TCREUR_Public/151215.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, December 15, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 247

                            Headlines

A Z E R B A I J A N

AZERBAIJAN RAILWAYS: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB-'


B U L G A R I A

BULGARIA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Ratings, Outlook Stable


F R A N C E

DRY MIX: Moody's Raises Corp. Family Rating to B1, Outlook Stable


G E R M A N Y

FRANZ HANIEL: Asset Sales Improve Leverage, Moody's Says
PLATINUM GMBH: Linceus Acquires Business, 42 Jobs Saved


G R E E C E

NAT'L BANK OF GREECE: S&P Alters Counterparty Credit Rating to SD


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO VI: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Notes
BANK OF IRELAND: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Longterm Deposit Ratings
NEWHAVEN II CLO: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes


K A Z A K H S T A N

KAZAKHSTAN ENGINEERING: Moody's Lowers CFR to Ba3, Outlook Neg.


L U X E M B O U R G

APERAM SA: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB+', Outlook Stable
ARMACELL INTERNATIONAL: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative


N E T H E R L A N D S

FAB CBO 2003-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to CCC-
HARBORMASTER CLO 7: Fitch Hikes Class B2 Notes' Rating to B+sf


N O R W A Y

DOLPHIN GROUP: Files for Bankruptcy After Crude Prices Plunge


R U S S I A

ALTAI REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
BALTIC LEASING: Fitch Hikes Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB-'
CB MAXIMUM: Bank of Russia Uncovers Accounting Discrepancies
CB RENAISSANCE: Placed Under Provisional Administration
CBD BANK: Placed Under Provisional Administration

DEAL-BANK LLC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
UNIFIN: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Rating to B3.ru
VNESHPROMBANK: Moody's Cuts Sr. Debt Ratings to B3, Outlook Neg.
VODOKANAL: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' CCRs, Outlook Negative


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: Option to Sell Abengoa Yield Stake Put on Hold
ABENGOA SA: Moody's Lowers PDR to Caa3, Outlook Negative
BBVA-10 PYME: DBRS Assigns CCC Rating to Series B Notes
ISOLUX CORSAN: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-', Outlook Negative
SANTANDER RMBS 5: DBRS Assigns C(sf) Rating to Series C Notes


U K R A I N E

UKRAINE: S&P Affirms 'B-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

HBOS PLC: Former Chief Executives Responsible for Collapse
INDUS ECLIPSE 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Ratings on 3 Notes
KCA DEUTAG: Moody's Affirms B3 CFR & Changes Outlook to Negative
REDTOP ACQUISITIONS: Moody's Corrects Dec. 3 Ratings Release
RMAC 2005-NS1: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class B1 Debt

SK PERFORMANCE: Enters Liquidation, Vehicles Seized
TIG FINCO: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
VIRIDIAN GROUP: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT Issuer Default Rating


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A Z E R B A I J A N
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AZERBAIJAN RAILWAYS: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has lowered its
long-term corporate credit rating on state-owned railway operator
Azerbaijan Railways CJSC (ADY) to 'BB-' from 'BB+' and placed the
rating on CreditWatch with negative implications.

This reflects S&P's understanding that ADY was three business days
late on a payment on one of its commercial loans in November due
to a delay in approval of another loan by the Ministry of Finance,
aimed at covering its liquidity gap.  As a result, S&P considers
that there is a lack of evidence that the Republic of Azerbaijan
has processes and procedures in place to enable effective
governance, monitoring, and control of ADY.  Reflecting S&P's
ongoing concerns regarding a lack of transparency in communication
and provision of information from ADY, S&P is revising downward
the stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to 'b-' and S&P now assess
ADY's liquidity as "less than adequate".

S&P understands that some of the bureaucratic procedures requiring
ADY to obtain permission from the government to enter a new loan
agreement took longer than usual due to a strategic governmental
review that the company is currently undergoing.  S&P understands
that the government is now working on a new regulation and
strategy for the railways, and that it has recently transferred
responsibility for ADY from the Ministry of Transportation to the
Cabinet of Ministers.

As a result of the delayed payment, S&P has revised downward its
assessment of the link between ADY and the government to "strong"
from "very strong", as S&P no longer have sufficient evidence that
processes and procedures are in place to enable effective
governance, monitoring, and control over the GRE.  S&P has
consequently lowered its assessment that the government would
provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to ADY to
"high" from "very high".  S&P continues to assess ADY's role to
the government as "very important".

S&P has also revised its assessment of ADY's SACP to 'b-' from
'bb-' reflecting a "less than adequate" liquidity.  S&P's
assessment of ADY's management and governance remains "weak"
reflecting S&P's ongoing concerns in relation to the transparency
in communication and provision of timely information from ADY.

The negative CreditWatch placement reflects that S&P could lower
the rating by two notches to 'B' if the transfer of ADY to the
Cabinet of Ministers does not result in improved governmental
oversight.  This could lead S&P to lower its assessment of the
government's link to ADY and to revise the likelihood of
extraordinary support to "moderately high" from "high", all else
being equal.

The CreditWatch placement also reflects the possibility that S&P
could lower the ratings by multiple notches if the likelihood of a
non-payment increases, even if driven by administrative reasons
rather than by ADY's capacity to service its debt.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch within the next 90 days,
during which time it expects to gain a clearer view of the
government's administrative capacity to provide support to ADY
following its expected transfer to the Cabinet of Ministers.  S&P
would also seek to understand the company's new strategy,
financial policy, and liquidity position.




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B U L G A R I A
===============


BULGARIA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Ratings, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Republic of Bulgaria.  The outlook is stable.

RATIONALE

The ratings on Bulgaria are constrained by its relatively low
income levels, with GDP per capita estimated at US$6,800 in 2015;
weak institutional settings; the limited flexibility of monetary
authorities in light of the country's currency board regime; and
the high proportion of loans and deposits denominated in euros
(i.e. high eurozation), which further restrict the effective
transmission of monetary policy.

The ratings are supported by the government's moderate net debt
position, estimated at nearly 20% of 2015 GDP, which affords
Bulgaria some fiscal space to respond to external and domestic
shocks, should they arise.  S&P notes, however, that this space
has been eroded to some extent by the sharp increase in government
debt following support extended to the banking sector last year.

The ratings also benefit from Bulgaria's moderately leveraged
external balance sheet following half a decade of external
deleveraging, led primarily by the financial sector.  However,
while this has led to a marked reduction in external indebtedness,
S&P observes that the process has had resonance on economic growth
through a contraction in bank lending, although the latter is in
part also fueled by poor demand for credit amid ongoing private
sector deleveraging.

The Bulgarian economy is currently benefitting from a period of
relative political calm.  The current coalition government, the
fifth since early 2013, was formed after the parliamentary
elections in late 2014 and was immediately tasked with the
resolution of the vestiges of the banking sector turbulence in the
summer of 2014.  To this end, the state extended a loan to the
Deposit Guarantee Fund, which allowed reimbursement of the
guaranteed deposits of the failed Corporate Commercial Bank (KTB),
nearly six months after its failure.  The government has made some
progress in passing parametric pension reform earlier this year
through an increase in the retirement age and pension
contributions. However, movement from the private pension pillar
to the government-managed first pillar, while likely to provide a
short-term boost to government finances through increased
contributions, could potentially undermine the positive effects of
pension reforms in the longer run by increasing future liabilities
to the state.  Being a minority coalition, the government relies
on support from parties outside the coalition with differing
ideologies, and this represents a source of potential instability,
which in turn could have implications for the direction of policy-
making and the reform agenda.

In the absence of the political uncertainty that has characterized
recent years and in conjunction with lower energy prices, a
reduction in unemployment, and acceleration in the absorption of
EU funds, domestic demand has continued to strengthen.  Demand for
Bulgarian exports has also been strong, with export volumes
increasing by nearly 8% in the first three quarters of 2015.
These factors have contributed to real GDP growth of 3% year on
year in the first nine months of the year.  S&P has accordingly
revised up its estimate of real GDP growth to 3% in 2015, against
its previous estimate of 1.5%.

S&P believes the prospects for 2016-2018 are somewhat weaker,
however.  With the beginning of a new EU budget cycle, there will
be a lag before new public investment projects financed by EU
structural and cohesion funds can resume momentum.  These funds
have been an important source for financing growth in 2015 because
policymakers have been keen to absorb the maximum possible amount
from the available envelope.  Indeed Bulgaria's absorption rate
has increased to over 90% as of November 2015 from under 70% a
year ago.

However, the strength of the recovery, independent of elevated
government spending, is still uncertain, as domestic demand has
struggled to gain momentum in the years following the 2008-2009
global financial crisis.  Although S&P estimates that Bulgarian
lev (BGN)-denominated nominal GDP will be nearly 20% higher than
its 2008 peak, S&P expects domestic demand will only exceed its
2008 level in 2016.

An important reason for Bulgaria's weak recovery is that the
drying up, or even reversal, of foreign inflows into the banking,
construction, and property sectors -- which propelled growth in
the years leading up to the crisis -- has not been fully offset by
foreign inflows into other sectors, such as tradeables.  As a
result, positive labor market developments have taken a long time
to materialize.  S&P notes a recent reduction in the unemployment
rate to 9.9% in the second quarter of 2015 (compared with 11.4% in
2014); however, it is unlikely that it will revert to the
precrisis low of 5.6% in the absence of a growth model that will
pick up the slack in the wake of the crisis.  Bulgaria is also
facing a structural drag from demographic challenges.  Its
population has shrunk by nearly 15% over the past two decades,
reflecting an aging society and net emigration.

Eurostat revised its assessment of Bulgaria's general government
deficit upward to 5.8% in 2014 from 2.8% to account for the
difference between the Deposit Insurance Fund's (DIF) repayment of
guaranteed deposits and expected liquidation proceeds from KTB.
S&P do not include the outstanding loans to First Investment Bank
or the DIF in government assets, nor do S&P accounts for any
repayments from either in our forecast of the general government
debt trajectory through 2015-2018.

"We expect the general government deficit to narrow to 2.8% of GDP
in 2015 on an accrual basis.  Thereafter, we expect the fiscal
deficit to gradually narrow to 2% of GDP in 2018.  Following state
support of the banking sector, general government debt rose by
nine percentage points to 27% of GDP in 2014.  We expect that the
fiscal deficit will remain debt financed over the forecast horizon
through 2018, with gross general government debt rising further to
33% by the end of 2018.  General government debt, net of liquid
assets, will amount to 19% of GDP in 2015and 25% in 2018.  We
include government deposits with commercial banks and the
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) in our assessment of government
liquid assets.  These are inclusive of the deposit assets of the
Fiscal Reserve Account," S&P noted.

Contingent liabilities that could potentially materialize on the
government's balance sheet include those from the energy sector.
The liabilities of the sector total BGN7.7 billion (about
EUR4 billion; 8% of 2015 GDP), while its highest net losses arise
from the Natsionalna Elektricheska Kompania (NEK; B/Negative/--),
estimated by the Ministry of Finance at 0.3% of GDP for 2015.

Another source for contingent liabilities is the banking sector.
Data from the BNB indicate that the system is well capitalized,
with an average capital adequacy ratio of 22% in September 2015.
The results of the asset quality review (AQR) the authorities plan
to conduct in 2016 could, however, potentially expose further
vulnerabilities.  To this end, the 2016 borrowing plan includes a
buffer of BGN2 billion (2% of GDP).  As per its charter and under
the currency board regime under which it operates, the BNB's
ability to act as a lender of last resort is limited.  It can
provide liquidity support tothe banking system only to the extent
that its reserves exceed its monetary liabilities.  Even then,
support can occur only under certain conditions and for short
periods against liquid collateral.

As of Sept. 30, 2015, the BNB's reserves covered monetary
liabilities by 1.6x.

With the adoption of the EU Banking Resolution and Recovery
Directive (BRRD) into Bulgarian law, the failure of a bank will
necessitate a bail-in of shareholders, creditors, and then a
resolution fund.  Only after exhausting these options would
budgetary support be needed.  In Bulgaria, banks' contributions to
the resolution fund have not yet begun.  Therefore, if the results
of the AQR indicate a capital shortfall of a systemically
important bank, there is still a likelihood that state support may
be needed.

The banking sector is also vulnerable to external factors, given
the large presence of Greek subsidiaries, which together account
for about one-fifth of the sector's assets.  The BNB has taken
steps to shore up the liquidity of these subsidiaries, such as
mandating higher deposits with the BNB, increasing the proportion
of liquid assets held, and reducing exposure to parent banks.
While formally not a member of the eurozone, a line of support
from the European Central Bank is available to the BNB in relation
to any confidence losses arising at Greek-owned subsidiaries.
Details of this support, such as how it can be obtained or whether
collateral would be needed, have not been released.

Policy makers' commitment to the currency board remains strong.
This is evident in their track record of small fiscal surpluses or
low deficits, and moderate general government indebtedness.  The
currency board was instated in 1997 in the wake of a banking
crisis amid hyperinflationary conditions, which were fueled by
central bank financing of budget deficits.  The board successfully
lowered price inflation and prevented further episodes of
hyperinflation.  However, the regime restricts policy response.
Apart from limiting the BNB's ability to act as a lender of last
resort, it restricts control over money creation.  The board also
does not allow the exchange rate to react in response to domestic
or external conditions.  Indeed, Bulgaria's adjustment following
the 2008-2009 global financial crisis has come from downward wage
effects, labor shedding, and an internal devaluation.

The low inflationary environment persisting in the eurozone has
also been reflected in Bulgaria through the currency board.
Indeed, in all of Europe, price deflation has been the most marked
in Bulgaria after Greece--aggravated until recently by weak demand
and domestic cuts in administered prices, particularly energy.
While annual average deflation came in at 1.2% in October, core
inflation (i.e., inflation adjusted for food, energy, alcohol, and
tobacco) moved into positive territory for the first time since
May 2013.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on Bulgaria reflects the balance between the
economic and fiscal risks S&P sees from potential vulnerabilities
in the financial sector against the fiscal space arising from
still-low general government debt.

S&P could lower the ratings if the domestic financial system
requires further substantial government support, or if outflows on
the financial account result in pressures on the balance of
payments.

S&P could consider an upgrade if Bulgaria effectively addresses
governance issues, thereby boosting its growth potential and
attracting higher foreign direct investment to the tradeables
sector; or if the economy expands faster than S&P anticipates,
such that general government finances consolidate more rapidly.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that all key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

                                        Rating        Rating
                                        To            From
Bulgaria (Republic of)
Sovereign credit rating
Foreign and Local Currency        BB+/Stable/B   BB+/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BBB+          BBB+
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency            BB+           BB+
Short-Term Debt
  Foreign and Local Currency            B             B



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F R A N C E
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DRY MIX: Moody's Raises Corp. Family Rating to B1, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded to B1 from B2 the corporate
family rating and to Ba3-PD from B1-PD the probability of default
rating (PDR) of Dry Mix Solutions Investissements S.A.S., the
intermediate holding company of France-based dry mix solutions
specialist Parex Group.  Concurrently, Moody's upgraded to B1
(LGD5) from B2 (LGD5) the rating on the group's seven-year EUR550
million senior secured floating rate notes (due June 2021).

"The upgrade recognizes the group's very strong financial results
for the first three quarters of 2015 which were particularly
driven by sustained buoyant demand in its key emerging markets,
most notably China.  Beyond a considerable 16.5% year-over-year
increase in group revenue, Parex's profitability improved markedly
with EBITDA margins as adjusted by Moody's climbing to around 17%
in the 12 months through September 2015 from 15% in fiscal year
2014", says Goetz Grossmann, Moody's lead analyst for Parex.
"Moreover, the upgrade takes into account Parex's improved
leverage which has decreased to around 4.1x debt/EBITDA in the 12
months ended September 2015 from 5.1x in 2014 and which positions
Parex solidly in the B1 rating category", adds Mr. Grossmann.

Upgrades:

Issuer: Dry Mix Solutions Investissements S.A.S.

  Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to Ba3-PD from B1-PD

  Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to B1 from B2

  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture (Local Currency) Jun 15,
   2021, Upgraded to B1 from B2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Dry Mix Solutions Investissements S.A.S.

  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action was prompted by Parex's very solid and
substantially improving operating performance for the year-to-date
(ytd) period ended Sept. 30, 2015.  This was predominantly owing
to continued strong demand in the group's emerging markets where
it derived EUR369 million of sales during the first three quarters
of 2015, a sharp 28% increase year-over-year (yoy) and accounting
for 54% of the group's total sales.  In particular, China
(accounting for 37% of emerging market sales) contributed the
lion's share to this growth, thanks to the ongoing healthy switch
of local tile setters from on-site mixed mortars to industrial dry
mix solutions.  Likewise, emerging markets accounted for the
majority (c.59%) of total EBITDA in the first nine months of 2015
which reached EUR117 million compared to EUR91.5 million in the
prior year (+27.9%).  Nevertheless, sales and EBITDA ytd have also
been positively impacted by sizeable currency effects amounting to
EUR39 million of sales and EUR6 million of EBITDA.  These
(translational) effects were attributable to a strengthening of
several key foreign currencies against the euro (about 71% of
group sales are invoiced in currencies other than the euro),
including the US dollar, Chinese renminbi or Argentinean peso.
Moody's also recognizes that Parex was able to post increasing
sales (+5.3%, including 3.6% currency translation effects) and
EBITDA (+10.5%) in its mature markets during Q3-15 ytd.  This
mainly pertained to a robust US residential market and recovering
new housing activity in Australia which helped to offset declining
volumes in Europe where sales losses (-3% yoy) suffered from an
ongoing sluggish new build residential sector in France
(accounting for about 58% of mature markets sales).

The very strong results for the first nine months 2015 translated
into a fast and distinct improvement in Parex's key credit
metrics.  For example, group EBITDA margin as adjusted by Moody's
widened to 17% in the 12 months ended Sept. 30, 2015, and leverage
reduced to about 4.1x debt/EBITDA, which positions Parex solidly
in the B1 rating category.  In addition, Moody's forecasts Parex's
free cash flow generation to improve meaningfully in the current
year, reflecting expected healthy growth in profits and despite
moderately rising capital expenditures (c. EUR35 million in 2015)
related to international expansion efforts, primarily in Asia.
Given the expectation of Parex to continue abstaining from larger
dividend payments, the agency now projects adjusted annual free
cash flows of EUR35-50 million in 2015 and 2016, respectively.

Regarding potential external growth opportunities, Moody's would
assume Parex to approach any such acquisitions in a prudent manner
by using available cash and internally generated free cash flow
rather than raising additional debt (as demonstrated in 2015).
That said, noticing the group's EUR550 million floating rate notes
have become callable since June 2015, the rating agency does not
expect Parex to engage in any major refinancing activities in the
foreseeable future.

LIQUIDITY

Parex's rating is supported by a good liquidity profile.  As of
Sept. 30, 2015, the group had access to internal cash sources
including cash and cash equivalents on the balance sheet of EUR113
million (of which around EUR10 million are restricted in
Argentina, even though the group was able to transfer EUR5 million
out of that country during 2015, EUR3 million in H1 2015 and EUR2
million in November 2015) as well as projected funds from
operations of around EUR95 million per annum.  Cash uses over the
next 12-18 months mainly relate to annual capital expenditures of
approximately EUR35 million, working capital consumption (intra-
year swings of around EUR30 million assumed) and minor short-term
debt maturities.  Together with working cash requirements of
around 3% of group sales, Moody's expects Parex's short-term
liquidity needs to be more than sufficiently covered by available
cash sources, which also include a committed and currently fully
undrawn EUR100 million super senior revolving credit facility
(maturing 2021).

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook assumes that Parex will be able to largely
maintain its recently improved profitability, whilst benefitting
from an overall supportive business environment (including a
sustained substitution trend in emerging markets) resulting in
higher mid-single-digit sales growth per annum.  It further
reflects the expectation that Parex will keep its Moody's-adjusted
leverage at around 4x debt/EBITDA and strengthen its free cash
flow generation with FCF/debt metrics in the 6-8% range (assuming
no dividend payments).

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- UP/DOWN

Moody's might consider upgrading Parex if credit metrics were to
strengthen further, exemplified by (1) leverage reducing below
3.5x debt/EBITDA; (2) EBITDA margins being maintained at current
levels of around 17%; and (3) material positive free cash flow
(FCF) generation with FCF/debt ratios of 8% or higher; all on a
sustained and Moody's-adjusted basis.  An upgrade would further
require Parex to build a track record of a conservative financial
policy, evidenced by financing acquisitions in a prudent way and
abstaining from larger dividend payments to its shareholder.

Negative rating pressure would evolve should Parex's (1) adjusted
gross debt/EBITDA exceed 4.5x, and not only temporarily; (2)
profitability deteriorate with adjusted EBITDA margins reducing to
below 15%; and (3) free cash flow turn negative.  Moreover,
failure to maintain an adequate liquidity profile would exert
pressure on the ratings.

Headquartered in Issy-les-Moulineaux, France, Dry Mix Solutions
Investissements S.A.S. is an intermediate holding company of
ParexGroup (Parex), a global leading manufacturer and distributor
of specialty dry-mix solutions for the construction industry.  The
group's product offering is divided into three business lines, (1)
Fa??ade Protection and Decoration; (2) Ceramic Tile Setting
Materials; and (3) Concrete Repair and Waterproofing Systems
across which Parex holds top 3 positions in its key markets.  In
the 12 months ended 30 September, Parex generated net sales of
EUR880 million and EBITDA (as adjusted by the group) of EUR142
million with over 3,800 employees worldwide.  The group operates
64 manufacturing sites and 9 R&D facilities in 21 countries.  In
June 2014, funds advised by private equity firm CVC Capital
Partners acquired all shares in Parex from French industrial
chemicals and building materials group Materis.



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G E R M A N Y
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FRANZ HANIEL: Asset Sales Improve Leverage, Moody's Says
--------------------------------------------------------
While German family-owned Franz Haniel & Cie. GmbH's (Haniel, Ba1
stable) proactive steps to reduce leverage through asset sales,
including a 9% stake in retailer Metro AG, have generated positive
rating momentum for the company, the continued asset concentration
and sizeable investments plans, which create uncertainty about the
quality of Haniel's future business profile, curtail this
momentum, says Moody's Investors Service in a special report
published.

"While asset sales have helped Haniel maintain more conservative
leverage metrics, they have also reduced the diversification of
the company's portfolio.  Positive rating action is therefore
dependent on Haniel reducing its asset concentration but also
ensuring newly-added investments will lead to greater stability of
leverage and dividend income," says Jeanine Arnold, a Moody's Vice
President -- Senior Analyst and author of the report.

Moody's expects that Haniel's future net market value leverage
(MVL) will be around or below 25% on a sustainable basis in 2016,
compared with the rating agency's previous leverage expectations
of below 35% back in 2013 and a peak of 50% in December 2012.

Haniel's plans to invest around EUR1 billion in new ventures
should help diversify its portfolio.  However, the significant
size of these plans creates uncertainty about the quality of
Haniel's future business profile, namely the extent to which
newly-added assets will stabilize and grow Haniel's portfolio
value and dividends received.  Moody's expects to have greater
clarity on this once Haniel has invested the majority of funds set
aside for these new investments.

Haniel's cash reserves and debt maturity profile are robust.
However, while Moody's expects that Haniel's interest and cash
cover metrics will improve to levels more consistent with an
investment grade rating, positive rating action would require
greater certainty that these levels will be sustainable over the
medium-term.


PLATINUM GMBH: Linceus Acquires Business, 42 Jobs Saved
-------------------------------------------------------
Sandra Enkhardt at pv magazine reports that a buyer has been found
for Platinum GmbH, citing information from Holger Leichtle of law
firm Schultze & Braun, as liquidator of Platinum.

According to pv magazine, with effect from Dec. 1, the insolvent
company was sold to Linceus GmbH, a subsidiary of SEW Eurodrive
GmbH & Co. KG for an undisclosed sum.  All remaining 42 employees
have been kept on, pv magazine notes.

                           About Platinum

Platinum GmbH is a German inverter company.  It entered into
preliminary insolvency in March 2014, citing poor market
conditions.  Holger Leichtle of Schultze & Braun was appointed
liquidator to oversee the insolvency proceedings.  In August 2014,
the company announced that it would focus solely on R&D of
inverter and other equipment going forward.



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G R E E C E
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NAT'L BANK OF GREECE: S&P Alters Counterparty Credit Rating to SD
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
counterparty credit rating on National Bank of Greece to 'SD'
(selective default) from 'D'.  S&P also raised its issue rating on
the senior unsecured debt to 'CCC+', its issue rating on the
subordinated debt to 'CC', and the short-term rating on the bank's
EUR5 billion EMTN program to 'C', all from 'D'.

The rating action follows NBG's completion of its EUR4.48 billion
capital raising plan.  The bank has covered EUR1.8 billion through
private funds, about EUR1.5 billion by completing a capital
increase and a distressed exchange on its senior unsecured,
subordinated, and preferred securities.  It also raised about
EUR302.4 million through mandatory conversion of senior debt,
subordinated instruments, and preference shares not voluntarily
exchanged into equity.  This measure of burden sharing follows the
bank's request for state aid to cover the remaining part of its
capital shortfall.

In addition, the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) will
provide the residual EUR2.7 billion needed to cover the entire
shortfall that emerged from the European Central Bank's Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), of which 25% will come through equity
and 75% by acquiring contingent convertible bonds to be issued by
NBG.

S&P's 'SD' rating on NBG reflects S&P's view that the bank is
still unable to completely fulfill its deposit obligations in a
timely manner, due to the capital controls being imposed in
Greece.

S&P raised its issue rating on NBG's senior unsecured bonds to
'CCC+' from 'D', reflecting S&P's view that the bank is currently
vulnerable and dependent on favorable business, financial, and
economic conditions to meet its financial commitments.  The rating
reflects the bank's fragile financial profile in the context of a
weak economic and operating environment in Greece.  S&P also
believes the EU authorities will continue to provide liquidity
facilities to the Greek banks.

S&P raised its issue rating on the subordinated debt to 'CC' from
'D'.  S&P rates NBG's subordinated debt three notches below the
senior notes to indicate their degree of subordination and that
these instruments carry higher risks that the senior obligations.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


AVOCA CLO VI: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Avoca CLO VI plc's class B notes, as
follows:

  EUR41.7 million Class A1 (ISIN XS0272579763): affirmed
  at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR64 million Class A2 (ISIN XS0272580266): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR19.4 million Class B (ISIN XS0272580779): upgraded to 'AAAsf'
  from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR31.5 million Class C (ISIN XS0272580936): affirmed at 'Asf';
  Outlook revised to Positive from Stable

  EUR20 million Class D (ISIN XS0272582395): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
  Outlook revised to Positive from Stable

  EUR23.9 million Class E (ISIN XS0272583286): affirmed at 'BBsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR10 million Class F (ISIN XS0272583955): affirmed at 'Bsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR7 million Class V (ISIN XS0272586891): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
  Outlook revised to Positive from Stable

Avoca CLO VI plc is a managed cash arbitrage securitization of
secured leveraged loans, primarily domiciled in Europe. The
transaction closed in 2006 and is actively managed by KKR Credit
Advisors.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of the class B notes reflects the significant
deleveraging and stable asset performance. The class A1 notes have
been paid down by EUR118 million and credit enhancement (CE) has
increased for all rated notes For the class B notes it has
increased by 14.9% and for the class F notes by 1.5%. Fitch has
revised the Outlook on the class C, D and V notes to Positive as
we expect deleveraging to continue over the next year.

The asset performance has been stable. All collateral quality
tests are passing except the weighted average maturity test, which
has been pushed back to August 1, 2010, from March 1, 2019. The
change is partially due to 11.37% of the portfolio extended the
maturity by average 2.7 years. The rest is due to portfolio
amortizations and trading. All coverage tests are passing, the
cushion on the class F test increased to1.7% from 1.1% and it is
0.74% above the 104% trigger set in the reinvestment criteria. The
Fitch rated 'CCC' or below bucket has increased by EUR300,000 but
in percentage terms it increased to 7.8% from 5.4%.

There is no defaulted asset as of the review date but two obligors
have defaulted since the last review. EUR8.8 million AVR was sold
at 70.25%, which realised a EUR2.6 million loss. EUR3.5 million
Truvo was restructured into a PIK facility, term loan and equity,
which realised a EUR 1.1 million loss.

The manager bought EUR60.6 million assets at the end of 2014,
which represents 31.7% of the current performing portfolio.
Although the performing portfolio balance decreased by EUR82
million, the concentration of the portfolio did not increase
significantly, with the top 10 obligor concentration increasing to
53.6% from 45.8%. The largest industry is telecommunications,
which represents 16.8% of the portfolio and the largest country
exposure is Netherlands, with 17.95% exposure.

The class V notes are a combination of the class D notes and the
equity tranche. The affirmation reflects the affirmation of the
class D notes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Increasing the default rate by 1.25x to all assets in the
portfolio would result in a downgrade of one notch for the class F
notes. Reducing the recovery rate by 0.75x to all assets in the
portfolio would result in a downgrade of the class F notes by one
rating category.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations and/or European Securities and Markets
Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on the
practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


BANK OF IRELAND: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Longterm Deposit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the long-term deposit
ratings of Bank of Ireland (UK) plc (BOI UK) at Ba2 and changed
the outlook on the ratings to positive from stable.  Moody's has
also affirmed BOI UK's baseline credit assessment (BCA) and
adjusted BCA at ba2 and its counterparty risk assessment (CR
Assessment) at Baa2(cr)/Prime-2(cr).  Short-term deposit ratings
have been affirmed at Not Prime.

The action follows the change of outlook on the bank's parent,
Bank of Ireland's (BOI, Baa2/Baa2, positive, ba2), deposit and
senior unsecured ratings to positive from stable.  Moody's has
maintained the alignment of the BCAs of both entities given the
high level of integration between BOI and BOI UK.  The positive
outlook reflects Moody's expectation that (1) the long term
deposit rating could move up in line with the BCA of its parent;
and (2) the bank's improving credit fundamentals, which will
contribute to an upgrade, to the extent that the bank develops a
longer track record of independence from its parent.

RATINGS RATIONALE

AFFIRMATION OF THE BANK'S BCA

Moody's affirmation of BOI UK's BCA and adjusted BCA at ba2 in
line with the BCA of BOI reflects the high level of integration
between the subsidiary and its parent.  Since its creation in
2010, the balance sheet of BOI UK has changed due to intra-group
transfers of assets, liabilities and capital from and to BOI.
During 2014, BOI UK acquired GBP1.5 billion of mortgages from the
parent and received GBP15 million in capital from BOI, although
parent capital contributions declined compared to the GBP121
million transferred in 2013.  In 2015, the bank restructured some
of its junior instruments: (1) in May BOI UK repurchased GBP300
million preference shares held by BOI and issued as a replacement
GBP200 million of high trigger Additional Tier 1 (AT1), which are
held by BOI.  The remaining GBP100 million was repatriated to the
BOI group following regulatory approval; (2) in November, BOI UK
restructured GBP523 million of Tier 2 debt into GBP100 million
high-trigger AT1 and GBP200 million new Tier 2 issuance, which are
again held by BOI.  The bank repatriated GBP58 mil. to BOI and
increased its common equity with the remaining GBP165 million.
Although Moody's considers these restructuring transactions as
positive given their contribution to increase the bank's tangible
common equity, they also highlight the interconnectedness between
BOI UK and its parent.

The positive outlook also incorporates BOI UK's improving credit
fundamentals, which will translate into an upgrade to the extent
that the bank enhances its track record of independence from its
parent.  These changes in BOI UK's credit metrics include: (1)
improving asset risk metrics with the impaired loan ratio
declining to 6.3% in 2014 from 7.9% a year earlier, albeit the
lending portfolio remains exposed to some downside risks given its
relatively high average loan-to-value ratios; (2) solid capital
levels; (3) stronger profitability amid a more competitive
operating environment in the UK; and (4) sound funding profile,
supported by a broad deposit base sourced largely through its
relationship with the Post Office in addition to deposits from
Northern Ireland and GB Business banking.

AFFIRMATION OF DEPOSITS AND SENIOR UNSECURED RATINGS

The Ba2 deposit ratings incorporate the results of Moody's
Advanced LGF analysis.  The analysis is forward-looking and is
based on the bank's pro-forma balance sheet at-failure
incorporating the two capital transactions performed during the
course of 2015.

A relatively low level of subordinated debt in BOI UK's liability
structure that would otherwise provide a loss absorbing cushion
results in no uplift from the BCA level for deposit ratings.

RATIONALE FOR THE POSITIVE OUTLOOK

The positive outlook on BOI UK's long-term deposit ratings is
aligned with the outlook on BOI's ratings and reflects Moody's
expectation that the improving trends in BOI UK's asset quality
and profitability will continue, supported by the favorable
operating environment.

WHAT WOULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

BOI UK's deposit ratings could be upgraded as a result of (1) an
increase of its standalone ba2 BCA; or (2) a significant increase
in the bank's bail-in-able debt.  BOI UK's BCA of ba2 could also
be upgraded to the extent that the bank establishes a longer track
record of independence from its parent while further maintaining
strong credit fundamentals.

BOI UK's deposit ratings could be downgraded as a result of a
lowering of its ba2 BCA.  The BCA could be lowered if higher than
expected losses were to cause BOI UK's capitalization to decline
materially.  A substantial increase in the bank's risk profile
could also lead to negative rating pressure.  Given the level of
integration with BOI, a downgrade of the parent's BCA could also
result in the lowering of BOI UK's ratings.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.


NEWHAVEN II CLO: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned these
provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Newhaven II CLO,
Designated Activity Company:

  EUR241,200,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  EUR37,250,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  EUR9,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  EUR21,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  EUR19,750,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

  EUR26,250,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

  EUR12,950,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2029.  The provisional ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure.  Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Sankaty Advisors,
Limited has sufficient experience and operational capacity and is
capable of managing this CLO.

Newhaven II is a managed cash flow CLO.  At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and high
yield bonds.  The portfolio is expected to be at least 70% ramped
up as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

Sankaty will manage the CLO.  It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR49.4 million of subordinated notes which will
not be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section
2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published September 2015.  The
cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.  In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche.  As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used these base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR400,000,000
Diversity Score: 40

  Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800
  Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.95%
  Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.25%
  Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42.00%
  Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the provisional rating assigned to the
rated notes.  This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.  Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3220 from 2800)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029: -1
Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029: -2
Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029: -2
Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029: -2
Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029: -2
Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029: -1
Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029: -1
Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3640 from 2800)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029: -1
Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029: -4
Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029: -4
Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029: -4
Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029: -3
Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029: -2
Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029: -3

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty.  The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit
conditions that may change.  Sankaty's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KAZAKHSTAN ENGINEERING: Moody's Lowers CFR to Ba3, Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded defence company JSC NC
Kazakhstan Engineering's (KE) corporate family rating to Ba3 from
Ba2.

Moody's has also downgraded its probability of default rating
(PDR) to Ba3-PD from Ba1-PD, its national scale rating to Baa3.kz
from Baa1.kz, and the rating of its three-year $200 million notes
due 2016 to Ba3 (LGD4) from Ba2 (LGD5).  The outlook on all the
ratings is negative.

Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded KE's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) -- which reflects KE's standalone credit strength
-- to b3 from b2.

The action on KE's ratings reflects the company's weak liquidity
and heightened refinancing risk in relation to KE's $200 million
notes due 2016 as well as the potential for further short-term
deterioration of KE's already weak financial metrics.  A recovery
in the company's metrics to levels commensurate with a higher BCA
and rating over the next 12-18 months is unlikely, given the tenge
devaluation and weakening macroeconomic environment.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of KE's ratings and BCA reflect Moody's view that
the company's already high leverage of 7.4x adjusted debt/EBITDA
as of mid-2015 may materially increase by end-2015 and will
unlikely improve to around 3.5x over the next 12-18 months, which
was Moody's guidance for the company's previous Ba2 rating.

This view factors in (1) the tenge devaluation against the dollar,
which has significantly increased KE's debt burden, given the
company's predominantly foreign currency debt, while 90% of
revenue is in tenge; (2) a deteriorating macroeconomic
environment, which will continue to suppress demand for its
products and services and limit the company's ability to negotiate
higher prices with its major client, the Ministry of Defence (MoD)
of Kazakhstan, and other clients among Kazakhstan's large state-
controlled businesses; and (3) KE's historically weak operating
and financial performance, the improvement of which would require
changes to some contract arrangements, including pricing
arrangements, with the MoD, which, though under discussion, are
yet to be introduced and proved to be sustainable.

Moody's also notes a deterioration of KE's liquidity since mid-
2015.  The level of coverage of KE's foreign-currency debt
maturities represented by its $200 million notes due December
2016, by foreign-currency cash reserves and availabilities, was
down to 40% from 70% as of mid-2015.  Given the significantly
depreciated tenge and the currency mismatch between its
predominantly dollar-denominated debt and tenge-denominated
revenue, KE may find it challenging to address the liquidity gap
on its own and will likely need support from its sole shareholder,
the Samruk-Kazyna Fund, or the government of Kazakhstan (Baa2
stable).

At the same time, KE's b3 BCA positively recognizes KE's recently
received status as the national defence procurement operator for
the MoD, which will likely translate into a higher revenue base
and allow the company to negotiate better contract terms and
improvement in prices with the MoD in the future.

Given that KE is fully controlled by the government of Kazakhstan
through the government-owned Samruk-Kazyna Fund, KE's Ba3 ratings,
which are three-notches above the company's standalone credit
quality (as measured by the BCA), reflect the impact of Moody's
joint-default analysis, which include assumptions of strong
support from the government and very high credit linkages between
the company and the government.  These assumptions remain
unchanged.  Moody's believes that the company is strategically
important for the government and expects that it will be supported
in case of need, in particular to meet its debt obligations in a
timely manner and in full.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on the ratings indicates Moody's concerns
over the company's weak liquidity and its ability to deleverage in
the next 18 months.  The outlook could be stabilized if the
company improves its medium-term liquidity, in particular by
successfully refinancing its notes due December 2016 in line with
its plans and deleverages towards 5.0x debt/EBITDA.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Although upward pressure on the ratings is currently unlikely,
this could occur if the company's BCA strengthened on the back of
sustainable deleveraging and adequate liquidity.

Conversely, the ratings are likely to be downgraded if the company
is unable to address the refinancing risk related to its maturing
notes in a timely manner.  Downward pressure on the ratings would
also develop if (1) there were a significant downward pressure on
Kazakhstan's sovereign rating; (2) the company were to fail to
deleverage in 2016; or (3) there was a revision downwards of
Moody's assessment of the probability of the Kazakhstan government
providing extraordinary support to KE in the event of financial
distress.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Aerospace and Defense Industry published in April 2014. Other
methodologies used include the Government-Related Issuers
methodology published in October 2014.

JSC Kazakhstan Engineering National Company (KE) is a state-
controlled holding company consolidating the machinery building
and engineering enterprises in Kazakhstan, which primarily service
the domestic defence sector.  In the last twelve months to June
2015, KE generated revenue of KZT35.2 billion (around $191.6
million) and had adjusted EBIT of KZT5.4 billion (around $29.0
million).



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


APERAM SA: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB+', Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on Luxembourg-based stainless steel producer Aperam
S.A. to 'BB+' from 'BB'.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P raised its issue ratings to 'BB+' from 'BB'
on Aperam's convertible notes, including its $200 million senior
unsecured convertible bonds maturing 2020 and its $300 million
senior unsecured convertible bonds maturing 2021.  The recovery
rating remains unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's expectations of
meaningful recovery prospects with coverage in the higher half of
the 50%-70% range for the debtholders in the event of a payment
default.

The upgrade reflects Aperam's continued earnings resilience
through 2015 against very challenging industry conditions for
steel and stainless products.  S&P also takes into account the
company's conservative balance sheet, showing only moderate debt
levels.  Additionally, S&P factors in the company's strict
financial policy, which the company has announced together with
third quarter results, targeting less than 1.0x unadjusted net
debt to EBITDA through the cycle, despite a generous dividends
commitment, which S&P believes free cash flows should cover.  Cash
and availability of credit lines also provide the company with
strong liquidity, in S&P's view.

Under S&P's base case, Aperam will continue to post very strong
credit metrics for the current rating, with 1.5x adjusted net debt
to EBITDA in 2015, and about 1.0x in 2016, or above 45% adjusted
FFO to debt for both 2015 and 2016.  S&P also assumes continued
strong positive free cash flows, which should amply cover the
announced dividends of $100 million per year from 2016.  S&P
anticipates net debt to continue reducing on cash build-up, in
line with the company's stated financial policy of maintaining
less than 1.0x net debt to EBITDA through the cycle.  S&P
anticipates that Aperam will maintain a moderate and opportunistic
appetite for mergers and acquisitions over the long term.
Nevertheless, S&P continues to have a particularly cautious view
on the global metals industry for the medium term.

S&P now forecasts about $540 million adjusted EBITDA for 2015
(including about $35 million of adjustments for operating leases
and pensions), from about $580 million previously, which S&P views
as reasonably strong given the harsh drop S&P has observed in
nickel prices since early 2015, depressed economic indicators in
Brazil, and material pressure on the industry from developments in
China.

The nickel price dropped from about $14,000 per ton in April 2015
to below $9,000 late November 2015.  This has translated into
lower-than-expected volume shipments, together with some
seasonality.  However, S&P continues to see improvement in the
EBITDA margins year-to-date, of about 100 basis points against the
10% EBITDA margin in 2014, reflecting operational restructuring
and measures to mitigate nickel price volatility.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Aperam will maintain
strong credit metrics for the rating, although S&P continues to
factor in a degree of potential volatility given the current
depressed market conditions for the steel industry.  Notably,
pressures may arise from developments in China and in Brazil.  S&P
projects that Aperam will maintain adjusted FFO to debt above 45%
under normal industry conditions, or above 30% in a more
challenging environment.  S&P believes there is leeway for the
current rating given the company's low outstanding debt.

Rating pressure may arise if economic developments in China or
Brazil deteriorate and weigh on Aperam's EBITDA to the extent the
company is unable to meet the above stated FFO to debt and net
debt to EBIDTA targets.  This could also stem from additional
volatility in the steel industry and further downward trending
nickel prices.  Deterring factors could also include higher-than-
expected investments, including unforeseen, large debt-funded
acquisition.

At this stage, upside potential is constrained by S&P's opinion of
the industry as highly volatile and the negative outlook for the
steel markets.  S&P also acknowledges the company's need to
establish a track record of operating with lower financial
leverage than has historically been the case.


ARMACELL INTERNATIONAL: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B' corporate credit
rating on Luxembourg-incorporated equipment insulation and
engineered foams manufacturer Armacell International S.A. on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

At the same time, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its 'B' issue
rating on Armacell's first-lien senior secured term loan B, due
2020, the first-lien senior secured revolving credit facility
(RCF), EUR120 million first-lien term loan C, and the $185 million
first-lien loan.  The recovery rating is unchanged
at '3', indicating S&P's expectations of meaningful recovery, in
the higher half of the 50%-70% range.

S&P has also placed on CreditWatch negative its 'CCC+' issue
rating on the company's second-lien $85 million term loan, due
2021.  The '6' recovery rating, indicating S&P's expectations of
negligible recovery, remains unchanged.

The CreditWatch placement follows the announcement made by
investment firms Blackstone and KIRKBI that they will buy Armacell
from Charterhouse.  S&P thinks that the transaction is likely to
increase Armacell's leverage in the coming years.

Armacell is currently owned by financial sponsor Charterhouse,
which acquired the company in 2013 for EUR520 million.  That deal
was funded with $390 million of debt, and increased earlier this
year by EUR65 million to fund two acquisitions leading to a debt-
to-EBITDA ratio at about 6x.  As of June 2015, S&P adds to debt
EUR63 million of shareholder loans and EUR79 million of preferred
equity certificates, leading to Standard & Poor's-adjusted gross
debt to EBITDA of about 8x.

Under the proposed financing, debt to EBITDA (excluding potential
non-common equity) is expected at about 6.5x, which is the
threshold for S&P's 'B' rating.  Still, S&P notes that the
leverage calculation is subject to the final conditions of the
financing package and the deal's potential impact on Armacell's
business plan following the acquisition.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch after it has received sufficient
information on the transaction as well as Armacell's updated
business plan following the acquisition.  S&P will likely
downgrade Armacell to 'B-' if adjusted gross debt to EBITDA
exceeded 6.5x without prospects of immediate recovery within the
ensuing 12 months.

The transaction is expected to close in the first quarter of 2016.
S&P anticipates that it will resolve the CreditWatch placement
within a similar timeframe.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


FAB CBO 2003-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to CCC-
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
FAB CBO 2003-1 B.V.'s class A-1E, A-1F, A-2F, A-2aE, and A-2bE
notes.  At the same time, S&P has lowered its ratings on the class
A-3E and A-3F notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's updated credit and cash flow
analysis of the transaction using data from the trustee note
valuation report dated Sept. 30, 2015, and the application of
S&P's relevant criteria.

Since S&P's June 25, 2014 review of the transaction, the class A-
1E and A-1F notes have deleveraged significantly.  According to
S&P's analysis, on aggregate the class A-1 notes have reduced by
nearly EUR20 million, representing slightly less than a 74%
reduction in the principal amount outstanding of the notes
compared with S&P's previous review.  In S&P's view, the repayment
of the class A-1 notes has resulted in increased available credit
enhancement for the class A-1 and A-2 notes.

S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rates (BDRs) at each rating level by applying its updated
corporate cash flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria
and its criteria for CDOs of asset-backed securities (ABS).  The
BDR represents S&P's estimate of the maximum level of gross
defaults, based on S&P's stress assumptions, that a tranche can
withstand and still fully repay the noteholders.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used the reported portfolio
balance that it considered to be performing, the principal cash
balance, the current weighted-average spread, and the weighted-
average recovery rates that S&P considered to be appropriate.  S&P
incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using various
default patterns, levels, and timings for each liability rating
category, in conjunction with different interest rate stress
scenarios.

S&P based its credit analysis on its updated assumptions to
determine the scenario default rates (SDRs) at each rating level,
which S&P then compared with the respective BDRs.  The SDR is the
level of defaults that S&P expects the transaction to incur at the
respective rating levels.

Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis, it considers the available credit enhancement for the
class A-1E, A-1F, A-2F, A-2aE, and A-2bE notes to be commensurate
with higher ratings than those previously assigned.  S&P has
therefore raised its ratings on these classes of notes.

The available credit enhancement for the class A-3E and A-3F notes
has decreased since S&P's previous review.  At the same time,
S&P's credit and cash flow results indicate that the BDRs are
unable to surpass the SDRs at their current rating level.  As a
result, S&P has lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' its ratings
on the class A-3E and A-3F notes.

FAB CBO 2003-1 is a CDO transaction backed by pools of structured
finance assets, which closed in July 2003.  The reinvestment
period ended in August 2007.

RATINGS LIST

FAB CBO 2003-1 B.V.
EUR308.8 mil asset-backed floating, fixed and zero coupon notes

                                    Rating          Rating
Class            Identifier         To              From
A-1E             XS0173031807       AA (sf)         A+ (sf)
A-1F             XS0173032284       AA (sf)         A+ (sf)
A-2aE            XS0173033688       BBB+ (sf)       BBB (sf)
A-2bE            XS0173037598       BBB+ (sf)       BBB (sf)
A-2F             XS0173038729       BBB+ (sf)       BBB (sf)
A-3E             XS0173039610       CCC- (sf)       CCC (sf)
A-3F             XS0173039966       CCC- (sf)       CCC (sf)


HARBORMASTER CLO 7: Fitch Hikes Class B2 Notes' Rating to B+sf
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Harbourmaster CLO 7's notes as follows:

  EUR93 million Class A2 (ISIN XS0273887363): affirmed at
  'AAAsf''; Outlook Stable

  EUR41 million Class A3 (ISIN XS0273889228): upgraded to 'AAsf'
  from 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR38 million Class A4 (ISIN XS0273890664): upgraded to 'Asf'
  from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR38 million Class B1 (ISIN XS0273891639): upgraded to 'BB+sf'
  from 'BBsf'; Outlook Positive

  EUR16.2 million Class B2 (ISIN XS0273894732): upgraded to 'B+sf'
  from 'B-sf'; Outlook Positive

  EUR2.7 million Class S2 combo (XS0273897917): upgraded to 'AAsf'
  from 'A+sf', Outlook Stable

  EUR1.8 million Class S5 combo (XS0273900992): upgraded to 'Asf'
  from 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable

Harbourmaster CLO 7 B.V. is a securitization of mainly European
senior secured loans, senior unsecured loans, second-lien loans,
mezzanine obligations and high-yield bonds. At closing a total
note issuance of EUR925 million was used to invest in a target
portfolio of EUR900 million. The portfolio is actively managed by
GSO / Blackstone Debt Funds Management Europe Limited.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade reflects a significant increase in credit enhancement
throughout the capital structure as a result of amortization,
stable portfolio concentration and credit quality. Portfolio
amortization over the last 12 months amounted to close to EUR100
million, of which EUR45 million was diverted to the full pay-down
of the class A1 notes and EUR55 towards the partial amortization
of the class A2 notes, which are now 63% of their initial balance.

Credit enhancement on the class A2 notes as a result increased to
64% from 45% and on the class B2 to 13% from 7%. Credit
enhancement increases to 75% if the current cash balance is
diverted to the pay-down of the class A2 notes. The transaction
cannot reinvest scheduled or unscheduled proceeds since 2013 and
therefore all proceeds are being diverted towards the pay-down of
the notes.

Despite the significant portfolio amortization, the portfolio's
concentration remains largely unchanged. The largest obligor has
over the last 12 months increased to 9.97% from 6.4%, and the top
10 obligors now make up for 68.2%, up from 55.7%. The largest
country represented in the portfolio is the US with 20.2%, up from
19.3%, followed by Germany with 18.8%, up from 12.2% and the UK
with 16.5%, down from 20.7%. Peripheral European exposure from
Spain and Italy decreased to 15.4% from 16.7%. The largest
industry is healthcare with 18.5%, down from 18.6%, followed by
broadcasting and media with 16%, up from 15.5% and
telecommunications with 15.1%, up from 11.8%.

In addition, the portfolio's credit quality has improved over the
past one year. Now over 50% of the included assets have a credit
opinion of 'B' and the exposure to 'B-' rated assets have halved
over the last 12 months. This is despite the 'CCC+' and below
bucket increasing to 6.4% from 3.9%. While there has been one
additional default during the same period, it has been worked out
and the portfolio currently does not include any defaulted assets.

The Positive Outlook on the junior notes reflects the possibility
of an upgrade of the junior notes if amortization maintains the
current pace and the effects on concentration remain limited.

The ratings of the combination notes S2 and S5 are linked to the
ratings of their respective components, the class A3 and A4 notes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch rating sensitivity analysis showed that stressing the
probability of default by 25% would not impact the notes, whereas
a reduction of recoveries by 25% would result in negative rating
migration on the class B2 notes by up to two notches.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised Statistical
Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and Markets
Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on the
practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.



===========
N O R W A Y
===========


DOLPHIN GROUP: Files for Bankruptcy After Crude Prices Plunge
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mikael Holter at Bloomberg News reports that Dolphin Group ASA
filed for bankruptcy as the collapse in crude prices claimed
another victim.

The company said in a statement it failed to reach an agreement
with bondholders, banks and other stakeholders to restructure its
debt and capital structure after months of talks and would file a
petition for bankruptcy on Dec. 14, Bloomberg relates.

The company's stock was suspended by the Oslo stock exchange and
the Financial Supervisory Authority, Bloomberg discloses.

"In light of the unpredictability of the oil price and subsequent
spending cuts of our customers, it has become impossible to have
the visibility needed to continue our business," Chairman Tim
Wells and Chief Executive Officer Atle Jacobsen, as cited by
Bloomberg, said jointly in the statement.

The company said subsidiary Dolphin Geophysical AS will also file
a petition for bankruptcy with the relevant court, Bloomberg
notes.

Dolphin Group ASA is a Norwegian seismic surveyor that maps the
seabed for oil and gas reservoirs.  The company is based in Oslo.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


ALTAI REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia's Altai Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB+',
National Long-term rating at 'AA(rus)' and its Short-term foreign
currency IDR at 'B'. The Outlooks on the Long-term IDRs and
National Rating are Stable.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged baseline scenario
regarding Altai region's stable budgetary performance, low debt,
and its satisfactory liquidity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'BB+' rating reflects the region's net cash positive status,
its satisfactory budgetary performance and low indebtedness. The
ratings also take into account the modest size of the region's
economy and the depressed macro trend for Russia in 2016-2017,
which could negatively influence the region's financials in the
medium term.

Fitch expects Altai to continue its prudent fiscal management,
leading to maintenance of a stable budgetary performance, with
operating surpluses around 6%-8% in 2015-2017 (2014: 7.6%) with
close to balanced budgets. The region recorded an interim surplus
of 4.7% before debt variation by end-9M15, after it posted a minor
deficit before debt variation of 1% of total revenue in 2014,
driven by capex financing.

Fitch expects the region to maintain its low debt position in the
medium term. Subsidized federal budget loans remain the sole debt
instruments since 2007, with final maturities in 2034. Despite an
expected gradual increase in the region's direct risk to up to
RUB10 billion in 2016-2017 (2014: RUB2 billion), Altai's debt is
likely to remain low by both national and international standards,
representing less than 10% of expected 2017 current revenue.

Altai region has been net cash positive since 2009, with interim
cash reserves growing to RUB6.5 billion at October 2015 (2014:
RUB4 billion). This sound cash position fully offsets the region's
budgeted deficit in 2015 and provides a buffer against potential
volatility in the Russian capital markets, which otherwise would
negatively affect Altai's liquidity.

Fitch expects Altai to continue administering conservative fiscal
practices leading to close to balanced budgets in the medium term
with a minor deficit before debt variation of about 1% of total
revenue expected in 2015, with potential for minor surpluses in
2016-2017.

The region's contingent liabilities are limited to a single
outstanding guarantee (for a negligible RUB8.7 million) and the
low indebtedness of its public-sector companies. In Fitch's view,
the administration's oversight of its public sector companies is
adequate, limiting the region's exposure to material contingent
risk.

Fitch considers the region's economy as weak by international
standards due to low per capita wealth metrics. Altai's 2013 gross
regional product (GRP) was RUB171,600 (USD5,600), which is 35%
below the national median stated per capita. This is in part
attributed to the concessional taxation of agriculture, which
largely relies on in-kind exchanges that is not captured in tax
accounts and official statistics.

In its restated forecast, the region's administration expects
economic growth of 1%-3% per year in 2015-2018, which in Fitch's
view may be optimistic, given the expected contraction in Russia
of 4% yoy for 2015. According to the administration's preliminary
estimates, Altai's GRP expanded 0.9% in 2014.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A downgrade could result from significant deterioration in
operating performance, coupled with a radical increase in the
region's total risk.

Positive rating action is unlikely in our base line scenario,
considering the worsened economic environment and low prospects
for a swift recovery in Russia.


BALTIC LEASING: Fitch Hikes Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Baltic Leasing OJSC's (BaltLease) Long-
term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'BB-' from 'B+'. Fitch has
also affirmed Carcade LLC's IDR at 'BB-' and removed it from
Rating Watch Negative (RWN). The Outlooks on both companies' IDRs
are Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of BaltLease reflects our reassessment of its credit
profile relative to peers, as well as a longer track record of
good asset quality metrics, improved funding and capital profiles,
and reasonable financial results in a challenging operating
environment. The Negative Outlook reflects the risks of a weaker
economic environment, which may negatively affect asset
quality/collateral disposals.

The recent change of ownership (the company is now 80% owned by
Tactics group, a company with business interests mainly in the
real estate and development sector) may also be a source of
contingent risk, as Fitch understands the shareholders could raise
some debt to buy the stake and there is limited transparency on
the acquisition structure. Fitch understands that the new
shareholder has a longstanding business relationship with Otkritie
group; in the agency's view, before the sale BaltLease had been
owned mainly by parties connected to Otkritie.

Fitch placed Carcade's ratings on RWN in August 2015 due to risks
from the potential change of the company's strategy, risk
appetite, balance sheet structure and financial metrics upon the
expected sale of the company to B&N group. However, the deal was
cancelled, so the ratings have been removed from RWN and affirmed
reflecting the company's good liquidity and solid solvency. The
Negative Outlook is due to moderate deterioration of asset quality
and financial performance, as well as potential further pressure
on metrics from the difficult operating environment including in
the core car/SME segments.

The companies are among the leading private leasing companies in
Russia. Carcade is a pure retail autoleasing company (passenger
cars, light commercial vehicles and trucks made up 97% of the
lease book at end-3Q15), while BaltLease has a more diversified,
albeit less liquid lease book (passenger cars, LCV and trucks made
up only 48% of the lease book at end-3Q15, while the remainder was
special-purpose equipment).

Asset quality metrics moderately deteriorated in 2015. Default
rates in the lease book increased to 13% at Carcade in 1H15 and 4%
at BaltLease in 9M15 (both annualized) from 11% and 2%,
respectively, in 2014. However, the current default rates are
still notably below 2008-2009 maximum levels (about 20% in Carcade
and 8% in BaltLease). Final credit losses were much lower due to
efficient foreclosure and sales of relatively liquid collateral:
0.2% in 3Q15 for BaltLease and 2.5% in 1H15 for Carcade (both
annualised). Foreclosed assets on the balance sheet are higher for
Carcade (45% of equity at end-1H15) compared with BaltLease (4% at
end-9M15), but residual/collateral value risks are mitigated by
low LTVs and rouble devaluation, which supports rouble prices (as
most assets are foreign/imported).

Solvency, as expressed by the net debt to tangible equity ratio,
was somewhat weaker at 5.9x for Carcade (this is adjusted for a
receivable from the shareholder, which is expected to be netted
against future dividends) and a solid 4.4x for BaltlLease. Both
companies rely on internal capital generation and Fitch does not
incorporate external capital support in its assessment. Capital
positions in a stress scenario could benefit from the companies'
proven ability to deleverage quickly without material losses.

FX risks are negligible, as both companies operate with
essentially rouble balance sheets.

The companies have moderate liquidity cushions, but their assets
are granular and generate stable and predictable cash flows
matching/exceeding expected debt maturities. BaltLease's liquidity
position is somewhat stronger due to its longer-term funding
profile largely in the form of domestic bonds, which Fitch
understands are held predominantly by Otkritie group banks.

Profitability moderated due to increased funding costs. Carcade
suffered a nearly 3pp hike due to a high share of floating rate
borrowings, which coupled with higher credit losses resulted in it
being only close to break even in 1H15. BaltLease was less
affected (only by 1pp increase of funding costs) due to more
favorable terms of funding. This allowed the company to preserve
its margin and earn a strong 30% ROAE (annualized).

The senior debt ratings are aligned with the companies' IDRs and
National ratings. BaltLease has issued bonds via its core
operating subsidiary, Baltic Leasing LLC.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The companies could be downgraded if asset quality and performance
weaken significantly causing erosion of solvency, or in case of a
further material deterioration in the operating environment. An
extended track record of reasonable performance and a
stabilization of the operating environment could result in the
Outlooks being revised to Stable.

The senior debt ratings could be downgraded in case of a downgrade
of the IDRs/National ratings, or a marked increase in the
proportion of pledged assets (which is now low for BaltLease and
moderate for Carcade), potentially resulting in lower recoveries
for the unsecured senior creditors in a default scenario.

The rating actions are as follows:

BaltLease

  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: upgraded to 'BB-'
  from 'B+'; Outlooks Negative

  Short-term foreign-currency IDR: affirmed at 'B';

  National Long-term Rating: upgraded to 'A+(rus)' from'A-(rus)';
  Outlook Negative

  Senior unsecured debt of Baltic Leasing LLC: upgraded
  to 'BB-'/'A+(rus)' from 'B+'/'A-(rus)'/Recovery Rating 'RR4'

Carcade

  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BB-';
  removed from RWN, Outlook Negative

  Short-term foreign-currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  National Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'A+(rus)'; removed from
  RWN, Outlook Negative

  Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BB-'/'A+(rus)'; removed from
  RWN


CB MAXIMUM: Bank of Russia Uncovers Accounting Discrepancies
------------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of OJSC CB Maximum appointed by
Bank of Russia Order No. OD-3273 dated November 23, 2015,
following the revocation of its banking license, revealed
discrepancies between the accounting data and the actual cash
balances in the amount of RUR1.8 billion on the first day of its
activity.

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on financial
transactions bearing the evidence of the criminal offence to the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the
Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for
consideration and procedural decision making.


CB RENAISSANCE: Placed Under Provisional Administration
-------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by Order No. OD-3590, revoked the banking
license of Moscow-based credit institution limited liability
company commercial bank RENAISSANCE or LLC CB Renaissance as of
December 14, 2015.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure on the revocation
of the banking license due to the credit institution's failure to
comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia regulations,
all capital adequacy ratios being below 2 percent and the
application within a year of measures envisaged by the Federal Law
"On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)".

LLC CB Renaissance implemented high-risk lending policy and did
not create loan loss provisions adequate to the risks assumed.
Credit risk adequate assessment requested by the supervisory
authority revealed a critical decrease in the capital adequacy
ratios.  At the same time, the credit institution was involved in
dubious operations connected with overseas money transfer and
dubious transit operations in significant amounts.

Both management and owners of the credit institution did not take
any effective measures to bring its activities back to normal.
Under these circumstances, the Bank of Russia performed its duty
on the revocation of the banking license from the credit
institution in accordance with Article 20 of the Federal Law "On
Banks and Banking Activities".

The Bank of Russia, by Order No. OD-3591 dated December 14, 2015,
appointed a provisional administration to LLC CB Renaissance for
the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under
Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".
In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit
institution's executive bodies are suspended.

LLC CB Renaissance is a member of the deposit insurance system.
The revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by legislation.  The said
Federal Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but not more than RUB1.4 million per
depositor.

According to reporting data, as of December 1, 2015, LLC CB
Renaissance ranked 242nd in the Russian banking system in terms of
assets.


CBD BANK: Placed Under Provisional Administration
-------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3592, revoked the banking
license of Moscow-based credit institution Commercial Bank for
Development (limited liability company) or CB CBD BANK (LLC) as of
December 14, 2015.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure on the revocation
of the banking license due to the credit institution's failure to
comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia regulations,
the repeated violations within a year of Bank of Russia
regulations issued in accordance with the Federal Law "On
Countering the Legalisation (Laundering) of Criminally Obtained
Incomes and the Financing of Terrorism", the application of
measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the
Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)" and considering the existence
of a real threat to creditors' and depositors' interest.

With low quality assets, CB CBD BANK (LLC) failed to create loss
provisions adequate to the risks assumed.  Besides, the bank did
not comply with Bank of Russia regulations on countering the
legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained incomes and the
financing of terrorism as regards notification of the authorized
body about operations subject to obligatory control.  Also, the
credit institution was involved in dubious transit operations.
Both management and owners of the bank did not take any effective
measures to bring its activities back to normal.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3593 dated December 14,
2015, appointed a provisional administration CB CBD BANK (LLC) for
the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under
Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".
In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit
institution's executive bodies are suspended.

CB CBD BANK (LLC) is a member of the deposit insurance system. The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by legislation.  The said
Federal Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but not more than RUB1.4 million per
depositor.

According to reporting data, as of December 1, 2015, CB CBD BANK
(LLC) ranked 566th in the Russian banking system in terms of
assets.


DEAL-BANK LLC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3588, revoked the banking
license of Moscow-based credit institution Deal-Bank, limited
liability company, or Deal-Bank LLC as of December 14, 2015.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure on the revocation
of the banking license because of the credit institution's failure
to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, all equity (capital) adequacy ratios below 2 per
cent, decrease in equity (capital) below the minimum amount of the
authorized capital established as of the date of the state
registration of the credit institution, and taking into account
the repeated application within a year of measures envisaged by
the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation
(Bank of Russia)".

Deal-bank LLC implemented high-risk lending policy connected with
placement of funds into low-quality assets.  As a result of
meeting the supervisor's requirements on creating provisions
adequate to the risks assumed, the bank fully lost its equity
(capital).  Besides, the credit institution was involved in
dubious transit operations.

The management and owners of the credit institution did not take
measures to normalize its activities.  Under these circumstances,
the Bank of Russia performed its duty on the revocation of the
banking license from the credit institution in accordance with
Article 20 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3589 dated December 14,
2015, appointed a provisional administration to Deal-bank LLC for
the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under
Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".
In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit
institution's executive bodies are suspended.

Deal-bank LLC is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event envisaged by
Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On Insurance of Household Deposits with
Russian Banks" regarding the bank's liabilities on deposits of
households determined in accordance with the legislation.  The
said Federal Law stipulates the insurance premium as 100%
reimbursement of the available balance to bank depositors,
including individual entrepreneurs, but not more than 1.4 million
rubles in aggregate per depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of December 1, 2015,
Deal-bank LLC ranked 222nd by assets in the Russian banking
system.


UNIFIN: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Rating to B3.ru
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) downgraded national scale
long-term deposit rating (NSR) of UNIFIN to B3.ru from Baa3.ru.
The NSR carries no specific outlook.  The rating action was driven
by the weakening of UNIFIN's liquidity profile.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's downgrade of the bank's NSR is driven by a significant
weakening of UNIFIN's liquidity profile, driven by the withdrawal
of several core deposits in October 2015.

The bank's deposit base contracted by 15.9% in October 2015, and
as a result UNIFIN's liquid assets (net of encumbered assets)
declined to 1.3% of total assets as at Nov. 1, 2015, according to
unaudited local GAAP data, down from 7.8% as at Oct. 1, 2015.  In
the current operating environment -- characterized by the local
currency volatility and low depositors' confidence in mid-sized
privately-owned banks -- Moody's envisages limited opportunities
for reinstatement of the bank's liquidity profile to a more
comfortable level in the absence of external support from third
parties.

UNIFIN's solvency metrics have also weakened, with total
regulatory capital adequacy ratio decreasing to 10.21% as of
Nov. 1, 2015, from 11.17% at Jan. 1, 2015, which is only slightly
above the regulatory minimum of 10%.  Weakened capital position is
somewhat counterbalanced by good asset quality to date with non-
performing loans with more than 90 days overdue loans accounting
for only 2.5% of the bank's gross book.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Upward rating momentum on the UNIFIN's rating is unlikely in the
short term, and will depend on the bank's ability to recover its
liquidity profile to a comfortable level, together with bolstering
its capital buffer.

Downward rating pressure could occur in case of: (1) Further
deterioration of the liquidity profile; or (2) significant
deterioration in the bank's asset quality and consequently
profitability, leading to a material erosion of the bank's
capitalization level.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in March 2015.

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs) are
intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks.  NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia.


VNESHPROMBANK: Moody's Cuts Sr. Debt Ratings to B3, Outlook Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Vneshprombank's long-term
global, local and foreign-currency deposit and senior unsecured
debt ratings to B3 from B2 and affirmed the bank's Not-Prime
short-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings.  The
outlook on the bank's long-term ratings is negative.

Concurrently, Moody's downgraded the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA to b3 from b2 and the bank's
long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment) to B2(cr)
from B1(cr).  The rating agency also affirmed the bank's short-
term CR Assessment of Not-Prime(cr).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects increased vulnerability of Vneshprombank's
credit profile amid the ongoing deterioration of the domestic
operating environment, given the bank's: (1) weak loss absorption
capacity -- as reflected in its weak capital adequacy metrics,
relatively low level of Loan Loss Reserves (LLR) and weakening
profitability; (2) high credit risk appetite, as reflected in the
bank's rapid lending growth in recent years; and (3) concentrated
funding base which could face increased volatility.

The rating action takes into account Vneshprombank's low capital
adequacy.  As at June 30, 2015, Vneshprombank reported a low Tier
1 ratio (Basel 1) of 7.0% down from 9.1% as at June 30, 2014.  Its
regulatory capital ratio (N1) also declined to 11.21% as at
November 1, 2015 from 12.51% as at Jan. 1, 2015, and 14.12% as at
July 1, 2014.

Moody's notes that Vneshprombank's capital adequacy has been
pressured by a rapid growth of its risk-weighted assets in 2014-
2015 and Moody's believes that a low capital buffer would create
substantial risks for the bank's credit profile if its loans were
to require additional provisioning.

Although Vneshprombank reported a relatively low level of problem
loans, Moody's believes that the bank's asset quality could face
elevated risk because of rapid lending growth in recent years amid
deteriorating economic conditions.  Vneshprombank's loan portfolio
increased by around 76% from Jan. 1, 2014, to Nov. 1, 2015, (as
reported under local GAAP) and will likely require additional
provisioning because of increased exposure to unsecured lending.
In this context, the LLRs at 3.3% of total gross loans accumulated
as of June 30, 2015, (as reported under IFRS) remain significantly
below the system average and appear to provide insufficient
coverage for potential credit losses and necessitate further
build-up.

Moody's also notes that Vneshprombank's ratings remain constrained
by its high funding concentration.  According to the bank, the 20
largest groups of customers, provided around 40% of the bank's
total customer funding as at Sept. 30, 2015, and the rating agency
believes that the bank's historically stable but highly
concentrated funding could face increased volatility in a
challenging and volatile operating environment.  Moody's, however,
notes that in order to address the high funding concentration, the
bank has maintained an ample buffer of liquid assets.

NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on Vneshprombank's long term ratings reflects
the persistent risks to the bank's credit profile in Russia's
challenging operating environment, which will continue to exert
pressure on the bank's financial fundamentals.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Vneshprombank's ratings have limited upside potential in the near
term, as captured in the negative outlook and a positive rating
action is not likely until operating environment and economic
conditions in Russia stabilize.  The rating outlook could be
changed to stable if the bank eliminates risks of capital erosion
and materially strengthens its loss absorption.  At the same time,
Vneshprombank's ratings could be further downgraded in case of a
further material deterioration in the bank's risk profile.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Vneshprombank reported total
(IFRS) assets of RUB260.1 billion and shareholder equity of
RUB14.5 billion as at June 30, 2015.


VODOKANAL: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' CCRs, Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB/B' long- and
short-term corporate credit ratings on Russian regional water
utility Vodokanal St. Petersburg (VKSPB).  The outlook remains
negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'ruAA' Russia national scale
rating on VKSPB and the 'BB' senior unsecured debt rating.

The affirmation reflects S&P's assessment of VKSPB's stand-alone
credit profile (SACP) at 'bb-' and S&P's view of a very high
likelihood that VKSPB would receive timely and sufficient
extraordinary support from the city of St. Petersburg, if needed.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for government-related entities
(GREs), its view of a very high likelihood of extraordinary
government support is based on S&P's assessment of VKSPB's:

   -- Very important role for St. Petersburg, given its strategic
      importance to the city as the sole provider of essential
      infrastructure services; and

   -- Very strong link with the city's government, given St.
      Petersburg's 100% ownership of VKSPB, S&P's expectation
      that the company will not be privatized in the medium term,
      the city's commitment to finance a portion of VKSPB's
      capital expenditure program, and the risk to the city
      government's reputation if VKSPB were to default.

S&P's assessment of VKSPB's SACP at 'bb-' is based on S&P's view
of the utility's weak business risk profile and intermediate
financial risk profile, with a one-notch downward adjustment for
our negative financial policy modifier.

S&P's assessment of VKSPB's business risk profile as weak
continues to reflect S&P's view of the utility's relatively aged
asset base and resulting sizable medium-term investment needs, a
politicized and short-term tariff regulation regime (although in
December 2015 the regulator approved tariffs for a five-year
period, they might be revised at any time during this period),
operating risk stemming from deteriorating water quality, and
exposure to Russian country risk, which S&P assess as high.  These
weaknesses are partly offset by VKSPB's monopoly position in its
franchise area, fairly stable earnings and cash flows derived
primarily from regulated activities, diverse customer base, and
improving operating efficiency.

S&P's assessment of the company's financial risk as intermediate
reflects its base-case forecast, with adjusted debt to EBITDA
below 1.5x and funds from operations (FFO) to debt above 60% over
the forecast period.  Constraining factors for the company's
financial risk profile include substantial planned capital
expenditures (capex), which result in moderately negative free
operating cash flow (FOCF) generation, reliance on new debt in
financing new investments, and a high level of expected volatility
for cash flow and leverage ratios during periods of stress.

S&P assigns a negative financial policy modifier because it thinks
that the financial policy framework allows VKSPB to take a more
leveraged position than S&P currently expects, mostly because of
higher investment needs.

The negative outlook on VKSPB reflects the credit quality of the
City of St. Petersburg, which in turn is negatively influenced by
that of the Russian Federation (local currency BBB-/Negative/A-3;
foreign currency BB+/Negative/B).  This is because of S&P's view
of the company's strategic role for the city, its 100% owner.

S&P could lower the rating on VKSPB if the credit quality of St.
Petersburg were to weaken under S&P's assessment, all else being
equal.  Under S&P's criteria for GREs, it might consider a
negative rating action if S&P was to revise its assessment of the
likelihood of extraordinary government support to high from very
high, although in S&P's view there are no signs of a weakening of
the utility's role for and link with the St. Petersburg city
government over S&P's 12-month ratings horizon.

S&P could also lower the rating if it revised down its assessment
of the company's SACP by one notch.  That might result from
aggressive debt accumulation and weak financial and operational
results, leading to debt to EBITDA rising significantly higher
that 1.5x and FFO to debt falling substantially below 60% without
a credible plan for recovery in the next 6-12 months.  Downward
pressure might also stem from deteriorating liquidity or maturity
profiles, and continuous covenant breaches.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the credit quality of
St. Petersburg improved and VKSPB's SACP remained unchanged.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: Option to Sell Abengoa Yield Stake Put on Hold
----------------------------------------------------------
Carlos Ruano and Jose Elias Rodriguez at Reuters report that
Abengoa SA and creditor banks agreed on Dec. 10 to put on hold an
option of selling shares in its Abengoa Yield business as a means
of raising money.

Abengoa, trying to avoid becoming Spain's biggest ever bankruptcy,
is negotiating a multi-million-euro lifeline with creditor banks
which have asked the company to guarantee it with assets, Reuters
relays.

According to Reuters, two banking sources briefed on the talks
said the company has agreed to look for financial investors
willing to inject emergency funds, although creditor banks will
consider putting up EUR100 million (US$109 million) in cash if
Abengoa cannot find alternative funding in coming days.

Banks had been pressing Abengoa -- which has biofuel and
solar-heated power plants in the United States -- to sell assets
immediately, including a 47% stake in U.S.-listed Abengoa Yield,
Reuters notes.

However, the sources, as cited by Reuters, said at a meeting on
Dec. 11 between Abengoa, creditor banks and KPMG, which advises
the banks, that idea was put on hold.

"Abengoa explained that the partial sale (of Abengoa's stake) in
Abengoa Yield might cause a rapid loss in value (of the Yield
shares)," Reuters quotes one banking source as saying.

Abengoa is now expected to try and tap hedge funds or other
financial investors for funds. Reuters states.

"If in the coming days, there is no progress in this search, the
banks would consider a (cash) injection to deal with immediate
needs of around 100 million euros," the source, as cited by
Reuters, said.

The source said banks are still insisting on guarantees before
they provide any fresh cash, Reuters relays.

The deadline for Abengoa to come up with the emergency cash
injection, needed to cover a Christmas payment to staff and urgent
supplier payments, is seen as around Dec. 20, Reuters discloses.

Abengoa SA is a Spanish renewable-energy company.


                        *       *       *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 1,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Spanish engineering and construction
company Abengoa S.A. to 'CCC-' from 'B+'.  S&P said the outlook is
negative.


ABENGOA SA: Moody's Lowers PDR to Caa3, Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Abengoa S.A.'s
probability of default rating (PDR) to Ca-PD/LD from Caa2-PD.
Concurrently, Abengoa's corporate family rating of Abengoa S.A.,
and the senior unsecured ratings at Abengoa, Abengoa Finance,
S.A.U. and Abengoa Greenfield, S.A., have been downgraded to Caa3,
from Caa2.  The outlook on the ratings is negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects Abengoa's filing to the Irish Stock
Exchange (ISE) that Abengoa S.A. has not paid the amounts payable
with respect of certain series of commercial papers issued under
its EUR750 million Euro-Commercial Paper Programme.  The default
on these payments amounts to approximately EUR14 million, and is
in the context of the creditor protection process according to
article 5 bis of the Spanish Insolvency Law (Ley Concursal), which
was announced on Nov. 25, 2015, and which is expected to take
approximately four months.

In the context of the abovementioned process, Moody's understands
that the company is currently undergoing a debt restructuring
process that has caused Abengoa to temporarily suspend certain
financial commitments.  This is aimed at ensuring the operational
sustainability of the company until an agreement with its main
creditors has been reached.  Whilst this process is not a default
in itself, it reflects the precarious liquidity situation of the
company and may be a likely precursor to more formal
administration or a distressed exchange.

Abengoa's Caa3 rating reflects the limited default on its
commercial papers and balances the high likelihood of a firm-wide
default and loss to creditors with the expectation that the
underlying business -- liquidity, leverage, working capital and
financing aside -- continues to perform.  This is illustrated by
the company's sizeable order backlog of EUR8.8 billion, as per end
of September 2015.  At the same time, Abengoa's EBITDA margin
remained at healthy levels of 18% during the first nine months of
2015.

The probability of default rating (PDR) of Ca-PD/LD reflects the
limited default related to the Euro-Commercial Paper Programme,
which is likely to be followed by further payment defaults during
the article 5 bis process.  Moody's expects to remove the "/LD"
suffix after approximately three business days.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the ongoing uncertainty as the
company enters this new phase of negotiations with its creditors,
payment risk on upcoming interest and 2016 debt maturity payments,
and the high likelihood that the 5 bis filing may be followed by a
more formal filing.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Abengoa's ratings and outlook could be upgraded, if the company
improved its capital structure as well as its liquidity situation
to sufficient levels.  A liquidity improvement to sufficient
levels would need to include the refinancing of the short-term
debt maturities and increasing short-term credit lines.
Furthermore, an improved rating would require substantial progress
in the existing EUR1.2 billion asset disposal program.

The rating of the CFR and the existing bonds could be further
downgraded if the existing 5bis process would be unsuccessful, and
result in a subsequent formal insolvency procedure and/or if the
company formally defaulted on its debt obligations, such as by a
distressed exchange on its outstanding bonds, or by the inability
to pay bond coupons and/or redeem its March 2016 bond maturities.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Construction
Industry published in November 2014.

Headquartered in Seville, Spain, Abengoa S.A. is a vertically
integrated environment and energy group whose activities range
from engineering & construction (E&C), utility-type operation (via
concessions) of thermal-solar energy plants, electricity
transmission networks and water treatment plants to industrial
production of biofuels.  Abengoa generated EUR7.0 billion of
revenues in twelve months ended September 2015.  Abengoa is partly
owned, by representatives of the founding families, through
Inversion Corporativa IC and Finarpisa (directly and indirectly).
Abengoa's shares are listed in Spain as well as in the form of
ADRs on NASDAQ.  Abengoa had a market capitalization of around
EUR350 million as of Dec. 10, 2015.


BBVA-10 PYME: DBRS Assigns CCC Rating to Series B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has assigned provisional ratings to the
following notes issued by BBVA-10 PYME FT (the Issuer):

  -- EUR596.7 million Series A Notes: A (low) (sf) (the Series A
     Notes)

  -- EUR183.3 million Series B Notes: CCC (low) (sf) (the
     Series B Notes, together, the Notes)

The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized by a
portfolio of term loans originated by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria, S.A. (BBVA or the Originator) to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) and self-employed individuals based in
Spain. As of 18 November 2015, the transaction's provisional
portfolio included 4,943 loans to 4,511 obligor groups, totaling
EUR880.0 million.

At closing, the Originator will select the final portfolio of
EUR780.0 million from the above-mentioned provisional pool.

The rating on the Series A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
Legal Maturity Date in January 2048.

The rating on the Series B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
Legal Maturity Date in January 2048. The provisional pool is
highly exposed to the Building & Development industry,
representing 28.2% of the outstanding balance. Business Equipment
& Services (7.6%) and Retailers (except food and drug) (5.6%)
complete the top three industries based on the DBRS industry
classification, with no significant borrower concentration and low
industry concentration. The provisional portfolio exhibits low
obligor concentration. The top obligor and the largest ten obligor
groups represent 0.9% and 8.2% of the outstanding balance,
respectively. The pool exhibits a moderate regional concentration.
The top three regions for borrower concentration are Catalonia,
Andalusia and Madrid, representing approximately 24.3%, 15.6% and
9.7% of the portfolio balance, respectively.

BBVA provided historical cohort performance data based on
defaulted amounts, rather than defaulted number of loans, which is
DBRS's preferable data format. DBRS considered the data as
provided and did not apply any additional stresses, as the PD
calculated was considered to be conservative, considering other
comparable transactions recently reviewed.

The above ratings are provisional. Final ratings will be issued
upon receipt of executed versions of the governing transaction
documents. To the extent that the documents and information
provided by BBVA-10 PYME FT, Europea de Titulizacion SGFT SA. and
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. to DBRS as of this date
differ from the executed versions of the governing transaction
documents, DBRS may assign lower final ratings to the Notes or may
avoid assigning final ratings to the Notes altogether.

These ratings are based upon DBRS's review of the following items:

-- The transaction structure, the form and sufficiency of
    available credit enhancement and the portfolio
    characteristics.

-- At closing, the Series A Notes benefit from a total credit
    enhancement of 28.5%, which DBRS considers to be sufficient
    to support the A (low) (sf) rating. The Series B Notes
    benefit from a credit enhancement of 5%, which DBRS considers
    to be sufficient to support the CCC (low) (sf) rating. Credit
    enhancement is provided by subordination and the Reserve
    Fund.

-- The Reserve Fund will be allowed to amortize after the first
    three years if certain conditions relating to the performance
    of the portfolio and deleveraging of the transaction are met.
    The Reserve Fund cannot amortize below EUR19.5 million.

-- The transaction parties' financial strength and capabilities
    to perform their respective duties and the quality of
    origination, underwriting and servicing practices.

-- An assessment of the operational capabilities of key
    transaction participants.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
    flow assumptions and repay investors according to the
    approved terms. Interest and principal payments on the Notes
    will be made quarterly on the 20th day of January, April,
    July and October, with the first payment date being on
    April 20, 2016.

-- The soundness of the legal structure and the presence of
    legal opinions which address the true sale of the assets to
    the trust and the non-consolidation of the special-purpose
    vehicle, as well as consistency with DBRS's Legal Criteria
    for European Structured Finance Transactions methodology.

DBRS determined these ratings as follows, as per the principal
methodology specified below:

-- The probability of default for the portfolio (PD) was
    determined using the historical performance information
    supplied. DBRS assumed an annualized PD of 4.44% for this
    portfolio.

-- The assumed weighted-average life (WAL) of the portfolio was
    3.98 years.

-- The PD and WAL were used in the DBRS Diversity Model to
    generate the hurdle rate for the target ratings.

-- The recovery rate was determined by considering the market
    value declines (MVDs) for Spain, the security level and type
    of the collateral. For the Series A Notes, DBRS applied the
    following recovery rates: 56.2% for secured loans and 16.3%
    for unsecured loans. For the Series B Notes, DBRS applied the
    following recovery rates: 69.6% for secured loans and 21.5%
    for unsecured loans.

-- The break-even rates for the interest rate stresses and
    default timings were determined using the DBRS cash flow
    model.


ISOLUX CORSAN: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-', Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has lowered its
long-term corporate credit rating on Spain-based Isolux Corsan
S.A. to 'B-' from 'B'.  The outlook is negative.

S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term corporate credit rating on the
company.

S&P also lowered its issue rating on the company's EUR850 million
senior unsecured notes to 'B-' from 'B'.  The recovery rating on
this debt instrument is unchanged at '4', indicating S&P's
expectation of average recovery in the higher half of the 30%-50%
range in the event of a payment default.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that Isolux will exhibit weak
liquidity over our 12-month rating horizon.

In S&P's view, Isolux's weak operational cash flows continue to
come under heavy pressure from a high cash interest burden.  This
results in very little cash available to repay short-term debt
maturities and also to fund capital expenditure (capex) and
potentially sizable working capital swings.

In 2014 and the first three quarters of 2015, Isolux's funds from
operations (FFO) were insufficient to cover working capital-
related cash outflows.  In total, the company faces approximately
EUR220 million of short-term debt repayments over the next 12
months, which is higher than freely available cash on balance
sheet and FFO, in S&P's view.  Isolux will have to continue to
dispose of assets in order to raise sufficient cash to meet short-
term debt maturities, and also to fund capex and working capital
swings.  S&P assess the group's asset base as having good
flexibility in terms of further potential asset disposals.
However, S&P only include contracted asset sales in its liquidity
analysis and therefore have not factored in further asset sales at
this point.

S&P continues to view the company's financial risk profile as
highly leveraged.  This is based on a group approach, including
the nonrecourse business, which S&P reconsolidates to arrive at
its adjusted credit ratios, using the company's reported segment
breakdown.  However, this only enables S&P to arrive at
approximate figures.  S&P's method reflects its assumption that
the company would have a strategic and economic incentive to
support most concessions' debt if projects came under stress.
That said, there are cases were Isolux has not supported loss-
making projects, and nonrecourse operations since 2014 are
deconsolidated in the accounts.

In S&P's base-case forecasts for 2015-2016, it assumes that FFO to
debt will remain below 3%, in part due to the high debt stemming
from the concessions business.  On a consolidated approach, free
operating cash flows (FOCF) will likely remain negative.  This
also depends on working capital patterns over the next 12 months.

Under S&P's base case for 2016, it assumes:

   -- Consolidated EBITDA margin of about 19%-20%, supported by
      high and stable margins from the concessions;

   -- Corporate capex of up to EUR60 million;

   -- Potentially significant working capital related cash
      outflows; and

   -- No dividends.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
for Isolux:

   -- Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt of about 9x; and
   -- FFO to debt below 3%.

The short-term rating is 'B'.  S&P assess Isolux's liquidity as
weak--primarily reflecting S&P's ratio of cash sources to cash
needs, which it estimates at below 1x over the next 12 months.
The group's liquidity remains pressured due to low FFO and a high
cash interest burden, twinned with potentially large cash needs
for working capital swings or higher capex.

Over the next 12 months, S&P expects Isolux to have access to
following principal liquidity sources:

   -- Available cash and cash equivalents of about EUR160 million
      reported as at Sept. 30, 2015. (S&P do not view the full
      amount on the balance sheet is fully available, as some of
      the cash is located in various joint ventures or in
      countries where accessing it could take some time.)

   -- Forecast corporate FFO of below EUR15 million.

   -- Second installment for the sale of U.S. transmission line
      WETT to PSP Investments, a total of about $175 million, to
      be received in the first quarter of fiscal 2016 once
      applicable regulatory approvals have been received.  The
      timely receipt of these funds is key to S&P's base case.

Over the same period, S&P expects these principal liquidity uses:

   -- Short-term corporate maturities of about EUR220 million in
      the next 12 months.

   -- Corporate capex of up to EUR60 million.

   -- Overall working capital outflow of approximately EUR50
      million for fiscal 2015, but S&P is mindful that there
      could be sizable swings over the coming year, as historical
      trends have shown.

S&P notes that Isolux is in its peak period for working capital
and cash needs, the third quarter of each fiscal year.  However,
any unexpected outflows over and above S&P's base case would
further weaken the group's liquidity position.

S&P understands from management that the proceeds of the agreement
with PSP can be included in our net corporate leverage
calculation, as defined in the loan documents.  Therefore,
following the transaction, S&P estimates that the debt-to-EBITDA
ratio is projected to be about 3.3x for the December 2015 covenant
testing.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that Isolux's liquidity
remains tight due to very low cash generation, high short-term
debt, and sizable working capital swings, and that Isolux will
have to continue to dispose of assets in order to bolster
liquidity.

S&P could lower the ratings on Isolux if S&P envisage any
constraints to the covenant headroom, specifically headroom of
less than 10%.  Weaker-than-expected operating performance or
unforeseen events, such as project-related execution problems or
cost overruns, would also weigh on the group's liquidity and the
ratings.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Isolux were to use
proceeds from potential further asset sales to permanently reduce
debt and, at the same time, build a sustainable track record of
generating positive FOCF.  S&P would also expect Isolux to sustain
adequate liquidity by S&P's assessment, including covenant
headroom of greater than 15%.


SANTANDER RMBS 5: DBRS Assigns C(sf) Rating to Series C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited (DBRS) has assigned provisional ratings to
the following notes to be issued by FT Santander RMBS 5 (Santander
5):

-- EUR1,013,600,000 Series A at A (low) (sf)
-- EUR261,400,000 Series B at CCC (sf)
-- EUR63,700,000 Series C at C (sf)

Santander 5 is expected to be a securitization of prime
residential mortgage loans, including a portion of borrowers with
higher risk characteristics, secured by first-ranking lien
mortgages on residential properties in Spain. The mortgage loans
are originated by Banco Santander SA (Santander), Banco Espa??ol de
Credito (Banesto) and Banco Banif S.A.U. (Banif). At the closing
of the transaction, Santander 5 will use the proceeds of the
Series A and Series B notes to fund the purchase of the mortgage
portfolio from the Seller, Santander, who will also service the
portfolio. In addition, the Series C notes proceeds will fund the
reserve fund. The securitization will take place in the form of a
fund, in accordance with Spanish Securitisation Law.

The ratings are based upon a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- The transaction's capital structure and the form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement. The Series A
    notes benefit from EUR261.4 million (25.5%) of credit
    enhancement in the form of 20.5% subordination of the Series
    B notes and the EUR63.7 million (5.0%) reserve fund, which is
    available to cover senior fees as well as interest and
    principal payments on the Series A and Series B notes. The
    Series A notes will benefit from full sequential
    amortization, as principal on the Series B notes will not be
    paid until the Series A notes have redeemed in full. The
    Series C notes will be repaid according to the reserve fund
    amortization.

-- The main characteristics of the portfolio as of November 23,
    2015 include (1) 72.0% weighted-average current loan-to-value
    (WA CLTV) and 93.4% Indexed WA CLTV (INE HPI Q1 2015); (2)
    the top three geographical concentrations of Madrid (25.4%),
    Andalucia (18.2%) and Catalu??a (13.4%); (3) 12.7% self-
    employed borrowers; (4) 4.4% foreign national borrowers; and
    (5) weighted-average seasoning of 6.3 years.

-- Of the mortgage portfolio, 96.0% pay a variable interest rate
    indexed to 12-month Euribor, and 4.0% pay a rate indexed to
    the Indice de Referencia de Prestamos Hipotecarios (IRPH).
    The notes are floating rate liabilities indexed to three-
    month Euribor. DBRS considers there to be limited basis risk
    in the transaction, which is mitigated by (1) the historical
    spread between 12-month Euribor and three-month Euribor in
    favor of 12-month Euribor; (2) the available credit
    enhancement to cover for potential shortfalls from the
    mismatch. DBRS stressed the interest rates as described in
    the DBRS methodology "Unified Interest Rate Model for
    European Securitisations'".

