TCREUR_Public/160224.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

         Wednesday, February 24, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 038


                            Headlines


G E R M A N Y

AENOVA: Moody's Lowers CFR to Caa1, Outlook Stable
FLIGHT DESIGN: Applies for Receivership Due to Liquidity Crunch
THYSSENKRUPP AG: Moody's Lowers CFR to Ba2, Outlook Stable


G R E E C E

GREECE: Creditors to Return to Athens for Bailout Review Talks


I R E L A N D

HUGUENOT XMI: Civil Court Appoints Interim Examiner
PETROCELTIC: Lenders Extend Debt Waiver Until March 4


K A Z A K H S T A N

CAPITAL BANK: S&P Affirms 'B-' Counterparty Credit Rating
CELF LOAN IV: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes


L U X E M B O U R G

INTELSAT SA: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
MALLINCKRODT INT'L: Moody's Affirms Ba3 CFR, Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

QUEEN STREET CLO I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1
WOOD STREET VI: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
ZIGGO GROUP: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable


R U S S I A

AGROINCOMBANK PJSC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Probe Shows
BANK GOROD: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Inspection Reveals


S P A I N

CAIXABANK RMBS 1: Moody's Assigns Caa3 Rating to Class B Notes
MADRID RMBS 1: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class E Notes


S W E D E N

SSAB AB: S&P Lowers Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DRAX: Chief Executive Mulls Closure of Half of Power Station
* Fitch Says Brexit to Bring Significant Long-Term Risks


                            *********



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G E R M A N Y
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AENOVA: Moody's Lowers CFR to Caa1, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded German CDMO Apollo 5
GmbH's (the parent company of Aenova) corporate family rating
(CFR) to Caa1 from B3, and probability default rating to Caa1-PD
from B3-PD.  The outlook on all the ratings is stable.

"Aenova's downgrade reflects deterioration in its credit metrics,
as a result of weaker than estimated 2015 operating performance,
and its 2015 negative free cash flow generation before one-off
exceptional proceeds, owing to significant expenditure from its
restructuring program and interest costs.  Due to the high level
of debt in the capital structure, any improvements in these
metrics will take several years and remain contingent to the
achievement of the company's operational improvement plan", says
Donatella Maso, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst.

Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded the ratings of the EUR500
million equivalent first lien term loan due 2020 to B3 from B2,
the rating of the EUR50 million revolving credit facility due
2020 to B3 from B2, and the rating of its EUR139 million second
lien term loan due 2021 to Caa3 from Caa2, all borrowed by Aenova
Holding GmbH and its subsidiaries.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action primarily reflects the fact that Aenova's
reported preliminary operating performance for 2015 was weaker
than both the company's 2015 budget and Moody's estimated when it
assigned the company's first public rating in 2014.  As a result,
Aenova's credit metrics, particularly its leverage ratio, have
weakened since 2014, and free cash flow generation, excluding
EUR59 million of one-off exceptional proceeds from the sale of
Munich plant and its subsidiary Temmler's own portfolio,
continued to be negative owing to high interest expenses from
increased drawn debt, approximately EUR29 million of cash
restructuring costs and capital expenditures (capex).  The
downgrade also reflects the execution risk associated with the
new management team's operational improvement plan.

Based on preliminary results, the company reported an increase in
pro forma revenues of less than 3% for full-year 2015.  However,
EBITDA before exceptional items decreased to EUR91 million or
EUR72 million (including the loss making Miami site) compared to
the company's budget of EUR116 million.  This was primarily
driven by increased personnel costs, and delays in achieving
planned cost savings and synergies through the integration of
Haupt Pharma (Haupt).  As a result, Aenova did not meet Moody's
guidance for a stable outlook, which included deleveraging to a
debt/EBITDA ratio below 6.5x by FYE 2015.  Conversely, Aenova's
Moody's-adjusted leverage increased to 8.0x in FYE 2015 excluding
drawn factoring facilities, or 8.6x including factoring, from
7.3x in FYE 2014 (excluding factoring).

Despite generally positive industry trends, new client
acquisitions and product launches, future growth and deleveraging
are contingent primarily on the achievement of 2018 roadmap set
by the new management including EUR18.6 million of operational
efficiencies.  Implementation of the operational improvement
plan, which started in Q3/Q4 2015 with the sale of loss making
Miami soft-gel plan and several redundancies, carries moderate
execution risk and Moody's expects it will deliver positive
effects on credit metrics only from FYE 2017 onwards.  In the
meantime, the company will continue to operate with high risky
financial profile.  While most of the costs have already been
incurred, Moody's expects that Aenova's free cash flow generation
likely to turn positive in 2017 owing to the amount of debt in
the capital structure and capex.

Aenova's Caa1 CFR also less favorably reflects (1) the company's
geographic concentration in Europe, particularly in Germany; (2)
the fragmented and competitive nature of the CDMO industry,
resulting in pricing pressure, particularly in the tablets
business, which remains Aenova's main segment accounting for 41%
of pro forma revenues in FYE 2015; and (3) ongoing consolidation
trends among Aenova's customers in the pharmaceutical industry,
which could potentially lead to pharmaceutical companies
rationalizing their portfolio of suppliers or in-sourcing the
manufacturing of certain products should they have spare
capacity.

These negatives are counterbalanced by (1) Aenova's leading
market positions, particularly in Europe, owing to the company's
enhanced scale following the Temmler and Haupt acquisitions in
2013 and its broad product portfolio; (2) a moderate customer
concentration, with its largest customer to represent
approximately 10% of the company's 2015 pro-forma sales, and the
top 10 accounting for 44%; (3) good long-term growth prospects in
the CDMO industry, owing to the general outsourcing trend
combined with positive underlying growth at the consumer level;
and (4) high barriers to entry in certain segments such as soft-
gel capsules and sterile products, owing to the more complex
technology used.

Aenova's liquidity profile is adequate for its near-term
requirements, although its cash flow generation remains weak.
The company has EUR28 million in cash balances at the end of
2015, EUR15 million available under its EUR50 million committed
revolving credit facility, EUR74 million of factoring lines (most
of them drawn) and no amortizing debt.  The loan term facilities
are not subject to any maintenance covenants, except for a
springing net leverage covenant on the revolving credit facility,
which will only be tested when drawings exceed 35% of the total
commitment amount and where the headroom is expected to remain
satisfactory.

                 RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Aenova's
operating performance and credit metrics will improve from
current level and free cash flow will turn positive in FYE 2017
as result of the operational improvement plan.  The stable
outlook assumes that industry conditions will not deteriorate and
that the company will pursue an organic growth strategy and make
no material debt-funded acquisitions or dividend distribution.

                WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Positive rating pressure could arise if Aenova achieves the
targeted growth and operational efficiencies, resulting in its
Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio falling sustainably below 6.5x
(including drawn factoring facilities), its EBITA/interest
expense ratio increasing above 1.0x, while generating positive
free cash flow.

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if the company is unable to
deleverage as expected from the existing level.  In addition, any
weakness in Aenova's liquidity, such as persistent negative free
cash flow beyond FYE 2017, would also exert downward pressure on
the rating.

