TCREUR_Public/160126.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, January 26, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 017


                            Headlines


A R M E N I A

ARMENIA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Long-term Issuer Default Ratings


G R E E C E

GREECE: Int'l Monetary Fund Reiterates Call for Debt Relief
GREECE: S&P Lifts Sovereign Credit Rating to 'B-', Outlook Stable


I C E L A N D

IBUDALANASJODUR: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Ratings, Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

EATON VANCE: Moody's Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes to Ba3


L U X E M B O U R G

LUXEMBOURG INVESTMENT: S&P Assigns 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

DPX HOLDINGS: Moody's Updates Database to Reflect Missing Loans
INDIGOLD CARBON: S&P Withdraws 'BB-' Corporate Credit Rating
KHAMSIN CREDIT: S&P Withdraws CCC- Rating on Series 30 Notes
METINVEST BV: Seeking U.S. Recognition of English Proceeding
MILLENNIUM OFFSHORE: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corp. Family Rating


R U S S I A

B&N BANK: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Ratings, Outlook Neg.
BANK PIVDENNYI: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' IDR, Then Withdraws Rating
BASTION-LINE LLC: Bank of Russia Suspends Insurance Licenses
BRUNSWICK RAIL: Bondholder Group Questions Loan Decision
KIROV REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Ratings

KOSTROMA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
MEZHREGIONBANK: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
NOVIKOMBANK: Rostec to Provide Additional Capital Due to Loans
RUSSIAN RYAZAN: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
SISTEMA JSFC: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3-PD, Outlook Stable

SOGLASIE INSURANCE: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Ratings, Outlook Negative
VEB: Will Need State Funds in Second Quarter, Chairman Says
VNESHPROMBANK: S&P Affirms, Then Withdraws D Counterparty Rating
VOLGOGRAD REGION: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT Issuer Default Ratings


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: Brazil in Talks with Investors Over Stalled Projects
IM CAJAMAR 4: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Series E Debt
TDA 31: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC-'


S W I T Z E R L A N D

MNP PETROLEUM: Raises Going Concern Doubt, Needs More Funding


U K R A I N E

NIZHNIY NOVGOROD: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB-'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

EASTERN CONTINENTAL: Seeks US Recognition of UK Proceeding
MISSOURI TOPCO: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B3' CFR to Negative
* UK: Insolvencies in Oil & Gas Service Sector Surge in 2015


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Puts 12 Mining Cos. in EMEA on Review for Downgrade


                            *********



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A R M E N I A
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ARMENIA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Armenia's long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B+' with a Stable
Outlook. Fitch has also affirmed the issue ratings on Armenia's
senior unsecured foreign currency bonds at 'B+'. The Country
Ceiling has been affirmed at 'BB-' and the Short-term foreign
currency IDR at 'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'B+' rating reflects the following factors:

Armenia's ratings are supported by its relatively high human
development and governance indicators, favorable business climate
and increasing economic resilience. However, they are weighed
down by vulnerabilities to external shocks, high levels of
external and foreign currency debt and political risks.

The Armenian economy is vulnerable to external shocks and has
been adversely affected by the recession in Russia and drop in
global commodity prices, which caused severe financial pressure
in late 2014 and a sharp contraction in domestic demand in 2015.
In 2014 Russia accounted for 80% of remittances (14% of GDP), 20%
of exports and 44% of FDI; while copper accounted for 22% of
exports, and other metals, minerals and gold for another 26%.
Total remittances dropped by 33% YoY -- the equivalent of 4.5% of
GDP -- in the first three quarters of 2015, while copper prices
were down 28% YoY in December 2015.

However, Armenia has proved remarkably resilient to the magnitude
of this shock, reflecting a strong trade performance, access to
international financing and an effective policy response, under
the aegis of an IMF program. Nevertheless, with oil prices, the
Russian rouble and copper prices well below their average 2015
levels and still under downward pressure, it is too early to
declare the external shock over, in Fitch's view.

Fitch estimates GDP growth was 2.7% in 2015, revised up from its
forecast of 1.5% in July. It estimates domestic demand fell by
4.9%, but net trade underpinned growth. Imports dropped 26% YoY
(in USD terms) in the first three quarters of 2015, while exports
fell only 1%, supported by the opening of the Teghut copper mine
and strong growth of agriculture output. Fitch forecasts GDP
growth at 2% in 2016, before picking up to 2.8% in 2017, but the
outlook depends on external conditions.

The remarkable rebalancing of the economy and access to funding
has eased pressures on Armenia's external finances. Fitch
estimates the current account deficit narrowed to 4.3% of GDP in
2015, from 7.3% in 2014, despite the drop in remittances. Foreign
exchange reserves recovered to USD1,771 million in December 2015
from USD1,261 million in February 2015, helped by the issue of a
USD500 million eurobond in March (USD300 million net of the
buyback of the eurobond due in 2020), USD100 million from the
Eurasian Fund for Stabilisation and Development as well as
funding from the IMF and World Bank. Nevertheless, net external
debt is high, at an estimated 46.5% of GDP at end-2015, compared
with the 'B' category median of 21.5%.

The dram has been fairly stable against the USD following a 14%
depreciation between October 2014 and February 2015. Inflation
declined to 1.2% in November 2015, and the central bank (CBA) cut
its refinancing policy interest rate to 8.75% from 10.25% in
October. The banking sector had a capital adequacy ratio of 15.9%
as of end-October 2015 and will raise further capital to manage
the increase in minimum capital ratios to AMD30 billion from AMD5
billion. Bank credit growth has slowed sharply after prior rapid
expansion. Non-performing loans increased to 8% in October 2015,
from 6.7% a year earlier, although the CBA estimates this is
equivalent to 3.8% on international definitions. Nevertheless,
dollarization of deposits and loans is high at around 65%,
exposing the system to exchange rate depreciation.

Fitch estimates the budget deficit widened to 4% of GDP in 2015,
from 1.9% in 2014 and compared with a budget deficit target of
2.3%. The deterioration reflected weaker-than-expected growth as
well as policy measures to support the economy and social
protection, including to eliminate the minimum profit tax, reduce
the turnover tax rate, extend VAT payment dates on imports from
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and a subsidy to compensate
some consumers for the increase in electricity tariffs.
Nevertheless revenues held up well given the magnitude of the
fall in domestic demand (the tax-rich part of GDP). However, the
government also increased net lending to the economy,
representing a quasi-fiscal policy loosening. The 2016 budget
envisages a narrowing of the deficit to 3.5% of GDP, helped by an
increase in excise duties in May.

Public debt increased to an estimated 47.8% of GDP at end-2015,
from 43.6% at end-2014, below the 'B' category median of 52%, but
above the 'BB' category median of 44%. Some 85% of government
debt stock is in foreign currency, exposing Armenia to exchange
rate depreciation, but it has a long average maturity of 9.7
years and much of it is concessional at low interest rates.

The IMF has revised down its estimates of medium potential growth
to 3.5%, from 4.5%-5% before the shock, partly reflecting the
outlook for Russia and commodity prices. The ratio of
investment/GDP declined to an estimated 19% of GDP in 2015, from
an average of 36% in 2005-2009. Armenia improved its ranking in
the World Bank Doing Business Survey to 35th in 2015, from 38th
in 2014, although the survey does not fully capture factors such
as weak competition and geographic isolation. The government is
planning reforms to the tax code and business regulations and
inspections.

Armenia's referendum on constitutional reform on December 6, 2015
was approved with 66.2% of votes on a turnout of 50.5%, just
above the required 50% threshold. However, independent observers
allege cases of irregularities. EU and US statements called on
the Armenian authorities to fully investigate credible fraud
allegations in a transparent manner. The constitutional
amendments will reduce the powers of the presidency and increase
those of parliament.

Armenia's geopolitical environment weighs on the rating. The
latent conflict with Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-
Karabakh region entails the tail risk of escalating. No
resolution is expected in the near term. Armenia's close
relations with Russia have been strengthened further by Armenia's
accession to the EEU. However, Armenia retains strong trade
access to the EU.


RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's assessment that upside and
downside risks to the rating are currently balanced.

The main risk factors that, individually or collectively, could
trigger positive rating action are:

-- An improvement in external economic conditions, for example a
    recovery in the Russian economy, or Armenia's sustained
    resilience to them.

-- A decline in the government debt-to-GDP ratio.

The main risk factors that, individually or collectively, could
trigger negative rating action are:

-- Severe adverse spill-over from worsening economic conditions
    in Russia or lower commodity prices.

-- A marked drop in foreign exchange reserves.

-- Fiscal slippage leading to a significant rise in the
    government debt-to-GDP ratio

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch assumes that Armenia will continue to experience broad
social and political stability and no significant escalation in
the conflict with Azerbaijan regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.



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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Int'l Monetary Fund Reiterates Call for Debt Relief
-----------------------------------------------------------
Suzanne Lynch at The Irish Times reports that the International
Monetary Fund has reiterated its call for debt relief for Greece,
raising pressure on European countries to cede to Greek demands
for debt re-profiling.

The International Monetary Fund has reiterated its call for debt
relief for Greece, raising pressure on European countries to cede
to Greek demands for debt re-profiling, The Irish Times relates.

According to The Irish Times, in a statement released in Davos
following a meeting between Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras
and IMF managing director Christine Lagarde, the Washington-based
fund said it was ready to support Greece but only if it was
granted "significant" debt relief by its European partners.

The managing director reiterated that the IMF stands ready to
continue to support Greece in achieving robust economic growth
and sustainable public finances through a credible and
comprehensive medium-term economic program," The Irish Times
quotes the IMF as saying in a statement issued on Jan. 21 in
Davos.

"Such a program would require strong economic policies, not least
pension reforms as well as significant debt relief from Greece's
European partners to ensure that debt is on a sustainable
downward trajectory."

The IMF's position raises pressure on Greece's euro zone lenders
to endorse debt relief if they wants to secure IMF participation
in a third bailout program, The Irish Times states.

Euro zone finance ministers are due to discuss the latest state
of play with the Greek bailout at a scheduled meeting of euro
zone finance ministers on February 11th in Brussels, The Irish
Times discloses.


GREECE: S&P Lifts Sovereign Credit Rating to 'B-', Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Hellenic
Republic (Greece) to 'B-' from 'CCC+'.  The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P raised the short-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings to 'B' from 'C'.

RATIONALE

The upgrade reflects S&P's assessment that the Greek government
is broadly complying with the terms of its EUR86 billion
financial support program financed by eurozone member states via
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).  In particular, by the
end of March S&P expects a compromise to be reached on pension
reform that will balance the government's preference to raise
social security contributions and consolidate the separate
pension funds into a single system, with creditors' and the IMF's
focus on spending cuts to narrow an unsustainably high pension
deficit, currently estimated at 9% of GDP.  An impending
agreement on pension reform, leading to the successful conclusion
of the first review of the program, would raise the possibility
of additional relief on the official portion of Greece's general
government debt (which makes up 88% of all general government
medium- and long- term liabilities, including Eurosystem holdings
of Greek tradeable bonds).

In the face of two general elections, a referendum, the
imposition of capital controls, and further tax increases, the
Greek economy contracted only slightly last year (-0.3% is S&P's
2015 GDP forecast), with investment declining by a much larger
12%.  In particular, consumption was surprisingly resilient
during 2015 with car sales up 13.5% year-on-year.  This was
partly because, in the run up to capital controls, households
hedged themselves by frontloading purchases of consumer durables.
Ministry of Labor data also indicates that there was net private
sector job growth for 2015 as a whole, reinforcing expectations
that unemployment has finally peaked in Greece, albeit at the
highest level in the EU (24.5% in October 2015).

S&P's prognosis for the Greek economy is for one more year of
essentially flat growth, followed by a more robust recovery.  S&P
sees three key drags on GDP this year.  First, despite last
autumn's successful recapitalization exercise, S&P anticipates
that, throughout 2016, Greek financial institutions will remain
focused on cleaning up their balance sheets rather than lending
to the private sector; nonperforming loans (NPLs; European
Banking Authority definition) at Greek banks are at an estimated
46% of total loans, implying high levels of financial distress
among Greek corporates and households.

Second, under Greece's current (and third) official loan program,
the government is committed to increasing public savings this
year, which will directly subtract from GDP.  Further fiscal
tightening will be challenging to implement, not least because of
the precarious state of the health care and educational systems
after seven consecutive years of spending cuts.

Third, the carry-over from last year's GDP growth creates a
notable negative statistical effect for this year.  S&P also
expects that some of last year's exceptional consumer behavior
will reverse during 2016.  At the same time, some positive
effects could contribute to a stronger-than-anticipated recovery
this year. Further declines in oil prices during 2016 will
support consumption.  Financing arrangements under the program
include plans to pay down an estimated 3% of GDP of arrears to
the private sector, which firms are likely to use to clear their
own wage arrears to employees, who may spend it.  On top of this,
Greece's tourism sector, which saw record arrivals in 2015, is
well positioned to benefit during 2016 from a weak euro and
rising security risks in key competitors.

Since August of last year, there has been progress on most of the
program milestones.  The Greek government has partly relaxed
capital controls by liberalizing foreign exchange spot
transactions and derivatives trading, and raising limits on
transfers abroad.  The introduction of capital controls last year
seems to have had the unintended positive benefit of encouraging
the use of debit-card and other non-cash forms of payment,
apparently reducing the size of the informal economy.  Also
during 2015, the government passed important legislation
facilitating NPL sales and workouts, including the controversial
lifting of a moratorium on home repossessions.  Lastly, the VAT
regime has been simplified.

Last October, the ECB's banking supervisor estimated a stress
scenario capital shortfall in Greece's four large systemic banks
of EUR14.4 billion (8.2% of GDP).  By the end of 2015, banks had
raised 60% of this shortfall from private investors via a
combination of new equity, and bail-ins of junior creditors --
together totaling EUR9.0 billion (5.1% of GDP).  As a
consequence, the general government only had to assume EUR5.4
billion (3.1% of GDP) of the cost of supporting two of the four
banks versus the program assumption of nearly five times that
amount.  Any estimates of the long-term financial cost to the
state of this exercise, however, should also reflect the ensuing
dilution of the government's banking stakes given the low equity
component (the 25%/75% common equity to contingent convertible
bonds split) in the recapitalization contribution by the Hellenic
Financial Stability Fund.  There is also a possibility that the
banking system, including smaller financial institutions, could
eventually require capital support.  Nevertheless, in S&P's
opinion, the recapitalization exercise has contributed to
Greece's financial stability while considerably lowering the risk
that further financial sector contingent liabilities will
crystallize on the government's balance sheet.

To understand the 2015 accounting for public debt, it is
important to recognize that last year's return of EUR10.9 billion
in recapitalization notes (issued under Greece's second program)
to the European Financial Stability Fund actually means that
overall government support of the financial sector in 2015 made a
net negative contribution to general government debt of an
estimated EUR5.5 billion, equivalent to 3.1% of GDP.  This, plus
the consumption of most remaining general government cash
reserves, led to a very small increase in gross general
government debt last year of just under EUR2 billion, S&P
estimates.  Net general government debt increased more
significantly, from 172.1% of GDP at end-2014, to an estimated
181.4% by end-2015.  S&P projects that net general government
debt will increase significantly again this year to 187.4% of
GDP, mainly because S&P projects no nominal GDP growth this year,
but also because the government plans to make just over 3% of GDP
(EUR5.5 billion) in arrears payments, as well as to finance a
deficit of just under 3% of GDP.  From 2017, however, S&P
projects sizeable annual declines in net general government debt
to GDP, on the assumption that the economy starts to grow and
reinflate again, and that the primary fiscal position improves.

S&P is forecasting a primary surplus of 0.4% of GDP this year
(versus the 0.5% target), increasing to close to 2% by 2019.
This is, however, substantially below the program target of 3.5%
by 2018.  One risk to fiscal targets this year is last year's
Council of State decision declaring that pension cuts introduced
in 2012 were unconstitutional.

Merchandise export performance has generally been positive since
late 2010, but from a low base (merchandise exports account for
just 15% of GDP).  Reflecting lower volume imports, the fall in
energy prices, and a 9% year-on-year increase in tourist
arrivals, S&P estimates that last year's current account shifted
into surplus.  This would be the first current account surplus
(under BPM6 methodology) for Greece since the mid-seventies.  S&P
expects Greece's current account will shift back into deficit as
demand recovers over the next few years, though oil prices,
should they remain at current levels, could improve the current
account position this year by as much as 2% of GDP.  S&P notes
that, over the last half decade, Greece's capital account has
averaged a surplus of 1.5%-2.0% of GDP, and that EUR35 billion
(20% of GDP) is available to Greece between 2014-2020 through EU
funds, on top of substantial remaining EU grants under the 2007-
2013 envelope. For this reason, S&P anticipates the capital
account to remain substantially in surplus over the forecast
horizon.

Greece's external debt levels are also far higher than European
averages especially as a percentage of current account receipts
(an indicator of capacity to service foreign debt).

Given the current Greek government's busy reform agenda, and its
narrow majority of three seats, the prospect of implementing
long-term reforms such as to the judicial system and public
administration seems low.  Nevertheless, S&P's baseline
expectation remains that, regardless of what government is in
power, Greece will largely comply with the terms of the Eurogroup
support program.  S&P takes this view as it don't believe the
alternative would be viable for Greece's financial stability; the
banking system continues to depend on Eurosystem support of
EUR107.5 billion or 61% of GDP (EUR68.9 billion of which was
Emergency Liquidity Assistance) as of end-December 2015.

"We expect any re-profiling of Greece's official debt to come in
the form of interest rate deferrals, and maturity extensions.  At
16.5 years, Greece already has the longest dated debt stock of
all rated sovereigns; while, at an estimated 1.9%, the general
government's effective borrowing cost (measured on an accruals
basis; on a cash basis it is even lower) is already considerably
lower than most peers.  In light of these low annual maturities
and very low interest rates, Greek government debt levels are
affordable, in our opinion, and we reflect that in our final
credit rating on Greece.  At the same time, in the absence of
meaningful front-loaded reductions in Greece's net general
government debt to GDP ratios, we think the possibility of Greece
re-accessing commercial markets toward the end of the third
program at similarly long maturities and low interest rates
remains low.  However, political constraints in creditor
countries appear likely to rule out write-downs of Greece's
official liabilities that might make earlier re-entry into
commercial markets at affordable terms viable.  This means, more
realistically, that whether or not Greece can bring down its net
general government debt level of 187% of GDP (the government's
projection for end-2016) quickly will ultimately depend on
whether the economy recovers rapidly in both real and nominal
terms. According to our projections at optimistic nominal GDP
growth rates of 5%, with an annual primary surplus of 2% of GDP
and at current borrowing costs, it will still be another 13 years
before net general government debt falls below 100% of GDP,
assuming privatization receipts over the period of EUR20
billion," S&P said.

Should the first review be completed successfully, S&P
anticipates that the small amount of Greek government bonds still
in the market are likely to become eligible for QE purchases by
the Bank of Greece.  In addition, a potential decision by the ECB
to reinstate its waiver on the eligibility of Greek sovereign and
sovereign guaranteed bank collateral for ECB (rather than
costlier Bank of Greece Emergency Liquidity Assistance) financing
would benefit the profitability of Greece's highly challenged
banking system.  S&P however, anticipates an only gradual lifting
of the capital controls still in place, including withdrawal
limits on household deposits.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook indicates S&P's view that, over the next 12
months, risks to its 'B-' rating are balanced.

S&P could consider an upgrade if it saw stronger growth
performance, and measureable progress in the reduction of the
still-high NPL levels in Greece's banking system, alongside the
lifting of capital controls including deposit withdrawal limits,
which would be a strong indication of a recovery of confidence in
financial stability and hence growth.  S&P could also consider
raising the rating on the back of an unexpected write-down of
Greece's level of net general government debt, which, at a
projected 187.4% of GDP by end-2016 (excluding guaranteed debt
outside of the general government perimeter), is one of the
highest public debt levels of all rated sovereigns.

On the other hand, S&P could lower the ratings on Greece if the
new government cannot implement the reforms it has agreed to in
the Memorandum of Understanding between itself and the ESM.
Prolonged implementation problems with the ESM program could
eventually lead to a general default on the government's debt.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that Greece's institutional effectiveness
had improved since the last committee.  All other key rating
factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                      Rating       Rating
                                      To           From
Greece (Hellenic Republic)
Sovereign credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency           B-/Stable/B CCC+/Stable/C
Transfer & Convertibility Assessme    AAA         AAA
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency           B-          CCC+
Commercial Paper
  Local Currency                       B           C



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IBUDALANASJODUR: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Ratings, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-/B' issuer
credit ratings on Ibudalanasjodur (Housing Financing Fund, HFF).
The outlook is stable.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that HFF's stand-alone credit
profile (SACP) remains 'b-' and the likelihood of extraordinary
government support remains high.

"On Jan. 15, 2016, we raised our long-term ratings on Iceland to
'BBB+'.  Even though we expect an improving trend for the
operating environment for banks in Iceland, we do not anticipate
HFF's SACP to improve to above 'b-' over the next 12 months.
This is because we anticipate the institution's capital position
will remain very weak, with the government only providing enough
capital to run-off the institution in an orderly fashion.  In
addition, we believe that HFF continues to experience revenue
problems, with a high share of prepayments resulting in very low
operating profits and limiting any meaningful capital generation.
While we see the risks in its loan book decreasing in line with
strong economic growth in Iceland, nonperforming assets (based on
our definitions) remain relatively high at double those of the
system as of June 30, 2015.  We expect loan loss provisions to be
small for the next 12-24 months and have little impact on HFF's
income," S&P said.

S&P rates HFF under S&P's criteria for government-related
entities.  S&P believes that HFF has an important role for and an
integral link with the Icelandic government.  Consequently, S&P
believes there is a high likelihood that the government would
provide extraordinary support to the institution if needed.

S&P sees HFF as having an important role for the government of
Iceland, primarily based on the consequences for the government
and the domestic capital market of a default by HFF.  HFF's
outstanding bonds amount to about 30% of Iceland's GDP and nearly
80% is held by Icelandic pension funds.  A default could
therefore entail losses for the pension funds; S&P do not believe
the government would view this as politically acceptable.  HFF's
default could also undermine confidence in other companies that
benefit from similar government guarantees.

S&P also regards HFF's link with the government as integral and
S&P believes it will remain 100% state-owned.  As a state agency,
HFF is not subject to bankruptcy proceedings and is exempt from
taxation.  The government provided support to HFF through capital
injections three times during 2010-2014, contributing a total of
more than Icelandic krona 50 billion.  The government also
provides an ultimate, but not timely, guarantee on HFF's
outstanding debt.

At present, HFF's future role and operations remain highly
uncertain.  As S&P has previously stated, it expects a gradual
and orderly disbanding of the institution over several years.
S&P anticipates HFF's new lending to remain minimal and the
institution's loan portfolio will continue to contract.  At
present, S&P do not expect to change its assessment of HFF's role
for or link with the government.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that HFF's current
SACP will remain unchanged, and that the likelihood of the
government of Iceland providing timely and sufficient
extraordinary support to HFF in the event of financial distress
remains high.  S&P do not expect to take a rating action on HFF
if S&P raises or lower its long-term local currency sovereign
credit rating on Iceland by one notch, all else being equal.

S&P could lower the ratings if it concluded that the effects of a
potential HFF default for the government and the capital markets
had reduced, which would reduce the incentive for the government
to provide timely and extraordinary support to the institution.
This could occur, for instance, if the volume of HFF's
outstanding bonds declined markedly.

S&P could raise the ratings if it believed that the risks
inherent in unwinding the mortgage portfolio had reduced
substantially, for instance based on improved asset quality and
resilient pre-provision earnings generation.



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EATON VANCE: Moody's Raises Ratings on Two Note Classes to Ba3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Eaton Vance CDO X Plc:

  EUR14,750,000 Class C-1 Third Priority Deferrable Secured
   Floating Rate Notes due 2027, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
   on May 6, 2014 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  USD19,175,000 Class C-2 Third Priority Deferrable Secured
   Floating Rate Notes due 2027, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
   on May 6, 2014, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  EUR17,750,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Deferrable Secured
   Floating Rate Notes due 2027, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);
   previously on May 6, 2014, Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

  USD23,075,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Deferrable Secured
   Floating Rate Notes due 2027, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);
   previously on May 6, 2014, Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

  EUR10,000,000 (current balance EUR8,076,011.01) Class E-1
   Fifth Priority Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2027, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 6, 2014 Affirmed
   B1 (sf)

  USD13,000,000 (current balance USD10,498,814.31) Class E-2
   Fifth Priority Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2027, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 6, 2014,
   Affirmed B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes issued by Eaton
Vance CDO X Plc:

  EUR150,000,000 (current balance EUR101,775,543.11) First
   Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Variable Funding Note
   due 2027, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 6, 2014,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR92,500,000 (current balance EUR30,056,738.77) Class A-1
   First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 6, 2014, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  USD120,250,000 (current balance USD 77,230,347.19) Class A-2
   First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 6, 2014, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  EUR18,000,000 Class B-1 Second Priority Secured Floating Rate
   Notes due 2027, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 6, 2014,
   Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  USD23,400,000 Class B-2 Second Priority Secured Floating Rate
   Notes due 2027, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 6, 2014,
   Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Eaton Vance CDO X Plc, issued in March 2007, is a Collateralised
Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield US and
European loans.  The portfolio is managed by Eaton Vance
Management.  The transaction's reinvestment period ended on
Feb. 22, 2014.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades of the notes are primarily a result of the
deleveraging of senior notes and subsequent increases of the
overcollateralization ratios (the "OC ratios") of the remaining
classes of notes.  Moody's notes that the class A and Variable
Funding notes have redeemed by approximately EUR151 million (or
43% of their original balance).  As a result of the deleveraging
the OC ratios of the notes have increased significantly.
According to the November 2015 trustee report, the classes B, C,
D and E OC ratios are 144.20%, 128.38%, 113.41% and 107.55%
respectively compared to levels just prior to the payment date in
August 2015 of 139.61%, 125.68%, 112.22% and 106.73%
respectively. The OC ratios do not take into account the partial
redemption of principal of the senior tranches on Nov. 23, 2015.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par balance of EUR356.9 million, a weighted average
default probability of 17.05% (consistent with a WARF of 2025 and
a weighted average life of 4.05 years), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 48.36% for a Aaa liability target
rating and a diversity score of 67.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery rates
for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF
CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be
considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these default and
recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash
flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it lowered the weighted average recovery rate by 5
percentage points; the model generated outputs that were in line
with the base-case results for classes A and B and within one
notch for classes C, D and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
   portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
   conditions and have a significant impact on the notes'
   ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of
   high loan prepayment levels or collateral sales by the
   collateral manager or be delayed by an increase in loan
   amend- and-extend  restructurings.  Fast amortization would
   usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning with the
   notes having the highest prepayment priority.

  Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
   have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
   collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
   defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
   the market price or the recovery rate to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.  Recoveries higher than Moody's
   expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'
   ratings.

  Foreign currency exposure: The deal has a significant exposure
   to USD denominated assets.  Volatility in foreign exchange
   rates will have a direct impact on interest and principal
   proceeds available to the transaction, which can affect the
   expected loss of rated tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


LUXEMBOURG INVESTMENT: S&P Assigns 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' corporate
credit rating to Luxembourg Investment Company 1 S.a.r.l.
(Armacell), the new holding company of engineered foams and
insulation materials manufacturer Armacell.  The outlook is
stable.

Additionally, S&P assigned Armacell's proposed EUR445 million
first-lien facility and the proposed EUR100 million revolving
credit facility (RCF) S&P's 'B' issue rating with a recovery
rating of '4', indicating recovery expectations in the higher
half of the 30%-50% range.

S&P also assigned its 'CCC+' issue rating to Armacell's proposed
EUR115 million second-lien debt.  The recovery rating of '6'
reflects S&P's expectations of negligible recovery.  Both
proposed issuances will be issued by Luxembourg Investment
Company 1 S.a.r.l.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its existing 'B' long-term
corporate credit on Armacell International S.A. and removed it
and all our existing issue ratings on the company from
CreditWatch with negative implications where S&P placed them on
Dec. 11, 2015. The outlook is stable.

S&P also affirmed its 'B' issue rating on Armacell International
S.A.'s existing first-lien debt.  The recovery rating remains
unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful
recovery (in the lower half of the 50%-70% range) in the event of
a payment default.  S&P affirmed its 'CCC+' issue rating on its
existing second-lien debt.  The recovery rating remains at '6',
reflecting S&P's expectations of negligible recovery (0-10%).

The rating actions reflect S&P's view that the planned
acquisition of Armacell by Blackstone and KIRKBI will not change
S&P's assessment of the manufacturer's financial risk profile as
highly leveraged and its business risk profile as fair.

Following the acquisition, S&P expects Armacell's gross debt will
amount to EUR560 million, up from about EUR490 million at end-
September 2015.  To this S&P adds about EUR30 million for
operating lease adjustments and EUR85 million for pension
obligations.

S&P does not deduct the cash on the balance sheet from its debt
calculation, owing to the company's private equity ownership and
S&P's view that internal cash could be used to fund further
investments.  S&P continues to expect positive free cash flows of
about EUR25 million per year, supported by the operations' modest
capital intensity and Armacell's good track record of working-
capital management.

As a result, S&P expects Standard & Poor's-adjusted leverage
(debt to EBITDA) will be about 6.2x at end-2016, and remain at
about 6.0x over the next two-to-three years, which is below S&P's
current threshold of 6.5x for the rating.  Moreover, S&P expects
interest coverage will remain strong for the rating in the coming
years, with adjusted EBITDA interest coverage at about 2.4x-3.0x.

Armacell is currently owned by financial sponsor Charterhouse,
which acquired the company in 2013 for EUR520 million.  The deal
was funded with $185 million and EUR120 million of first-lien
debt and $85 million second-lien debt, increased in 2015 by EUR65
million to fund two acquisitions amounting to adjusted leverage
of about 6x at year-end 2015.

As part of the upcoming transaction, the financial sponsor will
provide over EUR300 million of equity in the form of preferred
equity certificates (PECs).  S&P treats these PECs as equity,
according to S&P's criteria, in particular because of the
presence of a stapling clause.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view of Armacell's improved
EBITDA performance, supported by sustainable cost savings,
increased scope and geographic diversity, and somewhat above-
average growth in most regions.  Stronger EBITDA should, in S&P's
view, support modest free cash flows in the coming years.  S&P
expects the group will maintain adjusted debt to EBITDA of about
6.0x, and EBITDA cash interest coverage exceeding 2.4x, as S&P
forecasts under its base case.

S&P could lower the rating if it saw adjusted debt to EBITDA
exceeding 6.5x, without prospects for improvement; or a
deterioration of interest coverage.  Rating pressure could also
emerge in case of materially negative free cash flows.

S&P does not expect to raise the rating over the next one to two
years, given the company's highly leveraged capital structure and
aggressive financial policy due to its private equity ownership.
An upgrade would ultimately depend on a satisfactory operating
track record, such that S&P saw strong recurring free cash flow
and adjusted debt to EBITDA improving to below 5.0x.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DPX HOLDINGS: Moody's Updates Database to Reflect Missing Loans
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has updated its database to reflect the missing term
loans issued by DPx Holdings B.V. and their rating histories.
These tranches were originally treated as add-ons to the existing
previously rated term loans.  Subsequently, Moody's received
updated information showing these term loans to be separate
tranches with unique identifiers.  The updated rating histories
are:

EUR70 million Senior Secured First Lien Term Loan due 2021:

  Sept. 10, 2014 - B2, LGD3 new rating assigned
  April 29, 2015 - rating upgraded to B1, LGD3 from B2, LGD3

USD 20 million Senior Secured First Lien Term Loan due 2021:

  March 12, 2015 - B2, LGD3 new rating assigned
  April 29, 2015 - rating upgraded to B1, LGD3 from B2, LGD3


INDIGOLD CARBON: S&P Withdraws 'BB-' Corporate Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'BB-' corporate
credit ratings on Indigold Carbon B.V. and its subsidiary
Columbian Chemicals Acquisition LLC.  At the same time, S&P
discontinued its issue-level and recovery ratings on the
companies' associated debt issues.

"We have discontinued the issue-level and recovery ratings on all
Indigold Carbon's debt issues because they have been repaid,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Brian Garcia.

Following the repayment of Indigold Carbon's debt facility, S&P
withdrew the corporate credit rating on Indigold Carbon B.V., as
well as the corporate credit rating on Indigold Carbon's
subsidiary, Columbian Chemicals Acquisition LLC at the company's
request.  S&P did not have sufficient information to affirm or
revise the ratings prior to withdrawal.


KHAMSIN CREDIT: S&P Withdraws CCC- Rating on Series 30 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CCC-(sf)' rating
on Khamsin Credit Products (Netherlands) II B.V.'s series 30
notes, a leveraged super senior synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transaction, based on loss triggers that
reference the portfolio of Carnuntum High Grade I Ltd., a
European cash flow CDO backed by mainly high-grade European
residential mortgage-backed securities.

The withdrawal follows the termination of the notes.


METINVEST BV: Seeking U.S. Recognition of English Proceeding
------------------------------------------------------------
Svitlana Romanova, in her capacity as foreign representative of
Metinvest B.V., filed a Chapter 15 bankruptcy petition in the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (Bankr. D.
Del. Case No. 16-10105) on Jan. 13, 2016, in the United States,
seeking recognition of a scheme of arrangement under part 26 of
the English Companies Act 2006 currently pending before the High
Court of Justice of England and Wales.

The Debtor and its subsidiaries claim to be the largest
vertically integrated mining and steel business in Ukraine.

Joseph M Barry, Esq., at Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP,
counsel for the petitioner, said the Metinvest Group has
struggled in recent years in light of the ongoing political
turmoil in Ukraine since the end of 2013, which has negatively
impacted Ukraine's economy and the protracted slump in prices for
steel products, coal, and iron ore throughout much of 2014 and
2015.

Mr. Barry related that the geopolitical tensions in Ukraine have
decreased demand from the global investor base in the region, and
the Debtor has therefore been unable to obtain funding from the
international or domestic capital and loan markets to refinance
existing indebtedness.  The combination of decreased earnings
from operations and the inability to raise new capital has
created a liquidity crisis for the Debtor rendering it unable to
repay its debts at this time and maintain operations.

On June 26, 2015, the Debtor successfully obtained a consensual
waiver in respect of three series of Eurobond notes with an
aggregate outstanding principal amount of approximately $1.12
billion.  However, one series of the Notes with an aggregate
outstanding principal amount of $85,238,250, and bearing interest
at an annual rate of 10.25%, which was originally scheduled to
mature on May 20, 2015, but was deferred in the consensual
waiver, is now coming due on Jan. 31, 2016.  The failure to pay
at such maturity date would result in various cross-defaults
enabling holders of the Notes to accelerate outstanding
obligations and pursue remedies against the Debtor.

"Without provisional relief, the Debtor could be forced to cease
operations and ultimately liquidate assets at forced sale values
to the detriment of all stakeholders," Mr. Barry said in a
document filed with the Court.

According to the Debtor, it has been and remains fully committed
to working collaboratively with its creditors to achieve a
comprehensive restructuring of its indebtedness.  However, with
the impending Jan. 31, 2016, maturity date for one series of the
Notes, the Debtor said it does not have sufficient time to
finalize and implement a proposed restructuring.

As a result, the Debtor is seeking to implement a temporary
moratorium pursuant to the Scheme against creditor action to
provide the stability necessary for it to negotiate and finalize
a restructuring of its indebtedness and preserve operations for
the benefit of all stakeholders.

The Foreign Representative has commenced this Chapter 15 case
seeking aid in respect of the English Proceeding to ensure the
successful implementation of the Scheme.  If the Scheme is not
enforced on a provisional basis before Jan. 31, 2016, the Debtor
will face potential adverse creditor actions in the United States
pending resolution of the Petition by holders of the Notes and
the effectiveness of the Scheme will be severely compromised.

The petitioner has engaged Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor and
Allen & Overy LLP as her as counsel.

Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein has been assigned the case.


MILLENNIUM OFFSHORE: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corp. Family Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the B2 Corporate Family
Rating and B2-PD Probability of Default Rating of Millennium
Offshore Services Superholdings (MOS).  Concurrently, Moody's has
also withdrawn its B2 rating on the $225 million bond due
February 2018.  The ratings have been withdrawn pursuant to
Moody's guidelines for the withdrawal of ratings, as insufficient
information is available to Moody's to continue monitoring
effectively the company's creditworthiness.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the rating because of inadequate
information to monitor the rating, due to the issuer's decision
to cease participation in the rating process.

On Nov. 17, 2015, MOS announced the refinancing of its February
2018 bonds with bank debt following a successful tender with
98.04% of bondholders tendering.  The company amended, in the
process, the bond's indenture, releasing the guarantees and
collateral and eliminating the covenants.  The company,
subsequently, requested the withdrawal of the rating.

Millennium Offshore Services Superholdings LLC (MOSS), part of
the Seafox Group, is an entity through which the group entities,
headquartered in Ajman, UAE and Hoofddorp, Netherlands provides
offshore jack-up accommodation services vessels (ASVs) to the oil
and gas industry in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), UK
North Sea and Asia-Pacific (APac) regions.  Founded in 2007, the
company owns a fleet of eleven jack-up ASVs following the
addition of four ASVs through the acquisition of Seafox in
November 2014, of which six are based in the MENA region, four in
the North Sea and one in APac.  For the Last Twelve Months (LTM)
ending in June 2015, MOSS generated USD194 million in revenues
and had total assets of USD633 million.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


B&N BANK: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Ratings, Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-/C' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Russia-based B&N Bank
PJSC.  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'ruBBB-' Russia national scale
rating on the bank.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that the recent
deconsolidation of problematic ROST Bank and additional capital
support for B&N have together somewhat eased the pressure on
B&N's capital position.  The negative outlook acknowledges the
uncertainty in the bank's financial profile given the planned
merger with MDM Bank (B/Negative/B), another midsize bank in
Russia with a sizable amount of non-performing loans (14.1% as of
June 30, 2015).

In December 2015, B&N received regulatory approval to
deconsolidate ROST Bank, a Russia-based financial institution
that B&N previously took under a government-orchestrated
financial rehabilitation procedure.  One of B&N's ultimate
beneficiaries, Mikhail Shishkhanov, has become a direct owner of
ROST Bank.  S&P believes deconsolidation is overall marginally
positive for B&N's credit profile, because the risks of a failed
entity (mostly related to its corporate loan book) are now
offloaded from its balance sheet.  However, B&N still remains
exposed to the risks of ROST Bank directly through the Russian
ruble (RUB) 250 billion (about $342 million) interbank loan
(although with monthly interest payments).  Further evolution of
this exposure will depend on the exact details of a plan of
financial rehabilitation, which has yet to be approved by the
Central Bank of Russia and the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA).
S&P believes that this exposure is adequately captured by its
moderate risk position score.

S&P also positively views the recent capital support provided to
B&N by its owners by transferring RUB6 billion of subordinated
debt into equity and reclassifying another RUB9.9 billion of
subordinated debt as perpetual capital instrument, which makes it
eligible for inclusion in additional tier-1 capital under local
regulation.  S&P now considers these instruments as having
intermediate equity content, because of their perpetual nature
and the bank's ability to cancel interest payments upon its sole
discretion.

S&P anticipates that in 2016, B&N will be able to execute all the
necessary procedures to merge with MDM Bank, another Russia-based
institution which was acquired by B&N owners in 2015.  Since MDM
Bank is better capitalized and has a marginally better credit
standing, in S&P's opinion, the overall merger should be positive
for B&N's capital position, provided that the execution of the
transaction is managed smoothly.  S&P anticipates that risk-
adjusted capital (RAC) ratio will increase to above 3% by the end
of 2016, if S&P takes into account the merger and additionally
planned RUB10 billion capital injection from the owners.  Should
the merger be delayed, or B&N's post-merger capital position not
recover as fast as S&P expects, it might consider revising its
view of B&N's capital position downward.

The negative outlook primarily reflects S&P's concerns regarding
increasing operating risks in Russia, as well as potential
downside risks for the bank's capital position, which S&P
believes could materialize in the next 12-18 months.  S&P also
thinks the planned merger between B&N and MDM Bank could entail
operational and financial risks given the weak economic
environment in Russia.

S&P could consider a negative rating action if the bank does not
manage to sustainably recover its capital position within the
next 12 months, indicated by S&P's RAC ratio remaining below 3%.
A negative rating action could also be a result of materialized
integration risks from the merger with MDM Bank.  S&P believes
that integrating two large banks in current market conditions
could be a difficult task.  Therefore, S&P believes there is a
possibility of unexpected negative developments, weakening the
financial profiles of both B&N and MDM Bank.

An outlook revision to stable would depend on the stabilization
of operating conditions in Russia, as well as on progress in
integration of MDM Bank.  S&P could consider revising the outlook
to stable if it believes that the systemic importance of B&N (or
a joint bank) within the Russian banking sector has increased.


BANK PIVDENNYI: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' IDR, Then Withdraws Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term foreign currency Issuer
Default Ratings of Bank Pivdennyi (PB) and Joint Stock Commercial
Industrial & Investment Bank's (PJSC Prominvestbank, PIB) at
'CCC'.  Simultaneously, Fitch has withdrawn PIB's ratings as the
bank has chosen to stop participating in the rating process.
Therefore, Fitch will no longer have sufficient information to
maintain the ratings.  Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide
ratings or analytical coverage for PIB.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - ALL RATINGS

                                 PB

PB's IDRs are driven by its standalone creditworthiness, as
expressed by its 'ccc' Viability Rating (VR).  The VR reflects
weak asset quality, very limited additional loss absorption
capacity and modest core profitability (net of one-offs), while
Ukraine's operating environment remains difficult with resultant
further pressures on asset quality, performance and capital.  At
the same time, the VR considers reduced liquidity pressures and
the bank's access to additional liquidity sources through its
Latvian subsidiary.

At end-3Q15, PB reported NPLs (loans more than 90 days overdue)
at 11% of loans but restructured/rolled over exposures were a
significant 39% of loans.  Existing NPLs were reasonably
provisioned and/or collateralized, although significant downside
risks stem from restructured/rolled over loan categories,
although the borrowers were reportedly performing under the
revised schedules at end-3Q15.  Fitch estimates that unreserved
restructured/rolled over exposures equaled to a large 230% of
Fitch Core Capital, while the bank's reliance on loan collaterals
remains high.  Lending in foreign currencies remains significant
(58% of loans), while most of the borrowers are effectively
unhedged.

Pre-impairment profitability (annualized, net of one-offs), at
1.7% of average gross loans in 1H15, provided only modest
capacity to absorb new losses, while the origination of new NPLs
(defined as increase in NPLs in the reporting period plus write-
offs, divided by average gross loans) was around 5% in 9M15
(annualized).  PB's equity cushion offered only low loss
absorption (estimated at around 1% of loans at end-3Q15).

The recent asset quality review and capital stress test by the
National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) has revealed additional
recapitalization needs of around UAH600m or 37% of end-3Q15
regulatory capital, although these could be executed up until
end-2018.  The bank is looking to achieve it through the
prolongation of existing subordinated debt (USD14 mil. due in
October 2016) or new subordinated debt or other capital
management measures.  The regulatory forbearance allows sector
banks to restore solvency only gradually with the new minimum
requirement of 5% from September, 2016 (PB's regulatory capital
adequacy ratio was 10.6% at end-3Q15).

Retail deposit outflow has been significant at PB, despite
regulatory cash withdrawal restrictions in place from early 2014,
although it moderated to 14% in 9M15 from 36% in 2014 (adjusted
for FX effects).  Liquidity pressures were off-set through
increased shareholder deposits, term UAH-funding from the NBU,
short-term FX placements by Latvian subsidiary and deposits from
its few corporate clients (the latter at below market rates).
Access to FX remains stretched in the country, so the stability
of the highly dollarized deposit funding (57% of the total) is
key to maintaining FX liquidity.  PB's standalone FX liquidity
cushion is moderate, although Fitch understands additional FX
liquidity may flow directly or indirectly through the Latvian
subsidiary, including from its clients placing their funds with
PB.

The Support Rating Floor of 'No Floor' and Support Rating of '5'
reflect Fitch's view that support cannot be relied upon due to
the bank's limited systemic importance and the Ukrainian
authorities' limited financial flexibility to provide
extraordinary support to banks.  Potential and support from the
shareholders, while possible, is also not factored into the
ratings, as it cannot be reliably assessed.

                                PIB

PIB's IDRs and National Rating factor in the likelihood of
support the bank may receive from its foreign shareholder.  PIB
is almost fully owned by Russian state-owned Vnesheconombank
(BBB-/Negative).  The affirmation of the bank's 'CCC' Long-term
foreign-currency IDR reflects the constraint of Ukraine's Country
Ceiling (CCC), which captures the risk of transfer and
convertibility restrictions and limits the extent to which
support from the foreign shareholder of the bank can be factored
into the ratings.  PIB's Long-term local currency IDR also takes
into account the country risks.

Fitch has withdrawn PIB's VR without affirmation due to
insufficient information to assess the bank's current intrinsic
creditworthiness.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - ALL RATINGS

                                PB

The ratings could be downgraded if further deterioration in asset
quality results in capital erosion, without sufficient support
being provided by the shareholders, or due to liquidity
shortfall, in particular, in foreign currency, following deposit
outflows.

Stabilization of the country's economic prospects, combined with
strengthening of PB's loss absorption capacity, would reduce
downward pressure on the ratings.

PIB

Not applicable.

The rating actions are:

Pivdennyi Bank:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'ccc'

PJSC Prominvestbank:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC', withdrawn
  Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-', Outlook
   Negative, withdrawn
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C', withdrawn
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5', withdrawn
  Viability Rating: 'ccc', withdrawn
  National Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)'; Outlook
   Stable, withdrawn


BASTION-LINE LLC: Bank of Russia Suspends Insurance Licenses
------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-153 dated January 21,
2016, suspended the insurance and reinsurance licenses of the
Insurance Company Bastion-Line, LLC.

The decision is taken due to the failure of the insurance agent
to properly meet Bank of Russia instructions, i.e. failure to
eliminate violations of financial stability and solvency
requirements with regard to securing the equity capital and
insurance reserves by eligible assets.  The decision becomes
effective the day it is published in the Bank of Russia Bulletin.

The suspension of the insurance agent's license means a ban on
concluding insurance and reinsurance agreements and on making
amendments to the respective agreements leading to increased
liabilities of the insurance agent.

The insurance company is obliged to accept applications on
insured events and honor its obligations.


BRUNSWICK RAIL: Bondholder Group Questions Loan Decision
--------------------------------------------------------
Luca Casiraghi at Bloomberg News reports that a group of
bondholders is questioning the management of Brunswick Rail Ltd.
about its decision to refinance a loan before debt-restructuring
talks start.

According to Bloomberg, Richard Deitz, president of VR Capital
Group Ltd., one of the bondholders, said the group sent a letter
to the Russian railcar lessor last week asking about the terms of
RUR2.35 billion (US$30 million) sale-and-leaseback facility
agreed with Russian bank Alfa-Leasing.

"We are concerned that the company was overly hasty in moving to
refinance the loans without having a proper consultation with
bondholders," said Bloomberg quotes Mr. Deitz as saying.  "The
recent refinancing made bondholders raise eyebrows."

People familiar with the matter said last month Brunswick is
preparing a debt-restructuring proposal that may require
bondholders to take losses on US$600 million of bonds, Bloomberg
recounts.

According to Bloomberg, two people familiar with the matter said
the bondholder group also includes Ashmore Group Plc and Pacific
Investment Management Co. and is being advised by law firm
Shearman & Sterling.  The people said the group is seeking to
hire a financial adviser by next week, Bloomberg notes.

"If the company proposal is not acceptable, we think there are
other ways to restructure the debt, which may include the
business changing hands," Mr. Deitz, as cited by Bloomberg, said.

Brunswick Rail leases railcars to corporate clients in Russia.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 24,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its long-term
corporate credit rating on Russia-based freight car lessor
Brunswick Rail Ltd. at 'CCC-'.  The outlook remains negative.
S&P said the affirmation reflects the rating agency's view that
Brunswick Rail continues to face a high risk of having to prepay
its RUB4 billion (about US$63 million) of its syndicated bank
loan due 2016 following the expiry of the waiver.  The company
was in breach of its leverage covenant under the facility (net
debt to EBITDA of 4.75x) as of the end of June 2015, which the
bank syndicate waived until the end of October 2015.


KIROV REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Kirov Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-'
with Negative Outlooks, and its Short-term foreign currency IDR
at 'B'. The agency has also affirmed the region's National Long-
term rating at 'A+(rus)' with a Negative Outlook.

The Negative Outlook reflects the region's continuously growing
direct risk, which is driven by a persistent budget deficit. The
affirmation reflects the region's preliminary estimated 2015
annual budgetary performance being in line with Fitch's base case
scenario.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'BB-' rating reflects Kirov's weak operating performance with
low operating balance insufficient to cover interest payments and
ongoing budget deficit leading to growing direct risk.

Fitch projects Kirov's operating balance will be weak in 2016-
2018 at about 2% of operating revenue and the current balance is
likely to remain negative despite decreased interest payments. We
expect the region could moderately narrow the deficit before debt
variation towards 6%-7% of total revenue over the medium term
from an average 11% in 2012-2014, driven by requirements imposed
by the Ministry of Finance as a condition for granting state
support to the regional government. However, Fitch considers that
Kirov has low headroom for significant improvement of its fiscal
performance, given its limited expenditure flexibility and high
uncertainty with regards to tax revenues dynamics.

The region's financials for the 2015 fiscal year will be
finalized in February 2016. Based on the preliminary 2015 full-
year statement, the estimated operating balance was about 1% in
2015 (2014: 0.6%) and the current balance was about minus 1% of
current revenue (2014: -2.6%). In 2015, Kirov region recorded a
RUB3.3 billion deficit before debt variation, which is slightly
less than RUB3.5 billion in 2014. In relative terms, the fiscal
deficit remained at about 8% of total revenue.

Fitch forecasts direct risk to gradually grow over the medium
term towards 70% of current revenue (2015: 60%) driven by the
ongoing deficit. In 2015, the region's direct risk increased and
reached RUB23.6 billion (2014: RUB21 billion). This is mitigated
by the risk structure, which has substantially changed towards
larger proportion of subsidized funding. At end-2015, budget
loans composed 70% of direct risk (2014: 34%) as the region
contracted about RUB10 billion budget loans to refinance maturing
bank loans.

The region's refinancing risk is moderate and almost equally
spread between 2016-2017 and later. In 2016-2017, Kirov needs to
repay 54% of its direct risk, which includes RUB7.2 billion bank
loans and RUB5.5 billion budget loans. We expect the region to
fund its refinancing needs by rolling budget and bank loans.

The region's economic profile is weaker than the average Russian
region. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita was 65% of the
national median in 2013. The economy is diversified. The top 10
taxpayers contributed less than 20% of the region's tax revenue
in 2014. The major taxpayers are spread across various sectors of
the economy, which makes the region's tax proceeds less
vulnerable to the economic cycle. The region's administration
preliminary estimated that GRP contracted 4% in 2015 (2014:
growth 0.8%) following the national economic trend and expects
the local economy to stagnate with annual growth of 0%-1.5% pa in
2016-2018.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Growth of direct risk above 70% of current revenue and low
operating balance insufficient for interest payments would lead
to a downgrade.


KOSTROMA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Kostroma Region's Long-
term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at
'B+' with Negative Outlooks, Short-term foreign currency IDR at
'B' and National Long-term rating at 'A-(rus)' with a Negative
Outlook. Kostroma region's outstanding senior unsecured domestic
bonds have been affirmed at 'B+' and 'A-(rus)'.

The affirmation and Negative Outlook reflect Fitch's projections
of the region's weak budgetary performance and persistently high
refinancing risk amid growing direct risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'B+' rating reflects the region's material direct risk, with
considerable refinancing needs concentrated during next 12
months. The ratings also factor in the ongoing fiscal deficit and
below average wealth metrics of the local economy.

Fitch expects the operating performance in 2016-2018 will remain
weak, with an operating balance of 2%-4% of operating revenue and
a negative current balance due to high interest expenses.
Sluggish tax proceeds are likely to be mitigated by the regional
management's strong intention to reduce non-core operating
expenditure.

According to preliminary data, the region's 2015 budgetary
performance demonstrated a modest improvement compared with 2014.
Despite operating revenue dropping by 2.1%, the operating balance
grew to 2.7% of operating revenue in 2015, from a weak 0.2% one
year earlier. This was caused by strict control of opex, which
reduced by 4.6%. In Fitch's view, the region will continue the
practice of fiscal austerity, and total opex will decline by a
further 2% in 2016.

Fitch expects the region's direct risk to continue rising and
account for 110% of current revenue by end-2016, driven by a
RUB2.5 billion fiscal deficit (2015: RUB2.7 billion) amid
sluggish operating revenue growth due to the tough economic
environment. We expect the region's deficit to narrow in 2017-
2018, but to still represent 10% of total revenue. Direct risk
rose to RUB17.7 billion or 97% of current revenue at end-2015
(2014: RUB15.9 billion and 86%).

A large part of Kostroma's debt is short term, with 49% of total
direct risk maturing in 2016 and the remaining outstanding debt
due in 2017-2018. Fitch expects the region's current balance for
2016-2018 to be negative, leading to more capital market funding.
Fitch believes the region will be able to attain the required
funding in advance of the existing debt maturity dates.

Refinancing risk is partly mitigated by the region's reliance on
federal budget loans, which accounted for 43% of direct risk at 1
January 2016. We believe maturing federal budget loans are likely
to be rolled over.

Kostroma's tax base has historically been modest, limiting its
own fiscal capacity. Fitch forecasts marginal 0.5% growth of
national GDP in 2016, and believes the region will also face
stagnant economic activity, which will contain tax revenue
growth.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The region's inability to curb growth of total indebtedness,
accompanied by persistent refinancing pressure and a negative
operating balance, would lead to a downgrade.


MEZHREGIONBANK: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
--------------------------------------------------------------
Due to the ruling of the Court of Arbitration of the city of
Moscow dated January 11, 2016, with regard to Case No.
A40-219930/15-88-411B on recognizing insolvent (bankrupt) credit
institution Commercial Bank Mezhregionbank, LLC and appointing a
receiver in compliance with Clause 3 of Article 18927 of the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", the Bank of Russia
took a decision (Order No. OD-189, dated January 22, 2016) to
terminate from January 25, 2016 the activity of the provisional
administration of Mezhregionbank appointed by Bank of Russia
Order No. OD-3102, dated November 10, 2015, "On the Appointment
of the Provisional Administration to the Moscow-based Credit
Institution Commercial Bank Mezhregionbank (limited liability
company) or CB MRB (LLC) Due to the Revocation of Its Banking
Licence".


NOVIKOMBANK: Rostec to Provide Additional Capital Due to Loans
--------------------------------------------------------------
Oksana Kobzeva at Reuters reports that Russian state defense
company Rostec will provide additional capital to its subsidiary
bank Novikombank due to revaluation of loans to companies that
fell under Western sanctions.

Rostec, also under Western sanctions imposed on Russia for its
involvement in the Ukraine crisis, would not disclose how much
money will be shifted to the bank, saying only that it will
increase its share in the bank to "super-controlling", Reuters
notes.

Fitch rating agency recently downgraded the bank's rating to B-
from B, citing asset quality problems and lack of adequate
capital support from Rostec, Reuters relates.

Most of the bank's woes come from loans issued to the debt-laden
airline Transaero, which filed for bankruptcy last year, Reuters
says.

Novikombank is a reference bank, among others, for defense
enterprises headed by President Vladimir Putin's longtime friend
Sergei Chemezov, according to Reuters.


RUSSIAN RYAZAN: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Ryazan Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'B+'
with Stable Outlook, Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B' and
National Long-term rating at 'A(rus)' with Stable Outlook. The
region's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds have been
affirmed at Long-term local currency 'B+' and National Long-term
'A(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's view that Ryazan's direct risk
will remain stable and its fiscal performance will be
satisfactory in the medium term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'B+' rating reflects the region's high debt and weak Russia's
institutional framework. It also reflects satisfactory fiscal
performance amid stable economic prospects.

In its base case scenario, Fitch expects Ryazan to record
satisfactory fiscal performance in 2016-2018. Over the medium
term we expect operating surplus of 6%-7% of operating revenue,
sufficient to cover interest payments. Our forecasts are based on
the region's resilient tax base -- which should bring an
operating revenue increase of 5% yoy in 2016 -- and on continued
operating spending (opex) restraint.

Based on preliminary 2015 full-year statements we estimate
deficit before debt variation at close to last year's level of 6%
of total revenue (2013: deficit 18%), underpinned by spending
optimization. The region's financials for 2015 will be finalized
in February 2016.

Fitch expects the region's direct risk to stabilize at 75% of
current revenue in 2015-2016. The region's administration managed
to contain direct risk at RUB26.8 billion by end-2015 (2014:
RUB26.9 billion), in line with our expectations. At end-2015 debt
stock was 50% composed of bank loans, followed by federal budget
loans (43%) and domestic bonds (7%).

Ryazan's debt servicing ratio remains weak, with direct debt
servicing estimated to have exceeded almost 4x operating balance
in 2015. Additionally Fitch estimates 2015 debt payback period to
have been over 35 years, which is substantially more than the
average maturity of the region's debt portfolio of 2.5 years.
Therefore the region remains exposed to moderate refinancing risk
as 66% of its debt maturities are in 2016-2017.

The region's latest forecast sees the local economy growing 1%-
2.5% annually in 2016-2018. According to the administration's
preliminary estimates, the local economy contracted by 0.9% yoy
in real terms in 2015 after it expanded 1.7% a year earlier. The
region's economy is modest in the national context but is fairly
diversified and local producers benefit from the region's close
proximity to Moscow, the country's largest market.

Russia's institutional framework for local and regional
governments is a constraint on the region's ratings. It has a
shorter track record of stable development than many of its
international peers. Weak institutions lead to lower
predictability of Russian LRGs' budgetary policies, which tend to
be shaped by the federal government's continuous reallocation of
revenue and expenditure responsibilities within government tiers.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A positive rating action could result from an improvement of the
region's fiscal performance, leading to a smaller budget deficit
consistently below 5% of total revenue and improved debt coverage
ratio (as measured by direct risk/current revenue) of less than
70% on a sustained basis.

Increased total indebtedness with net overall risk above 90% of
total revenue, accompanied by persistent refinancing pressure and
a negative current balance, would lead to a downgrade.


SISTEMA JSFC: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3-PD, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to Ba3 from B1 the
corporate family rating and to Ba3-PD from B1-PD the probability
of default rating of one of Russia's largest public
conglomerates, Sistema Joint Stock Financial Corporation.  The
outlook on the ratings is stable.

"Our decision to upgrade Sistema's ratings follows the positive
outcome for the company of a legal case linked to its prior
ownership of oil company Bashneft, and also factors in its
ability to maintain strong financial metrics despite the loss of
Bashneft," says Julia Pribytkova, a Moody's Vice President --
Senior Analyst and lead analyst for Sistema.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade concludes a series of reviews started in September
2014 following claims from the Russian state against Sistema
related to its acquisition of the oil company Bashneft (Ba1,
review for downgrade) in 2005-09.  The settlement with the state,
whereby Sistema transferred its shares in Bashneft to government
ownership, was achieved in January 2015.

However, concerns remained over a pending criminal case against
Sistema's main beneficiary, Mr. Evtushenkov, who was accused of
money laundering in 2014 in conjunction with Bashneft's
privatization.  The dropping of this criminal case, which was
announced on Jan. 4, 2016, with a resolution of "no crime was
committed", eliminated the remaining risks associated with
Sistema's transforming credit profile and potential claims on its
liquidity on behalf of the state.

Moody's notes that Sistema's current business and financial
profile, which is largely determined by its 53%-ownership stake
in telecommunication asset Mobile TeleSystems PJSC (MTS, Ba1
stable), is comparable to that of 2008, prior to the Bashneft
acquisition.

While the disposal of Bashneft has had a negative effect on
Sistema's size and scale, as well as dividend cash flow
diversification, Moody's positively notes that the company has
achieved a proportional reduction in consolidated debt.  It has
also benefitted from receipt of a sizeable reimbursement of
damages totalling RUB58.5 billion (approximately $1.5 billion at
the then prevailing exchange rate) from Ural-Invest, the
successor of the seller of Bashneft to Sistema in 2009.

Sistema's key asset MTS's revenue generation remained stable and
its profitability robust in 2015 despite the market downturn.  In
addition, Sistema's liquidity is further bolstered by its recent
disposal of a 23% stake in retail chain Children's world for
RUB9.75 billion ($130 million at the exchange rate at the date of
the transaction) to the Russia-China Investment Fund (RCIF) on
Jan. 4, 2016.

Sistema's Ba3 rating factors in (1) Sistema's ability to maintain
strong consolidated financial metrics despite the loss of
Bashneft (Moody's expects Sistema's adjusted net debt/EBITDA to
be approximately 2.0x as of end-2015); (2) the company's solid
liquidity with a cash cushion that Moody's estimates at more than
$1.0 billion as of end-2015; (3) the company's ability to
orchestrate dividend distributions from MTS; (4) the continuing
diversification of its asset base and cash flow, as developing
assets begin dividend payments and the company makes selected
divestments of its portfolio assets; and (5) fairly low levels of
debt both at, and guaranteed by, the holding company relative to
total consolidated debt and the value of assets.

The rating also takes into account (1) the company's growing
leverage measured by adjusted gross debt/EBITDA (which Moody's
expects to exceed 3.0x as of end-2015), driven by its exposure to
continuing rouble depreciation; (2) its acquisitive nature, which
introduces event risk for its standalone as well as consolidated
credit profile; (3) Moody's expectation that the company will
need to continue supporting some of its developing assets; (4)
Sistema's increased reliance on dividend inflows from MTS, which
will remain Sistema's core asset; (5) Moody's expectation that
Sistema's ability to upstream cash from its subsidiaries,
including MTS, will be limited by its intention not to exert
excessive pressure on subsidiaries' cash flows; and (6) the
degree of potential structural subordination of debt at the
holding company level to debt at its operating subsidiaries.

                   RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on Sistema's rating reflects Moody's view that
the company is adequately positioned in its current rating
category, which is two notches below the rating of its key cash-
generating subsidiary MTS.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Currently, there is no upward pressure on the ratings.  However,
continued diversification of the asset base and cash flow stream
alongside maintenance of strong financial and liquidity profile
with consolidated leverage measured by Moody's adjusted total
debt/EBITDA decreasing to below 2.0x and/or an upgrade of
Sistema's key asset MTS's ratings could have a positive effect on
Sistema's ratings.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade Sistema's ratings if there
were a material deterioration in the company's standalone
liquidity or consolidated financial metrics, or in the credit
profile of its core subsidiary MTS.  Moody's would separately
assess the credit implications of any sizable M&A and investment
initiatives should those materially change the business mix
and/or exert pressure on Sistema's financial metrics.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010.

Sistema is one of Russia's largest public conglomerates with
holdings in the telecoms, technology, banking, media, retail,
transportation and other sectors The founder of the company,
Mr. Vladimir Evtushenkov, holds 64.18% of Sistema's common
shares. The remainder is held by minority shareholders and is in
free float.  In 2014, Sistema generated consolidated revenues of
$16.6 billion.


SOGLASIE INSURANCE: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Ratings, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
counterparty credit and insurer financial strength ratings on
Russia-based SOGLASIE Insurance Co. Ltd.  The outlook is
negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'ruAA-' Russia national scale
rating on the company.

S&P removed all the ratings from CreditWatch, where they were
placed with negative implications on Nov. 18, 2015.

The affirmations follow S&P's discussion with the company's
management and a representative of its majority shareholder,
Mikhail Prokhorov.  S&P has concluded that SOGLASIE is unlikely
to be sold over the next 12-18 months and that its owner remains
committed to supporting the company if necessary.  S&P notes that
SOGLASIE continues to receive support from its owner.

The company's capital adequacy improved in 2014-2015 following a
large capital increase of Russian ruble (RUB) 7.4 billion (about
$100 million) in 2014 and RUB6.5 billion in 2015 from its main
shareholder.

In S&P's view, however, due to the negative operating
environment, including adverse court decisions regarding
obligatory motor third-party liability insurance, continued
depreciation of the ruble, and lower demand for insurance,
SOGLASIE's bottom-line results may be weaker than the company's
forecast for 2017-2018. Should this occur, SOGLASIE will require
an additional capital injection in 2016 or 2017.  Therefore, S&P
thinks its capital adequacy could remain dependent on its main
shareholder's support beyond 2016, following turbulence on the
financial markets.  In such a scenario, if SOGLASIE does not
receive sufficient capital support, capital adequacy is likely to
weaken, leading to a downgrade.

In addition, S&P observes a deficiency in SOGLASIE's reserves, as
shown by the run-off in 2012-2014.  S&P expects some reserve
strengthening in 2015.  Based on S&P's expectations, this will
keep the net combined ratio above 110% in 2015-2016; the lower
the combined ratio, the more profitable the insurer, and a ratio
of more than 100% signifies an underwriting loss.

On a positive note, following the company's strategy to improve
underwriting standards, gross premiums written (GPW) dropped by
10% in 2014, and S&P estimates that it declined further in 2015.
Following two consecutive years of premium decline, S&P
anticipates that SOGLASIE's GPW will stay at about the 2015 level
in 2016 and increase by about 3% in 2017-2018.  The key reason
for the premium growth, despite the slowing economy, is further
consolidation of the insurance sector, which will benefit larger
players like SOGLASIE.  S&P expects SOGLASIE will remain among
the top 10 companies in the Russian insurance market in terms of
GPW. In the first nine months of 2015, voluntary motor insurance
dominated the company's portfolio, comprising about 48% of GPW,
and S&P expects this will continue.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's concerns regarding the
potential weakening of the company's capital adequacy under the
unfavorable economic conditions in Russia, which could lead to a
downgrade.

S&P could lower the ratings over the next 12-18 months if:

   -- SOGLASIE reports higher losses than S&P currently projects.
      This could be due to internal factors, such as additional
      provisions, or weaker market conditions, including further
      ruble depreciation and higher inflation; and

   -- S&P sees no or only limited financial support from the main
      shareholder in 2016-2017, which could put pressure on
      capital and earnings.

If S&P considers that liquidity poses severe risks to SOGLASIE's
operations as a going concern, S&P is likely to cap the rating at
'B-' at best.

A revision of the outlook to stable will largely depend on the
company's ability to show at least break-even bottom-line results
over the next 18 months.  This will provide S&P with more clarity
on whether the company has a viable business and will not be
dependent on shareholders support to maintain its capital
adequacy.


VEB: Will Need State Funds in Second Quarter, Chairman Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Alexander Winning at Reuters reports that VEB will need state
funds in the second quarter of this year, its chairman Vladimir
Dmitriev was quoted as saying on Jan. 22, after the bank was
granted an extension on some of its liabilities late last year.

Russian authorities had previously been considering a package of
as much as RUR1.2 trillion (US$15.2 billion) to VEB over a couple
of years, to help the state bank to deal with bad loans and pay
off some of its debt, Reuters states.

But sources familiar with discussions told Reuters on Jan. 21
that the government is now looking at potential help of between
RUR100 and RUR200 billion for VEB this year.

Under that scenario, the bank will have to sell liquid assets
such as bonds, and any losses it makes on these deals will be
compensated from the budget, Reuters discloses.

Interfax news agency quoted Mr. Dmitriev as saying on Jan. 22
that specific figures were not agreed yet and will depend on
VEB's ability to sell its liquid assets, Reuters relays.

Mr. Dmitriev, as cited by Reuters, said that VEB needs
US$20 billion to meet its obligations till 2020 and the amount of
support this year should meet the schedule of its debt
repayments.

Mr. Dmitriev added that some state support for VEB could come by
mid-February, Reuters says, citing Rossiya-24 state TV station.

VEB is a Russian state development bank.


VNESHPROMBANK: S&P Affirms, Then Withdraws D Counterparty Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'D' long- and
short-term counterparty credit and long-term Russia national
scale ratings on Foreign Economic Industrial Bank
(Vneshprombank).  The ratings were subsequently withdrawn.

The rating actions follow the Central Bank of Russia (CBR)'s
revocation of Vneshprombank's banking license on Jan. 21, 2016.
S&P understands that following the banking license withdrawal,
the CBR will start the process of settling the bank's obligations
to creditors in accordance with bankruptcy law.

In S&P's view, the regulator's latest action means that
Vneshprombank is currently unable to fulfil its obligations to
its counterparties according to the terms of the respective
agreements.  S&P had already factored this situation into its
analysis when it lowered all its ratings on the bank to 'D'.

S&P has therefore withdrawn its ratings on Vneshprombank due to
these factors, and because S&P has insufficient reliable
information to analyze the bank's future creditworthiness.


VOLGOGRAD REGION: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Volgograd Region's Long-term foreign
and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'B+', Short-
term foreign currency IDR at 'B' and National Long-term rating at
'A(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long-term ratings are Stable.

The region's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bond issues
have been affirmed at 'B+' and 'A(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects that the region's pre-closing 2015
annual budgetary performance was in line with Fitch's baseline
scenario. The Stable Outlook reflects the agency's expectation
that the region's direct risk will stabilize over the medium
term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'B+' rating reflects Volgograd's weak operating balance,
which is insufficient to cover interest payments, and high direct
risk due to persistent budget deficit in the past.

The region's operating performance was weak in 2015. Its
preliminary estimated operating balance was about 1% of operating
revenue (2014: 1.1%) and the current balance remained negative at
2.7% of current revenue in 2015 (2014: 3.2%). Volgograd
moderately narrowed its budget deficit to 8.4% of total revenue
from 10.6% in 2014. The improvement was driven by shifting part
of capex to later periods and a substantial 20% (RUB640 million)
reduction of interest payments due to increased reliance on
subsidized funding provided by the state.

Fitch projects a moderate restoration of the operating
performance over the medium term, with a marginally positive
current balance. We also expect the region's budget deficit to
narrow to 3%-5% from an average high 12% in 2013-2015. Since
2015, the region's administration has been implementing extensive
cost-cutting measures in operating and capital expenditure.
Volgograd is optimizing the list of social aid recipients,
freezing wages indexation for administration staff, implementing
centralized state procurement and optimizing the network of
budgetary institutions as the region intends to record a budget
surplus in 2016-2018 to reduce debt burden.

Fitch has a more conservative view and projects a gradual
reduction of the deficit. We consider the region has limited
headroom for maneuver to sharply reverse the five-year weak
performance with a deficit of 8%-16% towards surplus given
stagnating tax revenues and the rigidity of most budget
expenditure.

Fitch forecasts Volgograd's direct risk growth to slow in 2016-
2018. Risk will stabilize at about 70% of current revenue (2015:
63%) as a result of the expected reduction of the budget deficit.
In 2015, direct risk further increased to RUB47 billion from
RUB41bn at end-2014. Positively, the region contracted RUB6
billion budget loans to refinance part of the maturing bank loans
in 2015. The budget loans were almost interest free (0.1% annual
interest rate), which helped the region save on interest
payments.

The region's refinancing risk is lower than its 'B' category
peers. The debt portfolio is diversified and almost equally split
between bank loans (27%), bond issues (36%) and budget loans
(36%). About 90% of maturities are smoothly spread between 2016
and 2018. In 2016, Volgograd needs to repay RUB11.1 billion, or
24% of its direct risk at end-2015. The administration plans to
fund 2016 refinancing needs with RUB4bn bonds issue, RUB6.2
billion budget loans and the remainder with bank loans.

Volgograd region has an industrialized economy with a
concentrated tax base. The top 10 taxpayers are subsidiaries of
large national companies operating in oil & gas, power
generation, transportation and financial sectors. They
contributed about 40% of total tax revenue in 2015, which makes
the region's revenue vulnerable to economic cycles. The region's
administration preliminarily estimated that GRP declined 2.8% in
2015, which is in line with the national trend. It expects a 2%-
3% restoration in 2016-2018 supported by development of local
industries.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Additional support from the federal government leading to a
stabilization of indebtedness and improvement of the operating
balance sufficient to cover interest payments could lead to an
upgrade.

The region's inability to curb continuous growth of total
indebtedness, accompanied by an increase of the region's
refinancing pressure and a negative operating balance, would lead
to a downgrade.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: Brazil in Talks with Investors Over Stalled Projects
----------------------------------------------------------------
Luciano Costa at Reuters reports that Brazil's Mines and Energy
Ministry said on Jan. 22 it held talks this month with various
investors in the transmission line and wind sectors to feel out
potential interest in taking over local projects abandoned by
Spain's financially distressed Abengoa SA.

The ministry told Reuters it had met with executives from local
and international energy firms including Spain's Cymimasa and
Elecnor, China State Grid and Brazil's Engevix and Alupar.  It
also met with wind investors from Italy's Enel Green Power and
local firm Casa dos Ventos, Reuters discloses.

According to Reuters, the ministry said in an email that it was
seeking investors to take over Abengoa's transmission line and
wind farm projects in an effort to avoid delays in delivery of
new energy supplies.

The Spanish company said in a statement it was in constant
contact with local authorities to find a solution, Reuters
relays.

Abengoa SA is a Spanish renewable-energy company.


                        *       *       *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 21,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'SD'
(selective default) from 'CCC-' its long-term corporate credit
rating on Spanish engineering and construction company Abengoa
S.A.  S&P also lowered the short-term corporate credit rating on
Abengoa to 'SD' from 'C'.  S&P said the downgrade reflects
Abengoa's failure to pay scheduled maturities under its EUR750
million Euro-Commercial Paper Program.


IM CAJAMAR 4: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Series E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Cajamar RMBS series.

The transactions are a series of prime Spanish RMBS transactions
originated and serviced by Cajamar Caja Rural, Sociedad
Cooperativa de Credito (Cajamar; BB-/Stable/B).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Credit Enhancement

The notes in TDA Cajamar 2 and IM Cajamar 3 to 5 are currently
amortising on a pro-rata basis. Combined with amortizing reserve
fund balances, this has stabilised credit enhancement (CE) across
the structures. Nevertheless, Fitch considers the CE available in
the structures as sufficient to support the ratings, as reflected
in their affirmation.

IM Cajamar 6 continues to pay sequentially as not all pro-rata
triggers have been met. Fitch expects to see CE build up until
the notes switch to pro-rata amortization, which will likely be
in the next 12 months.

Stable Arrears

The affirmations reflect Fitch's expectation of stable asset
performance, supported by the decreasing and stable trend of
arrears over the past 12 months. As of end-November 2015, three-
months plus arrears (excluding defaults) ranged from 0.3% (TDA
Cajamar 2) to 0.8% (IM Cajamar 6) of the current pool balances.
These are below the Fitch Spanish Prime index of 1.05%.

Cumulative gross defaults (defined as loans in arrears for more
than 12 months) are low for IM Cajamar 3, IM Cajamar 4 and TDA
Cajamar 2, ranging between 1.8% (TDA Cajamar 2) and 3.4% (IM
Cajamar 4) of the initial portfolio balance. In IM Cajamar 5 and
6, cumulative gross defaults are higher at 5.2% and 7.5%,
respectively, and above the average 5.2% for other prime Spanish
RMBS. Nevertheless, these defaults have been fully provisioned,
and the reserve funds are the target level for all transactions.

Payment Interruption Risk Mitigated

Cajamar is the servicer and collection account bank in all
transactions. Although no back-up servicer arrangement is in
place, Fitch believes that a hypothetical servicer disruption
risk is mitigated by the daily sweep of cash collections to the
SPV account banks, and the liquidity available through the
reserve funds, as well as a dedicated cash reserve for TDA
Cajamar 2.

Fitch views the projected balance of cash reserves as sufficient
to support the transactions in meeting the senior non-deferrable
payment obligations if a servicer disruption event was to take
place, until alternative cash collection arrangements were
introduced.

Lack of Hedging

Fitch believes the absence of interest rate hedge agreements on
IM Cajamar 5 and 6 introduces basis and reset risks to the
transactions. Therefore, the agency applied an additional stress
in its analysis, which the rating agency believes the available
and projected CE for these two transactions is sufficient to
withstand.

Maturity Extensions

The IM Cajamar transactions have a proportion of loans that have
been offered maturity extensions, which could signal a weaker
borrower profile. As part of its analysis, Fitch carried out a
sensitivity analysis assuming these loans were in arrears. No
ratings were impacted as a result. Nevertheless, Fitch will keep
monitoring this risk as the transactions continue to amortize.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A worsening of the Spanish macroeconomic environment, especially
employment conditions, or an abrupt shift of interest rates could
jeopardize the underlying borrowers' affordability.

As IM Cajamar 5 and 6 are unhedged, an unexpected sharp rise or
high volatility in interest rates beyond Fitch's stresses could
cause the transactions to suffer cash shortfalls, which may
result in negative rating actions.

The ratings are also sensitive to changes to Spain's Country
Ceiling (AA+) and, consequently, changes to the highest
achievable rating of Spanish structured finance notes (AA+sf).

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis.
Loan-by-loan data with a cut-off date of:
August 30, 2015 for all IM Cajamar deals and downloaded from the
European Data Warehouse.
November 30, 2015 for TDA Cajamar 2 provided directly by
Titulizacion de Activos.

Transaction reporting as of November 2015 provided by:
Intermoney Titulizacion for all IM Cajamar deals.
Titulizacion de Activos for TDA Cajamar 2.

MODELS

The model below was used in the analysis. EMEA RMBS Surveillance
Model.

The rating actions are as follows:

IM Cajamar 3, FTA
Series A: affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Series B: affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
Series C: affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable
Series D: affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

IM Cajamar 4, FTA
Series A: affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Series B: affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Series C: affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable
Series D: affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Series E: affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 85%

IM Cajamar 5, FTA
Series A: affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Series B: affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Series C: affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable
Series D: affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
Series E: affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate revised to 85%
from 50%

IM Cajamar 6, FTA
Series A: affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Series B: affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Series C: affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Series D: affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
Series E: affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 25%

TDA Cajamar 2, FTA
Series A2: affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Series A3: affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Series B: affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Series C: affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable
Series D: affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable


TDA 31: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC-'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in TDA 31, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised and removed from CreditWatch positive its rating on
      the class A notes;

   -- Lowered and removed from CreditWatch positive its rating on
      the class B notes; and

   -- Lowered its rating on the class C notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's Oct. 2, 2015 raising to 'BBB+'
from 'BBB' of its long-term sovereign rating on Spain and the
application of its updated criteria for rating single-
jurisdiction securitizations above the sovereign foreign currency
rating.

On Oct. 30, 2015, S&P placed on CreditWatch positive its ratings
on TDA 31's class A and B notes.

S&P has also applied its Spanish residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) criteria as part of its credit and cash flow
analysis.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it has applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for
RMBS as moderate.  This transaction's notes can therefore be
rated four notches above the sovereign rating, if they have
sufficient credit enhancement to pass a minimum of a severe
stress.  However, if all six of the conditions in paragraph 44 of
S&P's RAS criteria are met, it can assign ratings up to a maximum
of six notches (two additional notches of uplift) above the
sovereign rating, subject to credit enhancement being sufficient
to pass an extreme stress.

Following the application of S&P's RAS criteria and its RMBS
criteria, S&P has determined that its assigned rating on each
class of notes in this transaction should be the lower of (i) the
rating as capped by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that
the class of notes can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria.

In S&P's view, the transaction's performance has remained stable
since its previous review.  Total delinquencies are at 2.87% of
the current nondefaulted collateral balance, compared with 3.14%
in S&P's previous review.

Following the application of S&P's credit and cash flow stresses
under its RMBS criteria, S&P considers that the available credit
enhancement for the class A notes is sufficient to support a
'AAA (sf)' rating level.  The class A notes only pass stresses at
the 'AA+ (sf)' rating level, under S&P's RAS criteria.
Consequently, the maximum uplift is six notches above the long-
term sovereign rating for the class A notes.  S&P has therefore
raised to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'AA (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch
positive its rating on the class A notes.

S&P has lowered to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' and removed from
CreditWatch positive its rating on the class B notes as the
interest deferral trigger may be breached in a moderate stress
scenario.  In S&P's previous review, the tranche was passing its
stress tests at a higher rating level as the level of defaulted
assets was lower, at 6.1%, than the current level of 6.6%.

S&P has lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' its rating on the
class C notes as S&P expects the interest deferral trigger to be
hit within the next six months.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when it applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of continuing high unemployment in 2016.

Spain's economic recovery is gaining momentum, but is currently
only supporting a marginal improvement in the collateral
performance of transactions in S&P's Spanish RMBS index.  Despite
positive macroeconomic indicators and low interest rates,
persistent high unemployment and low household income ratios
continue to constrain the RMBS sector's nascent recovery, in
S&P's view.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain vulnerable
to downside risks.  These include high unemployment and fiscal
tightening.  On the positive side, S&P expects interest rates to
remain low for the foreseeable future and stronger economic
growth.

TDA 31 is a Spanish RMBS transaction, which closed in November
2008 and securitizes mainly first-ranking mortgage loans.  Banco
Guipuzcoano S.A. originated the pool, which comprises loans
granted to prime borrowers secured over owner-occupied
residential properties in Spain.

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To                From

TDA 31, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR300 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised And Removed From CreditWatch Positive

A           AA+ (sf)          AA (sf)/Watch Pos

Rating Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Positive

B           BBB- (sf)         BBB (sf)/Watch Pos

Rating Lowered

C           CCC- (sf)         CCC (sf)



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


MNP PETROLEUM: Raises Going Concern Doubt, Needs More Funding
-------------------------------------------------------------
MNP Petroleum Corporation and its subsidiaries (the group) have
no operating income and therefore will remain dependent upon
continued funding from its shareholders or other sources,
according to Dr. Werner Ladwein, chief executive officer,
president and director, and Peter-Mark Vogel, chief financial
officer, treasurer and secretary of the company in a November 23,
2015 regulatory filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The company's cash balance as of Sept. 30, 2015 was US$212,491,
of which US$97,998 has been restricted leaving a balance of
US$114,493.

"These matters raise substantial doubt about the group's ability
to continue as a going concern," Messrs. Ladwein and Vogel
stated.

The officers elaborated: "Based on the group's expected monthly
burn rate of US$352,364 on basic operational activities,
management estimates that the company has sufficient working
capital to fund operations for less than one month.

"In order to continue to fund operations for the next twelve
months and implement the work program for the group's projects in
Central Asia as well as to finance continuing operations, the
group will require further funds.

"On October 29, 2015 the company entered into an Investment
Agreement with Seven and Seven IST Petro Kimya (Seven & Seven)
providing for a staged private placement of equity and
convertible debt for gross proceeds of up to EUR250 million
(approx. US$266 million).  Both parties are working on closing
the transaction.

"Seven & Seven and its subsidiaries have investments and had
investments in energy and oil and gas operations in Kazakhstan
and the Middle East as well as other investments in various
industry sectors.  Seven & Seven is incorporated under the laws
of Turkey and is headquartered in Istanbul.

"If the company is not able to raise the required funds, it may
consider other alternatives, including a possible farm-out of one
or more of its projects in order to reduce short term financial
commitments.  If the company is unable to obtain the funding that
it needs or arrive at an acceptable alternative solution, the
company will not be able to continue its business.  In addition,
any equity financing may be dilutive to shareholders, and debt
financing, if available, will increase expenses and may involve
restrictive covenants.  The company will be required to raise
additional capital on terms which are uncertain, especially under
the current capital market conditions.  If the company is unable
to obtain capital or is required to raise it on undesirable
terms, it may have a material adverse effect on the company's
financial condition."

At Sept. 30, 2015, the company had total assets of US$13,907,345,
total liabilities of US$3,002,777, and shareholders' equity of
US$10,904,568.

Net loss for the three-month period ended September 30, 2015 was
US$755,895 compared to net loss of US$2,731,215 for the same
period in 2014.  This increase of US$1,975,320 was primarily due
to a change in fair value of our investment in Petromanas Energy
Inc.

A full-text copy of the company's quarterly report is available
for free at http://tinyurl.com/zoy9dos

Baar, Switzerland-based MNP Petroleum Corporation explores and
produces oil and gas, primarily in Central and East Asia.  The
company carries out its operations both directly and through
participation in ventures with other oil and gas companies.  The
company is also actively involved in projects in Mongolia and
Tajikistan.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


NIZHNIY NOVGOROD: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Russian City of Nizhniy
Novgorod's Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) to 'BB-' from 'BB' and its National Long-term
rating to 'A+(rus)' from 'AA-(rus)', while affirming its Short-
term foreign currency IDR at 'B'. The Outlooks for all Long-term
ratings are Stable.

The downgrade reflects weak fiscal performance during 2014-2015
leading to a consistently negative current balance, and
increasing short-term debt, which has caused higher refinancing
pressure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects the following rating drivers and their
relative weights:

High

Fitch expects the city's current balance to remain negative over
the medium-term, weighed down by growing debt and higher interest
rates on the domestic capital market. At the same time Fitch is
projecting a modest recovery in the operating margin to 2%-3% in
2015-2017, after a close to zero margin during 2014-2015. This is
based on our expectation that the administration will maintain
operating expenditure growth at close to zero, as was the case in
2015.

The city's budgetary performance deteriorated materially in 2014-
2015, when the operating margin dropped to close to zero from a
sound average 6.6% during 2011-2013. This was caused by lower-
than-expected tax collection amid a difficult economic
environment in Russia.

The short-term maturity profile of Nizhniy Novgorod's debt is a
risk, as the city will have to repay almost its entire debt
stock, i.e. RUB7.9 billion of bank loans (38% of projected full-
year current revenue) by end-2016. Additionally the city will
have to borrow about RUB1.1 billion for deficit financing. To
meet this obligation, the city has two unused revolving bank
credit lines totalling RUB1.8 billion with one-year maturity and
bearing a 14% annual interest rate. Fitch expects the city to be
able to roll over its maturing bank loans, although the short-
term tenor of its loans means that it will continue to face
refinancing risk.

Fitch expects direct risk will grow to RUB9.3bn by end-2016 from
RUB8.2 billion in 2015. We project a deficit averaging 5.5% of
total revenue for 2016-2018 (2015: -6%). Despite growth, direct
debt remains moderate and should be below 55% of current revenue
by end-2018; however, the short-term nature of its debt leads to
increasing refinancing pressure.

Medium

With a population of 1.3 million, the city is the capital of
Nizhniy Novgorod region (BB/Negative/B), one of the top 15
Russian regions by gross regional product, providing an
industrialized and diversified tax base. The city receives
negligible general-purpose financial aid from the region as its
budget capacity is higher than the average municipality in the
region.

Fitch forecasts marginal 0.5% growth of national GDP in 2016, and
believes the city will also face sluggish economic activity,
which places a strain on the city's budgetary performance.

Nizhniy Novgorod's ratings also reflect the following key rating
drivers:

Nizhniy Novgorod's credit profile remains constrained by weak
institutional framework for local and regional governments (LRGs)
in Russia. Russia's institutional framework for LRGs has a
shorter record of stable development than many of its
international peers. The predictability of Russian LRGs'
budgetary policy is hampered by frequent reallocation of revenue
and expenditure responsibilities between tiers of government.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A downgrade may result from further increase of the city's direct
risk, driven by short-term financing, above 60% of current
revenue, coupled with weak budgetary performance with a
continuing negative current balance.

An upgrade may result from direct debt stabilization at below 50%
of current revenue coupled with a lengthening of the debt
maturity profile and improvement of budgetary performance with a
positive current balance on a sustained basis.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


EASTERN CONTINENTAL: Seeks US Recognition of UK Proceeding
----------------------------------------------------------
Ninos Koumettou, in his capacity as the liquidator and authorized
foreign representative of Eastern Continental Mining and
Development Ltd, filed a Chapter 15 bankruptcy petition (Bankr.
D. Del. Case No. 16-10121) on Jan. 18, 2016, in the United
States, seeking recognition of a proceeding commenced under the
United Kingdom's Insolvency Rules 1986.

Based in London, the Debtor was formed to explore and develop
direct investment opportunities in the Asian raw materials and
mineral resources sector.  The Debtor planned to construct
networks of mineral mining and collection, processing and
shipping centers.  Its principal focus was developing
opportunities in Indonesia, with a view to exporting to other
Asian economies including China, India, Japan, and Korea.  As
part of its commitment to sustainable development, all of the
Debtor's projects were tailored to advance the interests of local
communities -- a key selling points to gain the support of the
Indonesian government.  The Debtor's micro port projects were to
open isolated districts to new development opportunities,
employment opportunities and investments in local infrastructure.
Additionally, the micro ports would also help reduce waste and
increase productivity by bringing new levels of efficiency to an
otherwise outdated trade cycle.

The Debtor looked at and evaluated over 100 potential projects.
After identifying the ones that were potentially the most
lucrative, the Debtor entered into a joint venture with the
holders of six concessions for mining from the government of
Indonesia, all of which were located on the islands of Sumatra
and Java.  The Debtor's plan was to focus initially on
establishing mining and related operations for the mining of iron
sand on Java.  Iron sand mining is the fastest and least capital
intensive way to enter the mining sector, and iron sands contain
high amounts of iron and other valuable minerals and metals.

After generating revenues through its iron sand concession on
Java, the Debtor planned to mine for iron ore on an adjacent
concession and prepare to build up additional processing for the
separation and processing of titanium dioxide from the iron
sands.

To execute its plans, the Debtor needed to raise $50 million in
capital.  Signet Group LLC indicated that it had the unique
capability to raise the required funds for the Debtor.

In connection with its efforts to raise those funds, the Debtor
spent substantial sums, mainly through payments to SG, entities
affiliated with SG and/or entities with which SG had or desired
to have an ongoing working relationship.

Both Debtor and SG determined that, if the $50 million could be
raised, within 12 months of the commencement of the iron sand
project, the Debtor would have a profit of $4 million.  The
Debtor and SG further determined that in the ensuing years, the
Debtor could, through its iron sands concession, expect to have
profits of $19 million to $78 million per year.

SG proposed to raise the required funds by: (a) assembling and
acquiring a pool of life insurance policies; (b) forming an
entity to issue $500 million in notes, the obligations of which
were to be covered by proceeds from the life insurance policies;
and (c) use $50 million of the $500 million in proceeds from the
notes offering to provide the funding for Debtor's mining
project.

"Unfortunately, SG was not truthful about its accomplishments and
ability to raise the necessary funds," related Kevin S. Mann,
Esq., at Cross & Simon, LLC, counsel for the Debtor.  "SG
wrongfully led the Debtor to believe that SG had the experience
and capacity to discharge its contractual obligations when SG
plainly did not.  Thus, while SG led Debtor to believe that SG
had a track record of success, that was not the case.  In
actuality, SG had never accomplished any financing of the type
sought by the Debtor.  The Debtor would not have entered into
agreements with SG and incurred over $1 million in costs if SG
had not misled Debtor about SG's accomplishments," Mr. Mann
continued.

Furthermore, the Debtor said SG breached its obligations under a
retention agreement.  The Debtor asserts SG's failure to fulfill
its obligations under the Retention Agreement has resulted in its
multi-million dollar losses.

According to the Debtor, SG appears to have discontinued its
business and transferred its assets and operations to Cygnus LS,
LLC.  The Debtor asserts that this business scheme was an attempt
by SG and its principals to hide assets and avoid making payment
to Debtor.

On or about March 22, 2013, the Debtor filed a complaint in the
Southern District of New York against SG and several of its
individual principals alleging breach of the Retention Agreement
and fraudulent misrepresentation.  An amended complaint was filed
to add Cygnus LS, LLC as a party.  SG filed a counterclaim
against the Debtor, alleging that the Debtor had breached the
Retention Agreement and owes SG in excess of $250,000.  Although
several of the parties have since been dismissed from the
litigation, the case is currently scheduled for trial beginning
March 8, 2016.

As the Debtor was never able to obtain the financing necessary to
conduct its operations, on or about Jan. 13, 2016, the Debtor's
shareholders voted to voluntarily wind up the company pursuant to
the United Kingdom's Insolvency Rules 1986 and appointed Ninos
Koumettou as liquidator and foreign representative of the
company.


MISSOURI TOPCO: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B3' CFR to Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
ratings outlook of Missouri TopCo Limited ("Matalan" or "the
company") and Matalan Finance plc.  The ratings affected include
Matalan's Corporate Family Rating of B3, probability of default
rating (PDR) of B3-PD, and the B2 rating of GBP342 million senior
secured notes due 2019 and the Caa2 rating of GBP150 million
senior secured second lien notes due 2020, issued in each case by
Matalan Finance plc.  At the same time, Moody's affirms all
ratings.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The change in outlook reflects Moody's concerns about the
company's ability to reverse the decline in profitability
recorded during its current fiscal year, 2015/16, to end February
2016.

Last week, Matalan released results for the third quarter (Q3) of
2015/16 and reduced for the third consecutive quarter its EBITDA
guidance for the full year, with a range of GBP54-56 million now
expected by the company.

As mentioned in Moody's Issuer Comments of July 15 and Oct. 13,
2015, the primary reason for the reduced profitability recorded
in the first half of the fiscal year was the heavy discounting
necessary to clear excess stock arising from problems with the
new northern distribution centre (DC).  The impact of these
problems on Q3 profitability was in line with the rating agency's
expectations.  However, in revising full year profitability
guidance downwards again, the company also referenced difficult
trading conditions continuing into December, including unseasonal
weather impacting footfall and driving increased discounting
across the market.  As such, the lower guidance implies a further
material year-on-year shortfall in profitability in the final
quarter of 2015/16, notwithstanding progress reported with regard
to improving the efficiency of the DC.

Moody's expects the competitive environment to remain intense.
While noting relatively strong performance in product categories
such as home, footwear and childrens wear, the rating agency
believes that Matalan faces significant challenges to recover
market share in the larger categories of ladies and mens wear and
to rebuild momentum in e-commerce, which has been necessarily
scaled back as part of the short term fixes to the DC.  As such,
and with no certainty that the planned improvements to
operational efficiency that are required to offset staff cost
increases in respect of the national living wage will be
achieved, Moody's sees downside risk to the company's initial
fiscal 2016/17 EBITDA guidance of GBP80-85 million.

Notwithstanding the absence of any debt maturities until 2019,
Moody's considers Matalan's current adjusted leverage of 7.9x to
be unsustainable in the longer term.  However, as at the end of
Q3, the company had a cash balance of GBP60 million and, as this
is typically a low point in the annual cash flow cycle, Moody's
considers that Matalan's liquidity is currently adequate.
Depending upon working capital flows, the level of profitability
forecast by the company in fiscal 2016/17 should prove sufficient
to cover interest, tax and capex expenses.  However, the rating
agency considers it is important for Matalan to reach agreement
with its revolving credit facility (RCF) lender to amend the
financial covenant which needs to be passed to access more than
35% of that facility.

RATING OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Moody's concerns about Matalan's
ability to increase profitability following the decline
experienced in fiscal 2015/16.  The rating agency considers the
company's current leverage to be unsustainable in the longer
term.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Upward pressure is unlikely in the short term in light of the
negative outlook.  However, longer-term, positive rating pressure
could develop if there is a sustained improvement in Matalan's
key financial metrics, including like-for-like sales growth, and
a recovery in margins, leading towards Moody's adjusted leverage
of less than 6.0x coupled with positive free cash flow.

Negative pressure could be exerted on Matalan's ratings if
profitability does not recover during the first half of fiscal
2016/17 towards the previously recorded levels.  Furthermore, a
sustained period of negative free cash flow or any negative
pressure on liquidity, including specifically a failure or delay
in reaching agreement with its RCF lender with respect to revised
acceptable covenant levels, could also lead to a downgrade.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Retail
Industry published in October 2015.

CORPORATE PROFILE

Matalan, headquartered in Liverpool, UK, is one of the leading
value clothing retailers in the UK, with total annual revenues of
around GBP1.1 billion.  The company operates through 224 stores
across the UK, primarily in out-of-town retail parks, as well as
online and through franchise stores in the Middle East.


* UK: Insolvencies in Oil & Gas Service Sector Surge in 2015
------------------------------------------------------------
Pilita Clark at The Financial Times reports that the financial
grief inflicted by plunging oil prices has been laid bare by new
research showing a sharp jump in the number of UK oil and gas
service companies going insolvent.

According to the FT, accountancy group Moore Stephens said at
least 28 companies declared insolvency in 2015, up from 18 the
previous year and just six in 2013.

"The pain caused by the oil price fall has translated into a
rising tide of financial distress across the sector," the FT
quotes Jeremy Willmont -- jeremy.willmont@moorestephens.com --
head of restructuring and insolvency at the group, as saying.

Crude prices have fallen as much as 75% from a summer 2014 peak
of US$115 a barrel thanks to weaker Chinese demand, strong US
production and the decision of Opec, the oil producers' cartel,
not to cut output, the FT discloses.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Puts 12 Mining Cos. in EMEA on Review for Downgrade
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the ratings of 12 mining
companies in the EMEA region, and their rated subsidiaries, on
review for downgrade.

The actions reflect Moody's effort to recalibrate the ratings in
the mining portfolio to align with the fundamental shift in the
credit conditions of the global mining sector.

"Slowing growth in China, which consumes and produces at least
half of base metals, and is a material player in the precious
metals, iron ore and metallurgical coal markets is weakening
demand for these commodities and driving prices to multi-year
lows," David Staples, (Managing Director).  "China's outsized
influence on the commodities market, coupled with the need for
significant recalibration of supply to bring the industry back
into balance indicates that this is not a normal cyclical
downturn, but a fundamental shift that will place an
unprecedented level of stress on mining companies."

RATINGS RATIONALE

As part of an ongoing assessment of mining companies, Moody's
sharply reduced its price sensitivity assumptions on December 8,
2015.  Since then, credit conditions in the mining industry have
weakened further, with prices continuing to decline.  The
likelihood has increased that prices for base metals, precious
metals, iron ore and metallurgical coal will approach levels
closer to Moody's stressed sensitivity scenario.  In addition,
the strong US dollar is a further factor contributing to
weakening demand and driving prices lower since most metals are
traded in dollars.

This broad ratings review will look at companies across the whole
mining portfolio covering also gold, diamond and uranium
producers, the outlook for which is pressurized by depressed
prices for key commodities as well as slowdown in China's
economic growth.  The review will consider each mining company's
asset base, cost structure, cash flows and liquidity, as well as
management's strategy for coping with a prolonged downturn and
the ability to execute on same.  The review will assess each
company's cash flow and credit metrics closer to our latest
stressed price assumptions and the relative rating positioning.

Moody's believes that this downturn will mark an unprecedented
shift for the mining industry.  Whereas previous downturns have
been cyclical, the effect of slowing growth in China indicates a
fundamental change that will heighten credit risk for mining
companies.  This review reflects the belief that deteriorating
industry fundamentals require a recalibration of the global
mining portfolio rated by Moody's.  Although all issuers in these
sectors have been adversely affected by declining prices,
severity varies substantially by issuer.  Accordingly, the range
of possible outcomes upon conclusion of the review for given
issuers varies from possible confirmation of ratings to multi-
notch downgrades. Moody's expects to conclude a majority of the
reviews by the end of the first quarter.  While this review
focuses on companies rated in the range from A1 to B3, Moody's is
also reevaluating higher and lower rated companies in the context
of industry conditions. The higher rated companies, on average,
are somewhat more resilient to low commodity prices and many of
the lower rated companies have recently been downgraded.

This broad ratings review will incorporate ratings that have
previously been placed on review in the sector:

Anglo American plc (Baa3 -- RUR) - EMEA

List of Affected Ratings:

On Review for Downgrade:

Issuer: JSC Holding Company METALLOINVEST
  Probability of Default Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba2-PD
  Corporate Family Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba2

Issuer: Metalloinvest Finance Limited

  BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on
   Review for Downgrade, currently Ba2

Issuer: MMC Finance Limited

  BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on
   Review for Downgrade, currently Ba1
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review for
   Downgrade, currently Ba1

Issuer: MMC Norilsk Nickel, PJSC

  Probability of Default Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba1-PD
  Corporate Family Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba1

Issuer: Nord Gold N.V.

  Probability of Default Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba3-PD
  Corporate Family Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba3
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review for
   Downgrade, currently Ba3

Issuer: SUEK Finance

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review for
   Downgrade, currently Ba3

Issuer: SUEK PLC

  Probability of Default Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba3-PD
  Corporate Family Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba3

Issuer: Alrosa Finance S.A.

  BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on
   Review for Downgrade, currently Ba2

Issuer: ALROSA PJSC

  Probability of Default Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba2-PD
  Corporate Family Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba2

Issuer: Kazatomprom JSC

  Issuer Rating (Foreign Currency), Placed on Review for
   Downgrade, currently Baa3

Issuer: Uranium One Inc.

  Probability of Default Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba3-PD
  Corporate Family Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba3

Issuer: Uranium One Investments Inc.

  BACKED Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review
   for Downgrade, currently Ba3

Issuer: Norsk Hydro ASA

  Issuer Rating (Local Currency), Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Baa2

Issuer: Nyrstar NV

  Corporate Family Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently (P)B3

Issuer: Nyrstar Netherlands (Holdings) B.V.

  BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on
   Review for Downgrade, currently (P)B3

Issuer: AngloGold Ashanti Holdings plc

  BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on
   Review for Downgrade, currently Baa3

Issuer: AngloGold Ashanti Limited

  Issuer Rating (Foreign Currency), Placed on Review for
   Downgrade, currently Baa3

Issuer: Gold Fields Limited

  Probability of Default Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba1-PD
  Corporate Family Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba1

Issuer: Gold Fields Orogen Holding (BVI) Limited

  BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on
   Review for Downgrade, currently Ba1

Issuer: Petra Diamonds Limited

  Probability of Default Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently B1-PD
  Corporate Family Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently B1

Issuer: Petra Diamonds US$ Treasury Plc

  BACKED Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review
   for Downgrade, currently B2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: JSC Holding Company METALLOINVEST
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: Metalloinvest Finance Limited
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: MMC Finance Limited
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: MMC Norilsk Nickel, PJSC
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: Nord Gold N.V.
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: SUEK Finance
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

Issuer: SUEK PLC
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

Issuer: Alrosa Finance S.A.
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: ALROSA PJSC
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: Kazatomprom JSC
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: Uranium One Inc.
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

Issuer: Uranium One Investments Inc.
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

Issuer: Norsk Hydro ASA
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: Nyrstar NV
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

Issuer: Nyrstar Netherlands (Holdings) B.V.
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

Issuer: AngloGold Ashanti Holdings plc
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

Issuer: AngloGold Ashanti Limited
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

Issuer: Gold Fields Limited
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

Issuer: Gold Fields Orogen Holding (BVI) Limited
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

Issuer: Petra Diamonds Limited
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: Petra Diamonds US$ Treasury Plc
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

The principal methodology used in rating ALROSA PJSC, Alrosa
Finance S.A., Uranium One Inc., Uranium One Investments Inc. and
Kazatomprom JSC was Global Mining Industry published in August
2014.  Other methodologies used include the Government-Related
Issuers methodology published in October 2014.

The principal methodology used in rating Nyrstar NV, Nyrstar
Netherlands (Holdings) B.V., Norsk Hydro ASA, Gold Fields
Limited, Gold Fields Orogen Holding (BVI) Limited, AngloGold
Ashanti Limited, AngloGold Ashanti Holdings plc, Petra Diamonds
Limited, Petra Diamonds US$ Treasury Plc, MMC Norilsk Nickel,
PJSC, MMC Finance Limited, JSC Holding Company METALLOINVEST,
Metalloinvest Finance Limited, Nord Gold N.V., SUEK PLC and SUEK
Finance was Global Mining Industry published in August 2014.

                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Ann L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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