TCREUR_Public/160223.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, February 23, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 037


                            Headlines


B U L G A R I A

CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Report on Bankruptcy Expected to Be Filed


F R A N C E

* FRANCE: Number of Company Insolvencies Down 2.1% in 2015


G E R M A N Y

ALBA GROUP: S&P Lowers LT Corporate Credit Rating to 'B-'


G R E E C E

GREEK BANKS: Moody's Raises Ratings on 4 Institutions to 'Ca'


I C E L A N D

* ICELAND: Final Exemption for Failed Banks' Settlement Granted


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO III: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'B-(sf)'
CELF LOAN II: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to B3
HOUSE OF EUROPE V: S&P Raises Rating on Class A2 Notes to B+
M&J WALLACE: Cerberus Winds Up Business Over Debt


K A Z A K H S T A N

HALYK SAVINGS: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB'
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 5 Kazakhstan-Based Companies, Outlook Neg.


L U X E M B O U R G

ALTICE US: S&P Withdraws Prelim. B CCR on Reorganization
TONON LUXEMBOURG: Fitch Withdraws 'D' LT Issuer Default Ratings


M A C E D O N I A

MACEDONIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings


N E T H E R L A N D S

HUVEPHARMA INT'L: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3, Outlook Stable


R O M A N I A

* ROMANIA: New Law Trims Number of Insolvent Companies


R U S S I A

SPURT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B-' IDR, Then Withdraws Rating
VOZROZHDENIE BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Counterparty Ratings
TATARSTAN REPUBLIC: Moody's Says Privatization Likely Credit Neg.


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: Underlying Business Still "Viable", Moody's Says
GRUPO ANTOLIN: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB-' CCR


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ANGLO AMERICAN: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB/B'
FIRST OIL: In Administration, Enquest, Cairn Take Stake
PENDRAGON PLC: Moody's Withdraws Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
SOHO HOUSE: Moody's Puts Caa1 CFR on Review for Downgrade


                            *********


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Report on Bankruptcy Expected to Be Filed
---------------------------------------------------------------
According to FOCUS News Agency, the Bulgarian National Radio
disclosed that report on the bankruptcy of Corporate Commercial
Bank was expected to be filed at the registry for classified
information of the Bulgarian parliament on Feb. 22.

The request for declassification of the report worked out by
AlixPartners was made by Bulgarian Finance Minister Vladislav
Goranov on Feb. 22, FOCUS News relates.  Although his concerns
that the publication of the report can harm the collection of
CorpBank's receipts are still valid, the government preferred to
provide the MPs with access to the disclosures made by the
company investigating bank bankruptcies, FOCUS News notes.

Corporate Commercial Bank AD is the fourth largest bank in
Bulgaria in terms of assets, third in terms of net profit, and
first in terms of deposit growth.

Bulgaria's central bank placed Corpbank under its administration
and suspended shareholders' rights in June 2014 after a run
drained the bank of cash to meet client demands.



===========
F R A N C E
===========


* FRANCE: Number of Company Insolvencies Down 2.1% in 2015
----------------------------------------------------------
Creditman reports that for the second year running, the number of
company insolvencies in France [1] is down, to 60,800.  The
decrease was 2.1% compared to 2014 and touched businesses of all
type (ranked by turnover).  Despite a still-difficult economic
situation, several favorable factors were at play.  The sharp
drop in oil prices, the depreciation of the Euro compared to the
dollar and the full effect of tax credits for competitiveness and
employment (CICE[2]) allowed margins to recover to their highest
levels since 2011.  The low cost of debt boosted growth in loans
to non-financial companies, which increased by 5% in 2015.

Another positive sign: the failure rate[3] is back to its
pre-crisis 2008 level and now represents one company in 77.  The
cost of insolvencies is also down 15%, as is the number of jobs
affected by insolvencies, down 12% over one year.  In addition,
the increasing age of insolvent businesses -- observed in periods
of economic slowdown -- came to a halt in April 2015, at 8 years
11 months.  This stabilization is proof that the situation is
beginning to return to normal.

In Western Europe, company liquidations also improved over the
year and their number is down in 10 countries out of the 11
examined.  Decreases are particularly noticeable in the
Netherlands (-24%), Spain (-20%) and Finland (-13%). Only in
Portugal did liquidations increase, due to the difficulties
encountered in the construction sector.

There are still some blackspots.

The Ile-de-France region, which concentrates 24% of all French
companies, suffered 21% of the total number of business
insolvencies.  Worse yet, insolvencies within companies
established in Ile-de-France increased by 5.7%, the highest in
France.  This poor result is explained mainly by the
deterioration in the sectors of construction and services to
individuals.

Insolvencies are still on the increase in 2 out of the 11 sectors
monitored by Coface:

For companies active in services to individuals, insolvencies
increased by 4.2% (19% of the total).  Lackluster household
consumption of services weighed down catering (+4.6%) and drinks
outlets (+11.6%).

Textiles underwent the worst downturn of the year: up 4.3% (4% of
the total).  In addition to low consumer demand, it seems that
the mild end-of-year weather increased the burden of merchandise
stocks on the financial situation of businesses.

Despite a 3.2% decrease in insolvencies, construction remains the
sector most at risk, with a 2.1% failure rate (2.0% in 2006),
i.e. 1 company in 49, compared with 1 in 128 for chemicals.  The
lack of recovery in demand for real estate and lower investment
by local authorities weighed down this sector, which leads the
list of the 100 largest insolvencies by turnover, with 18 cases.

Third-time lucky: Another increase in 2016

For 2016, Coface is forecasting an accelerated rate of decline in
the number of company insolvencies, with a slightly improved
economic situation (1.4% GDP growth in France, compared with 1.1%
in 2015).  Coface's payment experience, which covers a broad
range of activity sectors, appears to reflect the current
situation for businesses.  The likely increase in two other
selected variables -- business margin rate (estimated at 32.3% by
end 2016) and the number of credits granted (estimated at 3.5%)
-- makes it possible to forecast a 3.5% decrease in the number of
insolvencies, down to 58,700, or March 2009 levels.

The gradual loosening of bank credit conditions, the weak Euro,
lower oil prices and a more dynamic household consumption in
France and in the Eurozone should benefit businesses. However,
this scenario has downside risks, such as the high level of
volatility in the financial markets, which could affect the
confidence of French businesses.

[1] Company insolvencies: liquidations (70% in 2015) and
     receiverships (30%)
[2] Credit d'Impot pour la competitivite et l'emploi
[3] The failure rate is the ratio of the number of failures over
     the total number of companies



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


ALBA GROUP: S&P Lowers LT Corporate Credit Rating to 'B-'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it has lowered its long-
term corporate credit rating on Germany-based waste management
firm ALBA Group plc & Co. KG to 'B-' from 'B'. The outlook is
negative.

S&P also lowered its long-term issue rating on the EUR203 million
unsecured notes, due in May 2018, to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'. The
recovery rating remains unchanged at '6'.

The downgrade primarily reflects the reduction in ALBA Group's
average maturity of outstanding debt facilities to about two
years and the continued challenging operating environment the
company faces, which could make the refinancing process of its
major debt instruments during 2016 more difficult. The company
faces roughly EUR200 million debt maturities in October 2017,
under the group's banking facilities, and a further EUR200
million debt maturity looms in May 2018, under the rated
unsecured notes. S&P said, we forecast that the group's
liquidity could weaken materially during 2016 without debt
refinancing or if commodity prices require heavier investments in
working capital.

S&P said, "We continue to forecast challenging operating
conditions, with scrap and metals prices staying weak throughout
2016 given global prices for iron ore, commodities, paper,
plastics, etc. The company's EBITDA margin will likely show some
improvement in 2016, following on from the group's cost
restructuring undertaken in 2015 and previous years, as well as
reduced restructuring costs which we consider to be part of
EBITDA. However, we forecast that the absolute level of EBITDA
will be lower as a result of the disposals completed. Overall, we
do consider there is some downside risk in our forecast EBITDA
margin improvement due to uncertainty over the company's
operating environment.

"With reductions in leverage in 2015 resulting from asset
disposals, we forecast that Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt at
Dec. 31, 2015 stood at nearly EUR640 million. This is made up of
drawn debt of just over EUR400 million; trade receivables sold of
EUR70 million; and adjustments of over EUR170 million for
operating leases, unfunded pension obligations, accrued interest,
finance leases, asset retirement obligations, and put options on
minority stakes. Additionally, we forecast that adjusted EBITDA
for 2015 will be nearly EUR140 million. Given the volatile nature
of the earnings resulting from exposure to scrap metal trading,
we focus on the company's credit metrics for 2015 and 2016.

In its base case for 2016, S&P assumes:

* Minimal organic revenue growth as a result of low prices for
   scrap metals and other waste streams, as well as continued
   overcapacity in the processing of waste, leading to greater
   competition over contract renewals. (The full year impact of
   recent disposals will only be felt in 2016 figures);

* An improvement of 50 basis points in the EBITDA margin as a
   result of cost efficiency actions taken in 2015;

* Capital expenditure (capex) of just under EUR50 million;

* No acquisitions;

* Dividends to minority shareholders in majority-owned
   subsidiary Interseroh of about EUR3 million;

* No forced purchases of shares of the minority shareholders
   given the current low market valuations; and

* S&P has not included any potential cash inflow from ALBA
   group's efforts to raise equity by selling a minority stake in
   its business.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures for 2016:

* Adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 4.5x;

* Funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 13%;

* Modest positive free operating cash flow of up to EUR10
   million; and

* FFO cash interest coverage of nearly 3.5x.

S&P said, "The negative outlook reflects our view that the
operating environment for ALBA Group remains challenging due to
market competition and falling scrap prices. Furthermore,
refinancing risks could mount over the next 12 months and there
could be some downside risk to our base-case forecast. Hence, the
company's credit metrics may be worse than we currently
anticipate. We consider adjusted debt to EBITDA of under 5x and
FFO to debt of above 12% to be commensurate with the rating
level.

"We could consider lowering the rating in the next 12 months if
the group's operating profit declines further or if its liquidity
weakens materially in the absence of debt refinancing. In
addition, the company's liquidity profile could also weaken due
to higher-than-expected working capital requirements in
the scrap and metal businesses, tightening covenant headroom,
sustained margin pressure due to competition for the group's
waste operations and service business, or if cost restructuring
benefits are not fully realized.

"An upgrade depends on the extension of ALBA Group's debt
maturity profile, coupled with a sustained improvement in the
company's operating environment, including stabilizing margins in
the waste operations and services segment. We could raise the
rating if we saw an improvement in credit metrics, including
debt to EBITDA below 4x and FFO to debt toward 20%, which could
result from an overall reduction in leverage."



===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREEK BANKS: Moody's Raises Ratings on 4 Institutions to 'Ca'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to Ca from C the long-term
senior debt ratings of Alpha Bank AE, Eurobank Ergasias S.A.,
National Bank of Greece S.A., and Piraeus Bank S.A.  At the same
time, Moody's affirmed the Caa3 long-term deposit ratings of the
aforementioned banks (and Attica Bank S.A.), and upgraded all
five banks' baseline credit assessment (BCA) to caa3 from ca.
The long-term debt and deposit ratings carry stable outlooks.

"The upgrade of the Greek banks' BCAs and debt ratings primarily
reflects the successful completion of the recapitalization
process by all rated banks, which has strengthened their capital
metrics, as well as our expectation of modest and gradual
improvements in funding," says Nondas Nicolaides, a Senior Credit
Officer at Moody's.  "Our ratings balance these improvements in
the banks' credit profiles against the still significant downside
risks due to the fragile operating environment in Greece."