                       PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in December 2014.

Headquartered in Starnberg, Germany, Aenova is a leading contract
development and manufacturing organisation (CDMO) providing
outsourcing services for the pharmaceutical and the healthcare
industry, along with developing its own products.  The company
offers a broad range of products such as tablets, hard and soft
gel capsules, liquids, sterile liquids and high containment
formulations.  It operates primarily through 18 production sites
in Europe and the USA, and employs approximately 4,400 people.
For the year ended Dec. 31, 2015, the company generated revenues
of EUR727 million pro forma for the disposal of the Miami site.


FLIGHT DESIGN: Applies for Receivership Due to Liquidity Crunch
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mary Grady at AVweb reports that Flight Design GmbH, based in
Germany, said in a news release it has applied for "a planned
receivership which allows for reorganization of the company."

According to AVweb, the filing will enable the company to deal
with a "liquidity crunch".

The crunch is driven mainly by one international customer that
"has not settled a bill of over seven digit Euros," the company,
as cited by AVweb, said.

An attorney appointed by the court, Knut Rebholz, said the most
urgent task is to start negotiations to fund continuing
operations, AVweb relates.

Flight Design GmbH employs about 20 workers in Germany and about
100 at its production plant in Ukraine.  The company was founded
in 1988 and has delivered about 1,500 aircraft, according to
AVweb.


THYSSENKRUPP AG: Moody's Lowers CFR to Ba2, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Germany's largest
steelmaker thyssenkrupp AG's corporate family rating and
probability of default rating to Ba2 and Ba2-PD from Ba1 and Ba1-
PD, respectively.  Concurrently, the rating agency downgraded to
Ba2 the rated debt (including provisional ratings) of
thyssenkrupp AG and thyssenkrupp Finance Nederland B.V.  The
outlook on all ratings is stable.

"The downgrade of thyssenkrupp's CFR and instrument ratings to
Ba2 reflects Moody's view that thyssenkrupp's 2016 profitability
will be weaker than initially expected with neutral to low
negative cash flow generation and no deleveraging" says Hubert
Allemani, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst and lead
analyst for thyssenkrupp.

The stable outlook mainly reflects Moody's view that benefits
from thyssenkrupp's cost reduction programme 'impact', growth
from the capital goods businesses and expected improvement of the
steel pricing environment in Europe in the second half of 2016
will offset somewhat profitability pressures from the current
harsh steel market environment.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade primarily reflects the fact that (1) profitability
improvements by thyssenkrupp over the last two years have been
insufficient to maintain a Ba1 rating and (2) low steel prices in
Europe and the recession in Brazil will pressure profitability in
2016 such that the company will be unable to improve its cash
generation this year.  Under those circumstances, thyssenkrupp's
leverage will remain high with few short-term prospects for a
recovery to levels commensurate with the previous Ba1 rating
category.

Moody's anticipates that thyssenkrupp will face continuous
difficulties in its steel operations as a result of the low price
environment in Europe, depressed demand in Brazil and limited
export opportunities.  This is despite the good level of growth
achieved in the capital goods business, which will continue to
drive the group's profitability and cash generation.

Moody's also expects that thyssenkrupp's steel margins in Europe
will come under pressure in H1 FYE Sept 2016 owing to the
accelerated decline in prices seen in Europe in late 2015, which
the rating agency expects to continue until mid-2016 before
improving.

thyssenkrupp's Ba2 rating is also constrained by (1) a Moody's
adjusted gross leverage of 5.1x for the 12-month period through
31 December 2015, which is high for the current rating and which
Moody's does not expect to decrease this year; (2) the company's
Brazilian slab producing plant, which will require management
focus to make it EBIT positive and cash neutral; and (3) the
company's ownership of the Italian stainless steel plant of
Acciai Speciali Terni (AST), which is undergoing a restructuring
programme to further improve its low profitability.

However, the Ba2 rating is supported by growing steel end markets
in Europe, particularly automotive, which is a core sector for
thyssenkrupp, with higher volumes leading to adequate utilization
rates and cost absorption.  The trading environment for
thyssenkrupp remains supportive also in the capital goods
business, which continues to report growth in revenues, with
strong order book and order backlog.

Also supporting the current rating are (1) thyssenkrupp's strong
business profile, with a well-positioned worldwide business and
diversified revenue streams into capital goods; (2) its
sustainable profitability improvements, supported by the gains
from the efficiency and restructuring program "impact"; (3) the
company's consistently high level of cash on the balance sheet
leading to a net leverage of 3.8x as of Dec. 31, 2015, and solid
liquidity profile mitigating the low equity position; and (4) low
reported financial debt level of EUR8.0 billion at the end of
December 2015.

                             LIQUIDITY

thyssenkrupp's liquidity is good and expected to remain solid
over the next year.  The company has EUR1.6 billion of debt
maturing in FY2015-16, which Moody's expect can be met without
putting excessive pressure on the company's cash flow.

At Dec. 31, 2015, thyssenkrupp's available liquidity amounted to
EUR7.4 billion.  This amount comprises EUR3.7 billion cash and
cash equivalents, and EUR3.8 billion undrawn committed credit
lines (which includes a EUR2 billion committed revolving credit
facility maturing in 2018).

                   RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The decision to stabilize the outlook takes into account the
growing steel demand in Europe driven by the automotive, capital
goods and construction sectors; the company's strong order book
in its capital good businesses; solid liquidity profile as
evidenced by the large amount of cash held at thyssenkrupp AG
level and continued operational improvements.

In addition, Moody's believes that thyssenkrupp will benefit from
improvements in the European pricing environment following (1)
the recent announcement made by the European Commission to impose
provisional anti-dumping tariffs on cold-rolled coils (CRC)
imported from China and Russia, as well as (2) the decision to
open an investigation into imports of hot-rolled coils and heavy
plates.  CRC represents approximately two thirds of
thyssenkrupp's steel shipments.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The Ba2 rating could be upgraded if (1) there is an appreciable
improvement in the market environment for the company's main
steel products and services with Moody's adjusted EBIT margin
reaching and staying above 5%; (2) liquidity remains strong and
thyssenkrupp is able to maintain its considerable cash cushion;
(3) adjusted gross debt/EBITDA decreases towards 4x and (4) CFO -
dividend is trending towards 15%.

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if it anticipates that (1)
thyssenkrupp's leverage, as measured by Moody's adjusted gross
debt/EBITDA, is greater than 5.5x on a sustained basis; (2) CFO -
dividend is less than 10% on a consistent basis, and (3) Moody's
adjusted EBIT to interest is less than 2x .

Moody's also gives weight to net leverage in its calculations
considering thyssenkrupp's sizeable unencumbered cash balances
and the expectation that thyssenkrupp could use this cash to pay
down debt if necessary.

                       PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Steel
Industry published in October 2012.

thyssenkrupp is a diversified industrial conglomerate operating
in around 80 countries and Germany's largest steelmaker.  In the
fiscal year ended Sept. 30, 2015, thyssenkrupp generated sales
from continuing operations of approximately EUR42.8 billion and
EBITDA of EUR2.8 billion.

List of Affected Ratings

Downgrades:

Issuer: thyssenkrupp AG

  Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to Ba2-PD from Ba1-PD
  Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1
  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to (P)Ba2
   from (P)Ba1
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba2 from
   Ba1

Issuer: thyssenkrupp Finance Nederland B.V.

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba2 from
   Ba1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: thyssenkrupp AG

  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: thyssenkrupp Finance Nederland B.V.

  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative



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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Creditors to Return to Athens for Bailout Review Talks
--------------------------------------------------------------
Capital.gr reports that European Commission spokeswoman
Annika Breidthardt said the technical staff of Greece's creditors
will return to Athens this week to resume the negotiations with
the Greek government over the pending issues of the first review.

The technical staff will reportedly focus on fiscal issues
seeking to finalize the 2015 fiscal performance and to find
common ground with the government on a baseline scenario for the
fiscal gap in 2016, Capital.gr relays, citing AMNA.

According to Capital.gr, creditors' mission heads will arrive in
Athens at a later stage assuming there has been progress in the
deliberations.



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I R E L A N D
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HUGUENOT XMI: Civil Court Appoints Interim Examiner
--------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that the Circuit Civil Court was told on
Feb. 22 Huguenot Xmi Limited is unable to pay its debts.

According to The Irish Times, Barrister Ross Gorman told Judge
Sinead Ni Chulachain that the company, through its two Cork-based
directors, Daniel Noel Coughlan and Dan Byrne, was seeking court
protection from its creditors while a financial rescue plan was
sought.

Mr. Gorman, who appeared with solicitors Fanning Kelly for the
company, said the directors were asking the court to put the
company in examinership as it was insolvent, The Irish Times
relates.

The judge granted the request and appointed Joseph Walsh --
joseph.walsh@hughesblake.ie -- chartered accountant with Hughes
Blake, interim examiner to draw up a survival plan to save the
firm and the jobs of its 14 employees, The Irish Times discloses.

Huguenot Xmi Limited is a multiskill creative marketing agency.


PETROCELTIC: Lenders Extend Debt Waiver Until March 4
-----------------------------------------------------
Pamela Newenham at The Irish Times reports that Petroceltic,
which owes more than US$200 million (EUR179 million), has been
given a two-week reprieve from its lenders.

According to The Irish Times, in a statement to the Irish Stock
Exchange on Feb. 22, the company said it had received a further
waiver of repayments under its senior bank facility until
March 4.

Petroceltic is a Dublin-based oil and gas explorer.



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K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


CAPITAL BANK: S&P Affirms 'B-' Counterparty Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-' long-term
and 'C' short-term counterparty credit ratings on Capital Bank
Kazakhstan JSC (CBK).  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'kzB+' Kazakhstan national
scale rating on the bank.

The affirmation reflects S&P's expectation that CBK will receive
capital injections this year.  As a result, S&P expects that its
risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio for the bank will remain above
10% in 2016.  S&P believes this higher-than-average capital level
provides an important additional cushion to absorb an expected
rise in credit costs and lower profitability.

Low oil prices and the ensuing weak economic growth have eroded
the operating environment for all Kazakhstan-based banks in 2016.
Since August 2015, there has been an approximate 50% depreciation
of the tenge against the U.S. dollar, which poses a significant
risk to banks' credit costs, liquidity, and capital, due to high
dollarization in the banking sector.

S&P expects the weakening environment, alongside CBK's rapid
credit growth over the past three years, large loan
concentrations, and high foreign currency lending, will cause
credit costs to rise to over 3% of total loans in 2016.  As a
result, S&P expects profitability will deteriorate this year,
with the return on assets (core earnings/adjusted assets)
reducing to less than 0.2%.

Consequently, S&P views the shareholder capital injections in
2016 (Kazakhstani tenge 4.4 billion of which came in January and
a further equity inflow is expected by approximately midyear) and
absence of dividend distributions as timely, and necessary to
keep CBK's RAC ratio above the 10% mark.

In S&P's view, CBK's high reliance on short-term interbank
funding, which constituted about 30% of its funding base on
Dec. 31, 2015, is one of the key risks.  S&P thinks that short-
term wholesale funding is vulnerable to systemic shocks, due to
tight liquidity in tenge, and therefore could represent an
increasingly unreliable source of funds.

The stable outlook reflects the balance between CBK's robust
capitalization and the expected increase in credit costs and
weaker profitability.

S&P could lower the ratings on the bank if the planned capital
injections did not materialize, or if weak profitability and
asset growth led to a rapid erosion of CBK's capital.  S&P could
also lower the ratings if it saw a substantial increase in credit
costs or nonperforming loans (overdue for more than 90 days and
restructured loans) above the system average.  Moreover, if the
bank's exposure to the interbank market increased or its sources
of funds appeared to be drying up, affecting the liquidity, this
could lead to a downgrade.

Although unlikely, S&P could take a positive rating action if CBK
decreased its dependence on short-term wholesale funding, in line
with domestic peers, and kept diversifying its loan portfolio and
funding base.  Maintenance of a RAC ratio sustainably above 10%
and adequate liquidity would support a positive rating action.


CELF LOAN IV: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
CELF Loan Partners IV PLC's class A-1, A-2a, A-2b, B, C, and E
notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'BB+ (sf)' rating
on the class D notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the Dec. 28, 2015 trustee report.

CELF Loan Partners IV's senior notes have been amortizing since
the end of its reinvestment period in May 2014.  Since S&P's
June 30, 2014 review, the aggregate collateral balance has
decreased by approximately 34.0% to EUR350.29 million from
EUR528.58 million.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class
at each rating level.  The BDR represents our estimate of the
maximum level of gross defaults, based on our stress assumptions,
that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay the
noteholders.  In our analysis, we used the portfolio balance that
we consider to be performing (EUR345,761,615), the current
weighted-average spread (3.84%), the principal cash balance
(EUR4,532,210), and the weighted-average recovery rates
calculated in line with our corporate collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) criteria.  We applied various cash flow
stresses, using our standard default patterns, in conjunction
with different interest rate and currency stress scenarios," S&P
said.

The available credit enhancement has increased for all of the
rated notes due to the transaction's structural deleveraging post
its re-investment period.  The class A-2a and A-2b notes are pari
passu with the class A-1 notes.  However, the class A-2a notes
pay interest and principal before the class A-2b notes.  As a
result, the class A-2a notes will redeem before the class A-1 and
A-2b notes.  This payment priority is reflected in the higher
rating that S&P has assigned to the class A-2a notes, compared
with the class A-1 and A-2b notes.  The class A-1 and A-2a notes
have amortized by EUR174.70 million since S&P's previous review
and currently have note factors of 51.5% and 34.7%, respectively.
The increased credit enhancement is the main rating driver for
the upgrades.

The weighted-average spread earned on the assets has decreased to
384 basis points (bps) from 403 bps since S&P's previous review.
At the same time, the number of distinct obligors in the
portfolio has reduced to 79 from 121 over the same period due to
asset repayments.  The top 10 largest obligors account for 28.64%
of the portfolio.

The proportion of assets rated in the 'CCC' category ('CCC+',
'CCC', or 'CCC-') and assets that S&P considers to be defaulted
(assets rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD' [selective default], and 'D') has
decreased since S&P's previous review.  The portfolio's credit
quality has remained stable, with an average rating of 'B', while
its weighted-average life has reduced to 4.91 years from 5.16
years over the same period.  The par coverage tests comply with
the documented required triggers.

The portfolio contains non-euro-denominated assets, which make up
26.7% of the performing portfolio.  The class A-1 variable
funding notes, which were drawn in euros, U.S. dollars, and
British pound sterling to fund these notes, create a natural
hedge.  Any foreign exchange mismatches that could result from
defaults in the portfolio or from coverage test failure are
hedged by a euro-denominated currency option.  In S&P's opinion,
the downgrade provisions in the currency option agreement do not
fully comply with S&P's current counterparty criteria.  In S&P's
cash flow analysis, for ratings above the issuer credit rating
(ICR) plus one notch on the options counterparty, Goldman Sachs
International, S&P has therefore considered scenarios where such
counterparty does not perform, and where, as a result, the
transaction may be exposed to greater currency risk.

The increased available credit enhancement for all of the rated
classes of notes has resulted in each class, except for the class
D notes, achieving higher ratings in S&P's cash flow analysis.
S&P's cash flow analysis indicates that these classes of notes
are able to sustain defaults at higher rating levels than those
currently assigned.  S&P has therefore raised its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2a, A-2b, B, C, and E notes.  At the same time, S&P
has affirmed its 'BB+ (sf)' rating on the class D notes as the
available credit enhancement is commensurate with the currently
assigned rating.

CELF Loan Partners IV is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans granted to
primarily speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction
closed in May 2007 and entered the end of its reinvestment period
in May 2014. CELF Advisors LLP manages the transaction.

RATINGS LIST

Class               Rating
              To             From

CELF Loan Partners IV PLC
EUR600 Million Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A-1           AA+ (sf)       A+ (sf)
A-2a          AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
A-2b          AA+ (sf)       A+ (sf)
B             AA (sf)        A+ (sf)
C             A+ (sf)        BBB+ (sf)
E             B+ (sf)        CCC+ (sf)

Rating Affirmed

D             BB+ (sf)



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L U X E M B O U R G
===================


INTELSAT SA: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it placed its
ratings on Luxembourg-based Intelsat S.A. and all of its
subsidiaries, including the 'B' corporate credit rating, on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The CreditWatch placement follows the company's announcement that
it expects revenue to decline 6.5%-9% in 2016, which is well
above S&P's original base-case forecast for a 3% revenue decline.
As such, S&P expects adjusted debt to EBITDA will increase to
about 9x in 2016 from about 8.1x in 2015, and that free operating
cash flow will be negative this year due to lower than expected
revenue and EBITDA performance.  The underperformance is led by a
15%-17% decline in network services revenues.  While S&P had
previously anticipated 2016 would be the trough year for
Intelsat, the steeper than expected revenue decline highlights
the continued pricing pressure Intelsat is facing in network
services across various regions as contracts renew, outside of
the ongoing roll-off of its legacy point-to-point and channel
services.  In S&P's view, this places increased uncertainty as to
the timing and extent of the anticipated revenue rebound and
leverage improvement in 2017 and beyond as a result of the Epic
satellite platform.

In addition to 2016 guidance, the company announced that it hired
Guggenheim Securities, LLC to advise the company on financing and
balance sheet initiatives.  The company has $500 million ($475
million outstanding) of 6.75% senior notes at Luxembourg due in
June 2018.  In the third quarter of 2015, the company put a $360
million intercompany loan ($347 million outstanding at Dec. 31,
2015) in place from a subsidiary of Intelsat Luxembourg to
Intelsat Jackson, which is pre-payable at any time and can be
used to repay a portion of the 6.75% senior notes without
triggering the 6x restricted payment test at Jackson.  S&P
expects that leverage will likely remain above 6x through Jackson
over the next several years, which would limit the company from
making cash distributions from Jackson up to Luxembourg absent
the use of permitted investment baskets.

In resolving the CreditWatch listing, S&P will review the
company's strategy regarding its capital structure and financing
initiatives.  Based on S&P's view of the company's adequate
liquidity and lack of near-term debt maturities, S&P currently
believes that ratings downside will be limited to one notch on
the corporate credit rating.  A multiple notch downgrade could
result if S&P concludes the capital structure is unsustainable
absent a subpar exchange.


MALLINCKRODT INT'L: Moody's Affirms Ba3 CFR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service raised the Speculative Grade Liquidity
rating of Mallinckrodt International Finance S.A. to SGL-2
(signifying good liquidity) from SGL-3 (adequate).  All other
ratings, including the Ba3 Corporate Family Rating and Ba3-PD
Probability of Default Rating were affirmed.  The rating outlook
is stable.

The improvement in the liquidity rating reflects an increase in
cash to over $500 million at Dec. 25, 2015, following strong
internal cash generation and the receipt of proceeds from the
divestiture of the CMDS business.  While cash will be deployed
for acquisitions and share repurchases Moody's anticipates that
strong free cash flow of around $1 billion over the next 12
months will quickly replenish liquidity.

Ratings Raised:

  Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating, to SGL-2 from SGL-3

Ratings Affirmed:

  Corporate Family Rating at Ba3
  Probability of Default Rating at Ba3-PD
  Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility at Ba1(LGD2)
  Senior Unsecured Notes (with subsidiary guarantees)
   at B1 (LGD4)
  Senior Unsecured Notes (without subsidiary guarantees)
   at B2 (LGD6)
  The rating outlook is stable

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Mallinckrodt's Ba3 Corporate Family Rating is supported by the
company's significant scale and Moody's expectation for
relatively moderate financial leverage of around 4.0x
debt/EBITDA.  The rating is also supported by Moody's expectation
for strong cash flow, creating the potential for rapid
deleveraging.  However, Moody's anticipates that cash flow will
be deployed more towards the acquisition of cash-generating
assets rather than debt repayment.  The rating is constrained by
the potential for operating volatility caused by Mallinckrodt's
high-risk nuclear products business and its concentration of
profits in H.P. Acthar Gel and controlled substances, both of
which also carry exogenous risks.  In addition, the ratings are
constrained by Mallinckrodt's aggressive appetite for
acquisitions that will likely lead to increased leverage from
time to time, and risks inherent in a rapidly evolving business
strategy.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's view that Mallinckrodt will
generally maintain adjusted debt to EBITDA around 4.0x over the
next 12-18 months.

Moody's could upgrade the ratings if the company sustains good
organic growth and strong predictable free cash flow while
maintaining debt/EBITDA below 3.0x.  An upgrade could also be
supported by improved revenue diversity.

Conversely, if Moody's expects Mallinckrodt to sustain
debt/EBITDA materially above 4.0 times the ratings could be
downgraded.  This scenario could arise if Mallinckrodt faces an
unexpected decline in one of its key products or if the company
pursues additional large, debt-funded acquisitions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Pharmaceutical Industry published in December 2012.

Luxembourg-based Mallinckrodt International Finance SA is a
subsidiary of Chesterfield, UK-based Mallinckrodt plc.
Mallinckrodt is a specialty biopharmaceutical company.  Revenues
for the 12 months ended Dec. 25, 2015, were approximately
$3.5 billion.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


QUEEN STREET CLO I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Queen Street CLO I B.V.:

  EUR41.3 mil. Class C1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 29,
   2015, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  EUR1.2 mil. Class C2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
   due 2023, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sept 29, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  EUR12.95 mil. Class D1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2023, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sept. 29,
   2015, Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

  EUR5.8 mil. Class D2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
   due 2023, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sept. 29, 2015,
   Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

  EUR20 mil. Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sept. 29
   2015, Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

  EUR7 mil. Class X Combination Notes due 2023, Upgraded to
   Aa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 29, 2015, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  EUR266 mil. (Current outstanding balance of EUR 28.7 mil.)
   Class A1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR66.5 mil.  Class A2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 29, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR38.75 mil. Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 29, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Queen Street CLO I B.V., issued in January 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans.  The portfolio
is managed by Ares Management Limited.  The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in April 2013.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
deleveraging of the Class A1 notes following amortization of the
underlying portfolio since the last rating action in September
2015.

The Class A1 notes have paid down by approximately EUR36.2
million or 13.6% of its initial balance on the last payment date
in October 2015.  As a result of the deleveraging, over-
collateralization has increased.  According to the trustee report
dated January 2016 the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E OC
ratios are reported at 181.6%, 137.9%, 124.7% and 113.1% compared
to August 2015 levels, on which the last rating action was based,
of 163.3%, 130.7%, 120.1% and 110.5%, respectively.

The rating on the combination notes address the repayment of the
rated balance on or before the legal final maturity.  For the
Class X, the rated balance at any time is equal to the principal
amount of the combination note on the issue date minus the sum of
all payments made from the issue date to such date, of either
interest or principal.  The rated balance will not necessarily
correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported by the
trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyszd the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR243.7
million, a weighted average default probability of 20.5%
(consistent with a WARF of 2742), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 45.9% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 28 and a weighted average spread of 3.41%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower weighted average recovery rate for the
portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weighted
average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs were
within 2 notches of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
     this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
     underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending
     on market conditions and have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Amortization could accelerate as a
     consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral
     sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase
     in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.  Fast amortization
     would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning
     with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

  2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
     trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
     have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
     collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
     and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
     defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
     the market price or the recovery rate to account for
     potential volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher
     than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
     the notes' ratings.

  3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
     liquidation risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes that, at
     transaction maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset
     will depend on the nature of the asset as well as the extent
     to which the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities.
     Liquidation values higher than Moody's expectations would
     have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


WOOD STREET VI: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Wood Street CLO VI B.V.'s class A1, B, C, D, and E notes.  At the
same time, S&P has affirmed its rating on the class A2 notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the Dec. 29, 2015 trustee report and
the application of S&P's relevant criteria.

S&P subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class
at each rating level.  The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the
maximum level of gross defaults, based on S&P's stress
assumptions, that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay
the noteholders.  In S&P's analysis, it used the portfolio
balance that it considers to be performing (EUR252,678,831), the
current weighted-average spread (3.74%), and the weighted-average
recovery rates calculated in line with S&P's corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.  S&P applied
various cash flow stresses, using its standard default patterns,
in conjunction with different interest rate stress scenarios.

Since S&P's June 25, 2013 review, the aggregate collateral
balance has decreased by 20.98% to EUR252.68 million from
EUR319.78 million.

S&P has observed that the class A1 notes have amortized by
EUR74.87 million since its previous review.  In S&P's view, this
has increased the available credit enhancement for all of the
rated classes of notes.  S&P has also observed that the
concentration of 'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-') rated
assets has increased, while the concentration of defaulted assets
has decreased since S&P's previous review.

S&P has observed that non-euro-denominated assets currently make
up 7.82% of the aggregate collateral balance.  A cross-currency
swap agreement hedges these assets.  In S&P's cash flow analysis,
it considered scenarios where the hedging counterparty does not
perform, and where the transaction is therefore exposed to
changes in currency rates.

The exposure to obligors based in countries rated below 'A-' is
greater than 10% of the aggregate collateral balance (16.1%).
Therefore, S&P has also applied additional stresses in accordance
with its non-sovereign ratings criteria.

Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis and the application of its current counterparty criteria
and its non-sovereign ratings criteria, S&P considers that the
available credit enhancement for the class A1 notes is
commensurate with a higher rating than the currently assigned
rating.  S&P has therefore raised its rating on the class A1
notes.  The available credit enhancement for class A2 is
commensurate with the currently assigned rating and S&P has
therefore affirmed its rating on the class A2 notes.

Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis, it considers that the available credit enhancement for
class B, C, D, and E notes is commensurate with higher ratings
than those currently assigned.  S&P has therefore raised its
ratings on these classes of the notes.

Wood Street CLO VI is a cash flow collateralized loan (CLO)
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
August 2007 and is managed by Alcentra Ltd.

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To                 From

Wood Street CLO VI B.V.
EUR325.8 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A1          AAA (sf)           AA+ (sf)
B           AA+ (sf)           A+ (sf)
C           AA- (sf)           BBB+ (sf)
D           BBB+ (sf)          BB+ (sf)
E           BB+ (sf)           B+ (sf)

Rating Affirmed

A2          AA+ (sf)


ZIGGO GROUP: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating on Netherlands-based Ziggo Group Holding
B.V.  The outlook is stable.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB-' issue rating on Ziggo's senior
secured debt.  The recovery rating remains unchanged at '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery, in the
higher half of the 50%-70% range, in the event of a payment
default.

Additionally, S&P affirmed the 'B' issue rating on Ziggo's
exchanged senior notes.  The recovery rating on these notes
remains unchanged at '6', indicating S&P's expectation of
negligible recovery (0%-10%) in the event of a payment default.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Ziggo remains a core
entity within the LGP group, despite the announced creation of a
50/50-owned JV between LGP and Vodafone Group, merging Ziggo and
Vodafone Netherlands.  Hence, S&P continues to equalize its
ratings on Ziggo with those on its current parent, LGP.

S&P views the proposed merger between Ziggo and Vodafone
Netherlands as moderately positive to the company's business,
making it a stronger competitor to the incumbent KPN B.V.  The
merged entity would have over 15 million revenue generating
units, including over five million Vodafone Netherlands' mobile
subscribers, as well as greater opportunities for cross selling
and converged quadruple play growth.  The JV targets revenue
synergies with a net present value of approximately EUR1.0
billion. However, the ratings are constrained by Ziggo's limited
geographical diversification and fierce competition in the Dutch
market.  In S&P's view, there are integration risks that limit
the potential for a positive rating action.  S&P assumes the JV
will generate annual costs and capital expenditure (capex)
synergies of EUR280 million by the fifth full year after closing,
partly offset by EUR350 million in integration costs.
Integration costs will mostly be incurred in the first three
years after closing. Vodafone Netherlands' adjusted EBITDA margin
of approximately 33% is lower than that of Ziggo at above 50%.
However, S&P expects the combined entity to generate above-
industry average profitability.

The JV will target leverage of 4.5x-5.0x, which corresponds to a
Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of above 5x.  S&P
expects the JV to generate free operating cash flow (FOCF) to
debt of 3%-4% in the first two-to-three years of operation.  Both
ratios are in line with S&P's current expectations for Ziggo.
S&P expects the JV to raise additional financing, maintaining the
current financial profile, even if EBITDA grows.  S&P assumes
that the proceeds from the financing and FOCF will be distributed
to the owners.

Because of Ziggo's strong operational, financial, and strategic
links with the LGP group -- which has a core long-term strategy
to build quadruple play capabilities in the European markets --
S&P equalizes its ratings on Ziggo with the ratings on LGP.  If
the JV closes in line with the announced structure, S&P believes
the JV is likely to receive support from both LGP and Vodafone
should it face financial difficulty.  S&P also views the combined
ownership as unlikely to decrease in the near term given
restrictions on initiating an IPO for the JV until after the
third anniversary of closing.  There are also restrictions on
other transfers of interests in the JV until the fourth
anniversary of closing and a first right of refusal to either
parent in the event of sales to a third party after the fifth
anniversary.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Ziggo's stabilizing
performance and SACP continue to be supported by LGP.  The
modestly stronger SACP of the proposed JV would also benefit from
the two owners, LGP and Vodafone.

S&P could revise down Ziggo or the JV's SACP if operating
performance deteriorated materially from current levels.  This
could happen if the Dutch market becomes even more competitive,
and Ziggo or Vodafone Netherlands continue to lose customers.
S&P is unlikely to lower the ratings on Ziggo given S&P's view of
parent support, however, S&P could downgrade Ziggo if S&P
downgraded LGP.  Over the long term, S&P could lower the ratings
on Ziggo if the combined parent ownership were to decline, making
support less likely, or if S&P assess the ratings more on a
stand-alone basis.

The likelihood of revising up S&P's assessment of Ziggo or JV's
SACP is currently unlikely, owing to strong market competition
and anticipated highly leveraged capital structure.  S&P could
raise the ratings on Ziggo if S&P was to upgrade LGP.  In the
long term, S&P could raise the ratings on Ziggo if S&P expected
stronger support than it currently assume from the two owners of
the JV.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


AGROINCOMBANK PJSC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Probe Shows
----------------------------------------------------------
During the inspection of financial standing of the credit
institution, the provisional administration of PJSC AGROINCOMBANK
appointed by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-2986, dated November 2,
2015, due to the revocation of its banking license, revealed
operations of the bank's former management bearing evidence of
bank assets' diversion by replacing high-quality liquid
securities (federal government bonds) by illiquid promissory
notes of companies with dubious solvency in the amount, exceeding
75% of the bank's total assets.  Furthermore, the originals of
the documents with regard to the above transactions to sell the
OFZs and buy the promissory notes are unavailable with the bank.

Besides, the cash audit findings established the lack of funds in
the amount of more than 19.6 million rubles, US$185.5 thousand,
and 18.6 thousand euros.  According to the bank cashiers, the
money was withdrawn by unidentified individuals as ordered by the
bank's management on the date of the revocation of the license.

According to the estimate by the provisional administration, the
assets of PJSC AGROINCOMBANK do not exceed 92.2 million rubles,
whereas the bank's liabilities to its creditors amount to 915
million rubles.

On December 25, 2015, the Court of Arbitration of the Astrakhan
Region took a decision to recognize PJSC AGROINCOMBANK insolvent
(bankrupt) and initiate bankruptcy proceedings with the state
corporation Deposit Insurance Agency appointed as a receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on the financial
transactions bearing the evidence of the criminal offence
conducted by the former management and owners of PJSC
AGROINCOMBANK to the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian
Federation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian
Federation and the Investigative Committee of the Russian
Federation for consideration and procedural decision making.


BANK GOROD: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Inspection Reveals
---------------------------------------------------------
During the inspection of financial standing of the credit
institution, the provisional administration of BANK GOROD JSC
appointed by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-3183, dated November 16,
2015, due to the revocation of its banking license, revealed
operations bearing evidence of bank assets' diversion, which
operations had been conducted by the bank's former management
prior to the revocation of the banking license and emergence of
solvency problems.  Specifically, the assets were diverted by
replacing the bank's credit portfolio in the amount of 10.5
billion rubles by receivables from the company with dubious
solvency, by the disposal of the bank's immovable property in the
amount of over 470 million rubles, and also by the transfer of
funds in the amount of 760 million rubles to top up the broker's
account followed by their transfer to a non-resident bank.

According to the estimate by the provisional administration, the
assets of BANK GOROD JSC do not exceed 1.9 billion rubles,
whereas the bank's liabilities to its creditors amount to 13.2
billion rubles.

Under the circumstances, the Bank of Russia applied to the Court
of Arbitration of the city of Moscow to recognize the bank as
insolvent (bankrupt).

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on financial
transactions bearing the evidence of the criminal offence
conducted by the former management and owners of BANK GOROD JSC
to the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the
Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for
consideration and procedural decision making.



=========
S P A I N
=========


CAIXABANK RMBS 1: Moody's Assigns Caa3 Rating to Class B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
CAIXABANK RMBS 1, FT's class A and B notes:

Issuer: CAIXABANK RMBS 1, FT

  EUR12,851 mil. Class A Notes due March 2063, Assigned
   (P)A2 (sf)

  EUR1,349 mil. Class B Notes due March 2063, Assigned
   (P)Caa3 (sf)

CAIXABANK RMBS 1, FT is a static cash securitization of first-
line prime mortgage loans extended to obligors located in Spain.
Of the portfolio, [75.97%] consists of flexible mortgages and
[24.03%] standard mortgage loans secured on Spanish residential
properties.

The provisional ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by legal final maturity.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for the timely payment of interest and the
ultimate payment of principal for the class A notes and the
ultimate payment of principal for the class B notes by legal
final maturity.  Moody's provisional ratings only address the
credit risks associated with the transaction.  Other non-credit
risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant effect
on yield to investors.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion.  Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings to the notes.  A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating.  Moody's will disseminate
the assignment of any definitive ratings through its Client
Service Desk.  Moody's will monitor this transaction on an
ongoing basis.

                      RATINGS RATIONALE

CAIXABANK RMBS 1, FT is a securitization of loans that CaixaBank,
S.A. (Baa2/P-2/ Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr)) granted to Spanish individuals.
CaixaBank, S.A. is acting as the servicer of the loans, while
GestiCaixa, S.G.F.T., S.A. is the management company.

The provisional ratings take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement ("MILAN
CE") assumption and the portfolio's expected loss.

The key drivers for the portfolio's expected loss of [4.5%] are
(i) benchmarking with comparable transactions in the Spanish
market through the analysis data in CaixaBank, S.A.'s book; (ii)
very good track record of previous Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities ("RMBS") originated by CaixaBank, S.A (the Foncaixa
Hipotecarios series); and (iii) Moody's outlook on Spanish RMBS
in combination with the seller's historic recovery data.

The transaction's [15.8%] MILAN CE number is in line other
Spanish RMBS transactions.  The MILAN CE's key drivers are (i)
the current weighted-average loan-to-value ("LTV") ratio of
[66.4%] (calculated taking into account the original appraisal
value when the loan was granted), which is lower than the average
for Spanish RMBS transactions; (ii) the well-seasoned portfolio,
which has a weighted-average seasoning of [7.5] years; (iii) the
fact that only [3.87%] of the borrowers in the pool are not
Spanish nationals; (iv) the absence of broker-originated loans in
the pool; and (v) the absence of restructured, renegotiated,
refinancing or debt consolidation loans in the pool.

However, [75.97%] of the pool consists of flexible mortgage
loans, which are structured like a line of credit.  Under these
flexible mortgage loans, borrowers can make additional drawdowns
up to a certain LTV ratio limit, for an amount equal to the
amortized principal.  As a result, flexible mortgages lead to a
higher expected default frequency and more severe losses than for
traditional mortgage loans.  Additionally, [11.72%] of the
borrowers have the option to avail of payment holiday periods,
where principal is not paid, and [39.27%] of the pool can avail
of principal and interest grace periods.

Moody's considers that the deal has the following credit
strengths: (i) the full subordination of the class B notes'
interest and principal to the class A notes; (ii) the notes'
sequential amortization; and (iii) a fully funded reserve upfront
equal to [4.0%] of the notes, which covers potential shortfalls
in the class A notes' interest and principal during transaction's
life (and subsequently of the class B notes, once the class A
notes have fully amortized).

The portfolio mainly contains floating-rate loans linked to 12-
month Euribor [91.5%], or "Indice de Referencia de Prestamos
Hipotecarios conjunto de entidades de credito" ("IRPH"), whereas
the notes are linked to three-month Euribor and reset every
quarter on the determination dates.  This leads to an interest-
rate mismatch in the transaction.  Of the provisional pool,
[8.5%] comprises fixed-rate loans.  Therefore, there is a
potential fixed-to-floating-rate risk, whereby the Euribor rate
on the notes increases, while the interest rates on the loans
remain constant until the reset date.  There is no interest-rate
swap in place to cover interest-rate risk.  Moody's takes into
account the potential interest rate exposure as part of its cash
flow analysis when determining the notes' provisional ratings.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significantly better-than-expected performance of the pool,
combined with an increase in the notes' credit enhancement.

Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings include
significantly different loss assumptions compared with our
expectations at closing due to either (i) a change in economic
conditions from our central forecast scenario; or (ii)
idiosyncratic performance factors that would lead to rating
actions; or (iii) a change in Spain's sovereign risk, which may
also result in subsequent rating actions on the notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.

The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time, but rather how the initial rating of the security
might have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

At the time the provisional ratings were assigned, the model
output indicated that the class A notes would have achieved an A2
if the expected loss was as high as 4.5%, if the MILAN CE was
15.8%, and all other factors were constant.  The model output
further indicated that the class A notes would not have been
assigned an A2 rating with a MILAN CE of 19%, and an expected
loss of 4.5%.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework," published in
January 2015.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.


MADRID RMBS 1: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three Madrid RMBS FTA transactions and
revised the Outlooks on 10 tranches to Stable from Negative.
The Spanish RMBS series comprises loans serviced by Bankia S.A.
(BB+/Positive/B).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Credit Enhancement

The structural credit enhancement (CE) across all notes has
remained stable since Fitch's last annual review in February
2015. This reflects that the notes are amortizing sequentially
and the balance of principal deficiency ledgers (PDL) is in most
cases declining. Fitch considers the existing and projected CE
sufficient to support the ratings, as reflected in the
affirmations and revision of the Outlook to Stable from Negative
on 10 tranches.

Stable Arrears Performance

The affirmations also reflect Fitch's expectation of stable asset
performance, supported by the decreasing trend of arrears over
the past 12 months in most transactions. As of December 2015,
three-months plus arrears (excluding defaults) ranged from 0.32%
(Madrid RMBS I) to 0.48% (Madrid RMBS II) of the current pool
balances down from 0.8% (Madrid RMBS III) and 0.64% (Madrid RMBS
II) as of December 2014. These levels remain below the Fitch
Spanish Prime index of 1.0%.

Cumulative gross defaults (defined as loans in arrears for more
than six months) are high but show signs of flattening, ranging
between 18.8% (Madrid RMBS I) and 21.9% (Madrid RMBS III) of the
initial portfolio balance. These levels are above the average
5.2% for other prime Spanish RMBS and the 15.8% of other Spanish
non-conforming RMBS. The lower pace of new entries into default
has allowed the PDL to decrease to EUR14.2m in Madrid RMBS II
(from EUR 16.3m as of October 2014) and remain broadly stable in
Madrid RMBS I and III.

Re-performing Assets

Fitch performed a loan by loan analysis on defaulted assets and
identified instances where loans had gone back to performing. For
example, EUR6.4 million (Madrid RMBS II) and EUR19.6 million
(Madrid RMBS III) of cumulative defaulted balance have returned
to being current on their payment obligations or are in arrears
of under six months. Fitch has adjusted the PDL balances
downwards to recognize the re-performance of prior defaults. The
default definition of Madrid RMBS transactions is shorter than
the standard 12 to 18 months typically seen in other Spanish
RMBS.

Foreclosure Frequency Adjustment

Fitch has reduced the magnitude of the foreclosure frequency
adjustment to foreign borrowers, self-employed borrowers and
borrowers with original mortgage tenor longer than 30 years to
150%, 20% and 5% (from 200%, 60% and 20%). While Fitch believes
loans granted to these borrowers are typically exposed to greater
performance volatility than traditional loans, the payment
history track record suggests these assets have demonstrated
resilience in periods of economic crisis. Fitch also applied no
additional foreclosure frequency adjustment to the proportion of
loans concentrated in the Madrid region given the economic
diversity and importance of the region.

These calibrations are due to the comparable performance of
foreign borrowers versus Spanish borrowers, self-employed
borrowers versus full-time employed borrowers and borrowers with
mortgage tenors higher than 30 years versus borrowers with
mortgages under 30 years, which has been possible via the loan-
by-loan data sets provided by the European Data Warehouse.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A worsening of the Spanish macroeconomic environment, especially
employment conditions, or an abrupt shift of interest rates could
jeopardize the underlying borrowers' affordability.

Additionally, larger recovery rates on defaulted loans and faster
recovery periods could support improvements to existing ratings,
all else being equal.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

The rating actions are as follows:

Madrid RMBS 1, FTA
Class A2 (ES0359091016) affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative
Class B (ES0359091024) affirmed at 'BB-sf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative
Class C (ES0359091032) affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative
Class D (ES0359091040) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%
Class E (ES0359091057) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

Madrid RMBS II, FTA
Class A2 (ES0359092014) affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative
Class A3 (ES0359092022) affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative
Class B (ES0359092030) affirmed at 'BB-sf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative
Class C (ES0359092048) affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative
Class D (ES0359092055) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%
Class E (ES0359092063) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

Madrid RMBS III, FTA
Class A2 (ES0359093012) affirmed at 'BB-sf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative
Class A3 (ES0359093020) affirmed at 'BB-sf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative
Class B (ES0359093038) affirmed at 'B+sf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative
Class C (ES0359093046) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%
Class D (ES0359093053) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%
Class E (ES0359093061) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Estimate 0%



===========
S W E D E N
===========


SSAB AB: S&P Lowers Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Swedish steelmaker SSAB AB to 'B+'
from 'BB-'.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B' short-term
rating on the company.  The ratings remain on CreditWatch with
negative implications, where S&P placed them on Dec. 21, 2015.

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue ratings on SSAB's senior
unsecured debt to 'B+' from 'BB-'.  The issue ratings also remain
on CreditWatch negative.  The recovery rating on this debt is
unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful
recovery in the lower half of the 50%-70% range in the event of a
payment default.

The downgrade follows SSAB's weaker-than-expected 2015 reported
earnings.  It also reflects a lowering of S&P's expectations for
SSAB's earnings in 2016 because Chinese, Russian, and Korean
exports to Europe and the U.S. are dragging down European and
U.S. steel prices and buyers have adopted a wait-and-see
approach.

The prolonged downturn in the global steel markets has prevented
SSAB from meeting the threshold for S&P's 'BB-' rating of funds
from operations (FFO) to debt of about 15% (compared with an
actual figure of about 10.5% for 2015).  S&P anticipates marginal
improvement in 2016 compared with 2015, based on its view that
synergies from the merger with Finnish steelmaker Rautaruukki Oyj
(Ruukki) and other cost efficiency measures should compensate for
the impact of weaker market conditions.  It remains to be seen
how effective import tariffs are in protecting European and U.S.
markets from the threat of cheap imports.

S&P continues to view favorably SSAB's 30% net debt-to-equity
target, which is significantly lower than the current 52%.  The
company has generated positive discretionary cash flow over the
past three years, accomplishing this in 2015 through positive
working capital movements and not paying a dividend to
shareholders.  Shareholders have been supportive of lower
dividend payments in times of weak cash generation.

SSAB operates in the highly cyclical steel industry, with end
markets such as heavy transportation, construction, machinery,
and mining.  Volumes typically move in line with GDP over the
long term, and can be volatile in the short term, as was
evidenced in the last quarter of 2015.

SSAB's key strength is in its strong market position in special-
grade steel products.  For example, it has a global market share
of about 40% in quenched and tempered steels, along with about 5%
in some advanced high strength steels, and 20%-25% market share
in heavy plates in the North and South America, according to
company estimates.  Following the merger with Ruukki, it also
commands a 40%-50% share in the flat carbon steels and tubes
market in the Nordic region.

In S&P's opinion, key challenges for SSAB are the risk of new
specialty grade steel capacity from competitors and the pace of
take-up of special-grade steel products by equipment
manufacturers.

In S&P's base case for SSAB, S&P assumes:

   -- A marginal year-on-year improvement in EBITDA to about
      Swedish krona (SEK) 3.7 billion-SEK4.0 billion, with
      unlocked synergies in line with the company's public
      guidance offsetting the negative impact of the weak market
      conditions.

   -- Capital expenditures (capex) of SEK1.5 billion-SEK2.0
      billion per year in 2016 and 2017.

   -- No dividend payments in 2016 or 2017.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- FFO to debt of 10%-15%.
   -- Debt to EBITDA of 5x-6x.
   -- Positive discretionary cash flow.

The CreditWatch reflects the possibility of a further downgrade
of SSAB in the coming three to six months, unless market
conditions and SSAB's earnings improve, such that it reduces its
Standard & Poor's-adjusted ratio of debt to EBITDA to about 5x.
Weakening in SSAB's current strong liquidity could also trigger a
downgrade.

S&P could consider affirming the ratings on SSAB if S&P sees a
sustained improvement in its operating margin and adjusted debt
to EBITDA falls to about 5x.

S&P could lower its ratings on SSAB if adjusted debt to EBITDA
remains at above 5x.  This could occur if market conditions do
not improve significantly, resulting in persistent stable or
negative discretionary cash flow.  Moreover, S&P could remove the
one-notch uplift it currently factors into the ratings on SSAB if
its currently strong liquidity weakened, potentially prompting a
downgrade.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


DRAX: Chief Executive Mulls Closure of Half of Power Station
------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Gosden at The Telegraph reports that half of Drax,
Britain's biggest power station, could be shut down or mothballed
because it is struggling to make money.

According The Telegraph, the company had launched a strategic
review of the three coal-fired units at its Yorkshire power plant
and was considering all options including closure.

Dorothy Thompson, Drax's chief executive, said the review had
been triggered by commodity markets, with the coal units
"struggling to make money" from current low power prices, and by
the Government's proposal to end UK coal generation by 2025, The
Telegraph relates.


* Fitch Says Brexit to Bring Significant Long-Term Risks
--------------------------------------------------------
Lengthy negotiations and uncertainty over UK firms' future access
to EU markets following a vote to leave in the upcoming
referendum on EU membership (Brexit) would weigh on confidence
and delay investment decisions. This would have a short-term
economic cost, although the precise impact would be highly
uncertain, Fitch Ratings says.

Prime Minster David Cameron has announced that an In-Out
referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union will be
held on 23 June. Polls suggest a Remain vote is marginally more
likely, and the Prime Minister's endorsement should boost the
campaign. But a Leave vote that triggers the UK's withdrawal from
the EU is a real possibility, although it is not our base case.

Fitch believes that in the event of a Leave vote, the authorities
on both sides would try to avoid disrupting the deep economic and
financial integration between the UK and EU by establishing a
clear new relationship, including a trade agreement that
preserves UK attractiveness for investment. Some tightening of
the freedom of EU citizens' to work in the UK would be likely.
Avoiding large-scale, permanent disruption to trade relations,
including services, could limit the long-term economic cost to
the UK, with Brexit only moderately negative for the UK.

But there would be significant risks, especially if the remaining
EU members attempted to impose punitive conditions on the UK to
deter other countries from leaving, or the UK sought very tough
restrictions on EU citizens coming to work in the UK.

Fitch has published a report outlining our base-case expectations
for Brexit, and how it might affect UK corporates, banks,
insurers, and RMBS and covered bond transactions.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *