TCREUR_Public/151111.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

         Wednesday, November 11, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 223



* AZERBAIJAN: Number of Banks in Liquidation Process Reaches 7


FBME BANK: Shareholders to Oppose Liquidation Plan


TANTALUS RARE: Enters Preliminary Insolvency Proceedings


GREECE: Needs Few More Days to Reach Agreement on EUR2BB Aid


BUDAPEST: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating & Changes Outlook to Pos.


TALISMAN-5 FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'Csf'


KASSA NOVA: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'B/C' Rating
KAZAKHTELECOM JSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating


HARBOURMASTER CLO: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
* NETHERLANDS: Number of Bankruptcies Rises to 47 in October 2015


FORUM BANK: Liquidator Puts Bakkara Hotel Up for Sale
UKRLANDFARMING: To Pay US$20-Mil. to Creditors Before Year-End

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ADUR OUTDOOR: To Go Into Voluntary Liquidation, Council Reveals
FAIRLINE BOATS: Seeks Company Voluntary Arrangement, Jobs at Risk
GEMGARTO 2015-2: Moody's Assigns (P)Caa3 Rating to Class X1 Notes
GEMGARTO 2015-2: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EXP)' Rating to Class X1 Debt
MARBLE ARCH NO 4: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E1c Debt

MOY PARK: S&P Raises Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB', Outlook Stable



* AZERBAIJAN: Number of Banks in Liquidation Process Reaches 7
APA News reports that in the third quarter, the banking sector
lost 2 banks -- Eurobank and Azerbaijan Credit Bank.  Licenses of
these banks have been cancelled under the decision of Central Bank
of Azerbaijan, according to APA News.

The report notes that at present, 43 banks operate in Azerbaijan.
Two of them are state-owned banks, while 41 are private banks.

The report relays that number of banks with foreign capital
reduced to 22 from 23, as Eurobank left the sector.

According to outcomes of the third quarter, Azerbaijan-based banks
operate 758 branches, while they operated 763 in the second
quarter. Banks link the reduction with optimization, the report

The report discloses Departments of local banks increased to 165
from 163.


FBME BANK: Shareholders to Oppose Liquidation Plan
Stelios Orphanides at Cyprus Mail reports that the shareholders of
FBME Bank said that they will resist a plan to liquidate its
Cyprus branch.

The Central Bank of Cyprus placed the lender under administration
more than a year ago, Cyprus Mail relates.

FBME Bank provides banking solutions for personal, corporate
banking and investment services.


TANTALUS RARE: Enters Preliminary Insolvency Proceedings
Reuters reports that the District Court in Munich on Nov. 4
ordered Tantalus Rare Earths to enter into preliminary insolvency

Axel W. Bierbach of Munich-based Mueller-Heydenreich Bierbach and
Co. has been appointed preliminary administrator, Reuters relates.

Tantalus Rare Earths AG is a Germany-based company that is
primarily engaged in the discovery, selection and development of
mineral deposits outside China.


GREECE: Needs Few More Days to Reach Agreement on EUR2BB Aid
Richard Bravo at Bloomberg News reports that Greece and its
European Union creditors need a few more days to reach an
agreement that would release an aid payment of EUR2 billion
(US$2.2 billion).

According to Bloomberg, an EU official with knowledge of the talks
said the two sides need to resolve several issues, including how
to deal with housing foreclosures.  Two other European officials
said the Greeks are seeking a system that would shield about 70%
of homeowners from foreclosure, Bloomberg notes.

Auditors from the International Monetary Fund, the European
Commission, the European Stability Mechanism and the European
Central Bank say the Greek limit is overly generous and are
seeking a stricter framework that would only cover the most
vulnerable, Bloomberg relays.

Euro-area finance ministers were scheduled to meet on Nov. 9 in
Brussels to review the implementation of Greece's latest bailout
program and whether the nation is meeting certain milestones
required for the disbursement of aid and the recapitalization of
its banks, Bloomberg discloses.  Failure to complete the review
could put the solvency of the sovereign and of its financial
system in doubt, Bloomberg states.


BUDAPEST: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating & Changes Outlook to Pos.
Moody's Public Sector Europe has changed to positive from stable
the outlook on the City of Budapest.  MPSE has also affirmed the
city's Ba1 rating.

The main drivers of the rating action are (1) the improving
Hungarian operating environment, as reflected in Moody's outlook
change on Hungary's Ba1 government bond rating to positive from
stable; and (2) the strong correlation between sovereign and sub-
sovereign credit risk, reflected in macroeconomic and financial
linkages as well as in institutional factors.

The change in outlook and the affirmation follow similar actions
on Hungary's government bond rating on Nov. 6, 2015.  For full
details, please refer to the sovereign press release:



The outlook change reflects the improving operating environment of
Hungary, as reflected by the positive outlook on the sovereign

The outlook change also reflects Moody's view that the
creditworthiness of Budapest is closely linked to that of the
sovereign, as Hungarian local governments depend on revenues that
are linked to the sovereign's macroeconomic and fiscal
performance.  Approximately 70% of Budapest's operating revenues
in 2014 were from intergovernmental revenues, in the form of
shared taxes and central government transfers that are set at the
national level.

Moody's expects that the comparatively good national economic
growth will be sustained.  This will result in growing central
government allocations, which will be a positive for the city's
income stream.


The affirmation of Budapest's Ba1 rating reflects the city's
proven track record of prudent budgetary management, as mirrored
by its solid operating surpluses and good financial performance.

Budapest's rating is underpinned by almost zero net direct and
indirect debt, which is a result of the decision of Hungarian
central government to cut public debt within its efforts to
consolidate municipal finances.  As such, Budapest's net debt fell
to a very low 3% of operating revenues in 2015 from 97% in 2012.

Moody's also notes that the Ba1 rating reflects Budapest's strong
liquidity and sound governance and management practices, as well
as its strong internal budget procedures.


Upward pressure on Budapest's rating could arise from an upgrade
of the sovereign rating associated with continued solid operating
performance and strong liquidity position.

Downward pressure on the rating could result from a downgrade of
Hungary's sovereign rating; and/or a material deterioration in the
city's operating and financial performance.