The affirmation of the banks' Caa3 deposit ratings primarily
reflects the on-going deposit controls in Greece, and the losses
for depositors that do not have instant access to the full amount
of their deposits.  Although Moody's expects only a gradual
relaxation of such capital controls over the next 12-18 months,
the change in the deposit rating outlook to stable from negative
reflects the rating agency's opinion that the risk of a bail-in
for uninsured depositors has somewhat abated following the recent
bank recapitalization.

Moody's affirmed the C ratings assigned to the four systemic
banks' subordinated Tier 2 debt and non-cumulative Tier 1
preferred stock.  These affirmations were driven by these
instruments' structural subordination to senior debt, and the
higher likelihood that they could sustain significant losses
before senior debt holders are affected in a potential bank
resolution scenario.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

   --- BCA UPGRADE TO caa3 FROM ca MAINLY DRIVEN BY ENHANCED
   CAPITAL BASE

The upgrade of all five Greek banks' BCAs to caa3 from ca
reflects the recent recapitalizations, and Moody's expectations
of modest funding improvements that will support profitability,
balanced against downside risks due to the fragile operating
environment.

Greek banks raised approximately EUR14.4 billion of new capital
in December 2015, enhancing their loss-absorption capacity and
capital metrics.  The share capital increases were triggered by
the comprehensive assessments conducted by the Single Supervisory
Mechanism for the four systemic banks, and the Bank of Greece for
the much smaller Attica Bank.  Moody's estimates that the pro-
forma common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio for the system improved
to around 19% post-recapitalization, from around 11% pre-
recapitalization as of September 2015.

Moody's notes that although banks' reported CET1 ratios have
increased considerably, deferred tax assets (DTAs) eligible for
deferred tax credits (DTCs) continue to form a substantial part
of banks' capital base.  While lower than the 70% pre-
recapitalization average as of September 2015, the share of
eligible DTAs in CET1 capital remains high at around 45% on
average for the system post-recapitalization.  The rating agency
considers this capital to be of inferior quality in view of the
Greek sovereign's (Caa3 stable) weak credit standing and its
limited ability to meet around EUR16.8 billion of such
outstanding DTAs in the banking system.

The BCA upgrade also takes into account nascent improvements in
the banks' funding and liquidity profiles, as part of the capital
proceeds were used to repay their high cost emergency liquidity
assistance (ELA) to the Bank of Greece.  ELA stood at around
EUR69 billion for the system in December 2015, down from EUR87
billion in June 2015.  Moody's expects further reduction in the
banks' dependence on ELA, provided the first review of the
country's support program by its official lenders
(EC/ECB/ESM/IMF) is concluded positively in a timely manner.
This development would likely trigger the reinstatement of the
European Central Bank (ECB) waiver, allowing Greek government
securities to be used by banks as collateral for ECB funding
purposes.  This would enable banks to switch a portion of their
funding from the more costly ELA to the ECB repo window, and also
somewhat restore confidence in the banking system resulting in
gradual deposit inflows.

Concurrently, Moody's expects that banks' reducing funding costs
will support pre-provision income in 2016-17, and bottom-lines
will be largely driven by the level of provisioning requirements.
Following significant provisions that Greek banks had to take in
2015 -- triggered by the ECB's asset quality review (AQR) -- loan
loss provisions are likely to be significantly lower in 2016-17.
Moody's estimates that system nonperforming loans (NPLs, loans
that are 90 days past due) comprised on average around 36.5% of
gross loans as of September 2015, while the non-performing
exposure (NPE) ratio (as per the ECB's definition including
performing restructured/forborne and impaired loans for at least
12 months) stood at 49.3%.  The rating agency considers that the
NPL ratio is likely to peak towards the end of 2016 or early
2017, provided there is political stability and economic
conditions that do not deviate materially from the European
Commission's current GDP growth forecast of around -0.7% in 2016
and +2.7% in 2017.

Moody's considers that the BCA of caa3 for all five banks
appropriately balances these recent improvements in their
standalone credit profiles as well as the considerable downside
risks stemming from the still fragile operating environment in
Greece.  Moody's considers that over the next 12-18 months,
banks' performance will highly depend on political stability in
the country and the implementation of the support program's
conditionality, which includes new legislation to overhaul the
NPL resolution framework.

  --- DEPOSIT RATINGS AFFIRMED AT Caa3, OUTLOOK CHANGED TO STABLE
   FROM NEGATIVE

The change in the deposit ratings outlook to stable from negative
reflects the recent improvements in the banks' financial
fundamentals, as well as the reduced risk for potential sizeable
losses for depositors following the recent recapitalization.  The
affirmation of the banks' Caa3 deposit ratings primarily reflects
the on-going capital controls in place as well as the implied
losses faced by depositors that do not have instant access to the
full amount of their funds.  Although Greek depositors were
excluded from bail-in during the recent recapitalization, Moody's
considers that the relative risks are still elevated, especially
within the context of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD) transposition law that was passed in Greece in 2015,
envisaging the inclusion of depositors in a potential bank bail-
in from Jan. 1, 2016.  All banks' Caa3 deposit ratings are
positioned at the same level as the local-currency deposit
ceiling for Greece.

   --- SENIOR DEBT RATINGS UPGRADED TO Ca from C, JUNIOR
   INSTRUMENTS AFFIRMED AT C

The upgrade of the four systemic banks' senior debt ratings to Ca
from C reflects Moody's view that the risk of potential expected
losses for senior debt holders has reduced, but remains high.
The rating agency notes the crystallization of losses for senior
debt holders through the banks' liability management exercises
(LMEs). These LMEs included an offer to investors to voluntarily
exchange their senior debt with new shares of the bank worth 100%
of the debt's par value.  Although any investors that sold their
stock holdings in the first few days of trading after the actual
exchange took place were able to recoup a substantial portion of
their senior debt holdings' par value, investors that retained
such new shares to date are facing significant losses.  Following
the banks' recapitalizations and improved credit profiles, with
the potential for more favorable prospects going forward, the
rating agency considers that senior debt investors are less
likely to sustain considerable losses.

However, the Ca senior debt rating is constrained by the still
sizeable downside risks faced by investors going forward.
Moody's considers that the level of senior debt outstanding in
the system is minimal at around EUR180 million.  This is because
there were only a few holdout investors that did not participate
in the debt-equity exchange at Alpha Bank and Eurobank, both of
which did not resort to any state aid from the Hellenic Financial
Stability Fund (HFSF) in the recent recapitalization.  As a
result of the minimal level of structural subordination offered
to senior depositors in case of a bank bail-in, such senior debt
holders could be faced with substantial losses.  The senior debt
ratings outlook is stable.

At the same time, Moody's affirmed the C ratings assigned to the
four systemic banks' subordinated Tier 2 debt and non-cumulative
Tier 1 preferred stock.  These affirmations were driven by these
instruments' structural subordination to senior debt, and the
higher likelihood that they could sustain significant losses
before senior debt holders are affected in a potential bank
resolution scenario.

                          INDIVIDUAL BANKS

   --- ALPHA BANK

Alpha Bank's pro-forma CET1 ratio increased to 17.4% from 12.5%
reported as of September 2015 following its recent
recapitalization.  Injected capital included around EUR2.6
billion solely from private sources, in addition to around EUR180
million of other capital measures approved by the ECB.  Moody's
estimates a prudent tangible CET1 ratio of around 10.9%,
excluding any eligible DTAs (estimate for all banks does not take
into account any risk-weighted-assets impact), positioning the
bank at the stronger end among its local systemic peers, having
more loss-absorbing capital.

The bank reported losses of around EUR839 million for the first
nine-months of 2015, while its NPL and NPE ratio stood at around
36.5% and 50%, respectively, as of September 2015.  NPL and NPE
provisioning coverage stood at around 67% and 49%, respectively.
Moody's believes that the relatively high NPL provisioning
coverage provides the bank with more flexibility to actively
manage its NPL portfolio.  The bank's ELA as of September 2015
stood at EUR22.2 billion, comprising 31.8% of its total assets,
although Moody's expects this type of funding to have reduced
following the liquidity boost from the recent share capital
increase.

    --- ATTICA BANK

Attica Bank, the smallest among all rated Greek banks with a
market share of only around 2%, raised around EUR681 million of
new capital, which is EUR67 million short of the adverse scenario
capital needs indicated by the Bank of Greece.  Moody's
understands that the bank is currently in negotiations with
potential investors aiming to cover this shortfall within Q1
2016. The bank's pro-forma CET1 ratio following the capital
increase of EUR681 million is amongst the highest in the system
at 22.6% as of September 2015, although the rating agency expects
this to have reduced by more than 200 basis points by the end of
December 2015 due to additional losses to be reported in Q4 2015.

The bank reported losses of around EUR273 million in the first
nine-months in 2015, as its NPE ratio increased significantly to
55.8% in September 2015 (NPL ratio of 54.2%) from 44.8% in
December 2014.  Following the AQR by the Bank of Greece, the bank
had to almost double its stock of provisions during 2015,
increasing its NPE provisioning coverage to 50.9% in September
2015 from a low 32.6% in December 2014.  The bank's ELA
dependence was around EUR815 million as of September 2015,
comprising around 22.6% of its total assets.

    --- EUROBANK ERGASIAS

Eurobank was able to raise around EUR2 billion from private
investors, having the lowest capital needs among its domestic
peers based on the ECB's comprehensive assessment.  This new
capital increased its pro-forma CET1 ratio to 17.5% from 12.1%
reported as of September 2015.  Nonetheless, Moody's considers
the bank to have a lower quality of capital than its peers, in
view of its eligible DTAs (EUR4.1 billion) and the state
preference shares of around EUR950 million that the bank retains
on its balance sheet and will need to repay at some stage.  The
rating agency estimates a forward-looking tangible CET1 ratio for
the bank, excluding any eligible DTAs and the state preference
shares, of around 4.7%.

The bank's losses in the first nine months of 2015 amounted to
around EUR1 billion, while its NPL and NPE ratio stood at around
35% and 43.1%, respectively, as of September 2015.  Eurobank's
NPL and NPE provisioning coverage stood at around 65% and 53%,
respectively.  The bank's ELA as of September 2015 stood at
EUR22.2 billion, comprising around 30% of its total assets,
although Moody's notes that the bank was able to recently regain
access to the inter-bank repo market with the use of its European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) bonds (Aa1 stable).  In
addition, the bank would be in a position to shift around EUR5
billion of funding to the ECB from ELA upon the reinstatement of
the waiver by the ECB, supporting its pre-provision income that
stood at EUR658 million during the first nine-months of 2015.

    --- NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE

In 2015, National Bank of Greece's capital metrics were enhanced
through its EUR1.8 billion capital raising from private sources,
as well as through EUR2.7 billion of new capital received from
the HFSF, of which EUR2 billion was in the form of contingent
convertible instruments (CoCos) recognized as CET1 capital.  In
addition, the bank concluded the sale of its Turkish subsidiary
Finansbank AS (deposits Ba2 on review for upgrade, BCA b1 on
review for upgrade) to Qatar National Bank (deposits Aa3 stable,
BCA baa1) for a consideration of EUR2.75 billion, which will
further boost its capital position provided all regulatory
approvals are granted.  The bank's pro-forma CET1 ratio,
incorporating the sale of Finansbank that will significantly
reduce the group's risk-weighted assets, will increase to 24.6%
from the reported 9.6% in September 2015.  The bank plans to use
part of its sale proceeds to repay its EUR2 billion CoCos to the
HFSF, reducing its CET1 ratio to 19.6% from 24.6%.  Excluding any
eligible DTAs (EUR4.9 billion) and CoCos, Moody's estimates a
tangible CET1 ratio for the bank of around 7.5%.

The bank's NPL and NPE ratios in Greece stood at 33.8% and 47%,
respectively, as of September 2015, while the NPL and NPE
provisioning coverage was 73% and 52%, among the highest within
its local peer group.  The rating agency believes that recoveries
from the NPL portfolio could enhance the bank's relatively weak
pre-provision income in Greece of around EUR337 million in the
first nine-months of 2015, combined with further reduction in its
operating expenses.  In view of the bank's strong savings
franchise in Greece, its ELA balance as of September 2015 stood
at a more modest EUR15.6 billion, comprising 18.6% of its total
assets (excluding its operations in Turkey).

   --- PIRAEUS BANK

Piraeus Bank's pro-forma CET1 ratio increased to 19.6% from
11.2%, reported as of September 2015 following its capital
increase.  The injection included around EUR1.9 billion from
private investors in addition to EUR2.7 billion received from the
HFSF (EUR2 billion in the form of CoCos) and other capital
measures of around EUR271 million approved by the ECB.  Moody's
estimates the bank's tangible CET1 ratio excluding its eligible
DTAs (EUR4.1 billion) and CoCos at around 8.6%.

Moody's considers Piraeus Bank's asset quality position to be
among the weakest in the system due to its numerous take-overs of
smaller problematic banks in the last few years, which resulted
in an NPL and NPE ratio of around 40.5% and 51.8%, respectively,
as of September 2015.  In addition, the bank's NPL and NPE
provisioning coverage is also the lowest among its local peers at
61% and 44%, respectively.  However, the rating agency expects
the bank's asset quality to gradually improve in view of its
focus and active management of its NPLs and the likely
contraction of its international book due to its commitment to
scale-down its operations outside Greece.  The bank reported a
net loss of around EUR635 million during the first nine-months of
2015, although Moody's positively views the bank's ability to
increase its pre-provision income excluding any one-off
revenues/costs.

                WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

The stable outlook indicates that downside risks for substantial
losses to creditors have abated somewhat following the recent
bank recapitalization.  Over time, upward deposit and senior debt
rating pressure could arise following a stabilization of the
country's macro-economic environment, combined with an
improvement in banks' asset quality, profitability and funding.

Greek banks' deposit and senior debt ratings could be downgraded
in case there is any political turmoil in the country for an
extended period of time that substantially affects domestic
consumption and economic activity, which have gradually been
recovering from a very low base.  In addition, the deposit
ratings could be downgraded if the rating agency considers that
the risk of a potential exit from the euro area, and
redenomination, increases materially.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

THE SPECIFIC RATING ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED ARE:

Issuer: Alpha Bank AE

   -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to caa3 from ca
   -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to caa3 from
      ca
   -- Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)Ca from (P)C
   -- LT Bank Deposits, Affirmed Caa3 Stable
   -- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP
   -- BACKED (government guaranteed) Senior Unsecured MTN,
      Affirmed (P)Caa3
   -- Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)C
   -- Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)NP
   -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed Caa3(cr)
   -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)
   -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Alpha Credit Group plc

   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured, Upgraded to Ca Stable from C
      (Assumed by Alpha Bank AE)
   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)Ca from (P)C
   -- BACKED Subordinate, Affirmed C (Assumed by Alpha Bank AE)
   -- BACKED Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)C
   -- BACKED Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)NP
   -- BACKED Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

Issuer: Alpha Group Jersey Limited

   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)Ca from (P)C
   -- BACKED Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)C
   -- BACKED Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Affirmed C (hyb)

Issuer: Emporiki Group Finance Plc

   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured, Upgraded to Ca Stable from C
      (Assumed by Alpha Bank AE)

Issuer: Attica Bank S.A.

   -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to caa3 from ca
   -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to caa3 from
      ca
   -- LT Bank Deposits, Affirmed Caa3 Stable
   -- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP
   -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed Caa3(cr)
   -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)
   -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Eurobank Ergasias S.A.

   -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to caa3 from ca
   -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to caa3 from
      ca
   -- Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)Ca from (P)C
   -- LT Bank Deposits, Affirmed Caa3 Stable
   -- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP
   -- BACKED (government guaranteed) Senior Unsecured MTN,
      Affirmed (P)Caa3
   -- Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)C
   -- BACKED Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)NP
   -- Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)NP
   -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)
   -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed Caa3(cr)
   -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: ERB Hellas (Cayman Islands) Limited

   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)Ca from (P)C
   -- BACKED Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)C
   -- BACKED Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)NP
   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured, Withdrawn, previously rated C
      Stable

Issuer: ERB Hellas Funding Limited

   -- BACKED Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Affirmed C (hyb)

Issuer: ERB Hellas PLC

   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured, Upgraded to Ca Stable from C
   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)Ca from (P)C
   -- BACKED Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)C
   -- BACKED Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)NP
   -- BACKED Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed C
   -- BACKED Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

Issuer: National Bank of Greece S.A.

   -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to caa3 from ca
   -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to caa3 from
      ca
   -- LT Bank Deposits Affirmed, Caa3 Stable
   -- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP
   -- BACKED (government guaranteed) Senior Unsecured Regular
      Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Caa3 Stable
   -- BACKED (government guaranteed) Senior Unsecured MTN,
      Affirmed (P)Caa3
   -- BACKED Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)NP
   -- Backed Other Short Term, Affirmed NP
   -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed Caa3(cr)
   -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)
   -- Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Withdrawn (hyb), previously
      rated C (hyb)
   -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: NBG Finance plc

   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)Ca from (P)C
   -- BACKED Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)C
   -- BACKED Subordinate, Withdrawn , previously rated C

Issuer: Piraeus Bank S.A.

   -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to caa3 from ca
   -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to caa3 from
      ca
   -- Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)Ca from (P)C
   -- LT Bank Deposits, Affirmed Caa3 Stable
   -- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP
   -- Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)C
   -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed Caa3(cr)
   -- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)
   -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Piraeus Group Finance Plc

   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)Ca from (P)C
   -- BACKED Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)C
   -- BACKED Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
   -- BACKED Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)NP
   -- BACKED Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Withdrawn ,
      previously rated C
   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Withdrawn ,
      previously rated C

Issuer: Piraeus Group Capital Limited

   -- BACKED Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Withdrawn , previously
      rated C (hyb)
   -- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From No Outlook

All banks affected by the rating actions are headquartered in
Athens, Greece:

   -- National Bank of Greece S.A. reported total consolidated
      assets of EUR110.9 billion as of September 2015
   -- Piraeus Bank S.A. reported total consolidated assets of
      EUR85.9 billion as of September 2015
   -- Eurobank Ergasias S.A. reported total consolidated assets
      of EUR73.8 billion as of September 2015
   -- Alpha Bank AE reported total consolidated assets of EUR69.8
      billion as of September 2015
   -- Attica Bank S.A. reported total consolidated assets of
      EUR3.6 billion as of September 2015



=============
I C E L A N D
=============


* ICELAND: Final Exemption for Failed Banks' Settlement Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
On February 18, 2016, the Governor of the Central Bank and the
Director of the Bank's Capital Controls Surveillance Unit signed
the final exemption from the Foreign Exchange Act, no. 87/1992,
for the settlement of the estates of the failed commercial and
savings banks on the basis of stability conditions.  The Central
Bank of Iceland has now granted a total of seven exemptions,
including the one granted on Feb. 18, and has assessed the
economic impact of seven composition proposals from the failed
banking institutions.  It is therefore clear that all of the
failed banking institutions covered by stability tax legislation
-- eight in all -- will opt to conclude composition agreements on
the basis of stability conditions. One of them had already
concluded a composition agreement, and one other did not require
an exemption from the Foreign Exchange Act.

This outcome concludes one of the main phases of post-crisis
settlement in Iceland.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


AVOCA CLO III: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'B-(sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Avoca CLO III PLC's class B Def, C Def, D-1 Def, D-2 Def, and R
combination notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its rating
on the class E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the Dec. 31, 2015 trustee report.

Avoca CLO III's class A notes fully amortized on the previous
payment date in September 2015, while the class B Def notes have
partially amortized.  As the senior notes have deleveraged, there
are only fourteen performing obligors in the pool.  This has led
to increased portfolio concentration and thereby potential
dilution of available credit protection to the rated notes by the
performance of individual obligors.  The largest obligor
represents 15.08% of the aggregate portfolio balance, with the
average exposure to each obligor at 7.14%.

Since S&P's Aug. 22, 2013 review, the aggregate collateral
balance has decreased by 72.6% to EUR82.06 million.  The
weighted-average spread earned on the underlying portfolio has
decreased to 3.69% from 3.80% while its weighted-average life has
reduced to 4.11 years from 4.99 years over the same period.  The
credit quality of the portfolio continues to remain stable with
an average rating of 'B'.  The proportion of assets rated in the
'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') has decreased since
S&P's previous review.  There are currently no defaulted assets
in the portfolio, compared with 2.13% in S&P's previous review.

The available credit enhancement for the class B Def, C Def, D-1
Def, and D-2 Def notes has increased due to the transaction's
structural deleveraging since its re-investment period ended.
The class B Def notes, which are the senior most class of notes
outstanding, have paid down EUR17.80 million of their principal
and currently have a note factor (the current notional amount
divided by the notional amount at closing) of 40.64%.  The
upgrades are primarily due to the increased available credit
enhancement.

The class B, C, and D par value tests are in compliance, with
sizable cushions over their documented trigger levels.  The class
E par value test, as of the December 2015 trustee report, is
failing with a ratio of 98.32% compared with the required
threshold of 103.0%.  As a result of this failure, interest
proceeds (after the repayment of class E note interest in the
interest waterfall) are redirected to repay the principal on the
senior notes until the class E note par value test is in
compliance.

S&P has also applied its non-sovereign ratings criteria.  S&P has
considered the transaction's exposure to sovereign risk because
some of the portfolio's assets -- 10.85% of the transaction's
total collateral balance -- are based in Spain and Italy.  In
'AAA' rating scenarios, S&P has limited credit to 10% of the
transaction's collateral balance, to correspond to assets based
in these sovereigns in S&P's calculation of the aggregate
collateral balance.

The issuer has entered into asset swap agreements with Citibank
N.A. to hedge any resultant currency risk from non-euro-
denominated assets (5.37% of the portfolio balance).  The
documented downgrade provisions in these asset swap contracts do
not fully comply with S&P's current counterparty criteria.  S&P
has therefore applied currency stresses to these non-euro-
denominated assets to test the effect on our rating on the class
B Def notes, which is currently above S&P's rating on the
counterparty, if the counterparty failed to perform.

The results of S&P's credit and cash flow analysis and the
application of its current counterparty and non-sovereign ratings
criteria indicate that the available credit enhancement for the
class B Def notes is commensurate with a higher rating than
currently assigned.  S&P has therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)' from
'AA- (sf)' its rating on the class B Def notes.

S&P's ratings on the class C Def, D-1 Def, D-2 Def, and R
combination notes are constrained by the application of the
largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress test that S&P
outlines in its corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
criteria.  This assesses whether a CDO tranche has sufficient
credit enhancement to withstand specified combinations of
underlying asset defaults, based on the ratings on the underlying
assets.  The test assumes a flat recovery of 5%.  The obligor
concentration risk has increased due to portfolio deleveraging,
with only 14 performing obligors, down from 46 at S&P's previous
review.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicates that the class C Def,
D-1 Def, D-2 Def, and R combination notes can support higher
ratings than those currently assigned (due to increased available
credit enhancement), the largest obligor default test caps S&P's
ratings on these classes of notes.  S&P has therefore raised its
ratings to 'A- (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' on the class C Def notes,
to 'B- (sf)' from 'CCC+ (sf)' on the class D-1 Def and D-2 Def
notes, and to 'B+ (sf)' from 'CCC+ (sf)' on the class R
combination notes.

S&P has affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class E notes as
these notes are currently undercollateralized.  In S&P's view,
undercollateralization and the subordinated position of this
class of notes in the payment waterfall make the class E notes
vulnerable to a payment default at their legal final maturity.

Avoca CLO III is a cash flow corporate loan collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
August 2005.

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating            Rating
            To                From

Avoca CLO III PLC
EUR408 Million Floating- And Fixed-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

B Def       AAA (sf)          AA- (sf)
C Def       A- (sf)           BBB+ (sf)
D-1 Def     B- (sf)           CCC+ (sf)
D-2 Def     B- (sf)           CCC+ (sf)
R Combo     B+ (sf)           CCC+ (sf)

Rating Affirmed

E           CCC- (sf)

Combo--Combination.


CELF LOAN II: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to B3
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on these notes
issued by CELF Loan Partners II plc:

  EUR50 mil. (current outstanding balance of EUR29,662,850) Class
   B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 1, 2014, Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  EUR7 mil. (current outstanding balance of EUR4,152,799) Class
   B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 1, 2014, Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  EUR42.5 mil. Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec. 1,
   2014, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  EUR19.5 mil. Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2021, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec. 1,
   2014, Affirmed B1 (sf)

CELF Loan Partners II plc, issued in November 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans.  The portfolio
is managed by CELF Advisors LLP.  The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in December 2011.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the upgrade of Class C notes results from
the deleveraging over the last year.  The Class A notes have
fully repaid and the Class B notes have paid down by
approximately EUR23.2 million (41% of closing balance) resulting
in increases in over-collateralization (OC) ratios.  As of the
trustee report dated January 2016, the Class A/B, Class C and
Class D OC ratios are reported at 309.1%, 137% and 109.1%,
respectively, versus January 2015 levels of 170.8%, 118.9% and
104.3%.

The downgrade of Class D notes results from the worsening credit
quality of the portfolio (measured by the weighted average rating
factor, or WARF).  As of the trustee's January 2016 report, the
WARF was 3454, compared with 3375 in January 2015.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR96.0 million,
defaulted par of EUR11.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 23.2% (consistent with a WARF of 3589), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 46.3% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 13 and a weighted average
spread of 4.0%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery rates
for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF
CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be
considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these default and
recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash
flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed one of the largest obligors in the portfolio
currently assessed in the Caa credit quality range defaults with
a recovery rate of around 30%.  The model generated outputs were
unchanged for the Class B and within one to three notches of the
base-case results for rest of the classes.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
   portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
   conditions and have a significant impact on the notes'
   ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of
   high loan prepayment levels or collateral sales by the
   collateral manager or be delayed by an increase in loan
   amend-and-extend restructurings.  Fast amortization would
   usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning with the
    notes having the highest prepayment priority.

  Around 11% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
   whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
   estimates.  As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed
   large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit
   estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of
   Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions," published in October
    2009 and available at:

    http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461

  Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
   have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
   collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
   defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
   the market price or the recovery rate to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.  Recoveries higher than Moody's
   expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'
   ratings.

  Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes that, at transaction
   maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend
   on the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities.  Liquidation
   values higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive
   impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


HOUSE OF EUROPE V: S&P Raises Rating on Class A2 Notes to B+
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
House of Europe Funding V PLC's class A1 and A2 notes.  At the
same time, S&P has affirmed its 'CC (sf)' ratings on the class
A3a, A3b, B, C, D, E1, and E2 notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using data from the Dec. 8, 2015 trustee report,
and the application of S&P's relevant criteria.

"We conducted our cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes.  The BDR
represents our estimate of the maximum level of gross defaults,
based on our stress assumptions, that a tranche can withstand and
still fully repay the noteholders.  We used the portfolio balance
that we consider to be performing, the reported weighted-average
spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates that we
considered to be appropriate.  We incorporated various cash flow
stress scenarios using our shortened and additional default
patterns and levels for each rating category assumed for each
class of notes, combined with different interest stress scenarios
as outlined in our criteria," S&P said.

The transaction's reinvestment period ended in November 2011.
Since S&P's Aug. 21, 2014 review, the class A1 notes have
amortized further.

Just over 15% of the class A1 notes' original principal balance
remains outstanding.  As a result of the class A1 notes
deleveraging, the available credit enhancement has marginally
increased for this class of notes, in S&P's view.  At the same
time, all of the collateral coverage tests continue to breach
their required triggers, similar to what S&P observed in its
previous review.

S&P's credit analysis indicates that its scenario default rates
(SDRs) -- the minimum level of portfolio defaults S&P expects
each collateralized debt obligation (CDO) tranche to be able to
support the specific rating level using Standard & Poor's CDO
Evaluator -- have increased at all rating levels since S&P's 2014
review (except for the 'BB' category).  S&P's credit and cash
flow analysis shows that the current BDRs are no longer able to
sustain SDRs at the currently assigned rating levels for the
class A3a, A3b, B, C, D, E1, and E2 notes.  S&P has therefore
affirmed its 'CC (sf)' ratings on these classes of notes.  S&P's
'CC (sf)' ratings reflect its view that these notes remain highly
vulnerable to non-payment.

S&P has raised to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' its rating on the
class A1 notes and to 'B+ (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' its rating on the
class A2 notes.  With further deleveraging resulting in increased
credit enhancement for these classes of notes, as well as the
notes' seniority in the capital structure, S&P's credit and cash
flow analysis supports higher ratings than previously assigned.

House of Europe Funding V is a cash flow mezzanine structured
finance CDO transaction that closed in October 2006.

RATINGS LIST

House of Europe Funding V PLC
EUR1 bil fixed- and floating-rate notes and annuity notes

                                 Rating       Rating
Class    Identifier              To           From
A1       XS0272910661            BBB+ (sf)    BB (sf)
A2       XS0272911479            B+ (sf)      CCC (sf)
A3a      XS0272911552            CC (sf)      CC (sf)
A3b      XS0272911982            CC (sf)      CC (sf)
B        XS0272912287            CC (sf)      CC (sf)
C        XS0272912873            CC (sf)      CC (sf)
D        XS0272913095            CC (sf)      CC (sf)
E1       XS0272913335            CC (sf)      CC (sf)
E2       XS0272913764            CC (sf)      CC (sf)


M&J WALLACE: Cerberus Winds Up Business Over Debt
-------------------------------------------------
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that US fund Cerberus
is winding up TD Mick Wallace's property business just weeks
after it succeeded in winning a EUR2 million judgment against
him.

Mr. Wallace, an Independent TD for Wexford, last month failed to
halt Cerberus's efforts to obtain a High Court judgment for EUR2
million arising out of a debt due from his company, M&J Wallace
Ltd., secured against its Italian Quarter development in Dublin,
The Irish Times recounts.

A Cerberus subsidiary, Promontoria Aran, has appointed
MĀ°cheal Leydon -- mleydon@outlookaccountants.ie -- of Outlook
Accountants as liquidator to M&J Wallace, after petitioning the
High Court to have it wound up, The Irish Times discloses.

Cerberus bought the M&J Wallace liabilities from Ulster Bank in
late 2014 as part of a package of property debts sold by the
lender in a transaction dubbed Project Aran, The Irish Times
relays.

Mr. Wallace, whose is tipped to be re-elected this week, gave
Ulster Bank a EUR2 million personal guarantee against a loan to
M&J Wallace, The Irish Times states.  This was secured against
his Italian Quarter development on Dublin's Ormond Quay,
according to The Irish Times.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


HALYK SAVINGS: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
counterparty credit rating on Halyk Savings Bank of Kazakhstan to
'BB' from 'BB+' and affirmed its short-term counterparty credit
rating at 'B'.  The outlook is stable.

S&P also lowered the Kazakhstan national scale rating on Halyk
Bank to 'kzA+' from 'kzAA-'.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that the Kazakhstan
government's financial capacity to provide extraordinary support
to systemically important private sector banks has gradually
weakened over the past 18 months.

S&P expects GDP growth in Kazakhstan to stagnate or to contract
modestly in 2016, in view of the economy's high dependence on the
oil sector, which accounts for an estimated 20% of GDP, 50% of
fiscal revenues, and 60% of exports.  S&P forecasts weaker
exports and roughly flat oil production (unless the large
offshore Kashagan oil field comes fully on stream earlier than
2018), as well as reduced domestic consumption due to the
devaluation of the Kazakhstani tenge, high inflation, and weak
consumer lending.  For 2017-2019, S&P expects a moderate economic
recovery as consumption and investments somewhat pick up. Longer-
term growth prospects will depend on the pace of the oil price
recovery, the Kashagan project, and progress in announced
structural reforms.

A weak external environment has resulted in the substantial
depreciation of the tenge by about 50% since August 2015.  S&P
believes that the ability of the national bank, NBK, to influence
domestic monetary conditions remains constrained by weak
transmission mechanisms.  Apart from shallow capital markets, the
banking system is extremely vulnerable and has become
increasingly dollarized.  More importantly, the recent oil price
drop and further tenge depreciation will present the NBK with
deepening challenges, including maintaining financial stability,
supporting credit and economic growth, and keeping inflation
within previously-stated targets.  In this context, S&P sees
increasing risks to the predictability and effectiveness of the
NBK's policies.

S&P views Halyk Bank to be of high systemic importance in
Kazakhstan, as the second-largest bank by assets and corporate
deposits, with a market share of above 20% in terms of retail
deposits.  High systemic importance means that S&P considers that
Halyk Bank's failure would likely have a highly adverse impact on
Kazakhstan's financial system and the real economy.

Nevertheless, S&P believes that the Kazakh government's financial
capacity to provide extraordinary support to systemically
important private sector banks, such as Halyk, has gradually
weakened.  Therefore S&P has removed the one-notch uplift for
extraordinary government support from the long-term rating on
Halyk Bank because the difference between Halyk Bank's stand-
alone credit profile (SACP) of 'bb' and the local currency
sovereign credit rating of 'BBB-' is not wide enough to warrant
it, according to S&P's methodology.

S&P's rating action also acknowledges that this less-supportive
economic environment in Kazakhstan is likely to put pressure on
Halyk Bank's new lending and on the creditworthiness of its
borrowers, especially in view of sharp tenge depreciation since
August 2015.  This is likely to reduce Halyk Bank's capacity to
continue accruing capital internally.  S&P expects Halyk Bank's
profitability to normalize at a weaker level in 2016, compared
with 2014.

The 'BB' long-term rating on Halyk Bank remains the highest among
private sector banks we rate in Kazakhstan, and reflects the
superior business and financial profiles of the bank versus those
of local peers.  Although Halyk Bank is not immune to the
economic slowdown, S&P thinks the bank is relatively well
positioned to sustain itself, thanks to sufficient capital
levels.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the bank's
business and financial profiles will remain at their current
levels over the next 12 months.  S&P expects that Halyk Bank will
remain resilient to the weakened operating environment in
Kazakhstan due to its adequate capitalization buffer and more
cautious growth strategy over the past five years than its
smaller domestic peers'.

S&P could consider a negative rating action over the next 12
months if the bank's loans more than 90 days overdue under IFRS
increase above the system average or if the bank's liquidity in
tenge becomes insufficient due to an inability to hedge its wide
mismatch between assets and liabilities in foreign currency.

A positive rating action is unlikely in the next 12 months due to
the negative economic and industry risk trends in the Kazakh
banking sector and their effect on Halyk Bank's business and
financial profile.


* S&P Cuts Ratings on 5 Kazakhstan-Based Companies, Outlook Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has taken various rating
actions on Kazakhstan-based companies in the commodity exports,
infrastructure, and utility sectors.

Specifically, S&P lowered to 'BB' from 'BB+' its long-term
corporate credit ratings on Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating
Co. JSC, KazMunayGas NC JSC, KazTransGas, KazTransOil, and
Kazakhstan Temir Zholy.

At the same time, S&P revised its outlook on Samruk-Energy JSC to
negative from stable and affirmed S&P's 'BB/B' long- and short-
term corporate credit ratings.

The outlooks on all six rated companies are negative.

The downgrades follow the lowering of our ratings on Kazakhstan
on Feb. 17, 2016.

S&P considers all six companies to be government-related entities
(GREs) that S&P believes may receive different levels of
extraordinary government support from the government of
Kazakhstan.

S&P has not revised its assessment of the likelihood of
extraordinary support these companies might receive from the
government.  The rating actions reflect solely the weaker
capacity of the sovereign to provide such support.

Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Co. (JSC) (KEGOC).  In
S&P's view, there's still a very high likelihood that KEGOC would
receive timely and sufficient extraordinary support from
Kazakhstan's government, if needed.  S&P continues to assess
KEGOC's stand-alone credit profile at 'b+'.

The negative outlook on KEGOC reflects that on Kazakhstan.  In
accordance with S&P's criteria for rating GREs, if S&P was to
lower the long-term rating on Kazakhstan by a further notch, this
will likely result in a similar rating action on KEGOC, all else
being equal.

                     KazMunayGas NC JSC (KMG)

S&P continues to see a very high likelihood that the Kazakh
government would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary
support to KMG in the event of financial distress, and assess the
company's stand-alone credit profile at 'b'.  S&P notes that KMG
was not immediately affected by the downward revision of S&P's
oil price assumptions, since upstream operations account for a
relatively small share of its profits in the current environment.
In addition, the company receives ongoing support from the
government, which supports the current rating.

The negative outlook reflects that on the sovereign.  In
accordance with S&P's criteria for GREs, a further one-notch
downgrade of Kazakhstan will result in a similar rating action on
KMG and its core subsidiary KazMunaiGas Exploration Production
JSC, all other factors remaining unchanged.

                         KazTransGas (KTG)

The rating action also reflects the downgrade of KazMunayGas,
KTG's parent company.  S&P caps its rating on KTG at S&P's rating
on KMG, owing to KTG's status as a moderately strategic
subsidiary of the KMG group and S&P's view that there is a
moderately high likelihood that KTG would receive timely and
sufficient extraordinary support in the event of financial
stress.  S&P assumes that this support would likely come directly
from the government, rather than from the parent.  Therefore,
S&P's long-term rating on KTG reflects S&P's assessment of its
stand-alone credit profile plus an uplift for potential
government support.

The negative outlook mirrors that on KTG's immediate parent, KMG.
Therefore, and in accordance with S&P's group rating methodology,
a negative rating action on the parent would lead to a similar
rating action on KTG, all else being equal.

                         KazTransOil (KTO)

The rating action also reflects the downgrade of KTO's parent
KMG. S&P caps its rating on KTO at that on KMG, owing to KTO's
status as a strategically important subsidiary of the KMG group
and S&P's view that there is a high likelihood that KTO would
receive timely and sufficient extraordinary support in the event
of financial stress.  S&P assumes that this support would likely
come directly from the government, rather than from the parent.
Therefore, S&P's long-term rating on KTO reflects S&P's
assessment of KTO's stand-alone credit profile plus an uplift for
potential government support.

The negative outlook reflects that on the parent, KMG.  In
accordance with S&P's group rating methodology, if it lowers its
rating on KMG by one notch, this would most likely lead to a
similar rating action on KTO.

                     Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ)

The rating on KTZ reflects S&P's view of the company's stand-
alone credit profile at 'b' and a very high likelihood that its
owner, the government of Kazakhstan, would provide extraordinary
support to the company, if needed.

The negative outlook mirrors that on the sovereign and indicates
that S&P would most likely downgrade KTZ if S&P lowers its
ratings on Kazakhstan.

                        Samruk-Energy JSC

S&P affirmed its global scale ratings on Samruk-Energy, based on
S&P's unchanged view that there is a high likelihood that the
Kazakh government would provide timely and sufficient
extraordinary support to Samruk-Energy in the event of financial
distress, and S&P's continued assessment of the company's stand-
alone credit profile at 'b+'.

The negative outlook reflects that on the sovereign.  In
accordance with S&P's criteria for GREs, a further one-notch
downgrade of Kazakhstan will result in a similar rating action on
Samruk-Energy, all else being equal.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded
                              To                From
Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Co. (JSC)
Corporate Credit Rating      BB/Negative/--    BB+/Negative/--

KazMunayGas NC JSC
KazMunaiGas Exploration Production JSC
Corporate Credit Rating      BB/Negative/--    BB+/Negative/--

KazTransGas
Intergas Central Asia JSC
Corporate Credit Rating      BB/Negative/--    BB+/Negative/--

KazTransOil
Corporate Credit Rating      BB/Negative/--    BB+/Negative/--

Kazakhstan Temir Zholy
JSC Kaztemirtrans
Corporate Credit Rating      BB/Negative/--    BB+/Negative/--

Outlook Action; Rating Affirmed

Samruk-Energy JSC
Corporate Credit Rating      BB/Negative/B      BB/Stable/B

NB: This list does not contain all the ratings affected.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


ALTICE US: S&P Withdraws Prelim. B CCR on Reorganization
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it withdrew its
preliminary 'B' corporate credit rating on Altice US Holding I
S.ar.l.

"The entity was an escrow financing company created for the
acquisition of a 70% interest in Cequel Corp., which closed on
Dec. 21, 2015," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Michael
Altberg. Under Altice N.V.'s new organizational structure, the
Altice US Holding I S.ar.l entity no longer exists, and as a
result, we are withdrawing our preliminary ratings.


TONON LUXEMBOURG: Fitch Withdraws 'D' LT Issuer Default Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Tonon Bioenergia S.A.'s (Tonon) 'D'
foreign and local currency long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) and the ratings on Tonon Luxembourg S.A.'s (Tonon
Luxembourg) associated debts. Tonon Luxembourg is a fully-owned
subsidiary of Tonon and the issuer of Tonon's debts.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch has withdrawn the ratings due to lack of updated
information following the company's filing for bankruptcy
protection on Dec. 9, 2015.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for
the corporate and debt instruments.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has withdrawn the following ratings:

Tonon Bioenergia S.A.
-- Foreign and local currency long-term IDRs 'D'.

Tonon Luxembourg S.A.
-- $US 89 million senior unsecured notes, due 2020, 'C/RR4';
-- $US 11 million senior unsecured notes, due 2020, 'C/RR4';
-- $US 230 million senior secured notes, due 2024, 'C/RR4'.



=================
M A C E D O N I A
=================


MACEDONIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Macedonia's Long-term foreign and
local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB+', with
Negative Outlooks. The issue ratings on Macedonia's senior
unsecured foreign and local currency bonds have also been
affirmed at 'BB+'. The Country Ceiling has been affirmed at
'BBB-' and the Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Macedonia's ratings are supported by a healthy economic growth
outlook, a favorable business climate and governance indicators
that perform better than most 'BB' range peers. However, the
Negative Outlook reflects risks to political stability and the
rising government debt/GDP ratio.

Macedonia is making progress in implementing the road-map
brokered by European Commissioner Johannes Hahn in the summer.
This aims to ease political tensions and lead to free and fair
elections scheduled for April 2016, after the country was hit by
political shocks in 2015. Since those shocks, important
milestones have included the return of the opposition SDSM party
to parliament (which it had boycotted since elections in 2014),
the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate the
wiretap and other allegations, the appointment of a transitional
government and the resignation of former Prime Minister
Nikola Gruevski in January 2016. However, all the main political
parties have yet to agree on media and electoral reforms and on
participating in elections.

The political outlook remains uncertain with downside risks, in
Fitch's view. It remains to be seen whether parliamentary
elections take place as planned in April 2016 with the
participation of all the main political parties, whether they are
free and fair, if the losers accept the result, if the next
administration adopts good governance standards and whether
political tensions ease.

Fitch estimates that Macedonia's general government debt was
38.7% of GDP at end-2015, below the 'BB' median ratio of 43.6%.
However, it is on a rising trend and has increased by 14.4pp
since 2010, due to an overshooting of fiscal targets and an
increase in government borrowing to co-finance investment
projects. Moreover, contingent liabilities in the form of
government guarantees to state-owned entities (SOEs) had
increased to 8.6% of GDP in 2015 from 3.2% of GDP in 2010,
pushing total public debt to 47.3% of GDP. This ratio will
continue to increase in the medium term, with Fitch estimating
52.8% of GDP by 2017. Finally, foreign currency debt is high,
accounting for 77.5% of total government debt. However, 88% of
foreign currency debt is in euros, highlighting the importance of
the peg to ensure fiscal sustainability.

The general government fiscal deficit was 3.5% of GDP in 2015,
slightly above the original budget target of 3.4% but just below
the July supplementary budget deficit target of 3.6%. It is in
line with the 'BB' median deficit. For 2016 and 2017, Fitch
forecasts Macedonia's fiscal deficits will narrow only modestly,
despite strong GDP growth, to 3.4% and 3.1% of GDP, respectively.
Despite a narrowing of the headline deficit, Macedonia's
structural fiscal balance is expected to widen, reflecting a lack
of structural policy measures in its medium-term fiscal
framework.

Macedonia's economic growth performance has been stable, with GDP
growth averaging 2.5% in the five years to 2015. GDP growth is
estimated at 3.2% in 2015, Fitch forecasts it at 3.6% in 2016 and
2017. The government's medium-term policies include active labor
market programs, increasing social welfare payments to improve
standards of living and increasing infrastructure spending, which
will support growth in household consumption, public and private
investment. Fitch expects domestic demand to be the main driver
of growth for 2016-2017.

Macedonia's rating is also supported by GDP per capita and levels
of human development above the 'BB' range median. The business
climate is highly favorable -- the 12th best in the world
according to the 2015 World Bank Ease of Doing Business survey.

The exposure of Macedonia's banking sector to Greece has
moderated. Including the two Greek-owned subsidiaries that
account for 24% of Macedonia's banking system assets, Macedonian
banks have remained well capitalized, with a sector average Tier
1 capital adequacy ratio of 14.5%. Liquidity is also adequate,
with liquid assets to total short-term liabilities in the sector
around 51%. A modest risk is the ratio of non-performing loans in
the sector, which is relatively high at 10.8% (end 2015),
although this ratio appears to have peaked. Additionally, they
appear to be well provisioned (103.1%, end 2015).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main risk factors that, individually or collectively, could
trigger negative rating action are:

-- Heightened or prolonged political instability, for example if
    there is a failure to fully implement the agreement brokered
    by European Commissioner Johannes Hahn, elections scheduled
    for April fail to ease tensions or a breakdown in ethnic
    relations.

-- Fiscal slippage or the crystallization of contingent
    liabilities that jeopardize the stability of the public
    finances or currency peg.

-- A widening of external imbalances that exerts pressure on
    foreign currency reserves and the currency peg.

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, result
in a stabilization of the Outlook include:

-- Implementation of a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation
    program consistent with a stabilization of the public
    debt/GDP ratio.

-- A marked easing in political tension and uncertainty, for
    example if free and fair elections scheduled for April 2016
    are completed.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch assumes that Macedonia will continue to pursue monetary and
fiscal policy measures consistent with its currency peg to the
euro.

Fitch assumes there is no near-term resolution of the "name
issue" with Greece that could unlock the path towards NATO and EU
accession.

Fitch assumes that the EU economy, Macedonia's largest trade
partner, will continue to recover gradually.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


HUVEPHARMA INT'L: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the corporate family
rating to Ba3 from B1 and the probability of default rating to
B1-PD from B2-PD of Huvepharma International BV, a vertically
integrated developer, manufacturer and distributor of a wide
range of animal health products to livestock animals.  The
outlook on all ratings is stable.

Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded to Ba3 from B1 the ratings of
the existing EUR75 million senior secured term loan A due in
2019, the EUR180 million senior secured term loan B due in 2020,
and a senior secured revolving credit facility due in 2019, the
amount of which was extended to EUR40 million from the initial
EUR20 million.  Moody's also assigned a Ba3 rating to the new $16
million senior secured term loan A2 due in 2019, $44 million
senior secured term loan B2 due in 2020, EUR48 million senior
secured capex facility due in 2019, and EUR45 million senior
secured acquisition facility due in 2020.

Moody's expects that Huvepharma will use the proceeds from the
senior secured term loans A2 and B2 to finance the acquisition of
Zoetis' assets.  The capex and acquisition facilities will
support Huvepharma's further expansion plans in the upcoming
years, while the increased revolver will enhance its liquidity
position.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of Huvepharma's ratings to Ba3 reflects its robust
financial performance, well ahead of Moody's initial expectations
driven by strong and profitable growth, healthy cash flow
generation and conservative financial policy.  Despite a
substantial step up in leverage in 2014 following the debt-funded
buyback transaction with adjusted debt/EBITDA increasing to 3.9x
from below 1.5x in 2012-13, the company's leverage remained
significantly below the level Moody's initially expected, of
around 4.9x.  The company also proved its ability to quickly
deleverage with adjusted debt/EBITDA reducing to 3.3x in Q3 2015.

Moody's understands that Huvepharma will continue to pursue its
ambitious plans to grow at double-digit annual rates while
maintaining an adjusted EBITDA margin at above 20%.  While the
company's primary focus will remain on organic growth, supported
by a strong new products pipeline and overall solid fundamentals
of the animal health market, it is also considering M&A deals as
part of its business development strategy.  The company recently
announced the acquisition of a number of assets from its peer
Zoetis Inc. (Baa2 stable) which will be complimentary to the
company's existing business in terms of sales, marketing,
technical support, and manufacturing capacity.

Despite a substantial increase in investments on capex and M&A in
2016 to support growth, Moody's expects that Huvepharma will
generate sufficient EBITDA and cash flows to comply with Moody's
guidance for a Ba3 rating.  Although there might be a temporary
increase in adjusted leverage, the rating agency expects that it
should remain below 4.0x and that the company will be quickly
back on track within its deleveraging plan.

The company's financial profile and liquidity are further
supported by (1) additional protection from a number of
restrictions under the facilities agreement regarding M&A
activity, shareholder distributions and leverage; (2) the long-
term maturity profile of the company's debt portfolio; and (3)
the discretionary nature of up to 80% of the planned capex, which
the company can easily defer in case of weaker-than-expected
operating results and cash flows.

Huvepharma's Ba3 rating is mainly constrained by its small size
and its concentration in livestock, in particular poultry and
swine.  These factors are partly offset by the company's (1)
strong position in key niche segments; and (2) balanced
diversification across products, geographies and customer base.
Huvepharma is also reasonably well positioned to withstand any
potential regulatory pressure related to the use of antibiotics
given the company's focus on developing products to offset a
potential reduction in the use of antibiotics.

                    STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Moody's rates the new term loans A2 and B2, acquisition and the
capex facility at Ba3, in line with the existing facilities,
because they are arranged as an extension of the original credit
facilities package and rank pari-passu with each other in
accordance with the intercreditor agreement.

                 RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the company
will continue to deliver on its growth strategy as planned, while
maintaining robust operating performance and a solid liquidity
profile.  This should allow the company to maintain its adjusted
debt/EBITDA at below 4.0x taking into account any potential M&A
transactions.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's do not expect any positive pressure on the rating in the
short term.  Over time, Moody's would consider upgrading
Huvepharma's rating if the company were to (1) materially
increase its scale and continue demonstrating robust operational
performance; (2) reduce its leverage (measured as adjusted
debt/EBITDA) to below 3.0x while sustaining retained cash flow to
net debt at above 20%; and (3) maintain a strong liquidity
profile and positive free cash flow generation.

Negative pressure would develop on the company's ratings in the
event of (1) a material deterioration in Huvepharma's competitive
position within its core product lines; (2) a negative impact on
its operating performance owing to increasing regulatory risks;
or (3) other related developments that could weaken its liquidity
position, or increase the company's leverage, with adjusted
debt/EBITDA trending towards 4.5x and retained cash flow/net debt
towards low teens in percentage terms on a sustained basis.

                      PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Manufacturing Companies published in July 2014.

Huvepharma International BV is a parent company for Huvepharma
EOOD.  Headquartered in Sofia, Bulgaria, Huvepharma EOOD is a
vertically integrated developer, manufacturer and distributor of
a wide range of animal health products for livestock animals,
with a focus on the poultry and swine markets.  Huvepharma sells
its products in more than 95 countries, with Europe and North
America being its key markets.  In 2014, the company generated
EUR242 million of revenues.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


* ROMANIA: New Law Trims Number of Insolvent Companies
------------------------------------------------------
Romania Insider reports that the new insolvency law, which
entered into force in mid-2014, has reduced the number of
businesses that entered insolvency.

Just over 9,100 companies became insolvent last year, compared to
over 19,000 in 2014, and 23,000 in 2013, Romania Insider
discloses.

In the first half of 2014, when the old insolvency law still
applied, over 17,000 companies entered insolvency, Romania
Insider relays.  The number dropped to 2,200 insolvency
procedures in the second part of 2014 after the new law was
introduced, Romania Insider says, citing local Profit.ro.

The law limits the possibility to declare insolvency under any
conditions, Romania Insider notes.  The debt threshold to declare
insolvency has been lifted, Romania Insider states.

According to Romania Insider, the wholesale and retail trade were
the sectors, which recorded most insolvencies in November 2015,
followed by companies in constructions.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


SPURT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B-' IDR, Then Withdraws Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed JSC Spurt Bank's Long-term foreign
currency IDR at 'B-' with Negative Outlook and subsequently
withdrawn the ratings.

Fitch has withdrawn the ratings as Spurt has chosen to stop
participating in the rating process. Therefore, Fitch will no
longer have sufficient information to maintain the ratings.
Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical
coverage for Spurt.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation follows the limited change in the bank's credit
profile since our last review. On December 2, 2015, Fitch
downgraded Spurt to 'B-' from 'B' with Negative Outlook
reflecting the bank's weak asset quality and capitalization with
significant additionally identified risky related
party/relationship lending.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Not applicable.

The following ratings have been affirmed and withdrawn:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'B-', Outlook Negative
Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'B'
Viability Rating: 'b-'
Support Rating: '5'
Support Rating Floor: 'No Floor'
National Long-term Rating: 'BB(rus)', Outlook Negative


VOZROZHDENIE BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Counterparty Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Russia-based
Vozrozhdenie Bank.  The outlook is negative.

S&P also affirmed its 'ruAA-' Russia national scale rating on
Vozrozhdenie Bank.

In addition, S&P removed all the ratings from CreditWatch where
they were placed with negative implications on Aug. 24, 2015.

The rating actions reflect S&P's opinion that it now have more
clarity on the future business strategy of Vozrozhdenie Bank
after recent material changes in the bank's ownership structure.
Dmitry Orlov, the founder and previous majority shareholder of
the bank, passed away in 2014.  In the third quarter of 2015,
Promsvyaz Capital B.V. -- the holding company of Promsvyazbank
OJSC, another Russian bank -- acquired a stake of about 70% in
Vozrozhdenie Bank's voting shares.  S&P understands that the new
majority shareholder does not want to immediately introduce
significant changes in Vozrozhdenie Bank's historically prudent
and well-articulated strategy, which has allowed it to post
recurring, healthy operating profits in the past.  This
alleviates some of S&P's concerns that previously caused it to
place the bank's ratings on CreditWatch with negative
implications.  S&P also understands that during the past six
months Vozrozhdenie Bank enjoyed rather stable client confidence
despite changes at the shareholder level.

Therefore, S&P continues view the bank's development strategy as
relatively conservative, which explains the bank's generally
stable performance through the cycle.  At the same time, S&P
cannot exclude the possibility that the new controlling
shareholder will eventually introduce more significant changes to
the bank's strategy that might incorporate a combined view on
development of both Vozrozhdenie Bank and Promsvyazbank.  S&P
could revise its opinion if it observes that the new owners are
inclined to shift toward a more aggressive risk appetite,
hampering sustainability of the bank's business position.  During
most of 2015, the bank's business growth indicators were
stagnating, impacted by undergoing changes in its ownership and
management.  At the same time, the weakened economic environment
and challenging operational conditions for banks in Russia
intensified pressure on the bank's financial fundamentals.

In S&P's opinion, Vozrozhdenie Bank and the sector as a whole
have been facing tough operating conditions since 2015, including
a contracting economy that cut some of its borrowers' payment
capacity, weak loan growth, and difficult funding conditions.  As
a result, Vozrozhdenie Bank faced higher credit costs in 2015,
leading to lower profitability and increased pressure on its
capital base, which could result in a downward revision of S&P's
assessment of the bank's capital position if not offset by new
capital support or stronger internal capital generation than S&P
currently anticipate.

Although S&P expects Vozrozhdenie Bank's asset quality will
deteriorate moderately as economic conditions in Russia weaken,
S&P do not forecast that nonperforming loans (NPLs; loans overdue
by more than 90 days) will exceed 12% of the bank's total loan
book over 2016.  This is mainly because of its good track record
of conservative underwriting and moderate risk appetite, combined
with the anemic loan growth S&P expects in 2016 and modest
exposures to higher-risk segments, such as commercial property
and unsecured retail lending.  Vozrozhdenie Bank's NPL level is
generally in line with the sector average and stood at 7.1% of
gross loans on Sept. 30, 2015, and the bank's loan loss provision
coverage ratio was an adequate 126% of NPLs as of the same date.

Vozrozhdenie Bank's product range does not include complex
structures, such as derivatives or securitizations, and its
business model is simple.  Almost 70% of Vozrozhdenie Bank's
retail portfolio (accounts for about 21% of the bank's loan book)
consists of less risky mortgage loans.  As a result, the total
retail portfolio's annualized credit cost in 2015 was relatively
low at about 1%.

S&P believes that Vozrozhdenie Bank's business profile is set
historically to be more sustainable than those of most midsize
banks in Russia, based on its well-established position in the
relatively wealthy Moscow region, its adequate business mix, and
less aggressive growth targets compared to peers'.  Because of
its track record of sound core banking profitability and strong
franchise in the rich and diversified Moscow region, S&P
currently considers Vozrozhdenie Bank's business position to be
adequate, despite low systemwide market shares in the highly
fragmented Russian market.  S&P believes the new major
shareholder of Vozrozhdenie Bank will aim to maintain the bank's
historically sound business focus and strategy at least in the
near term.

The negative outlook reflects remaining uncertainties regarding
the bank's status in the wider group alongside difficult
operating conditions in Russia, which S&P expects will constrain
profitability due to high credit costs and potentially erode its
capital buffers.

S&P could consider a negative rating action if challenging
operating conditions significantly deteriorate the bank's risk
profile or earning power, resulting in increased NPLs, loan
losses significantly higher than the system average, and a weaker
capital position as shown by S&P's forecast risk-adjusted capital
(RAC) ratio falling below 5%.

S&P could lower its long-term rating on the bank in the next 12-
18 months if S&P sees that its status toward the group is weaker
than a core subsidiary, resulting in limited probability of
extraordinary support from the group.  Similarly, a negative
rating action might be triggered if S&P observed a significant
increase in risk appetite due to changes in the bank's ownership
and strategy.  In S&P's opinion, a potential merger with its
sister bank, Promsvyazbank, might introduce implementation
challenges for both banks, especially amidst current adverse
market conditions.  In S&P's base-case scenario, though, it don't
foresee the two banks merging in the next 12-18 months.

Similarly, S&P could lower the rating if the bank's funding
profile or liquidity unexpectedly deteriorated, resulting in
rising asset-liability maturity mismatches or significant
concerns regarding the liquidity position of the bank.

S&P does not expect to revise the outlook to stable within the
next 12-18 months, since S&P believes operating conditions will
remain challenging in Russia.


TATARSTAN REPUBLIC: Moody's Says Privatization Likely Credit Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
On Feb. 8, 2016, it was announced that the government of the
Republic of Tatarstan (Ba2 stable) had added a 22% stake,
representing 25% of voting shares -- almost its entire stake --
in Nizhnekamskneftekhim PJSC (NKNK, Ba3 stable) to its 2016
privatization plan.  NKNK is a major Russian petrochemical
company majority owned by private, Tatarstan-focused TAIF Group
(unrated; 50% of NKNK's capital, including 52.3% of voting
shares).

The privatization of NKNK, if it materializes, would be credit
negative for the company because it would reduce the government's
involvement and the likelihood of government support -- factors
that currently enhance NKNK's credit quality.  However, the
actual impact on NKNK's credit quality would depend on the terms
and conditions, as well as the execution of the privatization,
all of which remain highly uncertain.  Moreover, NKNK's strong
financial profile mitigates some of the rating pressure from the
possible privatization.  As such, there is no immediate rating
impact from the inclusion of the government's 22% stake in NKNK
in the 2016 privatization plan.

In addition to its stake in NKNK, the Tatarstan government added
a 4.31% stake in Tatneft PJSC (Ba1 under review for downgrade), a
Russian major oil company, and a 9% stake in Taneco JSC
(unrated), an oil processing complex, to the 2016 privatization
plan. According to the announcement, the stakes may be disposed
or used as equity contributions to support the economy and key
businesses of the Republic of Tatarstan.  For this purpose, the
stakes were transferred from government-owned holding company
Svyazinvestneftekhim OAO (SINEK, Ba2 negative) to the Ministry of
Land and Property.  No further details on possible privatization
transactions have been disclosed or commented on by the
government.

NKNK, Tatneft and Taneco are all part of the oil and
petrochemicals sector of the Republic of Tatarstan, and as such
will likely maintain their importance to the government.
However, in contrast to the other two companies (where under the
above scenario the government would still control directly or
indirectly approximately 30%), the government is disposing of
almost its entire stake in NKNK under the 2016 privatization
plan.  As such, the transaction would distance NKNK from the
government and remove the credit enhancement from implied
government support, which could reduce its credit quality to the
standalone one.

At the same time, depending on the post-privatization ownership
structure, business and financial strategy, transparency and
quality of corporate governance, this pressure on NKNK's credit
quality could be mitigated by its low leverage, strong financial
performance and reasonably invested asset base.  For the 12
months to June 2015, NKNK's debt/EBITDA was around 0.2x and its
EBITDA margins strong at 20.1%.  These ratios provide the company
with a cushion within its Ba3 rating, even in the current
challenging domestic and global market environment.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: Underlying Business Still "Viable", Moody's Says
------------------------------------------------------------
The Financial Times reports that Moody's has given troubled
Spanish renewable energy group Abengoa a small but much needed
vote of confidence at a crucial stage in its fight for survival,
saying its underlying operating business is still "viable"
although the ratings agency also acknowledges that the company
could still end up insolvent.

Abengoa spelled out last week that it needs EUR826 million of
cash this year to stay on its feet, plus a further EUR304 million
in 2017, the FT relates.  These sums don't include contributions
from sales of assets, the FT notes.

In a note published on Feb. 19, Moody's acknowledged the "further
sizeable liquidity injections" that are needed on top of a debt
restructuring, which still has not been agreed with lenders, the
FT relays.

Moody's, as cited by the FT, said the company's plans support its
view that "Abengoa's underlying operating business is viable" but
the agency is maintaining a negative outlook on the Spanish
renewables group given that discussions over a debt restructuring
"might not be successful and the company might end up in a formal
insolvency process".

Abengoa set out a viability plan last week as part of Spain's
pre-insolvency process and will shortly publish a restructuring
plan, the FT discloses.  According to the FT, the viability plan
included selling assets that are no longer considered "core" to
its operations to raise EUR473 million in 2016-17 and to nearly
halve its cost base, from EUR450 million last year to EUR246
million in 2018.

Moody's says the pre-insolvency process is expected to last until
the end of next month, which would mark four months, the FT
recounts.

Abengoa SA is a Spanish renewable-energy company.


                        *       *       *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 21,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'SD'
(selective default) from 'CCC-' its long-term corporate credit
rating on Spanish engineering and construction company Abengoa
S.A.  S&P also lowered the short-term corporate credit rating on
Abengoa to 'SD' from 'C'.  S&P said the downgrade reflects
Abengoa's failure to pay scheduled maturities under its EUR750
million Euro-Commercial Paper Program.


GRUPO ANTOLIN: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB-' CCR
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Spain-
based auto supplier Grupo Antolin Irausa SA to stable from
negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'BB-' long-term corporate credit
rating on the group.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' issue rating on the
EUR400 million senior secured notes due 2022, the EUR400 million
senior secured notes due 2021, issued by Grupo Antolin Dutch
B.V., and the existing senior secured facilities, comprising a
EUR200 million revolving credit facility and a EUR400 million
term loan A, issued by Grupo Antolin Irausa SA.  The recovery
rating on these debt instruments is '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery prospects in the
event of a payment default.  S&P expects recovery prospects to be
in the lower half of the range.

The outlook revision reflects credit ratios' faster improvement
than S&P expected and the receding of execution risks related to
the integration of Canada-based Magna International's interiors
business.

Strong earnings growth should enable Grupo Antolin to restore its
financial profile.  Assuming a full-year consolidation of Magna's
operations, S&P estimates that Grupo Antolin posted a ratio of
funds from operations (FFO) to debt close to 25% in 2015.
Organic growth, in particular the dynamism of the Overheads
division, and to a lesser extent a favorable currency effect,
fueled this improvement.  S&P thinks that the group should
sustain good credit metrics for its ratings in 2016, with FFO to
debt of 20%-25% and free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt of
approximately 5%.  Yet, S&P expects organic growth to decelerate
significantly, as Grupo Antolin did not open any major production
facility in 2015.

S&P thinks that the execution risks related to the integration of
Magna's operations have decreased.  The absorption of these
assets creates operating challenges, since they double Grupo
Antolin's revenue base to about EUR5 billion.  Furthermore,
Magna's operations achieved low profitability levels for the
industry before the transaction.  But it seems that Grupo
Antolin's initiatives to restructure these operations have been
successful. Most of the acquired subsidiaries are now at least
breaking even at the EBITDA level, although S&P understands that
some issues remain in the U.K.  Still, the profitability of this
division is increasing more quickly than S&P expected.  S&P
forecasts that it should achieve a reported EBITDA margin of 5%-
6% in 2016, compared with about 2% in 2014.

The stable outlook on Grupo Antolin reflects S&P's view that it
will post revenue growth of about 3% on an organic basis and
achieve an adjusted EBITDA margin of about 9% over the next 12
months.  S&P also believes the group will maintain an FFO-to-debt
ratio of approximately 20%-25% and generate positive FOCF.

S&P may consider a negative rating action if Grupo Antolin failed
to maintain adjusted FFO to debt of more than 20%.  Such a
scenario could unfold if EBITDA declined markedly, owing to an
industry downturn or market share losses.  S&P could also
downgrade the group if it carried out another large debt-financed
acquisition or significantly increased shareholder remuneration,
although S&P acknowledge that the current debt documentation
limits dividend payments.

S&P could consider a positive rating action if Grupo Antolin
sustained FFO to debt of more than 25% and improved its FOCF
generation.  Such a scenario could unfold if the operating
environment remained supportive and if the group successfully
improved the profitability of the former interior division of
Magna.  Any upgrade would hinge on management's commitment to
sustaining stronger credit ratios.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ANGLO AMERICAN: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB/B'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its ratings on
global mining company Anglo American PLC (Anglo), including its
corporate credit rating (to 'BB/B' from 'BBB-/A-3') and national
scale rating (to 'zaBBB+/zaA-2' from 'zaAA-/zaA-1'). At the same
time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where it had placed them on Dec. 14, 2015. In
addition, S&P assigned a '3' recovery rating. The outlook is
stable.

The rating actions follow the recent revision in S&P's price
assumptions for commodity prices, which indicate that the
operating environment will be difficult for a prolonged period.
Many of the company's noncore assets now generate negative free
operating cash flow (EBITDA minus capex). These factors, combined
with the high proportion of Anglo's profits that it generates in
South Africa, mean that we now view the company's business risk
profile as being at the lower end of the satisfactory range. S&P
revised the outlook on South Africa to negative on Dec. 4, 2015.
A revision in S&P's view of Anglo's business risk profile after
the completion of its restructuring program is unlikely at this
stage. Although the program will improve Anglo's overall
competitive position, it will leave the company with a smaller,
less-diversified portfolio.

S&P said, "We recently revised our price assumptions for most
commodities, including some of the key commodities in Anglo's
portfolio (iron ore, copper, platinum, and coal). The drop in
commodity prices also affected the diamond industry, which
we had previously considered to be countercyclical. However,
since early 2015, the price of diamonds has declined by 15%-20%
due to oversupply. Despite Anglo's decision to curtail its
diamond production and the recent stabilization in prices, prices
are unlikely to recover in 2016 because high inventory in the
market will likely take time to sell through.

"The restructuring of the portfolio reflects management's
strategy of moving away from less-profitable assets and focusing
on commodities that have medium- and long-term strong
fundamentals such as copper, diamonds, and platinum. Anglo's
current portfolio includes more than 50 mines and it produces 11
or more commodities. In our view, some of the assets that are not
part of the planned, narrower portfolio are relatively small and
not cost-competitive. However, the list also includes some large
and attractive mines, such as niobium operations. For example,
the iron ore mines in South Africa have been deemed to be a
noncore asset. In 2014, the assets contributed more than $1.5
billion to Anglo's cash flows (about 40% of the EBITDA). However,
at current prices, we understand that Kumba will contribute less
than $300 million to free operating cash flows."

Given the company's planned portfolio, S&P anticipates that:

* Anglo will be more focused, with just 16 mines. It will
   produce three commodities (copper, diamond, and platinum) that
   should offer the most-promising demand-supply fundamentals
   over time. Most of the assets are in the first or second
   quartile of the global cash cost curve.

* EBITDA from South Africa (platinum and diamonds) will continue
   to account for a sizable part of group EBITDA (more than 40%).
   The portfolio will be able to generate positive free operating
   cash flows -- EBITDA minus maintenance capital expenditure
   (capex) -- under current prices. The diamond business will
   provide the majority of free operating cash flows. Copper
   mines are expected to break even if the price is $2.1/lb.

* The corporate organization will continue to include important
   minorities, as a result of which S&P's analysis seeks to focus
   on proportional consolidation. For example, it will hold
   effectively 50.1% of the Chilean mine Los Bronces and an
   economic share (after tax) of 19.2% of the joint-venture in
   the diamond business with the government of Botswana.

* After its divestments, S&P expects Anglo to become a midsize
   mining company. On a proportional basis it will have EBITDA of
   about $2 billion (or about $2.5 billion on a fully
   consolidated basis), and on attributable basis produce about
   400,000 tonnes of copper; 1,000,000 ounces of platinum; and
   11.5 million carats of diamonds. That said, S&P sees Anglo's
   market position in the diamond business as stronger than its
   economic share, given its control over large base assets and
   midstream operations (Anglo owns 85% of De Beers, whose total
   production is about 30 million carats).

The company plans to divest the non-core assets through 2016 to
2018. The divestment should help it lower Standard & Poor's-
adjusted debt from $16 billion as of Dec. 31, 2015 (net debt
$12.9 billion).

Because other companies are also seeking to divest assets at this
time, S&P remains very cautious about the timing of any sales and
the level of proceeds they will generate. In 2015, the company
agreed the sale of two major assets, and finalized the sale of
its stake in Tarmac Lafarge. Moreover, S&P sees the planned
medium-term spin-off of Kumba as negative to the rating on Anglo,
as Kumba contributes positive cash flows to the group and has
minimal debt.

Under its base-case scenario, S&P projects that Anglo's
unadjusted EBITDA will be about $4.3 billion-$4.7 billion in 2016
and about $3.8 billion to $4.0 billion in 2017, compared with an
estimated adjusted EBITDA of $5.1 billion in 2015.

The following assumptions underpin S&P's base case:

* As the company gradually divests noncore assets, the remaining
   noncore assets will continue to contribute to EBITDA and to
   cash flows.

* Iron ore prices will be $40/ton for the rest of 2016 and
   through 2017.

* Copper prices will be $2.1 per pound (/lb) for the rest of
   2016 and $2.2/lb in 2017.

* Production will be broadly in line with the company's
   guidance.

* Capex will be limited to maintenance, except for completing
   some projects already in progress (mainly the Brazilian iron
   ore mine Minas Rio).

* No dividends will be paid.

These assumptions translate into breakeven or slightly positive
discretionary cash flows (free cash flow after capex and
dividends) and adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of
25%-30% in 2016 and 2017 (compared with about 25% in 2015). Given
the material number of minority shareholders in Anglo's structure
(notably in South Africa and Chile), S&P considers that a
proportional consolidated approach -- that is, excluding the
assets, liabilities, and cash flows associated with minorities
from Anglo's account -- would lower the adjusted FFO-to-debt
ratio close to 20% in 2016, with some recovery to about
25% in 2017. Those ratios are at the low end of the range S&P
considers commensurate with a significant financial risk profile,
and therefore S&P applies a negative adjustment under its
comparable rating analysis.

The short-term rating on Anglo is 'B'. S&P considers the
company's liquidity to be strong, based on its estimate that the
ratio of liquidity sources to uses for the next 24 months will be
above 1.5x. S&P's assessment reflects the high level of cash on
Anglo's cash balance sheet and the availability under its
credit facilities.

Exchange controls in South Africa partly constrain Anglo's access
to liquidity, including some of its cash and available facilities
in the country. At this stage, S&P does not see this as a risk,
because the company keeps the bulk of its liquidity sources
outside South Africa, including a fully available $5 billion
revolving credit facility. The majority of its cash is held at
the holding company level.

Excluding any disposal proceeds in 2016 and 2017, S&P projects
that for the 12 months from Dec. 31, 2015, Anglo had the
following liquidity sources:

* $6.9 billion in cash, excluding $1.0 billion in cash that S&P
   does not consider immediately accessible to the parent;

* $7.9 billion of availability under medium-term committed bank
   lines, including a $5.0 billion core backup facility at the
   parent level, which largely matures in 2020, and other
   facilities located at the operating subsidiaries;

* FFO of $3.6 billion-$3.8 billion in 2016, with slight rebound
   in 2017; and

* Insignificant proceeds coming from the divestment of the
   agreed sale of the South African Rustenburg platinum mines, as
   well as other small mines.

Main liquidity uses:

* $2.0 billion of short-term debt and long-term debt maturing in
   2016 and about $3.0 billion in 2017;

* Capex of about $3.0 billion in 2016 and $2.5 billion in 2017.
   S&P understands that the company has very limited flexibility
   to reduce the capex from current levels;

* No dividends; and

* No material changes in working capital needs.

The stable outlook reflects Anglo's strong liquidity, which
provides time to implement its divestment and restructuring
program. The outlook also assumes the company will generate
positive cash flows under S&P's current price deck, further
supported by proceeds from disposals. In its ratings analysis,
S&P assumes FFO to debt of at least 20% when using proportional
consolidation (or 25%-30% on a fully consolidated basis).

S&P said, "We could lower the rating in 2017, if we see a further
decline in commodity prices (especially diamond prices, which are
particularly difficult to forecast), or if there is little
progress on asset disposals. This scenario could result in FFO to
debt (using the proportional consolidation approach) dropping to
below 20%, without near-term prospects of recovery.

"We do not currently expect to raise the rating. It would depend
on Anglo achieving adjusted FFO-to-debt (using the proportional
consolidation) of 30%; there being a more stable outlook for
commodities that would support higher prices; and clear progress
on reducing leverage through disposals."


FIRST OIL: In Administration, Enquest, Cairn Take Stake
-------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that First Oil Expro has entered administration.

As a result, Enquest and Cairn Energy will take on the company's
15% stake in the Kraken North Sea Oil field, BBC discloses.

Enquest, BBC says, will now have a 70.5% interest in the vast
field, and Cairn a 29.5% interest.

First Oil began reviewing its operations last year as the oil
price fell and started the process of selling parts of the
business, BBC recounts.

According to BBC, Blair Nimmo, joint administrator and head of
restructuring at KPMG in Scotland, said the sales, via the
administration process, were a reflection of the "significant
challenges facing UK North Sea oil and gas companies in the
current oil price environment".

First Oil Expro is based in Aberdeen.


PENDRAGON PLC: Moody's Withdraws Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Pendragon PLC's corporate
family rating (CFR) of Ba3, probability of default rating (PDR)
of Ba3-PD and the Ba3 rating of the company's GBP175 million
senior secured notes due 2020.  At the time of withdrawal, all
the aforementioned ratings carried a stable outlook.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating agency's actions follow the announcement by the
company of plans to redeem the notes as part of a refinancing
exercise which is scheduled to be completed in March 2016.
Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.

Pendragon PLC, headquartered in Nottingham, England, is the UK's
leading automotive retailer by revenues, according to the
company, with around 200 franchises, and posted revenues of GBP
4.45 billion in fiscal 2015.


SOHO HOUSE: Moody's Puts Caa1 CFR on Review for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed Soho House Group Limited's
Caa1 Corporate Family Rating and Caa1-PD Probability of Default
Rating on review for downgrade.  Also placed on review for
downgrade was Soho House Bond Limited's Caa1 rating of its senior
secured notes due 2018.  The rating action follows the company's
launch of a consent solicitation to increase its revolving credit
facility initially by GBP5 million to GBP30 million and
eventually to GBP35 million in exchange for equity infusions.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The review reflects the company's narrowed liquidity profile
ahead of its April 2016 interest payment on its senior secured
notes due 2018 and uncertainty about the impact of its recent
bondholder consent solicitation.  Soho House's business is
strongly cash flowing on the operating level; however, the firm
is also in a growth mode, thus consuming more cash than its
operations generate.  As a result, Soho House's liquidity is the
weakest feature of its credit profile, currently, with only
GBP2.5 million available on the revolver and GBP8.5 million of
cash on balance sheet.  The proposed consent solicitation would
provide Soho House with much needed liquidity via an increase in
the revolving credit facility (RCF) and equity contributions,
while marginally increasing the company's leverage.  Assuming the
proposed series of transactions are executed as outlined in the
consent solicitation statement, the company would receive the
required liquidity for the next 12 months.  However, uncertainty
remains over the timing and assurance of equity contributions.
Should they not materialize, the company could encounter
liquidity challenges and the ratings would likely be lowered.

The consent solicitation launched on Feb. 5, 2016, asks the
bondholders of Soho House's 9.125% notes due 2018 to permit the
company to increase its GBP25 million revolving credit facility
(RCF).  As of Feb. 12, 2015, the company received the bondholders
consent, and the first step of the transaction would involve a
GBP5 million increase in the RCF amount.  Moody's would expect
Soho House to utilize the additional funds quickly as they are
slated for the company's ongoing growth efforts.  At present, its
existing GBP25 million RCF has approximately GBP22.5 million of
drawings outstanding.  The ability to incur additional debt would
slightly raise the company's leverage (projected to be
approximately 7.5x for 2015 including Moody's standard
adjustments) by less than 0.1x and marginally lower its coverage,
which is already below 1.0x on an EBITA/interest basis (by
approximately 0.1x, assuming the revolver is drawn).

As a second step of the transaction, Soho House anticipates
receiving an equity infusion of GBP10 million from its existing
shareholders within 90 days of the expiration of the consent
solicitation.  If the equity is not received within this time
frame, the interest rate on the notes will increase by 1% until
the equity injection is made.  Should the interest expense
increase, the interest coverage ratio would decline by
approximately 0.1x.  Moody's assumes that any equity injection
would be utilized to pay down the RCF and subsequently re-drawn
to fund the company's ambitious expansion plans.  Soho House
plans to open approximately six new Houses and up to 30 new owned
and joint venture restaurants in the next two years.  Therefore,
Moody's would not anticipate the leverage profile of Soho House
to improve following the equity contribution.

As a third and final step of this transaction, Soho House expects
to receive another equity infusion of GBP10 million from its
existing shareholders within 180 days of the first equity
contribution.  Upon this equity injection, the RCF would increase
by another GBP5 million to a total amount of GBP35 million.
Similar to the treatment of the first equity contribution,
Moody's would expect the company to apply the proceeds to paying
down outstanding amounts under the RCF and subsequently re-
drawing them to continue funding the capex program.  As a result,
upon re-drawing the revolving credit facility, Soho House's
leverage (projected to be approximately 7.5x for 2015 including
Moody's standard adjustments) would increase marginally by less
than 0.2x.

During its review Moody's will continue to closely monitor Soho
House's liquidity, in particular, the receipt of equity funds as
detailed in the consent solicitation balanced against planned
capital expenditures.  For the outlook to revert to stable, the
company would have to find a way to finance itself through 12-18
months without frequently recurring liquidity-oriented
transactions, such as the bond tap in December following closely
on the heels of a PIK not issuance, as well as the current
consent solicitation.  Stable and profitable operating
performance would also be needed for a stable outlook.

Downward pressure on the rating could occur if (1) Soho House
fails to execute its development and growth plans successfully,
resulting in lower-than-expected growth in EBITDA and a failure
to deleverage; (2) the company loses members (higher competition,
resistance towards price increases); (3) Cash Flow from Operation
(CFO) remains negative over several quarters, leading to strong
liquidity pressures; and (4) the company fails to improve its
current liquidity profile.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Restaurant
Industry published in September 2015.

Soho House is a fully integrated hospitality company that
operates exclusive, private members clubs (or Houses) as well as
public restaurants, hotels and spas.  Membership targets
professionals in the creative industries and access to Houses is
reserved exclusively for members and their guests.  Soho House
benefits from a stable membership and has been able to capitalize
on its brand name to expand both in the UK and internationally.
In 2014, Soho House realized total revenues of GBP202.8 million
and EBITDA of GBP43.7 million.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *