agreements regarding guarantee
and warranty cases." This assurance applies expressly to all
pending guarantee and warranty cases that have not yet been
completed, the report adds.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: Fitch Says Bank Recap Not Enough to Restore Stability
-------------------------------------------------------------
The EUR14.4 billion Greek bank recapitalization plan is essential
to strengthen loss absorption buffers but will not, on its own,
be enough to restore financial stability, says Fitch Ratings.
Banking sector viability will remain weak until deeper structural
problems are addressed. Banks hold exceptionally large volumes of
problem loans and funding structures suffer from material
imbalances.

The ECB's comprehensive assessment of Greek banks, announced on
October 31, 2015, identified a capital shortfall of EUR4.4
billion under a baseline scenario and EUR14.4 billion assuming an
adverse scenario. Provided remedial actions are approved for the
banks, Fitch calculates that their average pro-forma common
equity tier 1 (CET 1) ratio will reach 14.8%. Capital injections
will also improve liquidity, particularly if they lead to the
reinstatement of a waiver allowing the ECB to accept Greek bonds
in exchange for ECB funding.

The ECB's review highlights that the four large Greek banks hold
EUR112 billion of non-performing exposures (NPE). This sheer
volume, accounting for 63% of GDP, makes recovery daunting,
especially given continued economic weakness. Prospective reform
of the country's insolvency framework might speed up recoveries.
Reserve coverage of NPEs has improved, but remains low at 53% or
less, considering the continued decline in collateral values.

Greek banks are highly reliant on central bank funding following
EUR116 billion of private-sector deposit outflows since 2009, of
which EUR43 billion was in the last 12 months. Customer behavior
remains highly sensitive to political developments and we believe
that it may take time before confidence in the banking sector
improves sufficiently to allow capital controls to be lifted.

The recapitalization process will likely be completed by end-
2015. The banks intend to cover at least the baseline capital
shortfalls through a combination of liability management
exercises, asset sales, equity issuance and other internal
measures. Fitch believes that certain senior and subordinated
creditors will absorb losses. However, any subsequent bail-in of
privately held senior bonds to cover capital gaps could be
problematic and expose the authorities to compensation claims.

The Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) might participate in
the recapitalization to address any capital shortfalls identified
under the adverse scenario. It might be possible to treat
potential HFSF injections as a precautionary recapitalization
under the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, rather
than as a resolution action, thereby avoiding the need for
authorities to bail-in 8% of the banks' liabilities and own
funds.



=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


HUNGARY: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba1 Rating to Positive
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the Ba1
government bond rating of Hungary to positive from stable.
Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed Hungary's Ba1 rating.

The key drivers for the outlook change are:

   -- Moody's view that the downward trend in the government debt
      stock will likely be sustained in the coming years.  This
      assessment is based on (1) the government's strong
      commitment to limit the budget deficit and maintain primary
      surpluses and its proven track record to deliver on this
      commitment, and (2) the declining share of foreign-currency
      liabilities in the government's debt stock, which renders
      it less susceptible to exchange rate shocks than in the
      past.

   -- The improving economic outlook, as the Hungarian economy's
      external vulnerability has been greatly reduced through the
      resolution of the foreign-currency debt overhang of both
      households and the banking sector.  This in turn should
      have a positive impact on domestic demand.  Moody's also
      believes that greater policy stability, in particular with
      regards to the banking sector, should help revive bank
      lending and support economic growth prospects.

Concurrently, Moody's also affirmed the Ba1 rating for the
National Bank of Hungary (NBH) and changed the outlook to
positive from stable, as Hungary's government is legally
responsible for the payments on NBH's bonds.

Hungary's long-term local-currency bond and deposit ceilings
remain at Baa2.  The long-term foreign-currency bond ceiling and
short-term foreign currency bond ceiling remain at Baa2 and P-2,
respectively.  The long-term and short-term foreign currency bank
deposit ceilings remain at Ba2 and Not Prime (NP), respectively.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR OUTLOOK CHANGE

    --- FIRST DRIVER: DOWNWARD TREND IN GOVERNMENT DEBT RATIO
WILL
        BE SUSTAINED

Moody's expects the government debt ratio to decline to 74.3% of
GDP this year and further to below 73% in 2016.  This compares to
a peak of 81% in 2011.  In the rating agency's view, this
downward trend is more robust than in the past, because the
government has shown its ability and strong commitment to
restrict the headline budget deficit to below 3% of GDP and
maintain primary surpluses on a consistent basis since 2012.
This year, higher-than-expected tax revenues are likely to reduce
the budget deficit below the target of 2.4% of GDP.  The 2016
budget targets a deficit of 2% of GDP, which Moody's considers to
be attainable.  The primary balance will remain in surplus of
above 1% of GDP, ensuring a declining debt trend.

In addition, the government's debt stock is less vulnerable than
in the past to exchange-rate fluctuations, with around 34% of the
stock being denominated in foreign currencies, compared to a peak
of around 50% in 2011.  Moody's expects the foreign-currency
share to decline further next year, probably to around 30% or
even lower, given the ongoing steps undertaken by the government
and central bank to refinance maturing foreign-currency debt with
HUF-denominated bonds and to encourage the domestic banking
sector as well as retail investors to invest in HUF-denominated
government bonds.  A foreign-currency share of around 30% in
total government debt would be lower than many Baa-rated emerging
market peers.  Moody's also notes positively that Hungary has not
been affected by exchange rate volatility during recent emerging
market stress periods, in contrast to earlier such episodes.

   --- SECOND DRIVER: GOOD GROWTH PROSPECTS CAN BE MAINTAINED

Moody's also believes that Hungary's recent positive economic
growth performance can be sustained in the coming years.  This
assessment is based to an important extent on Moody's view that
the resilience of the Hungarian economy has been materially
strengthened through the completion of the foreign-currency loan
conversion program earlier this year.  Households' foreign-
currency debt has been almost completely transformed into
domestic liabilities, which in turn should provide support for
private consumption.  For the banking sector, the reduction in
foreign-currency exposure is also material and Moody's expects
that the improved asset quality will allow the banks to return to
lending to the real economy.  Moreover, the banking sector
benefits from greater policy stability, with the bank tax being
reduced from next year onwards.  In addition, the government has
committed to reduce the state's involvement in the sector and
refrain from any measures that would be detrimental to the
sector.

Greater policy stability is also visible in the fiscal policy
area.  The government has approved its 2016 budget already in
June 2015, in order to provide a high degree of clarity and
predictability over tax and spending policies and to enshrine the
cut in the bank tax.  In the past, drastic changes in economic
policies have negatively affected confidence, bank lending,
investment and ultimately economic growth.  Moody's believes that
going forward real GDP growth rates of 2-2.5% can be sustained.

RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMING THE Ba1 RATING

Despite the recent positive developments and Moody's expectations
that Hungary's key credit metrics will continue to improve, the
public debt ratio is significantly higher than most peers at the
Baa3 rating level and will likely decline only gradually in the
coming years.  In the meantime, the Hungarian government has very
large borrowing requirements, exposing it to higher refinancing
risks than many higher rated peers.  Hungary's gross borrowing
requirements stand at around 20% of GDP per year compared to
Baa3-rated emerging market peers, which typically have borrowing
needs of 5-10% of GDP.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's would consider upgrading Hungary's rating if the
country's economic and fiscal metrics continued to improve,
resulting in a further reduction of the public debt ratio.  In
particular, an upgrade would be dependent on further confirmation
that economic policy-making is more stable than in the past, in
turn supporting sustained economic growth, fiscal consolidation
and a further reduction of external vulnerabilities.

Conversely, downward pressure on the government's bond rating
could arise following (1) signs of a weakened commitment by
policymakers to contain the budget deficit to less than 3% of
GDP; and/or (2) the introduction of policy measures that would
negatively impact the economic growth outlook, which in turn
would endanger the downward trajectory of the government's debt
ratio.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 25,019 (2014 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 3.7% (2014 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): -0.9% (2014 Actual)
Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -2.5% (2014 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: 2.3% (2014 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: [not available]

Level of economic development: High level of economic resilience
Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.

On Nov. 3, 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Hungary, Government of.  The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have increased.  The issuer's
fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile, has
increased.  The issuer has become less susceptible to event
risks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Bond Ratings published in September 2013.


PAPAI HUS: Local Government Commences Liquidation Procedure
-----------------------------------------------------------
Budapest Business Journal, citing national news agency MTI,
reports that liquidation has been initiated against Papai Hus and
the asset manager Papai Vagyonhasznosito es Ertekesito by the
local government of Papa in northwestern Hungary.

According to BBJ, the local government, as cited by MTI, said the
asset manager, which used to be called Papai Hus 1913, reached an
agreement with its creditors in the summer of 2014, but a
reorganization of the company never took place due to a shortage
of capital.

The local council added that the reserves of the companies were
exhausted by November, BBJ notes.

MTI reported that the company has paid its employees' wages due
early in November and is continuing production, BBJ relates.

Papai Hus is a Hungarian meat processing company.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


AVOCA CLO VIII: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Avoca CLO VIII Limited and revised the
Outlook on the class B notes, as:

  EUR236.8 mil. class A1 (ISIN XS0312372112): affirmed at
   'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR52.6 mil. class A2 (ISIN XS0312377772): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable

  EUR34.0 mil. class B (ISIN XS0312378747): affirmed at 'AAsf';
   Outlook revised to Negative from Stable

  EUR30.0 mil. class C (ISIN XS0312379984): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
   Outlook Stable

  EUR21.5 mil. class D (ISIN XS0312380305): affirmed at 'BBsf';
   Outlook Stable

  EUR21.5 mil. class E (ISIN XS0312380727): affirmed at 'Bsf';
   Outlook Stable

  EUR2.8 mil. class U (ISIN 0312381451): affirmed at 'BBsf';
   Outlook Stable

Avoca CLO VIII is a securitization of primarily senior secured
loans, unsecured loans, mezzanine loans and high yield bonds,
actively managed by KKR Credit Advisors (Ireland).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation reflects the stable portfolio performance since
the last review in Dec. 2014.  Natural deleveraging of the
portfolio has led to the amortization of class A1 notes by
EUR61.6 mil., resulting in increased credit enhancement
throughout the capital structure.  Credit enhancement for the
class A1 notes has increased to 43.06% from 38.5% over the past
year and to 30.4% from 27.5% for the class A2 notes.

However, the increased credit enhancement was not sufficient to
fully eliminate the risk of interest shortfalls on the class B
notes.  Ratings in the highest rating categories should be able
to meet timely payment of interest.  While Fitch expects the
asset manager to mitigate this possibility, it is reflected by
the revision of the class B notes' Outlook to Negative.

The transaction exited its reinvestment period in October 2014
and since then can only reinvest unscheduled principal and
proceeds from credit improved or credit impaired assets.

The portfolio's overall credit quality has improved, as
represented by the weighted average rating factor, which has
decreased to 26.4 from 27.6, while the 'CCC' and below bucket
increased to 3.8% from 3.2%.  Overall, portfolio concentration
increased over the past year as a result of amortization.
Exposure to peripheral European assets increased to 13.8% from
9.7%, represented by Italy and Spain and the largest industry now
represents 11.9% of the portfolio, up from 10.3%.

All coverage tests are passing with healthy cushions and none of
the portfolio profile tests are failing.  However, the maximum
weighted average maturity test is failing by five months.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

In its stress tests Fitch found that reducing the recovery rate
by 25% or increasing the default rate by 25% could lead to the
downgrade of class A1, A2 and B notes by up to one category.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies.  Fitch has relied
on the practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


AVOCA CLO XV: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned these
definitive ratings to notes issued by Avoca CLO XV Limited:

  EUR5,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR291,200,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR10,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  EUR49,400,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  EUR30,700,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
   due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  EUR27,100,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
   due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  EUR34,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  EUR16,300,000 Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2029.  The definitive ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure.  Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, KKR Credit
Advisors (Ireland) ("KKR Credit Advisors"), has sufficient
experience and operational capacity and is capable of managing
this CLO.

Avoca CLO XV is a managed cash flow CLO.  At least 93% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans or senior secured
bonds, and up to 7% of the portfolio may consist of senior
unsecured loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and
high yield bonds.  The portfolio is 70% ramped up as of the
closing date and comprises predominantly of corporate loans to
obligors domiciled in Western Europe.  The remainder of the
portfolio will be acquired during the six month ramp-up period in
compliance with the portfolio guidelines.

KKR Credit Advisors will manage the CLO.  It will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period.  Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk obligations, and are subject
to certain restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer issued EUR53.1 million of subordinated notes which are not
rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

KKR Credit Advisors will acquire and hold 50% of the outstanding
shares of the Issuer.  The remaining 50% of the Issuer's
outstanding shares will be held by a charitable trust.  However,
in a typical CLO transaction 100% of the Issuer's shares would be
held by a charitable trust.  As a result, certain structural
mitigants have been put in place to ensure that Avoca CLO XV will
remain bankruptcy remote from KKR Credit Advisors (for example,
covenants to maintain a majority of independent directors in
Avoca CLO XV, covenants to maintain that Avoca CLO XV and KKR
Credit Advisors are operated as separate businesses, and a share
charge given by KKR Credit Advisors over its shares in the Issuer
securing it's observance of such covenants).

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty.  The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  KKR's investment decisions
and management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
Sept. 2015.  The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.  In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche.  As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used these base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR500,000,000
Diversity Score: 37

  Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2854
  Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.0%
  Weighted Average Coupon : 5.6%
  Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42%
  Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analyses, which were important
components in determining the definitive rating assigned to the
rated notes.  These sensitivity analyses include increasing the
default probability relative to the base case.  Below is a
summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3282 from 2820)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0
Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0
Class B-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2
Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3710 from 2820)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1
Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class B-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3
Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3
Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -3
Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -2


CORK STREET: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba2' Rating to Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned these
provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Cork Street CLO
Designated Activity Company:

  EUR127,300,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
   due 2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  EUR112,700,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Step-up Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  EUR15,650,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
   due 2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  EUR26,350,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  EUR24,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  EUR21,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

  EUR26,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2028.  The provisional ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure.  Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Guggenheim
Partners Europe Limited has sufficient experience and operational
capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Cork Street is a managed cash flow CLO.  At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and high
yield bonds.  The portfolio is expected to be at least 66.6%
ramped up as of the closing date and to be comprised
predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western
Europe.

Guggenheim will manage the CLO.  It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR 53.5 mil. of subordinated notes which will
not be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published
September 2015.  The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders.  Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.  As such,
Moody's encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used these base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR 400,000,000
Diversity Score: 34
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.5%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42.75%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the provisional rating assigned to the
rated notes.  This sensitivity analysis includes increased
default probability relative to the base case.  Below is a
summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3220 from 2800)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028: 0
Class A-1B Senior Secured Step-up Floating Rate Notes due 2028: 0
Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028: -2
Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028: -2
Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2028: -2
Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2028: -2
Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2028: -1

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3640 from 2800)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028: -1
Class A-1B Senior Secured Step-up Floating Rate Notes due 2028: -
1
Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028: -3
Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028: -3
Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2028: -3
Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2028: -2
Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2028: -1

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in September 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty.  The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  Guggenheim's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.


CORK STREET: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EXP)sf' Rating to Class D Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Cork Street CLO Designated Activity
Company notes expected ratings, as follows:

Class A-1A: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class A-1B: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class A-2A: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class A-2B: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B: 'A(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class D: 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Subordinated notes: not rated

The assignment of final ratings is contingent on the receipt of
documents conforming to information already reviewed.

Cork Street CLO Designated Activity Company is a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the
'B' category. Fitch has credit opinions or public ratings on 37
of 53 obligors in the identified portfolio. Fitch used public
ratings from other NRSROs for the remaining obligors. The
weighted average rating factor of the identified portfolio is
31.2, below the covenanted maximum for expected ratings of 34.5.

High Recovery Expectations

At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations. Recovery prospects for these assets are typically
more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets. Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to 47 of the 63
assets in the identified portfolio. The weighted average recovery
rating of the identified portfolio is 68.6%, compared with the
covenanted minimum for assigning expected ratings of 67.0%.

Interest Rate Rise Hedged

Unhedged fixed-rate assets cannot exceed 10% of the portfolio
while fixed-rate liabilities account for 24.3% of the target par
balance. Consequently, the transaction is hedged against rising
interest rates.

A-1B Margin Step-Up

The interest margin due on the floating-rate class A-1B notes is
scheduled to increase two years after the issue date of the
notes. The issuer may avoid the increase in the cost of funding
if it exercises its option to re-price the class A-1B notes
before the step-up date. Re-pricing is defined as a reduction in
margin and cannot be rejected by the class A-1B noteholders.
Fitch assumed in its analysis that the re-pricing option would
not be exercised and the cost of funding would increase after the
step-up date.

Limited FX Risk

Any non-euro-denominated assets have to be hedged with perfect
asset swaps as of the settlement date, limiting foreign exchange
(FX) risk. The transaction is permitted to invest up to 30% of
the portfolio in non-euro-denominated assets.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Net proceeds from the notes will be used to purchase a EUR400m
portfolio of European leveraged loans and bonds. The portfolio
will be managed by Guggenheim Partners Europe Limited. The
reinvestment period is scheduled to end in 2019.

The transaction documents may be amended, subject to rating
agency confirmation or noteholder approval. Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings. Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final
maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders
should be aware that confirmation is considered to be given if
Fitch declines to comment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability would lead to a
downgrade of up to three notches for the rated notes.

A 25% reduction in expected recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to five notches for the rated notes.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE
No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


HARVEST CLO IV: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Ratings on Two Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the Class A-1B, A-2, B-1 and B-2 notes
of Harvest CLO IV Plc and affirmed the others as follows:

EUR93,286,165 Class A-1A: Affirmed at 'AAAsf' ; Outlook Stable

EUR74,000,000 Class A-1B: Upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf';
Outlook Stable

EUR15,781,714 Class A-2: Upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf' ;
Outlook Stable

EUR54,600,000 Class B-1: Upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'Asf' ;
Outlook Stable

EUR4,400,000 Class B-2: Upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'Asf' ;
Outlook Stable

EUR29,000,000 Class C: Affirmed at 'BBBsf' ; Outlook Stable

EUR11,100,000 Class D-1: Affirmed at 'BBsf' ; Outlook Stable

EUR8,900,000 Class D-2: Affirmed at 'BBsf' ; Outlook Stable

EUR15,400,000 Class E-1: Affirmed at 'Bsf' ; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative

EUR1,600,000 Class E-2: Affirmed at 'Bsf' ; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative

EUR47,000,000 Class F: not rated

Harvest CLO IV Plc. is a securitization of senior secured loans
managed by 3i Debt Management Investments Ltd, which closed in
2006. The final legal maturity is July 2021.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect the stable performance of the portfolio and
the deleveraging that has occurred since the transaction exited
its reinvestment period in July 2013. Since last reviewed in
December 2014, EUR167 million has been repaid on the Class A-1A
and A-2 notes, which has increased the credit enhancement
available to all notes. In this same period there has been only
one new default in the portfolio representing 1.8% of the current
performing portfolio.

As a result of the deleveraging and stable portfolio performance,
the credit enhancement available to the Class A-1A, A-1B, A-2, B,
C, D and E notes has grown to 70.6% (from 51.6%), 44.6% (32.7%),
44.6% (32.7%), 25.6% (18.9%), 16.2% (12.2%), 9.8% (7.5%) and 4.3%
(3.5%), respectively, since last reviewed.

The revision of the Outlooks on the Class E notes is a result of
the growth in credit enhancement since last reviewed, a reduction
in the long-dated asset bucket from 0.66% to 0.46% and a
reduction in the amend and extend activity.

Due to deleveraging, the underlying portfolio has become more
concentrated and now contains 60 obligors compared to 83 at last
review. The top 10 obligors in the portfolio have risen to 33.2%
from 21.5% in the same period. While this concentration is in
line with expectations, it will limit the potential upgrades of
the junior notes due to increased concentration risk.

The Fitch Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF) calculated by
Fitch rose to 33.85 from 33.00 when last reviewed, mainly on the
portfolio amortization as higher quality assets made up a larger
portion of the assets which repaid. Despite this, the transaction
remains within its WARF covenant, as calculated by the Trustee,
with a 1.2% cushion.

The Fitch Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR) remained largely
unchanged at 66.6% form 66.3% at last review, also as a result of
portfolio amortization. The WARR is below the covenanted level of
69%.

All OC tests are currently compliant, however the manager is
unable to reinvest any proceeds due to failure of five portfolio
profile tests, one collateral quality test and the reinvestment
test. In Fitch's view it is unlikely that the transaction will
become compliant in all of these tests and it is therefore viewed
as unlikely that the manager will have the ability to reinvest
any proceeds for the remainder of the transaction's life.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Increasing the default probability of all the assets in the
portfolio by 25%, or applying a recovery rate haircut of 25% on
all the assets would likely result in a downgrade of the notes of
between zero and two notches.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


PENTA CLO 1: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Penta CLO 1 S.A.'s class A-2, B, C, D, and E notes.  At the same
time, S&P has affirmed its rating on the class A-1 notes.

The upgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction's
performance and the application of its relevant criteria.

Since S&P's Feb. 27, 2013 review, the class A notes have
amortized by 44%.  As a result, all of the rated classes of notes
have benefited from an increase in par coverage.

S&P subjected the capital structure to our cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each class of
notes at each rating level.  The BDRs represent S&P's estimate of
the level of asset defaults that the notes can withstand and
still fully pay interest and principal to the noteholders.

As a result of the increase in par coverage, S&P believes the
rated notes are now able to withstand a larger amount of asset
defaults.

S&P has estimated future defaults in the portfolio in each rating
scenario by applying its corporate collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) criteria.

S&P's analysis shows that the available credit enhancement for
the class A-2, B, C, D, and E notes is now commensurate with
higher ratings than those previously assigned.  Therefore, S&P
has raised its ratings on the class A-2, B, C, D, and E notes.
At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the
class A-1 notes as it considers the available credit enhancement
to be commensurate with the currently assigned rating.

None of the ratings were capped by the application of S&P's
largest obligor or largest industry test, which are supplemental
stress tests that S&P outlines in its corporate CDO criteria.

Penta CLO 1 is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction managed by Penta Management Ltd.  A portfolio of
loans to European speculative-grade corporate firms backs the
transaction.  Penta CLO 1 closed in April 2007 and its
reinvestment period ended in June 2014.

RATINGS LIST

Penta CLO 1 S.A.
EUR405 mil floating-rate notes

                                   Rating         Rating
Class      Identifier              To             From
A-1        XS0289330028            AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
A-2        XS0289330531            AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
B          XS0289331182            AA+ (sf)       A+ (sf)
C          XS0289331935            A+ (sf)        BBB+ (sf)
D          XS0289333717            BBB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)
E          XS0289336652            BB+ (sf)       BB (sf)



=========
M A L T A
=========


CASSAR AND SCHEMBRI: Court Orders Liquidation Over Debts
--------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Xuereb at Times of Malta reports that a court has
liquidated Cassar and Schembri Marketing Limited, a company
co-owned by runaway businessman Ryan Schembri, former boss of the
More Supermarkets chain.

Mr. Justice Joseph Zammit McKeon ordered the dissolution of
Cassar and Schembri Marketing after upholding requests by two of
its many creditors who are owed an estimated EUR2 million, Times
of Malta relates.

The company went in the red while operating the debt-ridden
More Supermarkets chain as it was unable to keep up with its
debts, despite selling to third parties months before, Times of
Malta relays.

According to Times of Malta, Mr. Justice Zammit McKeon noted in
his decision that no effort had been made to give the company a
lifeline.

The judge, as cited by Times of Malta, said on the contrary, the
business had been "completely abandoned" by its directors, one of
whom had fled the island.

This decision follows numerous court cases filed by companies
owed money by Mr. Schembri, co-owner and director of Cassar and
Schembri Marketing, who left Malta in September 2014 after
alleged threats by loan sharks, Times of Malta notes.

The request for the company to be dissolved was made during a
civil case filed by Galleria Properties Limited, which was trying
to recoup more than EUR92,000 in arrears on the rent of part if
its Fgura complex to More Supermarkets (Fgura) Limited, Times of
Malta discloses.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


HARBOURMASTER CLO 10: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class B2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Harbourmaster CLO 10 B.V.'s class A3
and A4 notes, as follows:

  EUR59.5 million Class A2 (XS0331143973): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR24.0 million Class A3 (XS0331156108): upgraded to 'AAAsf'
  from 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR41.0 million Class A4 (XS0331171081): upgraded to 'BBB+sf'
  from BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR22.0 million Class B1 (XS0331161017): affirmed at 'BB-sf';
  Negative Outlook

  EUR9.0 million Class B2 (XS0331162684): affirmed at 'B-sf';
  Negative Outlook

Harbourmaster CLO 10 B.V. is a managed cash arbitrage
securitization of secured leveraged loans, primarily domiciled in
Europe. The portfolio is managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds
Europe Limited.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect the improvement in credit enhancement (CE)
over the past 12 months. The class A1 notes have been paid in
full and the class A2 notes have been paid down by EUR12.5m,
which increased the CE for all rated notes. CE for the class A3
and A4 notes increased by 20.8% and 12.3%, respectively.

The overcollateralization (OC) tests have also improved following
the principal payments. The most junior class B2 OC test
increased to 120.6% from 109.9% and is now passing with 14.5%
cushion, which will prevent additional proceeds from transferring
into the suspense accounts. There are EUR10 million in the
suspense accounts, unchanged from the last review. Fitch has no
view on when these will be released. The class A2 interest
coverage (IC) test has been passing since closing and currently
stands at 1191.5%, above its threshold of 107%.

There has been negative rating migration in the portfolio, which
increased the Fitch weighted average rating factor to 31.7 from
29.8 at last review, above the threshold of 30. The Fitch
weighted average recovery rate decreased to 71.0% from 72.3%,
below the trigger of 72.0%. The failures of both tests have less
impact on the transaction as the unscheduled proceeds have not
been able to be reinvested since 2010. There are no current
default assets compared with EUR10 million at last review.

The Negative Outlooks on the class B1 and B2 notes reflect the
uncertainty around the default definition in the OC test
calculation, which has been ongoing since 2009. No resolution has
been reached and Fitch has no further visibility on a potential
outcome. Fitch notes that despite pending resolution, the trustee
calculates the OC ratios differently by including defaulted
assets at the lower of market value and recovery estimates
instead of at par.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Increasing the default probability by 25% would likely result in
a downgrade of up to three notches. Furthermore, applying a
recovery rate haircut of 25.0% on all the assets would likely
result in a downgrade of zero to two notches.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transaction's
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


MALIN CLO: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Malin CLO B.V.:

  EUR32.5 mil. Class B Second Priority Deferrable Secured
   Floating Rate Notes due May 7, 2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
   previously on Aug. 15, 2014, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  EUR25 mil. Class C Third Priority Deferrable Secured Floating
   Rate Notes due May 7, 2023, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously
   on Aug 15, 2014, Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  EUR35 mil. Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Secured Floating
   Rate Notes due May 7, 2023, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously
   on Aug. 15, 2014, Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  EUR188 mil. (outstanding balance of EUR 107.1M) Class A-1a
   First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due May 7,
   2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2014 Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  EUR47 mil. Class A-1b First Priority Senior Secured Floating
   Rate Notes due May 7, 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
   Aug 15, 2014, Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  EUR18.75 mil. Class E Fifth Priority Deferrable Secured
   Floating Rate Notes due May 7, 2023, Affirmed B1 (sf);
   on Aug 15, 2014, Affirmed B1 (sf)

  EUR45.170887 mil. First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
   Variable Funding Notes due May 7, 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on Oct 12, 2015, Assigned Aaa (sf)

  GBP11.017219 mil. First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
   Variable Funding Notes due May 7, 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on Oct. 12, 2015, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Malin CLO B.V., issued in May 2007, is a multi currency
collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of mostly
senior secured European leveraged loans.  The portfolio is
managed by Babson Capital Management (UK) Limited.  This
transaction's reinvestment period ended in May 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily the result of the
deleveraging that has occurred since last rating action in August
2014.

The Class A notes have amortized by approximately EUR115 million
over the last five quarterly payment dates.  As a result of
deleveraging, over-collateralization (OC) ratios have increased.
According to the September 2015 trustee report the OC ratios of
Classes A, B, C, D and E are 163.9%, 142.4%, 129.3%, 114.6% and
108.1% compared to 147.7%, 132.7%, 123.1%, 111.7% and 106.5%,
respectively in September 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR338.7 million
and GBP11.1 million, defaulted par of EUR1.0 million, a weighted
average default probability of 22.6% (consistent with a WARF of
3063), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.0% for
an Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 37 and a
weighted average spread of 3.9%.  The GBP-denominated liabilities
are naturally hedged by the GBP assets.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in Sept. 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
were unchanged for the senior notes and Class B and within one
notch of the base-case results for rest of the classes.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

   -- Around 8.7% of the collateral pool consists of debt
      obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by
      using credit estimates.  As part of its base case, Moody's
      has stressed large concentrations of single obligors
      bearing a credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach
      to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions,"
      published in Oct. 2009.

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
      trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
      have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
      collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
      recoveries and the manager's decision whether to work out
      or sell defaulted assets can also result in additional
      uncertainty.  Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
      assuming the lower of the market price or the recovery rate
      to account for potential volatility in market prices.
      Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would have a
      positive impact on the notes' ratings.

   -- Foreign currency exposure: The deal has exposure to non-EUR
      denominated assets.  Volatility in foreign exchange rates
      will have a direct impact on interest and principal
      proceeds available to the transaction, which can affect the
      expected loss of rated tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Hybrid Secs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed EDP-Energias de Portugal S.A.'s Long-
term Issuer Default Ratings and senior unsecured ratings at
'BBB-', Short-term IDR at 'F3' and hybrid securities at 'BB'.
Fitch has also affirmed EDP Finance B.V.'s Long-term IDR and
senior unsecured ratings at 'BBB-', Short-term IDR at 'F3' and
Hidroelectrica del Cantabrico, S.A.'s (HC) Long-term IDR at 'BBB-
' and Short-term IDR at 'F3'.

The affirmation mainly reflects the resilience of economic
results and the improvement of the operating environment in
Portugal and Spain from both a regulatory and demand perspective.
It also factors in the still challenging scenario in Brazil and
the shift to a liberalized market in 2017 of the capacity
currently managed under long-term contracts in Portugal.

Fitch's revised forecasts result in average funds from operations
(FFO) adjusted net leverage of 4.6x and FFO interest coverage of
4.1x for 2015-2018, trending towards the positive guidelines for
an upgrade.  The management's commitment to deleveraging, a
strategy consistent with this target and a fairly limited market
risk are key issues supporting the ratios' evolution, in Fitch's
view.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Earnings Resilience in a Challenging Scenario

In the past three years, EDP has faced a tough regulatory
environment in Iberia, which from 2014 was coupled with a severe
drought in Brazil.  However, the group has been able to post
stable EBITDA at around EUR3.6 billion, including non-recurring
items.

This has been achieved thanks to the group's diversified business
mix in terms of activity (regulated activities 37% and quasi-
regulated, long-term contracted activities 51%) and geography
(Portugal 48%, Spain 20%, Brazil 17%, US 10%).  Fitch understands
that EDP's earnings stability is also helped by positive non-
recurring items largely under management control (i.e. assets
disposals and cost restructuring measures).  Therefore, Fitch
considers EDP is well placed to take advantage of increased
stability in Iberian regulation and potentially normalizing
weather in Brazil.

Net Debt Decrease

Fitch-adjusted net debt decreased to EUR17.4 billion in 2014 from
EUR19.3 billion in 2012.  Free cash flow (FCF) improved to become
broadly neutral in 2014, mainly as an effect of a stricter capex
policy and ongoing securitizations of Portuguese regulatory
receivables (RR).  Cash-inflows from asset disposals were offset
by negative FX movements leading to stable net debt by year end.

Fitch views the target of net debt below EUR17 billion as
reachable by end of 2015 down from EUR17.4 billion in 2014, even
including the negative impact on debt of the 50% Pecem (coal
plant in Brazil) acquisition and debt consolidation, which was
partially absorbed by the equity content of the EUR750 million
hybrid notes issued in September.

Easing Regulatory Risk

Fitch believes the group's regulatory risk exposure will reduce,
due to the recent completion of structural reforms in Iberia,
which successfully addressed the tariff deficit (TD) issue.
Fitch anticipates a decreasing balance of Iberian RR on EDP's
balance sheet (EUR2.3 billion in 9M15, 98% related to Portugal)
from 2016, assuming the current level of TD securitizations.  In
Spain, the system is expected to be in balance in 2014, and might
even show a surplus, whereas in Portugal, Fitch expects the
system's outstanding debt to decrease from 2016.  The expected
decreasing balance of Iberian RR is a key factor in Fitch's
assessment of deleveraging through 2018.

EDP could be exposed to higher Brazilian RR if the support from
the regulator, mainly in the form of extraordinary tariff
reviews, is reduced.  Finally, Fitch sees some political
uncertainty in Spain and Portugal coming from the most likely
need to form new coalitions after general elections this year,
which has been already the case in Portugal.

In addition, EDP has increased its exposure to other mature and
well established regulatory frameworks, such as the US, lowering
the historically high business concentration in Iberia to 65% by
2018, according to Fitch's estimates, from 71% in 2012.

Slow Recovery in Market Fundamentals

Fitch expects slightly better prospects for energy market
fundamentals, with electricity demand increasing on the back of
the Iberian economy recovery.  In this context, assuming
normalized wind and hydro volumes, gross profit could improve
based on slightly higher baseload power prices and particularly
more profitable and re-powered assets coming into operation (i.e
hydro pumping).  EDP has a low-cost and modern generation assets
portfolio, largely composed of hydro and wind (70% of total
capacity in 2014), which benefits from priority of dispatch.

Largely Offset Shift to Merchant

From 2017, all power purchase agreements (PPA)/Costs from the
maintenance of the contractual balance (CMEC) plants in Portugal
will enter into a new phase with exposure to price and volume
risk.  The CMEC system will only end in 2027 with the maturity
date of the last hydro PPA.  At gross profit level, the shift
could be accretive if market prices are above EUR50/MWh and
assuming normalized hydro conditions.  In 2018, the expected
EBITDA contribution from unregulated activities will rise,
according to Fitch's estimates, to 24% (from 11% in 2014), still
below the average of other EU peers, often at 30%-50%.

Fitch assumes this move will be slightly negative for the credit
profile, but mitigated by an improved operating environment since
2012 and new capacity additions in wind and hydro in Brazil
through secured PPAs with priority of dispatch.  In addition,
Fitch sees this shift well matched with the ongoing deleveraging
process until 2017.

Market Conditions in Brazil Still Tough

EDP Brazil, EDP's 51%-owned listed subsidiary, is one of the
largest integrated players of the country.  Generation and
distribution contribute broadly on a 50-50% basis to the EBITDA
of the subsidiary (17% of total EBITDA in 2014).  The Brazilian
electricity system relies heavily on hydroelectric plants (73% of
the energy generated in 2014) and has suffered from the drought
over the past two years.

This forced generation companies to buy electricity in the market
at a very high cost in order to deliver the full energy amount
defined in their PPAs (negative EBITDA impact of around EUR89m in
9M2015 for EDP).  However, the level of the reservoirs at October
2015 was substantially higher than October 2014 (28% vs. 19%),
increasing the likelihood of an improving scenario.  As for
distribution, the recent decisions of the regulatory body are
aimed at reducing the time needed to recover the costs related to
the involuntary exposure to the spot market.

Fitch believes that the main risks for the group's activity in
Brazil (sovereign IDR: BBB-/Negative) are represented by a
persistent drought, a rising possibility of political
interference in a weakening macroeconomic scenario (which is not
currently the case) and adverse foreign exchange movements,
albeit mitigated by the local funding of the activities in
Brazil.

CTG Partnership Delivering Results

The partnership between EDP and China Three Gorges (CTG, EDP's
main shareholder, A+/Stable), which dates back to 2012, foresees
that CTG invests EUR2 billion (including co-funding capex) for
stakes between 34% to 49% in 1.5GW of operational and ready-to-
build renewable projects.  Around EUR1 billion has been already
executed and there is visibility on a further EUR300 million
related to the 49% of the assets assigned to EDP from the split
of ENEOP in September 2015.

Fitch thinks that further transactions bringing the overall
amount close to the initial target of EUR2 billion would sustain
deleveraging and strengthen the link between CTG and EDP.

Deleverage Targets Confirmed

FFO adjusted net leverage reduced to 5.4x in 2014 from 5.7x in
2012 and Fitch forecasts a further decrease in 2015 to 5.3x.
Fitch's rating case shows FFO adjusted net leverage below 5x from
2016 (4.6x on average 2015 - 2018) and slightly below our
positive guideline for an upgrade from 2017.  The company's
internal target of 3.0x net debt adjusted by RR to EBITDA by 2017
is compatible with our guideline for an upgrade.  FFO interest
coverage (4.1x on average 2015-2018) is also in compliance with
Fitch's positive guideline of above 4.0x.

Overall, Fitch sees the group well positioned to achieve its
commitments up to 2017 due to the predictability of the regulated
and quasi-regulated revenues, high visibility of new capacity
additions in the next two years, moderate capital spending, sound
track record of asset monetization (assets disposals plus TD
securitizations) and flat dividends (albeit at a high level).
Fitch has a limited view beyond 2017 as no guidance has been
communicated.  The business plan presentation next year will
disclose the group's updated strategy.

HC's Rating Aligned

HC is wholly owned by EDP and its ratings remain aligned with
those of EDP according to Fitch's "Parent and Subsidiary Rating
Linkage Methodology", reflecting the two companies' close
integration.  HC is strategically and operationally important to
EDP as it provides the parent with a strong platform in Spain,
enabling the group to optimize its positioning in the Iberian
market.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- FY15 EBITDA at EUR3.6 bil. (excluding non-recurring items)
      and a low single-digit CAGR for 2016 to 2018, driven by
      wind & hydro organic growth and efficiency improvements.

   -- Persistent drought in Brazil with Generation Scaling Factor
      (GSF) around 90% and Settlement Price for Differences (PLD)
      around BR300/MWh.

   -- New capacity additions as per management disclosure.  Total
      transfer to liberalized activities of Portuguese hydro and
      coal plants under PPA/CMEC by 2017.

   -- Average capex of EUR1.35bn per year for 2015-2018.

   -- Stable dividends of EUR0.185 per share up to 2017 and
      EUR0.20 in 2018

   -- Around EUR800 mil. of additional cash-in for disposals in
      2016.

   -- Excess FCF positive (after dividends) deployed for de-
      leveraging.

   -- Cost of new debt 100bps above the company's assumptions.

   -- Stable RR on balance sheet for 2015 before moderately
      declining in 2016 to 2018.  This implies EDP will continue
      with TD securitization. No new TD in Spain.

   -- FX devaluation for BRL and appreciation of USD over 2014-
      2018.  However, major FX impacts already occurred in 2015.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that may potentially lead to
positive rating action include:

   -- FFO adjusted net leverage trending towards 4.5x and FFO
      interest coverage above 4.0x on a sustained basis, assuming
      no major changes in the activities' mix other than expected
      by Fitch

   -- Sustained positive FCF, together with the consolidation of
      the new regulatory framework in Spain and Portugal showing
      a consistent reduction of the tariff deficit in both
      countries.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Projected FFO net adjusted leverage above 5.0x and FFO
      interest coverage below 3.5x over a sustained period.

   -- Adverse regulatory or fiscal changes affecting the
      predictability of cash flows.

   -- A substantial increase of operations in emerging markets
      with a higher business risk or a substantial shift towards
      unregulated activities, higher than expected by Fitch,
      could lead Fitch to tighten the ratio guideline for the
      rating.

LIQUIDITY

EDP's liquidity is strong.  At Sept. 2015, the readily available
cash position was around EUR1.1 billion with undrawn committed
credit lines of EUR3.75 billion.  This compares with debt
maturities of EUR3.4 billion until the end of 2016.  Fitch
expects the company to generate about EUR600 million free cash
flow in 2016, which should be coupled with disposals of around
EUR400 mil. (49% of the assets split from ENEOP and mini-hydro in
Brazil).  The group benefits from continuous access to capital
markets and strong banking relationships.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


ASESOFT INTERNATIONAL: Enters Insolvency Process
------------------------------------------------
Romania-Insider.com reports that Asesoft International, which is
controlled by Romanian MP and businessman Sebastian Ghita, became
insolvent.

Mr. Ghita has been charged for influence peddling, tax evasion,
money laundering, abetting the use of EU funds, and corruption of
voters, the report relates.

Until February 2011, Mr. Ghita owned a majority stake in Asesoft,
the report says.  He later ceased his shares to the offshore
company Minasee Holdings LTD Cipru. According to the
Anticorruption National Directorate DNA, Mr. Ghita holds a 100%
stake in the offshore company, Romania-Insider.com discloses.

Asesoft posted last year a turnover of EUR25 million and losses
of almost EUR500,000. The company had 80 employees, Romania-
Insider.com reports citing Capital.ro.

The company which has asked for the insolvency of Asesoft
International is Transas Marine International Ab, based in
Sweden, the report notes.

According to the report, prosecutors said Mr. Ghita formed a
group which involved 53 companies and 24 people that ran huge
amounts of money and damaged the state, through the contracts
closed including with the Special Telecommunication Services
(STS) and Romania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Teamnet, another company founded by Mr. Ghita, recently won a
EUR5.4 million contract with STS, Romania-Insider.com reports.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK URALSIB: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-/C' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Russia-based BANK
URALSIB (PJSC).  The outlook remains negative.

On Nov. 4, 2015, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) announced
measures for Bank URALSIB's financial rehabilitation, including
having found an investor to buy an 82% stake in the bank.  S&P
understands that the investor is Vladimir Kogan, a prominent
Russian businessman.  S&P understands that the Deposit Insurance
Agency (DIA) will provide Bank URALSIB with several tranches of
long-term loans totaling Russian ruble (RUB) 81 billion, to help
maintain Bank URALSIB's financial stability.

"In our base case, we also believe that, over the next 12-18
months, the bank will comply with all regulatory ratios and the
regulator (CBR or DIA) will not execute the power to favor one
class of the bank's obligations over others or suspend payment of
the bank's outstanding liabilities, in line with its public
statement.  This is also why we are not lowering the ratings to
'R' (under regulatory supervision).  In our opinion, the
announced measures could be sufficient temporarily to alleviate
accumulated and anticipated losses for 2015 and help stabilize
the bank's financial metrics.  However, they are not sufficient,
in our view, to resolve Bank URALSIB's current fundamental
problems -- weak operating efficiency and a nonviable business
structure.  We also believe that it will take time for the bank
to restore its earnings capacity and previously sound market
footprint.  In our base-case scenario of Bank URALSIB as a going
concern, we also incorporate our assumption that, if the bank
generates additional unexpected losses over the next 12-18
months, they are likely to be covered by additional financial
support either from the new majority owner or from the CBR or
DIA," S&P said.

"We previously anticipated that the bank's ownership structure
could undergo major changes.  After several consecutive years of
losses, we believe that the bank's business stability has been
materially undermined.  We understood that the previous ultimate
beneficiary, Nikolay Tsvetkov, was actively looking for third-
party investment.  We also note that we have little visibility on
the bank's strategy and future business development.  We will
monitor how the new majority owner reshapes the bank's strategy
in the next few months," S&P noted.

Although S&P believes that the announced measures could
temporarily stabilize the bank's financial position, its capital
position and overall creditworthiness are vulnerable to adverse
economic conditions in Russia and remain reliant on external
support, in S&P's view.  In addition, accumulated losses and an
eroded capital buffer have taken a material toll on the bank's
business stability.  S&P believes that Bank URALSIB's currently
"very weak" capitalization, as S&P's criteria define the term,
allows it only limited room to maneuver in the event of
additional stress.

The long-term rating on Bank URALSIB is one notch higher than
S&P's 'ccc+' assessment of the bank's stand-alone credit profile.
This reflects S&P's current view of Bank URALSIB's "moderate"
systemic importance and the Russian government's "supportive"
stance toward the domestic banking sector.  Given Bank URALSIB's
wide franchise across the country and its material penetration in
the retail segment, notably in the regions, S&P thinks its
failure could result in a loss of confidence in the Russian
banking system.  For this reason, S&P believes there is a
"moderate" likelihood that the Russian government would support
Bank URALSIB if needed.  The financial support mentioned above
is, in S&P's view, evidence of Bank URALSIB's importance to the
stability of the domestic banking system.  Given this
governmental financial support, S&P don't have immediate concerns
about the bank's solvency or liquidity, or of a risk of
inevitable default on its obligations within the next 12 months.

The negative outlook reflects the possibility of a downgrade of
Bank URALSIB if insufficient support from the new investor and
government increase the bank's vulnerability to adverse economic
conditions in Russia.

Any rating actions on Bank URALSIB will depend largely on the
nature and size of the rehabilitation procedures, and S&P's
opinion of the bank's business and financial prospects with the
new investor once this information is available.

S&P could lower the ratings if it sees that the additional losses
it expects the bank will incur in the next few quarters are not
balanced by additional capital support or other remedial actions.
S&P could also lower the ratings if it observes a material
liquidity squeeze or deterioration in the bank's funding profile.
S&P will continue to monitor the CBR's actions with regard to
Bank URALSIB.  S&P would lower the ratings to 'CCC+' in the
absence of substantial initiatives to reshape the business model,
improve efficiency, and make the bank profitable before risk
costs, and therefore viable.  This would be in line with S&P's
definition of a 'CCC+' rating as per its criteria.  S&P could
also lower the ratings if it perceived a gradual decrease in the
bank's currently "moderate" systemic importance as a result of a
substantial loss of likelihood of extraordinary governmental
support.  S&P believes it is difficult at this stage to predict
the magnitude of further losses.  The size of the rescue package,
although large, might also indicate that all problems have not
surfaced yet.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it considers that the
erosion in the capital buffer and deterioration in the bank's
business position have been sufficiently offset by remedial
actions.


INVESTMENT TRADE: Moody's Hikes Nat'l. Deposit Rating to Caa1.ru
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) has upgraded to Caa1.ru
from Ca.ru the national scale long-term deposit rating (NSR) of
Investment Trade Bank (Russia).  The NSR carries no specific
outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action completes the review with direction uncertain
initiated by Moody's Interfax on Aug. 28, 2015, when the rating
agency downgraded the bank's NSR from Caa3.ru to Ca.ru and placed
the rating on review following the uncertainty as a result of the
Central Bank of Russia's (CBR) announcement that the state
Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) had taken Investment Trade Bank
into temporary administration.

The completion of the review of the bank's NSR follows the final
decision taken by the regulator that the bank will be subject to
a financial rehabilitation procedure, which will involve
Transkapitalbank (rated b1/B1 (negative) on global scale BCA and
deposit ratings) as an investor bank and will be supported by
financial facilities provided by the DIA.  According to the
public announcement, the DIA will provide a 10-year loan for the
amount of RUB29.7 billion directly to Investment Trade Bank to
cover the potential shortfall in the bank's net assets and
another two-year loan (RUB19.5 billion) will be provided by the
DIA to Investment Trade Bank via Transkapitalbank in order to
support Investment Trade Bank's liquidity position.

The upgrade by Moody's Interfax of Investment Trade Bank's NSR
reflects the upgrade by Moody's Investors Service of the bank's
global local and foreign currency deposit ratings to Caa3 from
Ca, which is a result of the moderate degree of government
support incorporated by the rating agency in the bank's ratings,
taking into consideration the substantial magnitude of the
financial support channeled from the DIA to the bank either
directly or via Transkapitalbank, as discussed above.

At the same time, Moody's notes the bank's very weak standalone
credit profile.  This is evidenced by the fact that the bank is
operating under the regulatory forbearance mode, whereby its
statutory core Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio (N1.1) of 2.36% and
its total capital adequacy ratio of 4.73% -- reported at Oct. 1,
2015 -- stood below the regulatory minimum requirements of 5% and
10%, respectively.  The rating agency also observes that
Investment Trade Bank's liquidity profile is supported by the
loan provided by the DIA, whilst without this support the bank's
liquidity position would have been much weaker.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

The rating agency might upgrade Investment Trade Bank's NSR if
the bank demonstrates significant and sustainable improvements in
its financial metrics.  An increase in the volume of external
support coming to the bank (either from the DIA or from
Transkapitalbank) may also trigger Moody's positive actions on
Investment Trade Bank's NSR.

Moody's might downgrade Investment Trade Bank's NSR if the
financial rehabilitation plan fails to achieve its objectives and
the bank's financial metrics worsen, or if the regulator decides
to suspend the implementation of the financial rehabilitation
plan with respect to Investment Trade Bank and revokes the bank's
license.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in March 2015.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Investment Trade Bank's reported
total assets of RUB134.1 billion, total equity of RUB10.9 billion
and net profit of RUB642 million under audited IFRS on Jan. 1,
2015.


INVESTMENT TRADE: Moody's Hikes Global Deposit Rating to Caa3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Investment Trade Bank's
long-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings to
Caa3 from Ca and assigned a stable outlook to these ratings.  The
rating agency has also affirmed the bank's Not Prime short-term
local and foreign currency deposit ratings.

At the same time, Moody's has confirmed the bank's Baseline
Credit Assessment (BCA) and Adjusted BCA of ca.

Moody's has also upgraded Investment Trade Bank's long-term
Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment) to Caa2(cr) from
Caa3(cr) and affirmed the bank's short-term CR Assessment of Not
Prime(cr).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions complete the review with direction uncertain
initiated by Moody's on Aug. 28, 2015, when the rating agency
downgraded the bank's long-term ratings from Caa3 to Ca and
placed them on review following the uncertainty as a result of
the Central Bank of Russia's (CBR) announcement that the state
Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) had taken Investment Trade Bank
into temporary administration.

The completion of the review of the bank's ratings follows the
final decision taken by the regulator that the bank will be
subject to a financial rehabilitation procedure, which will
involve Transkapitalbank (rated b1/B1 (negative) on BCA and
deposit ratings) as an investor bank and will be supported by
financial facilities provided by the DIA.  According to the
public announcement, the DIA will provide a 10-year loan for the
amount of RUB29.7 billion directly to Investment Trade Bank to
cover the potential shortfall in the bank's net assets and
another two-year loan (RUB19.5 billion) will be provided by the
DIA to Investment Trade Bank via Transkapitalbank in order to
support Investment Trade Bank's liquidity position.

Moody's upgrade of the bank's global local and foreign currency
deposit ratings to Caa3 from Ca reflects the one notch uplift
from its BCA.  This is a result of the moderate degree of
government support incorporated by the rating agency in the
bank's ratings, taking into consideration the substantial
magnitude of the financial support channeled from the DIA to the
bank either directly or via Transkapitalbank, as discussed above.

Moody's confirmation of Investment Trade Bank's BCA and Adjusted
BCA at ca reflects the bank's very weak standalone credit
profile. This is evidenced by the fact that the bank is operating
under the regulatory forbearance mode, whereby its statutory core
Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio (N1.1) of 2.36% and its total
capital adequacy ratio of 4.73% -- reported at October 1, 2015 --
stood below the regulatory minimum requirements of 5% and 10%,
respectively.  The rating agency also observes that Investment
Trade Bank's liquidity profile is supported by the loan provided
by the DIA, whilst without this support the bank's liquidity
position would have been much weaker.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

The rating agency might upgrade Investment Trade Bank's deposit
ratings if the bank demonstrates significant and sustainable
improvements in its financial metrics.  An increase in the volume
of external support coming to the bank (either from the DIA or
from Transkapitalbank) may also trigger Moody's positive actions
on Investment Trade Bank's ratings.

Moody's might downgrade Investment Trade Bank's ratings if the
financial rehabilitation plan fails to achieve its objectives and
the bank's financial metrics worsen, or if the regulator decides
to suspend the implementation of the financial rehabilitation
plan with respect to Investment Trade Bank and revokes the bank's
license.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Investment Trade Bank's reported
total assets of RUB134.1 billion, total equity of RUB10.9 billion
and net profit of RUB642 million under audited IFRS on January 1,
2015.


RUSSIAN STANDARD: Moody's Confirms B3 National Deposit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has confirmed B3.ru national scale
long-term deposit rating (NSR) of Russian Standard Bank (Russia).
The NSRs carry no specific outlooks.  The rating action was
driven by the replenishment of the bank's capital base following
the recently completed exchange of the bank's non-viability
subordinated loan participation notes (LPNs), which will help the
bank to maintain its regulatory capital ratios at the appropriate
levels over the next 12-18 months.

Moody's assessment of Russian Standard Bank's rating is largely
based on the issuer's unaudited financial statements for the
first half of 2015, prepared under IFRS, its audited IFRS
financial statements for 2014 as well as information received
from the bank.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating confirmation reflects Russian Standard Bank's
strengthening capital position following the RUB28,982 million
capital injection into the bank's Tier 1 capital from the
shareholder in late October.  This capital replenishment was part
of the distressed exchange of the bank's USD550 million non-
viability subordinated debt, which has been exchanged to the bank
holding company's new USD-denominated bonds with partial cash
repayment.  As of the beginning of Nov. 2015, Moody's anticipates
the bank's regulatory capital adequacy ratio (CAR) to stay at
around 14%, based on information from the bank.  The rating
agency also expects the bank's Basel I capital adequacy ratio to
remain above 10% over the next 12 months, which is supported by
the recent capital replenishment and an anticipated RUB5 billion
capital injection from the Russian government (likely to be
provided in the short-term).

Moody's notes that, prior to the debt restructuring and capital
replenishment, the bank's Basel I CAR completely depleted due to
heavy losses recorded by the bank in H1 2015.  The bank also
notified its bondholders that it would breach the 5% regulatory
N1.1. capital minimum in Q4 2015, and would likely breach the 2%
Tier 1 threshold in February 2016, leading to a write-down event
with regard to the aforementioned junior subordinated LPNs.

As the consumer market and household incomes currently remain
subdued, Moody's does not expect any improvements in the
operating environment for the bank in the medium term.  This
implies continued high loan loss provisions by the bank during
the remainder of 2015.  Nevertheless, Moody's expects that
Russian Standard Bank's problem loans will not grow materially
over the next 12-18 months, reflecting tightened underwriting
standards since H2 2014, which will help to contain the bank's
provisioning charges and potentially result in lower net losses
in H2 2015-H1 2016.

In H1 2015, the bank reported a substantial decline in its
profitability metrics, with annualized return on average assets
of -11.1% (year-end 2014: -4.1%).  This decline was driven by
elevated provisioning charges, as the bank's annualized cost of
risk grew to 25.7% in H1 2015 compared to 17.1% in 2014 (year-end
2013: 10.0%) following a substantial deterioration in asset
quality and shrinkage of the loan book due to deleveraging.

The bank's significant net losses also resulted from a decline in
its core profitability, as reflected in a decrease of its
annualized net interest margin to 3.3% as of at H1 2015 (YE 2014:
10.2%, YE 2013: 13.4%).  These adverse developments are explained
by: (1) the high cost of funding in H1 2015 caused by market
volatility in late 2014 -- beginning 2015 (as the Central Bank of
Russia's key rate increased from 5.5% to 17% in 2014); and (2)
decreasing interest income due to the bank's shrinking loan book
and increasing proportion of problem loans.

The challenges stemming from the bank's loss-making performance
and weak asset quality are partially mitigated by Russian
Standard Bank's adequate liquidity.  Its liquid assets-to-total
assets ratio was around 36% as of H1 2015 (or 21% after the
deduction of securities pledged under repo operations).

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Over the next 12-18 months, the bank's capacity to achieve
profitability, while maintaining adequate capital levels, will be
considered as credit positive for the bank's ratings.

If Russian Standard Bank is unable to achieve profitability and
requires additional capital injections, this could result in a
downgrade of the bank's ratings.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in March 2015.


RUSSIAN STANDARD: Moody's Confirms LT Caa2 Deposit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed Russian Standard Bank's
Caa2 long-term foreign- and local-currency deposit ratings, and
its foreign-currency senior debt ratings.  The bank's caa2
baseline credit assessment (BCA) and Adjusted BCA has also been
confirmed.  All long-term ratings now have a negative outlook.
At the same time, the bank's foreign-currency subordinated debt
rating was confirmed at Caa3, the Not-Prime short-term foreign-
currency and local-currency deposit ratings were affirmed.  The
bank's Caa1(cr) long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR
Assessment) was confirmed and its short-term CR Assessment of
Not-Prime(cr) was affirmed.

The rating actions were driven by the replenishment of the bank's
capital base following the recently completed exchange of the
bank's non-viability subordinated loan participation notes
(LPNs), which will help the bank to maintain its regulatory
capital ratios at the appropriate levels over the next 12-18
months.

Moody's assessment of Russian Standard Bank's ratings is largely
based on the issuer's unaudited financial statements for the
first half of 2015 (prepared under IFRS), its audited IFRS
financial statements for 2014, as well as information received
from the bank.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating confirmations reflect Russian Standard Bank's
strengthening capital position following the RUB28,982 million
capital injection into the bank's Tier 1 capital from the
shareholder in late October.  This capital replenishment was part
of the distressed exchange of the bank's USD550 million non-
viability subordinated debt, which has been exchanged to the bank
holding company's new USD-denominated bonds with partial cash
repayment.  As of the beginning of Nov. 2015, Moody's anticipates
the bank's regulatory capital adequacy ratio (CAR) to stay at
around 14%, based on information from the bank.  The rating
agency also expects the bank's Basel I capital adequacy ratio to
remain above 10% over the next 12 months, which is supported by
the recent capital replenishment and an anticipated RUB5 billion
capital injection from the Russian government (likely to be
provided in the short-term).

Moody's notes that, prior to the debt restructuring and capital
replenishment, the bank's Basel I CAR completely depleted due to
heavy losses recorded by the bank in H1 2015.  The bank also
notified its bondholders that it would breach the 5% regulatory
N1.1. capital minimum in Q4 2015, and would likely breach the 2%
Tier 1 threshold in February 2016, leading to a write-down event
with regard to the aforementioned junior subordinated LPNs.

As the consumer market and household incomes currently remain
subdued, Moody's does not expect any improvements in the
operating environment for the bank in the medium term.  This
implies continued high loan loss provisions by the bank during
the remainder of 2015.  Nevertheless, Moody's expects that
Russian Standard Bank's problem loans will not grow materially
over the next 12-18 months, reflecting tightened underwriting
standards since H2 2014, which will help to contain the bank's
provisioning charges and potentially result in lower net losses
in H2 2015-H1 2016.

In H1 2015, the bank reported a substantial decline in its
profitability metrics, with annualized return on average assets
of -11.1% (year-end 2014: -4.1%).  This decline was driven by
elevated provisioning charges, as the bank's annualized cost of
risk grew to 25.7% in H1 2015 compared to 17.1% in 2014 (year-end
2013: 10.0%) following a substantial deterioration in asset
quality and shrinkage of the loan book due to deleveraging.

The bank's significant net losses also resulted from a decline in
its core profitability, as reflected in a decrease of its
annualized net interest margin to 3.3% as of at H1 2015 (YE 2014:
10.2%, YE 2013: 13.4%).  These adverse developments are explained
by: (1) the high cost of funding in H1 2015 caused by market
volatility in late 2014 -- beginning 2015 (as the Central Bank of
Russia's key rate increased from 5.5% to 17% in 2014); and (2)
decreasing interest income due to the bank's shrinking loan book
and increasing proportion of problem loans.

The challenges stemming from the bank's loss-making performance
and weak asset quality are partially mitigated by Russian
Standard Bank's adequate liquidity.  Its liquid assets-to-total
assets ratio was around 36% as of H1 2015 (or 21% after the
deduction of securities pledged under repo operations).

RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

However, Moody's notes that the negative outlook on the bank's
ratings reflects its anticipated loss-making performance and
insufficient standalone capital-generation capacity, while its
capacity to return to profitability beyond 2015 remains dependent
on macroeconomic developments in Russia, in particular the
stabilization of household income and improving consumer
sentiments.  Moody's expects the bank to rebalance its business
model with the objective of achieving profitability in Q4 2016.
However, if after the rebalancing, the bank is still unable to
return to profitability over the next 12-18 months, it will lead
to further capital erosion and will likely indicate a necessity
of further capital injections.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Given that Russian Standard Bank's ratings have a negative
outlook, there is no short-term upward pressure on the bank's
ratings.  Over the next 12-18 months, the bank's capacity to
achieve profitability, while maintaining adequate capital levels,
will be considered as credit positive for the bank's ratings.

If Russian Standard Bank is unable to achieve profitability and
requires additional capital injections, this could result in a
downgrade of the bank's ratings.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Russian Standard Bank reported
total assets of RUB411 billion (around $7.7 billion) and a net
loss of RUB15.9 billion (around $300 million) at year-end 2014,
according to audited IFRS figures.  Retail loans comprise the
bulk of Russian Standard Bank's total loans, with credit card
loans and unsecured consumer loans (cash and point-of-sale loans)
dominating the loan book (67% and 21% of the total, respectively,
according to audited IFRS as of year-end 2014).


TRANSAERO AIRLINES: MAK Suspends Boeing 737 Flight Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Kathrin Hille at The Financial Times reports that Russia's
airline safety watchdog, the Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK),
on
Nov. 5 suspended flight certificates for all Boeing 737 aircraft
operated by Russian airlines, a highly unusual step that requires
Russian government officials to consider grounding aircraft.

According to the FT, two people present at an emergency meeting
convened on Nov. 6 to deal with the MAK's move said they believed
that Tatiana Anodina, the committee's chairwoman -- and mother
of Transaero's founder and largest shareholder, Alexander
Pleshakov -- had targeted the Boeings in a ploy to avert the
airline's bankruptcy.

"Threatening to ground more than 150 aircraft was an extreme
move, but it is very much Tatiana's style," the FT quotes an
executive from a smaller Russian airline as saying.  "It would
have hurt all airlines, so the hope was that she could force a
deal on Transaero."

Regardless of the possible motives behind MAK's attempt to ground
the Boeings, it did not save Transaero, the FT states.

At a meeting called on Nov. 6 by Rosaviatsia, the domestic
airline regulator that would be required to give the actual
order, it was determined that MAK's demand had no merit, the FT
discloses.

Just minutes later, a person close to the Pleshakov family, as
cited by the FT, said Valery Zaitsev, chief executive, had
resigned.

In a statement published on its website on Nov. 8, MAK said it
had decided to suspend the certificates because the US Federal
Aviation Authority had earlier stated that Boeing needed to make
improvements to the 737's elevator to ensure continued safe
operation of the aircraft, the FT relates.

OJSC Transaero Airlines is a Russian airline with its head office
in Saint Petersburg.  It operates scheduled and charter flights
to 103 domestic and international destinations.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


TURKEY: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Ratings; Outlook Neg
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its unsolicited
'BB+/B' foreign currency long- and short-term sovereign credit
ratings and 'BBB-/A-3' local currency long- and short-term
sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of Turkey.  The outlook
remains negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its unsolicited 'trAAA/trA-1'
long- and short-term Turkey national scale ratings.

RATIONALE

Repeat parliamentary elections held on Nov. 1, 2015, resulted in
a parliamentary majority for the incumbent Justice and
Development party (AK party).  Consequently, S&P bases its
macroeconomic projections on the assumption that current policy
settings will prevail, implying real GDP growth averaging 2.7% in
2016-2018, and unemployment staying at about 10%.  Following
Turkey's very high credit-driven GDP growth in 2010 and 2011, S&P
thinks the economy has partially rebalanced away from internal
toward external demand.

In the absence of external shocks that could weigh further on
growth prospects, the exchange rate, and on budgetary
performance, S&P expects that Turkish general government debt
levels will remain manageable.  Under S&P's fiscal assumptions,
it also incorporate its view that contingent liabilities to the
Turkish general government are limited.  Specifically, S&P
considers that Turkey's domestic banks -- the intermediators of
the country's external deficit -- will remain well-regulated and
amply capitalized.

"In our central scenario, we anticipate that the government will
continue running limited deficits, averaging 1.6% of GDP in 2015-
2016 and widening to 3% in 2018.  Historically, fiscal
performance has been highly cyclical and subject to large deficit
swings.  Our headline deficit projections are higher than the
government's because of our lower growth forecasts.  Trends in
our key debt metrics for Turkey will, under our baseline
projections, remain largely flat.  We foresee the general
government interest burden at about 7% of revenues and net
general government debt at about 30% of GDP over 2015-2018.  We
estimate that nearly two-thirds of net general government debt is
denominated in Turkish lira.  We also note that, since 2009, the
average maturity of Turkish government domestic borrowing has
more than doubled to six years. One risk to the central
government's funding profile remains the high stock of domestic
debt held by non-residents.  It stood at just below 20% of total
debt at end-March 2015, down from its 25.7% peak in April 2013.
In the event of external instability, this stock could become a
flow, which might put pressure on balance-of-payments financing,"
S&P said.

"We project real GDP will grow by 3.1% in 2015.  Although
Turkey's economy benefited from stronger-than-anticipated demand
in the first half of this year, we think political uncertainty in
the run-up to the November elections is likely to have weighed on
growth in the second half.  Early signals of potentially
faltering growth in the second half include the compression in
imports in August balance-of-payment data, as well as the
deceleration in private-sector credit growth.  Lower external
demand from oil-producing markets has hampered Turkey's exports,
though the oil price decline has also benefited Turkey's terms of
trade.  Turkey's higher inflation versus rates for its main
trading partners has somewhat offset the competitive gains
arising from the 18% year-to-date depreciation of Turkey's
nominal trade weighted exchange rate (nominal effective exchange
rate, Bank of International Settlements data January-September
2015)," S&P noted.

"In our view, authorities have accurately flagged key risks in
the past, particularly Turkey's high and recurrent external
deficits resulting from its relatively low domestic savings rate
(15% of GDP).  The Tenth Development Plan focuses on ways to
raise domestic savings, to deepen domestic capital markets, and
cut the bill for imported energy (an important contributor to the
current account deficit), while improving the currently low
participation of women in the labor market and reducing the size
of Turkey's substantial informal economy.  However, since the
plan's publication in the summer of 2013, progress in its
implementation has been only modest.  If the pace of
implementation accelerates, it could help Turkey shift away from
its current economic growth model, which still depends highly on
net debt financing from abroad and therefore on monetary policy
settings by major central banks.  In the absence of such reforms,
though, we believe Turkey's external position and economic
performance could deteriorate further," S&P said.

The Turkish economy continues to have higher external debts and
refinancing needs, alongside lower foreign exchange reserves,
relative to other large emerging markets.  Over 2015-2018, S&P
anticipates that Turkey's short-term external debt by remaining
maturity plus current account payments will on average amount to
1.9x usable reserves and current account payments, compared with
0.7x in Brazil and about 1x in South Africa and Hungary.

S&P estimates usable reserves (gross reserves excluding foreign
exchange and gold reserve requirements) at $37 billion as of end-
September 2015, an amount roughly equal to our estimate of the
2015 current account deficit.  This international reserve
position provides only a limited buffer against any further
exchange-rate pressure.  For instance, although Turkish banks can
draw on these deposits to pay down external liabilities, the
central bank's ability to use this portion of reserves during
times of stress is limited.  Total deposits for all foreign
exchange reserve requirements made up nearly 70% of the central
bank's gross foreign currency reserves in September 2015 (up from
37% in 2011).

External leverage for Turkey's banking sector remains relatively
high, and at quite short maturities.  S&P notes, though, that
external statistics for 2015 indicate a slight lengthening of
banks' external loan maturities, coinciding with a net redemption
of their external bonded debt.  Although recent increases to
reserve requirements for short-term borrowing could incentivize
banks to increase their proportion of longer-term borrowing, S&P
thinks sustaining this trend would hinge on external creditors'
willingness to finance Turkish banks at longer maturities.

Between 2008 and 2015, net banking sector external debt increased
to about $160 billion (23% of GDP) from less than $8 billion (1%
of GDP), while the size of Turkey's economy contracted by nearly
3% in dollar terms, owing to the lira's 50% depreciation in the
period.  It remains to be seen whether rapid credit growth in the
corporate sector, particularly in small and midsize enterprises,
can benefit Turkey's long-term growth potential.  Although S&P
views Turkey's banking system as generally well-capitalized and
supervised, the size of state-owned banks (representing about
one-third of total banking system assets), and their involvement
in quasi-fiscal operations, means that domestic banks' asset
quality may not be homogenous throughout the system.
Furthermore, although the banking sector is fully hedged, its
foreign currency borrowing has risen in tandem with declining
profitability.  This could represent a risk for banks if their
hedges do not hold, due to counterparty risk, or because of the
second-round effects of the large open foreign exchange position
in the corporate sector (at an estimated 25% of GDP) on banks'
asset quality.

Although Turkish banks' direct exposure to the construction and
property sectors appears to be limited to 7% of total assets,
their overall exposure -- taking into account indirect loans
through the corporate sector -- is likely higher.  In S&P's view,
the Turkish financial system would therefore not be immune to a
large downturn, if one were to occur, especially if accompanied
by further exchange rate depreciation.  Nevertheless, the low
system-wide ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans, at about
3%, indicates a robust starting point in any potential crisis.

S&P forecasts ongoing reliance on net external debt flows to
finance the current account deficit over our 2015-2018 horizon.
S&P envisage, however, a deceleration in these inflows as the
external funding environment becomes more difficult, leading to a
narrowing of the current account deficit to 3.9% of GDP by 2018
from 4.8% of GDP in 2015.  S&P further anticipates that lower
debt inflows, particularly into the banking sector, will
translate into lower domestic lending.  Therefore, S&P expects
real GDP growth will average 2.7% from 2016-2018, lower than the
credit-fueled average growth of 4.5% from 2011-2014.

The uncertain global economic environment, particularly a
possible reversal in historically low U.S. interest rates could,
in S&P's opinion, raise real interest rates in Turkey.  This
could exacerbate any slowdown and in turn reduce the risk
appetite of nonresident investors in Turkey's government debt and
equity markets, which have been important destinations for
external financing inflows over the past several years.

Mitigating its external vulnerabilities to some degree, Turkey
has deep local currency capital markets that have benefited the
sovereign's access to and cost of financing.  S&P views the
treasury's policy of meeting net public-sector financing needs by
issuing in local currency at longer maturities as a positive
rating factor.

Increased curbs on the operational independence of Turkey's
central bank have made it more challenging for the bank to
credibly fulfill its price stability mandate and to dampen the
impact of exchange-rate volatility on the economy's growth
prospects.  One consequence of rising currency volatility, which
reflects a less transparent monetary policy, is the re-
dollarization of the financial sector's deposit base.  Deposits
denominated in foreign currency had increased to more than 40% of
overall deposits in September 2015 versus 33% in December 2015.
This rise reflects both the impact of lira depreciation, which
has pushed up the lira value of foreign currency-denominated
deposits, as well as a shift toward dollar deposits given the
lira's volatility.

Overall, S&P thinks the central bank's challenged credibility,
including a weakened monetary transmission channel, has
diminished the status of the Turkish lira as a reliable
transactional currency.  S&P thinks this poses greater risks to
the refinancing of Turkey's considerable stock of external debt.
Although S&P considers that Turkey's relatively deep capital
markets benefit its monetary flexibility, S&P views the complex
monetary framework -- with multiple interest rates and an
unusually broad interest rate corridor -- as relatively
ineffective given the high pass-through of exchange rate
depreciation into headline inflation.

In light of Turkey's traditionally high reliance on international
market financing of the gap between aggregate production and
aggregate demand, S&P would view any further deterioration in
institutional settings as a risk to economic performance, fiscal
metrics, and ultimately the ratings.  Such deterioration could
include loss of independence of the central bank and the
financial regulator, leading to worsening business conditions; or
trigger the rise ofquasi-fiscal activity.

OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the one-in-three likelihood that
S&P could downgrade Turkey within the next six to 12 months if
its fiscal performance and debt metrics were to deviate from
current expectations.  This could occur, for instance, following
a sudden drop in revenues, higher expenditure needs, or the
materialization on the government's balance sheet of contingent
liabilities from quasi-fiscal activities or financial-sector
instability.  Such fiscal deterioration could result from a
balance-of-payments or a growth shock, as a result of changed
global liquidity conditions or an economic downturn in core
trading markets.  An intensification of intervention in the
independence of Turkish institutions, including the central bank,
could also lead to more sluggish growth, and lower ratings.

S&P could revise the outlook on Turkey to stable if economic
growth continued to rebalance and depended less heavily on
external borrowing.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and
explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating
factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant
criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were
considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that all key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                              Rating            Rating
                              To                From
Turkey (Republic of)
Sovereign credit rating
  Foreign Currency|U^         BB+/Neg./B        BB+/Neg./B
  Local Currency|U^           BBB-/Negative/A-3 BBB-/Neg./A-3
  Turkey National Scale|U^    trAAA/--/trA-1    trAAA/--/trA-1
Transfer & Convertibility
  Assessment|U^               BBB               BBB

|U^ Unsolicited ratings with issuer participation and access to
    internal documents.


YUKSEL INSAAT: Investor Group Challenges Restructuring Plan
-----------------------------------------------------------
Michael Turner at Reuters reports that Turkey's Yuksel Insaat is
facing a revolt from a growing faction of investors who have
vowed not to vote in favor of a critical restructuring plan,
which could push one of the country's largest construction
companies into insolvency.

According to Reuters, Yuksel Insaat, which is the operating
company of Yuksel Holding, is trying to restructure US$200
million 9.5% bonds, equal to more than half of its debt.

The notes mature on Nov. 10, Reuters discloses.  The issuer is
due to have a Scheme of Arrangement hearing at the UK High Court
a day before the notes' maturity, Reuters says.

But a group of investors claiming to hold around 20% of the
principal of the bonds told IFR that they are trying to block the
plans, Reuters relays.

If Yuksel Insaat fails to come to an agreement, it warns that it
will likely fall into bankruptcy and cause a cross-default on its
bank debt, Reuters notes.

Yuksel Insaat is offering to pay back US$110 million to investors
on the day the Scheme becomes effective and create a new US$40
million bond due March 2016, according to Reuters.  When that
bond matures, investors will have been paid back around 71 cents
on the dollar, including coupon payments, Reuters states.  The
rest will be written off. The outstanding bond is bid at 60 cash,
Reuters says, citing Thomson Reuters data.

An ad hoc committee, advised by Moelis, has agreed to this deal,
Reuters discloses.

According to Reuters, the sticking point for the holdout group is
that Yuksel Insaat has been passing money and the ownership of
some of the Cubuklu field upwards in its capital structure to its
holding company, Yuksel Holding.

Investors claim that either or both should have been used to
fully repay the bond, Reuters states.  The holding company is
outside of the bond investors' liabilities under the deal's
documentation, Reuters notes.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AVOCA CLO IV: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Def Notes to 'B+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Avoca CLO IV PLC's class C1 Def, C2 Def, and D Def notes.  At the
same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class B Def, E Def
notes, and N Combo notes.  S&P has also withdrawn its ratings on
the class P Combo and Q Combo notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance and the application of its current counterparty
criteria.

Since S&P's previous review on Jan. 24, 2013, it has observed
several developments in the transaction.  These include:

   -- The deleveraging of the class A1a, A1b, and, A2 notes,
      which resulted in increased credit enhancement for all
      classes of notes except the class E Def notes.

   -- The portfolio is now more concentrated, with 20 unique
      obligors.

   -- A relatively negative rating migration of the underlying
      portfolio (the weighted-average portfolio rating is now 'B'
      compared with 'B+' at S&P's previous review).  This was
      mainly associated with the increase in the proportion of
      assets rated in the 'CCC' category (rated 'CCC+', 'CCC', or
      'CCC-').  The 'CCC' category exposure now accounts for
      9.65% of performing assets, up from 6.33% at our previous
      review.

   -- The class E overcollateralization test continues to fail
      and defer interest.

   -- Due to deleveraging, the portfolio is now more
      concentrated. The application of S&P's supplemental test
      limits its ratings on the class C1 Def and C2 Def notes at
      'BBB+ (sf)', and for the class D Def notes at 'B+ (sf)'.

   -- The maximum potential rating on the notes is 'A+', based on
      the downgrade provisions documented for the account bank
      and custodian.

Since February 2012, when the transaction entered its
amortization period, the class A notes have fully amortized and
the class B Def notes have partially amortized.  This has
resulted in increased available credit enhancement for all
classes of notes except the class E Def notes and the class N
combo note.  The class E notes continue to defer interest due to
a coverage test failure.  Non-euro-denominated assets,
denominated in British pounds sterling in the underlying
portfolio, and the resulting foreign currency risk is hedged via
perfect asset swaps with Credit Suisse AG (A/Stable/A-1) as the
swap counterparty.

S&P has subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate for each
rated class of notes at each rating level.  S&P used the
portfolio balance that it considers to be performing, the
reported weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average
recovery rates that S&P considers to be appropriate.  S&P
incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using its
standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each rating
category assumed for each class of notes, in conjunction with
different interest rate stress scenarios.

With increased available credit enhancement for the class B Def
to D Def notes, S&P's credit and cash flow analysis results
suggest higher ratings than previously assigned.  The affirmation
of the class B Def notes is based on the downgrade provisions
documented for the account bank and custodian.  The maximum
potential rating on any class of notes in Avoca CLO IV is 'A+'.
S&P has therefore affirmed its 'A+ (sf)' rating on the class B
Def notes.

S&P applied the supplemental tests (largest obligor default test
and the largest industry default test), which are intended to
address both event risk and model risk that may be present in
rated transactions.  Due to increased concentration risk in the
portfolio, the maximum ratings on the class C1 Def, C2 Def, and D
Def notes are limited by the largest obligor test.  The rating
actions on these classes of notes are based on the outcome of the
largest obligor test.  S&P has therefore raised its ratings on
the class C1 Def, C2 Def, and D Def notes.

Based on S&P's cash flow results, it has affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)'
ratings on the class E Def notes and the class N combo notes.

S&P has withdrawn its ratings on the class P Combo and Q Combo
notes, following confirmation that these notes have been
decoupled.

Avoca CLO IV is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction, backed primarily by leveraged loans to speculative-
grade corporate firms.  Geographically, the portfolio is
concentrated in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the U.K.,
which together account for about 70% of the portfolio.  Avoca CLO
IV closed in January 2006 and is managed by Avoca Capital
Holdings.

RATINGS LIST

Avoca CLO IV PLC
EUR494.1 mil floating- and fixed-rate notes

                                  Rating
Class              Identifier     To                  From
B Def              053813AB7      A+ (sf)             A+ (sf)
C1 Def             053813AC5      BBB+ (sf)           BB+ (sf)
C2 Def             053813AH4      BBB+ (sf)           BB+ (sf)
D Def              053813AD3      B+ (sf)             CCC+ (sf)
E Def              053813AE1      CCC- (sf)           CCC- (sf)
N Combo            053813AK7      CCC- (sf)           CCC- (sf)
P Combo            053813AM3      NR                  CCC-p (sf)
Q Combo            053813AG6      NR                  BB+ (sf)

NR--Not rated


BOLTON WANDERERS: Denies Possible Administration
------------------------------------------------
Jonathan McIntosh at Sports Mole reports that Bolton Wanderers
have released a statement denying that they are on the verge of
going into administration.

The Championship club are reportedly in debt to the tune of
GBP173 million with the majority of the money being owed to owner
Eddie Davies.

"Whil[e] the club acknowledges it is going through a challenging
time, there have been no threats to any staff jobs in the
immediate future," a Bolton Wanderers statement said, according
to Sports Mole.

The report relays "after consistent backing from owner Eddie
Davies, the club continues to seek fresh investment in what is a
difficult and challenging economic climate."

Bolton remain in the Championship relegation zone after a
goalless draw against Bristol City, the report notes.


CENTRIX SOFTWARE: Seeks Buyer After Entering Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------
Doug Woodburn at CRN reports that UK-based workspace management
vendor Centrix Software is being marketed for sale after entering
administration.

The firm, whose reseller partners included SCC and Softcat, is
continuing to trade after appointing turnaround specialist David
Rubin and Partners as its administrator on October 27, the report
says.

Asher Miller, who is handling the administration, told CRN that
Centrix had run out of cash but was a "strong and stable
business", adding that 25 staff have been retained to ensure
development and support is maintained throughout the insolvency
process.

Centrix's WorkSpace IQ is a usage analytics tool designed to help
firms decide "who is using what, where and when across the end-
user environment, users, applications and content".

According to the report, Mr. Miller said he hoped a trade sale to
a competitor would be achieved in the coming weeks.

"Administration is a rescue procedure and there is a strong,
stable underlying business there," the report quotes Mr. Miller
as saying.  "We have just started marketing it to the trade. We
would hope to find a new home for it in the next few weeks or
couple of months, perhaps with a competitor who buys the
intellectual property and takes the team as well."

CRN relates that Mr. Miller said Centrix's majority investor, Ki
Corporation, is continuing to fund the Newbury-based firm, which
lists the likes of SCC, Softcat, Kelway, Crayon and Trustmarque
as partners on its website.

"The underlying product had been supported by Ki for some time
but the infrastructure was such that it was just costing too much
and it needed a change in infrastructure and strategic
direction," Mr. Miller told CRN. "It ran out of all its money due
to cash burn."


CHICHESTER HONDA: In Administration, Stocks Moved Out of the Shop
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Observer reports that Chichester Honda, a city firm, has gone
into administration with stock being moved out of its shop.  The
company went into administration at the end of October.

The report discloses that there is no sign on the doors from the
business indicating to customers what has happened, according to
The Observer.

The report notes that the phone lines do not connect and visitors
to its website -- http://www.chichesterhonda.co.uk-- are greeted
with message saying the website is undergoing maintenance.

The report relates it is not known how many staff are affected by
this, with Honda saying all the employees would have been part of
the franchise and not Honda employees.


CITY LINK: Hopelessly Insolvent Before Christmas, Court Hears
-------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Neville at Independent.co.uk reports that the parcel
delivery company City Link was "dead in the water" and
"hopelessly" insolvent in the few days leading up to last
Christmas Day when it went bust, a court has heard.

Independent.co.uk relates that three former directors of the
collapsed business are accused of failing to give 45 days' notice
of dismissals which took place on New Year's Eve, and of not
informing the Business Secretary of impending redundancies under
the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act.

Its former managing director David Smith, finance director Robert
Peto and non-executive Thomas Wright deny the charges at Coventry
Magistrates Court, the report says.

According to the report, the court heard that they were told on
December 22 that a GBP25 million funding boost had fallen
through, leaving the company unable to continue.

Opening the case against the men, Paul Ozin, representing the
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, claimed the
information was withheld to keep the business functioning in the
run up to Christmas and so "protect creditors," Independent.co.uk
says.

It meant hundreds of delivery drivers worked through the busy
last-minute Christmas period not knowing that the company was
insolvent and that they would be unlikely to be paid, the report
states.

"City Link was a nationwide parcel delivery service which went
into administration on Christmas Eve of last year.  It operated
53 depots and four hubs in locations across the United Kingdom,
employing 2,727 employees," the report quotes Mr. Ozin as saying.

"The triggering event was the collapse on December 22 of a
proposal, known as the turnaround plan, which was designed to
provide City Link with an essential injection of GBP25 million.
We say that the plan formulated by the managers on 22 December
was to carry on trading over the Christmas period -- with the
purpose of delivering the bulk of the parcels within the City
Link network -- and then to put the company into administration
by, at the latest, Boxing Day."

Independent.co.uk says the court also heard that managers planned
to "minimise" the collection of new parcels on Christmas Eve and
cease trading in a controlled fashion.

According to the report, Mr. Ozin told the court that during
interviews with the defendants, they claimed redundancies were
not "inevitable" on December 22, despite the failure to secure
funds or a buyer.

If found guilty, the trio face fines of GBP5,000 each. The case
is expected to conclude on November 13, the report adds.

                          About City Link

City Link Limited was a Coventry-based courier and parcels
delivery company.

Hunter Kelly, Charles King and Tom Lukic of Ernst & Young were
appointed Joint Administrators of City Link Limited and City Link
(Properties) No.1 Limited, on Dec. 24, 2014.


CLIMATE ENERGY: Thrift Energy Hires Firm's Terminated Employees
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ely News reports that eight people who lost their jobs when
Climate Energy company went into administration have been
employed by local firm, Thrift Energy.

Thrift Energy, based in Soham, was working alongside Essex-based
company, Climate Energy, on a major contract to refurbish around
1,000 properties in Cambridgeshire, according to Ely News.

The report notes Climate Energy went into administration last
month and Thrift Energy has now taken on eight people who were
employed by the firm.

The report notes that Derek Campbell, managing director at Thrift
Energy, said: "The job losses affected some key individuals that
had been working on the scheme who had a huge amount of
knowledge, expertise and involvement from the start.

"Thrift Energy made the bold decision to employ eight members of
staff that were affected in order to ensure, not only the
security of their employment, but also so that residents
experienced minimal disruption and the scheme continued to be
delivered as seamlessly as it could be," the report quoted Mr.
Campbell as saying.

The report relays that Thrift Energy is the largest contractor
involved in the scheme which includes carrying out extensive
external wall insulation works to improve the energy efficiency
and aesthetics of privately owned, rented and social housing in
Cambridge shire.

The scheme was funded by a consortium of district councils in the
county, using funds from the Department for Energy and Climate
Change, which provided a community fund of GBP7.5 million to
assist in making residents' homes more energy efficient, as well
as assisting in lowering their energy bills, the report notes.

The report discloses that with 366 properties now completed, the
company expects another 600 properties will be refurbished by the
time the scheme finishes in August 2016.


GLOBO PLC: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
corporate credit rating on U.K.-based mobile software firm Globo
PLC to 'D' from 'CCC'.  S&P removed the rating from CreditWatch
with negative implications.

Subsequently, S&P withdrew the corporate credit rating on Globo.

The rating action follows Globo's announcement that it has
received a letter from its main creditor regarding the occurrence
of events of default, and that a court has placed the company
into administration.

The administration appointment follows disclosures regarding the
falsification of data and misrepresentation of Globo's financial
situation.

The withdrawal reflects S&P's lack of reliable data and
sufficient information on the company's financial situation.


HARLEY CURTAIN: Faces Financial Difficulties Over Contract Issues
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Muhammad Aldalou at Insider Media Limited reports that Harley
Curtain Wall, an East Sussex construction company which provided
curtain walling to major building projects throughout the UK, was
forced into administration after facing financial difficulties
due to issues with a major contract, new documents have revealed.

Harley Curtain Wall entered administration on September 8 with
the appointment of Julie Palmer -- julie.palmer@begbies-
traynor.com --  and Simon Campbell -- simon.campbell@begbies-
traynor.com -- from Begbies Traynor, according to Insider Media
Limited.  The report notes that a total of 11 staff members were
made redundant and various assets of the business were sold to
Harley Facades Ltd.

The report discloses in a newly filed report to creditors seen by
Insider, administrators have shed light on the circumstances
leading to the company's collapse.

The report says Harley traded successfully for many years and
operated in a niche market.  The company "survived" the recession
and revenue grew from GBP3.8 million in 2011 to GBP6.5 million in
2014, the report notes.

The report relates the business began to experience financial
difficulties due to issues with a major contract which meant that
funds were not being released by the customer.  Harley dealt with
the issue by using its reserves but after six months of below
cost payments, its reserves were diminished, the report
discloses.

The report says the issue with the customer was also affecting
the ability of management to focus on trading matters as a
significant amount of time was spent trying to resolve the
issues.

The report relays, on September 7, 2015, the customer claimed
GBP428,000 against Harley for disputed work.  The company was
insolvent as it was unable to pay its debts as and when they fell
due.

Harley had no secured creditors but trade creditors were owed
approximately GBP1.04 million when the business entered
administration, the report adds.

Harley Curtain Wall, trading as Harley, was based in Crowborough
and established in 1996.  The business, which built up a
reputation for the quality of its work, also specialised in
windows, doors, structural glazing and rainscreen cladding
systems. Projects included high- and low-rise apartment and
office complexes.


INFINIS PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' IDR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Infinis plc's Long-term IDR at 'BB-'
with Stable Outlook and has affirmed the senior secured notes at
'BB-'.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's expectations of positive free
cash flow generation, supported by an increasing proportion of
revenues qualifying for support under the renewable obligation
(RO) scheme in place until 2027.  However, the company's size and
diversification are limited and average selling prices have been
lowered by the recent cut to the Climate Change Levy (CCL) and
lower UK wholesale power prices.  These issues will affect the
cash build and capacity to refinance the GBP350m bond due in
2019. Accordingly, Fitch would like to see faster deleveraging in
future to reduce refinancing risk and maintain the existing
credit rating.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Largely Supportive UK Regulation

More than 90% of Infinis's revenues benefit from the RO incentive
scheme.  This figure is due to rise to 100% in FY19, raising
average selling prices as lower fixed price NFFO contracts
expire. RO certificate prices are supported by ensuring the
minimum required number of RO certificates is higher than RO
certificate generation.  The UK government has confirmed its
commitment to grandfathering existing incentive schemes and we
assume will continue to receive the same level of support until
2027.  However, the government announced in July 2015 its
intention to discontinue the CCL exemption for renewable
electricity from August 2015.  Infinis expects a reduction in
revenue and EBITDA of around GBP4.5 million in FY16 and around
GBP6.5 million in FY17.  This equates to 7% of FY15 EBITDA.

Power Price Exposure

Around 50% of Infinis's revenues are exposed to wholesale price
risk under the RO scheme, which could lead to price volatility
and have a substantial impact on cash flows and the rating.  Weak
gas prices, coal prices and demand have all meant continued
weakness in UK wholesale baseload electricity prices.  Latest
forwards indicate GBP42/MWh through FY19, versus GBP52-55/MWh
assumed previously.  Although Infinis typically hedges ahead for
6-12 months, with the latest contracted position covering nearly
70% of 1H17 revenues, the longer-term impact is negative.

Declining Output

Fitch expects landfill gas (LFG) output to show a gradual
continuous decline of 4%-6% per year.  However, with a half-life
of around 12 years, output can continue until around 2047.
Although reliance on a single fuel source is a weakness, the
portfolio is relatively well diversified by region, with the top
10 sites accounting for 38% of the total.  Exported generation in
the three months to June 2015 was 435 GWh versus 463GWh in 1Q15,
a fall of 6% due to a combination of the natural decline in
landfill gas, drier weather conditions and district network
operator (DNO) instructed outages at Bletchley & Wapseys Wood,
resulting in 11 days of lost output.  Adjusting for the DNO
outages, the output decline was 4.7%.

Refinancing Risk

Fitch expects Infinis to refinance the GBP350m bond maturing in
2019 with a debt issuance sized at around 3.5x EBITDA.  Repayment
of the existing bond will depend on Infinis retaining adequate
cash levels, as we estimate EBITDA be lower than previously
expected due to the CCL cut and lower wholesale prices; however,
this is offset by the dividend lock-up covenants.  Fitch's
understanding is that the refinanced bond maybe amortizing.
Fitch's estimate is that this should amount to around GBP275 mil.
The forthcoming change in ownership structure of Infinis plc's
ultimate parent, Infinis Energy plc (IEP), due to close by end
2015, may influence any potential early refinancing of the bond.

Standalone Rating

Fitch's view is that the bond indenture largely insulates Infinis
from its parent, IEP and its investment in onshore wind projects.
The bond indenture allows potentially substantial leakage of cash
from Infinis in the form of dividends and other permitted
payments, but the restricted payment provisions are standard and
reflect the company's strong free cash (FCF) flow pre-dividends
rather than weakness in the bond documentation.  Infinis plc and
its immediate parent Infinis Energy Holdings Limited (IEHL) are
both 100% owned by IEP.

Terra Firma (TF), which owns 68.5% of IEFS, announced in October
2015 an offer to buy out the minorities.  There is no short-term
credit impact for Infinis plc, although longer term, this may
lead to splitting off IEP's wind business from LFG, selling first
wind, potentially in 2016, and later LFG.  Because of political
and regulatory changes affecting both wind and LFG, the offer to
buy out the minorities is a change of strategy from last year
when TF announced plans to sell its 68.5% stake.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Infinis PLC
include:

For pricing, Fitch assumes sites remunerated by NFFO fall to 2%
of revenues by 2018 and zero by FY19.  All remaining NFFO
contracts expire by November 2018.  The proportion of LFG
remunerated under the RO scheme therefore increases to 98% by
2018 and 100% by 2019, increasing Infinis's average selling
price.

For the NFFO, Fitch assumes an average GBP43.40 for FY16, based
on the latest contracted position, rolled forward at RPI in line
with regulation.

For the RO scheme, Fitch assumes an average selling price of just
over GBP90 per MWh, based on an average GBP48.90 for FY16 for RO
certificates, rolled forward at an average 3% pa (in line with
2009-2015) plus the wholesale power price.  Fitch bases estimates
of uncontracted revenues beyond 1H17 on forward wholesale power
prices of around GBP42/MWh through FY19.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A positive rating action is unlikely near term in view of the
slow deleveraging and scope for increased dividends and permitted
investments with affiliates.  Future developments that could
nevertheless lead to positive rating action include an increase
in wholesale electricity prices or LFG recovery above Fitch's
expectations, leading to FFO gross adjusted leverage sustainably
below 3x and FFO interest cover sustainably above 4x.

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action include recoverable LFG depletion
faster than Fitch currently assumes or wholesale electricity
prices substantially lower than the forward curve, so that FFO
net adjusted leverage is sustainably above 4x and FFO interest
cover sustainably below 2.5x.

A slower pace of deleveraging, based on net adjusted leverage, as
the refinancing deadline approaches could also lead to a negative
rating action.

LIQUIDITY

Based on solid FCF generation, we expect the company's liquidity
position to be strong.  Available liquidity consists only of cash
on the balance sheet in view of the absence of a revolving credit
facility in the restricted Group.  As at June 2015, readily
available cash stood at GBP61m, before the latest dividend
payment of GBP17 mil.  There is no uplift from the IDR for the
senior notes, in view of average expected recoveries.  Asset
concentration and limited retail hedges are reflected in
potentially greater than average volatility in LFG valuations.


NYRSTAR: To Raise EUR275-Mil. Via Share Offering to Cut Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Neil Hume at The Financial Times reports that heavily-indebted
Nyrstar plans to raise up to EUR275 million through a share
offering to pay down debt and has appointed bankers to explore a
total exit from mining.

Bill Scotting, chief executive, flagged the possibility of
another equity fundraising last month when he said business as
usual was not an option for the perennially underperforming
company, the FT relates.

According to the FT, the package of measures laid out on Nov. 9
by Mr. Scotting, who previously ran the mining division of
steelmaker ArcelorMittal, will help Nyrstar repay a EUR415
million bond that matures in 2016 and also address ongoing
problems with it mining division.

As well as a rights issue of EUR250 million-EUR275 million,
Nyrstar is raising a further EUR150 million-EUR200 million from a
so called "prepayment deal", or a loan for metal deal, the FT
discloses.

On top of that, it is considering a high-yield bond issue --
subject to market conditions -- and has struck a number of
commercial supply agreements with Trafigura, its biggest
shareholder, the FT notes.

These will start in January but will not replace a current deal
Nyrstar has to sell a large chunk of its zinc output through
Noble Group, the Hong-Kong based commodity trader, the FT says.

"Nyrstar has retained financial advisers to assist with a process
to pursue strategic alternatives including a sale of certain or
all of the mining segment assets," Mr. Scotting, as cited by the
FT, said.

Nyrstar is a zinc producer.


RANGERS FOOTBALL: Says Ibrox Tax Case Ruling No Impact on Club
--------------------------------------------------------------
Alan McEwen at Daily Record reports that a judgment from the
Judiciary of Scotland on Nov. 4 stated the Employee Benefit Trust
scheme operated by Sir David Murray between 2001 and 2010 was
"subject to income tax".

Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HRMC) on Nov. 4 won its appeal
in the Rangers Football Club Big Tax Case after judges ruled
against the Ibrox club's former owner, Daily Record relates.

HRMC last year lost its original appeal against a tax tribunal
ruling on payments made by former Rangers owner Sir David
Murray's group of companies, Daily Record recounts.

But that ruling was overturned after judges at the Court of
Session in Edinburgh found various trusts for executives and
players at the club were "a mere redirection of emoluments or
earnings", Daily Record relays.

They ruled the trusts were accordingly "subject to income tax",
Daily Record discloses.

A court previously decreed that a GBP46.2 million tax demand on
Mr. Murray's company, most of which referred to oldco Rangers, be
"reduced substantially", Daily Record recounts.

The Murray group contended the payments -- made through the now
outlawed Employee Benefit Trusts -- were loans and not taxable
income, Daily Record notes.

HMRC appealed against a decision on tax assessments made on
Murray Group Holdings and other members of the Murray Group of
companies, including Rangers oldco, Daily Record relays.

According to Daily Record, the appeal judges observed that the
"fundamental principle" that emerged from previous cases was
clear, namely "if income is derived from an employee's services
qua [in their capacity as] employee, it is an emolument or
earnings, and is thus assessable to income tax, even if the
employee requests or agrees that it be redirected to a third
party".

The judge found that "the obligation to deduct tax under the PAYE
system fell on the employer who made such a payment", Daily
Record discloses.

Mr. Murray sold Rangers to Craig Whyte in May 2011, and the club
was liquidated 13 months later over separate debts, Daily Record
recounts.

                          No Impact

According to Video Celts' Joe McHugh, the club website on Nov. 4
announced: "We would like to correct some misleading information
that has been circulating on what is described as the "Big Tax
Case".

"For the avoidance of doubt, Rangers have not lost the case.
There is no question of any liability impacting on our Club, its
history or any member of the Rangers International Football Club
plc Group.

"The Rangers Football Club and the entities which currently own
and manage it are not party to these proceedings nor do we have
any say in what happens.  The proceedings are a matter for those
affected by them.

"We note that the assessments for tax which were the subject for
appeal and which are referred to as the Big Tax Case relate to
Murray Group Holdings Limited, Murray Group Management Limited,
The Premier Group Property Limited, GM Mining Limited and RFC
2012 PLC (in liquidation)."

                             Losses

In a separate report, Daily Record's Stephen Stewart relates that
Rangers' annual report shows the club is still hemorrhaging cash
and states the company "require up to GBP2.5 million by way of
debt or equity funding" by the end of season to meet liabilities.

The club has revealed that it lost a staggering GBP7.5 million in
the past year, Daily Record discloses.

The club's annual report highlighted the loss a year after it
lost GBP8.1 million, Daily Record notes.  Turnover for the year
was GBP16.5 million while operating expenses came to more than
GBP26 million, Daily Record states.

However, on Oct. 30, the club released a statement in which they
outlined a funding plan that would see Dave King, Douglas Park,
George Letham and George Taylor make further loan facilities
available "on the same no fees and no interest basis as the
existing loan facilities", Daily Record relates.

                   About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station, RANGERSTV.tv.  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.


THPA FINANCE: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded THPA Finance Limited's (THPA) notes
as:

  GBP110.7 mil. class A2 secured 7.127% fixed-rate notes due
   2024: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A-'; off Rating Watch Negative
  (RWN); Outlook Negative

  GBP70 mil. class B secured 8.241% fixed-rate notes due 2028:
   downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB+'; off RWN; Outlook Negative

  GBP30 mil. class C secured 10% fixed-rate notes due 2031:
   downgraded to 'B' from 'BB-'; off RWN; Outlook Stable

The rating actions follow THPA's announcement regarding the
impact of the permanent closure of Redcar steel plant and the
related liquidation of Sahaviriya Steel Industries (SSI).  SSI's
contribution to EBITDA in the year to June 2015 was assessed by
the company at around GBP10m (approximately 25% of yearly
EBITDA).  The downgrades reflect the lower future cash flows and
the consequential reduction of debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
metrics.  The Negative Outlook on the class A2 and B notes
reflects the uncertainty over the exact impact on revenues and
operating costs, and potential revision of the capital
expenditures funding program.  The Stable Outlook on the class C
notes reflects the very limited potential for further downgrades,
given the deferability of payments due on this tranche and
therefore the low likelihood of default in the next few years.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Revenue Risk - Volume: Midrange

After the SSI liquidation and Redcar steel plant closure, the
majority of Teesport's traffic depends on the chemical and the
oil industries located nearby the port, with a heightened
concentration risk in terms of businesses and customers.  The
largest customer is now Conoco Phillips, who led the increase in
the total handled volumes in FY14 despite the challenges the
crude oil business is facing.  SSI was the largest customer with
a 15% contribution to revenues, beyond being the driver for
future EBITDA growth.  THPA's management will continue to focus
on diversification strategies to recover the volume loss.

Revenue Risk - Price: Midrange

The group employs a combination of a 'landlord' and 'operating'
business model, thus maintaining some volatility related to
operating risk from its business.  Tariffs are unregulated and,
to a varying extent, linked to inflation.  Contracts with
guaranteed revenue are mostly short term.  Fitch expects the
portion of guaranteed revenues to decrease after taking out SSI's
contribution to 10% of revenues (from 20%).

Infrastructure Development/Renewal: Midrange

The port is generally well maintained and notably some larger
refurbishments were made in 2014 and 2015 in relation to the No.
1 Quay deck maintenance.  The company was expecting the funds
available for investment to increase as a result of the
conditions agreed with the SSI contract renewal in 2015, in
addition to external sources.  The availability of internal and
external funds for ongoing investment will now partly depend on
the business's ability to attract new volumes over the next few
years.

Debt structure: Stronger for Class A notes and a Midrange for
Class B and C notes

All classes of notes are fully amortizing and benefit from a
strong security package typical for UK whole business
securitizations.  There is no interest rate risk.  The
transaction allows for more control by the senior noteholders if
performance deteriorates and covenants are breached as a borrower
event of default could lead class A noteholders to enforce at the
expense of junior notes.  The liquidity facility is available
only to the class A notes.

Financial Metrics

The projected minimum of average or median EBITDA DSCR in Fitch's
rating case has deteriorated to 1.6x (from 2.2x), 1.2x (from
1.7x) and 1.1x (from 1.5x) for the class A2, B and C notes,
respectively.  Under Fitch's rating case the transaction is
projected to breach the default covenant at the borrower level
(set at 1.25x) over the medium term and will remain in lock up.
Falling EBITDA worsened gross debt to EBITDA to around 3.8x (from
2.9x), 6.3x (from 4.7x) and 7.3x (from 5.5x), respectively, for
each class of notes.

Peer Group

The closest peer used to be ABP Finance PLC (ABP) which is rated
'A-', but THPA suffers from a weakened revenue profile and
coverage metrics.  Fitch assesses ABP to have Stronger Revenue
Risk characteristics (both in terms of Volume and Price) due to
ABP's dominant market position in the UK and its diverse revenue
streams.  Additionally, almost 50% of revenues are either
contractually fixed or subject to minimum guarantees.
Consequently, we consider ABP to be stronger in terms of cash
flow volatility compared with THPA.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating could be downgraded if the impact of SSI's liquidation
proves to be higher than expected.  In addition, a reduction in
oil revenues or the loss of another major customer could
adversely impact the transaction's revenues.  EBITDA DSCR
forecasts under Fitch's rating case consistently below 1.50x at
class A and 1.20x at class B will trigger further negative rating
actions.  Notably, we view the class C notes as less likely to be
downgraded due to their deferability, resulting in a low
likelihood of default in the next few years.

The Outlook on the class A2 and B notes may be revised to Stable
if, absent other negative developments, the EBITDA proves to be
consistently in line with the updated forecasts.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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