TCREUR_Public/160315.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, March 15, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 052


                            Headlines


A U S T R I A

HETA ASSET: Creditors On Their Own After Rejecting Debt Offer


B E L A R U S

BANK BELVEB: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings


B O S N I A

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Sovereign Ratings


C R O A T I A

CROATIA: Moody's Lowers Rating on Sr. Unsecured Debt to Ba2


G R E E C E

GREECE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings


I R E L A N D

ANGLO IRISH: Ex-Boss Extradited, Faces Fraud Charges in Ireland
BACCHUS 2007-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'B+'
TABERNA EUROPE I: S&P Affirms CC Ratings on 4 Note Classes


I T A L Y

MONTE PASCHI: Prime Minister Urges Lenders to Consider Takeover
ONORATO ARMATORI: S&P Assigns 'B+' CCR, Outlook Developing


L U X E M B O U R G

VAT LUX II: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

NORTHERN LIGHTS III: Moody's Reviews Ba2 Rating for Downgrade
PDM CLO I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba2


P O R T U G A L

PORTO CITY: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term IDRs, Outlook Stable


R U S S I A

KRASNOYARSK CITY: Fitch Withdraws 'B' Issuer Default Ratings
LENINGRAD OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Negative
PENZA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
RUSSIAN NIZHNIY: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Ratings
VNESHPROMBANK: Declared Bankrupt by Moscow Court


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: Seeks Support of Lenders on Debt Restructuring Plan
GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA: Moody's Review Ba2 Rating for Downgrade


T U R K E Y

DENIZBANK AS: Moody's Puts Ba2 Rating on Review for Downgrade


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ANGLO AMERICAN: S&P Reinstates 'BB' Ratings on Sr. Unsec. Notes
LION/GLORIA HOLDCO: Moody's Affirms B3 CFR, Outlook Negative
SPS PRINT: Enters Into CVA Deal, 154 Jobs Secured


X X X X X X X X

* Fitch Says High-Yield Debt Still Attractive to EU Investors
* Moody's Concludes Rating Reviews on 5 European OFS Companies


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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HETA ASSET: Creditors On Their Own After Rejecting Debt Offer
-------------------------------------------------------------
Alexander Weber and Boris Groendahl at Bloomberg News report that
Austrian Finance Minister Hans Joerg Schelling told creditors of
bad bank Heta Asset Resolution AG they are on their own trying to
get repaid after they rejected a discounted offer for the debt by
the province of Carinthia.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Schelling said the federal government
won't take on the liabilities of Carinthia, whose guarantees for
Heta's debt still add up to EUR11 billion (US$12 billion), or
five times its annual budget.  He spoke minutes after Carinthia
confirmed the Heta bond offer wasn't accepted by the necessary
two thirds of creditors, Bloomberg relates.

"The federal government has exhausted all possibilities,"
Bloomberg quotes Mr. Schelling as saying.  "It's the creditors
who couldn't accept the offer that have failed."

Carinthia offered to buy Heta's debt at a discount, effectively
asking creditors to share the losses of the nationalized lender
with Austrian taxpayers, who already injected EUR5.5 billion, and
former shareholders, Bloomberg discloses.

Mr. Schelling, as cited by Bloomberg, said Carinthia could get
the funds it needs for its day-to-day operations from the
Treasury.  He said the offer he made to lend an extra EUR1.2
billion to fund the tender offer expired with the bid, Bloomberg
relays.

He said further talks with Heta's creditors are up to Carinthia,
as the federal government has no mandate for such negotiations,
Bloomberg notes.

Heta Asset Resolution AG is a wind-down company owned by the
Republic of Austria.  Its statutory task is to dispose of the
non-performing portion of Hypo Alpe Adria, nationalized in 2009,
as effectively as possible while preserving value.



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B E L A R U S
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BANK BELVEB: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'B-/C' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on
Belarus-based Bank BelVEB OJSC.  The outlook is stable.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that BelVEB's risk profile is
balanced by ongoing support from its parent, Russian government-
owned Vnesheconombank (VEB), despite deteriorated market
conditions in Belarus' banking sector.

The 'B-' long-term rating on BelVEB reflects S&P's view that it
is predominantly exposed to the Belarus market and thus remains
vulnerable to the economic and operating conditions in Belarus.
S&P considers BelVEB to be a strategic subsidiary of VEB.
However, S&P do not incorporate any additional notches above
BelVEB's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) into the rating to
reflect potential extraordinary support from VEB, because S&P
caps the long-term rating on BelVEB at the level of S&P's long-
term foreign currency sovereign rating on Belarus.

In S&P's view, BelVEB's stand-alone creditworthiness benefits
from ongoing funding and liquidity support from VEB, as well as a
more flexible business model than that of state-owned Belarusian
peers, which the state compels to provide loans to strategically
important Belarusian entities.  In S&P's view, BelVEB's Russian
ownership positively influences its management and governance and
helps it to deliver on targets in a difficult operating
environment.

The stable outlook on BelVEB mirrors that on Belarus and reflects
S&P's view that risks to the rating will remain balanced over the
next 12 months.  The ratings are constrained by the foreign
currency sovereign credit ratings on Belarus because the bank
operates exclusively in Belarus and remains highly exposed to
domestic country risk.  S&P currently expects that any potential
deterioration of BelVEB's SACP would be counterbalanced by
support from the parent in the form of funding or capital
support.

If S&P was to downgrade Belarus, it would result in a downgrade
of BelVEB.  Moreover, although it is not a part of S&P's base-
case scenario for the next 12 months, if it observed a
significant deterioration in BelVEB's funding or liquidity
position, or deterioration of its asset quality significantly
more severe than S&P's current expectations (for example, more
than the average expected for the banking sector), it could also
lead S&P to downgrade BelVEB.



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B O S N I A
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Sovereign Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).  The outlook is stable.

                             RATIONALE

The ratings on BiH reflect S&P's view of its institutional setup,
with fragile, multilayered, and overlapping government
institutions, that complicate its policymaking process and delay
implementation of reforms.  BiH's weak fiscal management
framework and vulnerabilities arising from persistent current
account deficits further constrain the ratings.  The ratings are
supported by S&P's expectation of continued international
support, most importantly by its anticipation of a successful
agreement on a new program with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in the next few months.  Such a program would also unlock
additional EU and World Bank funding, alleviate external
financing and budgetary pressures, and also provide an important
policy anchor for the government's reform agenda.

The anticipated agreement with the IMF is likely to grant BiH
access to funding at favorable rates and maturities.  In
addition, it could support structural reform efforts for both
entity governments in the coming years, given that disbursements
are likely to be linked to meeting program conditions.  It would
also address any concerns on government financing following the
expiration of BiH's last Stand-By Arrangement (SBA; originally
secured in September 2012) with the IMF in June 2015. No
disbursements had been made under the last SBA following the
October 2014 general elections.  For the new agreement, S&P
understands that an important condition is the resolution of
Banka Srpske, particularly related to its capitalization and
corporate governance.  S&P believes such events highlight
vulnerabilites at some of BiH's smaller banks.  Banka Srpske is
owned by the government of Republika Srpska, the second of BiH's
two entity governments along with the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.

In the absence of foreign loan disbursements, entity governments
have been forced to tighten public finances.  Deficit financing
has been mainly covered by issuance in the domestic markets.  S&P
anticipates that BIH's two entity governments will continue to
rely on domestic issuance to cover financing needs in the first
half of 2016.  S&P further anticipates that the governments'
deposits with the central bank and commercial banks -- about 4%
of GDP as of year-end 2015 -- could provide an additional buffer
for the government to meet debt repayments.

Coupled with the IMF negotiations, the governments of both
entities have adopted legislation to fulfill prior actions and
move ahead on their reform agenda adopted last year, including
new labor laws in both entities, reform of corporate income tax,
and laws to improve banking supervision.  However, S&P
anticipates that even with the expected IMF agreement,
implementation risk remains high.  Progress on structural reforms
would be a main condition for improving the business environment
and, in turn, for fueling economic growth.  S&P expects real GDP
growth will average just under 2% in 2016-2019.  Investment
financed by multilateral institutions, as well as private
projects particularly in the energy sector, together with steady
but rather sluggish consumption and exports, will drive growth,
in S&P's view.

As in the past, disbursements from a fresh IMF agreement would be
key in the financing of BiH's 2016 current account deficit, which
S&P estimates will amount to US$1.1 billion, or 7.2% of GDP.  S&P
estimates debt-creating inflows (net of amortization) and net
foreign direct investment will finance US$470 million and US$360
million, respectively, with inflows to the capital account making
up the rest.  The public sector will contract the bulk of the
borrowing, in S&P's view.  S&P expects the banking and nonbanking
private sectors will fully roll over the US$1.7 billion stock of
short-term external debt, equivalent to 11% of GDP.

The expected new IMF arrangement -- over and above its role as an
incentive for structural reform and as an important source of
funding for the still-large current account deficit -- will also
anchor fiscal discipline for the authorities.  S&P expects the
consolidated general government fiscal deficit will narrow to
2.0% of GDP in 2019, compared with slightly above 2% of GDP in
2016.

General government debt will increase to 48% of GDP by 2019,
according to S&P's forecast.  S&P expects that the majority of
government debt will continue to be denominated in foreign
currency over S&P's forecast horizon through 2019.

BiH applied for EU membership in February 2016.  S&P thinks,
however, that the chances of success of its application will
depend partly on meaningful reform progress.  In S&P's opinion,
the governments of BiH's two administrative entities are
committed to progress on reforms, despite the apparent
disagreement over the circumstances of the EU application,
particularly the adoption of a coordination mechanism for EU
matters.

The banking system appears relatively well-capitalized and
represents a limited contingent liability for the government, in
S&P's view.  Nonperforming loans (NPLs; overdue 90 days or more),
although on a slightly decreasing trend over the past 12 months,
remain high at 13.7% of total loans on Dec. 31, 2015.

S&P understands that while BiH's banking system is stable, some
banks are undercapitalized.  Vulnerabilites of smaller domestic
banks with weaker corporate governance practices have surfaced
over the past two years, for example with Bobar Banka in late
2014 and with Banka Srpske in late 2015.

BiH has a currency board regime and the konvertibilna marka is
pegged to the euro.  While the currency board provides stability,
it restricts monetary flexibility.  S&P also views the high share
of loans denominated in or indexed to foreign currency (more than
50% of total system loans) as constraining the Central Bank of
Bosnia and Herzegovina's ability to influence the cost and
availability of credit to the real economy.  Although reserves
covered monetary liabilities 1.07x as of December 2015, the
central bank cannot act as a lender of last resort under BiH law.
S&P understands that BiH is committed to maintaining the
independence of the central bank and preserving the stability of
the currency board, which entails adequate coverage of the
monetary base by the central bank's foreign currency reserves.

                             OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on BiH balances S&P's view, over the next one-
two years, of the risks to policy-making posed by BiH's complex
institutional set-up and its high dependence on debt-creating
foreign financing to meet its external and fiscal deficits,
against our expectation of continued international support.

S&P could lower its ratings if timely external financing for
BiH's twin fiscal and current account deficits does not
materialize and government financing pressures emerged.  An
extended period without external financial support is likely to
exert liquidity pressure on the budgets of all government tiers,
particularly in light of the country's currency board
arrangement.  Although the state's external debt repayments are
funded by indirect tax receipts, a prolonged period without
external funding could put debt servicing, as well as other
payment obligations, at risk.  If S&P sees delays in payments to
official creditors, it could lower the ratings by more than one
notch.

S&P could also lower its ratings if the independence of the
central bank and the stability of the currency board arrangement
were called into question.

An easing of tensions between BiH's two entities, improved
relations with state institutions, and increased effectiveness of
policymaking would, in S&P's view, gradually enable reform
implementation that does not rely on international pressure and
policy conditionality.  S&P believes this would strengthen the
business environment and pave the way for more sustainable growth
and better external performance, which could in turn lead S&P to
consider raising its ratings on BiH.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that all key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                      Rating      Rating
                                      To          From
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency          B/Stable/B  B/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment BB-         BB-



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C R O A T I A
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CROATIA: Moody's Lowers Rating on Sr. Unsecured Debt to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Croatia's long-term
issuer and senior unsecured debt ratings to Ba2 from Ba1 and
maintained the negative outlook.

The key drivers for Moody's decision to downgrade the ratings
are:

  1. The government's large and increasing debt burden, which
     stood at around 86% of GDP at year-end 2015 and which
     Moody's expects will increase to above 90% by 2018.  This
     significantly exceeds the Ba1 peer group median of around
     45% of GDP and is unlikely to reverse much before the end of
     the decade.

  2. Croatia's continuing weak medium-term economic growth
     prospects, which derive from historically low investment and
     structural rigidities, including a low labor force
     participation rate, as well as bottlenecks in the absorption
     of EU funds.  Despite having recently emerged from
     recession, Moody's believes that Croatia's potential growth
     is below 1%, which is low for a converging economy and below
     other catching-up economies.

The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that the balance of
risks at the Ba2 level is tilted towards the downside.  Moody's
expects the new government to face significant challenges in
implementing a demanding reform agenda.  Croatia has had a poor
track record of implementing far-reaching reforms and the current
government coalition lacks significant support in parliament to
push through contentious changes.  Evidence of only gradual
fiscal and macroeconomic reforms could lead to downward pressure
on the rating within the next six to 12 months.

Croatia's long-term and short-term foreign-currency bond ceilings
were lowered to Baa3/P-3 from Baa1/P-2, the long-term foreign-
currency deposit ceiling was lowered to Ba3 from Ba2.  The short-
term foreign-currency deposit ceiling remains unchanged at Not
Prime (NP).  At the same time, the local-currency bond and
deposit country ceilings were lowered to Baa1 from A3.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE DOWNGRADE

FIRST KEY DRIVER: LARGE AND INCREASING GOVERNMENT DEBT BURDEN

Croatia's government debt is substantial at an estimated 86.5% of
GDP at year-end 2015.  This significantly exceeds the 45% median
of Ba1-rated countries.  Under Moody's baseline scenario, the
debt burden will increase to above 90% of GDP by 2018 and will
only fall slowly thereafter.  At the current level and
trajectory, the government debt burden is more consistent with a
Ba2 rating.

Croatia entered the global financial crisis with a modest debt
burden of around 39% of GDP in 2008.  However, debt has risen
rapidly in the last seven years, due to low nominal growth, high
budget deficits, the assumption of state-owned enterprise debts,
as well as costs related to restructuring state enterprises.

High budget deficits during the crisis reflected both revenue
shortfalls and expenditure overruns.  The deficit averaged 6% of
GDP in 2009-2014, compared to 3.4% of GDP in 2001-08.
Expenditure pressures developed as a result of increasing social
security benefits and higher interest payments, while revenue
shortfalls were largely unanticipated due to optimistic
macroeconomic assumptions underpinning the budget preparation
process.

Moody's believes that the process of fiscal consolidation will be
slow and halting, and expects a fiscal deficit of around 3.9% of
GDP this year, weaker than the 3% of GDP criteria required to
exit the European Union's (EU) excessive deficit procedure.  This
trend, combined with the anticipated modest levels of real
economic growth, will likely push the debt burden above the 90%
of GDP threshold by 2018.  Moody's also notes that debt
affordability has deteriorated, with the interest to revenue
ratio increasing to 8.2% in 2014 from 4.6% in 2008.  Despite the
structure of the sovereign's debt -- with around 78% of total
government debt denominated in foreign currency -- exchange-rate
risks appear limited due to the tightly managed float of the
Croatian kuna and a captive domestic investor base.

SECOND KEY DRIVER: WEAK MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH PROSPECTS THAT ARE
BELOW OTHER CATCHING-UP ECONOMIES AND WILL IMPEDE THE REDUCTION
IN DEBT

The economy grew 1.6% in 2015, emerging from a six-year recession
that reduced real GDP by 12.5% between 2008 and 2014.  However,
the economic recovery was principally driven by one-off factors,
such as an exceptionally strong tourist season and a recovery in
private consumption boosted by low oil prices and a reduction in
the personal income tax, both of which increased real disposable
incomes.

In 2016, Moody's expects growth of around 1.5%.  Downside risks
to the growth outlook could emanate from a deterioration in the
global environment, delays to the reform agenda and/or increased
political uncertainty that could weaken confidence and thus
impact growth.  Additionally, given the economy's dependence on
tourism, events related to the refugee crisis that could affect
tourism in Croatia could also hamper growth.

The ratings agency expects Croatia to grow on average by 1.7%
over the next four years, which is much lower than the pre-crisis
average of 4.5% between 2000 and 2007.  At this level, growth
prospects are also much weaker than for other Central and Eastern
European (CEE) peers, where Moody's expects growth of close to 3%
on average over the same period.  Low growth for a prolonged
period of time undermines economic resilience and impedes the
reduction in the debt burden.

Low medium-term growth prospects reflect the fall in investment
over the past years and institutional bottlenecks that hinder the
stronger absorption of EU funds required to finance more
investment.  Higher potential growth requires far-reaching
structural reforms, specifically of the labour and product
markets, which are hard to implement, especially now that some
growth has returned.

                RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that the balance of
risks at the Ba2 level are tilted towards the downside.  Moody's
expects the new government to face significant challenges in
implementing its reform agenda, which is designed to arrest the
debt increase and to improve growth prospects.

In particular, Moody's notes that the current coalition in
parliament between the Patriotic Coalition (led by the Croatian
Democratic Union, HDZ) and the newly-formed party MOST (which
translated as "Bridge") holds only a slim majority, especially
following the latter's loss of four MPs.  The wide range of
political views within the coalition and the relative
inexperience of MOST's MPs at the central government level
increase the risk that the new government will be unable to
sustain majority support in parliament for economic and fiscal
reforms.  While the new government has popular support for
reforms as MOST campaigned on a pro-reform platform, some of the
proposed reforms (such as the rationalization of the public
administration) already face resistance from different parts of
the coalition.

The poor track-record of previous Croatian governments provides
little assurance that the current government will succeed in its
reform plans.  In previous years, fiscal targets were missed
repeatedly, mainly due to spending overruns and weaker than
expected growth.  Given structural weaknesses in the budget
planning and execution process, Moody's views the risk of
recurring fiscal slippage as material for the coming years, which
could push the upward debt trajectory towards a steeper incline
than currently assumed.

                 WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN

Evidence of pressures resulting in the debt burden rising more
quickly than expected could lead to a further downgrade of
Croatia's rating.  That might include further signs that the
government is facing obstacles in legislating and implementing
economic and fiscal reforms over the next six to 12 months.
Given the lack of fiscal space, a weakening of the growth outlook
based on both domestic or external factors would also be credit
negative.  Downward pressure on the rating could also stem from
an assessment that Croatia's external vulnerability metrics
deteriorate to an extent that they will fall significantly below
those of Ba2-rated peers.

                  WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP

Moody's could consider stabilizing the outlook if it concluded
that implementation of reforms would likely spur medium-term
economic growth, improve the fiscal outlook significantly beyond
what is expected today and hence lead to materially narrower
fiscal deficits and a rapid and sustained decline in the
government debt burden.

  GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 20,947 (2014 Actual) (also
   known as Per Capita Income)
  Real GDP growth (% change): -0.4% (2014 Actual) (also known as
   GDP Growth)
  Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): -0.5% (2014 Actual)
  Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -5.6% (2014 Actual) (also
  known as Fiscal Balance)
  Current Account Balance/GDP: 0.8% (2014 Actual) (also known as
   External Balance)
  External debt/GDP: 99.3% (2014 Actual)
  Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
   resilience
  Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
   loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On March 8, 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of Croatia, Government of.  The main points raised during
the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have materially decreased.  The
issuer's institutional strength/framework, have materially
decreased.  The issuer's governance and/or management, have
materially decreased. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength,
including its debt profile, has materially decreased.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Bond Ratings published in December 2015.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.



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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Greece's Long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'CCC'. The issue
ratings on Greece's long-term senior unsecured foreign and local
currency bonds have also been affirmed at 'CCC'. The Short-term
foreign currency IDR and the issue rating on Greece's Commercial
Paper have both been affirmed at 'C', and the Country Ceiling at
'B-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Substantial progress has been made towards agreeing the first
review of the financial assistance program with the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) but implementation risks remain. The
conditions of the EUR86 billion package are demanding and front-
loaded and further measures are required this year to meet the
primary fiscal surplus targets of 0.5% of GDP in 2016, 1.75% in
2017 and 3.5% from 2018.

Greece's primary fiscal deficit in 2015 is estimated at just
within the program target of 0.25% of GDP, partly due to a more
resilient economic performance than was assumed last year. The
Greek authorities have already legislated for the majority of the
specific milestones agreed, most notably to increase VAT and
reduce social security costs. However, the package included
further unidentified measures totaling 1% of GDP, on top of which
there remains a fiscal gap that has yet to be determined but
could be more than 3% of GDP cumulatively to 2018. The main
potential stumbling block is the politically sensitive pension
proposals, where creditors are pushing for upfront cuts as a way
of reducing implementation risks.

"Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras aims to secure a swift agreement
to unlock the promise of debt relief on official loans and to
help shore up economic confidence. Despite a slender coalition
majority that includes significant ideological opposition to key
reforms, we expect him to be able to continue to rely on votes
from centrist parties. Fitch estimates that the government has
sufficient buffers (cash, repos and possible arrears build up) to
last into May without further ESM disbursement. However, further
timetable slippages and any return to the brinkmanship of last
year could lead to increased liquidity strains in the summer and
the resurfacing of "Grexit" fears."

"The next set of measures agreed with creditors is expected to
place greater emphasis on facilitating the workout of non-
performing loans and strengthening legal processes and
institutions which, if successful, would boost Greece's growth
potential. Whether the IMF formally participates in the program
later this year remains unclear, and will depend on its
assessment of implementation risk, government ownership of reform
and the size of debt relief. We do not expect principal haircuts
on the official debt stock, and debt relief may be delivered in
stages contingent on program performance as a way of retaining
incentives."

Overall public debt to GDP remained broadly flat in 2015 at close
to 180% of GDP as large positive stock-flow adjustments,
including repayment of a EUR10.9 billion EFSF bond, offset the
fiscal deficit and bank recapitalization costs. Fitch forecasts
primary fiscal surpluses in 2016 and 2017 slightly above the
program targets, with overall general government debt coming down
from a peak of 183% of GDP this year to 181% in 2017. A sharp
fall in imports in 2015 moved the current account from a deficit
of 2.1% of GDP in 2014 to close to balance, while net external
debt remains elevated at above 120% of GDP.

The recession has been relatively shallow, with GDP growth
estimated at -0.3% in 2015. In particular, private consumption
held up well, growing by some 0.3% last year, partly due to
precautionary spending and the limited scope for further large
falls in discretionary expenditures. Capital controls had a less
negative effect than anticipated as companies had already stocked
up on inventories and households on cash. One unintended
consequence of capital restrictions was encouraging a transition
of activities from the informal to the formal economy, which
supported GDP, a trend that is expected to continue this year.
Fitch forecasts a decline in GDP of 0.9% in 2016 due to negative
carry over effects and fiscal contraction, with a moderate
recovery taking hold from 2H16.

Last year's bank recapitalization represented an important step
towards stabilizing the financial sector. A higher than expected
share of the EUR14.4 billion shortfall identified by the ECB
Comprehensive Assessment was met through private capital, such
that the required ESM disbursement totalled EUR5.4 billion, less
than a quarter of available funds. The key challenge remains
tackling non-performing exposures, which are extremely high, at
48% of gross loans. Changes to the insolvency law and a new
target-setting framework for banks should help, but Fitch expects
only a moderate improvement in loan quality from 2017. Greek
banks also continue to face very large funding imbalances and
incentives to deleverage. Private sector deposits have barely
increased since falling 25% in 1H15 and banks are targeting a
reduction in reliance on relatively expensive Emergency Liquidity
Assistance, constraining new lending.

The migrant crisis has the potential to incur sizeable fiscal,
social and political costs for Greece. Continuation of the de
facto restrictions of movement imposed by neighboring countries
could lead to a further rapid increase in the numbers of migrants
within Greece's borders. The recent proposal on returning
migrants to Turkey somewhat alleviates this risk, but is yet to
be agreed and tested. Resulting political strains on relations
with EU partners could potentially also spill over to Greece's
ESM program, increasing delivery risks.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future developments that could, individually or collectively,
result in an upgrade include:

-- A track record of successful implementation of the ESM
    program, brought about by an improved working relationship
    between Greece and its official creditors and a relatively
    stable political environment.

-- An economic recovery, further primary surpluses, and official
    sector debt relief would provide upward momentum for the
    ratings over the medium term.

Developments that could, individually or collectively, result in
a downgrade include:

-- A repeat of the prolonged breakdown in relations between
    Greece and its creditors seen last year, for example in the
    context of a failure to meet program targets and worsening
    liquidity conditions.

-- Non-payment, redenomination and/or distressed debt exchange
    of government debt securities issued in the market or a
    government-declared moratorium on all debt service.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Any debt relief given to Greece under the ESM program will
    apply to official-sector debt only, and would not therefore
    constitute an event of default under the agency's criteria.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ANGLO IRISH: Ex-Boss Extradited, Faces Fraud Charges in Ireland
---------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that David Drumm, former boss of the Anglo Irish
Bank, has been granted bail by an Irish court after he was
extradited from the US to face fraud charges.

Mr. Drumm, who resigned in December 2008 as the bank was
collapsing, was brought before Dublin District Court on March 14
to be charged with 33 offenses, BBC relates.

They include false accounting linked to transactions worth EUR7
billion (GBP5.4 billion), BBC discloses.

He was arrested in the early hours of March 14 after arriving at
Dublin Airport on an overnight flight from Boston, BBC relays.

Gardai (Irish police) accompanied the former chief executive on
the transatlantic flight and shortly after landing he was brought
to a Dublin police station, and then escorted to the court, BBC
recounts.

According to BBC, sixteen of the charges relate to the alleged
provision of unlawful financial assistance to 16 wealthy
investors, in a bid to prop up Anglo's share price before the
collapse.

Mr. Drumm moved to the US in 2009, the same year Anglo Irish Bank
had to be bailed out by Irish taxpayers, BBC notes.

                  About Irish Bank Resolution

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.  Irish Bank Resolution sought assistance
from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Irish Nationwide Building Society.  The two banks failed and were
merged into IBRC in July 2011.  IBRC is tasked with winding them
down and liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish
lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was
placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to
complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some EUR25 billion (US$33.5 billion). About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about EUR50 billion, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

IBRC was granted protection under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code in December 2013.

Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson of KPMG have been named the
special liquidators.

                       About Anglo Irish

Anglo Irish Bank was an Irish bank headquartered in Dublin from
1964 to 2011.  It went into wind-down mode after nationalization
in 2009.  In July 2011, Anglo Irish merged with the Irish
Nationwide Building Society, with the new company being named the
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC).

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Irish Bank
Resolution Corp. Ltd. (IBRC) to 'D/D' from 'B-/C'.   S&P also
lowered the senior unsecured ratings to 'D' from 'B-'.  S&P then
withdrew the counterparty credit ratings, the senior unsecured
ratings, and the preferred stock ratings on IBRC.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'BBB+' issue rating on three government-
guaranteed debt issues.

The rating actions follow the Feb. 6, 2013, announcement that the
Irish government has liquidated IBRC.

The former Irish bank sought protection from creditors under
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on Aug. 26, 2013 (Bankr.
D. Del., Case No. 13-12159).  The former bank's Foreign
Representatives are Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson.  Its
U.S. bankruptcy counsel are Mark D. Collins, Esq., and Jason M.
Madron, Esq., at Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., in Wilmington,
Delaware.


BACCHUS 2007-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'B+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
BACCHUS 2007-1 PLC's class B, C, and D notes.  At the same time,
S&P has affirmed its rating on the class E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the Jan. 29, 2016 trustee report and
the application of its relevant criteria.

S&P subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class
at each rating level.  The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the
maximum level of gross defaults, based on its stress assumptions,
that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay the
noteholders.  In S&P's analysis, it used the portfolio balance
that it considers to be performing (EUR87,998,783), the current
weighted-average spread (3.86%), and the weighted-average
recovery rates calculated in line with S&P's corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.  S&P applied
various cash flow stresses, using its standard default patterns,
in conjunction with different interest rate and currency stress
scenarios.

Since S&P's Sept. 26, 2014 review, the aggregate collateral
balance has decreased by 57.89% to EUR88.11 million from
EUR209.24 million.

S&P has observed that the class A and RCF notes have fully
amortized, while the class B notes have amortized by EUR9.99
million since S&P's previous review.  In S&P's view, this has
increased the available credit enhancement for all of the rated
classes of notes.  S&P has also observed that the concentration
of 'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-') rated assets and
defaulted assets has decreased since S&P's previous review.

BACCHUS 2007-1's portfolio is concentrated and comprises 19
performing obligors, compared with 36 at S&P's previous review.
The largest obligor's assets represent 12.78% of the aggregate
collateral balance and the largest five obligors comprise 42% of
the total pool of performing assets.

Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis, it considers that the available credit enhancement is
commensurate with higher ratings than previously assigned for the
class B, C, and D notes.  S&P has therefore raised its ratings on
these classes of notes.  S&P's ratings on the class C and D notes
are constrained by the application of its largest obligor test,
which measures the risk of several of the largest obligors
defaulting simultaneously.

S&P has affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class E notes
because its credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the
available credit enhancement is commensurate with S&P's currently
assigned rating.

BACCHUS 2007-1 is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
April 2007 and is managed by IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG.

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To                 From

BACCHUS 2007-1 PLC
EUR450 Million Senior Secured And Deferrable Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

B           AAA (sf)           AA+ (sf)
C           AA+ (sf)           BBB+ (sf)
D           B+ (sf)            CCC+ (sf)

Rating Affirmed

E           CCC- (sf)


TABERNA EUROPE I: S&P Affirms CC Ratings on 4 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings
Taberna Europe CDO I PLC's class A1, A2, B, C, D, and E notes.

The affirmations follow S&P's performance review of the
transaction, which includes its credit and cash flow analysis
using data from the trustee report dated Jan. 29, 2016.

"We conducted our cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes.  The BDR
represents our estimate of the maximum level of gross defaults,
based on our stress assumptions, that a tranche can withstand and
still fully repay the noteholders.  We used the portfolio balance
that we consider to be performing, the reported weighted-average
spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates that we
considered to be appropriate.  We incorporated various cash flow
stress scenarios using our standard default patterns, levels, and
timings for each rating category assumed for each class of notes,
combined with different interest stress scenarios as outlined in
our criteria," S&P said.

Since S&P's previous review on April 4, 2014, it has observed
further credit deterioration in the underlying pool.  For
example, the par value tests have decreased since S&P's previous
review, and all continue to be failing against their required
levels under the transaction documents.

Furthermore, S&P's analysis indicates that the class A2 notes
continue to be at risk of an interest shortfall which, if
triggered, would result in an event of default under the
transaction documents.  This may lead to the acceleration or
enforcement of the underlying collateral portfolio, in S&P's
view. S&P has therefore affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the
class A2 notes.

The class A1 notes have continued to repay and have amortized by
approximately 27% of their outstanding principal balance since
S&P's previous review.  While this has had an overall positive
impact on the transaction, in S&P's view, the transaction is
still at risk of an event of default occurring.  This in turn
increases the transaction's market value risk if the transaction
were to be liquidated.  As a result, S&P has affirmed its 'B
(sf)' rating on the class A1 notes.

S&P's credit and cash flow analysis indicated that the class B,
C, D, and E notes are unable to withstand its credit and cash
flow stresses at rating levels higher than those currently
assigned.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'CC (sf)' ratings on
the class B, C, D, and E notes.

Taberna Europe CDO I is backed by a portfolio of mostly corporate
loans and bonds, with some commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) exposure.

RATINGS LIST

Class        Rating

Taberna Europe CDO I PLC
EUR600 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A1           B (sf)
A2           CCC- (sf)
B            CC (sf)
C            CC (sf)
D            CC (sf)
E            CC (sf)



=========
I T A L Y
=========


MONTE PASCHI: Prime Minister Urges Lenders to Consider Takeover
---------------------------------------------------------------
According to Bloomberg News' Sonia Sirletti and Francesca
Cinelli, la Repubblica reported that Italian Prime Minister
Matteo Renzi is pressing other lenders to consider a takeover of
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA ,the country's third-largest
bank.

Italy's government sees Intesa Sanpaolo SpA and state-owned Cassa
Depositi e Prestiti as possible buyers along with some Italian
foundations, the newspaper, as cited by Bloomberg, said.

"Finding a partner for Monte Paschi will continue to be a
challenging task as long as the amount of deteriorated exposures
is not curtailed," Bloomberg quotes analysts at Mediobanca led by
Antonio Guglielmi, as saying in a note on March 14.

"The current concern about a potential resolution of Monte Paschi
and the consequent systemic risk for Italian banks is over-
emphasized."

Chief Executive Officer Fabrizio Viola is seeking to restore
profitability and bolster the bank's finances by reducing risk
and selling assets, Bloomberg discloses.

After tapping investors for funds to replenish capital, Mr. Viola
has been seeking a buyer as he faces pressure from the European
Central Bank, Bloomberg notes.

                    About Monte dei Paschi

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.


ONORATO ARMATORI: S&P Assigns 'B+' CCR, Outlook Developing
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B+'
long-term corporate credit rating to Italy-based ferry operator
Onorato Armatori SpA.  The outlook is developing.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'BB-' issue rating to the
senior secured EUR60 million revolving credit facility (RCF),
EUR200 million term loan A, and EUR300 million senior secured
notes issued by Onorato Armatori.  S&P is also assigning its '2'
recovery rating to the senior secured debt, indicating its
expectation of substantial recovery (70%-90%) for the secured
lenders in the event of a payment default.

The ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings S&P assigned
on Feb. 1, 2016.

The rating on Onorato Armatori reflects the company's exposure to
the cyclical transportation industry, which S&P views as high
risk, and its narrow business scope compared with other global
ship operators and transport service providers.

The company's business model is mainly built around ferry
operations providing services via two main subsidiaries: Moby and
Tirrenia-CIN, which jointly manage a fleet of 46 passenger and
cargo ferries and 17 tug boats. Onorato Armatori predominantly
serves routes between continental Italy and Italian islands (also
Corsica), with a large concentration on the Sardinia route, which
accounts for more than two-thirds of the company's revenues.  S&P
understands that the passenger ferry routes, which account for
more than half of Onorato Armatori's revenues, are highly
seasonal with some not being profitable during the low tourist
season and certain routes never turning a profit.  Nevertheless,
annual contracted subsidies of about EUR87 million from the
Italian government for all of Tirrenia-CIN's and some of Moby's
loss-making routes -- in exchange for a provision of a certain
standard and frequency of service -- help to smooth earnings and
boost profitability.  However, the European Commission has
challenged this payment as potential unauthorized state
subvention and the outcome of the ongoing investigation, which
also encompasses other issues related to the alleged unfair
conduct of the privatization of Tirrenia-CIN business, is
difficult to predict.  On top of its ferry operations, Onorato
Armatori generates about 30% of its total revenue from cargo
transportation, which S&P considers to have more stable volume
patterns throughout the year.

"Onorato Armatori's weaknesses are further mitigated, in our
view, by the company's leading and fairly protected position as a
ferry operator in the niche Italian market.  This is underpinned
by the well-recognized and long-standing Moby brand, which has
been operating in the maritime industry since the 18th century.
Moreover, we believe that the company's well-invested, relatively
young, and large fleet, compared with other European ferry
operators, helps to provide frequent rides to match high season
demand, drives the economies of scale, and underpins operating
efficiencies.  Onorato Armatori's competitive advantage is
further supported by limited competition, as its business model
mainly targets families with children, who prefer to travel in
their own cars, rather than use other means of transport such as
airlines. We also take a positive view of Onorato Armatori's
demonstrated ability to proactively manage its exposure to
fluctuations in bunker fuel prices (hedging approximately 89%,
89%, and 32% of its 2015 bunker volumes for 2016, 2017 and 2018,
respectively) and its fairly flexible cost base.  We consider
this flexibility to be essential for managing profitability
during the slack winter season," S&P said.

"Our base-case assumptions for Onorato Armatori have not changed
materially since we assigned the preliminary rating on Feb. 1,
2016.  We continue to anticipate revenue growth of 2%-4% and an
average-adjusted EBITDA margin of about 30%.  These are
underpinned by bunker fuel hedges and realization of the
synergies unlocked from a consolidation of the Moby and Tirrenia-
CIN businesses.  We also continue to believe that the company
will be able to achieve Standard & Poor's-adjusted funds from
operations (FFO) to debt of 20%-23% over the 2016-2017 forecast
period, which we see as commensurate with a significant financial
risk profile," S&P noted.

The rating also incorporates a one-notch downward adjustment for
S&P's assessment of liquidity as less than adequate, which
incorporates the uncertainty over the outcome of the ongoing
European Commission investigation.  Additionally, it includes a
one-notch downward adjustment under our comparable rating
analysis modifier following S&P's evaluation of the company's
credit characteristics in aggregate, which reflects S&P's view
that Onorato Armatori's business risk and financial risk profiles
are at the weaker end of their range.

The developing outlook reflects that S&P may take a positive or
negative rating action on Onorato Armatori depending on the
decision of the European Commission on the ongoing state aid
investigation, which could be determined in 2016.

S&P could take a positive rating action if the repayment amount
ruled by the European Commission did not considerably exceed the
deferred amount of EUR180 million, which would remove the
uncertainty over Onorato Armatori's liquidity position and
stabilize its credit quality.  In addition, ratings upside would
depend on the company being able to maintain the ratio of FFO to
debt at more than 20%.

S&P would be likely to lower the rating by one or more notches if
the European Commission's decision resulted in Onorato Armatori
having to repay significantly more than the deferred payment
amount, which would be likely to lead to a liquidity shortfall
for the company.  S&P considers the downside scenario as less
likely than the upside scenario.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


VAT LUX II: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on Luxembourg-based vacuum valve producer
VAT Lux II Sarl.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' issue rating on VAT's $405
million senior secured term loan B due 2021 ($316 million
outstanding).  The '3' recovery rating on this instrument is
unchanged, reflecting S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery in
the higher half of the 50%-70% range in the event of a payment
default.

The affirmation follows VAT's announcement of its intention to
apply for a listing on the SIX Swiss Exchange.  S&P understands
that this IPO, which is still in very early stages and will not
generate cash inflows for VAT, aims to enlarge the shareholder
base.

VAT has been majority-owned by financial sponsors Partners Group
and Capvis Equity Partners since 2014.  Family shareholders and
the recently appointed management retain a combined stake of 15%.

At this stage, S&P lacks visibility on potential changes in the
shareholding structure and on key mechanisms under consideration
in the capital structure, specifically the existing shareholder
loan.  What's more, the group's intended financial policy, upon
closing of the IPO (if successful), remains unclear in terms of
acquisitive strategy, dividend position, and deleveraging path.

S&P acknowledges that if the IPO takes place, a reduction in
financial sponsor ownership, combined with deleveraging, is most
likely to positively affect S&P's credit ratios for VAT and, in
turn, its financial risk profile.  If the financial sponsorship
stake continues to exceed 40%, S&P will maintain its assessment
of the group's financial sponsor ownership.

Still, S&P thinks that contemplated IPO remains subject to
execution risks, especially given the volatility in equity
markets since the beginning of this year.

S&P's assessment of VAT's financial risk profile as highly
leveraged stems from the group's current debt, as adjusted by
Standard & Poor's, of Swiss franc (CHF) 730 million (EUR664
million).  Of this amount, more than one-half represents the
shareholder loan.  S&P consequently estimates total debt to
EBITDA slightly in excess of 6x at year-end 2015 and funds from
operations (FFO) to debt below 12%.

S&P is maintaining its assessment of VAT's business risk profile
as fair based on the group's market leadership, technology edge,
and attractive geographic diversification.  With its focus on
premium vacuum valves, the group has delivered sustained healthy
EBITDA margins averaging 28% over the past three years.

Still, VAT remains exposed to the semiconductor industry, which
is inherently volatile and has some customer concentration.  Over
the medium to long term, S&P considers that VAT's products could
also face technology risk if competing products emerge.

The stable outlook on VAT reflects S&P's opinion that the group
will retain both its leading position and technology advantage in
its niche market, translating into sustained healthy
profitability over the next 12 months.  In S&P's view, the
volatility in the group's operating performance will diminish
over time, owing to the use of its products for a wider scope of
applications.  S&P expects the EBITDA margin will remain above
20%, with positive free operating cash flow (FOCF).  S&P expects
liquidity will remain adequate.

S&P could consider raising its ratings on VAT if the IPO
succeeded and resulted in lower adjusted leverage.  This could
occur, for example, if the shareholder loan was converted into
equity, or the financial sponsors' stake in VAT fell below 40%
and was accompanied by a less aggressive financial policy.

S&P could also consider a positive rating action if VAT posts
stronger operating performance than S&P anticipates, with EBITDA
in the CHF150 million-CHF200 million range.  A track record of
positive FOCF, used to reduce debt, could also trigger a positive
rating action.  Together, these would lead to an improvement of
S&P's financial risk profile assessment to the higher end of the
highly leveraged category.

S&P could lower the rating if unexpected adverse operating
developments occurred or if VAT lost some of its market share,
narrowing its reported EBITDA margin to 20% or less.  S&P could
also consider a negative rating action if the group's FOCF turned
negative as a result of operating shortfalls or if the non-cash-
paying shareholder loan were replaced by a cash-paying
instrument.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


NORTHERN LIGHTS III: Moody's Reviews Ba2 Rating for Downgrade
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
rating of Northern Lights III B.V.:

  USD1,000,000,000 Loan Participation Notes due August 2019
   Series 2012-1, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
   previously on Aug 15, 2014 Upgraded to Ba2

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the rating action on the Ba2 senior unsecured (foreign) debt
rating of the Government of Angola, which was recently placed on
review for downgrade.

The issueThe  proceeds from the Notes were used to fund a loan
facility agreement made between the Issuer as lender and the
Government of Angola through its Ministry of Finance as borrower
(the "Loan Agreement").  Payments received by the Issuer under
the Loan Agreement will be used to make payments due under the
Notes.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

This rating is essentially a pass-through of the rating of the
Government of Angola.  Noteholders are exposed to its credit risk
and therefore the rating moves in lock-step.

Moody's expects to conclude this review when the review of the
government of Angola is completed.


PDM CLO I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba2
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on these notes
issued by PDM CLO I B.V.:

  EUR208,500,000 (current balance EUR125,217,326.26) Class A
   Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR11,250,000 Class B Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes
   due 2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  EUR17,250,000 Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes
   due 2023, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  EUR16,500,000 Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes
   due 2023, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  EUR13,500,000 Class E Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes
   due 2023, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of
deleveraging of the Class A notes following amortization of the
underlying portfolio since the last rating action in April 2015.

The Class A notes have paid down by EUR77.34 million or 37.09% of
its initial balance over the past year on the payment dates in
August 2015 and February 2016.  As a result of the deleveraging,
over-collateralization (OC) has increased.  According to the
trustee report dated February 2016 the Class A, Class B, Class C,
Class D and Class E OC ratios are reported at 150.57%, 141.04%,
128.55%, 118.52% and 111.40% (these figures do not take into
account the principal repayment of Class A notes that occurred in
February 2016) compared to February 2015 levels, on which the
last rating action was based, of 139.47%, 132.13%, 122.27%,
114.12% and 108.22%, respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR209.55
million, a weighted average default probability of 20.69%
(consistent with a WARF of 2934), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 46.22% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 32 and a weighted average spread of 4.02%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery rates
for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF
CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be
considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these default and
recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash
flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in
the portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
were unchanged for Classes A and B and within two notches of the
base-case result for the remaining classes.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
     this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
     underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending
     on market conditions and have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Amortization could accelerate as a
     consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral
     sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase
     in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.  Fast amortization
     would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning
     with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

  2) Around 9.51% of the collateral pool consists of debt
     obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by
     using credit estimates.  As part of its base case, Moody's
     has stressed large concentrations of single obligors bearing
     a credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the
     Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions," published
     in October 2009 and available at:

    http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


PORTO CITY: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term IDRs, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the City of Porto's Outlook to Stable
from Positive while affirming the city's Long-term foreign and
local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB+'. The Short-
term foreign currency IDR has been affirmed at 'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The change in the Outlook of Porto's IDR reflects the following
key rating drivers and their relative weights:

HIGH

The change of Outlook reflects a similar rating action on
Portugal's Outlook to Stable from Positive.

Porto's ratings remain constrained by the Portuguese sovereign
(BB+/Stable), in accordance with Fitch's criteria. As with other
Portuguese cities, Porto's accounts and budgets are overseen by
the central government and its financial liabilities are approved
by the national Court of Accounts. The limited role of the
intermediate tiers of government (province and region) in
Portugal strengthens the link between the central government and
cities.

Porto's intrinsic credit profile is stronger than its ratings
indicate, due to the city's healthy budgetary performance, its
moderate debt as well as the strong oversight by the central
government. Prudent management and Porto's role as a service
centre in north Portugal are also credit- positive.

Porto's 'BB+' IDRs also reflect the following key rating drivers:

Porto has maintained a high operating margin in a difficult
economic environment, at above 17% since 2009. This, coupled with
flexibility on capital expenditure, has allowed the city to
report a surplus before debt variation every year over the same
period. The 2015 preliminary accounts confirm a consistent
performance with an expected operating margin exceeding 20%, due
to the strengthening of taxes and fees revenue over the year.

The 2016 budget is based on a prudent operating revenue forecast,
and discipline in managing spending, with the intention to
further reduce debt below 45% of current revenue. It includes
extraordinary financial revenues coming from concessions
contracts, as well as a high allocation from EU capital transfers
as the city was particularly active in applying for such funds in
2015, aimed mostly at refurbishing projects. Porto's budget
indicates a current balance of EUR25 million, but the city has
broadly outperformed its budgets since 2010 and Fitch expects the
operating margin to remain above 15%.

Porto reduced outstanding debt to EUR87.3 million in 2014, or
53.5% of current revenue, from EUR97m in 2013, and decreased to
close to EUR80 million at end-2015, according to preliminary
accounts. The city started deleveraging in 2009, when debt peaked
at EUR121.5 million and as a key infrastructure development
phase, including the enlargement of the metropolitan transport
and the renewal of the airport, came to a close. The
administration expects no new debt in view of the city's adequate
financial performance and liquidity, aside of the building
refurbishing program started in 2014. Porto has no contingent
liabilities, and control over public sector entities is tight and
was reinforced by the State Law 50/2012.

Porto has a prudent financial policy and is constantly looking to
improve its efficiency, having contained its operating
expenditure after revenue collection fell during the economic
downturn. It currently has around 2,800 employees, down from over
3,500 in 2001. Disclosure of information is satisfactory and
precise, including the annual financial results of all public
bodies within its perimeter.

With an estimated population of 237,000 in 2014, the City of
Porto is the second-largest cultural, administrative and economic
Portuguese centre, providing services to a greater metropolitan
area of 14 municipalities with 1.2 million inhabitants. After a
severe economic recession, GDP resumed growth in 2014, and is
expected grow moderately over the next two years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Porto's intrinsic credit profile is well above the sovereign's
and could benefit from a continued decline in debt. However,
Porto's IDR ratings are constrained by the sovereign IDRs and are
sensitive to changes of the sovereign rating



===========
R U S S I A
===========


KRASNOYARSK CITY: Fitch Withdraws 'B' Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the Russian City of Krasnoyarsk's
Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of 'BB' and National Long-term rating of 'AA-(rus)', both
with Stable Outlooks, and its Short-term foreign currency IDR of
'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch has chosen to withdraw the ratings of City of Krasnoyarsk
for commercial reasons. As Fitch does not have sufficient
information to maintain the ratings, accordingly, the agency has
withdrawn the city's ratings without affirmation and will no
longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for the City of
Krasnoyarsk.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Not applicable.


LENINGRAD OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' long-term
issuer credit rating and its 'ruAA+' Russia national scale rating
on the Russian region Leningrad Oblast.  The outlook is negative.

                            RATIONALE

The ratings on Leningrad Oblast reflect S&P's view of Russia's
volatile and unbalanced institutional framework and the oblast's
very weak budgetary flexibility, combined with relatively weak
economy and financial management compared with its international
peers.  In S&P's view, the oblast's average budgetary performance
has a neutral impact on its creditworthiness.  The ratings are
supported by the oblast's strong liquidity, very low debt burden,
and very low contingent liabilities.  The long-term issuer credit
rating on the oblast is equal to its stand-alone credit profile
(SACP).  The SACP is not a rating, it is a means of assessing a
local and regional government's (LRG's) intrinsic
creditworthiness, under the assumption that there is no sovereign
rating cap.

Leningrad Oblast's economy benefits from its favorable location
surrounding the City of St. Petersburg and on transit routes to
the EU, as well as from a continued inflow of investments into
transport and energy infrastructure and the manufacturing sector.
However, S&P assess the oblast's wealth level as weak by
international standards, and S&P believes that gross regional
product per capita will remain below US$10,000 over the next
three years.

S&P revised its assessment of Leningrad Oblast's budgetary
flexibility to very weak from weak.  Like most Russian local and
regional governments (LRGs), the oblast has very limited control
over its revenues, about 95% of which come from federally
regulated taxes and transfers from the federal government.  In
the past two years, changes to national tax legislation have
markedly affected the oblast's budgetary performance and
increased the oblast's tax-base concentration.  The top 10
taxpayers -- which include the single largest contributor, oil
company Surgutneftegaz (SNG) -- contributed just under 40% of the
oblast's tax revenues in 2015, compared with 30% two years ago.

Changes in federal tax policy will likely continue to undermine
the oblast's revenues predictability.  For example, potential
changes to mineral extraction tax could affect oil company
profits, which would weigh on the oblast's corporate profit tax
(CPT) proceeds in the coming few years.  CPT is Leningrad
Oblast's key revenue source and currently accounts for about 50%
of operating revenues.

S&P anticipates that the oblast's budgetary performance is likely
to remain average by international standards over S&P's 2016-2018
forecast horizon.  The region is also likely to demonstrate
strong operating margins of about 7% of operating revenues and
only modest deficits after capital accounts over S&P's forecast
horizon.  However, S&P expects CPT could be subject to
significant fluctuations in the coming years due to its strong
link with the cyclical oil industry.  The oblast's budgetary
performance could also be affected by the potential volatility of
state transfers.

Since the creation of consolidated taxpayer groups in 2012,
several large corporate holdings that benefit from tax breaks
granted by Leningrad Oblast have redistributed CPT payments to
the oblast from other regions.  This caused net tax inflows to
the oblast to rise over the past few years and budgetary
performance to improve significantly.

However, S&P expects the oblast's future operating margins to
decrease because of a potential decline in CPT in line with weak
national economic performance as the positive effect of ruble
depreciation on exporters' profits is exhausted and commodity
prices stay low.  S&P also expects the federal government to
decrease the amount of federal grants that it could distribute to
much weaker regions.

At the same time, S&P assumes that operating performance will be
supported by financial management's cautious spending policies,
thanks to some easing of the requirements of the 2012
presidential decrees that increased public sector salaries,
combined with ongoing austerity measures that include cuts in
maintenance and repair expenditure.

S&P expects the deficit after capital accounts to remain only
modest at about 4% of revenues on average in 2016-2018, following
exceptionally strong surpluses in 2014-2015.  S&P thinks the
oblast's management will remain committed to fiscal discipline
and that it could use its flexibility within the capital program
to reduce the deficit if budget revenues underperform.

S&P anticipates that, in 2016-2017, the oblast will use the cash
that it accumulated in 2014-2015 to finance deficits.  Tax-
supported debt will therefore remain very low and won't exceed
10% of consolidated operating revenues before 2018.  In the near
term, S&P expects Leningrad Oblast's debt burden will also be
mitigated by its high operating balance -- direct debt is likely
to represent less than three years of operating margin.  In
addition to direct debt, S&P includes the guarantees that the
oblast provided to its government-related entities in S&P's
calculation of tax-supported debt.  The oblast's largest
outstanding guarantee, of Russian ruble (RUB) 1.3 billion
maturing in 2019, was granted to the oblast-owned Hotel Zvezdny
in Sochi.  S&P views the oblast's contingent liabilities as very
low, thanks to the oblast's low involvement in the local economy.

S&P regards Leningrad Oblast's financial management as weak, as
S&P do for most Russian regional governments, mainly because of
unreliable long-term financial planning and weak management of
government-related entities compared with international peers.
At the same time, S&P views debt and liquidity management as
prudent and more sophisticated than that of most Russian peers.

                            LIQUIDITY

S&P has revised its assessment of Leningrad Oblast's liquidity to
strong from adequate, based on a combination of exceptional debt-
service coverage and limited access to external liquidity.  S&P
now forecasts that throughout 2016 the oblast's average free
cash, net of the deficit after capital accounts, will be about
RUB23.5 billion (about $313 million at the time of publication).
This amount is more than five times the oblast's very low debt
service over the next 12 months, which S&P estimates at RUB4
billion (about $53 million at the time of publication).

In the medium term, S&P expects the oblast to spend part of its
current cash reserves to cover deficits.  However, the debt
service coverage ratio will remain very high because debt service
is likely to stay around a modest 3% of operating revenues on
average in 2016-2018.

Similar to Russian peers, S&P views the oblast's access to
external liquidity as limited given the weaknesses of the
domestic capital market and the banking system.

                             OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on Leningrad Oblast reflects that on Russia.
Any negative rating action S&P takes on the sovereign would
likely be followed by a similar action on Leningrad Oblast.

S&P could lower the rating on Leningrad Oblast, even if the
sovereign rating remains the same, if the oblast's budgetary
performance and liquidity weakened as a result of a significant
reduction in tax revenues or loose spending policy at the oblast
level.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable following a similar action
on Russia, if the oblast's intrinsic creditworthiness remains in
line with S&P's base case.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                    Rating        Rating
                                    To            From
Leningrad Oblast
Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency        BB+/Neg./--   BB+/Neg./--
  Russia National Scale             ruAA+/--/--   ruAA+/--/--


PENZA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Penza Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'
with Stable Outlooks, Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B' and
its National Long-term rating at 'AA-(rus)' with a Stable
Outlook.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's expectation that the region will
maintain a sustainably positive current balance and moderate
direct risk, whose growth will be limited by a narrowing fiscal
deficit.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'BB' rating reflects the region's moderate direct risk with
limited exposure to immediate refinancing risk and satisfactory
fiscal performance with a sufficient operating balance to cover
interest payments. The ratings also factor in the modest size of
the region's economy and budget, a weak institutional framework
for local and regional governments (LRGs) in Russia and a
deteriorating macroeconomic environment.

"Fitch expects the operating balance to be at 7%-8% of operating
revenue in 2016-2018, which is below our previous expectations of
8%-10%, but still in line with the ratings. Current margin will
remain positive at 5%-6%. Penza's operating performance
deteriorated in 2015 with an operating margin of 6%, down from
sound 11.3% one year earlier. This was due to a sharp decline of
23% in corporate income tax (CIT) proceeds, which was not
compensated by increases in current transfers or cuts to
operating expenditure."

"The CIT decline reflected the weakening financial results of
local companies due to a sluggish national economy in 2015 and a
one-off return of CIT overpaid by taxpayers in late-2014. Fitch
does not expect such tax refunds to repeat in 2016. On the
contrary, we project a moderate recovery of CIT proceeds leading
to the region's overall tax revenue growth of 8% in 2016
(2015: -1.4%), close to our projections of an annual inflation of
9.5%.

Fitch assumes the deficit before debt will be moderate over the
medium-term at no more than average 2% of total revenue in
2016-2018 (2015: 3.6%). This will be supported by the region's
intent to limit operating expenditure growth below inflation and
cut capital spending. Fitch expects capital expenditure will
decline to an average 10% of total spending annually in 2016-
2018, from an average of 16% in 2013-2014."

Fitch expects direct risk will remain moderate at below 55% of
current revenue in 2016-2018 (2015: 54%). As of January 1, 2016,
the region's direct risk composed of bank loans and federal
budget loans amounting to RUB21.2 billion, little changed since
the beginning of 2015. Penza's deficit of RUB1.5 billion in 2015
was almost fully covered by outstanding cash, so the region
contracted new debt only for refinancing maturing debt in that
year. Subsidized budget loans constitute around 45% of total
direct risk, and their 0.1% annual interest rates allow the
region to save on interest payments.

Fitch views positively the smooth amortization profile of the
region's direct risk until 2019. This puts Penza in a more
favorable position than national peers in terms of refinancing
pressure. However, as with most Russian regions, the debt
maturity profile of Penza is shorter than international peers'.

As of January 1, 2016, Penza had to repay RUB1.2 billion of bank
loans and RUB2.9 billion of budget loans for this year. The
budget loans should be refinanced by the RUB2.5 billion new
budget loans that Penza is due to receive from the federal
government in 2016 and Fitch expects Penza will roll over the
maturing bank loans.

The region's credit profile remains constrained by the weak
institutional framework for Russian LRGs, which has a shorter
record of stable development than many of its international
peers. The predictability of Russian LRGs' budgetary policy is
hampered by frequent reallocation of revenue and expenditure
responsibilities between tiers of government.

Penza's economy is historically weaker than the average Russian
region with a GRP per capita at 75% of the national median in
2013. This has led to a weaker tax capacity than its regional
peers. Federal transfers constitute a significant proportion of
finances, averaging 40% of operating revenue annually in 2011-
2015, which limits the region's revenue flexibility. Fitch views
the federal government's ability to provide additional support in
the form of transfers to compensate for tax revenue decline as
limited, due to the current negative financial and economic
environment. Fitch expects national GDP to decline 1.5% in 2016
following a 3.7% decline in 2015.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Sharp deterioration of budgetary performance leading to an
operating margin below 5%, coupled with an increase in direct
risk to above 60% of current revenue, could lead to a downgrade.

A sustainable operating balance at 15% of operating revenue and
stabilization of direct risk at around 50% of current revenue
accompanied by a Russian economic recovery could lead to an
upgrade.


RUSSIAN NIZHNIY: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Nizhniy Novgorod Region's
Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR)
at 'BB', Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B' and National
Long-term rating at 'AA-(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long-term
IDRs and National Long-term rating are Negative.

The region's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds have
been affirmed at Long-term local currency 'BB' and National Long-
term 'AA-(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged baseline scenario
regarding Nizhniy Novgorod Region's budgetary performance. The
Negative Outlook reflects growing direct risk accompanied by high
refinancing pressure and deteriorating operating performance.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings reflect the region's satisfactory budgetary
performance with a small positive operating balance, but also its
ongoing budget deficit leading to debt increase. The ratings
further take into account the slowdown of the national economy,
which places a strain on the region's budgetary performance.

Fitch expects Nizhniy Novgorod's operating balance will stabilize
at a low 5%-6% of operating revenue over the medium-term (down
from an average 8.8% in 2011-2015) due to sluggish tax proceeds
amid the national economic slowdown. At the same time the agency
expects a current balance of close to 1% in 2016-2018, weighed
down by growing interest payments, and placing the region's
creditworthiness under pressure.

According to Fitch's baseline scenario, the region's direct risk
will increase towards 70% of current revenue in 2016-2017 and
stabilize at this level due to likely cuts in capex after the
commissioning of major projects for Football World Cup 2018. The
agency estimates that the region's deficit before debt will
narrow to 3%-4% by 2018, from 7.5% in 2015.

In 2015, direct risk grew to RUB73.2 billion (12% increase yoy)
or 63.5% of current revenue as of January 1, 2016. However, the
structure has shifted favorably towards a higher proportion of
medium-term debt instruments, ie average maturity improved to 2.4
years in 2015 from 1.9 years in 2014. The region has also managed
to switch half of its bank debt to two-year loans, easing
refinancing pressure. At end-August 2015, after a two-year break,
the region re-entered the domestic bond market with a RUB12
billion 2020 amortizing bond issue.

The region remains exposed to refinancing pressure over the
medium-term as 83% of the region's direct risk will mature in
2016-2018. As of 1 February 2016 the region's refinancing needs
for this year stood at RUB21.9 billion (31% of outstanding debt),
but this is mitigated by RUB26 billion available revolving bank
credit facilities and RUB8.5 billion standby short term credit
facilities from the Russian Treasury.

The region's credit profile remains constrained by a weak
institutional framework for Russian LRGs. The latter has a
shorter record of stable development than many of its
international peers. The predictability of Russian LRGs'
budgetary policy is hampered by frequent reallocation of revenue
and expenditure responsibilities between tiers of government.

Nizhniy Novgorod has a diversified economy with a fairly well-
developed industrialized sector, supporting wealth metrics near
the national median. The region is among the top 15 Russian
regions in gross regional product (GRP) volume and has a
population of 3.3 million people (1.7% of Russia's). GRP fell 3%
2015, which is slightly better than the wider Russian economy (-
3.7%) due to firm performance of the steel sector.

Additionally, the region benefits from increased military
spending as it hosts the sector's production facilities (nuclear
naval reactors for submarines and icebreakers, missile and
artillery systems, etc.). Fitch forecasts national GDP will
contract 1.5% in 2016, and that Nizhniy Novgorod will likely
follow this negative trend.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

An increase in direct risk to above 70% of current revenue
accompanied by ongoing refinancing pressure or an inability to
maintain sustainable positive current balance could lead to a
downgrade.


VNESHPROMBANK: Declared Bankrupt by Moscow Court
------------------------------------------------
RIA Novosti reports that the Moscow Arbitration Court has
declared Vneshprombank bankrupt and launched six-month bankruptcy
proceedings.

According to RIA Novosti, the court sided with the Central Bank
of Russia that revoked the license of Vneshprombank and sought
its bankruptcy.

Earlier this month, the CBR revised up its estimation of the hole
in the balance sheet of Vneshprombank from RUB187.4 billion to
RUB210.12 billion, which is a new record-high amount for banks
that lost their licenses, RIA Novosti relays.

One of the reasons for revoking its license was a considerable
gap between its assets and liabilities, RIA Novosti discloses.

Vneshprombank ranked 40th by assets in the country's banking
sector as of January 1, 2016.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: Seeks Support of Lenders on Debt Restructuring Plan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Katie Linsell, Macarena Munoz and Luca Casiraghi at Bloomberg
News report that Abengoa SA is stepping up efforts to win
creditor support for a debt-restructuring plan two weeks ahead of
a court deadline that could lead to insolvency.

The company still needs the support of lenders with about 35% of
its debt to approve a deal agreed with its main bank creditors
and bondholders last week, Bloomberg relays, citing two people
familiar with the matter, who asked not to be identified because
the negotiations are private.

According to Bloomberg, under Spanish law, creditors holding 75%
of the debt must approve the plan, and Abengoa must present it to
a court by March 28.  Abengoa, which has EUR9.4 billion (US$10
billion) of gross debt, will hold a conference call on Wednesday,
March 16, to inform lenders of the proposal, which would leave
existing shareholders with 5% of the firm, Bloomberg discloses.

Abengoa on March 11 said the company's advisers, Alvarez & Marsal
Inc. and Lazard Ltd., will be on the call, along with KPMG and
Houlihan Lokey Inc. who are advising the creditors, Bloomberg
relates.

The proposal agreed last week would see lenders get a 55% stake
in return for giving the company as much as EUR1.8 billion in
loans, Bloomberg recounts.  Other creditors will get 35% of the
company in a debt-for-equity swap, Bloomberg states.  Abengoa
will also seek investors to provide EUR800 million in new
guarantees in return for a 5% stake, Bloomberg notes.

Abengoa SA is a Spanish renewable-energy company.


                        *       *       *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 21,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'SD'
(selective default) from 'CCC-' its long-term corporate credit
rating on Spanish engineering and construction company Abengoa
S.A.  S&P also lowered the short-term corporate credit rating on
Abengoa to 'SD' from 'C'.  S&P said the downgrade reflects
Abengoa's failure to pay scheduled maturities under its EUR750
million Euro-Commercial Paper Program.


GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA: Moody's Review Ba2 Rating for Downgrade
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the Ba2 long-term issuer and
debt ratings of the Generalitat de Catalunya on review for
downgrade.  The decision to place the ratings on review reflects
the increasing concerns about the Generalitat de Catalunya's
capacity to meet its short-term financial obligations.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR PLACING THE RATINGS UNDER REVIEW

The rating action reflects the increasing uncertainty about
Catalunya's ability to roll-over its short-term debt.  In October
2015, the region requested the central government's authorization
to convert some short-term bank debt into long-term debt.
Approval from the central government is required under the
conditions for the region to access Fondo de Liquidez Autonomico
(FLA) funding.  In the past, authorization has been provided and
regions under the FLA were able to convert short term debt into
long term debt, however, the central government's authorization
for this particular request was never provided.  As such, the
region's liquidity tensions are heightened.

While there is a strong track record of government liquidity
support to the region through the FLA since it was created in
2012, failure to obtain approval for this particular conversion
highlights the uncertainty surrounding the program and risks to
creditors should the central government not provide support in a
timely manner.

At present, Moody's assigns a baseline credit assessment (BCA) to
Catalunya of b3, reflecting the weak standalone credit profile of
the region.  The final rating of Ba2 incorporates four notches of
uplift reflecting the support received to date via the FLA and
Moody's expectation that support would continue to be
forthcoming.  The lack of central government authorization leads
us to question this assumption of timely liquidity support.
During the review, we will focus on the mechanisms in place for
the provision of timely support and examine the circumstances
surrounding this particular request to convert the short term
debt.  Moody's will also monitor any future policy developments
introduced by the central government on this topic.

                WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

The rating could be downgraded should Moody's concludes that its
current support assumption is inappropriate given any risks
inherent in the funding mechanism, or doubts about the central
government's willingness to provide support through the FLA.  The
rating could also be downgraded should we conclude that the
liquidity risks associated with the region's short term debt
program are not adequately captured by the assigned b3 BCA.

The ratings could be affirmed if we conclude that Catalunya's
short term debt position and associated refinancing risks are
commensurate with the b3 BCA, and we are convinced that the
failure to gain approval to covert the specific short term debt
noted above into long term does not imply any lessening in the
central government's willingness and ability to provide liquidity
support via the FLA.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Catalunya, Generalitat de

  LT Issuer Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade, currently Ba2
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review for
   Downgrade, currently Ba2
  Senior Unsecured MTN, Placed on Review for Downgrade, currently
   (P)Ba2

Affirmations:

  Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
  Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)NP
  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

The specific economic indicators, as required by EU regulation,
are not available for Catalunya, Generalitat de.  These national
economic indicators are relevant to the sovereign rating, which
was used as an input to this credit rating action.

Sovereign Issuer: Spain, Government of

  GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 33,835 (2014 Actual) (also
   known as Per Capita Income)
  Real GDP growth (% change): 3.2% (2015 Actual) (also known as
   GDP Growth)
  Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 0% (2015 Actual)
  Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -5% (2015 Actual) (also known
   as Fiscal Balance)
  Current Account Balance/GDP: 1.2% (2015 Actual) (also known as
   External Balance)
  External debt/GDP: [not available]
  Level of economic development: High level of economic
   resilience
  Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have
   been recorded since 1983.

On March 10, 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Catalunya, Generalitat de.  The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer has become increasingly
susceptible to event risks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


DENIZBANK AS: Moody's Puts Ba2 Rating on Review for Downgrade
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has announced that it has placed the
Ba2 local and foreign currency long-term deposit ratings and ba2
adjusted baseline credit assessment (BCA) of Denizbank A.S. on
review for downgrade.

At the same time, Moody's has placed the Counterparty Risk (CR)
Assessment of Ba1(cr) on review for downgrade.  The bank's short
term NP deposit and NP(cr) CR Assessment ratings and its
standalone ba3 BCA were not affected from this rating action.

Moody's says that the review for downgrade results from the
review for downgrade on the ratings and standalone BCA of
Sberbank (FC Deposits: Ba2 Rating Under Review/Debt: Ba1, Rating
Under Review; BCA: ba2 Rating Under Review), Denizbank's Russia-
based parent, which owns 99.9% of the Turkish subsidiary.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Denizbank's Ba2 long-term deposit rating and ba2 adjusted BCA
incorporate one notch of uplift from the bank's ba3 standalone
BCA due to Moody's assumption of a high probability of affiliate
support from its parent and majority shareholder Sberbank.

Therefore, the review will focus on the likelihood of support
assumptions and the parent's capacity to provide such support in
case of need, given the review of Sberbank's standalone rating.

Moody's expects that the review will conclude after the
conclusion of the review on parental ratings.

                WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

As noted by the review for downgrade, upside potential for
Denizbank's deposit ratings is currently limited.

Factors that would result in the stabilization of Denizbank's
deposit ratings are: (1) confirmation of the BCA of Sberbank; and
(2) Moody's view of continued high support from the parent
towards its subsidiary.

Downward pressure would be exerted on Denizbank's deposit ratings
in the event of: (1) a downgrade of BCA of Sberbank; and/or (2)
any adverse changes in Moody's affiliate support assumptions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

On Review for Downgrade:

Issuer: Denizbank A.S.

  LT Bank Deposits (Local Currency and Foreign Currency), Placed
   on Review for Downgrade, currently Ba2 Rating Under Review

  Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Placed on Review for
   Downgrade, currently ba2

  Counterparty Risk Assessment, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
   currently Ba1(cr)

Outlook Actions:

  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ANGLO AMERICAN: S&P Reinstates 'BB' Ratings on Sr. Unsec. Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it corrected by
reinstating its 'BB' ratings on these debt instruments issued by
Anglo American PLC:

   -- EUR581.4 million senior unsecured notes due 2016 (original
      amount EUR750 million).

   -- EUR537.8 million senior unsecured notes due 2018 (original
      amount EUR750 million).

   -- EUR481.6 million senior unsecured notes due 2018 (original
      amount EUR750 million).

   -- GBP266.7 million senior unsecured notes due 2018 (original
      amount GBP400 million).

The recovery rating on these notes is unchanged at '3', with
recovery prospects in the lower half of the 50%-70% range.

S&P had withdrawn the issue ratings in error on March 7, 2016.


LION/GLORIA HOLDCO: Moody's Affirms B3 CFR, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
outlook of Lion/Gloria Holdco Limited (known as "ghd") and its
subsidiary ghd Bondco plc.  Concurrently Moody's has affirmed
ghd's B3 corporate family rating (CFR) and B3-PD probability of
default rating (PDR).  Moody's also affirmed the B3 (LGD 4)
rating of the GBP165 million senior secured notes issued by ghd
Bondco plc.

"The change of outlook reflects ghd's weak financial profile and
our expectations that its leverage (as adjusted by Moody's) will
remain well beyond what we previously anticipated over the
foreseeable future" says Guillaume Leglise, Moody's lead analyst
for ghd.  "While we acknowledge that profitability and cash flow
generation have improved over recent quarters, we expect ghd to
remain weakly positioned in its rating category over the next 12
months", says Mr. Leglise.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of ghd's CFR at B3 reflects the positive trading
performance recorded in the last few quarters, notably in terms
of operating performance and sales momentum.  In the last 6
months to 31 December 2015, ghd's profitability improved,
reflecting (1) continued solid top line growth (at constant
currency) on the back of the launch of its new Platinum product
in June 2015 and (2) moderate improvement in the company's gross
profit margin, driven by a positive product mix and rising
digital sales.

Nevertheless, ghd's profitability and free cash flow generation
remain modest and substantially impacted by adverse foreign-
currency movements.  The company was negatively affected in
recent quarters by the strengthening of the British pound against
the euro and the Australian dollar.  The weakening of the pound
against the US dollar also affected ghd, as a large portion of
the company's cost of goods are denominated in US dollar.  At the
same time, profitability was also constrained by brand investment
costs owing to continued investments in the global launch of
Platinum.

Moody's decision to change the outlook to negative from stable
reflects ghd's weak positioning in its rating category.  The
company's leverage stood at around 8.4x, measured as
Moody's-adjusted gross debt/EBITDA, in the last 12 months to
Dec. 31, 2015, well above the rating agency's initial
expectations.  At the completion of the bond issuance in April
2014, ghd's initial leverage stood at around 6.0x.  While the
company's leverage reduced in the last few quarters, mainly
reflecting improvement in profitability, Moody's believes that
ghd presents limited deleveraging prospects and Debt/EBITDA is
likely to remain above the 7.0x trigger for a downgrade over the
next 12 months.

In addition, ghd's modest liquidity position presents limited
headroom to offset any underperformance at peak season: ghd faces
a high degree of cash flow seasonality, with a peak during the
Christmas period and limited free cash flow generation during the
remainder of the year.  Although the recent increase in the
company's super senior revolving credit facility to GBP30 million
from GBP20 million is credit positive, Moody's expects that ghd
will remain structurally reliant on this external source of
funding to cover its basic cash requirements.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS DOWN/UP

Downward pressure could be exerted on the rating if (1) ghd's
operating performance weakens on a last twelve month basis; (2)
the company fails to reduce its gross debt/EBITDA (as adjusted by
Moody's) below 7.0x; or (iii) its interest cover ratio (defined
as Moody's adjusted EBIT/interest expenses) falls below 1.0x.  A
weakening in the company's liquidity profile could also exert
downward pressure on the rating.

Upward pressure on the rating could develop if (1) the company
improves its adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio (as adjusted by Moody's)
below 5.5x on a sustained basis; (2) it continues to grow and
diversify its revenues across geographies, channels and products;
and (3) it increases its free cash flow generation sustainably.

                       PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Consumer
Durables Industry published in September 2014.

Lion/Gloria Holdco Limited, the ultimate parent of the Jemella
Group, operates under the commercial name "ghd" and offers high-
end hair styling tools and salon quality hair dryers complemented
by a range of accessories.  In the 12 months to Dec. 31, 2015,
ghd reported revenues of GBP168 million (GBP161 million in 12
months to 31 December 2014) and EBITDA (as adjusted by the
company) of GBP 29.5 million (GBP26.2 million in the 12 months to
Dec. 31, 2014).


SPS PRINT: Enters Into CVA Deal, 154 Jobs Secured
-------------------------------------------------
Hannah Jordan at PrintWeek reports that SPS Print Group has
entered a company voluntary arrangement (CVA) maintaining 154
jobs after creditors voted in favor of the move.

According to PrintWeek, the proposal to enter a CVA was approved
at a meeting on March 9, with 99% of creditors taking part in the
vote electing to support a CVA, allowing the 39-year-old business
to keep trading and securing around 154 jobs.

A statement issued by the company, as cited by PrintWeek, said it
had enlisted the services of accounting advisory firm Grant
Thornton "following the identification of discrepancies in its
accounting function, which had led to the under-reporting of
losses in the business".

"The board has now appointed a new financial director, a new
financial controller and implemented a range of measures to
reduce costs and return the business to profitability.  Now the
CVA has been approved, the directors are extremely positive about
the future."

A report by Grant Thornton insolvency practitioners Richard
Lewis -- richard.lewis@uk.gt.com -- and Nigel Morrison --
nigel.morrison@uk.gt.com -- reveals a creditors list totaling
GBP7.76 million, including GBP2.92 million to unsecured
creditors, GBP2.65 million to secured creditors, GBP140,425 to
preferential creditors and GBP2.05 million listed under "other
creditors" including GBP831,529 in employee claims and GBP1.22
million to SPS parent company SPS Martin Holding, PrintWeek
relays.  Of the unsecured creditors, HMRC is owed GBP807,000,
PrintWeek notes.

Under the CVA, the company will make 48 monthly contributions --
GBP30,000 per month for eight months followed by 40 monthly
payments of GBP35,000 -- to enable payments to be made to
creditors, PrintWeek states.  Contributions will total GBP1.64
million and will provide a yield to creditors of 53p in the pound
over the duration, compared to an estimated 2p in the pound if
the business were to be liquidated, according to PrintWeek.

SPS Group's accounts show that in the 18 months to October 31,
2015, the business made a net loss of GBP2.38 million on a
turnover of GBP20.98 million, relates.

SPS Print Group is a Dorset-based POS printer.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Fitch Says High-Yield Debt Still Attractive to EU Investors
-------------------------------------------------------------
European investors still see high-yield debt as an attractive
investment despite growing expectations that fundamental credit
conditions in the sector will deteriorate over the next year,
according to Fitch Ratings' latest survey of senior credit
investors.

High-yield debt was the second-most popular investment option in
the survey, which closed 12 February, with 22% of respondents
saying it is where they would choose to make a marginal
investment. However a further 14% said it is the last place they
would choose to put more money, behind only emerging-market
corporates and sovereigns as the least-favored investment
options.

"This split in opinion reflects increasing uncertainty over the
high-yield sector as investors try to balance attractive-looking
valuations with renewed concerns about economic weakness and
expectations of deteriorating credit conditions. Our survey found
30% of respondents see high-yield debt as undervalued, up from
24% in December, but 72% now expect credit conditions in
high-yield to deteriorate over the next year, compared to 55% in
the previous survey."

The perception of better value in the high-yield sector has
coincided with a fall in prices and a widening of European high-
yield credit spreads to their highest level in three-and-a-half
years. Market swings have been exacerbated by limited liquidity
and credit rating downgrades that prevent some funds from
investing in the assets. European high-yield issuance volumes in
the first two months of the year dropped 90% year-on-year to
EUR3.9 billion, their lowest level since 2008.

While they still see opportunities in high-yield, investors have
become increasingly selective, spurning the lower end of the
rating spectrum as they seek to avoid losses. This is highlighted
by a steady rise in the spread between 'CCC' and 'B' category
bonds since the start of 2015. This spread was 875bp at the end
of February, compared to around 400bp in late 2014. The spread
between 'B' and 'BB' category bonds has widened by 7% to 270bp
since the start of the year, but is still below its level at the
start of 2015.

"While concerns over credit conditions have grown, we expect the
European high-yield default rate to remain below 1% in 2016. This
reflects the high proportion of 'BB' category bonds, which make
up two thirds of the market, as well as low debt service burdens
across the broader market, which are supported by the European
Central Bank's quantitative easing program. A gradual shift to
longer tenors over the last few years has extended high-yield
maturity profiles."


* Moody's Concludes Rating Reviews on 5 European OFS Companies
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has concluded rating reviews on five
European oilfield services (OFS) companies.  Moody's confirmed
the B3 corporate family rating (CFR) and B3-PD probability of
default rating (PDR) of Bibby Offshore Holdings Ltd, negative
outlook; downgraded KCA Deutag Alpha Ltd's CFR and PDR by one
notch to Caa1/Caa1-PD from B3/B3-PD with stable outlook, CGG SA's
CFR and PDR by one notch to Caa1/Caa1-PD from B3/B3-PD with
negative outlook, Welltec A/S's CFR and PDR by one notch to
B2/B2-PD from B1/B1-PD with negative outlook, and Petroleum Geo-
Services ASA's CFR and PDR by three notches to Caa1/Caa1-PD from
B1/B1-PD with negative outlook.  These actions conclude the
rating reviews begun on Jan. 22, 2016.

On Jan. 22, 2016, Moody's placed the ratings of 32 integrated
oil, exploration and production (E&P), and oilfield services
companies in the EMEA region on review for downgrade.  This
reflected the substantial drop of oil prices and the continued
oversupply in the global oil markets.  Moody's also lowered its
oil price estimates on Jan. 21, 2016, and assumes Brent oil price
to average $33/boe in 2016 and $38/boe in 2017, with a slow
recovery for oil prices over the next several years.  The drop in
energy prices and corresponding capital markets concerns will
also raise financing costs and increase refinancing risks for OFS
companies.

The drop in oil prices and weak natural gas prices have caused a
fundamental change in the energy industry, and its ability to
generate cash flow has fallen substantially.  Moody's believes
this condition will persist for several years.  As a result,
Moody's is recalibrating the ratings of many energy companies
globally to reflect this industry shift.  However, the impact of
the drop in oil prices and low natural gas prices will vary
substantially from issuer to issuer.  Therefore, Moody's
confirmed the current ratings of some companies, while
downgrading others sometimes by multiple notches.

For the five rated European OFS companies, the reduction in capex
initiated by the Exploration and Production (E&P) companies to
adapt to the low oil price environment put pressure on both
volumes and pricings in 2015, significantly impacting their
operating and financial performance.  For 2016, Moody's expects
the market conditions to remain very challenging and oil prices
to remain low and volatile.  Despite the ongoing cost reduction
and restructuring measures implemented by all OFS companies, we
anticipate revenues and EBITDA for the five companies to keep
falling next year while Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA ratios are
expected to increase given the poor prospects for cash flow
generation.  However, we anticipate that the credit metrics of
the best positioned issuers will start to improve in 2017 as a
result of a combination of recovering oil and gas markets as well
as internal adaptation plans.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Bibby Offshore Holdings Ltd

Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the B3 CFR and B3-PD
probability of default rating (PDR) of Bibby Offshore Holdings
Limited's (Bibby Offshore).  Concurrently, Moody's also confirmed
the B3 rating of Bibby Offshore Services Plc GBP175 million
senior secured notes due 2021.  The outlook on all ratings is
negative.

The B3 CFR reflects the deteriorating credit metrics of the
company due to difficult market conditions resulting in a 30%
sales decline and a lower total fleet utilization rate of 77%
compared to 89% last year as of Sept. 30, 2015.  Over the same
period, EBITDA as reported by the company was down 42% year-on-
year at GBP33 million.  Moody's does not assume a recovery this
year.

Furthermore, Moody's expects leverage to increase over the next
12 months due to lower level of activity and further pricing
pressures.  As of Sept. 30, 2015, Bibby Offshore's Moody's-
adjusted leverage stood at 3.2x including an adjustment for
operating lease and charter costs compared to 2.7x at year-end
2014.  However, Moody's now expects leverage to increase to about
6.0x in 2016.

Moody's expects the company's liquidity to weaken in 2016 due to
the expected negative free cash flow, albeit it should remain
adequate overall.  As at Sept. 30, 2015, the company had cash of
GBP93 million and access to an undrawn super senior RCF of GBP20
million.  Whilst the company still benefits from some headroom
under its springing covenant tested only when the RCF is drawn by
at least 25%, Moody's cautions against a potential tightening of
the headroom below the minimum covenant level which would
restrain the company's ability to draw under its RCF.

Bibby Offshore, headquartered in Aberdeen, UK, is a leading
provider of offshore and subsea project management services in
the UK North Sea.  The company offers an integrated service
portfolio that encompasses engineering, procurement and subsea
construction and intervention services to build, maintain, extend
and decommission subsea oil fields.  Its clients include
independent oil companies, larger oil majors as well as a range
of national oil companies.

                            Welltec A/S

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Welltec A/S 's (Welltec)
CFR and PDR by one notch to B2/B2-PD from B1/B1-PD.
Concurrently, Moody's downgraded the rating on the senior secured
notes due 2019 to B2 from B1.  The outlook on all ratings is
negative.

The downgrade is primarily driven by the concern that persisting
challenging market conditions and high volatility are likely to
continue affecting its financial profile and credit metrics in
2016.  Notwithstanding the efforts of the company to reduce costs
to mitigate a 28.7% drop in revenues to $246 million, 2015
Moodys-adjusted EBITDA fell by nearly 40% to $84 million,
increasing gross adjusted leverage to 4.5x from 2.5x in 2014, and
decreasing Moodys-adjusted EBIT/Interest ratio towards 1.1x from
2.7x.  For 2016, Moody's anticipates a double digit drop in
revenues, which would then translate into a further decline in
EBITDA, in spite of cost saving actions being implemented by
management.  The downgrade reflects Moody's view that the
financial profile and main credit metrics of Welltec are likely
to deteriorate further in 2016, from already weak levels in 2015.
In particular, Moody's expects gross adjusted leverage to rise
towards 5.0x and EBIT/Interest ratio to fall to just below 1.0x.
The negative outlook reflects the high risks to the downside and
lack of sufficient visibility at this stage, also due to the
short term nature of Welltec's backlog of jobs, which remains
exposed to risks of deferral and/or cancellation by customers.

As an important mitigating consideration, liquidity is adequate,
as it is supported by a cash balance of approximately $60 million
at the end of 2015, full availability under the committed undrawn
$40 million revolving credit facility, as well as some modest
positive free cash flow generation.  A much weaker liquidity
position, and/or a further material deterioration in key credit
metrics beyond the levels Moody's is anticipating for 2016, will
exert downward rating pressure.

Headquartered in Allerod, Denmark, Welltec is an oil and gas
services company specializing in well intervention using
proprietary equipment developed, tested and manufactured in-
house. The company's services improve well production performance
and increase the amount of recoverable oil and gas reserves in
reservoirs.  In October, Summit Partners LP sold its 26% Welltec
stake to 7-Industries Holding BV and EXOR S.p.A. (unrated), a
European investment company owned by the Italian Agnelli family.
At year-end 2015, it reported revenues of approximately $246
million.

                      KCA Deutag Alpha Ltd

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded KCA Deutag Alpha Ltd's
CFR to Caa1 from B3 and probability of default rating (PDR) to
Caa1-PD from B3-PD.  Moody's also downgraded the ratings on the
revolving credit facility and term loan at KCA Deutag Alpha Ltd,
the senior secured notes at Globe Luxembourg SCA, and the senior
secured notes at KCA Deutag UK Finance plc to Caa1 from B3.  The
outlook on all ratings is stable.

This action takes into account Moody's updated oil price
assumptions for 2016/2017, high price pressure on services for
offshore platform and land drilling, and reflects the company's
high leverage that Moody's expects to increase in 2016, with
Moody's-adjusted gross leverage reaching 6.3x.  The downgrade to
Caa1 also reflects Moody's view that KCA Deutag's credit metrics
should deteriorate further over the next twelve months due to
continued pricing pressures and lower level of new drilling
activity.

Moody's regards KCA Deutag's liquidity as adequate for its near-
term requirements albeit free cash flow generation will remain
constrained by high maintenance capex requirement and high
interest burden.  The ratings are also based on the assumptions
that the company will be able to alleviate any liquidity pressure
by accessing the remaining shareholder funding, and that the
committed shareholder funding including the $50 million drawn
earlier this year could be used to cure a potential covenant
breach if required.  Finally the additional $80 million facility
in Oman recently closed adds to the liquidity cushion.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's view that the implemented
cost reduction should support profitability and cash flow.

Headquartered in the UK, KCA Deutag is a provider of onshore and
offshore drilling services as well as engineering services to
both IOCs and NOCs in international markets.  Its ultimate owner
is a consortium led by Pamplona Capital Management.  In 2014, KCA
Deutag reported revenues of $2.1 billion.

                              CGG SA

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded CGG SA CFR and
probability of default rating to Caa1 and Caa1-PD respectively
from B3 and B3-PD.  Concurrently, Moody's has also downgraded the
ratings on the senior secured French revolving credit facility
issued by CGG SA to B2 from B1, the senior secured US revolving
credit facility and the senior secured term loan B issued by CGG
Holding (U.S.) Inc to B2 from B1 and (P)B1 respectively as well
as the ratings on the senior notes issued by CGG SA to Caa2 from
Caa1.  The outlook on all ratings is negative.

CGG's Caa1 CFR reflects the company's high Moody's-adjusted
leverage of approximately 6.6x at year-end 2015 as measured by
debt/EBITDA minus multi-client amortization combined with our
expectations that leverage could rise towards 8.2x by the end of
the year.  There is limited visibility on deleveraging prospects
in 2017 due to the continued deterioration of market conditions
in the seismic industry.  CGG's core seismic market will continue
to be challenging in the current low oil price, while visibility
on the company's cash flow remains weak.

Moody's views CGG SA's liquidity as adequate post equity raise
and the recently performed capital structure management (bond
exchange offer and Fugro loan refinancing).  Pro-forma for the
EUR350 million (c. $370 million) equity raise, CGG had liquidity
of $790 million as of year-end 2015 (cash balance and undrawn
revolving credit facilities).  However, approximately $300
million of the new equity is earmarked to fund the expected cash
cost related to the new transformation plan ($200 million in 2016
and $100 in 2017 and thereafter).

CGG ranks among the top three players in the seismic industry.
In 2014, CGG generated USD3 billion in revenues.  It is listed on
both Euronext Paris and the New York Stock Exchange.  The company
is organized around three divisions: Contractual Data
Acquisition, Geology, Geophysics and Reservoir or GGR, and
Equipment.  The Contractual Data Acquisition division comprises
(i) offshore seismic acquisition and (ii) land seismic and multi-
physics.  The GGR division offers a multi-client library, a
processing and imaging business, as well as geology and basins
consulting and reservoir characterization through the Robertson,
Hampson-Russell and Jason brands.  The Equipment division
consists of the manufacture and sale of equipment used for
seismic data acquisition, such as recording and transmission
equipment (via its fully owned subsidiary Sercel).

                    Petroleum Geo-Services ASA

Moody's has downgraded the CFR of Petroleum Geo-Services ASA
(PGS) to Caa1 from B1 and probability of default rating (PDR) to
Caa1-PD from B1-PD.  Concurrently, Moody's has also downgraded
the ratings of the senior notes and the senior secured bank
facilities to Caa1 from B1.  The outlook on all ratings is
negative.

The rating action reflects the company's high Moody's-adjusted
leverage of approximately 6.6x at year-end 2015 as measured by
adjusted debt/EBITDA minus multi-client amortization.  Moody's
expects that market conditions in the seismic industry will
remain challenging throughout 2016 and 2017 with limited
visibility on the timing of a potential market recovery and
deleveraging prospects.

The company had liquidity of approximately $560 million as of 31
December 2015 including cash balance of $82 million and $475
million available under its revolving credit facility maturing in
September 2018.  Moody's assessment of PGS' liquidity profile is
affected by an expected tightening of covenant headroom.  In
October 2015, PGS received consents from its lenders to reset the
total gross leverage financial maintenance covenant under its
revolving credit facility to 4.00x from 2.75x until March 31,
2017.  As of Dec. 31, 2015, the company's leverage as per the
covenant calculation was 2.56x.  The company's ability to access
its revolving credit facility could become constrained as
covenant headroom is likely to tighten given Moody's expectation
of an increase in leverage.  The current rating assumes that PGS
will take relevant steps to mitigate a potential covenant breach
sufficiently in advance.

Petroleum Geo-Services ASA (PGS) is a technologically leading oil
services company specializing in reservoir and geophysical
services, including seismic data acquisition, processing and
interpretation, and field evaluation.  PGS also maintains an
extensive multi-client (MC) seismic data library.  In the 12
months ended Sept. 30, 2015, the company reported revenue of $1.2
billion.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Oilfield Services Industry Rating Methodology published in
December 2014.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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