-- DBRS classified 31.3% of the underlying borrowers as higher-
    risk. DBRS considers higher risk borrowers to be those with
    (1) a loan modification or (2) no loan modification, but (a)
    the loan has a principal grace period or (b) had a missed
    payment date within the past two years and had an amendment
    in the loan agreement. In DBRS's view, these characteristics
    indicate a higher degree of potential future payment
    problems, as they do not occur frequently and in combination.
    According to Santander's annual financial statement, modified
    loans are part of Santander's forbearance portfolio, which
    contains borrowers who are likely to incur problems paying
    their outstanding debts (including debt other than mortgage
    loans) with Santander but who have never been more than three
    months in arrears (which would classify them as non-
    performing). As a result, borrowers might apply for some form
    of debt consolidation or may be given a principal payment
    holiday or an extension of the maturity. Currently, 11.2% of
    the mortgage loans are in a grace period, with an average
    remaining term of two months. The furthest grace period
    ending date is in 2017. DBRS applied higher default
    probabilities to borrowers  classified as higher-risk and
    adjusted its cash flow modelling for the loans with a current
    grace period.

-- The credit quality of the mortgages backing the notes and the
    ability of the servicer to perform its servicing
    responsibilities. DBRS was provided with Santander's
    historical mortgage performance data, as well as loan-level
    data for the mortgage portfolio. The probability of default
    (PD), loss given default (LGD) and expected losses (EL)
    resulting from DBRS's credit analysis of the mortgage
    portfolio at A (low), CCC (sf) and C (sf) stress scenarios
    are detailed below. In accordance with the transaction
    documentation, the Servicer is able to grant loan
    modifications, within the range of permitted variations,
    without the consent of the management company. According to
    the documentation, permitted variations include the reduction
    of the loan margins to a weighted-average of 1.0% for the
    mortgage portfolio and maturity extension for 10% of the
    portfolio up to the final payment date in August 2059. DBRS
    stressed the margin of loans with a margin above 1.0% and
    repayment of the portfolio for longer amortization in its
    cash flow analysis.

-- The transaction's account bank agreement and respective
    replacement trigger require Santander acting as the treasury
    account bank to find (1) a replacement account bank or (2) an
    account bank guarantor upon loss of a BBB (high) rating. DBRS
    concluded that the assigned ratings are consistent with the
    account bank criteria.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions addressing
    the assignment of the assets to the issuer and the
    consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for European
    Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

As a result of the analytical considerations, DBRS derived a base
case PD of 25.7% and LGD of 42.2%, which results in an EL of
10.8%, using the European RMBS Credit Model. DBRS cash flow model
assumptions stress the timing of defaults and recoveries,
prepayment speeds and interest rates. Based on a combination of
these assumptions, a total of 16 cash flow scenarios were applied
to test the capital structure and ratings of the notes.




=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRAINE: S&P Affirms 'B-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-/B' long- and
short-term local and foreign sovereign credit ratings on Ukraine.
The outlooks on the long-term foreign and local currency ratings
are stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'uaBBB-' Ukraine national scale
rating on the country.

RATIONALE

The affirmation reflects the progress Ukraine has made during 2015
in restructuring its debt, while passing major reforms.  For
example, the government has cut household energy subsidies,
solidified the independence of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU,
the central bank), and revised an overly complex value-added tax
(VAT) system.  At the same time, S&P's 'B-' long-term rating
captures the economic and political challenges that Ukraine faces.
These include widespread corruption, the unpredictable security
situation in the East of the country, as well as parliamentary
opposition to the adoption of a tax reform program compatible with
the finance ministry's proposed 2016 general government budgetary
target of 3.7% of GDP.  As of S&P's publication date, with 20 days
remaining in 2015, the Rada (Ukraine's parliament) has yet to pass
a 2016 budget.  S&P also notes the possibility that the opposition
may attempt to bring down the government via a no-confidence vote
before year end.

Despite this, S&P is maintaining its baseline expectation that by
early next year, parliament will pass a budget that is roughly
compliant with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) general
government deficit target of less than 4% of GDP.

At an estimated 70% of GDP by the end of this year, Ukraine's net
general government debt remains high for a low-income economy,
even after the public debt restructuring in October.  S&P
estimates that public and publicly guaranteed debt outside of the
general government perimeter amounts to an additional 24% of GDP.
In S&P's view, such a high level of public debt means that
targeting a higher primary budgetary surplus and retaining access
to relatively cheap official financing via the IMF are of critical
importance for debt sustainability in Ukraine alongside GDP
growth.

Although Ukraine's economy returned to positive growth in the
third-quarter 2015, increasing 0.7% quarter on quarter, growth
prospects remain challenging in light of security risks, the weak
domestic business environment, and the troubled financial sector.
S&P expects quarterly growth in the fourth quarter will be about
zero, given the depressive effect on consumption from the large
increase in energy tariffs for households in November.  In 2016,
S&P projects that GDP will recover to 2%, in line with the
government's forecast, assuming that the security situation in
eastern Ukraine does not deteriorate further.  However, S&P thinks
the drag from further expected fiscal consolidation next year will
be substantial.

S&P's ratings and stable outlook on Ukraine factor in S&P's
assumption that the government will remain generally on course
with the IMF program, which would mean it will receive a further
$11 billion in installments by year-end 2018 and that gross
(though not net) reserves will increase toward $27 billion by the
same date.

Since the beginning of this year, the IMF has disbursed over one-
third of the $17.5 billion available under the four-year Extended
Fund Facility (EFF) program.  The disbursements carry an average
interest rate of 1.05% and cover most of Ukraine's net government
borrowing requirements through 2018, now thatcommercial debt
redemptions have been extended beyond 2018 as a consequence of the
exchange.  One important outcome of Ukraine's debt restructuring
in October was the agreement by holders of Ukraine's international
law bonds to a moratorium on interest payments from now until
2019.  This concession will lower the effective interest rate on
the entire outstanding stock of general government debt from close
to 11.0% this year to an estimated 7.7% in 2016 and 7.0% in 2017,
giving Ukraine four years during which it can try to improve debt
dynamics by increasing the primary fiscal surplus and enacting
reforms to boost growth.

Whether or not the primary fiscal position will improve next year
is not yet clear, however, because the Rada has so far delayed
passage of an IMF-compliant 2016 budget.  The key fiscal debate
currently taking place in parliament centers on two separate tax
reform proposals.  The first is the cabinet/finance ministry plan
to simplify the tax framework and establish a uniform 20% tax rate
for the four principal rates--personal, corporate, VAT, and
payroll.  If implemented, in S&P's view, the measures,
particularly the proposed sharp reduction in the payroll tax,
would facilitate whitening of Ukraine's large (and untaxed)
informal economy.  The alternative proposal from parliament's tax
committee involves much larger tax cuts, and would, by S&P's
estimates, lead to a fiscal deficit next year exceeding 10% of
GDP.  S&P assumes in its baseline scenario that an amended version
of the finance ministry's proposal will be passed by end-December,
and that the budget will comply broadly with IMF targets.  Under
this scenario, S&P still projects a deviation from the
government's target budget deficit of 3.7% of GDP in 2016.  S&P
thinks the deviation will be a modest 0.8% of GDP given that there
is a hard budgetary financing constraint for the public sector in
2016.  This means that the IMF has only committed to financing a
budgetary deficit of less than 4% of GDP, although arrears
financing (technically capped under the IMF program), and
additional monetization of the deficit are alternative sources of
a budgetary overrun next year.  S&P forecasts a budgetary deficit
of 4.5% of GDP in 2016, but this still represents significant
underlying fiscal tightening of about 1.7% of GDP given the loss
of extraordinary revenues from dividends paid by the NBU (an
estimated 1.4% of GDP), as well as the loss of 0.7% of GDP in
receipts from the expired temporary import surcharge in 2015.

The Rada is also considering important budgetary reforms to the
pension system (including the elimination of special pensions),
scrapping the VAT payment exemption on agricultural production,
and reforms to revenue administration that have already been
rolled out nationally for VAT collection.  In another positive
development, state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz could break
even by next year, reducing the need for transfers from the
central government.  Lastly, if the finance ministry's proposal on
introducing a uniform 20% rate across all major tax rates is
implemented, this would, in S&P's view, be a major step toward
broadening what is currently a narrow, porous tax base.  For this
reason, the introduction and implementation of tax reform along
these lines would lead S&P to reconsider its current assessment
that Ukraine's flexibility to raise revenues is limited.  There's
a risk that the finance ministry's proposed tax reform will not
pass in parliament, if the government is caught up in a potential
no-confidence vote and, in an extreme scenario, falls.  If this
occurs, S&P would expect extended delays in the disbursal of IMF
funds, with negative effects on confidence and growth.

In 2015, the NBU used its powers of monetization extensively:

   -- To recapitalize Naftogaz (via treasury bond purchases worth
      Ukrainian hryvnia [UAH] 29.7 billion [about $1.2 billion]
      or just over 1.5% of GDP).

   -- To shore up funds in the Deposit Guarantee Fund and to
      recapitalize domestic banks (via government bond purchases
      of an estimated UAH36.5 billion or $1.5 billion or a little
      bit less than 2% of GDP).

As a consequence, between year-end 2013 and October 2015, the
NBU's balance sheet has more than doubled in size via the purchase
of government debt and the provision of liquidity support to the
banks.  This quasi fiscal role of the NBU has not been recorded in
the budget.  However, the ensuing monetary expansion has,
alongside the rise in publicly administered tariffs, pushed up
inflation, which was 49.5% year on year in October, according to
State Statistics Service of Ukraine.  S&P expects inflation will
decelerate markedly during the rest of 2015 and into 2016 (to
about 20% versus the 12% official forecast), as quasi fiscal
financing abates, and the pace of tariff hikes recedes.
Nevertheless, S&P still projects 20% inflation for 2016, the
third-highest projected level of inflation of the 131 sovereigns
S&P rates, after Venezuela and Argentina.

Capital controls, which the government partially lifted in June
2015, remain in place.  The NBU has put a limit on daily cash
withdrawals (although it relaxed them somewhat over the summer)
and has required exporters to convert 75% of foreign currency
revenues into local currency.  Also in place are daily caps on
wholesale market foreign currency purchases, as well as other
surrender and transfer regulations, which were updated in
September of this year.  S&P expects capital controls will remain
in place throughout 2016 in an effort to minimize any further
exchange-rate volatility.

Since end-2014, official reserve assets (including swap
arrangements with Sweden's Riksbank and the People's Bank of
China) have increased by $5.4 billion to $13.0 billion as of end-
October, reflecting IMF foreign currency loan inflows, reduced
external debt payments, the imposition of capital controls, and
the shift of the current account into balance (due to an even
sharper contraction in U.S. dollar-denominated imports versus
exports).  With the debt exchange completed, public gross external
financing requirements are low--at $3.4 billion and just under
$4.0 billion in 2016 and 2017 respectively (about 4.5% of GDP for
both years, depending on exchange-rate developments), by S&P's
estimates.  However, overall gross external requirements,
including trade credit, deposits, and other short-term debt, over
the next several years remain very high--at $55 billion (62% of
GDP) and $58 billion (57% of GDP) for 2016 and 2017, respectively,
by S&P's estimates.  S&P assumes that foreign lenders will roll
over all external trade financing, which account for just above
one-third of this requirement.  However, whether nonresidents will
roll over all or part of the remaining $30 billion of gross
external financing requirements in 2016 and 2017, split between
short-term maturities and maturing medium- and long-term debt is
uncertain.  Rollover rates on medium- and long-term debt in 2015
have so far been well below 50% (versus the EFF program assumption
for next year of just over 80%).  An alternative financing source
for private sector external redemptions next year and in 2017
would be a combination of reserve depletion and private sector
default.  If state-owned and private-sector companies and banks
continue to default on foreign debt, S&P assumes this will not
have any additional destabilizing effect on the economy but will
proceed via negotiated debt restructurings (as has occurred in
2015).

Conditions in the financial sector appear precarious, with
confidence in the system strained.  S&P classifies Ukraine's
banking sector in group '10' ('1' being the lowest risk, and '10'
the highest) under S&P's Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment
(BICRA) methodology.  Foreign currency deposits are still down by
more than 20% this year, although they have started to stabilize
over the past few months.

The NBU officially floated the hryvnia in February 2015, and high
refinancing rates (22%), and strict currency controls are propping
it up.  Although the IMF program gives us greater confidence in
the near-term ability of the Ukrainian government to meet its
borrowing requirement as long as it stays in the program, S&P
thinks the government may face legal challenges to external bond
issuance when the program ends, if it has not resolved any
creditor disputes that may still persist.

In 2013, Russia lent Ukraine $3 billion, in the form of a
tradeable U.K.-law Eurobond. Holders of this $3 billion Eurobond
due Dec. 20, 2015 (which S&P now rates 'D') decided not to tender
the security in the October debt exchange.  S&P assumes one of two
treatments for this obligation:

   -- The Ukrainian government will pay the obligation out of its
      international reserves, because governments occasionally
      pay in full creditors who have not participated in an
      exchange offer to place the episode behind them; or

   -- The Ukrainian government will not pay the obligation, and
      will let it remain in default until another solution is
      found or the debt is repudiated.

S&P understands the IMF amended its policy on lending into arrears
on Dec. 8, 2015, allowing it to continue to disburse loans to
Ukraine under its $17.5 billion, four-year EFF program ending in
2018, regardless of whether the defaulted debt is deemed to be
official or private.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that over the next 12
months the Ukrainian government will maintain access to its
official creditor support by pursuing needed reforms, albeit with
a lag, on the fiscal, financial, and economic fronts.
Specifically, the stable outlook also factors in S&P's assumption
that an IMF-compliant 2016 budget is passed by early next year,
although S&P acknowledges that risks to this outcome are
substantial.

S&P foresees possible ratings upside in the event of the passage
of the proposed tax and tax administration reform that would
simplify and widen the government's revenue base, alongside
reforms to the business environment and the judiciary.  S&P could
also consider an upgrade if key state-owned banks and other
enterprises, including Naftogaz, cease their reliance on budgetary
and quasi fiscal support.

Although not S&P's base case, downside risk to the ratings could
build if Ukraine doesn't stay on track with the IMF program, its
conflict with the Russian Federation deepens, very sizable
contingent liabilities migrate to the general government balance
sheet, or if S&P concludes that a further debt exchange was
inevitable.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

All key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

                                        Rating
                                        To            From
Ukraine
Sovereign credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency           B-/Stable/B   B-/Stable/B
  Ukraine National Scale               uaBBB-/--/-- uaBBB-/--/--
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   B-            B-
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign Currency                      D             D
  Foreign Currency                      B-            B-



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


HBOS PLC: Former Chief Executives Responsible for Collapse
----------------------------------------------------------
Holly Williams at The Scotsman reports that executives in charge
at HBOS in the run-up to its collapse were "ultimately
responsible" for its failure and could face being struck off from
working in financial services following the much-delayed
publication of damning reports into the bank's demise.

City watchdogs will now look at taking potential further action
against former HBOS senior management after a report by
Andrew Green QC blasted past regulator the Financial Services
Authority for its failure to investigate a raft of top bosses, The
Scotsman says.

In a scathing assessment of the FSA's handling of the original
inquiries into HBOS, Mr. Green, as cited by The Scotsman, said the
regulator should have considered investigating ex-chief executives
Andy Hornby and James Crosby, as well as past chairman Lord
Stevenson.

Current regulators, the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential
Regulation Authority, will now review whether to take any
enforcement action against the trio of bankers, as well as other
managers holding key positions at the lender before its collapse
and subsequent taxpayer bailout, The Scotsman discloses.

The report named former senior managers at the bank that the FSA
should have looked into investigating as Mike Ellis, former
finance director, Colin Matthew, ex-head of the international
division and Lindsay Mackay, former boss of the treasury division,
The Scotsman relates.

But any decision into whether to take action against managers will
not come until next year and it could be another 18 months to two
years before regulators can enforce bans, The Scotsman
states.

HBOS, which was formed from the merger of Halifax and Bank of
Scotland in 2001, expanded too rapidly and lent recklessly before
the credit crunch and financial crisis struck, The Scotsman
relays.

It agreed to a rescue takeover by Lloyds in September 2008, but
the enlarged bank needed a GBP20.5 billion taxpayer bailout just
weeks later, The Scotsman recounts.

According to The Scotsman, a highly critical report by the
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards in April 2013
accused the trio of bankers of a "colossal failure of management".

The commission found that their "toxic" misjudgments led to the
bank's downfall at the height of the financial crisis, The
Scotsman notes.

HBOS plc is a banking and insurance company in the United Kingdom,
a wholly owned subsidiary of the Lloyds Banking Group having been
taken over in January 2009.  It is the holding company for Bank of
Scotland plc, which operates the Bank of Scotland and Halifax
brands in the UK, as well as HBOS Australia and HBOS Insurance &
Investment Group Limited, the group's insurance division.  The
group became part of Lloyds Banking Group through a takeover by
Lloyds TSB on January 19, 2009.


INDUS ECLIPSE 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Ratings on 3 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Indus (Eclipse 2007-1) plc's class B
floating rate notes due 2020 and affirmed the rest as follows:

  GBP5.5 million class B (XS0294757173) upgraded to 'Asf'
  from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable

  GBP50 million class C (XS0294757256) affirmed at 'Dsf'; Recovery
  Estimate (RE) revised to 80% from 50%

  GBP0 million class D (XS0294757504) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%

  GBP0 million class E (XS0294757686) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%

The transaction was originally a securitization of 18 commercial
loans originated by Barclays Bank plc (A/Stable) and one loan
originated by Bank of Scotland (A+/Stable). Eighteen loans have
repaid since closing in 2007, including six with losses, affecting
the class C, D and E notes. The total loan balance has been
reduced to GBP55.4 million in October 2015 from GBP894 million
originally.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of the class B notes and the revised RE on the class C
notes reflect that the resolution of four loans has resulted in
proceeds exceeding Fitch's expectations as of the last rating
action in December 2015. The rating actions also reflect the
stable occupational performance of the collateral for the sole
remaining loan, NOS 2 LTD and NOS 3 LTD (balance GBP55.8 million).
The class B rating reflects that its high debt yield is balanced
by the lack of detailed information on the properties in the pool,
many of which have not been revalued since closing in 2007.

The loan, which is in primary servicing, is due in January 2017.
It has repaid by 40% since closing, via asset sales and a one-off
GBP10m equity injection following a change of control in 2014. The
collateral consists of 225 mixed-use commercial properties located
in the UK, with approximately half in East Anglia, South East and
South West England. The vacancy rate had risen to 25% as at July,
compared with 19.5% a year ago and 10% at closing.

The reported loan-to-value of 48% is based on the original
valuation for most remaining assets and on a 2012 re-valuation for
the rest. Despite its fixed rate of interest (reflecting higher
legacy swap rates) and 25% vacancy, the loan still has an interest
coverage ratio of 2x. In case the loan defaults the issuer can
draw on GBP5m in a liquidity facility. Fitch expects a moderate
loss in case the loan defaults at maturity.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Should the loan default at maturity and remain outstanding beyond
July 2018, the class B notes would likely be downgraded given the
risk of the loan workout lasting longer than 18 months. Fitch
applies a 'BBBsf' rating cap in such circumstances.

Fitch estimates 'Bsf' proceeds of approximately GBP45 million.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's initial
closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


KCA DEUTAG: Moody's Affirms B3 CFR & Changes Outlook to Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the B3 corporate family rating
and B3-PD probability of default rating of KCA Deutag Alpha Ltd.
Moody's also affirmed the B3 ratings on the revolving credit
facility and term loan at KCA Deutag Alpha Ltd, the senior secured
notes at Globe Luxembourg SCA, and the senior secured notes at KCA
Deutag UK Finance plc.  The outlook on all ratings was changed to
negative from stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects Moody's view that KCA Deutag's credit
metrics could deteriorate further over the next twelve to eighteen
months due to continued pricing pressures and lower level of
activity, which in turn may weaken the company's liquidity
profile.  The company's Moody's-adjusted leverage stood at 4.8x as
of Sept. 30, 2015, compared to 4.3x at year-end 2014 but could
increase towards 6.0x by year-end 2016.

Land Drilling, 44% of last twelve month EBITDA as of
September 30, 2015 (LTM EBITDA), has been the most resilient
segment to date due to its exposure to regions with low marginal
production costs such as Russia and the Middle East, and
contribution from new rigs deployed in those regions offsetting
weak utilization in Europe, Nigeria and Kurdistan.  That being
said, Moody's cautions that the segment is not immune to pricing
pressures on day-rates especially when the company's rigs will
roll-off contract, albeit the company expects utilization rate to
remain stable in 2016.   Land drilling contracts in the company's
core markets typically range from two to five years.
Additionally, international land rig count has been more resilient
than the US where the company has no operations.

Platform Services, 29% of LTM EBITDA, is expected to continue to
be affected by market weaknesses in the UK North Sea.  Whist the
Norwegian North Sea has been more resilient to date, further
deterioration in market conditions could lead to more platforms
being stacked.  Moody's also notes that the company is currently
in discussion with BP for the contract renewal of the seven
platforms that the company operates in Azerbaijan.

Moody's expects soft level of activity at Bentec and RDS, 10% and
7% of LTM EBITDA respectively, due to cautious capex spend by oil
companies.  MODUs, 10% of LTM EBITDA, had a good performance this
year but only one of the two rigs is currently contracted.
Additionally, the company received notice from its customer that
the rig will be demobilized around January 2016, six months ahead
of its contractual termination date, albeit the company expects
the customer to honor the remaining payments.  The second rig,
currently uncontracted, could be sold by year-end.

More positively, the ratings are supported by the company's
geographic diversification and focus on international land
drilling markets, which are characterized by generally higher
barriers to entry -- and hence less volatile drilling activity --
relative to the North American drilling contractor market --
albeit with greater political risk.  It is also supported by the
company's greater exposure to more stable, development and
production drilling programs backed by a significant contract
backlog.

Moody's regards KCA Deutag's liquidity as adequate for its near-
term requirements albeit free cash flow generation will remain
constrained by high maintenance capex requirement and high
interest burden.  As of Sept. 30, 2015, the company had
unrestricted cash of USD29 million and USD135 million available
under the cash component of its revolving credit facility.  The
company also have access to USD50 million of shareholder funding
committed until September 2016.  Whilst the company currently has
adequate headroom under the net leverage covenant on its senior
secured credit facilities, Moody's cautions that headroom could
tighten over the coming quarters as the covenant will step down to
5.50x from 5.75x in 2016 and then to 5.25x from 2017 onwards.  The
company has no debt maturities until 2018.

The ratings incorporate Moody's assumptions that the company will
be able to alleviate any liquidity pressure by accessing the
remaining shareholder funding, and that the committed shareholder
funding including the USD50 million drawn earlier this year could
be used to cure a potential covenant breach if required.

RATING OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the continued softening of market
conditions combined with the lack of visibility around an eventual
stabilization.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the rating action, upward pressure on the rating is unlikely
in the near term.  However, over time, the rating could be
upgraded following Moody's adjusted leverage moving sustainably
towards 4.5x, together with an improvement in liquidity and a near
term expectation of positive free cash flow generation.  Any
potential upgrade would also include an assessment of market
conditions.

The CFR could face downward pressure if Moody's-adjusted leverage
rises to 6.0x or above, or if the liquidity profile deteriorates.
Furthermore, debt purchases at a discount to par to alleviate
liquidity or refinancing issues could lead to such actions being
potentially classified as a distressed exchange, albeit at this
stage there is no evidence suggesting that the company has
concrete plans to do so.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Oilfield Services Industry Rating Methodology published in
December 2014.

Headquartered in the UK, KCA Deutag is a provider of onshore and
offshore drilling services as well as engineering services to both
IOCs and NOCs in international markets.  Its ultimate owner is a
consortium led by Pamplona Capital Management.  In 2014, KCA
Deutag reported revenues of USD2.1 billion.


REDTOP ACQUISITIONS: Moody's Corrects Dec. 3 Ratings Release
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service on Dec. 11 issued a correction to its
Dec. 3 rating release.

The revised version is as follows:

Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba3 rating to the new
EUR52 million senior secured first lien loan due 2020 to be issued
by Redtop Acquisitions Limited (CPA), the parent holding company
of CPA Global, as an incremental facility under its senior
facilities agreement.  The proceeds of the loan will be used to
finance the acquisition of Innography Inc., an Intellectual
Property (IP) analytics business headquartered in Austin, USA.

CPA's B1 corporate family rating (CFR), B1-PD Probability of
Default Rating (PDR), the Ba3 instrument rating of the existing
USD643 million equivalent senior secured first lien term loan
facilities due 2020, the Ba3 instrument rating of the USD80
million revolving credit facility (RCF) due 2018 and the B3
instrument rating of the USD280 million second lien loan facility
due 2021 are affirmed."

RATINGS RATIONALE

CPA's B1 corporate family rating (CFR) incorporates its high
financial leverage 5.9x at July 31, 2015, and 6.1x (Moody's-
adjusted pro-forma leverage) based on acquisition details provided
by management.  The rating derives considerable support from the
company's strong business profile including (1) CPA's leading
market position in the patent renewal niche market; (2) a degree
of revenue predictability from CPA's resilient patent renewal
business, which represents about 70% of the company's gross
income; and (3) CPA's history of low customer churn of less than
5%.

Innography provides subscription-based online patent search and
analysis software tools, leveraging CPA's unique database of 100
million global patent documents that are correlated to other
relevant IP-related information.  Innography was founded in 2006
with a focus on big data analytics for business intelligence, in
particular patent related information.  The Company is
headquartered in Austin, Texas and now employs 78 staff.
Innography has a diverse client portfolio of over 300 clients
across a range of industries, including energy, financial
services, healthcare, internet services, patent services and law
firms.  The business has a blue chip client base counting
International Business Machines Corporation ("IBM"), Microsoft
Corporation, Bayer AG, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Huawei, Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd., Halliburton Company, The Coca-Cola Company
and General Motors Company as clients.  Revenue in the year ended
31st December 2014 was $10.9 million and was generated across
multiple sectors with no material client concentration.

CPA's leverage of 5.9x as of financial year ending 31 July 2015
remains high for the B1 rating category.  Moody's estimates that
pro-forma for the Innography acquisition, leverage will increase
to 6.1x.  Moody's expects that the company will de-lever below
6.0x quickly and will then maintain its leverage below this
threshold.  Moody's anticipates that moderated growth in patent
renewal revenues, as well as additional focus on cross-selling
products and services, will continue to drive positive EBITDA
growth although this is likely to be at a slower rate than in
recent years.  The rating benefits from CPA's track record of
deleveraging through a combination of debt repayment and EBITDA
growth.  With low annual capex, the company demonstrates good free
cash flow generation.

CPA's loan facilities are covenant-lite with only a springing
covenant relating to the revolving credit facility (when it is at
least 30% drawn).  Despite the financial flexibility that this
implies in terms of dividend payments and/or acquisitions, the B1
CFR assumes that CPA will maintain its leverage below 6.0x on a
sustained basis.

Moody's notes that patent renewal Gross Income per Case declined
by 6.7% in FY2015 (down 1.6% on a constant currency underlying
basis).  Moody's considers that after a long run of uninterrupted
growth in patent renewal revenue, the company has now reached a
more sensitive point in the price/volume balance at which
additional price increases adversely affect volumes.
Consequently, Moody's expects revenue growth (on a constant
currency basis) from the patents renewal business to remain low in
FY 2016.  Future patents renewal revenue growth will be driven to
a greater extent by patent volume growth.  The market is estimated
to be growing by 5% per annum in volume terms and management is
seeking to maintain market share.  The challenge for management is
to ensure that volume growth is not offset by a deterioration in
the business mix as larger clients offering greater volumes are
increasingly seeking more competitive rates.

With a more mature position in the Renewals market, Group revenue
growth will be driven to a greater degree by acquisitions and
growth in the Software and Services businesses.  In 2014, CPA
acquired Landon to develop its Services offering, followed by the
acquisition of Innography in 2015.  The development of business
lines complimentary to, but outside of, the core renewals business
adds a degree of risk to the business profile.  Moody's notes that
the Landon acquisition has been successful and synergies are
flowing through, albeit slightly behind expectation.

The rating is supported by strong market position and revenue
visibility.  In renewals, the company's core market, CPA benefits
from a market share of around twice that of its nearest
competitors.  Providing renewals on a global scale is technically
complex, requiring a high degree of accuracy for a high volume of
cases that require IT systems and data management tools.  Moody's
considers this would be costly to replicate and therefore acts as
a significant barrier to market entry.  While patents are granted
for up to 20 years, they typically have an average life span of
around 13 years.  The requirement to pay a maintenance fee at
intervals throughout the life of the patent ensures a strong
pipeline of recurring revenue and good visibility.  This also
provides cross-sell opportunities to the complimentary analytics
market.

CPA's rating positively reflects the company's strong geographic
and end-market diversification.  This is supported by a suite of
products and services that spans 6,300 clients in 181 countries.
The company benefits from low customer churn and long-standing
customer relationships.  Around 70% of CPA's clients have been
clients for more than 10 years.  CPA is not exposed to one
specific industry and has a wide geographic presence, although the
US makes up the majority of patent renewal cases by volume (35%).
Moody's estimates that no one firm represents more than 3% of
total gross income and CPA's top five customers represent less
than 10% of gross income combined.  The company has some revenue
concentration through strategic alliances, with its largest (in
Japan) representing around 10% of gross income.  Mitigating this
exposure is CPA's long-standing relationship with that entity,
which dates back to 1979.

Moody's deems CPA's liquidity profile to be good.  It is supported
by a GBP58.6 million cash balance as at July 31, 2015, (despite
having spent GBP27.1 million on acquisitions including Landon IP).
Pro-forma for the acquisition of Innography, management forecasts
a cash balance of GBP22.9 million in addition to a USD80 million-
equivalent undrawn committed revolving credit facility (RCF).

The Ba3 rating to CPA's senior secured first lien loans, one notch
higher than the CFR, reflects the cushion provided by the second
lien, which ranks junior in the debt waterfall.  The debt
facilities will benefit from guarantees by all material
subsidiaries representing at least 80% of the group's EBITDA and
gross assets.  The B3 rating assigned to the second lien term loan
reflects its contractual subordination to the senior secured first
lien facilities.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

Moody's considers that CPA's earnings growth is likely to remain
at a reduced rate over the ratings horizon as growth in the core
patent renewals business has slowed.  Moody's now considers the
company to be weakly positioned in the B1 rating category and
there is limited headroom for additional debt-funded M&A at this
time.  The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the
company will reduce its leverage below 6.0x quickly and will
sustain leverage below 6.0x to the end of July 2017 through EBITDA
growth and/or prepayment of the debt facilities.  It also assumes
that the company will maintain a solid liquidity profile and that
the Founding Firm client referral contracts that expire in 2016
are renewed on comparable terms.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- UP/DOWN

Positive pressure on the ratings could develop if CPA is able to
reduce adjusted leverage comfortably below 5.0x, while maintaining
a solid liquidity profile.

Negative pressure could develop if credit metrics do not improve
as projected.  This would include debt-to-EBITDA not falling below
6.0x by the end of July 2016.  Any concerns regarding the
company's liquidity profile could also exert negative pressure on
the ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in December 2014.

Headquartered in Jersey, CPA, formerly known as Computer Patent
Annuities, is a business outsourcing company that provides a range
of intellectual property (IP) and legal support services globally.
The company has two main business areas (1) renewals (accounting
for about 70% of the company's gross income in the financial year
ended July 2015 2014), which include monitoring and renewing
patents and trademarks on behalf of corporate clients or patent
lawyers; and (2) non-renewals (30% of gross income), which include
software solutions for IP management, middle- and back-office
legal process outsourcing, trademark infringement surveillance,
and patent research services.  In August 2014, CPA acquired Landon
IP, based in Alexandria, Virginia, which provides patent search
and analytics services and which will further develop non-renewal
revenues.  CPA is majority-owned by funds managed or advised by
private equity firm Cinven.  For the fiscal year ending 31 July
2015, CPA generated revenues of GBP1,024 million.


RMAC 2005-NS1: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class B1 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed 83 tranches of the
RMAC RMBS series.

The RMAC transactions are securitizations of UK non-conforming
loans, originated by GMAC-RFC Limited.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Credit Enhancement (CE)

The high seasoning of the transactions has led to the portfolios
deleveraging to between 3.8% (RMAC 2003-2) and 49.2% (RMAC 2007-1)
of their initial pool balances.

The structures of the earlier deals (RMAC 2003-2, 2003-3, 2003-4,
2004-1 and 2004-2) in the series do not include reserve funds but
are instead over-collateralised. The reserve funds for all other
transactions have either amortized to floor level or are no longer
allowed to amortize as a result of breach of the cumulative loss
trigger (set at 1.25% of the initial portfolio balance for all
transactions). As a result, CE across the series has continued to
build up steadily. In particular, Fitch believes the build-up of
CE on the mezzanine tranches of RMAC 2007-1 (B1a and B1c) can now
sustain higher ratings stresses and has upgraded these tranches.

Solid Performance

The affirmations across the rest of the transactions reflect the
strong performance of the underlying portfolios. The volume of
loans in arrears by more than three months remains between 4.2%
(RMAC 2004-NSP2) and 10.1% (RMAC 2007-NS1) of their respective
portfolio balances. For the 2006 and 2007 deals, the levels remain
comparable with the UK non-conforming average of 9.7% while the
2003-2005 deals remain far below this level.

Unhedged Interest Rate Risk

The portfolios of RMAC 2003-2, 2003-3, 2003-4 and 2004-1 comprise
solely LIBOR-linked loans. All other RMAC portfolios contain
varying proportions of BBR-linked loans, between 26% (RMAC 2004-3)
and 84% (RMAC 2006-1). These transactions are not hedged against
the basis risk between the LIBOR-linked notes and BBR-indexed
mortgages. In its analysis, Fitch stressed the excess spread to
account for this risk and found the CE available to the rated
notes sufficient to withstand the stresses.

Interest Only Concentration

The transactions have material concentration of interest-only
loans maturing within a three-year period during the lifetime of
the transaction. As per its criteria, Fitch carried out a
sensitivity analysis assuming a 50% default probability for these
loans. No rating action was deemed necessary as a result of the
interest-only loan concentration. Nevertheless, Fitch will keep
monitoring this risk as the transactions continue to amortize.

Currency Swap Obligations

The affirmation of the currency swap ratings are based on Fitch's
view that the swap payment obligations rank pro rata and equally
with the referenced notes. Consequently, the credit profiles of
the currency swap payment obligations are consistent with the
long-term rating on the referenced notes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The transactions are backed by floating-interest-rate loans. In
the current low interest rate environment, borrowers are
benefiting from low borrowing costs. An increase in interest rates
could lead to performance deterioration of the underlying assets
and consequently downgrades of the notes if defaults and
associated losses exceed those of Fitch's stresses.

Any change to the rating of the corresponding notes will likely
lead to an equal change in the rating of the SPV's currency swap
obligations. The rating sensitivity will primarily be driven by
the rating analysis applicable to the corresponding note. The
rating of the SPV's currency swap obligations will be withdrawn if
the currency swap agreement is terminated due to non-performance
by the swap counterparty or a non-credit related event.

The proposed criteria, if adopted, will lead to smaller loss
expectations for all types of mortgage portfolios. As a result,
Fitch expects all outstanding UK RMBS and covered bond ratings to
either be affirmed or upgraded. If the current criteria are
updated after considering market feedback, Fitch will review all
existing UK RMBS ratings within six months of the new criteria
publication.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions' initial
closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

RMAC 2003-NS2 Plc
Class A3 (ISIN XS0171105439): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable

RMAC 2003-NS3 Plc
Class A3 (ISIN USG7603WAH19) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable

RMAC 2003-NS4 Plc
Class A3 (ISIN XS0179780803) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable

RMAC 2004-NS1 Plc
Class A3 (ISIN XS0185375325) affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

RMAC 2004-NS3 Plc
Class A2a (ISIN XS0200800943) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2c (ISIN XS0200802568) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1 (ISIN XS0200802725) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2 (ISIN XS0200803962) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0200804770) affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable

RMAC 2004-NSP2 Plc
Class A3 (ISIN XS0194465653) affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable

RMAC 2004-NSP4 Plc
Class A2 (ISIN XS0206944240) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1 (ISIN XS0206944596) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2 (ISIN XS0206944836) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1 (ISIN XS0206945056) affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable

RMAC 2005-NS1 Plc
Class A2a (ISIN XS0212187826) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2c (ISIN XS0212189103) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1 (ISIN XS0212190028) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2 (ISIN XS0212191851) affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1 (ISIN XS0212192669) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

RMAC 2005-NS3 Plc
Class A2a (ISIN XS0230220443) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2c (ISIN XS0230220872) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1a (ISIN XS0230221250) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1c (ISIN XS0230221334) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2a (ISIN XS0230221763) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2c (ISIN XS0230222068) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1a (ISIN XS0230222225) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1c (ISIN XS0230222498) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

RMAC 2005-NS4 Plc
Class A3 (ISIN XS0235775854) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1 (ISIN XS0235781159) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2 (ISIN XS0235778106) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1 (ISIN XS0235782801) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

RMAC 2005-NSP2 Plc
Class A2a (ISIN XS0220953235) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2b (ISIN XS0220954712) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2c (ISIN XS0220957061) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1a (ISIN XS0220957657) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1c (ISIN XS0220959356) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2a (ISIN XS0220958036) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2c (ISIN XS0220959604) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1a (ISIN XS0220958465) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1c (ISIN XS0220961097) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1c Cross Currency Swap affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2b Currency Swap Obligation affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable
Class A2c Currency Swap Obligation affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable
Class M1c Currency Swap Obligation affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable
Class M2c Currency Swap Obligation affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
Stable

RMAC Securities No 1 Plc (Series 2006-NS1)
Class A2a (ISIN XS0248588047) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2c (ISIN XS0248595091) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1a (ISIN XS0248589524) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1c (ISIN XS0248596735) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2a (ISIN XS0248590613) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2c (ISIN XS0248595687) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1c (ISIN XS0248597543) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1 Currency Swap Obligation affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable
Class M2c Currency Swap Obligation affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
Stable
Class A2c Currency Swap Obligation affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable
Class M1c Currency Swap Obligation affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook
Stable

RMAC Securities No 1 Plc (Series 2006-NS2)
Class A2a (ISIN XS0257367960) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2c (ISIN XS0257369073) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1a (ISIN XS0257369156) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1c (ISIN XS0257370329) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2c (ISIN XS0257371137) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1a (ISIN XS0257371301) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1c (ISIN XS0257372374) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1c Currency Swap Obligation affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable
Class M2c Currency Swap Obligation affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
Stable
Class M1c Currency Swap Obligation affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook
Stable

RMAC Securities No 1 Plc (Series 2006-NS3)
Class A2a (ISIN XS0268014353) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1a (ISIN XS0268021721) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1c (ISIN XS0268024071) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2c (ISIN XS0268027769) affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable

RMAC Securities No 1 Plc (Series 2006-NS4)
Class A3 (ISIN XS0277409446) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1a (ISIN XS0277411004) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1c (ISIN XS0277437223) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2a (ISIN XS0277457841) affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2c (ISIN XS0277445671) affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1a (ISIN XS0277450838) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1c (ISIN XS0277453691) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable

RMAC Securities No 1 Plc (Series 2007-NS1)
Class A2a (ISIN XS0307493162) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2b (ISIN XS0307489566) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2c (ISIN XS0307505601) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1a (ISIN XS0307496264) affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M1c (ISIN XS0307506674) affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class M2c (ISIN XS0307511591) affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1a (ISIN XS0307500479) upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf' RE:
95%; Outlook Stable
Class B1c (ISIN XS0307512219) upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf' RE
95%; Outlook Stable


SK PERFORMANCE: Enters Liquidation, Vehicles Seized
---------------------------------------------------
Ian Proctor at The Bolton News reports that SK Performance Cars
that had swish sports cars including a GBP105,000 Ferrari seized
has been officially wound up.

The company was recently closed by a judge, The Bolton News
relates.

The judicial decision halted in its tracks a proposed company
voluntary arrangement (CVA) that would have seen creditors get
back 68p in the pound of what they are owed, The Bolton News
notes.

The CVA was being prepared on behalf of the firm's sole director
by Doncaster-based insolvency practitioners Absolute Recovery and
showed the creditors -- including the company's own director --
are owed a total of about GBP800,000, The Bolton News discloses.

Ex-customers do not, however, have the confidence they will
receive the entire value of their car or all the sums they are
owed, The Bolton News states.

Things began to unravel for the firm when the High Court sitting
in Leeds approved the appointment of a provisional liquidator --
Critchleys based in Oxford -- at the end of October, The Bolton
News recounts.

Three days later, court enforcement officers acting on a warrant
went to confiscate all of the expensive vehicles in the showroom
and on the forecourt and to shut up shop, The Bolton News
discloses.

According to The Bolton News, in a further hearing back at the
High Court in Leeds on Dec. 8, SK Performance Cars was wound up
and the official receiver in Manchester was appointed the
liquidator.

The winding up came about as a result of a petition by a company
director named Peter Birch, of Stainton near Rotherham, South
Yorkshire, The Bolton News notes.

SK Performance Cars is a luxury car dealership based in Bolton.


TIG FINCO: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlook on TIG Finco PLC's
(Towergate) Long-term Issuer Default Rating to Negative from
Stable and affirmed the IDR at 'B-'. Fitch has also affirmed
Towergate's GBP75 million super senior secured notes and GBP425
million senior secured notes due 2020 at 'BB-'/'RR1' and 'B'/'RR3'
respectively.

The Negative Outlook reflects Towergate's underperformance against
a number of Fitch's negative rating sensitivity metrics, including
leverage, free cash flow (FCF) and EBITDA margin. Fitch believes
there is significant execution risk associated with the
implementation of Towergate's strategic plan due to tightening
liquidity and continued pressure on FCF. Nonetheless, newly
appointed management has only recently started implementing its
turnaround plan and the rating actions are based on Fitch's rating
case, updated for 3Q15 reported results, not new forward guidance
from the company.

The Outlook could be revised back to Stable if the plan delivers
stabilization and improvement in cash generation and metrics
return towards 'B-' medians for the sector.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Execution Risk

Towergate has a new management team in place. Fitch views the
experienced new management team favorably but believes that
significant execution risk still remains in extracting the
required operational efficiencies to improve profitability and
reduce leverage over the next two years. Fitch expects significant
restructuring costs to continue into 2016 due to further cost-
saving initiatives and investment in IT platforms.

Weak Deleveraging Profile

If the new strategic plan is not implemented effectively, Fitch
believes that funds from operations (FFO) adjusted gross leverage
could remain above 7.5x and FFO fixed charge coverage below 1.5x
over the next two years, metrics more in line with 'CCC' rated
peers. Material deleveraging is not forecast, as the challenging
operating environment in the UK non-life insurance market
persists.

Tightening Liquidity Profile

Fitch believes that despite the reduction in interest costs, the
continued decrease in earnings is starting to put pressure on
liquidity. Continuing earnings pressure across all divisions
coupled with the challenging market environment has resulted in a
tightening liquidity profile. The company does not have access to
alternate committed sources of liquidity. The new capital
structure does not include an revolving credit facility (RCF) for
additional liquidity, and the possibility of further asset sales
remain limited as non-core assets were sold prior to the financial
restructure in March 2015. Financial flexibility therefore remains
constrained.

Negative Free Cash Flow

The primary use of cash is interest payments, with working capital
needs low. Cash outflows are expected to continue, with low
earnings growth and a high cost base likely to keep FCF negative
over the rating horizon. Further contributing to a negative FCF
profile are payments Towergate might have to pay as redress, in
respect of past advice provided by Towergate Financial on enhanced
transfer values (ETV) and unregulated collective investment
schemes (UCIS). Fitch believes that these restructuring and
compensation costs could result in Towergate's FCF profile
remaining negative until end-2017.

Leading UK Non-Life Intermediary

Despite the recent financial distress and weakened operating
performance, Towergate continues to maintain its leading position
as an independent insurance intermediary in the UK, albeit at
lower margins. It continues to maintain its relationship with
leading insurance providers and has a wide distribution platform
and significant underwriting capacity in the niche segment of the
personal and SME commercial non-life insurance market.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Organic revenue remaining flat for 2015-2017.

-- EBITDA margin also remaining flat in 2015-2017, with only a
    modest improvement over the rating horizon.

-- Capex and restructuring cash outflows as per management
    guidance.

-- FFO adjusted gross leverage increasing towards 10x by 2016
    before easing from 2018 onwards, driven by reduced costs
    associated with the transformation plan and the running off
    of costs associated with UCIS/ETV.

-- Liquidity tightening during 2015-2017.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future developments that could lead to downgrade include:

-- The need to access additional credit facilities to meet
    liquidity needs.

-- FFO adjusted gross leverage remaining above 7.5x and FFO
   fixed charge cover remaining below 1.5x on a sustained basis
    and sustained negative FCF.

-- Lack of improvement in EBITDA margin, suggesting no
    efficiency gains realised from the restructuring.

Future developments that could lead to a revision of the Outlook
to Stable include:

-- Upward momentum in EBITDA to a level where cash flow
    generation supports business needs.

-- Evidence of financial metrics coming back into line with 'B-'
    peers, such as FFO fixed charge cover above 1.5x and FFO
    adjusted gross leverage below 7.5x on a sustained basis.

LIQUIDITY

Towergate's capital structure comprises super senior secured notes
and senior secured notes. The super senior secured notes are pari
passu with the senior secured notes, but rank first upon the
application of proceeds upon enforcement.

Both series are bullet maturities and long-dated, with repayments
commencing in February 2020. The non-amortizing profile of both
series of notes will also help preserve cash in the business.
However, cash restructuring costs continue to represent a material
use of cash, followed by interest on the notes and capex.

Other sources of liquidity remain limited and the new capital
structure does not contain a RCF. However, there are allowances
for additional uncommitted credit facilities in the bond
indentures.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

TIG Finco PLC

-- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook revised to Negative
    from Stable

-- Super senior secured notes: affirmed at 'BB-'/'RR1'

-- Senior secured notes: downgraded to 'B-'/'RR4'


VIRIDIAN GROUP: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Viridian Group Investments Limited's
(VGIL) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+'. Fitch has
also affirmed Viridian Group Fundco II Limited's notes senior
secured rating at 'B+' and Viridian Group Limited's (VGL) and
Viridian Power and Energy Holdings Limited's (VPEHL) super senior
revolving credit facility (RCF) senior secured rating at 'BB+'.
The Outlook on the IDR is Stable.

The affirmation reflects VGIL's adequate operating and financial
performance and Fitch's expectation that the company would slow
down the pace of its investments and generate substantial positive
free cash (FCF) flow from the financial year ending March 31, 2017
onwards. At the same time, the ratings are under pressure from
adverse regulatory developments of the last 12 months and from
considerable cash interest payments on a subordinated shareholder
loan.

Financial metrics have limited headroom at the current rating.
Headroom could further decrease if investments increase.
Transition to the I-SEM (integrated single electricity market) in
4Q17 could also be credit-negative for Viridian.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Possible Change of Control

VGIL's ultimate shareholders are currently assessing strategic
options for their interest in the company, which may or may not
lead to a sale in due course. A change of ownership would trigger
change of control clauses in VGIL's super-senior RCF, senior
secured notes and its parent company's PIK (payment in kind)
instrument. In the event of a sale, we would assess its rating
impact once more details are available.

Successful Refinancing

In February 2015, the company refinanced its 11.1% EUR313 million
and USD250 million senior secured notes due 2017 with EUR600
million 7.5% senior secured notes due 2020. Proceeds were also
used to pay down GBP64 million of the subordinated shareholder
loan (13.5% interest-bearing), which is currently classified as an
equity-like PIK instrument by Fitch. As a result of the
refinancing, the company has substantially reduced its interest
costs, extended its debt maturity profile, but also increased its
leverage.

Unfavorable Regulatory Developments

In 2015, a number of adverse regulatory changes took place,
including a 10% capacity pot reduction from January 1, 2016, early
termination of renewable obligation support for onshore wind and
removal of levy exemption certificates in Northern Ireland. These
developments will have a moderately negative impact on VGIL's
financial profile, in particular, in FY17, when the full-year
impact of capacity pot reduction will feed through.

Adverse Market Dynamics

Single Market Price (SMP) has been continuously declining since
2013, largely due to falling gas prices, but also due to
increasing renewables contribution to the single electricity
market. Given large amount of wind capacity in the pipeline and
the government's ambitious renewable targets, merit order and SMP
will be negatively impacted in the medium- to long-term. Unless
gas prices rebound, we do not expect SMP to recover.

VGIL's renewable PPAs segment would be impacted by lower SMP.
Contracts with wind farms in Ireland are largely based on fixed
price, while Northern Ireland's portfolio is mostly variably
priced. REFIT contracts in Ireland benefit from floor price
protection.

VGIL's two CCGT plants, Huntstown 1 and Huntstown 2, have been
running at less than 10% unconstrained utilization in the last 12
months. These plants are used for system support and are
profitable due to capacity payments.

Transition to I-SEM Potentially Negative

The Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM) regulators are working
on a detailed design of the new all-island electricity market, I-
SEM, which will be compatible with the electricity markets of
continental Europe. I-SEM introduction is planned for 4Q17. We
expect greater electricity price convergence between Ireland and
continental Europe, with SMP approaching European levels in the
medium term. We also expect lower capacity payments, which will be
allocated based on a competitive auction. In addition to capacity
payments, a larger pool of ancillary payments would be introduced
(increased to GBP235m from GBP40m-GBP50m currently), including
payments for operating reserve or voltage support.

The company's CCGTs could be disadvantaged, depending on their
ability to compensate lower capacity payments with ancillary
services' earnings. The overall timing and magnitude of the impact
is still uncertain.

Stretched Financial Ratios

Fitch expects VGIL's funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net
leverage to remain broadly at the negative rating guideline of
5.0x in the next three years. Interest cover is forecast to remain
2.1x versus the guideline of 2.0x. In our updated forecast
deleveraging is much slower than what we had expected a year ago.
This is due to adverse market and regulatory developments, as well
as more conservative assumptions on PIK instrument interest
payments. Leverage headroom for the current rating is limited.

Continued Investment in Renewables

Renewables remain the core component of the company's long-term
growth strategy. In addition to the currently operational 34MW,
VGIL is developing projects with a combined capacity of 168MW. The
company also owns 24MW of renewable capacity via minority
participation and has 31MW in various stages of obtaining planning
permission and grid connections. VGIL is looking to acquire
further early-stage development projects and grow its overall
portfolio to 300MW. Around GBP40m of equity investments are
expected in FY16, which will be reflected as restricted group
capex. Bond documentation allows VGIL to make GBP70 million of
investments in renewable assets.

Non-recourse project financing facilities are in place for
operational and under construction wind farms. As at September 30,
2015, GBP56.4 million of project finance bank facilities were
included within VGIL's financial liabilities, up from GBP30.2m a
year ago. The significant increase in the facilities is due to the
company's active investment phase. VGIL expects renewables
investments to slow down from FY17. Fitch considers these
obligations as off- balance sheet as they are non-recourse and are
secured over the assets of specific projects.

Shareholder Loans and Project Finance

Fitch excludes VGIL's shareholder loans and non-recourse project
finance debt from the leverage calculations. These liabilities are
outside the restricted group and are not impacting either the
probability of default or recovery rates. Shareholder loans are
structurally and contractually subordinated to all other debt of
the group and have no independent enforcement rights.

Since September 2014 Viridian has been quarterly electing to cash-
pay interest on its interest-bearing subordinated shareholder loan
(junior facility A, raised at VGHL level, outside of the
restricted group) as opposed to deferring it. Junior facility A
bears an annual interest rate of 13.5%. The interest-bearing
portion of the subordinated shareholder loan amounted to GBP176m
at 30 September 2015. Cash interest payments have been reducing
the company's FCF and slowing down deleveraging. We continue to
rate the restricted group according to its debt, but we are taking
into account the dividend policy that would service the junior
facility A, which results in more conservative ratios.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Near-zero unconstrained utilization of both Huntstown 1 and 2
    for FY16-FY19.

-- System marginal price flat at 55 EUR/MWh before the I-SEM
    introduction, declining thereafter.

-- 10% capacity pot reduction implemented from 1 January 2016
    until I-SEM introduction in 4Q17. Capacity payments reduced
    by 20% post I-SEM introduction.

-- Renewable PPAs segment growth due to new own renewables
    coming on stream, partially offset by lower SMP forecast.

-- Margins in the currently regulated Power NI business to
    slowly decline, reflecting customer attrition and tariff
    decrease from April 1, 2015.

-- Gradual market share gain of the new retail supply business
    in the Republic of Ireland ('RoI Domestics') over FY16-FY19,

-- EBITDA from procurement of power from Ballylumform power
    station mirrors the regulatory determinations for FY16-FY17,
    and zero thereafter.

-- Capex reflects predominantly investments in renewables assets
    and is funded from internally generated cash flow. Average
    capex spending assumed at GBP25m per annum for FY16-FY19.

-- GBP24 million annual cash interest payment on shareholder
    loan.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: An upgrade is unlikely in the near term. In the longer
term, we could consider a positive rating action should FFO
adjusted net leverage decrease below 4x on a sustained basis and
FFO interest cover trend towards 3x.

Negative: Further adverse regulatory changes, increase in
investments or a failure to generate substantial positive FCF from
FY17 onwards would be negative for the ratings. We could consider
a negative rating action if FFO adjusted net leverage weakens
further to above 5x and FFO interest cover falls below 2x on a
sustained basis.

LIQUIDITY

Liquidity is adequate as debt maturities were extended to 2020 as
part of the refinancing. Liquidity is further supported by cash
and short-term deposits of GBP70.9 million and a fully undrawn RCF
of GBP100 million at September 30, 2015. Fitch projects negative
FCF of GBP44 million in FY16.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Viridian Group Investments Limited
-- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook Stable

Viridian Group Fundco II Limited
-- Senior secured rating: affirmed at 'B+'/'RR4'

Viridian Group Limited
-- Senior secured rating: affirmed at 'BB+'/'RR1'

Viridian Power and Energy Holdings Limited
-- Senior secured rating: affirmed at 'BB+'/'RR1'


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
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Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
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