The publication of this rating action deviates from the previously
scheduled release date in the sovereign release calendar published
on Moody's.  The reason for the deviation is the rating action on
the sovereign rating.

The specific economic indicators, as required by EU regulation,
are not available for this entity.  These national economic
indicators are relevant to the sovereign rating, which was used as
an input to this credit rating action.

Sovereign Issuer: Hungary, Government of

  GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 25,019 (2014 Actual) (also
   known as Per Capita Income)
  Real GDP growth (% change): 3.7% (2014 Actual) (also known as
   GDP Growth)
  Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): -0.9% (2014 Actual)
  Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -2.5% (2014 Actual) (also
   known as Fiscal Balance)
  Current Account Balance/GDP: 2.3% (2014 Actual) (also known as
   External Balance)
  External debt/GDP: [not available]
   Level of economic development: High level of economic
   known as Fiscal Balance)
  Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have
   been recorded since 1983.

On Nov. 5, 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Budapest, City of.  The main points raised during
the discussion were: The issuer's institutional strength/
framework, have not materially changed.  The systemic risk in
which the issuer operates has materially decreased.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this rating action, if applicable.


TALISMAN-5 FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'Csf'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded TALISMAN -5 Finance plc's class A, B
and C notes due in July 2016 and affirmed the others as follows:

  EUR57.4 million class A (XS0278333736) downgraded to 'B-sf' from
  'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative

  EUR35.9 million class B (XS0278334460) downgraded to 'CCsf' from
  'BBsf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 100%

  EUR26.1 million class C (XS0278334973) downgraded to 'Csf' from
  'CCsf'; RE75%

  EUR9.4 million class D (XS0278335277) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%

  EUR0m class E (XS0278335863) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%

TALISMAN - 5 Finance plc originally was a EUR544.2 million
securitization of seven CMBS loans, originated by ABN AMRO. As of
end-October 2015, three loans were outstanding with a cumulative
balance EUR121.5 million. All loans are currently in special


The downgrades reflect the diminishing prospects of the issuer
repaying its liabilities by legal final maturity in July 2016. In
the last 12 months the main success was the resolution of the Fish
loan, fetching EUR50.3 million (at a EUR7.3 million loss) in
recoveries. Elsewhere progress has slowed and in some cases
reversed: bids have been withdrawn (eg Reindeer loan), local
politics have added complication and uncertainty (eg Penguin
loan), while marketing efforts have been slow (eg Monkey loan).
Added to this, vacancy has been steadily rising and expected to
rise further, as some large tenants follow through on previous
notices to vacate.

Fitch estimates that sizeable pockets of collateral value remain
in each of the three portfolios, thus supporting the recovery
estimates (which look through bond maturity). However, the special
servicer's ability to release this value in time for bond maturity
has fallen markedly, leaving no margin of safety for class A
investors. The Negative Outlook on this tranche reflects the risk
of a further downgrade in the months ahead unless significant
progress on work-outs can be demonstrated.

The Penguin loan (39.3% of the pool) is secured by six offices in
the Paris region. The sale and purchase agreement that was signed
with a major French residential developer regarding the Colombes
site (comprising four of the properties) was rejected by the
mayor, on the grounds that the scheme would have been above the
desired residential density. Should the mayor purchase the site
for the city's own redevelopment plans, as intended, and while an
offer for the site may come soon, it is likely to be well down
from the previous bids.

The two remaining Penguin offices are in Evry and Suresnes. The
Evry property is let on a 3/6/9 lease to Carrefour, which Fitch
expects to vacate in December 2017. The borrower restarted
marketing the multi-let Suresnes property in 2Q15, with several
bids reportedly received. Fitch understands from the special
servicer that they expect the property will be sold for at least

The Reindeer loan (32.5%) is secured by a portfolio of secondary
Finnish retail properties. Challenges in the Finnish retail market
have resulted in a gradual increase in vacancy to approximately
35% currently, from 28% a year ago. Fitch understands from the
special servicer that final offers for the portfolio have been
received and are currently being evaluated. If a portfolio sale is
not achieved by year end, an asset-by-asset sale strategy will be
pursued, limiting the prospect of significant proceeds flowing in
time for bond maturity in Fitch's view.

The Monkey loan (28.4%) is secured by a business park and a hotel
on the outskirts of Munich. The largest tenant at the business
park (accounting for 40% of income) has terminated its lease
contract and is due to vacate in December. An attempt to refinance
the property has failed, and a borrower-led sale process is now
being pursued. This offers the greatest chance of realising
material proceeds in the short term given the hotel is leased for
nine years to Holiday Inns.


The Negative Outlook on the class A notes reflects the risk of a
further downgrade in the months ahead unless significant progress
on work-outs can be demonstrated.

Fitch estimates ultimate 'Bsf' recoveries of EUR105m - EUR120m


No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's initial
closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.


KASSA NOVA: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'B/C' Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Kazakhstan-based Kassa Nova Bank JSC to negative from stable.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed its long- and short-term counterparty
credit ratings on the bank at 'B/C' and the national scale rating
at 'kzBB'.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that Kassa Nova Bank's
capital buffers are likely to come under increasing pressure
because of the slowdown of the Kazakh economy and associated
deterioration of creditworthiness of the bank's borrowers.  S&P
expects the bank's operating margins to decrease slightly, due to
elevated cost of funding in Kazakhstan, exacerbated by the market
turmoil and rapid depreciation of the Kazakh tenge since August
2015.  Given the bank's rather low internal capital generation
levels, S&P thinks that its strong capitalization in the next 12-
18 months will depend to a large extent on the capital injection
from shareholders that the bank expects at the beginning of 2016.
Any change of plans by shareholders with regards to capital
provision or a delay in providing the capital may lead S&P to
revise downward its assessment of the bank's capitalization, which
S&P currently considers to be "strong."

S&P believes that the major risks for the bank's lending
operations are related to its focus on retail customers and small
and midsize companies, which S&P considers vulnerable in the
currently depressed economic environment.  However, S&P believes
that the bank will be able to keep the level of nonperforming
loans (loans overdue by more than 90 days) below 5% of total loans
in the next 12-18 months, due to its strong underwriting and good
risk management systems.

S&P also thinks that Kassa Nova Bank's funding base will remain
stable.  The bank's customer accounts grew 15% over the first
eight months of 2015 (adjusted for currency revaluation effects).
The bank's deposit base mostly comprised corporate deposits, which
accounted for 91% of total liabilities on July 1, 2015.  In
addition, S&P considers that management has been successful in
diversifying the bank's funding base and gradually diminishing
dependence on shareholders' deposits.

Finally, S&P notes that the bank hedges its open currency position
with foreign currency swaps with the National Bank of Kazakhstan
(NBK) that expire in October 2016.  Currently, S&P don't have
sufficient clarity on whether NBK is going to extend the foreign
currency swaps with banks when they expire or whether an
alternative hedging instrument will be developed.  In the absence
of such a hedging instrument, the bank would have to recognize a
substantial amount of losses from currency revaluation of its
assets and liabilities following depreciation of the tenge between
August and November 2015.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's expectation of pressure on
Kassa Nova Bank's capital ratios in the next 12 months, due to
increasing credit costs and narrowing margins, as well as some
uncertainty with regards to the capital increase that the bank
expects in 2016.

S&P could take a negative rating action if its forecast risk-
adjusted capital (RAC) ratio before adjustments for
diversification and concentration decreased below 10% in the next
12 months.  This could happen if the bank did not receive the
capital injection in early 2016 as currently expected, or if its
credit costs increased substantially above 3% of total loans per
year, putting significant pressure on the capital buffers and also
resulting in deterioration of S&P's RAC ratio below our current
base-case forecasts.  In addition, a negative rating action could
follow if the bank's liquidity cushion, which S&P currently
considers to be adequate, weakened materially.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the bank's projected RAC
ratio stayed sustainably above 10% and the bank demonstrated
better operating performance than local peers during the economic
slowdown and maintained satisfactory loan portfolio quality, with
nonperforming loans remaining below 5% of total loans.

KAZAKHTELECOM JSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Kazakhtelecom JSC's (Kaztel) Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a Positive Outlook.

"The creation of a joint venture (JV) from the combination of
Kaztel's and Tele2 AB's mobile assets in Kazakhstan should
significantly strengthen Kaztel's position in mobile services. We
are maintaining the Positive Outlook on the company's IDR as this
transaction should only have a slightly negative impact on its
leverage. We believe the company should be able to digest a spike
in leverage if it has to purchase in three years the 49% stake in
the mobile JV it does not own."

Kaztel is a strong fixed-line incumbent, with dominant market
shares in traditional telephony and fixed-line broadband services,
operating in a benign regulatory environment. The company re-
entered the mobile mass market with its LTE/GSM service in 2014,
providing it with a capability to offer both fixed and mobile


Stronger Mobile Business

The transaction should strengthen the mobile market positions of
both parties. The JV will have a 22% share of Kazakhstan's mobile
subscriber market or 5.6 million active customers. The companies
will continue operating separately under their current brand
names. Fitch does not expect any significant subscriber
cannibalization as both brands should continue to operate in
separate consumer niches.

Kaztel and Tele2 Group will hold 51%/49% economic interest and
49%/51% voting interest, respectively. Kaztel will contribute its
mobile subsidiary Altel on a debt-free basis while Tele2 will
contribute its mobile assets in Kazakhstan with a KZT97 billion
shareholder loan. Tele2 will retain management control over the JV
and will appoint all of the Management Board apart from CFO. The
deal is subject to regulatory approval and is expected to close in

More Rational Mobile Market

Tele2 and Altel compete aggressively with mobile market leaders
JSC Kcell and Vimpelcom Ltd. The price war initiated by the
operators in 2015 along with mobile termination rates cuts have
led to pressure on mobile average revenue per user. With a
combined subscriber share of 22%, the JV has less incentive for
disruptive price behavior to acquire customers. We expect the
focus to shift towards the value of offers and quality of service.

LTE Remains an Advantage

Kaztel is rapidly growing the number of its data-hungry 4G
customers as it remains the only Kazakh provider of LTE mobile
services capable of managing high data volumes. Once the JV is
created, Tele2's subscribers will be able to use 4G network while
both companies' customers will benefit from wider 2G/3G coverage.

Expected Synergies

The merger of companies should generate synergies in operating
costs and capital expenditures. The JV should be able to save
money on network construction while the overlap of existing
networks should lead to a higher quality of service and wider
coverage. Given Kaztel's ability to provide the whole spectrum of
telecom services, the upselling efforts in the mobile business may
help it expand its broadband and pay-TV subscriber base.

Leverage to Increase Marginally

As a result of the transaction, Kaztel will guarantee up to 51% of
the JV's total external debt. Fitch projects that the JV will
require external funding in 2016-2017 to finance capex. Fitch
includes these guarantees in Kaztel's total debt calculation. This
results in a marginal deterioration of the company's leverage

Fitch still expects funds from operations (FFO) adjusted gross
leverage to decline below 2.0x in 2017-2018 on the back of
continuing strong operating cash flow generation and lower capex.

Call/Put Options

As part of the merger Kaztel will have a call option allowing it
to buy out the share of Tele2 in the JV in three years at a price
determined by an independent appraiser. Tele2 has a mirroring put
option with the same terms. Fitch conservatively assumes that this
option is exercised and includes the shareholder loan repayment in
its calculations, which causes FFO adjusted gross leverage in 2019
to exceed 2.0x. Due to robust free cash flow (FCF) generation,
leverage should drop below 2.0x again in 2020.

Mobile Margins to Improve

Tele2 Kazakhstan and Altel have launched their mobile operations
recently compared with market leaders Kcell and Vimpelcom. Rapid
network development and aggressive subscriber acquisition have put
pressure on the companies' margins. Tele2's mobile operations in
Kazakhstan turned EBITDA-positive in 2014 and now generate a low
single-digit margin while Altel reached EBITDA-breakeven only in
2015. Further profitability growth is likely from stabilizing
subscriber acquisition costs and cost synergies from the merger.


Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Kaztel include
the following:

-- Low single-digit consumer revenue declines in the fixed-line

-- A decline in capex to below 20% of revenues from 2016
    excluding the mobile JV;

-- Positive FCF generation from 2016 excluding the mobile JV;

-- Rapid mobile JV revenue growth of double digits in 2016-2017,
    declining to high single-digits thereafter;

-- 100% ownership of the mobile JV in 2019 conservatively
    assuming earliest possible exercise of the put/call option;

-- Kaztel's guarantees for external debt issued by the mobile JV
    are included in total debt calculation

-- Priority of debt repayment over dividends distribution at the
    mobile JV


Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to a positive rating action include:

-- A sustained decrease in FFO adjusted gross leverage to below
    2x (end-2014: 1.9x);

-- Maintaining sufficient liquidity that is diversified between
    external and internal sources;

-- Stronger FCF generation with pre-dividend FCF margin in the
    mid-single digit range;

-- Successful integration of Tele2's and Altel's assets and
    further strong execution of Kaztel's mobile strategy.

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to a negative rating action include:

-- A protracted rise in FFO-adjusted gross leverage to above 3x
    and/or a material increase in refinancing risks, which would
    lead to a downgrade

-- Operating underperformance in the fixed and/or mobile
    segment, which may cause the Outlook to be revised to Stable.


Kaztel has a few credit lines from foreign banks and the domestic
Development Bank of Kazakhstan (BBB/Stable) which are sufficient
to cover its short-term refinancing needs and fund its
expansionary capex program. Facilities from foreign banks are in
foreign currency, which match its forthcoming foreign currency

The company also has a 10-year KZT18 billion credit line from
Development Bank of Kazakhstan. It is available for financing
mobile development but it would also allow Kaztel to divert
operating cash flow from internal capex funding to other needs,
including refinancing. Kaztel's debt profile is well spread with
no medium-term debt redemption peaks.


Kazakhtelecom JSC

  Long-term foreign and local IDRs: affirmed 'BB', Outlook

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'A+(kaz)', Outlook

  Senior unsecured debt in foreign and local currency: affirmed at

  Senior unsecured debt in local currency: affirmed at 'A+(kaz)'


HARBOURMASTER CLO: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
Fitch Ratings has taken multiple rating actions on Harbourmaster
CLO 5 B.V.'s notes as follows:

  EUR5.5 million Class A3 (XS0223503078): upgraded to 'Asf' from
  'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR9 million Class A4E (XS0223503151): affirmed at 'BBsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR16 million Class A4F (XS0223503581): affirmed at 'BBsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR4 million Class B1E (XS0223503664): affirmed at 'B-sf';
  Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

  EUR15 million Class B1F (XS0223503748): affirmed at 'B-sf';
  Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

  EUR5.9 million Class B2E (XS0223503821): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
  Recovery Estimate (RE) 0%

  EUR4.7 million Class B2F (XS0223504043): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
  RE 0%

Harbourmaster CLO 5 B.V. is a managed cash arbitrage
securitization of secured leveraged loans, primarily domiciled in
Europe. The portfolio is managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds
Europe Limited.


The upgrade reflects an improvement in credit enhancement (CE)
over the past 12 months while the affirmations reflect the higher
CE being offset by increased portfolio concentration risk. The
class A2 notes have been paid in full and the class A3 notes have
been paid down significantly to 17.3% of the original note
balance. The Outlook on the class B1 notes has been revised to
Stable from Negative following a 13.7% increase in CE.

In March 2015, EUR376,693 or 35% of the excess spread was used to
pay down the class B2 notes to cure the class B2
overcollateralization (OC) test. The OC test has since been met
and is now passing with a 11.1% cushion.

The portfolio has become highly concentrated following
amortization. The number of issuers in the current portfolio has
been reduced to 10 from 15 over the past 12 months and the largest
10 assets account for 79.7% of the par value. The Fitch-weighted
average rating factor increased to 41.3 from 33.6, well above the
trigger at 30, indicating weakening credit quality of the
underlying assets. The high concentration, coupled with the low
credit quality, suggest that portfolio default rates can be highly

There are currently no defaulted assets compared with EUR15.5
million a year ago. However, as the transaction becomes more
concentrated, the note's sensitivity to defaults increases,
particularly at the junior level.


Increasing the default probability by 25% would likely result in a
downgrade of up to three notches to the class B1 and B2 notes.
Furthermore, applying a recovery rate cut of 25% on all the assets
would likely result in a downgrade of up to two notches.


No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pools ahead of the transaction's initial
closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

* NETHERLANDS: Number of Bankruptcies Rises to 47 in October 2015
Statistics Netherlands reports that adjusted for court session
days, the number of bankruptcies rose by 47 in October 2015
relative to September.

The number of bankruptcies increased notably in the sectors
construction and hotels and restaurants, Statistics Netherlands

The number of bankruptcies adjusted for court session days peaked
in May 2013 and in August 2015 dipped to the lowest level since
October 2008, Statistics Netherlands notes.

In October, the number of businesses declared bankrupt grew by 47
relative to September, Statistics Netherlands discloses.

If the number of court session days is not taken into account, 366
businesses and institutions (excluding one-man businesses) were
declared bankrupt in October 2015, resulting in a total of 4,399
bankruptcies over the first 10 months of this year, i.e. 22
percent down from the same period last year, Statistics
Netherlands states.

With a total of 82, the trade sector had the highest number of
bankruptcies, Statistics Netherlands says.

The financial institutions sector accounted for 59 bankruptcies,
Statistics Netherlands states.  These two sectors also include the
highest number of businesses, Statistics Netherlands discloses.
In relative terms, the construction sector recorded the highest
number of bankruptcies (56), according to Statistics Netherlands.


FORUM BANK: Liquidator Puts Bakkara Hotel Up for Sale
Ukrainian News Agency reports that the liquidator of Forum bank
has decided to put up for sale the Bakkara hotel in Kyiv.

According to Ukrainian News, the liquidators said in a statement
the tender for the sale of the hotel will take place on Nov. 23.

The organizer of the auction is Kyiv-based Samson limited
liability company, Ukrainian News discloses.

The participants of the upcoming auction will have to pay the
registration fee worth UAH100, as well as the guarantee fee worth
10% of the starting price of the lot, Ukrainian News states.

The bids for the online-auction are accepted at until Nov. 20, Ukrainian News says.

The starting price of the hotel will make up UAH48.063 million,
Ukrainian News notes.

The hotel is located on a bank of the Dnieper river in Kyiv,
Ukrainian New discloses.  The hotel has 200 rooms, a conference-
hall for 100 seats with the area of 105 square meters and a
negotiation room for 20-30 seats with the area of 52 square
meters, according to Ukrainian New.

Bank Forum was founded in 1994.  According to the National Bank of
Ukraine, on January 1, 2014, by total assets the bank ranked 24th
(UAH10.404 billion) among 180 banks in Ukraine.

In June 2014, the National Bank of Ukraine put the bank under

UKRLANDFARMING: To Pay US$20-Mil. to Creditors Before Year-End
Ukrainian News Agency reports that UkrLandFarming plans to pay
extra US$20 million to creditors before the yearend.

According to Ukrainian News, UkrLandFarming says any talk about
restructuring of its Eurobond is premature, because in September,
it paid the coupon and looks to successful next payout in March
2016 with support of investors.

The company is not planning to convert a part of its debt into
stock, respecting creditors' interests, Ukrainian News notes.

UkrLandFarming in September paid US$27 million of yield for the
third coupon period on its five-year US$500 million Eurobond
issued in March 2013, Ukrainian News recounts.

UkrLandFarming is a Ukrainian agricultural holding company.

                       *       *       *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 06,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
foreign currency corporate credit rating on Ukraine-based
agribusiness company UkrLandFarming PLC to 'CC' from 'CCC-'.  S&P
said the outlook is negative.  S&P said the downgrade of
UkrLandFarming reflects the increased risk that the company could
default on its financial debt obligations in the next few months.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ADUR OUTDOOR: To Go Into Voluntary Liquidation, Council Reveals

The Worthing Herald reports that West Sussex County Council
disclosed that Adur Outdoor Activities Center will go into
voluntary liquidation, but revealed that a number of parties have
expressed an interest in taking over.

Following the shock announcement last month that the activities
center will close following the withdrawal of the center's Trust,
clubs and customers have been up in arms over the center's
uncertain future, according to The Worthing Herald.

The report notes that a spokesman for West Sussex County Council
said: "FRP Advisory has now been formally instructed to place the
Adur Outdoor Activity Center into creditor's voluntary

"We have also been informed the staff at the center have been made
redundant with effect from October 31," the spokesman said.

"The AOAC will continue caretaking arrangements for the building
until November 12.  After that it is likely the keys will return
into the possession of the County Council," spokesman added.

A meeting of shareholders and creditors is to be held on Nov. 12
in Worthing to decide what happens next, spokesman relays.  An
inventory of AOAC assets has been compiled ahead of the meeting.

The report discloses the spokesman continued: "A number of parties
have expressed an interest in taking over the center.  We are
currently considering a number of options to try and keep the
building running for the benefit of the local community, even if
there has to be a period of closure over the winter period."

FAIRLINE BOATS: Seeks Company Voluntary Arrangement, Jobs at Risk
Paul Grinnell at Peterborough Telegraph reports that bosses of
Fairline Boats have warned of "significant" job losses as they
battle to keep the troubled company afloat.

According to Peterborough Telegraph, the company, which has bases
at Oundle and Corby, says it has already begun a consultation
period with staff about possible redundancies as it seeks to stem
financial losses.

The 52-year-old business has also announced it is seeking
agreement from its creditors for a Company Voluntary Arrangement
to help it repay burdensome debt, Peterborough Telegraph relates.

The news comes just weeks after the company announced it was
temporarily laying off 109 of its 465 staff for four weeks,
Peterborough Telegraph notes.

That action come just a day after the company had been bought by
Wessex Bristol Investments from Better Capital, Peterborough
Telegraph states.

"Fairline has procured the services of turnaround specialists KSA
who are assisting in the development of a complete and robust
recovery and restructuring plan for the business," Peterborough
Telegraph quotes a statement issued by the company as saying.
"This will involve the company proposing a Company Voluntary
Arrangement (CVA) which, if agreed by creditors, will allow the
company to restructure its debt and move forward with a sensible
and manageable cost base."

Fairline Boats is a yacht-builder.

GEMGARTO 2015-2: Moody's Assigns (P)Caa3 Rating to Class X1 Notes
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional long-term
credit ratings to Notes to be issued by Gemgarto 2015-2 Plc:

  Class A mortgage backed floating rate notes due Feb. 2054,
   Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  Class B mortgage backed floating rate notes due Feb. 2054,
   Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

  Class C mortgage backed floating rate notes due Feb. 2054,
   Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  Class D mortgage backed floating rate notes due Feb. 2054,
   Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  Class E1 mortgage backed floating rate notes due Feb. 2054,
   Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

  Class E2 mortgage backed floating rate notes due Feb. 2054,
   Assigned (P)Caa1 (sf)

  Class X1 floating rate notes due Feb. 2054, Assigned
   (P)Caa3 (sf)

Moody's has not assigned ratings to the Class Z floating rate
notes due Feb. 2054, the Class X2 fixed rated notes due Feb. 2054,
the Class Y floating rate notes due Feb. 2054 and the R

The portfolio backing this transaction consists of UK prime
residential loans originated by Kensington Mortgage Company

On the closing date, KMC Stirling Square Limited (which is the
warehouse funding entity) will sell the beneficial interest in the
portfolio to Kayl PL S.a.r.l. (as to one part of the portfolio)
and Koala Warehouse Limited (as to another part of the portfolio).
In turn each Seller will sell the beneficial interest in its
respective part of the portfolio to Gemgarto 2015-2 plc.
Kensington Mortgage Company Limited holds legal title to the


The ratings take into account the credit quality of the underlying
mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined the MILAN Credit
Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss, as well as the
transaction structure and legal considerations.  The expected
portfolio loss of [1.8]% and the MILAN required credit enhancement
of [11]% serve as input parameters for Moody's cash flow model and
tranching model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal

Portfolio expected loss of [1.8]%: this is higher than the UK
Prime RMBS sector average and was evaluated by assessing the
originator's limited historical performance data and benchmarking
with other UK prime RMBS transactions.  It also takes into account
Moody's positive UK Prime RMBS outlook and the improved UK
economic environment.

MILAN CE of [11]%: this is higher than the UK Prime RMBS sector
average and follows Moody's assessment of the loan-by-loan
information taking into account the historical performance
available and the following key drivers: (i) although Moody's have
classified the loans as prime, it believes that borrowers in the
portfolio often have characteristics which could lead to them
being declined from a high street lender; (ii) the weighted
average CLTV of [72.20]%, (iii) the very low seasoning of [0.68]
years, (iv) the presence of [8.68]% of borrowers with prior CCJs,
(v) the very low proportion of interest-only loans ([0.55]%); and
(vi) the absence of any buy-to-let, right-to-buy, shared equity,
fast track or self-certified loans.

At closing the mortgage pool balance will consist of million of
loans.  The total reserve fund of [2.0]% of the initial mortgage
pool balance will be split into the Liquidity Reserve Fund and the
Non Liquidity Reserve Fund.  The Reserve Fund Required Amount will
equal the higher of (i) the sum of [2.5]% of the outstanding
balance of Class A and B notes and [2.0]% of the initial balance
of Class C,D, E1 and E2 notes; and (ii) [2.0]% of the initial
balance of Class A to E2 notes.  On the first interest payment
date, an amount equal to [0.5]% of the initial balance of Class A
and B notes will be diverted from the principal waterfall to top-
up the Liquidity Reserve Fund.  Thereafter, the Liquidity Reserve
Fund Required Amount will equal [2.5]% of the outstanding balance
of Class A and B notes and will only be available to cover senior
expenses, Class A and Class B interest.  The Non Liquidity Reserve
Fund will equal the difference between the total Reserve Fund and
the Liquidity Reserve Fund, and will be used to cover interest
shortfall and cure PDL for Class A to D notes.  For the avoidance
of doubt, the Non Liquidity Reserve Fund will not be available to
cover interest shortfall and cure PDL for Class E1 and E2 notes.

Operational risk analysis: Kensington Mortgage Company Limited
("KMC", not rated) will be acting as servicer.  KMC will sub-
delegate certain primary servicing obligations to HomeLoan
Management Limited (HML, not rated).  In order to mitigate the
operational risk, there will be a back-up servicer facilitator,
and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Aa1/P-1/Aa1(cr)) will be acting as a
back-up cash manager from close.  To ensure payment continuity
over the transaction's lifetime, the transaction documents
including the swap agreement incorporate estimation language
whereby the cash manager can use the three most recent servicer
reports to determine the cash allocation in case no servicer
report is available.  The transaction also benefits from principal
to pay interest mechanism for Class A to D notes, subject to
certain conditions being met.

Interest rate risk analysis: BNP Paribas (A1/P-1/Aa3(cr)) is
expected to act as the swap counterparty for the fixed-rate
mortgages in the transaction.  The floating-rate loans will be
unhedged.  Moody's has taken into consideration the absence of
basis swap in its cash flow modeling.

The provisional ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the Notes.  In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest with
respect to Class A, B, C and D Notes, ultimate payment of interest
for Class E1, E2 and X1 Notes and ultimate payment of principal
with respect to all rated notes by legal final maturity.  Moody's
issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
securities, but these ratings represent only Moody's preliminary
credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of the transaction and
associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings to the Notes.  A definitive rating may differ
from a provisional rating.  Other non-credit risks have not been
addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
Jan. 2015.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with our
expectations at close due to either a change in economic
conditions from our central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic
performance factors would lead to rating actions.  For instance,
should economic conditions be worse than forecast, the higher
defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in downgrade of the ratings.
Deleveraging of the capital structure or conversely a
deterioration in the notes available credit enhancement could
result in an upgrade or a downgrade of the rating, respectively.

Stress Scenarios:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the portfolio expected loss
was increased from [1.8]% to [5.4]% of current balance, and the
MILAN CE was increased from [11]% to [17.6]%, the model output
indicates that the Class A notes would still achieve (P)Aaa(sf)
assuming that all other factors remained equal.  Moody's Parameter
Sensitivities quantify the potential rating impact on a structured
finance security from changing certain input parameters used in
the initial rating.  The analysis assumes that the deal has not
aged and is not intended to measure how the rating of the security
might change over time, but instead what the initial rating of the
security might have been under different key rating inputs.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.

The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

GEMGARTO 2015-2: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EXP)' Rating to Class X1 Debt
Fitch Ratings has assigned Gemgarto 2015-2 plc's notes expected
ratings, as follows:

Class A: 'AAA(EXP)sf', Outlook Stable
Class B: 'AA(EXP)sf', Outlook Stable
Class C: 'A(EXP)sf', Outlook Stable
Class D: 'BBB+(EXP)sf', Outlook Stable
Class E1: 'BB+(EXP)sf', Outlook Stable
Class E2: 'BB(EXP)sf', Outlook Stable
Class X1: 'BB(EXP)sf', Outlook Stable
Class Z: not rated
Class X2: not rated
Class Y: not rated

The final ratings are subject to the receipt of final documents
conforming to information already received.

This is an RMBS securitization by Gemgarto 2015-2, an SPV
incorporated in England and Wales. The collateral comprises near-
prime owner-occupied residential mortgages originated by
Kensington Mortgage Company in the UK. The expected ratings are
based on the quality of the collateral, the available credit
enhancement, the origination and underwriting processes used by
Kensington for this collateral, the servicing capabilities of
Homeloan Management Limited (HML), and the financial and legal


Post-Crisis, Near-Prime

The first transaction in the series, Gemgarto 2012-1, has
performed strongly, with three-month plus arrears at 1.6%,
compared with the Fitch prime index of 0.8% and non-conforming
index of 9.8%. Kensington has a manual approach to underwriting,
focusing on borrowers with some form of adverse credit and/or
complex income.

Underwriting practices are robust and the lending criteria does
not allow for any adverse credit 24 months before application.
Fitch applied an underwriter adjustment of more than one while
assigning base default probabilities using its prime default

Adverse Credit

The pool has a higher proportion of adverse credit than Gemgarto
2015-1 but lower than Gemgarto 2012-1. The number of county court
judgments was 10.7%, compared with 2.2% in Gemgarto 2015-1, and is
lower than non-conforming transactions. Fitch has applied an
upward adjustment to the default probability for these
characteristics in line with its criteria.

Unrated Originator and Seller

The originator and seller are unrated entities and so may have
limited resources to repurchase mortgages if there is a breach of
the representations and warranties (RW). This is a risk, but there
are a number of mitigating factors, such as the low occurrence of
previous breaches of the RW and an extended file review.

Combined Liquidity, General Reserve

The transaction is supported by a non-amortizing rated note
reserve fund (RNRF) set at 2% of the collateral balance at
closing. Initially, most of the RNRF provides liquidity only to
the class A and B notes, but as these notes amortize, the amount
allocated for liquidity will fall in line with the note balances
(2.5% of class A and B outstanding), and the rest will become
available to absorb credit losses.


The assigned ratings and the related analysis performed are based
on the assumptions in the existing criteria - Criteria Addendum:
UK, dated 11 June 2015. Fitch's exposure draft report - Exposure
Draft - Criteria Addendum: UK, dated 22 September 2015 has not
been adopted (and the related model has not been through the full
validation process), and these were not used in the rating
analysis. Fitch has performed a sensitivity analysis which shows
that if the criteria in that Exposure Draft (and the related
model) were used, the assigned ratings would be:

Class A 'AAA(EXP)sf'
Class B 'AA+(EXP)sf'
Class C 'A+(EXP)sf'
Class D 'BBB+(EXP)sf'
Class E1 'BB+(EXP)sf'
Class E2 'BB+(EXP)sf'
Class X1 'BB+(EXP)sf'

Material increases in the frequency of defaults and loss severity
on defaulted receivables could produce loss levels greater than
Fitch's base case expectations, which in turn may result in
negative rating actions on the notes. Fitch's analysis revealed
that a 30% increase in the weighted average (WA) foreclosure
frequency, along with a 30% decrease in the WA recovery rate,
would imply a downgrade of the class A notes to 'AA-sf' from
'AAAsf' and the class B notes to 'Asf' from 'AAsf'.


Kensington provided Fitch with a loan-by-loan data template. All
relevant fields were provided in the data tape, with the exception
of prior mortgage arrears. Performance data on historic static
arrears were provided for all loans originated by Kensington, but
the scope of the data was limited due to rather low origination
volumes, especially from 2010 to 2012, and the length of available
history (Kensington restarted with its new lending program in

Due to its limited origination history, only four cases of sold
repossessions have been experienced to date. When assessing the
relevant assumptions to apply for the QSA Fitch considers the
robustness of the initial valuations as the key driver together
with the special servicing arrangements in place.

Considering the QSA assumptions are based on a comparison between
sale price and an indexed original valuation, it is important for
Fitch to have comfort that the original valuations obtained were
robust and that sufficient controls and processes were in place to
help ensure the veracity of the valuations received. In Fitch's
view, Kensington has a robust approach to obtaining property
valuations - with full valuations always required with additional
desktop valuation checks and audits in cases when the valuation
differs substantially.

Furthermore, it is Fitch's view that the special servicing, which
is performed by Kensington, demonstrates a high performance in
overall servicing ability. Given this, the agency has applied QSA
assumptions as per its standard criteria and has not applied any
upward adjustments.

During the previous 12 months, Fitch conducted a site visit to
Kensington's offices and conducted a file review to check the
quality of Kensington's originations. During the site visit, Fitch
conducted a review of a small targeted sample of the originator's
origination files and found the information contained in the
reviewed files to be adequately consistent with the originator's
policies and practices and the other information provided to the
agency about the asset portfolio.

Fitch reviewed the results of a third party assessment conducted
on the asset portfolio information, which indicated no adverse
findings material to the rating analysis.

Overall and together with the assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

To analyze the credit enhancement levels, Fitch evaluated the
collateral using its default model ResiEMEA. The agency assessed
the transaction cash flows using default and loss severity
assumptions under various structural stresses including prepayment
speeds and interest rate scenarios. Fitch rates the notes to the
terms and conditions of the notes, which states that interest can
be deferred for the class B to X1 notes given any such note is not
the most senior class outstanding. However, Fitch always rates
notes 'AA' or above for timely interest. Fitch's ratings scenarios
indicate that the class A to D notes receive interest payments in
our modelling scenarios without incurring any interest shortfall
at any time.

MARBLE ARCH NO 4: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E1c Debt
Fitch Ratings has upgraded six and affirmed nine tranches of
Marble Arch Residential Securitisation Ltd No 3 (MARS 3) and
Marble Arch Residential Securitisation Ltd No 4 (MARS 4).

The two transactions comprise UK non-conforming residential
mortgages originated by Matlock Bank for MARS 3 and the London
Mortgage Company and London Personal Loans Limited for MARS 4.


Strong Credit Enhancement (CE)

The combination of sequential amortization and non-amortizing
reserve funds has led to a substantial build-up in CE available to
the senior notes; 63.9% for MARS 3 and 84.9% for MARS 4. The
agency deems the current CE to be sufficient to withstand the
'AAAsf' rating stresses applied in its analysis, as reflected by
the affirmation.

For MARS 3's class M2 and B notes and MARS 4's class C and D notes
of, Fitch notes the build-up in CE over the past 12 months allows
the notes to sustain stresses associated with higher ratings,
leading to the upgrades.

Stable Performance

The issuers have reported stable asset performance over the past
year. Loans in arrears by more than three months, excluding loans
with properties in possession increased to 24% from 21.9% and to
14.6% from 14.4% over the past 12 months for MARS 3 and 4,
respectively. The increase in the proportion of loans in late
stage arrears in MARS 3 is driven by the small collateral pool and
a small number of new mortgages entering the three months plus
arrears stage. The build-up in late-stage arrears is driven by the
servicer's decision to apply more stringent foreclosure practices.
This is also evident from the marginal increase in the outstanding
balance of loans associated with properties taken into possession
as a proportion of the original collateral balance, which in the
past 12 months went up to 15.3% from 15.2% in MARS 3 and to 11.8%
from 11.6% in MARS 4.

Unhedged Interest Rate Risk

MARS 4's notes are exposed to basis risk due to 88% of the
collateral paying a variable rate linked to BBR, while the notes
pay an interest linked to three month Libor. There is no swap in
place to hedge this risk. Fitch accounted for the unhedged basis
risk by reducing the excess spread generated by the BBR-linked
portions of the portfolio.


The transactions are backed by floating-interest-rate loans. In
the current low interest rate environment, borrowers are
benefiting from low borrowing costs. An increase in interest rates
could lead to performance deterioration of the underlying assets
and consequently downgrades of the notes if defaults and
associated losses exceed those of Fitch's stresses.

As the reserve fund is the only source of CE for MARS 3's class B
notes, the rating of the notes is now capped at the Long-term
Issuer Default Rating of the account bank (Barclays Bank plc);
currently implying a cap of 'A'/Stable.


Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions' initial
closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating

EMEA RMBS Surveillance Model.

The rating actions are as follows:

Marble Arch Residential Securitisation Ltd No 3
Class A1a (ISIN XS0214916081): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A1b (ISIN XS0214916917): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1 (ISIN XS0214917303): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2 (ISIN XS0214917642): upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AA-sf';
Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0214918533): upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBB+sf';
Outlook Stable
Class A1b Currency Swap Obligation (ISIN XS0214916917): affirmed
at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

Marble Arch Residential Securitisation Ltd No 4
Class A3c (ISIN XS0270513590): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1a (ISIN XS0270496994): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1b (ISIN XS0270510224): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1c (ISIN XS0270513756): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C1a (ISIN XS0270497612): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AAsf';
Outlook Stable
Class C1c (ISIN XS0270513830): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AAsf';
Outlook Stable
Class D1a (ISIN XS0270498180): upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'BBBsf';
Outlook Stable
Class D1c (ISIN XS0270513913): upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'BBBsf';
Outlook Stable
Class E1c (ISIN XS0270514309): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable

MOY PARK: S&P Raises Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB', Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on U.K. poultry producer Moy Park Holdings Europe to
'BB' from 'B+'.  S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch with
positive implications, where they had initially been placed on
June 25, 2015.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P raised the issue ratings on the existing
GBP300 million senior unsecured notes due 2021 to 'BB' from 'B+'.
The '3' recovery rating on these notes remains unchanged,
reflecting S&P's expectation of average (50%-70%) recovery in the
event of a payment default.

U.K.-based poultry producer Moy Park has been sold by its previous
owner Marfrig Global Foods S.A. and is now a fully owned
subsidiary of Brazil-based JBS S.A.  Following the acquisition,
S&P assess Moy Park's status within the new JBS group as
"strategically important" under our criteria definitions.

S&P bases its opinion on these four factors:

   -- JBS is unlikely to sell Moy Park;
   -- Moy Park is important to JBS' long-term strategy;
   -- Moy Park benefits from the long-term commitment of its
      parent; and
   -- Moy Park is reasonably successful at what it does.

JBS (BB+/Stable) fully consolidates all its subsidiaries and has a
GCP of 'bb+'.  Under S&P's group rating methodology, the long-term
issuer credit rating of a "strategically important" subsidiary can
receive three additional notches of uplift above its SACP.
However, it is capped at one notch below the GCP.  S&P therefore
is applying one notch of uplift to Moy Park's 'bb-' SACP and
raising its long-term issuer credit rating to 'BB'.  Moy Park's
'bb-' SACP remains unchanged.  Before the acquisition, S&P rated
Moy Park one notch lower that its SACP to reflect the weaker
credit standing of its previous owner Marfrig.

S&P continues to assess Moy Park's business risk profile as "weak"
and its financial risk profile as "significant," resulting in an
anchor of 'bb-'.  The business risk assessment reflects Moy Park's
geographic concentration in the U.K. and France; limited product
diversity, with over 75% of revenue derived from poultry products;
and significant exposure to private label retailers.  Moy Park's
"significant" financial risk profile reflects S&P's base-case
forecast of stable Standard & Poor's-adjusted free operating cash
flow of about GBP18 million-GBP23 million for the next 12-18
months, and the group's ability to maintain debt to EBITDA of 3x-
4x.  The SACP is equal to the anchor of 'bb-' as there is no
impact from rating modifiers.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Low-single-digit revenue growth, reflecting modest
      increases in consumer demand offset by deflationary price

   -- Stable operating performance resulting in Standard & Poor's
      adjusted EBITDA margins of 8.0%-8.5% in 2015 and 2016.

   -- Annual capital expenditure (capex) of approximately 4.0%-
      5.0% of revenues.  Negligible movement in working capital
      requirements and no acquisitions.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit metrics:

   -- Standard & Poor's adjusted debt to EBITDA of 3.2x in 2015
      and 3.1x in 2016.

   -- Standard & Poor's adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of
      5.5x-6.5x in 2015 and 5.0x-6.0x in 2016.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Moy Park will maintain
fairly stable revenues and profitability, resulting in the
continued generation of free cash flow.  S&P expects Standard &
Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA to remain at 3.0x-3.5x with EBITDA
interest coverage of 5.0x-6.0x over the next 18-24 months.  S&P
bases its financial policy assessment of Moy Park on statements
from management and representatives of JBS that the group has no
plans to increase debt leverage from current levels through debt-
financed acquisitions or a step-up in the distribution of funds to

S&P could lower the ratings if it was to revise Moy Park's status
within the group to "moderately strategic" or lower.  This would
limit the uplift to its stand-alone credit profile (SACP).  Such a
revision could come from Moy Park no longer being as important to
the group's long-term strategy, or if JBS' commitment to the
success of the business became uncertain.  Substantial leverage
not commensurate with that of the rest of the group, such that
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA remained above 5.0x on a sustainable
basis, could be seen as evidence that Moy Park's group status had
weakened and could lead S&P to review this status.  Operational
factors that could lead S&P to revise Moy Park's SACP include
material adversity (such as avian disease) in the trading
environment for Moy Park, but these are not currently central to
our operating base-case scenario.

S&P could raise the ratings if it was to revise Moy Park's SACP to
a level equal with the 'bb+' GCP.  This could occur if its
financial risk profile improved significantly, with a reduction in
long-term debt resulting in adjusted debt-to-EBITDA below 2x on a
sustainable basis.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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