TCREUR_Public/151120.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Friday, November 20, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 230



HEINZ KETTLER: ZEG Takes Over Business, Reorganization Ongoing


CORDATUS LOAN I: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
HARVEST CLO XIV: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes


SALINI IMPREGILO: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Stable


BANK RBK: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Ratings, Outlook Stable
KAZAKHSTAN ELECTRICITY: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Negative
SC CONDENSATE: Fitch Withdraws 'B-' Issuer Default Rating


PENTA CLO 1: Moody's Hikes Class E Debt Rating to Ba2(sf)
SWISSPORT GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable


AVOCA CLO V: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to B-
CANDIDE FINANCING 2011-1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. B Notes


NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: Moody's Cuts CFR to Caa3, Outlook Negative


NOVO BANCO: Moody's Puts B2 Ratings on Review for Downgrade


RUSSIAN BANKS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 5 Consumer Lenders
SOGLASIE INSURANCE: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative


NORDIC MINES: Lack of Working Capital May Lead to Bankruptcy


BANK HOTTINGER: Banque Heritage to Snap Up Client Assets


BANK CAPITAL: Court Revokes Fund's Liquidation Resolutions
REGIONAL POWER: Files for Bankruptcy in Kyiv Court
UKRAINE: Fitch Raises Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'CCC'

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

COOPER GAY: Moody's Continues to Review 'B3' CFR for Downgrade
HBOS PLC: Former Top Executives May Face Ban Over 2008 Collapse
LIBERTY GLOBAL: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Corporate Family Rating


* BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History



HEINZ KETTLER: ZEG Takes Over Business, Reorganization Ongoing
Bike Europe reports that the world's largest dealer cooperative
ZEG officially confirmed the takeover of Heinz Kettler GmbH & Co.
KG's bicycle division including its Hanweiler-based bike factory.

ZEG has been a long-time partner of the struggling company, Bike
Europe says, citing a press release.

The acquisition is conditional upon the approval of the
transaction by the relevant competition authorities, Bike Europe


For Kettler, the sale of the bicycle division is a milestone in
the ongoing reorganization, Bike Europ states.  Since Sept. 1,
the manufacturer is working on an insolvency plan "in
self-administration" which offers the company options for
recapitalization in order to avoid bankruptcy, Bike Europe

According to Bike Europe, company owner Dr. Karin Kettler and the
Kettler management said the insolvency plan is scheduled to be
finalized together with the creditors at the end of this year.

Kettler wants to restart as a leading manufacturer of outdoor
furniture, fitness equipment and toys within three remaining
business divisions early 2016, Bike Europe discloses.

Heinz Kettler GmbH & Co. KG is an outdoor furniture-, fitness
equipment-, toys- and aluminium bicycle manufacturer.


CORDATUS LOAN I: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Cordatus Loan Fund I PLC's class C and D notes.  At the same
time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class VFN, A1, A2, B,
and E notes.

Cordatus Loan Fund I is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
January 2007 and its reinvestment period ended in January 2014.
The transaction is managed by CVC Cordatus Group Ltd.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the latest available trustee report,
in addition to S&P's cash flow analysis.  S&P has taken into
account recent developments in the transaction and reviewed it
under S&P's current counterparty criteria.

According to S&P's analysis, since its May 3, 2013 review, the
rated liabilities have deleveraged, which has increased the
available credit enhancement for all classes of notes.  The class
A1, A2, and VFN notes have, on aggregate, reduced by
approximately EUR68 million (converting any British pound
sterling issuances into euros, based on the spot rate provided in
the trustee report).  This represents a 32% aggregate reduction
in the principal amount outstanding of these classes of notes.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class,
which we then compared against its respective scenario default
rate (SDR) to determine the rating level for each class of notes.
In our analysis, we used the reported portfolio balance that we
consider to be performing, the weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that we considered appropriate.
We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using our
standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each rating
category assumed for all classes of notes, in conjunction with
different interest stress scenarios," S&P said.

In S&P's view, the deleveraging of the senior classes of notes
has resulted in increased available credit enhancement for all
classes of notes.  S&P's credit and cash flow analysis indicates
that the class C and D notes are now able to achieve higher
ratings that those currently assigned.  S&P has therefore raised
its ratings on these classes of notes.

According to S&P's analysis, British pound sterling-denominated
assets currently comprise 21.35% of the transaction's aggregate
collateral balance.  These assets are hedged by the class VFN and
A2 notes' British pound sterling-denominated liabilities.
Currency options with The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC (RBS) hedge
any mismatches if those assets default.  In accordance with S&P's
current counterparty criteria, the currency call option provided
by RBS only supports ratings up to a 'A-' rating level.  S&P has
therefore stressed non-euro-denominated assets in 'A' scenarios
and above, in line with S&P's criteria.  S&P's analysis shows
that the class VFN, A1, A2, and B notes can withstand stresses at
the currently assigned rating levels.  S&P has therefore affirmed
its ratings on these classes of notes.

S&P's analysis indicates that while the available credit
enhancement has increased for the class E notes, the BDR is
unable to pass its respective SDR at rating levels that are any
higher than the notes' current 'BB' rating level.  Taking this
into account, as well as S&P's view that the available credit
enhancement for this class of notes is commensurate with the
currently assigned rating, S&P has affirmed its 'BB (sf)' rating
on the class E notes.


Cordatus Loan Fund I PLC
EUR416.25 mil, GBP22.635 mil secured floating-rate notes and
subordinated notes
Class            Identifier         To                  From
VFN                                 AA+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)
A1               XS0280399568       AA+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)
A2               XS0280401562       AA+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)
B                XS0280394254       AA- (sf)            AA- (sf)
C                XS0280394684       A+ (sf)             A (sf)
D                XS0280395657       BBB+ (sf)           BBB- (sf)
E                XS0280396895       BB (sf)             BB (sf)

HARVEST CLO XIV: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes
Fitch Ratings has assigned Harvest CLO XIV Limited notes final

  EUR139 mil. Class A-1A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR100 mil. Class A-1B: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR5 mil. Class A-2: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR32 mil. Class B-1: 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR10 mil. Class B-2: 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR23 mil. Class C: 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR25 mil. Class D: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR24.5 mil. Class E: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR12 mil. Class F: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

Subordinated notes: not rated

Harvest CLO XIV Limited is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO).


'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the
'B' category.  Fitch has credit opinions or public ratings on all
but one of the assets in the identified portfolio.  The Fitch
weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the initial portfolio is
31.1, below the covenanted maximum of 33.

High Recovery Expectations

At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations.  Recovery prospects for these assets are typically
more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets.  Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings (RRs) to all but one
of the assets in the identified portfolio.  The Fitch weighted
average recovery rating (WARR) of the initial portfolio is 72%,
above the covenanted minimum of 67%.

Variable Euribor Referencing Notes

The class A-1B notes are subject to six-month Euribor rate of
interest and receive interest and principal on a semi-annual
basis.  This is in contrast to all other notes, which are subject
to three-month Euribor rate of interest and paid on a quarterly
basis.  Upon the occurrence of a frequency switch event, it is
possible that class A-1B note holders, and all other class A
noteholders, will be paid on alternative payment dates.  In this
case, cash will be provisioned for such that each noteholder
retains their pro-rata, pari passu, semi-annual payment receipts
via the establishment of a principal reserve account.

Diversified Asset Portfolio

The transaction contains a covenant that limits the top 10
obligors in the portfolio to 20% of the portfolio balance.  In
addition, the maximum Fitch industry exposure is restricted to
15% for the largest industry, and 35% for the top three.  This
ensures that the asset portfolio is not exposed to excessive
obligor concentration.

Limited Interest Rate Risk

Unhedged fixed-rate assets cannot exceed 5% of the portfolio
while fixed-rate liabilities represent 3.75% of target par.
Consequently, interest rate risk is naturally hedged for most of
the portfolio through floating-rate liabilities.


Net proceeds from the notes are being used to purchase a EUR400m
portfolio of European leveraged loans and bonds.  The portfolio
is managed by 3i Debt Management Investments Limited. The
reinvestment period is scheduled to end in 2019.

The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation or noteholder approval.  Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyse the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings.  Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective, Fitch may decline to comment.  Noteholders
should be aware that confirmation is considered to be given if
Fitch declines to comment.


A 25% increase in the obligor default probability would lead to a
downgrade of up to three notches for the rated notes.  A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of
up to five notches for the rated notes.


No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


All but one of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch.  Fitch has relied on the practices of the
relevant Fitch groups to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


SALINI IMPREGILO: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'BB+' long-term corporate credit rating on Italy-based
construction company Salini Impregilo SpA.  The outlook is

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' issue rating on Salini
Impregilo's EUR400 million senior unsecured notes maturing in
2018.  The recovery rating on the notes is unchanged at '4',
indicating S&P's expectations of recovery in the higher half of
the 30%-50% range in the event of a payment default.

The affirmation follows Salini Impregilo's announcement on
Nov. 12, 2015, that it intends to acquire U.S.-based Lane
Industries Inc., a family-owned construction company operating in
the surface transportation and energy sector.  The transaction
value is equivalent to about US$406 million, or about 6.5x Lane's
reported EBITDA. Salini Impregilo expects to fund the acquisition
through a combination of cash on the balance sheet and new debt.
The completion of the transaction is conditional on approval from
Lane's shareholders and the antitrust authority.

S&P believes the Lane acquisition will significantly strengthen
Salini Impregilo's presence in the U.S. infrastructure market and
improve the group's country risk profile.  S&P expects the U.S.
infrastructure market to grow moderately over the next few years,
due to large renovation and expansion needs.  Through the
acquisition, Salini Impregilo can unlock business opportunities
in the U.S., which would become a key market, generating about
20% of total revenues.  As a result, the company's country risk
reduces to "intermediate" from "moderately high."  However,
Salini Impregilo has substantial exposure to emerging markets,
which creates unpredictable downside risk.  Furthermore, after
the acquisition, Salini Impregilo would still be smaller than
stronger peers, such as Strabag SE, Bilfinger, and Vinci.
Consequently, S&P is maintaining its business risk profile
assessment at "fair."

However, Salini Impregilo's leverage metrics will deteriorate
temporarily as a result of the acquisition, but remain
commensurate with an "intermediate" financial risk profile.  S&P
forecasts the Standard & Poor's-adjusted ratio of funds from
operations (FFO) to debt will decline to 29%-32% by year-end
2016, which is on the cusp of the "intermediate" and
"significant" categories, before recovering to 32%-35% in 2017.
In S&P's opinion, management's commitment to reduce the company's
reported net debt supports the ratings.

Nevertheless, the rating headroom has significantly reduced, and
unexpected operating setbacks would put pressure on Salini
Impreglio's credit metrics, given its exposure to emerging
markets and the structural volatility of the construction
industry.  S&P believes the company's free operating cash flow
(FOCF) will likely stay negative for the next few years, due to
high working capital and capital expenditure, since the company
is in a growth phase.

S&P's adjusted debt figure is higher than the company's reported
debt because S&P deducts cash that it believes is not immediately
available for debt repayment.  Furthermore, S&P adds about
EUR300 million in financial guaranties that Salini Impregilo
provides to non-consolidated companies, as well as other minor
items, such as operating leases and pension liabilities.

S&P believes that Salini Impregilo's post-acquisition EBITDA will
increase by 10%-15% annually over the next few years, on the back
of strong demand for infrastructure work and a high order backlog
that will provide strong revenue coverage.  In addition, lower
interest expenses in 2015 should support FFO generation, since
Salini Impregilo substantially reduced its cost of debt by
refinancing bank facilities at the beginning of 2015.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Salini Impregilo's
adjusted leverage metrics will remain commensurate with an
"intermediate" financial risk profile.  The company's solid order
backlog adds significant visibility to revenues over the next few
years, and S&P expects leverage metrics to recover in 2017
following a temporary drop in 2016.  However, the rating headroom
has significantly reduced, taking into account the planned Lane

Negative rating pressure may arise if the company's adjusted FFO
to debt weakens to below 30% for a sustained period.  This would
most likely happen if the group suffered a severe operating

S&P may also lower the ratings if the company were to pursue
further debt-funded acquisition or adopt a more generous
shareholder remuneration policy, although S&P sees this as
unlikely.  In addition, a downgrade would follow if the company's
liquidity were to become less than adequate.

An upgrade is unlikely at this stage, since it would require FFO
to debt to improve comfortably above 45%.  This could, however,
happen if the company's strong backlog and favorable economic
conditions translated into higher-than-anticipated earnings
growth.  An upgrade would also depend on whether Salini Impregilo
successfully manages working capital and capital expenditure
needs, so that FOCF becomes sustainably positive.


BANK RBK: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Ratings, Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Kazakhstan-based Bank RBK to stable from positive and affirmed
its 'B-/C' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on
the bank.  At the same time, S&P lowered its Kazakhstan national
scale rating on the bank to 'kzBB-' from 'kzBB'.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that Bank RBK's
aggressive growth strategy may lead to the accumulation of
significant risks going forward.  Although coming from a low
base, the bank's assets increased by 89x between 2011-2014,
significantly exceeding the Kazakh banking sector's average asset
growth, and the bank increased its asset base by 48% in the first
nine months of 2015 when economic growth in Kazakhstan was under
pressure and many other local banks were deleveraging.

"We expect that the quality of the bank's loan portfolio will
deteriorate in the next 12-18 months, with nonperforming loans
(defined as loans overdue by more than 90 days) increasing to
5.0%-7.0% from 2.8% at mid-2015 (which is currently below the
Kazakh banking sector's average).  This will likely result from
the bank's maturing loan portfolio and the deteriorating
creditworthiness of the bank's borrowers, given that the Kazakh
economy is slowing down.  The bank's loan book is highly
concentrated, with corporate customers making up 80% of loans as
of Sept. 1, 2015.  The top 20 borrowers accounted for 39% of
overall loans and 3.4x of the bank's total adjusted capital as of
the same date, which is very high in global comparison, although
comparable to local peers," S&P said.

S&P also expects that the bank's capital buffers will remain
constrained, despite significant capital injections from
shareholders, in view of its rapidly increasing risk-weighted
assets.  However, S&P estimates that the bank's risk-adjusted
capital ratio before adjustments for concentration and
diversification will remain between 6.5%-7.0% in the next 12-18
months in S&P's base-case scenario, which includes the bank's
planned sizable capital injections over the next two years.

The stable outlook on Bank RBK reflects S&P's expectation that
pressure on the bank's creditworthiness from increasing credit
costs and narrowing margins, due to depressed economic conditions
in the country, will likely be balanced over the next 12-18
months by significant support from shareholders in the form of
capital injections and funding resources.

S&P could take a negative rating action if, contrary to its
expectations, Bank RBK did not receive the planned capital
injections at the end of 2015 and in 2016 while its risk appetite
remained high or if asset quality deteriorated markedly, with
nonperforming loans increasing to more than 7% of total loans in
the next 12-18 months, resulting in elevated credit costs and
weaker capital ratios.  S&P could also downgrade the bank if its
adequate liquidity deteriorated materially as a result of
unexpected deposit outflows or the bank's unwillingness to
maintain sufficient liquidity cushions.

S&P considers a positive rating action is unlikely in the next
12-18 months, given its view of the increasing economic and
industry risks in the Kazakh banking sector.

KAZAKHSTAN ELECTRICITY: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'BB+' long-term corporate credit rating on Kazakhstan Electricity
Grid Operating Co. (JSC) (KEGOC).  The outlook remains negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' issue rating on KEGOC's
senior unsecured bank loan.

The affirmation reflects S&P's assessment of KEGOC's stand-alone
credit profile (SACP) at 'b+' and S&P's view of a "very high"
likelihood that KEGOC would receive timely and sufficient
extraordinary support from Kazakhstan's government, if needed.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for government-related entities
(GREs), S&P's view of a "very high" likelihood of extraordinary
government support is based on S&P's assessment of KEGOC's:

   -- "Very important" role for Kazakhstan's government, given
      the company's strategic importance as the monopoly provider
      of essential electricity infrastructure; and

   -- "Very strong" link with the government, which owns 90% plus
      one share in KEGOC, currently guarantees about 44% of
      KEGOC's debt (and possibly any new debt), and has a history
      of injecting equity to cover the company's liquidity

S&P currently doesn't expect the likelihood of extraordinary
government support for KEGOC to weaken following the partial
so-called people's IPO that took place in December 2014.  S&P
notes that only a minor stake (10% less one share) in KEGOC was
placed, and the government is likely to retain incentives and
instruments to financially support KEGOC if needed.

S&P now assesses KEGOC's SACP at 'b+' compared with 'b'
previously. This reflects S&P's view of the company's "weak"
business risk profile, the improvement of its financial risk
profile to "significant," and a negative adjustment for the
capital structure.

"Our reassessment of the company's financial risk profile to
"significant" from "aggressive" reflects our view of more
predictable revenues and operating cash flows.  The regulator has
approved tariffs for the five-year period starting 2016, whereas,
previously, the tariff horizon was limited to one year.  We
therefore consider future operating cash flows to be less
volatile and believe that tariff increases partly offset the
effect of the tenge's devaluation.  This should allow KEGOC to
maintain cash flow and leverage metrics in line with a
"significant" financial risk profile, according to our criteria,"
S&P said.

The ratings are constrained by Kazakhstan's cost-plus-based
tariff system, which lacks predictability and transparency; by
high country risk; as well as by KEGOC's high financial leverage,
with all its debt denominated in euros or U.S. dollars, and large
investment program.

Positive factors include the strong ongoing support KEGOC
receives from the state; KEGOC's monopoly position in the stable
electricity transmission business, which S&P considers to have
fairly low operating risk because of its regulated earnings
profile; and its long-dated debt maturity profile.

The negative outlook on KEGOC reflects that on Kazakhstan.  In
accordance with S&P's criteria for rating GREs, if S&P lowers the
long-term rating on Kazakhstan by one more notch, this will
likely will result in a similar rating action on KEGOC, all else
being equal.

S&P might also lower the ratings on KEGOC if, in S&P's view, the
likelihood of extraordinary state support had reduced to "high"
from "very high."  This could occur if, for instance, the
government intervenes, with a negative effect on KEGOC; has a
lower incentive to support the company; or required much larger

Likewise, pressure on the ratings might arise if KEGOC's SACP
deteriorates to 'b-', even if S&P's assessment of the likelihood
of state support remains "very high" and the sovereign rating
remains at 'BBB'.  The SACP might deteriorate as a result of
weakened liquidity, covenant breaches, or an unexpected increase
in Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA beyond 5x, for
instance, due to higher capital expenditures or dividends than in
S&P's base case.

S&P would likely revise its outlook on KEGOC to stable following
a similar outlook revision on the sovereign rating.

SC CONDENSATE: Fitch Withdraws 'B-' Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Kazakhstan-based SC Condensate's

Fitch has withdrawn Condensate's ratings without affirmation as
the agency no longer has sufficient information to maintain the
ratings as Condensate has chosen to stop participating in the
rating process.  Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide
ratings or analytical coverage for Condensate.

Condensate is an oil refining company with small, but growing,
production scale based in North West Kazakhstan.  At end-2014,
Condensate's funds from operations (FFO) adjusted gross leverage
was zero.


Rating sensitivities are not applicable.


  Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR): 'B-',
   Stable Outlook, withdrawn
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'B', withdrawn
  Long-term local currency IDR: 'B-', Stable Outlook, withdrawn
  National Long-term rating: 'B+(kaz)', Stable Outlook, withdrawn
  Local currency senior unsecured rating: 'B-', withdrawn
  National senior unsecured rating: 'B+(kaz)', withdrawn


PENTA CLO 1: Moody's Hikes Class E Debt Rating to Ba2(sf)
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
actions on the following classes of notes issued by PENTA CLO 1

-- EUR240,000,000 (current outstanding balance of EUR130.0M)
    Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa
    (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR26,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2024,
    Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2015 Affirmed Aaa

-- EUR48,000,000 Class B Senior Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
    due 2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2015
    Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

-- EUR21,000,000 Class C Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
    Mar 24, 2015 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

-- EUR15,000,000 Class D Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
    Mar 24, 2015 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

-- EUR13,000,000 Class E Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
    Mar 24, 2015 Affirmed B1 (sf)

-- EUR5,500,000 (current rated balance of EUR3.0M) Class Q
    Combination Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously
    on Mar 24, 2015 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

-- EUR5,000,000 (current rated balance of EUR0.5M) Class R
    Combination Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously
    on Mar 24, 2015 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

-- EUR8,000,000 (current rated balance of EUR4.5M) Class S
    Combination Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously
    on Mar 24, 2015 Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

Penta CLO 1 S.A., issued in April 2007, is a Collateralised Loan
Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield
European loans. It is predominantly composed of senior secured
loans. The portfolio is managed by Penta Management Limited, and
this transaction has ended its reinvestment period on 04 June


According to Moody's, the upgrade of the notes is primarily a
result of deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes and subsequent
increase in the overcollateralization (the "OC ratios"). Moody's
notes that on the June 2015 payment date, the Class A-1 notes
have been redeemed by EUR37.3 million, or 15.6% of their original
balance. As a result of this deleveraging, the OC ratios of the
senior notes have increased. As per the latest trustee report
dated September 2015, the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D and
Class E OC ratios are 180.75%, 138.23%, 125.33% 117.50% and
111.46%, respectively, versus January 2015 levels of 164.30%,
131.62%, 121.09%, 114.54% and 109.41%.

The ratings on the combination notes address the repayment of the
rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. For the
Class S notes, the 'rated balance' at any time is equal to the
principal amount of the combination note on the issue date times
a rated coupon of 0.25% per annum accrued on the rated balance on
the preceding payment date, minus the sum of all payments made
from the issue date to such date, of either interest or
principal. For the Classes Q and R, the rated balance at any time
is equal to the principal amount of the combination note on the
issue date minus the sum of all payments made from the issue date
to such date, of either interest or principal. The rated balance
will not necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional
amount reported by the trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR255.2
million, defaulted par of EUR6.6 million, a weighted average
default probability of 21.86% (consistent with a WARF of 2972
with a weighted average life of 4.68 years, a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 45.95% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 24 and a weighted average spread of

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate of
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it lowered the
weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio by 5%; the model
generated outputs that were within one notch of the base-case

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

SWISSPORT GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating to airport services provider
Swissport Group S.a.rl (Swissport, the new parent company of the
Swissport Group).  The outlook is stable.

S&P is also assigning the 'B' long-term corporate credit rating
to Luxembourg-based Swissport Investment S.A., a financing
subsidiary of Swissport.

At the same time, S&P is assigning its 'B' issue rating to the
proposed CHF150 million senior secured revolving credit
facilities (RCF) and the CHF1.145 million equivalent term loan B.
The issue ratings on these instruments are '3'.  S&P's recovery
expectations are in the higher half of the 50%-70% range.

In addition, S&P is assigning its 'CCC+' issue rating to the
proposed CFH315 million equivalent senior unsecured notes.  The
recovery on the proposed notes is '6', indicating S&P's
expectation of negligible recovery (0%-10%) in the event of a
payment default.

The issue and recovery ratings remain subject to S&P's receipt
and review of the final documentation, guarantor, and security

The 'B' long-term corporate credit rating on Swissport reflects
S&P's view of the company's business risk profile as "fair" and
its financial risk profile as "highly leveraged," as S&P's
criteria define these terms.

"We have noticed deterioration in Swissport's EBITDA margin over
the last year, in part driven by increased pricing pressures on
the renewal of contracts, adverse foreign exchange movements, and
losses at certain stations which have damaged profitability.  In
addition, the company's increased exposure to the higher-margin
de-icing activities introduced volatility to its operations.
Looking ahead, we believe that, under the new ownership of the
HNA Group, Swissport could benefit from further higher-margin
opportunities in Asia and Africa.  However, in our view,
significant improvement in profitability is unlikely over the
short term.  This is because potential new contract wins require
significant capital outlays and involve start-up costs,
particularly in regions where the company doesn't have an
established network.  That said, we expect Swissport should be
able to maintain profitability at least at its current levels,
including adjusted EBITDA of between 10%-11%," S&P said.

S&P's "fair" business risk assessment continues to factor in
Swissport's position as the world's No. 1 independent provider of
ground handling services and its well-diversified customer base,
in what S&P considers to be a highly fragmented market.

S&P will continue to view Swissport's financial risk profile as
"highly leveraged" after the proposed transaction.  This
assessment reflects S&P's expectation that the proposed
transaction will reduce Swissport's annual interest cost bill
marginally, but should enable cash flow generation over the
medium term and contribute to some deleveraging.  That said,
under S&P's base case the company will maintain a weighted-
averaged Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 7x
and EBITDA interest coverage of more than 2x, which is
commensurate with S&P's 'B' rating.

In addition, S&P assess Swissport's financial policy as 'FS-6'
under its new ownership, as S&P's criteria define it.

"We believe that the acquirer, a legal entity of the HNA Group,
is acting as a financial sponsor, by following an aggressive
financial strategy using debt and debt-like instruments to
maximize shareholder returns.  Accordingly, the financial risk
profiles we assign to companies controlled by financial sponsors
ordinarily reflect our presumption of high leverage.  For
example, we forecast that Swissport will have adjusted debt to
EBITDA of about 7x over the forecast period, however, we do not
expect leverage to increase meaningfully beyond this level.  Our
'FS-6' assessment constrains our financial risk profile
assessment to "highly leveraged," unless there is evidence of a
material shift in financial policy and commitment to lower
leverage levels," S&P said.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Revenue decline of 9%-10%, before improving in the low-
      single-digits in 2016.  The strengthening of the Swiss
      franc accounts for a significant part of the expected
      decrease in 2015, with the remaining decline being a direct
      result of disposed or discontinued businesses.

   -- Reported EBITDA margin of about 6% in 2015, broadly in line
      with its 2014 performance.  S&P expects the EBITDA margin
      to improve to around 7%-8% in 2016, driven by the continued
      advantages of direct cost savings and the divestment of
      loss-making stations.

   -- Small bolt-on acquisitions of up to CHF15 million in both
      2015 and 2016.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Weighted-average adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to
      debt of about 8%-9%.

   -- Weighted-average adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 7x.

   -- EBITDA interest coverage of about 2.0x-2.5x.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Swissport should be
able to maintain its profitability at least at current levels.
S&P believes that an improvement in profitability is possible
over the medium term if Swissport fully realizes synergies from
its recent acquisitions and successfully executes its growth
ambitions in Asia and Africa.  Furthermore, S&P believes the
proposed transaction will reduce Swissport's annual interest
bill, which in turn will contribute to free cash flow generation
and some deleveraging over the medium term.  S&P expects
Swissport to maintain debt to EBITDA of around 7x and EBITDA
interest cost of more than 2x on a weighted-average basis over
the next two years. S&P also anticipates that the company will
maintain "adequate" liquidity, as defined by S&P's criteria.

S&P could lower the rating on Swissport if its revenues and
profitability decline as a result of a loss of multi-year
contracts, or if S&P observes a significant cash outflow due to
higher-than-expected integration and start-up costs for new
businesses.  This could lead the company's cash flow generation
and credit metrics to fall below levels that S&P considers
commensurate with a 'B' rating.  S&P could also lower the rating
if Swissport's interest coverage ratio falls to less than 2x, on
a weighted-average basis, or its liquidity weakens significantly.

S&P could raise the rating on Swissport if the company reduces
its debt through improved operating performance, leading to
stronger credit metrics with adjusted debt to EBITDA decreasing
to less than 5x, on a sustainable basis.  However, given the
current high levels of absolute debt, S&P thinks this scenario is
unlikely to materialize over the next two years.


AVOCA CLO V: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to B-
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Avoca CLO V PLC's class C1, C2, E, and R combo notes.  At the
same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class B, D, and F

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance by conducting its credit and cash flow analysis and
applying its relevant criteria.

Since S&P's previous review, the class A1a, A1b, and A2 notes
have fully amortized.  The class B notes are now the most senior
class of notes in the capital structure and has partially
amortized since S&P's previous review.  This has increased the
available credit enhancement for all classes of notes.
Additionally, all classes of notes have paid interest that was
due on the last payment date in August 2015 and none of the rated
notes are deferring interest.  Defaulted assets (assets from
obligors rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD' [selective default], or
'D') have reduced to zero from 3.16% at Jan. 2015.  Over the same
period, the proportion of assets rated in the 'CCC' category
('CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') has increased to 13.40% from 5.35%.
This increase in 'CCC' rated assets in the portfolio combined
with asset concentration and the weighted-average remaining life
of the portfolio, which remains unchanged since S&P's previous
review, has resulted in an increase in scenario default rates
(SDRs) at each rating level.  The SDRs are the modeled level of
gross defaults that CDO Evaluator estimates for every
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) liability rating.

S&P has subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rates (BDRs)
for each rated class of notes at each rating level.  The BDR is a
measure of the maximum level of gross defaults that a tranche can
withstand and still fully repay the noteholders.  S&P has
incorporated a series of cash flow stress scenarios using various
default patterns and levels for each liability rating category,
in conjunction with different interest stress scenarios.

Deutsche Bank AG (BBB+/Stable/A-2) acts as a bank account
provider and a custodian in the transaction.  The downgrade
provisions documented for the bank account provider and custodian
can support a maximum rating of 'A+ (sf)'.  Based on S&P's credit
and cash flow analysis, the available credit enhancement for the
class B, C1, C2, E, and R combo notes is commensurate with higher
ratings than those previously assigned.  However, the transaction
documents cap S&P's ratings on the class B, C1, C2, and R combo
notes at 'A+ (sf)'.  S&P has therefore raised to 'A+ (sf)' from
'BBB+ (sf)' its ratings on the class C1, C2, and R combo notes.
At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'A+ (sf)' rating on the
class B notes.

S&P has also raised to 'B- (sf)' from 'CCC+ (sf)' its rating on
the class E notes.  Although the concentration risk has
increased, S&P's credit and cash flow analysis suggests a higher
rating than previously assigned due to the increased available
credit enhancement for the class E notes.

S&P's rating on the class D notes is constrained by the
application of the largest obligor test, a supplemental stress
test that addresses event and model risk that might be present in
the transaction.  Although the BDRs generated by S&P's cash flow
model indicated higher ratings, the largest obligor test
effectively limits S&P's rating on the class D notes at 'BB+
(sf)'.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'BB+ (sf)' rating on the
class D notes.

S&P has also affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class F notes
as the BDR continues to be lower than the SDR, at the current
rating level, for this class of notes.

Avoca CLO V is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that closed in June 2006.  The collateral is managed
by KKR Credit Advisors (Ireland).


EUR543.25 mil floating-rate notes
Class        Identifier            To                  From
B            05381CAD3             A+ (sf)             A+ (sf)
C1           05381CAE1             A+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
C2           05381CAF8             A+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
D            05381CAG6             BB+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)
E            05381CAH4             B- (sf)             CCC+ (sf)
F            05381CAJ0             CCC- (sf)           CCC- (sf)
R Combo      05381CAM3             A+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)

CANDIDE FINANCING 2011-1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. B Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Candide Financing 2008 B.V., Candide
Financing 2008-2 and Candide Financing 2011-1 B.V.

The prime Dutch RMBS transactions comprise loans originated by
Bank of Scotland, Amsterdam Branch, which is a 100%-owned
subsidiary of Lloyds Banking Group plc (A+/Stable/F1).


Increasing Sold Repossessions and Losses

As of Sept. 2015, late stage arrears (loans with more than three
monthly installments overdue) were reported at 0.7% (+5bps yoy),
0.4% (-40bps yoy) and 0.3% (-13bps yoy) of the current portfolio
balance in Candide 2008, 2008-2 and 2011.  The Dutch Prime RMBS
Index was 0.7%.  However, the general improvement in arrears is
offset by an increase in repossessions and losses.  The
cumulative balance of mortgages with collateral that has been
repossessed and sold accounts for 2.2% (+50bps yoy), 1.8% (+57bps
yoy) and 1.1% (+36bps yoy) of the original pool balances.
Realized losses have increased to 0.7% in Candide 2008 and 2008-2
(+16bps and +20bps yoy, respectively) and to 0.26% (+11bps yoy)
in Candide 2011.

The index currently reports cumulative repossessions at 0.7% and
losses at 0.2%.  Fitch believes the higher than average LTVs and
DTI ratios are the main reasons for the worse than average asset
performance, particularly for the deals originated in 2008.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement

Realized losses have been fully provisioned for using the gross
excess spread generated by the structures, allowing the reserve
funds to remain at their target levels.  Credit enhancement
ranges between 1.5% (class B notes, Candide 2011) and 15.6%
(class A notes - Candide 2008) of the current portfolio balance,
which is sufficient to affirm the ratings.  The revision of the
Outlook on the class A notes in Candide 2008-2 to Negative
reflects the lower protection available to this tranche compared
with the class A notes in Candide 2008.

Payment Interruption Risk Mitigated

The risk associated with an interruption in servicing activity is
mitigated by fully funded dedicated reserves, accounting for 2%,
3.3% and 1.7% of the transactions' current class A and B notes'
balance.  The liquidity funds are sufficient to cover more than 2
interest payment dates of scheduled interest payments and senior
fees, calculated under stressed Euribor assumptions.

Interest Only (IO) Concentration

The transactions have a concentration of more than 20% of IO
loans maturing within a three-year period during the lifetime of
the transaction.  As per its criteria, Fitch carried out a
sensitivity analysis assuming a 50% default probability for these
loans, which showed that CE is able to accommodate these
stresses.  No rating action was deemed necessary as a result of
the IO loan concentration.


Deterioration in asset performance may result from economic
factors, in particular of unemployment.  A corresponding increase
in foreclosures, beyond Fitch's standard assumptions, could
result in a downward pressure on excess spread and greater
reliance on the respective reserve funds, thereby resulting in
negative rating action.


No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing

Applicable to Candide 2008 and 2008-2: Fitch did not undertake a
review of the information provided about the underlying asset
pools ahead of the transactions' initial closing.  The subsequent
performance of the transactions over the years is consistent with
the agency's expectations given the operating environment and
Fitch is therefore satisfied that the asset pool information
relied upon for its initial rating analysis was adequately

Applicable to Candide 2011:

Prior to the transaction closing, Fitch did not review the
results of a third party assessment conducted on the asset
portfolio information.

Prior to the transaction closing, Fitch conducted a review of a
small targeted sample of Bank of Scotland, Amsterdam Branch's
origination files, which indicated that updates to loan details
are not always completed on the system.  These findings were
considered in this analysis by applying a lender adjustment
factor to the base default probability for this transaction.

Overall and together with the assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


These information was used in the analysis.

   -- Loan-by-loan data provided by Lloyds Bank as at Aug.
      (Candide 2008) and July 2015 (Candide 2008-2 and Candide

   -- Transaction reporting provided by Lloyds Bank as at
      Sept. (Candide 2008), Oct. (Candide 2008-2) and Aug. 2015
      (Candide 2011)


The ResiEMEA and EMEA Surveillance models below were used in the

EMEA RMBS Surveillance Model. ResiEMEA.

The rating actions are:

Candide Financing 2008 B.V.
Class A (XS0358345592) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

Candide Financing 2008-2 B.V.
Class A (XS0392368345) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised to
Negative from Stable

Candide Financing 2011-1 B.V.
Class A (XS0625067680) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (XS0625071526) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable


NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: Moody's Cuts CFR to Caa3, Outlook Negative
Moody's Investors Service, downgraded Norske Skogindustrier ASA's
(Norske Skog) Corporate Family Rating ("CFR") to Caa3 from Caa2
and its Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to Ca-PD from
Caa2-PD. Concurrently, Moody's assigned a provisional (P)Ca
(LGD5) rating to the proposed unsecured exchange notes due 2019
and 2026 and a provisional (P)C (LGD6) to the subordinated
Perpetual Notes issued by Norske Skog. Further, Moody's
downgraded the rating of the EUR290 million senior secured notes
due Dec-2019 issued by Norske Skog AS to Caa1 (LGD2) from B3
(LGD2). In addition, Moody's downgraded the ratings assigned to
the legacy senior unsecured notes due 2016, 2017 (to be
exchanged) and 2033 issued by Norske Skog to Ca (LGD5) from Caa3
(LGD5) as well as the rating of the senior unsecured notes due
2021 and 2023 issued by Norske Skog Holdings AS to Caa3 (LGD3)
from Caa2 (LGD3). The outlook is negative.

This rating action follows the continued weak operating
performance of Norske Skog in 2015 and the announced exchange
offer which, if executed successfully, would qualify as
distressed exchange under Moody's definition. Upon successful
conclusion of the transaction, Moody's expects to assign a "/LD"
indicator to the company's PD rating.

The provisional ratings that have been assigned to the debt
instruments are subject to the final participation rate of the
liability management transaction as well as review of final terms
and conditions of the new exchange notes.

In Moody's view, there remains a significant likelihood that the
envisaged financing structure is not implemented as proposed
which could result in increased uncertainties on the capacity of
the company to service its debt and in particular repay the
upcoming 2016 and 2017 maturities. The failure of the exchange
offer might increase the risk of a more comprehensive balance
sheet restructuring.


The company's offer to exchange existing bonds qualifies as a
distressed exchange, because investors are offered a lower
nominal amount of restructured debt with extended maturities and
lower cash interest coupon which, in Moody's view, diminishes
some of the original debt obligations. Moody's would expect to
remove the "/LD" suffix after approximately three business days
following the debt exchange, if assigned.

The envisaged structure is proposed as follows:

The holders of the 2016 senior unsecured bonds are offered a 90%
of nominal value in exchange notes due 2019 bearing a cash
interest rate of 5.875% and a PIK interest rate of 5.875%. The
holders of the 2017 senior unsecured bonds are offered to receive
50% of nominal value as exchange notes due 2026 bearing a cash
interest rate of 3.5% and a PIK interest rate of 3.5% as well as
a 25% of nominal value as perpetual exchange notes, bearing 2%
interest subject to deferral rights.

The envisaged combined transaction is expected to ease near-term
refinancing needs in 2016-2017 significantly though the liquidity
would remain stretched even after a successful exchange. In
addition, the exchange offer is expected to result in a pro-forma
total debt reduction of up to around NOK600 million in case of
full participation, yet given the current negative profitability
this will not have a meaningful effect on pro forma leverage.

The downgrade of the company's CFR also reflects Norske Skog's
weaker than expected profitability and cash flow generation in
2015. Its high exposure to the mature publication paper market in
Europe and Australia weighs on the company's ability to improve
profitability. Recently announced investments in growth projects,
namely biogas and tissue production as well as the acquisition of
a New Zealand-based wood pellet production to diversify away from
the traditional publication paper market are not sufficient to
materially offset challenging market conditions in its paper
operations. We note that these investments will only moderately
improve profit generation over time. Nevertheless, the
incremental profits from the investments as well as slight
improvements in paper prices should help to improve
profitability, which combined with the significantly reduced
near-term maturities would ease the immediate refinancing
pressure until 2019 and would therefore be credit positive.

The continued weak profitability is reflected in a negative
EBITDA as adjusted by Moody's as of LTM ending September 2015.
Also, Moody's forecasts that demand for publication paper will
continue to decline in the coming years including the company's
relevant and rather mature newsprint and magazine markets.
Despite continued substantial capacity reductions, indicated by
sizeable capacity closures, pricing power has generally been
subdued while raw material costs remain elevated and add pressure
to profitability and cash generation. This will make it
challenging for Norske Skog to materially improve profit and cash
flow generation and to meaningfully reduce its debt load to more
sustainable levels.


The (P)Ca rating assigned to the proposed senior unsecured
exchange notes maturing in 2019 and 2026 is in line with the
legacy senior unsecured bonds maturing in 2016, 2017 and 2033.
Moreover, the Caa1 rating to the EUR290 million senior secured
notes issued by Norske Skog reflects the relatively higher
recovery expectations compared to the structurally and
contractually subordinated legacy unsecured exchange notes and
the remaining unsecured legacy notes. This is because the secured
notes enjoy first priority ranking pledges over assets and bank
accounts, land charges on lands and buildings from Australian and
New Zealand subsidiaries as well as upstream guarantees from all
material subsidiaries. The Caa3 rating of the senior notes
maturing in 2021 and 2023 is in line with the CFR and reflective
of the junior ranking to the sizeable amount of secured bonds but
seniority over the remaining portion of the unsecured debt due to
upstream guarantees from operating entities, placing them ahead
of other unsecured debt at the holding company level, namely the
legacy 2016, 2017 and 2033 as well as the new exchange notes due
2019 and 2026. Lastly, the proposed perpetual notes are
contractually subordinated to all other debt in the group and
therefore rated (P)C.

The negative outlook reflects that a default is very likely in
the near term and that a failure of the exchange offer could be
credit negative with potentially weaker recovery prospects for
creditors in case of disorderly default.

What Could Change the Rating UP/DOWN

The outlook could be stabilized if the 2016 and 2017 debt
maturities were successfully refinanced and Norske Skog was able
to improve its profitability to sustainable levels and generate
meaningful positive free cash flow allowing the company to de-
leverage over time. However, given Norske Skog's highly leveraged
capital structure and diminished profitability and cash flow
generation, Moody's considers that an upgrade of the ratings
would require a substantial improvement of the cash-flow
generation for considering a potential upgrade.

The rating of the CFR and the existing bonds could be downgraded
if the exchange offer does not attract sufficient interest from
existing bondholders, and therefore would heighten the company's
refinancing risk towards its June 2016 debt maturity with the
risk of a disorderly payment default and a bankruptcy, which
could imply low recovery prospects for creditors.

Norske Skogindustrier ASA, with headquarters in Oslo, Norway, is
among the world's leading newsprint and magazine producers with
production in Europe and Australasia. In the last twelve months
ending September 2015, Norske Skog recorded sales of around
NOK11.7 billion (approximately EUR1.24 billion).


NOVO BANCO: Moody's Puts B2 Ratings on Review for Downgrade
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for downgrade Novo
Banco, S.A.'s and its supported entities' B2 long-term senior
debt and deposit ratings, the bank's baseline credit assessment
(BCA) of caa2 and its long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment
(CRA) of B1(cr).

The review for downgrade was prompted by the EUR1.4 billion
capital shortfall identified in the adverse stress test scenario
of the European Central Bank's (ECB) Banking Supervision stress
test for Novo Banco that was announced on November 14, 2015.
Moody's considers that Novo Banco will face serious challenges to
replenish its capital from internal resources given its very weak
standalone credit profile. Furthermore, due to Novo Banco's
status as a bridge bank, any external capital injection is likely
to be conditional on completion of a sale process. The Bank of
Portugal led sale process is currently suspended, which adds
additional pressure for further external support in order to find
a buyer and avoid the liquidation of the bank before August 2016
(deadline after which the bank will be wound down if no buyer is

Moody's expects to conclude the rating review in the next weeks,
when Bank of Portugal will present the remedial actions to cover
Novo Banco's capital shortfall.

At the same time, Moody's has affirmed Novo Banco's following
ratings: (1) the short-term senior debt and deposit ratings at
Not-Prime; and (2) the short-term CRA at Not-Prime(cr).

A list of affected ratings can be found at the end of this press



The review of Novo Banco's ratings was triggered by the bank's
capital shortfall of EUR1.4 billion identified under the ECB's
adverse stress test scenario. Moody's considers that Novo Banco
will be challenged to cover the shortfall from internal
resources, given its very limited capital generation capacity.
Bank of Portugal, the Portuguese central bank and resolution
authority, has announced that, as required by the ECB, a
restructuring and recapitalization plan including corrective
measures to cover the capital shortfall will be prepared in the
next two weeks. The Portuguese central bank has also announced
that it will shortly resume the sale process of Novo Banco, which
had been postponed in September 2015, now that the ECB's stress
test and capital needs for the bank have been made public.

Moody's notes that Bank of Portugal's pressure to find a buyer
for Novo Banco before August 2016, has increased the likelihood
of an external capital injection for Novo Banco to address the
EUR1.4 billion capital needs. Further public direct capital
injection to recapitalize Novo Banco is unlikely, given the
European Commission's current prohibition regarding an additional
government funded capital injection for Novo Banco. However,
Moody's views that a failure to seek a private sector solution
for the recapitalization of Novo Banco heightens the risk of its
liquidation, and therefore some other type of public support for
the bank could be approved to ensure the completion of the sale

During the review period, Moody's will assess the implications
for Novo Banco's ratings of the remedial actions presented by
Bank of Portugal in order to cover the bank's identified capital

Novo Banco's BCA of caa2 reflects its very weak asset risk and
low capital buffers that are challenged by its lack of market
access and very weak profitability metrics. The bank's BCA also
reflects its (1) weak liquidity position, despite visible
improvements in restoring customer confidence and the generation
of liquidity through asset sales and balance-sheet deleveraging;
and (2) its status as a bridge bank, with the associated high
degree of uncertainty around future strategy.

Novo Banco's B2/Not Prime senior debt and deposit ratings reflect
(1) the bank's caa2 BCA; (2) the uplift from Moody's Advanced
Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis; and (3) one notch of uplift
from Moody's assumptions of moderate government support. Moody's
would re-assess its current government support assumptions once
Novo Banco's ownership changes.


The review will focus on the potential impact of the set of
measures approved to recapitalise Novo Banco and cover the EUR1.4
billion capital shortfall identified under the ECB's stress test.

Downward pressure on Novo Banco's senior debt and deposit ratings
could arise if (1) the bank is unable to raise sufficient capital
to offset its capital needs from internal sources and requires
further external capital support; and/or (2) the restructuring
and recapitalisation measures trigger a substantial downsizing in
the balance sheet perimeter that could further weaken the bank's
credit fundamentals and heighten risks for senior creditors.

An upgrade of the bank's ratings is unlikely given the current
review for downgrade.


On Review for Downgrade:

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.

-- Long-term Deposit Rating, previously B2 DEV, Placed on Review
    for Downgrade

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, previously B2 DEV,
    Placed on Review for Downgrade

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, at caa2, Placed on
    Review for Downgrade

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, at caa2, Placed on Review for

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, at B1(cr), Placed on
    Review for Downgrade

Issuer: BES Finance Ltd.

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, previously B2
    DEV, Placed on Review for Downgrade

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., London Branch

-- Long-term Deposit Rating, previously B2 DEV, Placed on Review
    for Downgrade

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, previously B2 DEV,
    Placed on Review for Downgrade

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, at B1(cr), Placed on
    Review for Downgrade

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., Luxembourg Branch

-- Long-term Deposit Rating, previously B2 DEV, Placed on Review
    for Downgrade

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, previously B2 DEV,
    Placed on Review for Downgrade

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, at B1(cr), Placed on
    Review for Downgrade

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Cayman Branch

-- Long-term Deposit Rating, previously B2 DEV, Placed on Review
    for Downgrade

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, at B1(cr), Placed on
    Review for Downgrade

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Madeira Branch

-- Long-term Deposit Rating, previously B2 DEV, Placed on Review
    for Downgrade

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, at B1(cr), Placed on
    Review for Downgrade


Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.

-- Short-term Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP

-- Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., London Branch

-- Short-term Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP

-- Senior Unsecured Deposit Program, Affirmed NP

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., Luxembourg Branch

-- Short-term Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Cayman Branch

-- Short-term Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Madeira Branch

-- Short-term Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Outlook Actions:

-- Outlook Changed To Rating Under Review From Developing

-- Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.

-- Issuer: BES Finance Ltd.

-- Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., London Branch

-- Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., Luxembourg Branch

-- Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Cayman Branch

-- Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Madeira Branch


RUSSIAN BANKS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 5 Consumer Lenders
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of OTP Bank (OTP) at 'BB', Tinkoff Bank, Sovcombank and
Home Credit & Finance Bank (HCFB) at 'B+', and Orient Express
Bank (OEB) at 'B-'.

The Outlooks on Tinkoff and SCB have been revised to Stable from
Negative.  The Outlooks on other banks remain unchanged: Stable
on OTP, and Negative on HCFB and OEB.  Fitch has also affirmed SB
JSC Home Credit Kazakhstan (HCK) at 'B' with the Stable Outlook.


The affirmation of the five Russian banks' ratings reflects
moderate deterioration in their credit profiles over the last 12
months (only recently for OEB, OTP and HCFB) and already low
rating levels.  The deterioration reflects an overheating Russian
consumer finance market, larger credit losses, negative bottom
line profitability (except at SCB and Tinkoff) and pressured
capitalization (especially at OEB).

Fitch does not expect Russian consumer finance lending to recover
in the near-term given the weak economic environment, high
consumer indebtedness, rising unemployment and a drop in real
disposable incomes due to currency devaluation and high

The revision of the Outlooks on Tinkoff and SCB to Stable from
Negative reflects their still profitable performance despite
larger credit losses and higher funding costs.  This has been
driven mainly by somewhat higher effective interest rates at
Tinkoff, and by a combination of lower-risk borrowers and
securities gains at SCB.  Fitch expects these banks to remain
profitable, even in case of further moderate deterioration of
asset quality, due to a gradual reduction in funding costs
following the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) rate cuts in 1H15.

On the contrary, HCFB and OEB remain on Negative Outlook, and
while OTP's VR faces downward pressure, as these banks continue
to suffer significant losses in 2015, eroding their capital
bases.  In 1H15 IFRS accounts, OEB lost 37% of end-2014 equity
(the bank received an equity injection from its shareholders in
June, preventing it from beaching regulatory capital ratios),
HCFB 17% and OTP 13%.  Although there are some early indicators
of credit losses bottoming at these banks, as well as a return to
break-even/modest profitability in October-November based on
Russian regulatory accounts, the sustainability of this trend is

In 1H15, the average credit losses of the reviewed banks (defined
as loans 90 days overdue originated in the period divided by
average performing loans) were a high 22% (annualized), up from
21% in 2014 and 16% in 2013.  Credit losses were the largest at
OEB and OTP in the peer group, at 29% and 24%, respectively in
1H15 (2014: 26% and 16%, respectively), with slightly lower
ratios at HCFB (20%), Tinkoff (19%) and SCB (16%).  All of the
reviewed banks have reduced their risk appetite, and tightened
underwriting standards and approval rates, which should lead to
improved performance in recent loan vintages.

However, new loan issuance has been limited (as reflected by a
decline in overall loans) and it will take time to replace older,
weaker-quality loans, which have been the main source of
heightened credit losses.  Asset quality will also remain
vulnerable to the weak economic environment and potential further

The main mitigating factor against credit losses is the banks'
sizable pre-impairment profitability, although this weakened in
1H15 due to higher funding costs and lower fee generation, as
loan issuance declined.  Pre-impairment profitability was still
solid and sufficient to cover credit losses in Tinkoff (20% of
average performing loans in 1H15) and SCB (41%, although this
was, to a large extent, attributable to significant one-off mark-
to-market gains on the bank's large bond portfolio), but weaker
and significantly below break-even levels at HCFB (10%), OTP
(13%) and in particular OEB (15%).

Fitch expects pre-impairment profitability to improve by at least
3-4ppt in 2016, due to a gradual pick-up in new lending and a
reduction in funding costs as expensive retail deposits collected
during the market turbulence in December 2014 and 1Q15 mature and
are replaced with cheaper accounts.

Capital buffers have remained solid in OTP and Tinkoff (in the
former mainly due to deleveraging) with Fitch Core Capital
(FCC)/risk weighted assets ratios of, respectively, 16% and 15%,
at end-1H15. Their regulatory tier 1 capital adequacy ratios
(CAR), although about 3pts lower from the previous year due to
higher risk-weights and additional operational risk charges for
consumer banks, are also acceptable.  HCFB had a reasonable FCC
ratio of 13.3% at end-1H15, although its regulatory tier 1 CAR
was rather tight at 6.9% at end-3Q15.

SCB is more weakly capitalized, as reflected by an FCC ratio of
9.5% at end-1H15, which was likely to have decreased to 6%-7% in
3Q15 due to further growth of the bank's securities book and a
bank acquisition.  In assessing SCB's capitalization, Fitch views
positively the fairly robust quality of the securities book and
the bank's significantly lower exposure (relative to capital) to
consumer lending than peers.  SCB's regulatory capital is
supported by lower risk-weights on securities, as reflected by a
reasonable 11% regulatory tier 1 CAR at end-3Q15.

Fitch views OEB's solvency as the weakest in the peer group, with
an FCC ratio of 8% at end-1H15 and regulatory CARs only
marginally above the minimum, exposing the bank to significant
reliance on equity injections made by its majority shareholder,
Baring Vostok Capital Partners.  According to management, OEB may
get a further RUB3 billion equity injection by end-2015 (22% of
end-1H15 equity), in addition to the RUB2.6 billion already
received in June 2015.  OEB and HCFB also managed to ease capital
pressure by means of de-leveraging, but further de-leveraging may
hit profitability.

Market risk is generally limited for these banks, as loans are
short-term and rouble- denominated, while funding dollarization
is moderate.  However, significant market risk is present in SCB
due to its large securities book (55% of end-3Q15 assets), as the
bank has been pursuing carry trade strategies.  Although the
portfolio has fairly long average duration (around 2.5 years) and
is exposed to significant fair value volatility, SCB may convert
these bonds to held-to-maturity securities to protect itself from
significant mark-to-market losses in case of stress.  However,
SCB would still be exposed to interest rate risks, as it largely
funds the bond portfolio with shorter-term CBR funding.  The
credit quality of SCB's bond book is sound, with 90% of bonds at
end-1H15 rated in the 'BB' category or above.

Funding and liquidity at each of the banks are supported by
reasonable deposit collection capacity and strong cash generation
of loan books.  Loan-to-deposit ratios remain high (above 100%,
except for SCB), but reliance on wholesale funding is falling, as
the banks gradually replace this with retail deposits.  The
banks' liquidity profiles are supported by fast loan turnover and
sizeable cushions of liquid assets, while refinancing needs are
limited in the near term.  At end-3Q15, liquidity buffers
exceeded 20% of customer funding at all banks except for OTP
(13%), which may benefit from access to parent funding in case of


HCK's VR of 'b' is constrained by the cyclicality of the bank's
performance and asset quality due to HCK's exposure to the
potentially volatile unsecured consumer finance market in
Kazakhstan.  Its weak funding profile is also credit-negative,
due to a high, albeit decreasing, reliance on parent group
resources (21% of end-1H15 total liabilities) and concentrated
deposit base (the 10 largest third-party depositors accounted for
23% of non-equity funding).  Positively, the VR reflects HCK's
reasonable asset quality and performance to date, and solid
capital buffer.

HCK's credit losses were a moderate 15% in 1H15 (annualized),
significantly below the bank's breakeven credit loss rate of 24%.
This would be sufficient to absorb a moderate increase in loan
impairments, as Fitch expects asset quality to weaken in the
near-term due to the challenging economic environment and a
potential drop in borrowers' real disposable incomes following
the recent devaluation of the Kazakh tenge.  HCK's profitability
is sound, as reflected in a 24% ROAE in 1H15 (annualized).

HCK's capitalization is strong, despite sizeable dividends paid
to the parent bank, HCFB, in 9M15 (USD32 million, almost equal to
the bank's net income during the period).  The bank's FCC ratio
stood at a high 30% at end-1H15 and is unlikely to be consumed by
loan growth in the near- term (HCK reported 2% loan growth in
2014 and an 8% contraction in 1H15).  However, capital ratios may
decrease if HCFB starts to upstream dividends from HCK more
aggressively to offset its own capital pressures.


OTP's IDRs, National Long-term Rating and Support Rating are
driven by potential support, in case of need, from the parent
bank, Hungary-based OTP Bank Plc.  Fitch believes that the parent
would have a high propensity to support OTP in light of its
majority (98%) ownership, high level of integration, reputational
damage for the parent from a default at OTP, and common branding.
However, Fitch believes that the Russian subsidiary is unlikely
to contribute to the group's results in the near future.

The '5' Support Ratings of HCFB, SCB, TCS and OEB reflect Fitch's
view that support from the banks' shareholders, although
possible, cannot be relied upon.  The Support Ratings and Support
Rating Floors of 'No Floor' also reflect that support from the
Russian authorities, although possible given the banks'
considerable deposit bases, cannot be relied upon due to the
banks' still small size and lack of overall systemic importance.
Accordingly, the four banks' IDRs are based on their intrinsic
financial strength, as reflected by their VRs.

HCK's Support Rating of '4' reflects the limited probability of
support which the bank may receive from its 100% parent, HCFB.
In Fitch's view, HCFB's propensity to support HCK is high given
the full ownership, the subsidiary's favorable performance to
date, common branding and potential reputational damage for the
broader Home Credit group in case of HCK's default.  However
HCFB's ability to provide support to HCK is constrained by its
own financial strength, as expressed by its 'B+' IDR.


The banks' senior unsecured debt, where rated, is affirmed at the
same level as their Long-term IDRs and National Ratings,
reflecting Fitch's view of average recovery prospects, in case of

Tinkoff's and HCFB's senior unsecured debt ratings have been
withdrawn as they are no longer considered to be relevant to the
agency's coverage.  Tinkoff's senior unsecured debt ratings have
been withdrawn as only a minimal amount of the bank's senior debt
issue remains outstanding following the exercise by most
bondholders of a put option, while HCFB's rating has been
withdrawn as it now has no senior unsecured debt issues
outstanding under its program.

The subordinated debt ratings of HCFB and TCS are notched down
one level from their VRs (the banks' VRs are in line with their
IDRs), in line with Fitch's criteria for rating these



Limited progress in asset-quality improvement, or further
deterioration, leading to continued weak performance and capital
erosion may result in negative rating actions.  These risks are
lower for Tinkoff and SCB due to stronger performance and better
asset quality to date, which drive the Stable Outlooks on the

Further deterioration in the broader economy could result in
additional pressure on all banks' credit profiles.  Any positive
rating actions would be contingent on a meaningful improvement of
the operating environment, which Fitch views as unlikely in the

Changes to OTP's IDRs are also possible if Fitch changes its view
on the parent's ability and propensity to support its Russian


HCK's VR could be downgraded in case of either a significant
deterioration of the operating environment in Kazakhstan, or
weaker asset quality leading to earnings losses and capital
erosion.  A downgrade of HCK's VR would not result in the
downgrade of the bank's IDRs, which would still reflect potential
support from HCFB.

An upgrade of HCK's IDRs would rely on (i) an extended track
record of solid asset quality and performance in the challenging
Kazakh operating environment and increased funding
diversification; or (ii) an upgrade of the parent, reflecting an
improved ability to provide support to HCK.

The rating actions are:


  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B+';
   Outlooks revised to Stable from Negative
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  National Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'A(rus)'; Outlook
  revised to Stable from Negative
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b+'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
  Senior unsecured debt Long-term rating: affirmed at 'B+';
  Recovery Rating 'RR4', and withdrawn
  Subordinated debt (issued by TCS Finance Limited) Long-term
   rating: affirmed at 'B'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'


  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B+';
   Outlooks revised to Stable from Negative
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  National Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'A(rus)'; Outlook
   revised to Stable from Negative
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b+'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'


  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BB',
   Outlooks Stable
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  National Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'AA-(rus)', Outlook
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b+'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '3'


  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B+';
   Outlooks Negative
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b+'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
  Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'B+', Recovery Rating 'RR4',
   and withdrawn
  Subordinated debt (issued by Eurasia Capital SA) Long-term
   rating: affirmed at 'B', Recovery Rating 'RR5'


  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B';
   Outlooks Stable
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  National Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'BB+ (kaz)'; Outlook
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '4'
  Senior unsecured debt Long-term rating: affirmed at 'B',
   Recovery Rating 'RR4'
  Senior unsecured debt National Long-term rating: affirmed at
   'BB+ (kaz)'


  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B-';
   Outlooks Negative
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  National Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'BB-(rus)'; Outlook
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

SOGLASIE INSURANCE: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had placed its
'BB-' long-term insurer financial strength and counterparty
credit ratings and its 'ruAA-' Russia national scale rating on
Russia-based SOGLASIE Insurance Co. Ltd. on CreditWatch negative.

The CreditWatch placement stems from uncertainty about the future
long-term commitment of financial support for SOGLASIE from its
owner, Mikhail Prokhorov.  S&P considers that, without such
support, SOGLASIE's financial risk profile could deteriorate, in
particular, its capital adequacy, due to poor underwriting

During 2015, SOGLASIE's owner provided it with Russian ruble
(RUB) 6.5 billion (slightly more than $105 million) in financial
aid.  This is in addition to RUB7.4 billion he provided in 2014
to cover losses from SOGLASIE's insurance activities.  However,
the owner's willingness to provide support in the long term is
uncertain, in S&P's view, due to SOGLASIE's poor underwriting
results and potential sale.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch within the next 90 days,
once it has more clarity on SOGLASIE's future strategy and
potential financial support from the owner.

S&P may affirm the rating if it believes that the owner remains
committed to SOGLASIE, for example, by providing anticipated
capital injections and not putting SOGLASIE up for sale.  An
affirmation will also depend on the longer-term sustainability of
SOGLASIE's financial risk profile, given its poor underwriting
performance for the first nine months of 2015.

S&P will lower the ratings by one or several notches if negative
operating results weigh on SOGLASIE's capital adequacy and there
is no counter-balancing capital injection, or if S&P believes the
unfavorable macroeconomic environment and SOGLASIE's poor
underwriting performance would undermine the owner's willingness
or capacity to support SOGLASIE.


NORDIC MINES: Lack of Working Capital May Lead to Bankruptcy
Nasdaq Stockholm have, after dialogue with Nordic Mines AB
decided to temporarily give Nordic Mines' share observation
status in anticipation of payments for the rights issue for
existing shareholders.

As set forth in the press release published on Friday,
November 13, 2015, and the supplementary prospectus published on
Monday November 16, 2015, the Company has entered into an
agreement with Lau Su Holding AB (the "Investor") pursuant to
which such company has committed to the subscription of
233,500,000 new shares for a total of SEK46,700,000.  The
commitment is not secured, but the Indian company Royal Refinery
Private Limited has entered into a surety undertaking for its
fulfillment.  Pursuant to the undertaking, payment for the
subscribed shares shall be made no later than November 28, 2015,
which date has been agreed due to the requirement of a permit for
export of capital from India.  Conditional on the undertaking
being fulfilled (including due payment), the Investor shall, as
consideration for the undertaking, be entitled to a share based
compensation corresponding to 114,419,495 new shares (which shall
be paid for by set off, based on the subscription price in the
Rights Issue, of a cash remuneration of SEK22,883,899).  The
undertaking has been procured by the Company in order to ensure
reaching a satisfactory subscription rate in the Rights Issue.
The agreement, and the therein included commitment fee, has been
negotiated between the parties.  Several other investors have
been contacted and also other forms of financing have been
sought. The agreement and the conditions therein have thereby
been tested against the market.

As set forth in the Company's prospectus, which was approved and
registered by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority on
Friday, October 23, and published by the Company the same date,
the Company (as of the date of the prospectus) does not have
access to sufficient working capital during the next twelve
months.  The deficit is expected to arise before the year end and
if the Company fails with a capital raising through the Rights
Issue it is most likely that it could lead to a new corporate
reorganization, bankruptcy or other liquidation of the Company.

Nordic Mines -- is a Nordic mining
and exploration company.  The Company was mining gold in the
Laiva mine in Finland during the years from 2011 to 2014.  These
gold deposits are among the largest in the Nordic region.  Nordic
Mines is a member of SveMin and applies its reporting regulations
for public mining and exploration companies.


BANK HOTTINGER: Banque Heritage to Snap Up Client Assets
Joshua Franklin at Reuters reports that Switzerland's Banque
Heritage on Nov. 18 said it would take on client assets from
wealth manager Bank Hottinger, which regulators put into
bankruptcy last month.

According to Reuters, the agreement is expected to be among a
host of deals and closures in the Swiss banking industry, as an
international crackdown on tax avoidance and costly regulation
put pressure on banks, many of whom had relied on Switzerland's
bank secrecy rules.

Geneva-based Banque Heritage will take on guaranteed deposits of
up to CHF100,000  (US$98,678) as well as assets held at the bank,
part of efforts to boost its presence in emerging markets, Europe
and the Middle East, Reuters says.

It did not disclose the value of the transaction, Reuters notes.

Swiss financial regulator FINMA said in October it had initiated
bankruptcy proceedings against Zurich-based Bank Hottinger, which
was founded in 1786, Reuters relays.

Bank Hottinger & Cie is a Swiss private bank.


BANK CAPITAL: Court Revokes Fund's Liquidation Resolutions
Ukrainian News Agency reports that the Donetsk District
Administrative Court has ruled to revoke the National Bank of
Ukraine and Deposit Guarantee Fund resolutions on the liquidation
of Bank Capital.

On July 20, 2015, the NBU categorized Bank Capital as insolvent,
so the Fund decided to take the bank into provisional
administration and began withdrawing it from the market,
Ukrainian News recounts.

On October 19, the Fund Executive Board extended the provisional
administration in the bank into November 20, Ukrainian News

On October 7, 2015, the Donetsk District Administrative Court
produced a judgment finding as unlawful and reversing the NBU and
Fund resolutions dated July 20, 2015, that declared the bank
insolvent and took it into provisional administration,
Ukrainian News discloses.

On November 13, 2015, the Donetsk Administrative Court of Appeal
upheld the first judgment, Ukrainian News relays.

According to Ukrainian News, The tribunal ordered quashing the
NBU and Fund resolutions for absence of proper proofs of the
breaches established by the regulator following an inspecting
check of the bank.

The Deposit Guarantee Fund took Bank Capital into provisional
administration on July 20, Ukrainian News recounts.

Bank Capital is based n Donetsk.

REGIONAL POWER: Files for Bankruptcy in Kyiv Court
Ukrainian News Agency, citing a court ruling dated Oct. 22,
reports that Regional Power Networks has filed for bankruptcy at
the Economic Court of Kyiv Region.

Regional Power Networks has a principal debt of UAH2.46 billion
to The Energorynok State Company, Ukrainian News discloses.

The tribunal opened the bankruptcy case on Oct. 22, Ukrainian
News relates.

The Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry on Oct. 13 ordered
Regional Power Networks to commence the procedure of its
bankruptcy, Ukrainian News recounts.

On Oct. 6, the enterprise itself petitioned the Ministry about
its own insolvency, Ukrainian News notes.

Regional Power Networks is a state-owned enterprise engaged in
supply of electric energy to coalmines.

UKRAINE: Fitch Raises Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'CCC'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Ukraine's Long-term foreign currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'CCC' from 'RD' (Restricted Default) and
affirmed the Long-term local currency IDR at 'CCC'. The Short-
term foreign-currency IDR is upgraded to 'C' from 'RD'. The
Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'CCC'.

Senior unsecured local-currency debt ratings are affirmed at
'CCC'.  Fitch has assigned 'CCC' ratings to the eurobonds issued
on November 12 and withdrawn ratings on those securities tendered
in the debt exchange.


The upgrade of Ukraine's IDRs reflects the following key rating
drivers and their relative weights:


The country has emerged from default on commercial external debt,
issuing new bonds on Nov. 12, to holders of USD15 billion in
defaulted eurobonds.  The restructuring pushes out maturities to
2019-2027 and reduces the debt stock by USD3 billion (3.4% of
GDP). Public debt sustainability has improved.  Reduced
refinancing needs and a pipeline of official financing give the
public and external finances some breathing room and lower the
risk of a sovereign debt crisis over the short- to medium-term.

The rating level also reflects the following factors:

Although real output has stabilized, with a 0.7% qoq seasonally
adjusted rise in real GDP in 3Q, the economy will still contract
on an annual basis by 11.6% in 2015, led by a 20% fall in
consumption.  Fitch believes a swift recovery is unlikely,
projecting growth of 1% in 2016, compared with the government
assumption of 2.4%.  In 2017, Fitch projects growth could reach

The same factors that led to the deep recession in 2014 and 2015
continue to constrain growth prospects.  Exporters face a
permanent loss of Russian demand (its share of Ukraine's exports
has shrunk to just 12% in 2015 to date from 24% in 2013), while
military conflict in the east has damaged the industrial base and
supply chains.  Geopolitical risks will weigh on investor
confidence. Banks are focused on repairing balance sheets and
both the supply of and demand for credit will be constrained.
Although Ukraine's economy is energy-intensive and will benefit
from lower energy prices, the share of commodities (grain and
steel) in exports means that low commodity prices are a net

The hryvnia has stabilized in a range between UAH22-24 to 1 USD.
The National Bank of Ukraine floated the hryvnia in 1Q and was
able to cut its policy rate to 22% in August.  Energy tariff
rises and currency depreciation led to a burst of inflation but
this is now subsiding.  Annual inflation fell to 46.4% in
October.  Prices declined 2.4% month-on-month, largely driven by
a 13.8% fall in energy prices as the statistics authority
included subsidized energy prices in the index for the first
time.  In May-September, monthly inflation averaged 0.6%, or 7.4%
at an annualized rate.  A further gas tariff adjustment in 2016
will push up prices again but Fitch believes that the National
Bank's 12% inflation target for 2016 is within reach, provided
further exchange rate instability is avoided.

The government led by Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk has shown
commitment to an ambitious package of reforms agreed with the IMF
in return for USD17.5 billion in financing under a three-year
Extended Fund Facility (EFF), plus other official financing.
Reforms include cleaning up the commercial banking system,
introducing a free float of the currency, and removing fiscally
costly distortions in the domestic gas market.  The National Bank
of Ukraine (NBU) has been granted a new mandate and will pursue

Government indebtedness is high, exceeding 80% of GDP, including
sovereign and sovereign- guaranteed debt.  Fitch expects the
government debt ratio to fall from 2016, but there is uncertainty
over Ukraine's ability to generate the combination of GDP growth
and primary fiscal surpluses that would reduce the debt/GDP ratio
(including sovereign and sovereign-guaranteed debt) to the
government's target of 71% of GDP by 2020.

The government has kept a tight rein on public spending in 2015,
freezing public sector wages and social benefits in nominal terms
despite high inflation, and imposing wide-ranging cuts to make
room for higher defense spending.  Revenues have been boosted in
2015 by one-off sources: exceptional transfers of NBU profits to
the budget (UAH61.8 bil. or 3.3% of GDP), and a temporary import
surcharge (2.2% of GDP).  The authorities will face a challenge
in shrinking the consolidated budget deficit (including losses at
Naftogaz) in 2016.  However, without improvement in tax
compliance, a proposed tax reform may do little to boost revenue.

Governance indicators are weak.  The conflict in parts of two
eastern provinces, Donetsk and Lugansk, has subsided although it
could flare up again.  Russia and Ukraine agreed in October to
continue to work to implement the Minsk II peace accords beyond
the previous deadline of December 2015.  This process should
contain hostilities even if the agreement is not fully
implemented.  Ukraine has increased defence spending to 5% of

The pro-reform ruling coalition continues to enjoy a majority in
the Rada, but the government's popularity has declined and
passing reforms is likely to remain difficult.  This has already
led to delays to measures required to pass the second review of
the IMF program due in Sept. 2015, and decentralization reforms
related to Minsk II.  One party left the coalition in September.
Fitch believes that the result of local elections held on Oct.
25, 2015, reduces the risk of early elections.  Rival parties
failed to make decisive gains and will not have been emboldened
to try to overturn the existing majority.

The banking system is fragile in the wake of the severe recession
and currency depreciation and the conflict in the east of
Ukraine. Non-performing loans, on a broad definition, as
published by the IMF, are 44% of total loans, and provisions are
68% of total NPLs. On aggregate, the system lost UAH52bn in 9M15,
or 35% of bank equity at the start of 2015.  Banks have
restructured external debts.  The NBU has liquidated 58 banks
since 2014, reducing the number of banks to 122.  Bank
recapitalization and deposit insurance costs weigh on public

Steep exchange rate depreciation and a collapse in trade and
domestic demand have led the current account back to balance, and
Fitch expects a current account deficit of below 1% of GDP in
2015.  Private sector capital flows have been negative as foreign
direct investment (except that related to recapitalization of
foreign-owned banks) is muted and corporates make net repayments
on (or default on) external debt.  These outflows have been more
than balanced by large-scale inflows of official financing.
External liquidity measures are weak but have improved.  Gross
reserves have increased but are expected to remain low at USD15bn
at end-2015 (end-October 2015: USD13 billion).  Capital controls
remain in place to curb foreign exchange demand but will be
progressively lifted.


These factors could individually or collectively lead to positive
rating action:

   -- Formal decision by the IMF to change its policy on 'lending
      into arrears' and willingness to disburse the tranche
      linked to the delayed second review of the EFF program.

These factors could individually or collectively lead to negative
rating action:

   -- A change in the nature and status of the USD3 bil. bond
      maturing on Dec. 20.

   -- Substantial delays to disbursements by the IMF and other
      official creditors that lead to a deterioration in
      confidence and macro stability.

   -- External or political/geopolitical shock.


Fitch assumes that the conflict in eastern Ukraine does not

Fitch assumes that non-payment of the USD3bn bond maturing on
Dec. 20, 2015, which is held by Russia's National Wealth Fund,
would not constitute a default under Fitch's Sovereign rating
criteria.  Fitch also assumes that any legal action resulting
from non-payment of this debt does not hinder the servicing of
newly issued external debt.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

COOPER GAY: Moody's Continues to Review 'B3' CFR for Downgrade
Moody's Investors Service continues to review for downgrade the
ratings of Cooper Gay Swett & Crawford Ltd. (CGSC, corporate
family rating B3, probability of default rating B3-PD) following
the company's announcement that it is pursuing a sale of CGSC
North America, its strongest business unit. The rating review
reflects CGSC's weak profitability, financial leverage and
interest coverage metrics, along with uncertainty about the
timing and ultimate proceeds of the CGSC North America sale. The
B2 rating on CGSC's revolving credit facility and first-lien term
loan and the Caa2 rating on its second-lien term loan also remain
on review for downgrade.

CGSC plans to use proceeds from selling CGSC North America to
repay its credit facilities. Moody's believes a favorable sale
would allow CGSC to repay most or all of its facilities. If the
facilities were fully repaid and terminated, the rating agency
would withdraw the company's ratings.


The ongoing review will focus on CGSC's divestiture process,
including the operating performance of the North American
business, market conditions in property & casualty specialty
lines and the availability of funding for potential buyers. The
rating agency will also consider CGSC's progress on expense
reduction and other strategic initiatives to enhance

CGSC's debt-to-EBITDA ratio remained above 10x for the 12 months
through June 2015 (on a Moody's adjusted basis) while (EBITDA -
capex) interest coverage fell below 1x. The rating review will
consider the company's ability to repay debt or otherwise improve
these metrics. As of September 30, 2015, the company had
sufficient resources to meet near-term obligations, with cash and
equivalents of US$36 million and no borrowings under its
revolving credit facility.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of CGSC's ratings include:
(i) debt-to-EBITDA ratio remaining above 8x on a sustained basis,
(ii) (EBITDA-capex) coverage of interest remaining below 1.2x,
and/or (iii) free-cash-flow-to-debt ratio consistently below 2%.

Conversely, the ratings could be confirmed in the event of: (i)
strategic actions to restore revenue and EBITDA growth, (ii)
debt-to-EBITDA ratio trending down toward 8x or below, (iii)
(EBITDA-capex) coverage of interest of exceeding 1.2x, and/or
(iv) free-cash-flow-to-debt ratio consistently exceeding 2%.

CGSC's revolving credit facility is available to CGSC and certain
designated subsidiaries, including CGSC of Delaware Holdings
Corporation (CGSC DE), and the group's term loans were issued by
CGSC DE. The facilities are guaranteed by all direct and indirect
material subsidiaries of CGSC, and facility borrowings by CGSC DE
and other designated subsidiaries are also guaranteed by CGSC. In
addition, the facilities are secured by substantially all assets
of CGSC, CGSC DE and US guarantors, including the capital stock
of material subsidiaries.

Moody's is reviewing for downgrade the following ratings (and
loss given default (LGD) assessments):

CGSC corporate family rating B3;

CGSC probability of default rating B3-PD;

CGSC and CGSC DE US$75 million revolving credit facility expiring
in April 2018 rated B2 (LGD3);

CGSC DE US$305 million first-lien term loan due in April 2020
rated B2 (LGD3);

CGSC DE US$120 million second-lien term loan due in October 2020
rated Caa2 (LGD5).

Based in London, England, CGSC is an independent wholesale,
underwriting management and reinsurance broker group, placing
over US$5 billion of premiums annually for clients in London, US
and international insurance markets. For the 12 months through
September 2015, the company generated revenue of US$354 million.

HBOS PLC: Former Top Executives May Face Ban Over 2008 Collapse
Tim Wallace at The Telegraph reports that HBOS's top bosses
including former chairman Lord Stevenson and ex-chief executives
Andy Hornby and James Crosby could be banned from the finance
industry or even from directing any company, as a pair of damning
reports found their failures ran the bank into the ground.

The bank collapsed in 2008 and was bought by Lloyds, but the
scale of its bad loans was such that the government had to step
in to bail out the combined pair at a cost of GBP20.5 billion,
The Telegraph recounts.

But only one executive, former corporate bank boss Peter
Cummings, was punished by regulators, The Telegraph notes.  He
was fined GBP500,000 and banned from senior jobs in financial
services, The Telegraph discloses.

The main report, from the Prudential Regulation Authority and the
Financial Conduct Authority, the FSA's successors, blames the
bank's executives for its failure, as well as being critical of
the FSA, The Telegraph relays.

But it is a parallel report, from Andrew Green QC, which is
perhaps the most damning, suggesting the two regulators should
consider banning as many as 10 former HBOS executives from the
City, according to The Telegraph.

Mr. Hornby in particular should be re-investigated by the
authorities, the report found, alongside the entire senior
management team, The Telegraph says.

Mr. Green, as cited by The Telegraph, said too much time has
elapsed for regulators to fine those responsible, though they
could still be banned from the industry.

In addition, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
could bar them from being a director in any company, The
Telegraph states.  The Insolvency Service, which operates under
the Department, looked into the case in 2013 but decided there
was too little evidence to act -- a position which may be changed
by the latest report, The Telegraph recounts.

The study from the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct
Authority also found then-regulator the Financial Services
Authority failed to identify the risks that the bank was running,
and that when it did spot problems, it failed to act, The
Telegraph discloses.

According to The Telegraph, the joint PRA/FCA report said HBOS
collapsed due to a lack of liquidity, with the failure explained
by a number of reasons including:

   -- the board failed to instill a culture within the firm that
balanced risk and return appropriately, and lacked sufficient
experience and knowledge of banking;

   -- a flawed and unbalanced strategy and a business model with
inherent vulnerabilities arising from an excessive focus on
market share, asset growth and short-term profitability;

   -- the firm's executive management pursued rapid and
uncontrolled growth of the Group's balance sheet, and led to an
over-exposure to highly cyclical commercial real estate (CRE) at
the peak of the economic cycle;

   -- a failure by the Board and control functions to challenge
effectively executive management in pursuing this course or to
ensure adequate mitigating actions;

   -- and the fact that HBOS's underlying balance sheet
weaknesses made the Group extremely vulnerable to market shocks
and ultimately failure as the crisis of the financial system

The authorities have asked accounting regulator the Financial
Reporting Council to investigate HBOS' auditor KPMG, The
Telegraph discloses.

To date the FRC has declined, awaiting the publication of this
report, reiterating that stance in a statement on Nov. 19,
following another review of its own, The Telegraph notes.

HBOS plc is a banking and insurance company in the United
Kingdom, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Lloyds Banking Group
having been taken over in January 2009.  It is the holding
company for Bank of Scotland plc, which operates the Bank of
Scotland and Halifax brands in the UK, as well as HBOS Australia
and HBOS Insurance & Investment Group Limited, the group's
insurance division.  The group became part of Lloyds Banking
Group through a takeover by Lloyds TSB January 19, 2009.

LIBERTY GLOBAL: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Ba3 Corporate Family
Rating and the Ba3-PD Probability of Default ratings of Liberty
Global plc. The rating outlook is stable.

The affirmation follows Liberty Global and Cable & Wireless
Communications plc's announcement of a recommended offer (the
"Offer") by Liberty Global for all outstanding and to be issued
shares of Cable & Wireless. Pursuant to the Offer, Liberty Global
would acquire Cable & Wireless for shares of Liberty Global in a
scheme of arrangement. Liberty Global will offer a maximum of
31.7 million of its Class A shares, 77.5 million of its Class C
shares, 3.6 million of Class A shares of the tracking stock for
its operations in Latin America and the Caribbean (the "LiLAC
Group), 8.9 million of LiLAC Class C shares as well as a special
dividend of USD 201 million. The Offer has been recommended by
Cable & Wireless' supervisory board, but is subject to approval
by both Cable & Wireless' and Liberty Global's shareholders.

The potential transaction values Cable & Wireless' equity at
GBP3.5 billion (USD5.3 billion) and attributes an enterprise
value of around USD8.2 billion to it, including the assumption of
USD2.7 billion of proportionate net debt of Cable & Wireless. The
enterprise value represents a multiple of 12.3x of Cable &
Wireless' proportionate EBITDA for the last-twelve-months period
to September 30, 2015 (10.7x including unrealized synergies from
Cable & Wireless acquisition of Columbus International Inc.
(Columbus)). The transaction, which is also subject to certain
regulatory approvals and to court approval of the scheme of
arrangement is expected to close during the second quarter of
2016. Cable & Wireless is expected to become part of the LiLAC
Group within Liberty Global.

Liberty Global intends to leave Cable & Wireless' existing
capital structure largely intact. Limited incremental debt
(around USD400 million) will be raised to fund the special
dividend and deal costs. The affirmation assumes that the
transaction is concluded as currently laid out. Any material
changes could cause Moody's to revisit Liberty Global's ratings.
Ratings of Liberty Global's existing rated subsidiaries are not
affected by this deal.


The ratings affirmation at Ba3 CFR and a stable outlook
acknowledge the leverage-neutral funding of the transaction and
recognize Liberty Global's solid track record in integrating
acquisitions and achieving planned synergies. However, Liberty
Global's leverage will remain at the upper end of Moody's
tolerance for the Ba3 rating pro forma for the Cable & Wireless
acquisition with a Moody's adjusted Debt/EBITDA ratio close to

Moody's notes that the acquisition will significantly strengthen
the LiLAC Group within Liberty Global and acknowledges Cable &
Wireless' sound growth prospects. In addition there should be
some incremental synergy benefits from the transaction. However,
synergies have yet to be quantified and might be limited by the
lack of significant overlap between Liberty Global's and Cable &
Wireless' existing activities. The agency also believes that the
Cable & Wireless acquisition will somewhat weaken Liberty
Global's business profile. Cable & Wireless is not a cable
company, but a traditional telecoms operator with still mobile
centric operations (39% of 2014/15 revenue pro forma for the
recent acquisition of Columbus International Inc. (Columbus))
that are geographically dispersed over a large number of mainly
Caribbean countries and which are highly dependent on tourism
from the US and indirectly the US economy. While the Columbus
acquisition will accelerate Cable & Wireless' transition to an
integrated quadruple play operator this process will not be
completed for some time and Cable & Wireless' profit margins
(before expected synergies from the Columbus acquisition) are
currently still visibly below Liberty Global's group margins.

Notwithstanding its large scale M&A activity, Liberty Global is
also continuing an aggressive share repurchase program. During
the first nine months of 2015 the company repurchased USD1.4
billion worth of its own shares and remains committed to
repurchase a further USD2.5 billion under its current program by
the end of 2016. Moody's expects these share repurchases to
absorb a substantial portion of the company's free cash flow
generation. As a consequence, the agency does not expect any
material reduction in absolute debt amounts in the near term and
any de-leveraging will therefore largely be a function of EBITDA

In addition, Moody's expects Liberty Global to remain an
opportunistic acquirer of capital properties. While the
opportunities for large scale acquisitions in Liberty Global's
core European cable activities are now limited, the agency would
not rule out Liberty Global's participation in further convergent
deals such as its proposed acquisition, through its Telenet NV
(B1 stable) subsidiary, of Belgian mobile operator BASE Company
(unrated). Liberty Global has also continued to make exploratory
investments in broadcasting and programming and has re-iterated
its interest in further acquisitions in Latin America and the

Liberty Global's Ba3 CFR remains supported by (i) the company's
good geographic diversification; (ii) its substantial scale which
translates into significant purchasing advantages and the ability
to implement best practice across diverse operations, (iii) a
track record of successful acquisition integration and (iv) a
long-established financial policy of managing debt within a
corridor of 4x-5x Gross Debt/Operating Cash Flow (as defined by
Liberty Global).

Liberty Global's results for the nine months to September 30,
2015 remained solid overall with 3.3% revenue growth and 3.0% OCF
growth (both as rebased by the company). However, the solid
overall performance balances out continued lackluster performance
in the CEE markets (1.2% rebased revenue growth and rebased OCF
decline of 3.9% for the first nine months of 2015) and continued
challenging conditions in the highly competitive Dutch market
where the newly combined Ziggo Group Holding B.V. unit (Ba3,
stable; -1.2%/-3.2%) lost market share to KPN on the one hand,
and continued strong growth in Germany (+5.9%/+5.8%) and a solid
performance in the UK/Ireland (+3.5%/+6%) on the other.

Moody's anticipates that nine months revenue and profit trends
will broadly continue for the remainder of 2015 and strengthen
somewhat into 2016, driven by the company's largely sustainable
speed advantage in broadband, competitive video products and
increased revenue from mobile and B2B activities. New build
activities and some market tolerance for price increases will
also contribute. Liberty Global has reconfirmed full year 2015
guidance of OCF growth in the mid-single digits.


Moody's regards Liberty Global's liquidity provision as
sufficient for its current requirements. As of September 30 2015,
the company reported cash of USD1.1 billion, of which a third was
at the level of the parent company and at unrestricted
subsidiaries (including USD99 million attributable to LiLAC). In
addition, available borrowing capacity under the various credit
facilities within the group totaled USD4 billion as of the same
date, of which USD3.6 billion were available after taking into
account September 2015 covenant compliance. Liberty Global and
its subsidiaries have limited near-term maturities that are
material relative to the size of the group. The current portion
of Liberty Global debt, USD1.8 billion includes outstanding
principal amounts under subsidiaries' revolving credit
facilities, but consists in the main of short term vendor finance
falling due. Out of Liberty Global's total debt amount of USD45.7
billion as of September 30, 2015, around 91% fall due after 2020.
Moody's notes that Liberty Global remains dependent on timely
distributions from its operating groups to fund distributions and
corporate activity at the parent level and to service debt raised
against its stakes in ITV and Sumitomo. Distribution capacity at
the company's subsidiary groups is subject to restricted payment
and covenant tests.


Following the announcement of the Cable & Wireless acquisition,
Liberty Global's ratings remain relatively weakly positioned in
the Ba3 category. Downgrade pressure could develop, if : (i)
Liberty Global's acquisition activity and stock repurchase
activity result in leverage as measured by the company's
Debt/EBITDA ratio exceeding a ratio of 5.5x on a sustained basis;
(ii) the company experiences a marked deterioration in its
operating performance; or (iii) Liberty Global generates negative
free cash flow (after capex and dividends) on a sustained basis.


Moody's does not expect any upgrade pressure in the near term.
Over time, continued strong operating performance and achieving a
consolidated leverage ratio (Debt/EBITDA ratio as defined by
Moody's) sustained well below 4.5x together with a FCF/Debt ratio
approaching double digits could result in positive pressure on
the ratings.

Liberty Global plc, headquartered in London, England is a large,
internationally operating cable operator with revenue of around
USD18.2 billion on a September 30 2015 nine-months-annualized


* BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History
Posted on January 29, 2015 by tope_editor
Author: Alfred L. Malabre, Jr.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 256 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry
Order your personal copy today at

Alfred Malabre's personal perspective on the U.S. economy over
the past four decades is firmly grounded in his experience and
knowledge. Economics Editor of The Wall Street Journal from 1969
to 1993 and author of its weekly "Outlook" column, Malabre was
in a singular position to follow the U.S. economy in recent
decades, have access to the major academic and political figures
responsible for economic affairs, and get behind the crucial
economic stories of the day. He brings to this critical overview
of the economy both a lively, often provocative, commentary on
the picture of the turns of the economy. To this he adds sharp
analysis and cogent explanation. In general, Malabre does not put
much stock in economists. "In sum, the profession's record in the
half century since Keynes and White sat down at Bretton Woods
[after World War II] provokes dismay." Following this sour note,
he refers to the belief of a noted fellow economist that the
Nobel Prize in this field should be discontinued. In doing so, he
also points out that the Nobel for economics was not one
originally endowed by Alfred Nobel, but was one added at a later
date funded by the central bank of Sweden apparently in an effort
to give the profession of economists the prestige and notice of
medicine, science, literature and other Nobel categories.

Malabre's view of economists is widespread, although rarely
expressed in economic circles. It derives from the plain fact
that modern economists, even hugely influential ones such as John
Meynard Keynes, are wrong as many times as they are right. Their
economic theories have proved incomplete or shortsighted, if not
basically wrong-headed. For example, Malabre thinks of the
leading economist Milton Friedman and his "monetarist
colleagues" as "super salespeople, successfully
economic medicine that promised far more than it could deliver"
from about the 1960s through the Reagan years of the 1980s. But
the author not only cites how the economy has again and again
disproved the theories and exposed the irrelevance of wrong-
headedness of the policy recommendations of the most influential
economists of the day. Malabre also lays out abundant economic
data and describes contemporary marketplace and social activities
to show how the economy performs almost independently of the best
analyses and ideas of economists.

Malabre does not engage in his critiques of noted economists and
prevailing economic ideas of recent decades as an end in itself.
What emerges in all of his consistent, clear-eyed, unideological
analysis and commentary is his own broad, seasoned view of
economics-namely, the predominance of the business cycle. He
compares this with human nature, which is after all the substance
of economics often overlooked by professional and academic
economists with their focus on monetary policy, exchange rates,
inflation, and such. "The business cycle, like human nature, is
here to stay" is the lesson Malabre aims to impart to readers
interested in understanding the fundamental, abiding nature of
economics. In Lost Prophets, in language that is accessible and
jargon-free, this author, who has observed, written about, and
explained economics from all angles for several decades,
persuasively makes this point.

In addition to holding a top position at The Wall Street Journal,
Malabre is also the author of the books, Understanding the New
Economy and Beyond Our Means, which received the George S. Eccles
Prize from the Columbia Business School as the best economics
book of 1987.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *