TCREUR_Public/151112.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, November 12, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 224

                            Headlines

A Z E R B A I J A N

AZERBAIJAN RAILWAYS: S&P Reinstates 'BB+' CCR; Outlook Negative


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

NEW WORLD: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC', Outlook Negative


G R E E C E

ALPHA BANK: Issuer Substitution No Impact on Moody's Ratings
GREECE: Aid Payment Delayed Following Dispute with EU Lenders


H U N G A R Y

PAPAI HUS: Declared Company of Elevated Strategic Importance


K A Z A K H S T A N

ARAL PETROLEUM: To Pursue Kazakh Rehabilitation Procedures


N E T H E R L A N D S

FAXTOR ABS 2003-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on 2 Note Classes
HARBOURMASTER PRO-RATA: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. B2 Debt
JUBILEE CDO VII: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
JUBILEE CDO I-R: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to B+
STORK TECHNICAL: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'


R U S S I A

BALTINVESTBANK: Moody's Lowers LT Deposit Rating to 'B3.ru'
BALTINVESTBANK: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Ratings to Caa2
KAMA RE: Placed Under Provisional Administration
TOR CREDIT: Placed Under Provisional Administration


U K R A I N E

BANK UKRAINIAN: Deposit Guarantee Fund Extends Liquidation
UKRAINE: Bondholder Group Rejects Terms of Kiev's Debt Offer


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DECO 6 - UK: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A2 Notes to CCC-
RA ROBERTS: Bought Out of Administration by Complete Office
SANTANDER ASSET: S&P Maintains 'BB' Rating on CreditWatch Neg.
* UK: A Third of Care Homes Face Insolvency, Company Watch Says


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Predicts Slow Global Growth for Another 2 Years
* Fitch Says EU Credit Investors Bearish on Emerging Markets


                            *********


===================
A Z E R B A I J A N
===================


AZERBAIJAN RAILWAYS: S&P Reinstates 'BB+' CCR; Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services reinstated its 'BB+' long-term
corporate credit rating on state-owned railway operator
Azerbaijan Railways CJSC (ADY).  The outlook is negative.  S&P
suspended the rating on July 31, 2015, due to a lack of
sufficient information on financial and operating performance.

The reinstatement follows S&P's receipt of information from ADY
that S&P considers of sufficient quality on its financial and
operating performance and prospects.

S&P's rating on ADY is based on S&P's assessment of the company's
'bb-' stand-alone credit profile (SACP) and on S&P's opinion that
there is a "very high" likelihood that the government of the
Republic of Azerbaijan (BBB-/Negative/A-3) would provide timely
and sufficient extraordinary government support to ADY in the
event of financial distress.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for government-related entities
(GREs), it bases its view of a "very high" likelihood of
extraordinary government support on S&P's assessment of ADY's:

   -- "Very important" role for the Azerbaijani government, in
      light of ADY's monopoly position as the owner and manager
      of the national rail infrastructure and rolling stock.  In
      S&P's view, ADY plays a key role in implementing
      Azerbaijan's infrastructure development plan, which S&P
      understands is one of the government's priorities.

   -- "Very strong" link with the government of Azerbaijan, given
      the state's 100% ownership of ADY; the government's role in
      appointing the company's senior management and its
      involvement in strategic decision taking; and

   -- S&P's understanding that ADY will not be privatized in the
      medium term.

S&P's assessment of the company's SACP at 'bb-' is one notch
lower than the SACP at the time S&P suspended the rating.  S&P's
downward revision of the SACP is due to its assessment that ADY's
financial risk profile has weakened to "intermediate" from
"minimal."  This revision reflects S&P's expectation that the
company's funds from operations (FFO) to debt will fall to less
than 45% and FFO cash interest coverage will decline to below
9.0x by year-end 2015, primarily due to weaker operating
performance and the depreciation of Azerbaijani manat (AZN).  The
manat lost about one-quarter of its value after devaluation in
February 2015, which inflated ADY's mainly U.S. dollar-nominated
debt.  Additionally, S&P estimates that transportation volumes
have fallen by up to 40% in the first half of 2015, which
translates into a broadly similar decline in EBITDA.

ADY's SACP also reflects uncertainties related to the company's
governance given the recent management changes and the lack of
transparency and information disclosure in the past that
ultimately led S&P to suspend the rating.  As a result, S&P
revised its assessment of ADY's management and governance to
"weak" from "fair."

ADY's business risk profile continues to reflect the relatively
small area it serves in a somewhat weak national economy
(compared with some Western European rated peers') and what S&P
views as significant competition from other modes of
transportation, in particular pipelines and road traffic.  S&P
also takes into account ADY's limited route network; reliance on
a commodity type of freight; and what S&P views as an opaque
regulatory, legal, and political framework that lacks
transparency and predictability.

These weaknesses are somewhat supported by ADY's key position in
the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) and its
monopoly position within Azerbaijan.  ADY is the only railroad
operator in the country, controlling both infrastructure and
rolling stock.  S&P also views ADY's ability to adjust tariffs as
supportive for S&P's rating.

The negative outlook on ADY reflects that on the Azerbaijan, its
sole shareholder.  The outlook also reflects the risk that ADY's
operating performance will continue to weaken in the next 12
months, triggered by declining cargo volumes and resilient costs.
S&P also sees a risk of higher leverage, which could materialize
if the Azerbaijani manat were to experience another wave of
depreciation or if the government were to decide that the company
can tolerate higher leverage when designing its new strategy
later this year.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for rating GREs, it would
likely lower the rating on ADY if S&P was to lower the sovereign
rating on Azerbaijan.

S&P would also lower its rating if it assess that ADY's 'bb-'
SACP had weakened to 'b+' or lower.  This could occur if the
company's operating performance does not stabilize or its
financial policy changes and the company finances a significant
part of its capex program with external funds, which would result
in S&P's FFO to debt ratio declining to below 30% on a prolonged
basis.

S&P could also take a negative rating action if ongoing liquidity
support from the Azerbaijani government is not as timely as we
currently anticipate and if S&P estimates that existing liquidity
sources do not cover upcoming debt maturities and minimum capex
requirements.

S&P might revise the outlook on ADY to stable if it revises the
outlook on the sovereign rating to stable.  S&P could also revise
the outlook to stable if operating performance and leverage
remain commensurate with S&P's current 'bb-' SACP.



===========================
C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


NEW WORLD: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC', Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Czech coal miner New World Resources
N.V. (NWR) to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'.  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue rating on NWR's EUR300
million senior secured notes due 2020 to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'.

The downgrade reflects continued negative operating cash
generation and therefore gradual deterioration in the liquidity
position over the past year.  S&P believes low metallurgical and
thermal coal prices will continue to weigh on NWR's profits and
cash flows, as S&P do not expect any marked improvement in market
dynamics in the coming quarters.  Unless coal prices recover
materially or an unforeseen positive development materially
changes the company's circumstances, S&P believes the company
could run out of cash as early as second-quarter 2016.

As of end-June 2015, the group's coking coal production for the
remainder of the year was still 25% exposed to market prices, and
100% exposed for 2016.  Coking coal should represent about 60% of
NWR's total sales.  Since the beginning of the year, hard coking
coal prices have dropped about 25%, and thermal coal prices have
dropped about 17%.  S&P therefore continues to forecast neutral
to slightly negative EBITDA for 2015, turning materially negative
in 2016, despite management's ongoing cost-cutting initiatives.
These include site reorganization, restructuring, overhead
reductions, and product mix improvements.  In addition, the
company has already cut capital expenditure (capex) to a minimum,
which S&P expects to be EUR30 million-EUR40 million in 2015.  S&P
takes into account that the falling price environment, together
with factoring of receivables -- provided that programs remain in
place -- and expected improvement in payables management, could
help working capital requirements in the coming quarters.
Despite these cash-saving measures, S&P forecasts deepening
negative free operating cash flow from early 2016.

Key structural aspects of NWR's performance include its
relatively high unit cash cost of mining and high maintenance
capex, making it barely sustainable in a difficult market
environment, reflected in a "vulnerable" business risk profile,
as defined in S&P's methodology.

The negative outlook reflects that, in the absence of material
positive developments in the company's circumstances, it is
likely to default on its debt obligations in the coming 12
months.

In S&P's view, NWR could run out of cash as early as second-
quarter 2016, unless coal prices recover materially or an
unforeseen positive development materially changes the company's
circumstances.

A stabilization of NWR's credit profile would require a material
rebound in the coal market, bringing free cash flow back to
breakeven, or some form of external liquidity support.


===========
G R E E C E
===========


ALPHA BANK: Issuer Substitution No Impact on Moody's Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that Alpha Bank AE's proposal
to substitute the issuing entity of the below mentioned senior
unsecured and subordinated notes (currently issued by Alpha
Credit Group plc) with Alpha Bank AE (deposit rating Caa3
negative, baseline credit assessment ca) would not, in and of
itself and at this time, result in a withdrawal of the notes' C
ratings.  In addition, the C senior unsecured and subordinated
debt ratings are already at the lowest level on Moody's rating
scale and, therefore, no downgrade of the ratings is possible.

Although the notes were originally issued by Alpha Credit Group
plc, the amendment would permit Alpha Bank AE to substitute Alpha
Credit Group plc as the issuer of eleven senior unsecured notes
(ISIN:XS0244535968 due February 2021; ISIN:XS0246885775 due March
2021; ISIN:XS0286484646 due February 2027; ISIN:XS0285806906 due
March 2017; ISIN:XS0738953594 due February 2017;
ISIN:XS0777923177 due May 2017; ISIN:XS0795391043 due June 2022;
ISIN:XS0926021923 due May 2018; ISIN:XS1006310590 due December
2028; ISIN:XS1078807390 due June 2017; ISIN:XS1102005797 due
August 2024) and two subordinated notes (ISN: XS0290781490 due
March 2017; ISN: XS0284930889 due February 2017), which are
currently guaranteed by Alpha Bank AE.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has determined that the amendment, in and of itself and
at this time, will not result in the withdrawal of the senior
unsecured and subordinated debt ratings of C currently assigned
to these notes issued by Alpha Credit Group plc, which is a
funding subsidiary of Alpha Bank AE.  As the C senior unsecured
and subordinated debt ratings are already at the lowest level on
Moody's rating scale, no downgrade of the ratings is possible.
However, Moody's opinion addresses only the credit impact
associated with the proposed amendment, and Moody's is not
expressing any opinion as to whether the amendment has, or could
have, other non-credit related effects that may have a
detrimental impact on the interests of holders of rated
obligations and/or counterparties.

The rating agency said that it will continue to monitor these
senior unsecured and subordinated notes to be transferred, and
will accordingly express its views on any future developments
involving these notes.


GREECE: Aid Payment Delayed Following Dispute with EU Lenders
-------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Spiegel at The Financial Times reports that Greece and its
European creditors have run into a dispute over Athens' new EUR86
billion bailout, forcing a delay in a EUR2 billion aid payment
and raising questions over whether the government is returning to
the brinkmanship tactics that embittered relations with Brussels
earlier this year.

Eurozone finance ministers were scheduled to sign off the EUR2
billion tranche at a Nov. 9 meeting in Brussels, but ministers
said a stand-off over repossession protections for homeowners
would delay the payment for at least a week, and potentially
longer, the FT relates.

"The EUR2 billion will only be paid out once [bailout monitors]
give the green light and say that all agreed actions have been
carried out and have been implemented.  That still has not
happened," the FT quotes Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Dutch finance
minister, who chaired the meeting, as saying.

The need to reach a deal has an added urgency because it is tied
to the release of an already approved EUR10 billion in aid
earmarked for recapitalizing Greece's banks, a process that must
be completed by next month or depositors would be at risk of
having their accounts seized to help pay for the bank rescue, the
FT notes.  Finance ministers gave Athens a week to reach a
compromise, the FT discloses.

According to the FT, senior officials said the two sides are at
odds over how far Greece must go in scrapping current foreclosure
protections.

Creditors are demanding a weaker safeguards, arguing that many
mortgage arrears are "strategic defaults" by borrowers who could
afford to pay but are seeking delays in Greece's slow-moving
legal system, the FT states.



=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


PAPAI HUS: Declared Company of Elevated Strategic Importance
------------------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews, citing a decree published in the latest issue of the
official gazette Magyar Kozlony, reports that Hungary's
government has declared Papai Hus a company of "elevated
strategic importance".

Companies that are declared as such get special treatment in
bankruptcy procedures, MTI-Econews notes.

Last week, the local council of Papa, which owns Papai Hus,
decided to put the company under liquidation, MTI-Econews
recounts.

Papai Hus reached a bankruptcy agreement with its creditors in
June of 2014, but the company's reserves have been exhausted,
MTI-Econews relates.

Papai Hus is a Hungarian meat processing company.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


ARAL PETROLEUM: To Pursue Kazakh Rehabilitation Procedures
----------------------------------------------------------
Caspian Energy Inc. on Nov. 9 disclosed that, after careful
consideration of all available alternatives, the board of
directors of Caspian has determined that it is in the best
interests of Caspian and its wholly-owned subsidiary,
Aral Petroleum Capital LLP, to authorize Aral to seek protection
from its trade creditors under the Law of the Republic of
Kazakhstan On Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy through
implementation of rehabilitation procedures.

As noted in a news release dated August 4, 2015, Aral has a
number of outstanding trade payables that it has been unable to
discharge due to its lack of operational revenues and positive
cash flow. Some of these trade creditors have pursued litigation
in Kazakhstan that has resulted in Aral's bank accounts being
frozen. Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Law, Aral will apply to the
court for implementation of the Rehabilitation Procedures.  If
Aral is able to successfully negotiate the Rehabilitation
Procedures with its creditors and obtain the requisite court
approval, it will prevent trade creditors and others from
commencing litigation against Aral for payment of outstanding
amounts and afford it the ability to restructure its financial
affairs for a period of up to five years.  The process of
applying for the Rehabilitation Procedures will result in an
automatic moratorium of up to two months on claims by creditors
regardless of whether or not negotiations are successful.  There
can be no assurance that Aral will be successful in negotiating
the Rehabilitation Procedures.

"The Rehabilitation Procedures have the potential to facilitate
Aral's access to its existing loans and other capital, and
provide it with additional time to focus on recommencing oil
production. If successful, this will generate operational cash
flow and help to stabilize the economic outlook for both Caspian
and Aral," said Michael Nobbs, Chairman of the Board.

A further update will be provided as additional information
becomes available.

                         About Caspian

Caspian is an oil and gas exploration and development company,
operating in Kazakhstan through Aral, which has a number of
targets in the highly prospective Aktobe Oblast of Western
Kazakhstan.  Caspian indirectly holds, through its interest in
Aral, an exclusive licence pursuant to an exploration contract,
which entitles it to explore and develop certain oil and gas
properties known as the "North Block," an area of 1,467 square
km, and a production contract for the area known as "East
Zhagabulak".



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


FAXTOR ABS 2003-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on 2 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
actions on these classes of notes issued by Faxtor ABS 2003-1
B.V.:

  EUR23 mil. (Current balance outstanding: EUR10 mil.) Class A-2E
   Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
   Feb. 10, 2015, Affirmed Aa2 (sf)

  EUR9 mil. (Current balance outstanding: EUR3.9 mil.) Class A-2F
   Fixed Rate Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 10,
   2015, Affirmed Aa2 (sf)

  EUR7.5 mil. Class A-3E Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Baa3
   (sf); previously on Feb. 10, 2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  EUR15 mil. Class A-3F Fixed Rate Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
   previously on Feb. 10, 2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  EUR5.5 mil. (Current balance outstanding: EUR5.9 mil.) Class BE
   Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 10, 2015, Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

  EUR9.5 mil. (Current balance outstanding: EUR 11.1 mil.) Class
   BF Fixed Rate Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 10, 2015, Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are a result of the material
improvement in the credit quality of the collateral.

Since the last rating action in February 2015, 56.7% of the
portfolio aggregate amount has been upgraded by an average of
2.76 notches.  Additionally the proportion of assets rated within
the Caa range by Moody's has decreased to 15% from 29% of the
portfolio performing par while the defaulted assets have
decreased from EUR6.6 million to EUR3.7 million.  As a result,
the credit quality of the performing portfolio as measured by the
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF) reported by the trustee has
improved from 2350 in Dec. 2014 to 1849 in Sept. 2015.

On the May 2015 interest payment date, Classes A-2 have repaid
EUR2.6 million or 8% of the tranche original balance.  The
amortization of the Classes A-2 has also marginally improved the
overcollateralization ratios ("OC ratios") of the Classes A-3.
As per the September 2015 trustee report, Class A and Class B
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 158.50% and 104.02%
respectively, compared to 156.40% and 105.62% as per the December
2014 trustee report.

Moody's notes that the interest coverage test is failing and that
since the payment date in May 2014, the interest payment to
Classes A-3 has been made partially from the principal proceeds.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes:

  (1) Amounts of defaulted assets - Moody's considered a model
run where all the Caa assets in the portfolio were assumed to be
defaulted.  The model outputs for this run are consistent with
today's ratings.

  (2) Weighted Average Life (WAL) Sensitivity - Moody's
considered a model run where the WAL increased by two years; the
model generated outputs which were unchanged for Classes A-2, and
within one notch of the base case run for Classes A-3 and B.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy 2) divergence in the legal interpretation of CDO
documentation by different transactional parties due to or
because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high prepayment
levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager.  Fast
amortization would usually benefit the ratings of the notes
beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

  Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Recoveries
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


HARBOURMASTER PRO-RATA: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. B2 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 2 B.V. and
revised the Outlook on the class A2 to B1 notes, as follows:

Class A1VF: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A1T: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2: affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook revised to Stable from
Negative
Class A3: affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook revised to Stable from
Negative
Class A4E: affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to Stable from
Negative
Class A4F: affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to Stable from
Negative
Class B1E: affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook revised to Stable from
Negative
Class B1F: affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook revised to Stable from
Negative
Class B2: affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative
Class S1: affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook revised to Stable from
Negative; rating withdrawn
Class S4: affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to Stable from
Negative; rating withdrawn

Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 2 B.V. is a securitization of mainly
European senior secured loans with the total EUR602 million note
issuance invested in a target portfolio of EUR587.5 million. The
portfolio is actively managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Europe
Limited.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation reflects the transaction's stable performance
over the past year. The revision of the Outlook on the class A2
to B1 notes to Stable from Negative reflects the increase in
credit enhancement and deleveraging of the transaction following
the end of the reinvestment period in October 2013.

Credit enhancement has increased for all rated notes since the
last review in November 2014 due to the transaction's rapid
deleveraging. The senior notes have paid down by approximately
EUR158 million and credit enhancement has increased to 65.3% from
45.8% for the class A1 notes and to 30.9% from 22.3% for the
class A2 notes.

The reinvestment period ended in October 2013 but the collateral
manager was able to reinvest unscheduled proceeds until the
payment date failing in October 2015. During the past year, the
collateral manager purchased approximately EUR75 million of
additional assets around par. As a consequence of these
additional purchases, the weighted average life of the portfolio
remains stable at four years.

The Fitch weighted average rating factor, as calculated by the
trustee, has decreased to 29.1 from 29.7 over the past year and
the Fitch weighted average recovery rate has increased to 72.4
from 70.9. There are currently no defaulted assets in the
portfolio and two assets, representing approximately 1.7% of the
portfolio, are rated 'CCC' by Fitch. The slight increase in
credit quality was compensated by an increase in portfolio
concentration due to deleveraging. The largest obligor now
represents 4.39% of the portfolio, up from 3.93% as of the last
review while the top 10 obligors have increased to 38.16% from
32.65%.

Currently there are no revolving or delayed drawdown notes in the
portfolio. Of the portfolio, 15.2% is non-euro-denominated.
However, only 1.6% is hedged by the variable funding note and the
remainder is hedged by currency swaps that meet Fitch's
counterparty criteria. The transaction documents allowed for up
to EUR88.1 million of the portfolio notional to be invested in
non-euro-denominated revolving assets, or delayed drawdown notes.
Any investment or drawings would be matched by a corresponding
drawing on the multi-currency variable funding A1VF note.

As of October 2015 payment date report, all the coverage tests,
portfolio profile tests and collateral quality tests are passing.

Fitch has affirmed and withdrawn the ratings on the class S1 and
S4 combination notes. These notes were exchanged for their
components and thus no longer exist.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

In its rating sensitivity analysis, Fitch found that a 25%
increase of the default probability would result in downgrade of
between one and two notches across all notes apart from the class
A1 notes, which would be unaffected. A 25% reduction of the
recovery rate would result in a downgrade of between one and
three notches across all notes apart from the class A1 notes,
which would be unaffected.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


JUBILEE CDO VII: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Jubilee CDO VII B.V.:

  EUR30 mil. Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
   Sept. 10, 2014, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  EUR31 mil. Class D Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
   Sept. 10, 2014, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes issued by
Jubilee CDO VII B.V.:

  EUR218 mil. (current outstanding balance of EUR 27.3 mil.)
  Class A-T Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sept 10,
  2014, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR100 mil. (current outstanding balance of EUR 11.9 mil.)
  Class A-R Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 10,
  2014, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR50 mil. Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
  Sept. 10, 2014, Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  EUR20 mil. Class E Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on
  Sept. 10, 2014, Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Jubilee CDO VII B.V., issued in November 2006, is a
Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of mostly
high yield senior secured European loans.  The portfolio is
managed by Alcentra Limited.  The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in November 2012

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
improvement of their over-collateralization ratios following the
last 4 payment dates, when Class A-R and A-T notes amortized by
approximately EUR32.56 mil. and EUR72.65 mil., respectively, or
33.33% of their original balances.

As of the trustee's October 2015 report, Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E had OC ratios of 205.81%, 153.99%, 122.19%
and 107.83% compared with 143.23%, 126.37%,112.67% and 105.3 %,
respectively, as of the trustee's August 2014 report.

The key model inputs Moody's uses, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score and the weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its published methodology and could differ
from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's
analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of EUR185.90 million and
GBP6.00 million, a weighted average default probability of 25.35%
(consistent with a WARF of 3,504), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 49.13% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 19 and a weighted average spread of 3.93%.
The GBP denominated liabilities are naturally hedged by the GBP
assets.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in September 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed all the Caa assets, which make up to 17.19%
of the performing portfolio to be defaulted, the model generated
outputs that were within two notches of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty.  Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices.  Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

Around 15.54% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates.

Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets.  Moody's assumes that, at transaction maturity, the
liquidation value of such an asset will depend on the nature of
the asset as well as the extent to which the asset's maturity
lags that of the liabilities.  Liquidation values higher than
Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'
ratings.

Foreign currency exposure: The deal has a significant exposures
to non-EUR denominated assets.  Volatility in foreign exchange
rates will have a direct impact on interest and principal
proceeds available to the transaction, which can affect the
expected loss of rated tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


JUBILEE CDO I-R: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to B+
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
all classes of Jubilee CDO I-R B.V.'s notes.

The upgrades follow S&P's review of the transaction's performance
under its updated criteria for rating corporate collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) transactions.  S&P performed a credit and
cash flow analysis and assessed the support that each participant
provides to the transaction by applying our current counterparty
criteria.  In S&P's analysis, it used data from the latest
available trustee report dated Sept. 10, 2015.

S&P's corporate CDO criteria incorporate supplemental tests
intended to address both event risk and model risk that may be
present in rated transactions.  These consist of (1) the "largest
obligor default test," which assesses whether a CLO tranche has
sufficient credit enhancement to withstand specified combinations
of underlying asset defaults based on the ratings on the
underlying assets, and (2) the "largest industry test," which
assesses whether or not it can withstand the default of all the
obligors in the largest industry category.

The updated criteria do not change the calculation of the loss
amounts for the supplemental tests.  However, the criteria now
allow the loss amounts calculated for the largest obligor default
test to be run through S&P's cash flow model to take into account
excess spread and to ensure that the tranche subject to the test
receives timely interest and ultimate principal in S&P's
analysis.

S&P subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class of
notes at each rating level.  In S&P's analysis, it used the
reported portfolio balance that it considered to be performing
(EUR638.2 million), the weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates for the performing portfolio.
S&P applied various cash flow stress scenarios, using its
standard default patterns in conjunction with different interest
stress scenarios for each liability rating category.

The exposure to obligors based in countries rated below 'A-' is
greater than 10% of the aggregate collateral balance (17.5%).
Therefore, S&P has also applied additional stresses in accordance
with its nonsovereign ratings criteria.

Non-euro-denominated assets comprise 15.6% of the aggregate
collateral balance, which are hedged by a cross-currency swap
agreement.  In S&P's opinion, the documentation for the cross-
currency swap agreement does not fully reflect S&P's current
counterparty criteria.  In S&P's cash flow analysis, for ratings
above the issuer credit rating plus one notch on the swap
counterparty, it considered scenarios where the counterparty does
not perform, and where the transaction is therefore exposed to
changes in currency rates.

S&P's review of the transaction highlights that the class A notes
have paid down by EUR209.7 million since S&P's Feb. 4, 2013
review.  This has increased the available credit enhancement for
all of the rated classes of notes.

S&P's credit and cash flow analysis, together with the
application of its nonsovereign ratings criteria and current
counterparty criteria, indicates that the available credit
enhancement for the class A and B notes is commensurate with
higher ratings than those currently assigned.  Therefore, S&P has
raised its ratings on the class A and B notes.

In S&P's February 2013 review of the transaction, its credit and
cash flow analysis indicated that the available credit
enhancement for the class C, D, and E notes was commensurate with
higher ratings.  However, the application of the largest obligor
default test constrained S&P's ratings on these classes of notes.
Following the application of the largest obligor default test
under S&P's updated corporate CDO criteria, and taking into
account the results of its credit and cash flow analysis, as well
as the application of its counterparty criteria, the transaction
can now support higher ratings on the class C, D, and E notes.
Therefore, S&P has raised its ratings on the class C, D, and E
notes.

Jubilee CDO I-R is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans granted to primarily
European speculative-grade corporate firms.  Alcentra Ltd.
manages the transaction.  The transaction closed in May 2007 and
entered its amortization period in July 2014.

RATINGS LIST

Class                Rating
             To                From

Jubilee CDO I-R B.V.
EUR900 Million Senior Secured Fixed- And/Or Floating-Rate And
Subordinated Notes

Ratings Raised

A            AA+ (sf)          AA (sf)
B            AA (sf)           A+ (sf)
C            A+ (sf)           BB+ (sf)
D            BBB- (sf)         CCC+ (sf)
E            B+ (sf)           CCC- (sf)


STORK TECHNICAL: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had raised its
long-term corporate credit rating on Netherlands-based business
services company Stork Technical Services Holdco B.V. to 'B' from
'B-'.

At the same time, S&P raised its issue rating on Stork's EUR272
million senior secured notes to 'B-' from 'CCC+'.  The recovery
rating remains at '5', indicating S&P's expectation of modest
recovery in the higher half of the 10%-30% range in the event of
a payment default.

The upgrade follows the completion of the sale of Fokker, a Dutch
aircraft manufacturer, by Stork's shareholders Arle Capital
Partners and Eyrir Invest, on Oct. 28, 2015, for EUR706 million.
The proceeds were used to fully repay the debt at Stork Topco BV,
Stork's parent company, which controlled Fokker.  The debt repaid
includes EUR240 million of payment-in-kind (PIK) notes, accrued
interest on the PIK notes, and part of a EUR1.9 billion
shareholder loan.  The balance of the shareholder loan was
converted into equity.  Following this transaction, Stork Topco
BV exited the group's perimeter.

As a result, S&P considers that Stork's financial risk profile
has improved to "aggressive" from "highly leveraged," based
solely on the debt obligations at Stork.  S&P expects the
company's credit metrics to improve gradually during the
remainder of 2015 and in 2016 on the back of stronger
performance, the full benefits of restructuring measures, and
moderate margin improvement.  As such, S&P forecasts that Stork's
Standard & Poor's-adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt
will improve to 10% in 2015 and strengthen further to 12%-15% in
2016, compared with 7.7% at year-end 2014.  S&P's adjustments to
reported debt include the addition of EUR63 million of operating
leases, EUR31 million of pension obligations, and EUR15 million
in factoring of receivables.  The stable outlook reflects S&P's
expectation that Stork will continue to post organic growth amid
challenging oil and gas industry conditions and further improve
its profitability.  S&P anticipates that the reported EBITDA
margin (after nonrecurring items) will improve to 6% in 2016 on
the back of cost efficiencies, higher volumes, and Giovenco's
contribution.

S&P could raise the rating by one notch if Stork's credit metrics
strengthen further, with FFO to debt sustainably above 15%.  An
upgrade would also require the company to demonstrate a
supportive financial policy, sustain "adequate" liquidity, and
generate healthy FOCF, as well as an upturn in key oil and gas
end markets.

S&P might lower the rating if Stork's EBITDA margins failed to
improve to 6% or S&P sees further significant order deferrals
that indicate negative spill-over from oil and gas end markets.
FFO interest coverage below 2.5x could also trigger a negative
rating action, as could sizable dividends or acquisitions, or
inability to arrange timely refinancing of debt maturing in 2017.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


BALTINVESTBANK: Moody's Lowers LT Deposit Rating to 'B3.ru'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) has downgraded to B3.ru
from Baa2.ru national scale long-term deposit rating (NSR) of
Baltinvestbank (Russia).  The NSRs carry no specific outlooks.
The rating is under review for further downgrade.

The rating action is driven by Baltinvestbank's weak liquidity
profile and continuing further liquidity pressures, exacerbated
by recent negative publicity due to police investigation against
the bank's clients.  Moody's notes that Baltinvestbank has denied
any affiliation with the subject of investigation.

In its rating action, Moody's also takes into account the bank's
weak and volatile profitability metrics posted in Q3 2015, which
we anticipate to continue until year-end 2015.  These metrics
reflect the bank's weak net interest margin and will likely put
additional pressure on the bank's already weak capital position.

Moody's assessment of Baltinvestbank's ratings is largely based
on the bank's audited IFRS financial statements for 2014, its
statutory statements prepared under RAS, as well as information
received from the bank.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The bank has operated with weak and volatile liquidity levels
over the past two years, and its liquidity cushion has weakened
even further over the past few months, as reflected in its liquid
assets-to-total assets ratio (calculated under Russian accounting
standards, RAS, statements; less repo operations, mutual funds,
investment in subsidiaries and equities) of around 3% since
October 2015.  Moody's anticipates that the negative publicity
associated with the aforementioned police investigation will add
to existing liquidity pressures and/or the risk of weakening of
relationships between the bank and its key customers and
creditors.

Moody's notes that the bank's credit profile has also been
impacted by its weak profitability metrics, combined with modest
capital levels.  In 2015, the bank reported further weakening of
its core profitability metrics, with a decline in its core
profitability toward marginally negative levels in Q3 2015
(according to RAS statements).  These adverse developments are
largely explained by the bank's high cost of funding in H1 2015
caused by market volatility in late 2014 -- beginning 2015 (as
the Central Bank of Russia's key rate increased from 5.5% to
17.0% in 2014).  Nevertheless, we also note that the bank's
annualized return on average assets was negative at -0.3% as of
year-end 2014, according to IFRS statements (2013: -0.8%).

FOCUS OF REVIEW

Moody's rating review reflects the bank's high liquidity
pressures and is concentrated on the bank's capacity to boost its
liquidity position toward more sustainable levels over the next
few weeks.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Given that Baltinvestbank's ratings is under review for further
downgrade, upward pressure on the ratings is unlikely.  The
bank's capacity to obtain additional liquidity by improving
funding from stable sources and/or by exploring other external
sources would lead to a confirmation of the bank's rating.

Evidence of Baltinvestbank's inability to recover its liquidity
position to more sustainable levels would put significant
pressure on the bank's rating and could result in a downgrade of
the bank's rating.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in March 2015.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Baltinvestbank reported total
assets of RUB77.4 billion and net loss of RUB228 million under
audited IFRS as of year-end 2014.


BALTINVESTBANK: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Ratings to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa2 from B3
Baltinvestbank's long-term foreign and local-currency deposit
ratings and placed them on review for further downgrade.  The
bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA was
downgraded to caa2 from b3 and placed under review for further
downgrade.  At the same time, its Not-Prime short-term foreign-
currency and local-currency deposit ratings were affirmed.  In
addition, Moody's has downgraded the bank's long-term
Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment) to Caa1(cr) from
B2(cr) and placed it on review for downgrade and affirmed its
short-term CR Assessment of Not-Prime(cr).

The rating actions are driven by Baltinvestbank's weak liquidity
profile and continuing further liquidity pressures, exacerbated
by recent negative publicity due to police investigation against
the bank's clients.  Moody's notes that Baltinvestbank has denied
any affiliation with the subject of investigation.

In its rating action, Moody's also takes into account the bank's
weak and volatile profitability metrics posted in Q3 2015, which
we anticipate to continue until year-end 2015.  These metrics
reflect the bank's weak net interest margin and will likely put
additional pressure on the bank's already weak capital position.

Moody's assessment of Baltinvestbank's ratings is largely based
on the bank's audited IFRS financial statements for 2014, its
statutory statements prepared under RAS, as well as information
received from the bank.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The bank has operated with weak and volatile liquidity levels
over the past two years, and its liquidity cushion has weakened
even further over the past few months, as reflected in its liquid
assets-to-total assets ratio (calculated under Russian accounting
standards, RAS, statements; less repo operations, mutual funds,
investment in subsidiaries and equities) of around 3% since
October 2015.  Moody's anticipates that the negative publicity
associated with the aforementioned police investigation will add
to existing liquidity pressures and/or the risk of weakening of
relationships between the bank and its key customers and
creditors.

Moody's notes that the bank's credit profile has also been
impacted by its weak profitability metrics, combined with modest
capital levels.  In 2015, the bank reported further weakening of
its core profitability metrics, with a decline in its core
profitability toward marginally negative levels in Q3 2015
(according to RAS statements).  These adverse developments are
largely explained by the bank's high cost of funding in H1 2015
caused by market volatility in late 2014 -- beginning 2015 (as
the Central Bank of Russia's key rate increased from 5.5% to
17.0% in 2014).  Nevertheless, Moody's also notes that the bank's
annualized return on average assets was negative at -0.3% as of
year-end 2014, according to IFRS statements (2013: -0.8%).

FOCUS OF REVIEW

Moody's rating review reflects the bank's high liquidity
pressures and is concentrated on the bank's capacity to boost its
liquidity position toward more sustainable levels over the next
few weeks.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Given that Baltinvestbank's ratings are under review for further
downgrade, upward pressure on the ratings is unlikely.  The
bank's capacity to obtain additional liquidity by improving
funding from stable sources and/or by exploring other external
sources would lead to a confirmation of the bank's ratings.

Evidence of Baltinvestbank's inability to recover its liquidity
position to more sustainable levels would put significant
pressure on the bank's ratings and could result in a downgrade of
the bank's ratings.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Baltinvestbank reported total
assets of RUB77.4 billion and net loss of RUB228 million under
audited IFRS as of year-end 2014.


KAMA RE: Placed Under Provisional Administration
------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3021, dated November 2,
2015, took the decision to appoint from  November 2, 2015, a
provisional administration to Reinsurance Company KAMA RE,
limited liability company.

The decision to appoint a provisional administration was taken
following the suspension of the Company's reinsurance license
(Bank of Russia Order No. OD-2559, dated September 24, 2015).

The powers of the executive bodies of the Company are suspended.

Igor Rekunov, member of the non-profit partnership Far Eastern
Interregional Self-Regulatory Organisation of Receivers has been
appointed as a head of the provisional administration of the
Company.


TOR CREDIT: Placed Under Provisional Administration
---------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3103, dated November 10,
2015, revoked the banking license from the Moscow-based credit
institution Non-Bank Credit Institution Tor Credit, limited
liability company, or NCI Tor Credit LLC from November 10, 2015.

Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of the
banking license -- because of decrease in equity capital below
the minimum amount of the authorized capital established as of
the date of the state registration of the credit institution.

NCI Tor Credit LLC implemented high-risk lending policy connected
with placement of funds into low-quality assets.  Meeting the
supervisor's requirements on creating provisions adequate to the
risks assumed by the credit institution resulted in a loss of
significant part of its equity capital.

The management and owners of the credit institution did not take
measures to normalize its activities.  Under these circumstances,
Bank of Russia performed its duty on the revocation of the
banking license from the credit institution in accordance with
Article 20 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3104, dated November 10,
2015, appointed a provisional administration to NCI Tor Credit
LLC for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant
to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies are suspended.

According to the financial statements, as of November 1, 2015,
NCI Tor Credit LLC ranked 757th by assets in the Russian banking
system.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


BANK UKRAINIAN: Deposit Guarantee Fund Extends Liquidation
----------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the Individuals' Deposit Guarantee
Fund has extended the liquidation of PJSC Bank Ukrainian
Financial World (Ukrainsky Finansovy Svit, UFS-Bank, Donetsk) for
two years until November 12, 2017.

The fund said Roman Oberemko has been appointed liquidator of the
bank for this period, Interfax-Ukraine relates.

The National Bank of Ukraine made the decision to revoke the
banking license and liquidate the bank on November 10, 2014,
Interfax-Ukraine recounts.

The fund introduced temporary administration in the bank from
Aug. 15 to Nov. 15, 2014, Interfax-Ukraine relays.

Bank Ukrainian Financial World was founded in 2003.  UFS-Bank's
assets as of July 9, 2014 were estimated at UAH1.599 billion,
individuals' bank deposits and assets on current accounts
amounted to UAH655.8 million and UAH250.3 million respectively,
according to Interfax-Ukraine.


UKRAINE: Bondholder Group Rejects Terms of Kiev's Debt Offer
------------------------------------------------------------
Marton Eder at Bloomberg News reports that a committee of
investors rejected terms put forward by Ukraine's capital to
restructure its foreign debt after negotiations with the group
failed to reach an agreement on easing the city's US$550 million
debt burden.

According to Bloomberg, an e-mailed statement said the bondholder
group won't support terms offered by the City of Kiev, including
a 25% reduction to face value and a switch to new sovereign notes
maturing 2019 and 2020.

The committee, which didn't identify its members, said they owned
a combined 38% of the bond that was due last week and 22% in a
note maturing next year, Bloomberg relates.

"These terms do not represent fair value to the holders of the
city's notes," Bloomberg quotes the creditor committee as saying
in the statement.  "The committee continues to be willing to work
with representatives of the city and the Ministry of Finance and
their advisers to agree a balanced proposal."



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


DECO 6 - UK: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A2 Notes to CCC-
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
DECO 6 - UK Large Loan 2 PLC's class A2 and B notes.  At the same
time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class C and
D notes.

DECO 6 - UK Large Loan 2 is a 2005-vintage U.K. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At closing, the
transaction comprised four loans.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the remaining loan in
this transaction following the resolution of the Brunel loan.  On
the October 2015 interest payment date (IPD), the issuer applied
final recovery amounts (GBP65.3 million) from the resolution of
the Brunel loan to the class A2 notes.

The remaining loan in the transaction is the Mapeley loan.  The
loan matured in July 2015 and is currently secured on four (down
from 20 at closing) secondary U.K. office properties.  The loan
defaulted in October 2011 and subsequently entered special
servicing at that time.

The securitized loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is well above 100%
based on a July 2015 valuation of GBP6.0 million.

S&P has assumed principal losses on the loan in its 'B' rating
stress scenario.

RATING RATIONALE

S&P's ratings in this transaction address the timely payment of
interest (payable quarterly in arrears) and the payment of
principal no later than the July 2017 legal final maturity date.

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class A2
notes to be insufficient to mitigate the risk of losses from the
underlying loan at the currently assigned rating level.
Therefore, S&P has lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its
rating on the class A2 notes as S&P believes the repayment of
these notes is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and
economic conditions.  This is in line with S&P's criteria.

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class B
notes to be commensurate with a lower rating level.  This class
of notes has also experienced interest shortfalls on the October
2015 IPD.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'
its rating on this class of notes.  This is in line with S&P's
criteria.

S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class C and D notes
because they have previously experienced interest shortfalls.
This is in line with S&P's criteria.  These notes are unlikely to
be repaid, in S&P's opinion.

RATINGS LIST

DECO 6 - UK Large Loan 2 PLC
GBP555.119 mil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes
                                   Rating
Class            Identifier        To                   From
A2               XS0235683223      CCC- (sf)            B- (sf)
B                XS0235683736      D (sf)               CCC (sf)
C                XS0235684114      D (sf)               D (sf)
D                XS0235684544      D (sf)               D (sf)


RA ROBERTS: Bought Out of Administration by Complete Office
-----------------------------------------------------------
South Yorkshire Times reports that the business and assets of RA
Roberts Office Equipment Ltd., which has been trading for nearly
100 years, has been bought out of administration by Complete
Office Solutions UK Ltd.

According to South Yorkshire Times, RA Roberts Office Equipment,
based in Shepcote Business Park, had suffered a downturn in
trading and encountered cash flow problems due to competition
from web-based suppliers despite following a proactive
diversification strategy, increased product range and office
showroom improvements.

Robert Dymond and Lisa Hogg, insolvency practitioners at Wilson
Field, were appointed to the firm on Sept. 18, South Yorkshire
Times relates.  Five weeks later, the family-run business and its
assets have now been sold as a going concern to Wakefield-based
Complete Office Solutions UK Ltd as part of the company's
expansion plans, South Yorkshire Times recounts.

All 13 staff jobs have been preserved, South Yorkshire Times
discloses.

RA Roberts Office Equipment Ltd. is a Sheffield office equipment
supplier.


SANTANDER ASSET: S&P Maintains 'BB' Rating on CreditWatch Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it maintained its 'BB'
long-term counterparty credit rating on Jersey-based Santander
Asset Management Investment Holdings Ltd. (SAM) on CreditWatch
with negative implications.  The 'BB' issue ratings on the
company's senior secured debt also remain on CreditWatch
negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B' short-term
counterparty credit rating on SAM.

The ratings on SAM remain on CreditWatch pending finalization of
the transaction structure and further details on the merger plan
with Pioneer Investments.

"We intend to resolve the CreditWatch within the next three
months, by which time we expect to have reviewed the final terms
and integration plans, although we expect regulatory approvals to
take a few more months.  At the time of the resolution, we will
assess the financing structure and the degree to which any
additional debt is factored into the current rating level.  We
will also assess management and governance under the new
structure and integration risks associated with the merger," S&P
said.


* UK: A Third of Care Homes Face Insolvency, Company Watch Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Geoff Ho at express.co.uk reports that nearly a third of care
home operators are struggling financially with more than 400 in
danger of going bust, according to new research from Company
Watch.

Of the UK's 5,500 care home operators, the risk management group
estimates that as many as 1,650 companies are struggling
financially, and of those it expects a quarter, which account for
1,500 sites, to fall into insolvency, express.co.uk discloses.

The report says many groups in the sector are struggling to meet
the interest payments on their debts, because of rising staff
costs and local authorities cutting fees in response to Whitehall
demands for savings.

Last week, credit rating agency Standard & Poor's warned that
Four Seasons Health Care, the UK's largest operator with 470
homes and more than 20,000 beds, could run out of cash during the
first half of 2016 and default on its loan repayments, the report
recalls.

According to express.co.uk, Nick Hood, business risk advisor at
insolvency group Opus Restructuring, said that the current
business model of many homes was unsustainable as they barely
make a profit.

"Government austerity measures have slashed top line income,
while labour and other essential costs are rising all the time
through factors that are mostly outside the control of care home
operators," express.co.uk quotes Mr. Hood as saying.  "Something
has to give if major problems are to be avoided and if capacity
is to be increased to house the escalating number of the elderly
and the vulnerable in society."

express.co.uk notes that beleaguered Four Seasons is reportedly
looking to raise GBP60 million in a fire sale to ease the strain
on its finances.

It is also believed to have appointed specialist bankers from
Rothschild and law firm Freshfields to restructure its balance
sheet, the report states.

The firm is owned by Guy Hands' private equity group, which
acquired it for GBP825 million in a leveraged buyout in 2012.

However, loss-making Four Seasons is struggling to cope with the
GBP500 million debt mountain that the takeover saddled it with
and annual interest payments of GBP50 million, the report notes.

According to the report, the company is believed it is looking to
raise GBP30 million from the sale of 14 properties that it owns
and operates before the end of the year.

The firm also wants to raise a further GBP30 million from the
disposal of sites that it owns but are run by third parties, adds
express.co.uk.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Predicts Slow Global Growth for Another 2 Years
---------------------------------------------------------
Global growth will be lackluster over the next two years as the
slowdown in China and other emerging markets continues to weigh
on the world economy, Moody's Investors Service said in a report
published on Nov. 10, 2015.

Moody's forecasts that G20 GDP growth will average 2.8% in 2015-
17, only 0.3 percentage point higher than in 2012-14 and below
the 3.8% average recorded in the five years before the global
financial crisis.  The rating agency's latest forecasts are
broadly unchanged from its last quarterly Global Macro Outlook in
August.

"Muted global economic growth will not support a significant
reduction in government debt or allow central banks to raise
interest rates markedly," said the report's author Marie Diron,
Senior Vice President, Credit Policy.  "Authorities lack the
large fiscal and conventional monetary policy buffers to protect
their economies from potential shocks."

G20 GDP growth is forecast to rise slowly to 2.8% in 2016 and 3%
in 2017 from 2.6% in 2015.  Emerging markets' contribution to G20
GDP growth in 2015-17 will fall to the lowest levels since the
early 2000s.  The combination of persistently low commodity
prices and subdued global growth will maintain disinflationary
pressures, weigh on revenues and hamper attempts to deleverage.

The main risks to the economic outlook would stem from a bigger
than expected global fallout from the Chinese slowdown and a
larger impact from tighter external and domestic financing
conditions in other emerging markets.

"The direct effects on the global economy from both of these
potential risks would likely be limited," Ms Diron adds.
"However, advanced economies would be unable to do much to shore
up global growth, given policymakers' limited room for manoeuvre
on fiscal and monetary policy and the high leverage we're seeing
in a number of sectors and countries."

In China, Moody's forecasts GDP growth of just under 7% in 2015,
6.3% in 2016 and 6.1% in 2017.  The gradual economic slowdown
reflects a trade-off between further reforms -- aimed at
lessening the economy's dependence on investment and credit and
increasing the influence of market mechanisms -- and the risk of
jeopardizing employment and social stability.

Commodity prices are unlikely to rise significantly in the next
few years.  A large inventory build-up, a slow supply response
and muted demand from China and other key importers will all
weigh on prices.

Moody's expects no significant rise in prices for energy, metal
and mining commodities in the next two years.  For commodity
producers, the economic effects of low commodity prices will
spill over into other sectors through supply chains and weaker
growth in household income.

As well as weaker commodity prices, a range of country-specific
factors will contribute to lower growth in emerging markets and
could lead investors to reassess growth and return prospects in
some countries.  For example, political uncertainty will be a
negative factor in Brazil and Russia and infrastructure shortages
will hamper growth in South Africa.

Slow growth in emerging markets will not derail growth in
advanced economies, where the economic outlook is likely to be
supported by more accommodative monetary policy in the years
ahead.  Growth is expected to be broadly stable in the US, Europe
and Japan.  For 2015-17, Moody's forecasts average GDP growth at
around 2.5% in the US, the UK and Korea and 1.5% for the euro
area.


* Fitch Says EU Credit Investors Bearish on Emerging Markets
------------------------------------------------------------
European credit investors have grown more bearish on emerging
markets (EMs) and see them as the biggest risk to European credit
markets, according to Fitch Ratings' latest senior investor
survey. But most investors see selective EM risk as acceptable in
more stable countries and sectors.

Fifty-nine percent of respondents to the survey, which closed on
November 4, said the risk posed over the next 12 months by
adverse developments in one or more emerging markets was high, up
from 45% in our previous survey in July.

Investors again singled out EMs as most likely to experience
deteriorating fundamental credit conditions in the coming year.
Three-quarters of respondents think EM sovereign fundamentals
will deteriorate, compared with two-thirds in July. For EM
corporates the proportion increased nearly 20pp to 80%. Just 6%
predict an improvement for either category.

A more pessimistic view among investors is consistent with the
volatility in EM assets since mid-year. This has been driven by
concerns about US monetary tightening, global growth, and
commodity prices, as well as country-specific factors.

Survey responses reflect this range of related challenges, with
no single risk factor notably outweighing others. 29% of
respondents see low commodity prices as the main risk to EMs,
followed by slower global growth (26%), a Fed rate rise (24%),
and high debt levels (21%). The view that EM corporates face the
greatest refinancing challenge has hardened, with 63% of
respondents selecting this category, up from 46% in our previous
survey.

Nevertheless, more than half of respondents described their view
on EM debt as selective, looking to pick more stable countries
and sectors to avoid high risk exposures. 14% think now is a good
time to buy in an oversold market.

Concerns about EMs are not new, and Fitch's European senior
investor surveys have shown increasingly negative sentiment in
recent years. US investors also saw EM contagion as the top risk
to their market in our recent US survey. Fitch's global growth
forecast of 2.3% for 2015 factors in the impact of recessions in
Brazil and Russia and a structural slowdown in China and other
EMs.

Fed tightening can exacerbate credit pressures via its impact on
EM rates, capital flows and currencies, but this will vary across
regions and asset classes. Many sovereigns have large FX reserves
and low public debt, while EM corporate debt has risen sharply in
the last decade. Highly indebted corporates with large dollar
exposure and unhedged FX risk profiles will face greater
refinancing risk than those with good funding diversification. US
rate rises may put pressure on some EM banking systems' asset
quality and increase refinancing challenges.

Fitch's 4Q15 survey represents the views of managers of an
estimated EUR7.5 trillion of fixed-income assets. Fitch will
publish the full results later this month.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *