TCREUR_Public/160322.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, March 22, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 057


                            Headlines


A L B A N I A

KURUM: Tirana Court Begins to Examine Bankruptcy Filing


A R M E N I A

ARMENIA: Moody's Lowers Issuer & Sr. Unsecured Debt Ratings to B1


A U S T R I A

HETA ASSET: Court Cancels FMS Case Verdict, June 9 Hearing Set


A Z E R B A I J A N

SOUTHERN GAS: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba1 Rating to US$1BB Notes


B E L G I U M

NYRSTAR NV: Moody's Lowers CFR to B3, Outlook Stable


B U L G A R I A

CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: KONPI Files BGN2.2BB Claim Against Vassilev


C Y P R U S

CYPRUS: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


H U N G A R Y

HUNGARY: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


I R E L A N D

BOSPHORUS CLO I: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
CORDATUS LOAN I: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. E Notes to Ba2
SHEFFIELD CDO: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CC'
TABERNA EUROPE II: S&P Affirms CC Ratings on 2 Note Classes


I T A L Y

CORDUSIO RMBS 2007: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class E Debt


L U X E M B O U R G

AWAS FINANCE: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to US$234.8MM Loan


N E T H E R L A N D S

FIAT CHRYSLER: S&P Raises LongTerm CCR to 'BB', Outlook Stable
JUBILEE CDO VI: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
STORK TECHNICAL: S&P Affirms B- Rating on EUR272.5MM Sr. Notes


N O R W A Y

NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: GSO, Cyprus to Provide EUR120MM in Funds


P O R T U G A L

PORTUGAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


R O M A N I A

CE HUNEDOARA: At Risk of Bankruptcy, Owes RON1.5 Billion


R U S S I A

KALUGA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Ratings
LIPETSK REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Ratings
RUSSIA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
STARBANK JSC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
TRANSCONTAINER PJSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating

TULA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Ratings


S E R B I A

SERBIA: Moody's Affirms B1 Issuer & Sr. Unsecured Debt Ratings


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: Seeks Seven-Month Standstill to Restructure Debt
CATALONIA: At Risk of Default, Wants Spain to Provide Aid
CATALONIA: S&P Lowers ICR to 'B+', Outlook Negative
CATALONIA: Fitch Says Weak Liquidity Increases Vulnerability
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to Cl. D Notes

SANTANDER CONSUMER: DBRS Finalizes D Notes Rating at 'BB(low)'


S W I T Z E R L A N D

GOLD FIELDS: Moody's Confirms 'Ba1' CFR, Outlook Stable


U K R A I N E

KORSAN LLC: Dnipropetrovsk Economic Court Dissolves Business
KYIV CITY: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
UKRNAFTA: Lacks Funds to Pay Debts, At Risk of Bankruptcy


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AIR NEWCO: Moody's Affirms B3 CFR & Changes Outlook to Stable
NEDBANK LTD: Stake Sale No Impact on Fitch's 'BB+' Debt Rating


                            *********



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A L B A N I A
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KURUM: Tirana Court Begins to Examine Bankruptcy Filing
-------------------------------------------------------
(joy)

bne intellinews reports that a Tirana court has started to
examine the bankruptcy filing for Kurum.

The company unexpectedly filed for bankruptcy in 2015, bne
intellinews recounts.

Kurum faced huge competition mainly from china, which produces
steel at lower costs, bne intellinews relays.

According to bne intellinews, local media reported on March 17
Kurum filed for bankruptcy as it was unable to repay loans from
several banks, and a decision is expected in the next few days.

Kurum is one of the largest steel producers in Southeast Europe.
It is a unit of Turkey's Kurum Holding.



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A R M E N I A
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ARMENIA: Moody's Lowers Issuer & Sr. Unsecured Debt Ratings to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Armenia's long-term
issuer and senior unsecured debt ratings to B1 from Ba3.
Concurrently, Moody's has changed the outlook to stable from
negative.

The key drivers for the downgrade to B1 are:

  1. Armenia's increasing external vulnerabilities stemming from
     (a) declining remittances from Russia that have not yet
     bottomed out, (b) an uncertain outlook for foreign direct
     investment (FDI) inflows that collapsed in 2015 and (c) an
     elevated susceptibility to renewed pressures on the local
     currency and the country's foreign exchange reserves;

  2. Armenia's worsening fiscal and government debt metrics and
     the expectation that Armenia's general-government-debt-to-
     GDP ratio will rise above 50% in 2017 under the baseline
     assumption of a growing economy.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that downside and
upside risks to Armenia's credit profile are broadly balanced at
the new, lower rating level of B1.

In the same action, Moody's has also lowered Armenia's long-term
foreign-currency deposit ceilings to B2 from B1 and the long-term
local-currency bond and deposit ceilings to Ba2 from Ba1.  At the
same time, the long-term and short-term foreign-currency bond
ceiling and the short-term foreign-currency deposit ceilings
remain unchanged at Ba2/NP and NP, respectively.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADING THE RATING TO B1 FROM Ba3
FIRST DRIVER: ARMENIA'S HIGH DEGREE OF EXTERNAL VULNERABILITY

The first driver for downgrading Armenia's issuer and government
bond ratings to B1 (from Ba3) is the country's increasing
external vulnerabilities stemming from (a) declining remittances
from Russia that have not yet bottomed out, (b) an uncertain
outlook for foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows that
collapsed in 2015, as well as (c) an elevated susceptibility to
renewed pressures on the local currency and the country's foreign
exchange reserves.

Russia remains Armenia's largest single export market destination
as well as the major originator of gross money transfers
(remittances) and FDI inflows into the country.  Russia's ongoing
economic crisis has not only weighed on Armenia's export sector,
but also, and more importantly, depressed domestic private
consumption through a drastic decline in remittances from Russia.
Remittances from Russia, which had already contracted by 10% in
US$ terms or 8.6% in local-currency (Armenian Dram; AMD) terms in
2014, declined by a further 35.6% in 2015 US$ terms (or 26% in
AMD terms).  Increased remittances from other countries,
including the US, were not able to compensate for the deep fall
in remittances from Russia.  As a result, total gross remittances
into Armenia decreased by 23.5% in 2015 in US$ terms (or 12.1% in
AMD terms), addition to the contraction of 7.8% (or 6.3%) that
had already occurred in 2014.

Despite recent declines, remittances from Russia still account
for more than 60% of Armenia's total remittances (or 9.5% of
Armenia's GDP).  Given Russia's ongoing economic problems,
Armenia's remittances will likely decline further this year and
continue to depress private consumption.  The collapse in FDI
inflows also means that Armenia's gross capital formation will
remain weak, weighing on the economy in the near term and
constraining Armenia's medium-term growth potential.  While
Armenia's gross capital formation continued to contract for the
third consecutive year in 2015 (latest number is as of Q3 2015: -
13.2% Y-o-Y), annualized FDI inflows (as measured by the 4
quarter moving sum) decreased by almost 80% Y-o-Y in US$ terms in
the third quarter of last year.

Meanwhile, Armenia's gross external debt level has remained high
both relative to Armenia's GDP as well as current account
receipts, leaving the country vulnerable to a further worsening
of external conditions.  While Armenia's gross-external-debt-to-
GDP ratio increased to more than 80% in 2015 (according to latest
available data for Q3 2015) from 73.3% in 2014, the country's
ratio of gross external debt to current account receipts rose
further to an estimated 168% from roughly 153% in 2014.  Although
Armenia's external vulnerability indicator (EVI, the ratio of
short-term external debt in the previous year plus currently
maturing long-term external debt in the current year and total
non-resident deposits over one year in the current year to
official foreign exchange reserves of the previous year) declined
to an estimated 153% for this year -- mainly due to an increase
in foreign exchange reserves in 2015 -- from more than 190% in
2014, it remains very high both in absolute terms as well as
relative to the median EVI ratios of around 40% and 65% for Ba3
and B1 rated sovereigns, respectively.

SECOND DRIVER: ARMENIA'S WORSENING FISCAL AND GOVERNMENT DEBT
METRICS

The second driver captures Armenia's worsening fiscal and
government debt metrics in the recent past and the likely upward
debt trend trajectory over the coming two years.  Armenia's
fiscal and government debt metrics are today much weaker than
prior to economic crisis in 2009 when the country's construction
boom came to an end with real GDP contracting by roughly 14% and
the fiscal deficit widening to 7.5% of GDP.  Only in 2009,
Armenia's government-debt-to-GDP ratio spiked to 40.4% from just
16.4% (+24 percentage points of GDP).

After remaining broadly stable between 2010 and 2014, Armenia's
government debt resumed its upward trajectory in 2015, primarily
as a result of fiscal easing to support the domestic economy amid
severe external headwinds and also because of the debt-raising
effects stemming from the currency depreciation on the
government's large share of foreign-currency debt.  Specifically,
the government-debt-to-GDP ratio increased to 48.7% in 2015 from
43.5% in 2014.  At the same time, the government-debt-to-revenue
ratio rose to around 208% (from roughly 180%).  Debt
affordability as captured by the ratio of interest payments to
government revenues also deteriorated, increasing to 6.5% in
2015, up from 5.2% in 2014.  Going forward, Moody's forecasts the
ratio of interest payments to government revenues to increase
further to around 8.5% in 2016, more than double the level of
2013 (4.2%).

The government will face significant headwinds this year and
beyond in its efforts to gradually narrow the fiscal deficit as a
result of weakening economic conditions.  After benefiting from
one-time boosting effects in the agriculture and mining sectors,
Moody's expect real GDP growth to decelerate to 2.2% in 2016
(from an estimated 3.0% in 2015) given the ongoing adverse
external environment.  Beyond this year, economic growth is
unlikely to pick up rapidly given the latent and weak recovery
expected in its main trading partner, Russia.  As a result, the
rating agency expects the upward debt trajectory to continue,
with the debt-to-GDP to rise above 50% in 2017.  Petrotrin
baseline scenario does not foresee a reversal of this unfavorable
trend in the coming years.  Therefore, the strength of the
government's balance sheet will remain much weaker than in the
past, leaving the country more vulnerable to the adverse impact
of potential renewed economic shocks in the future.

                 RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that downside and
upside risks to Armenia's credit profile are broadly balanced at
the new, lower rating level of B1.

Downside risks mainly relate to worsening economic situation in
Russia, which would adversely hit Armenia's economy more sharply
than expected, mainly through the remittances, trade and
investment channels, and which could prompt significant downward
pressures on the local currency and the country's foreign
exchange reserves.  Moreover, further major downside risks stem
from lower prices for Armenia's major commodity export items
(such as copper or metals), which would further affect the
country's terms of trade.  Under this adverse macro-economic
scenario, the budgetary and debt trajectory would likely worsen
significantly and further erode the country's fiscal strength.

Major upside risks stem from a faster-than-expected improvement
in the external environment and the related positive spill-over
to the Armenian economy as well as rising prices for Armenia's
major commodity export items (such as copper or metals), which
would lead to an improvement in the country's terms of trade and
would make foreign direct investment into Armenia's commodity
sector more attractive.  Stronger- than-expected growth could
pave the way for more favorable budgetary outcomes and general
government debt trends.

                     WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP

Upward pressures could be exerted on Armenia's issuer and
government bond ratings following a reduction in Armenia's high
degree of external vulnerability and/or the prospects that
Armenia's government-debt-to-GDP ratio will show a firm downward
trajectory over the medium term.  A reduction in Armenia's
external vulnerability could be triggered, for instance, by a
faster-than-expected economic stabilization of Russia, Armenia's
largest single export market destination and key source of
remittances and foreign direct investment, and the related
positive spill-overs to the Armenian economy.  Also, a decrease
in geopolitical risks could lead to upward pressures on Armenia's
sovereign bond rating.  Furthermore, significant improvements in
the country's institutional framework and business environment,
sustained economic diversification and a rise in Armenia's
medium-term growth potential could create upward pressure on the
sovereign rating.

                  WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING DOWN

Downward pressures could develop on Armenia's issuer and
government bond ratings following a worsening economic situation
in the Russian economy, which would adversely hit Armenia's
economy more sharply than expected, mainly through the
remittances, trade and investment channels, and which could
prompt significant downward pressures on the local currency and
the country's foreign exchange reserves.  Moreover, the rating
could come under downward pressures if Armenia's government debt
metrics deteriorated faster and more pronounced than expected
over the near term and diminishing prospects for an ultimate
stabilization and/or reversal of the country's high government
debt burden over the medium term.  Also, an increase in
geopolitical risks, for instance, related to the unresolved
conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan over the disputed territory
of Nagorno-Karabakh could lead to downward pressures on Armenia's
sovereign bond rating.

  GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 8,164 (2014 Actual) (also
   known as Per Capita Income)
  Real GDP growth (% change): 3.4% (2014 Actual) (also known as
   GDP Growth)
  Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): -0.1% (2015 Actual)
  Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -1.9% (2014 Actual) (also
   known as Fiscal Balance)
  Current Account Balance/GDP: -7.3% (2014 Actual) (also known as
   External Balance)
  External debt/GDP: 73.3 % (2014 Actual)
  Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience
  Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have
   been recorded since 1983.

On March 15, 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Armenia, Government of.  The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have materially decreased.  The
issuer's institutional strength/ framework, have not materially
changed.  The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including
its debt profile, has materially decreased.  The issuer has
become increasingly susceptible to event risks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Bond Ratings published in December 2015.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.



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A U S T R I A
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HETA ASSET: Court Cancels FMS Case Verdict, June 9 Hearing Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
Carolynn Look and Karin Matussek at Bloomberg News report that
bad bank Heta Asset Resolution AG won a reprieve as a Frankfurt
court canceled the planned verdict in a case seeking bond
repayment after Austria's financial watchdog stalled the case.

Presiding Judge Stefanie Klinger, who was due to announce her
ruling on March 18 in a suit brought by German bad bank FMS
Wertmanagement AoeR, instead scheduled a new hearing for June 9,
Bloomberg relates.  According to Bloomberg, the court said in a
statement Austria's FMA watchdog, which oversees Heta's wind-
down, requested to stay the case in line with European Union bank
resolution rules.

Judge Klinger said in a February court hearing that in her view
the rules may not apply to Heta bonds issued in Germany because
the bank was set up to wind down the assets of failed bank Hypo
Alpe-Adria-Bank International AG, and had already relinquished
its bank license, Bloomberg recounts.

FMA spokesman Klaus Grubelnik said if the FMA's request to
interrupt the case is rejected based on that same argument, the
Austrian authority asked the court to expedite the dispute
directly to the EU Court of Justice, Bloomberg relays.

Heta Chief Executive Officer Sebastian Schoenaich-Carolath told
Handelsblatt in an interview published on March 18 a ruling in
favor of creditor FMS, which demands repayment of EUR200 million,
could have triggered Heta's immediate insolvency and would be bad
for all other creditors, Bloomberg notes.

The FMA's third request to the court was not to allow FMS to
execute its claim immediately, the normal procedure in German
insolvency cases, Bloomberg states.

Heta Asset Resolution AG is a wind-down company owned by the
Republic of Austria.  Its statutory task is to dispose of the
non-performing portion of Hypo Alpe Adria, nationalized in 2009,
as effectively as possible while preserving value.



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A Z E R B A I J A N
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SOUTHERN GAS: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba1 Rating to US$1BB Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba1
rating to Southern Gas Corridor Closed Joint Stock Company's
(SGC) upcoming US$1.0 billion 6.875 per cent (semi-annual)
Guaranteed Notes due March 24, 2026, and guaranteed by the
Republic of Azerbaijan (Ba1, Review for Downgrade).  At the same
time, the provisional rating is placed under review for
downgrade, in line with the review for downgrade of the
government's rating.

The review on SGC's rating will conclude at the same time as the
review on the government's ratings.

RATIONALE FOR THE (P)Ba1 RATING OF SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR'S STATE
GUARANTEED NOTES

The (P)Ba1 debt rating of SGC matches the long-term issuer rating
of the Republic of Azerbaijan, reflecting the very strong support
provided by the Republic of Azerbaijan through (a) the existence
of a formal state guarantee that satisfactorily meets our core
principles of guarantees for credit substitution which we have
identified in our special comment "Moody's Identifies Core
Principles of Guarantees for Credit Substitution" (Nov. 11,
2010,) as well as (b) Moody's view that it is sensible to expect
Azerbaijan's government to be equally committed to honoring debt
that is formally in its name or in SGC's name given that SGC is
merely a public policy vehicle.

SGC is an Azerbaijani-domiciled registered legal entity under the
laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan.  It is owned at 51% by the
Republic of Azerbaijan, represented by the Ministry of Economy,
and at 49% by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic
(SOCAR; Ba1, Review for Downgrade).

The Southern Gas Corridor project aims to bring Caspian gas from
Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe.  It is one of the largest gas
development projects in the world and comprises (a) the Shah
Deniz gas-condensate field (Shah Deniz Stage 1/SD1 and Shah Deniz
Stage 2/SD2), (b) the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) and its
Expansion (SCPX) through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey, (c)
the construction of the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) through
Turkey to Greece and (d) the construction of the Trans Adriatic
Pipeline (TAP) through Greece, Albania and the Adriatic Sea to
Southern Italy.

Gas deliveries to Turkey are expected to take place in late 2018,
and to Europe by 2020, upon construction of the needed
transportation infrastructure of TANAP and TAP that is set to
complement the existing SCP, also to be expanded.  Once
completed, the SGC project is projected to add an additional 16
billion cubic meters per annum (bcma) of Azerbaijani gas
production to the approximately 9 bcma currently produced by SD1.

               RATIONALE FOR THE REVIEW FOR DOWNGRADE

Given that the rating assigned to SGC's notes is based solely on
the government guarantee, any positive or negative rating action
on the Republic of Azerbaijan, the guarantor, will be matched by
a similar rating action on SGC's state-guaranteed debt.
Therefore, given that the government of Azerbaijan rating of Ba1
is now under review for downgrade, the provisional rating of SGC
is also under review for downgrade.  The review on the debt
instrument will conclude with the conclusion of the sovereign
review.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Bond Ratings published in December 2015.



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B E L G I U M
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NYRSTAR NV: Moody's Lowers CFR to B3, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has concluded its rating review on
Nyrstar NV initiated on Jan. 22, 2016, when the rating agency
placed Nyrstar, and 54 other mining companies globally, under
review for downgrade.  The initiation of the review reflected
Moody's view of deteriorating credit conditions and weakening
demand for base metals, precious metals, iron ore and
metallurgical coal, driving prices to multi-year lows in the
metals & mining industry.

Moody's has downgraded Nyrstar's corporate family rating (CFR) to
Caa1 from (P)B3 and assigned to Nyrstar a Caa1-PD probability of
default rating (PDR).  Concurrently, the rating agency has
downgraded to Caa1 from (P)B3 the rating of the existing EUR350
million senior unsecured guaranteed notes due 2019 which were
issued in September 2014 by Nyrstar Netherlands (Holdings) B.V.,
a subsidiary of Nyrstar.  All ratings have a stable outlook.

The assigned ratings are one notch lower than the provisional (P)
B3 CFR and the provisional (P) B3 rating of the 2019 notes which
were placed under review for downgrade.  The provisional ratings
first assigned in September 2014 were conditional on the
completion of fundraising to cover the AUD 563 million
(approximately EUR368 million) Port Pirie smelter redevelopment
in Australia (the 'Port Pirie project').  In November 2015 the
last funding milestone of the Port Pirie project was completed.
This consisted in the signing of the final agreement with bank
lenders and EFIC, the export agency of the Government of
Australia (Aaa stable), allowing Nyrstar's project vehicle (Port
Pirie Pty Ltd) to start issuing up to AUD292 million worth of
perpetual notes to complete the Port Pirie project.  Moody's has
been informed that the first issuance of perpetual notes occurred
in November 2015, and has verified that the key terms of these
notes are in line with the terms initially considered when the
agency first assigned provisional ratings to Nyrstar.  The
definitive ratings are one notch lower than the provisional ones
as a result of further negative credit factors which Moody's has
identified during its review of Nyrstar's ratings, which are
deteriorating credit metrics, weak liquidity and ongoing cash
burn from the mining business.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The Caa1 CFR reflects the weak liquidity position of Nyrstar over
the next 12 to 18 months.  The rating also reflects a highly
leveraged capital structure, with an adjusted gross leverage of
4.8x at the end of 2015 and Moody's expectation of credit metrics
weakening further in 2016, under the rating agency's more
conservative commodity price assumptions, including for zinc
($1,653/tonne for both 2016 and 2017).  Under such assumptions,
the overall financial profile of the company remains exposed to
persisting underperformance of the mining division (negative
EBITDA of c. EUR25 million estimated for 2016) and heavily
reliant upon the continuing positive performance of the metal
processing core business.  This business reported a record EBITDA
of EUR 336 million in 2015, +40% yoy.  Moody's however
anticipates that such business, albeit remaining profitable, will
generate much lower EBITDA than in 2015.  This is because
treatment charges are expected to be at least 10% lower in 2016
vs 2015, which would then reduce EBITDA by c. EUR30 million
compared to 2015, all else being equal.  Additional negative
pressure on 2016 EBITDA of the metal processing business, for a
EUR15 to EUR20 million further decline versus 2015, is associated
to much lower volumes of minor metals (namely indium and
germanium) anticipated to be processed by Nyrstar during 2016.

The rating also factors in the execution risk related to the
timely disposal of the mining business, which Moody's does not
consider as an easy process to pursue under the currently
challenging environment for mining assets.  Furthermore, the
rating factors in some residual execution risk on the large Port
Pirie project, although Moody's expects that such risk is
gradually reduced as the project is progressing towards
completion by June 2016 and then ramp-up phase.  Pending such
project ramp-up between H2 2016 and H1 2017, Nyrstar's free cash
flows will remain negative.

Given the additional borrowing required to fund the liquidity gap
associated with projected negative free cash flows (estimated in
a EUR -250 to -300 million range for 2016, including the residual
capex for Port Pirie), including AUD292 million (equivalent to c.
EUR198 million) worth of subordinated perpetual notes to fund the
Port Pirie project, Moody's anticipates that adjusted gross
debt/EBITDA will exceed 5x in 2016.  Adjusted (CFO-dividend)/debt
ratio will remain very low, between 2% to 5% during the same
horizon.

Nyrstar however should start to gradually recover its financial
position when Port Pirie ramps up production and starts
contributing to cash flows, most notably from H2 2017 onwards.
Before then, the liquidity profile of the company will remain
weak.  This is in spite of net proceeds of nearly EUR264 million
Nyrstar received from the rights issue completed last February,
and US$150 million of proceeds from a metal prepay deal received
last December.  Such proceeds, albeit proactively addressing the
short term refinancing risk associated with the EUR415 million of
retail bonds maturing in May 2016, are not sufficient to restore
an adequate liquidity position.

Moody's believes that as long as the scheduled capital
expenditures remain high and the mining business continues to
burn cash, pending management efforts to dispose it, liquidity
will remain under pressure.  Moody's liquidity assessment does
not factor in the benefit of possible proceeds from the currently
attempted disposal of all mines.  However, it factors in an
expectation that the company is able to (i) fully fund its
strategic Port Pirie redevelopment project with the proceeds from
the issuance of perpetual subordinated notes entirely guaranteed
by EFIC, (ii) start generating positive earnings and cash flow
from the redeveloped Port Pirie smelter, once it is fully ramped-
up to nameplate capacity by mid-2017, and (iii) reduce the cash
burn of the mining division already during 2016, towards EUR60
million to EUR80 million per annum, after such business burned
cash for EUR120 million in 2015.

                    STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Caa1 rating of the EUR350 million senior unsecured guaranteed
notes due 2019 reflects the relative positioning of this
instrument behind the undrawn senior secured EUR400 million
revolving borrowing base facility and ahead of other senior
unsecured obligations of the group, which were raised at the
level of various holding companies and are not benefitting from
the guarantees of the operating subsidiaries, unlike the rated
notes which continue to benefit from the senior unsecured
guarantees by the main operating subsidiaries.

                             OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's view that Nyrstar will
continue to proactively manage its liquidity requirements, and
its reference shareholder, Trafigura (unrated), as well as its
main relationship lenders, will continue to be supportive if
needed. The outlook anticipates limited residual execution risk
to complete and ramp-up the Port Pirie project in line with
management targeted budget and timetable.  The outlook also
assumes that the fundamentals for the zinc market are stabilizing
and further downside risk is unlikely.

What could change the rating UP

Positive rating pressure would build if the company manages to
sell its entire mining business and can improve its liquidity
buffer with the proceeds from such disposal.  A sustained
recovery of zinc prices leading to revise our price assumptions
upwards, and completion of the Port Pirie project in line or
ahead of budget, would also contribute towards a possible rating
upgrade, as both developments would have a positive impact on
credit metrics.  A rating upgrade however would require liquidity
to improve to an adequate level.

What could change the rating DOWN

A downgrade would be considered if the company does not address
its liquidity needs.  Weaker credit metrics than currently
anticipated under Moody's commodity price assumptions, and
materially reduced headroom under the financial maintenance
covenants will also exert negative rating pressure.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.

Nyrstar NV is a medium-sized integrated smelting and mining
company, operating nine mines and six smelters and a fumer.
Nyrstar is listed on Euronext Brussels exchange and reported 2015
revenues of EUR3,139 million.  The single main shareholder of
Nyrstar is Trafigura, with a 24.6% equity stake.



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CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: KONPI Files BGN2.2BB Claim Against Vassilev
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dimitar Koychev at bne Intellinews reports that Bulgaria's
commission for withdrawal of criminal assets (KONPI) has filed a
BGN2.2 billion (EUR1.1 billion) claim against controversial local
tycoon Tsvetan Vassilev with the Sofia city court.

Mr. Vassilev is the majority shareholder of bankrupt Corporate
Commercial Bank (Corpbank), through which billions of taxpayers'
levs are suspected to have been siphoned off, bne Intellinews
discloses.

Local media reported that the claim was filed against Mr.
Vassilev and 26 natural and legal persons linked with him, bne
Intellinews relays.  KONPI, bne Intellinews says, has also levied
distraint on BGN1.4 billion worth of Mr. Vassilev's assets.

KONPI's claim has already been allocated to a Sofia city court
judge, who should examine it by May 20, bne Intellinews notes.

Corporate Commercial Bank AD is the fourth largest bank in
Bulgaria in terms of assets, third in terms of net profit, and
first in terms of deposit growth.

Bulgaria's central bank placed Corpbank under its administration
and suspended shareholders' rights in June 2014 after a run
drained the bank of cash to meet client demands.



===========
C Y P R U S
===========


CYPRUS: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its long- and short-
term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Republic of Cyprus at 'BB-/B'.  The outlook is positive.

                            RATIONALE

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that, following the
conclusion of European Stability Mechanism/International Monetary
Fund-financed economic adjustment program in March 2016, S&P
expects the Cypriot economy will continue to grow at more than 2%
in real terms over 2016-2019, despite high levels of
nonperforming loans (NPLs) remaining a key concern for financial
stability and economic performance.

S&P estimates that after a deep three-year recession, the Cypriot
economy grew by about 1.6% in real terms in 2015.  Cyprus'
recovery reflects resilient business services, tourism, and
gradually recovering private consumption, supported by the euro
depreciation and a decline in oil prices.  At the same time, the
financial services and construction sectors have continued to act
as a drag on economic growth, with the latter posting its first
year of positive growth after seven consecutive years of decline.
While S&P believes that the investment outlook is still
challenged, mainly due to ongoing restructuring in the financial
sector, current investment projects -- which include a casino,
oil reserve storage, solar thermal plants, and other investments
in the tourism sector -- will positively contribute to domestic
demand over the next several years.  S&P also expects the
unemployment rate, at 15.5% at end-2015, to decline further to
below 13% by 2018, which will support consumption.  S&P also
considers the possibility of a reunification of the island, which
would represent an important positive contribution to the
country's growth rate, even if it presented initial fiscal and
external challenges.

The improved economic outlook has supported stronger government
receipts.  These and tight spending controls have contributed to
the success of the government's budgetary consolidation efforts.
As a result, S&P estimates the general government deficit at
about 0.5% of GDP in 2015, excluding EUR175 million used in
December 2015 for the recapitalization of the Cooperative Central
Bank. Last year's budgetary outcome includes several deficit-
increasing one-off items, and as a result of this as well as
solid economic growth more than offsetting the removal of public
wages and pension freezes, S&P expects Cyprus' budgetary position
will improve and post surpluses over the forecast period.

Ahead of parliamentary elections in May 2016, S&P do not expect
the government will continue with discretionary deficit-reducing
measures.  Instead, S&P anticipates the government's budgetary
position will benefit from a gradual reduction in unemployment
benefits and an increase in cyclical revenue items against the
background of continuous economic recovery.  Nevertheless, S&P
expects the government will proceed with the introduction of the
public administration reform related primarily to the wage bill
as well as the reform of property tax.

S&P forecasts that net general government debt will decline below
80% of GDP by 2019 (including an asset swap with the Central Bank
of Cyprus, which was delayed to 2016.  S&P projects that general
government interest payments will average about 6.3% of general
government revenues during 2016-2019.  Approximately 40% of
Cypriot general government debt or EUR7.25 billion represents
official lending from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under the EUR10 billion
economic adjustment program negotiated in May 2013.  This debt
(excluding the EUR950 million loan from the IMF) does not start
to mature until December 2025 (with an average maturity of 15
years); the interest rate Cyprus pays on the ESM obligations is
well below the expected cost of market financing, particularly in
the absence of eligibility of Cypriot bonds for quantitative
easing, should that be confirmed.  Following the conclusion of
the IMF/ESM-financed program earlier this month, S&P believes
that potential loss of eligibility for the European Central
Bank's public sector purchase program will not impair the
sovereign's access to funding in the financial market.  Eventual
further easing of borrowing terms by the official lenders would
support a decline in net government debt to GDP beyond what S&P
currently projects on the assumption that Cyprus' primary general
government budgetary position, which reached 2.8% of GDP last
year or one of the highest levels in the eurozone, stabilizes at
about 3% of GDP.

The execution of the privatization plan, which the Cypriot
government committed to in the context of the ESM/IMF financially
supported economic adjustment program, would in S&P's view
generate sale proceeds that could lead to a further decline in
government debt, unaccounted for in our government debt
projection.  However, S&P believes that the sale of Cyprus
Telecom (the privatization of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus
was cancelled) is unlikely to be completed before the May 2016
elections.

At the same time, S&P believes that strengthening private
consumption will limit the extent of improvement in the current
account balance.  While the majority of Cyprus' current account
deficit for the past several years represents the accounting
treatment of net income payments made on the large stock of
inbound equity and foreign direct investment in the economy, S&P
don't believe this represents a large domestic savings gap.
While Cyprus' tourism sector posted solid performance in 2015
(tourist revenues increased by 4.4% year on year), it
nevertheless felt pressure from the EU sanctions against Russia,
the Russian recession, and the devaluation of the ruble.  S&P
believes that the economy's external vulnerabilities persist,
given its large, albeit reduced, stock of external debt, as well
as its high net international liability position.  S&P expects
the economy's narrow net external debt is expected at about 450%
of current account receipts on average during 2016-2019,
including a large portion of Eurosystem financing of the Bank of
Cyprus, the largest domestic commercial bank (S&P has revised the
underlying data in line with the sixth edition of the IMF's
Payments and International Investment Position Manual).  On the
positive side, S&P expects foreign direct investments will be
supported by foreign interest in the tourism sector and energy-
related infrastructure, especially related to the hydrocarbon
sector.

Financial stability remains a key risk, in S&P's opinion.
Deterioration in the banking sector's asset quality may have
peaked in 2015, with NPLs estimated at 57.6% of total loans in
December 2015 compared to the highest level of 58.1% in October
2015, and S&P believes the prospects for a turnaround during 2016
have improved. Banks' reserve coverage is low, at about 38% in
2015 (including provisions made by cooperatives) but up from 33%
in 2014, with the remaining balance covered by tangible
collateral.  Although S&P expects the enforcement of the new
legislation regarding foreclosures and insolvency procedures
adopted will improve the situation, together with a significant
increase in banks' capacity to manage nonperforming assets, S&P
thinks the progress is likely to be slow.  The Central Bank of
Cyprus introduced incentives for all the banks to reduce their
NPLs, and legislation was adopted that allows for the creation of
a secondary market for nonperforming assets.  Given the high
level of the NPLs, more resolute measures may be needed to
improve the banking system's asset quality.

                              OUTLOOK

The positive outlook reflects S&P's view that it could raise the
ratings this year should economic recovery exceed its projections
in real and nominal terms.  S&P could also raise the ratings
should Cypriot banks accelerate progress in reducing currently
high levels of NPLs on their balance sheet.  This, in S&P's
opinion, would lead it to assess that Cyprus' credit and monetary
conditions were converging with those of the eurozone.

S&P could lower the ratings if banking sector stability comes
under renewed significant pressure, for example due to
unaddressed deterioration in asset quality or if budgetary
performance falls short of reducing government debt in line with
S&P's current forecast.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the debt burden risk had deteriorated.
All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                        Rating         Rating
                                        To             From
Cyprus (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency            BB-/Pos./B     BB-/Pos./B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   AAA            AAA
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency            BB-            BB-
Short-Term Debt
  Local Currency                        B              B
Commercial Paper
  Local Currency                        B              B



=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


HUNGARY: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Hungary.  S&P also affirmed its 'BB+' long-term issuer credit
rating on the National Bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank; MNB
or central bank).  The outlooks on Hungary and MNB are stable.

                             RATIONALE

S&P's sovereign ratings on Hungary remain constrained by what S&P
considers to be a less predictable policymaking environment,
Hungary's low potential growth, and high general government
indebtedness.  S&P believes adverse supply-side factors, such as
the substantial net emigration of skilled workers and weak
capital accretion, will weigh on underlying growth.  The
increasing opaqueness around key institutions, such as the
central bank, reduces S&P's visibility of future risks both in
and outside the financial sector.

At the same time, S&P sees a more specific impairment of monetary
policy flexibility in that certain central bank policies could,
in S&P's opinion, potentially hinder its willingness and ability
to pursue its inflation-targeting mandate in the future.  In
particular the central bank's assumption of interest rate risk
via its provision of interest rate swaps to the market will
create losses if and when policy rates are raised.  S&P sees this
as being at odds with inflation targeting.  Given gradually
increasing underlying wage pressures, despite admittedly low
present core and headline inflation, S&P projects that
inflationary pressures will recur in Hungary, albeit probably not
until late 2017.

The ratings on Hungary are supported by its lower external
vulnerabilities, including lower foreign currency-denominated
government debt and the reduced ownership of Hungarian sovereign
debt by nonresidents.  The ratings also benefit from S&P's
assessment of Hungary's comparatively advanced economy and
relatively diversified export structures.

The improvement of Hungary's external financial profile since
2009 relative to the rest of the world, has been considerable.
The deleveraging has been prompted by the repayment of banks'
foreign loans, particularly to their parents, and also by the
redemption of official loans contracted in relation to balance-
of-payments assistance.  Moreover, since 2014, as part of the
self-financing program, the government has reduced its issuance
of external debt in favor of domestic issuance, largely to a
captive market, on top of increased issuance of government debt
to the retail market.

In 2015, Hungary ran a current account surplus of 5% of GDP,
higher than any other economy in the Visegrad Group (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia).  This reflects the
strong performance of Hungarian net exports -- the most important
driver of Hungary's economic recovery since the global financial
crisis in 2009 -- particularly auto exports.

Central bank programs, such as the Funding for Growth Scheme and
the more recent Market-Based Lending Scheme, aim to normalize
bank lending, particularly to small and midsized enterprises.
The conversion of households' foreign currency-denominated loans
into forint loans in 2015 has rendered the sector less vulnerable
to currency fluctuations and will gradually free up households'
precautionary savings.  Lower oil prices have also boosted
disposable incomes.  Although the end of the EU budget cycle is
likely to lead to a deceleration in headline real GDP growth in
2016, S&P anticipates that a continuation of fiscal and monetary
stimuli will support domestic demand.  As a result, S&P forecasts
the Hungarian economy will grow by 2.1% on average in real terms
between 2016 and 2019.

As with many regional peers, Hungary's demographics remain weak
and net emigration, including the emigration of highly skilled
workers, has increased materially compared with before the 2008-
2009 global financial crisis.  Since 1992, the population has
declined by 5%.  Labor participation, particularly among women,
is among the lowest in Europe.  S&P thinks these factors
contribute to what it considers to be Hungary's weaker potential
growth than peers such as Poland and Turkey.  Another concern on
the supply side is the ability of the country to attract foreign
investment into productive avenues.  Sectoral taxes and the
unpredictability of policy have exacerbated the already weak
flows arising from the investment climate globally.  Since 2010,
net foreign direct investment inflows into Hungary have averaged
just 1% of GDP annually.

The accumulated losses of the banking sector -- in part a result
of the imposition of several punitive measures -- have also
prevented lending growth to the private sector.  In this regard,
the commitment to phase out the balance sheet levy on banks will
improve the health of the sector, as will its ability to create
credit.  Even then, S&P anticipates that the MNB will pursue
policies to fan credit growth.  S&P believes that some of these
policies -- for instance, the requirement to maintain lower
capital adequacy ratios conditional on lending growth -- could
encourage banks to embark upon riskier practices.

S&P views some other policies adopted by the MNB as transferring
risks to its balance sheet from the private sector.  This is
particularly related to interest rate swap transactions in which
the MNB pays a variable rate to domestic commercial banks, in
return for receiving a fixed rate.  The swaps are created as
incentives under two separate programs with different objectives:
the Self-Financing Program and the Market-Based Lending Scheme.
Under the Self-Financing Program, the central bank offers
interest rate swaps to banks to allow them to manage the interest
rate risk arising from their increased holdings of Hungarian
government bonds.  Banks have had to increase their exposure to
the sovereign (currently just under 20% of total system assets)
after the central bank phased out its two-week bill and brought
forward requirements related to liquidity coverage for commercial
banks. Under the Market-Based Lending Scheme, the central bank
offers incentives to banks to increase their lending by offering
swaps at attractive spreads.

Being on the "pay-variable, receive-fixed" side of the swap
transactions, the MNB stands to lose if interest rates rise.  S&P
believes such losses could potentially create a disincentive for
the central bank to raise rates, thereby failing to curb
inflationary pressures and preventing it from effectively
fulfilling its price-stability mandate.  On the other hand, if
the central bank were to raise rates, any large accumulated
losses could represent a potential claim on state finances
through a need to recapitalize the central bank.

"Our base-case scenario incorporates our view that policy
efforts, whether through the central bank, or through the state
budget, or through quasi-fiscal activities (i.e., through the
balance sheets of other public institutions), will continue to
support Hungary's cyclical recovery over our forecast horizon
through 2019.  For example, we anticipate that budgets will
divert improved tax revenues and interest savings toward spending
or offset higher revenue intake with tax cuts in other areas,
rather than channeling them toward deficit reduction.  We
therefore expect that the general government deficit will not
narrow significantly from the 2% of GDP mark.  Consequently we
expect that gross general government debt will reach 74% of GDP
in 2019," S&P said.

Even if the pace of deficit reduction is faster than S&P
currently anticipates, S&P thinks it unlikely that net general
government debt would be lower than 60% of GDP by 2019.  Downside
risks to S&P's base-case fiscal forecast could arise from further
state acquisitions, an expansion of fiscal programs to support a
slowing economy, electoral considerations, budgetary spending on
large projects such as the PAKS nuclear power project, the
materialization of contingent liabilities -- for instance,
guarantees to the state-owned, rapidly expanding Magyar Eximbank
or Hungarian Development Bank (Magyar Fejelesztesi Bank) -- or,
as already mentioned, the possibility of the recapitalization of
the central bank by government finances.

In S&P's projections, it does not consider any sale of assets
from the state's past acquisitions in the financial sector, such
as Budapest Bank.  Similarly, S&P does not account for the sale
of the assets of MKB Bank following its restructuring.  S&P
understands that any proceeds from the sale of the latter would
in any case not flow through to the budget, even though the state
had paid for its purchase.  Sale proceeds would rather accrue to
the special purpose vehicle owned by the central bank, to which
MKB's assets were transferred.  S&P notes that the Hungarian
parliament recently passed legislation restricting the
transparency of foundations and companies owned by the central
bank.  If implemented, S&P would view this as reducing its
visibility on potential risks, which could be relevant, not least
from the fiscal viewpoint.

S&P currently classifies Hungary's banking sector in group '8'
under S&P's Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA)
methodology ('1' is the lowest risk; '10' the highest).  S&P's
BICRA assessment of Hungary reflects the sector's high exposure
to the commercial real estate and construction sectors, weak
profitability, and high levels of nonperforming loans (NPLs;
loans more than 90 days overdue [11% of total system loans
excluding loans to the financial sector]).  With the objective of
clearing banks' balance sheets of bad loans related to commercial
real estate and project finance, the MNB set up an asset
management company (commonly known as a "bad bank"), MARK Zrt.
MARK was set up with a EUR1 billion (1% of GDP) loan from the
central bank.  As with S&P's treatment of all bad banks, it
includes this loan in its calculation of Hungary's gross and net
general government debt from 2016 onward.

                             OUTLOOK

The stable outlook balances S&P's assessment of Hungary's
declining external vulnerabilities and steady headline fiscal
performance amid the ongoing cyclical recovery against its still-
high general government indebtedness, less-predictable
policymaking, and weak underlying growth potential.

S&P could raise the ratings if it was to see improvements in the
economy's longer-term growth prospects, allowing for more fiscal
space and enabling a faster reduction in general government
indebtedness.  S&P could also raise the ratings if it was to view
policy-making as having become more transparent and predictable,
or if S&P was to assess that the country's institutions were
strengthening, or if S&P had better visibility on longer-term
risks.

Conversely, S&P could lower the ratings if Hungary's public
finances weakened materially, most likely through an increase in
quasi-fiscal activity, or if external vulnerabilities once again
built.  S&P could also lower the ratings if it was to view
increasing disincentives to the central bank to effectively
fulfill its price-stability mandate or if S&P saw the
transparency of key institutions weakening further, especially if
S&P anticipated an eventual fiscal risk associated with such
weakening.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the external assessment had improved.
All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                      Rating       Rating
                                      To           From
Hungary
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency          BB+/Stable/B BB+/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment BBB          BBB
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency          BB+           BB+
Short-Term Debt
  Foreign and Local Currency          B              B

Hungary (National Bank of)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency         BB+/Stable/--  BB+/Stable/--
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign Currency                    BB+            BB+



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


BOSPHORUS CLO I: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Bosphorus CLO I Ltd.'s class C and D notes.  At the same time,
S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, E, and F notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the Feb. 10, 2016 note valuation
report.

S&P subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class
at each rating level.  The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the
maximum level of gross defaults, based on its stress assumptions,
that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay the
noteholders.  In S&P's analysis, it used the portfolio balance
that it considers to be performing (EUR181,441,015), the current
weighted-average spread (4.41%), and the weighted-average
recovery rates calculated in line with its corporate CDO
criteria.  S&P applied various cash flow stresses, using its
standard default patterns, in conjunction with different interest
rate stress scenarios.

Since the transaction's closing date on Feb. 25, 2015, the
aggregate collateral balance has decreased by EUR48.60 million to
EUR181.44 million.  The class A notes have amortized by EUR48.75
million to a note factor (the current notional amount divided by
the notional amount at closing) of 64.0%.  The available credit
enhancement has increased for all of the rated classes of notes
due to the transaction's structural deleveraging.  The upgrades
of the class C and D notes reflect this increased available
credit enhancement.

The weighted-average recovery rates have decreased since closing
at all rating levels, while the weighted-average spread earned on
the underlying portfolio assets (including the benefit of EURIBOR
[Euro Interbank Offered Rate] floors) has increased to 441 basis
points (bps) from 409 bps.  The portfolio's average credit
quality has improved to 'B+' from 'B' at closing, while its
weighted-average life has shortened to 5.22 years from 5.80
years.

The results of S&P's credit and cash flow analysis and the
application of its current counterparty criteria and nonsovereign
ratings criteria indicate that the available credit enhancement
for the class C and D notes is commensurate with higher ratings
than those previously assigned.  S&P has therefore raised its
ratings on the class C and D notes.

The available credit enhancement for the class A, B, E, and F
notes are commensurate with the currently assigned ratings.  S&P
has therefore affirmed its ratings on these classes of notes.

For the junior class F notes, the excess spread benefit has
reduced since closing due to a shorter weighted-average life of
the portfolio and the increased cost of capital (as the less
expensive senior notes amortize).  However, the class F notes
currently benefit from EURIBOR floors on a significant portion of
the portfolio and can therefore withstand higher defaults in low
interest rate scenarios.  Assets with EURIBOR floors are
beneficial for the performance of a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction as they generate increased interest
proceeds when EURIBOR is below the floor.

Bosphorus CLO I is a static cash flow CLO transaction
securitizing a portfolio of senior secured loans and bonds
granted to speculative-grade European corporates.  The
transaction closed in February 2015 and is managed by Commerzbank
AG, London branch.

As this is a static transaction, the portfolio was fully ramped
up at closing, with no reinvestment or discretionary trading
permitted thereafter.  However, the portfolio manager will
identify and may dispose of credit-impaired and defaulted assets
during the transaction's life.

RATINGS LIST

Class     Rating          Rating
          To              From

Bosphorus CLO I Ltd.
EUR233.40 Million Secured Deferrable and Non-Deferrable
Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

C         AA- (sf)        A+ (sf)
D         A- (sf)         BBB+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A         AAA (sf)
B         AA+ (sf)
E         BB (sf)
F         B (sf)


CORDATUS LOAN I: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. E Notes to Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has announced that it has taken these
rating actions on the notes issued by Cordatus Loan Fund I
P.L.C.:

  EUR174.6 mil. (current outstanding balance of EUR79.2 mil.)
   Euro Class A1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 16, 2014, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  GBP22.635 mil. (current outstanding balance of GBP13.1 mil.)
   Sterling Class A2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 16, 2014, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  EUR78.75 mil. (current outstanding balance of 31.6 mil.) Senior
   Secured Floating Rate Variable Funding Notes due 2024,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 16, 2014, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  EUR39.6 mil. Class B Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on April 16, 2014,
   Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  EUR24.3 mil. Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2024, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 16, 2014,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  EUR31.5 mil. Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2024, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 16, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  EUR18 mil. Class E Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2024, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 16, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cordatus Loan Fund I P.L.C., issued in January 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans, managed by CVC
Cordatus Group Limited.  This transaction ended its reinvestment
period in January 2014.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of
deleveraging.  The Class A1, Class A2 and the Variable Floating
Notes (VFN) have paid down by EUR95.4 mil., GBP9.5 mil. and
EUR 35.2 mil. respectively in the last twelve months.  As a
result of the deleveraging, over-collateralization has increased.
As of the trustee's January 2016 report, the Class A, Class B,
Class C, Class D and Class E have an over-collateralization ratio
of 171.1%, 143.7%, 130.8%, 117.2% and 110.7% respectively,
compared with 153.0%, 133.8%, 124.3%, 113.7% and 108.5% in
January 2015. The OC ratios will improve further following the
January 2016 payment date given the principal account balance of
approximately EUR 53.8 million and GBP 14.4M.

Moody's has also withdrawn the rating of the Class W Combination
Notes because it has been split back into its original
components.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR230.8 mil.
and GBP 42.6 mil., a weighted average default probability of
20.3% (consistent with a WARF of 3175, a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 45.56% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 25 and a weighted average spread of
3.86%).  The GBP-denominated liabilities are naturally hedged by
the GBP assets.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery rates
for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF
CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be
considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these default and
recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash
flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
were within 1 notch of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  (1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
      this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
      underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly
      depending on market conditions and have a significant
      impact on the notes' ratings.  Amortization could
      accelerate as a consequence of high loan prepayment levels
      or collateral sales by the collateral manager or be delayed
      by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.
      Fast amortization would usually benefit the ratings of the
      notes beginning  with the notes having the highest
      prepayment priority.

  (2) Around 15.7% of the collateral pool consists of debt
      obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by
      using credit estimates.  As part of its base case, Moody's
      has stressed large concentrations of single obligors
      bearing a credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach
      to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions,"
      published in October 2009 and available at:

    http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461

  (3) Foreign currency exposure: The deal has a significant
      exposures to non-EUR denominated assets.  Volatility in
      foreign exchange rates will have a direct impact on
      interest and principal proceeds available to the
      transaction, which can affect the expected loss of rated
      tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


SHEFFIELD CDO: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CC'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Sheffield CDO Ltd.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised to 'A- (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' its rating on the
      class B notes;

   -- Affirmed its 'CCC- (sf) rating on the class C notes;

   -- Lowered to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on the
      class D notes; and

   -- Withdrawn its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class S notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using data from the trustee report dated Jan. 12,
2016.

S&P subjected the capital structure to its cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each class of
notes at each rating level.  The BDR represents S&P's estimate of
the maximum level of gross defaults, based on its stress
assumptions, that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay
interest and principal to the noteholders.  In S&P's analysis, it
used the reported portfolio balance that it considers to be
performing, the current weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that S&P calculated in accordance
with its criteria.  S&P applied various cash flow stress
scenarios, using different default patterns, in conjunction with
different interest rate stress scenarios for each liability
rating category.

The transaction's post-reinvestment period began in April 2011.
The full amortization of the class S, A-1, and A-2 notes, and the
partial deleveraging of the class B notes, has resulted in higher
available credit enhancement for the class B notes compared with
our previous review on Aug. 22, 2014.

The available credit enhancement for the class C and D notes has
decreased due to a lower aggregate collateral balance and
increased deferred interest for the class C and D notes.  The
deferred interest is capitalized (i.e., added to the notes'
principal amount) and accrues interest.

The overcollateralization tests for the class C and D notes are
failing, as was the case at S&P's previous review.  The interest
coverage test for the class D notes is also failing, while it was
passing at S&P's previous review.

The proportion of assets that S&P considers to be defaulted
(rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD' [selective default], or 'D') has increased
to 33.77% from 14.21% of the portfolio balance since S&P's
previous review.

S&P's cash flow analysis indicates that the available credit
enhancement for the class B notes is commensurate with a higher
rating than previously assigned.  S&P has therefore raised to
'A- (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' its rating on the class B notes.

S&P's cash flow analysis indicates that the available credit
enhancement for the class C notes is commensurate with the
currently assigned rating.  S&P has therefore affirmed its
'CCC- (sf)' rating on these notes.

S&P has withdrawn its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class S notes as
they have fully amortized.

S&P has lowered its rating on the class D notes as they continue
to defer interest and are undercollateralized.  In S&P's view,
there is a significant probability that these notes will not
repay the entire principal amount due at maturity.  S&P has
therefore lowered to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on the
class D notes.

Sheffield CDO is a cash flow mezzanine collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) of structured finance securities, comprising
predominantly U.S. CDOs and, to a lesser extent, U.S. CDOs of
asset-backed securities (ABS), trust-preferred CDOs, and hybrid
CDOs. It is managed by Dynamic Credit Partners LLC and entered
its amortization period in April 2011.

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating            Rating
            To                From

Sheffield CDO Ltd.
EUR25.2 Million And $254.56 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

B           A- (sf)           B+ (sf)

Rating Lowered

D           CC (sf)           CCC- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

C           CCC- (sf)

Rating Withdrawn

S           NR                AAA (sf)

NR--Not rated.


TABERNA EUROPE II: S&P Affirms CC Ratings on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
Taberna Europe CDO II PLC's class A-1, A-2, B, C-1, C-2, D, and E
notes.

The affirmations follow S&P's updated assessment of the
transaction's performance using data from the latest available
payment date report (dated Feb. 2, 2016, including the most
recent note valuation report), S&P's cash flow analysis, and the
application of its relevant criteria for transactions of this
type.

S&P's analysis indicates that the overall credit quality of the
underlying assets has continued to deteriorate since its April
17, 2015 review.

S&P has subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis
based on the methodology and assumptions outlined in S&P's
corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class
of notes.  The BDR represents our estimate of the maximum level
of gross defaults, based on S&P's stress assumptions, that a
tranche can withstand and still fully repay the noteholders.

S&P has also conducted a credit analysis to determine the
scenario default rate (SDR) at each rating level, which S&P then
compared with its respective BDR.  The SDR is the minimum level
of portfolio defaults S&P expects each CDO tranche to be able to
support the specific rating level using Standard & Poor's CDO
Evaluator.  In S&P's analysis, it used the portfolio balance that
it considered to be performing, the weighted-average spread, and
the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P considered to be
appropriate.  S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using various default patterns, levels, and timings for each
liability rating category assumed for each class of notes, in
conjunction with different interest rate stress scenarios.

Since S&P's previous review, the class A-1 notes have amortized
by nearly EUR75 million, the equivalent of just over an 18.5%
reduction in their outstanding principal balance.  At the same
time, according to S&P's analysis, defaulted assets in the
underlying portfolio have increased to EUR134.78 million from
EUR126.20 million.  Overall, this has resulted in a marginal
improvement in the available credit enhancement for the class A-1
notes, and an overall decrease in the available credit
enhancement for all other classes of notes.

As S&P has noted in its previous review, all par coverage tests
continue to fail.

S&P's analysis indicates that the available credit enhancement
for the class A-1 and A-2 notes is commensurate with the
currently assigned ratings.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'BB-
(sf)' and 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes,
respectively.

S&P has also affirmed its ratings on the class B, C-1, C-2, D,
and E notes.  This is because S&P's analysis shows that these
classes of notes are unable to withstand its credit and cash flow
stresses at higher rating levels than those currently assigned.

Taberna Europe CDO II is a CDO transaction backed by a portfolio
comprising mostly subordinated loans and bonds, with some
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) exposure.

RATINGS LIST

Class        Rating

Taberna Europe CDO II PLC
EUR899.1 Million Senior Deferrable Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A-1          BB- (sf)
A-2          CCC- (sf)
B            CCC- (sf)
C-1          CCC- (sf)
C-2          CCC- (sf)
D            CC (sf)
E            CC (sf)



=========
I T A L Y
=========


CORDUSIO RMBS 2007: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four Cordusio RMBS transactions and
Capital Mortgage Series 2007-1.

The transactions were originated and serviced by UniCredit S.p.a.
(BBB+/Stable/F2).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stabilizing Asset Performance

Over the last 12 months, asset performance has improved across
the Cordusio series and in Capital Mortgage as the proportion of
late stage arrears remained broadly stable in Cordusio 1 and 2 at
around 1.5% of the current portfolio balance and at 1.2% in
Capital Mortgage, broadly in line with the Italian arrears index.
Meanwhile, the advanced delinquency pipeline dropped slightly in
the other transactions to 2% (Cordusio 4) and 2.4% (Cordusio 3),
compared with a range between 2.3% (Cordusio 4) and 2.8%
(Cordusio 3).

At the same time, the volume of defaults in the Cordusio series,
defined as loans with 12 unpaid monthly instalments, increased by
a maximum of 50bp in the last 12 months and are currently
reported between 1.4% (Cordusio 1) and 5.2% (Cordusio 3) of the
initial pool. In Capital Mortgage, the volume of gross defaults,
defined as loans with six unpaid instalments, increased by 70bp
to 11% of the initial pool.

Fitch believes that the combination of stable arrears ratios and
fewer new annual defaults underpins the stabilization of the
asset performance. This is mainly due to the high portfolio
seasoning of between 112 (Capital Mortgage) and 155 months
(Cordusio 1), as well as general economic recovery. These
considerations were factored into the revision of the Outlook to
Stable on the mezzanine notes of Cordusio 3 and 4.

Lengthy Recovery Timeframe

Fitch did not receive update loan-by-loan recovery information.
Nevertheless over the last 12 months, recoveries were between
12.1% (Capital Mortgage) and 48% (Cordusio 1) of the gross
cumulative defaults, broadly unchanged compared with a range
between 10% (Capital Mortgage) and 44.5% (Cordusio 1) 12 months
ago. Lengthy recovery timing, limited proportion of closed
positions and reliance on borrowers' repayment plans as recovery
strategy have resulted in Fitch's lower recovery assumptions.
Specifically, despite the relatively low current loan to value
ratio, the agency has capped the recovery rate at 100% of the
defaulted balance in Cordusio 1 and 2 and at 90% in Cordusio 3
and 4 where fewer positions have been closed. For the same reason
in Capital Mortgage the recovery rate on closed and open position
is estimated at about 50% of the defaulted balance.

The agency believes that the income from recovery activity will
remain limited, especially in Capital Mortgage where the
proportion of positions under payment plans or with no legal
procedure started is very high (about 77% as of end-2014).

Adequate Credit Support

Credit enhancement available to the rated notes has continued to
build up due to the smooth amortisation of the underlying pools.
The agency noted that even in Capital Mortgage the combination of
fewer new defaults and sufficient excess spread (about 90bp p.a.)
led to increased credit enhancement over the last payment dates.
In its analysis, Fitch found that the credit enhancement is
sufficient to support the ratings and associated stresses.

Limited Payment Holidays and Maturity Extensions

The underlying portfolios include between 1.3% (Cordusio 3) and
2.8% (Capital Mortgage) of loans currently in payment holidays
and between 1.1% (Capital Mortgage) and 4.7% (Cordusio 2) of
loans with extended tenor. Since payment holidays and maturity
extensions are usually granted to borrowers in financial
distress, Fitch has associated a higher probability of default
with these loans. The adjustment had no effect on the ratings.

Payment Interruption Risk

Fitch found that exposure to payment interruption risk is
adequately mitigated through the available cash and commingling
reserves in Cordusio 1, 2 and 3, even in a rising Euribor
scenario. To date only Cordusio 3's cash reserve has been
partially drawn and currently stands at 64% of the target
balance.

Cordusio 4 and Capital Mortgage retain unmitigated exposure to
payment interruption risk and, as a result, the notes of both
transactions cannot achieve ratings more than three notches
higher than the servicer's rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Changes to Italy's Long-term Issuer Default Rating (BBB+/Stable)
and the rating cap for Italian structured finance transactions,
currently 'AA+sf', could trigger rating changes to the notes
rated 'AA+sf'.

Performance deterioration and/or recovery income below Fitch
expectations would lead to negative rating actions.

Conversely, steady stabilization in asset performance and larger
volume of closed defaulted positions may lead to positive rating
actions.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

The rating actions are as follows:

Cordusio RMBS S.r.l. (Cordusio 1):
Class A2 (ISIN IT0003844948): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN IT0003844955): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN IT0003844963): affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable

Cordusio RMBS 2 S.r.l. (Cordusio 2):
Class A2 (ISIN IT0004087174): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN IT0004087182): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN IT0004087190): affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable

Cordusio RMBS 3 - UBCasa 1 S.r.l. (Cordusio 3)
Class A2 (ISIN IT0004144892): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN IT0004144900): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN IT0004144934): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN IT0004144959): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative

Cordusio RMBS Securitisation S.r.l. - Series 2007 (Cordusio 4):
Class A2 (IT0004231236): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class A3 (IT0004231244): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (IT0004231285): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (IT0004231293): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative
Class D (IT0004231301): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
Class E (IT0004231319): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate
75%

Capital Mortgage Series 2007-1 (Capital Mortgage):
Class A1 (ISIN IT0004222532): affirmed at 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2 (ISIN IT0004222540): affirmed at 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN IT0004222557): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 45%
Class C (ISIN IT0004222565): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


AWAS FINANCE: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to US$234.8MM Loan
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a rating of Ba2 to the
proposed $234.8 million two-year secured term loan extension
maturing 2018 issued by AWAS Finance Luxembourg S.A. and
guaranteed by AWAS Aviation Capital Limited (AWAS).  The outlook
for the rating is stable.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the loan is based on its terms, which include
perfected security interests in commercial aircraft as well as
security assignments of associated leases, and pledges of the
ownership interests of the aircraft owning entities.  The Loan is
guaranteed by AWAS on a senior unsecured basis and is also
guaranteed by the AWAS subsidiaries that own assets pledged in
support of the Loan on a senior secured basis.  The loan is a
two-year extension of an existing secured loan rated Ba2 and
maturing in June 2016.

The Ba2 rating assigned to the Loan is one notch above the Ba3
corporate family rating of AWAS, based upon the facility's terms
that meaningfully lower secured creditors' risk of loss.  Based
on the executed Credit Agreement of the Loan, these include a
maximum loan-to-value (LTV) covenant of 67% (currently 62.9%)
that is to be determined semi-annually, as well as the quality of
the underlying collateral.  Narrow-body aircraft comprise nearly
92% of the loan collateral.  The term loan will be secured by 19
aircraft that are on lease to 12 airlines in seven countries.

The rating of the Loan also reflects the fundamental credit
characteristics of AWAS.  These factors include AWAS' strong
operating cash flow, solid competitive positioning as a mid-tier
commercial aircraft leasing company, and acceptable balance among
its portfolio risk exposures (geographic, aircraft type and
model, and customer).  Credit constraints include the company's
high reliance on secured funding that limits its operational and
financial flexibility, Moody's expectation that the company's
leverage will increase moderately over the intermediate term, and
uncertainty regarding the company's ultimate ownership.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that AWAS will
continue to achieve solid profitability, but that leverage will
moderately increase as a result of distributions to the company's
owners.

AWAS' ratings could be upgraded if the company continues recent
strength in operating results, leverage (D/TNW) declines to 2.5x
or lower, it maintains balanced fleet composition and risk
characteristics, and effectively manages liquidity considering
its financing requirements and growth objectives.  Further
funding diversification that materially reduces the reliance on
secured debt would strengthen AWAS' prospects for a rating
upgrade.

Ratings could be downgraded if profitability materially declines,
leverage (D/TNW) increases to more than 3.5x given current fleet
risk characteristics, or if liquidity weakens.

AWAS Aviation Capital Limited, headquartered in Dublin, Ireland,
is a commercial aircraft leasing company.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Finance
Companies published in October 2015.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


FIAT CHRYSLER: S&P Raises LongTerm CCR to 'BB', Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'BB' from 'BB-' its
long-term corporate credit ratings on automotive manufacturer
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. (FCA) and FCA US LLC (FCA US, a
U.S. subsidiary formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC).  S&P also
affirmed its 'B' short-term corporate credit rating on FCA.  The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P raised its issue ratings on the senior
unsecured debt instruments issued and guaranteed by FCA to 'BB'
from 'BB-', in line with the rating action on the corporate
credit rating.  The '4' recovery rating on these debt instruments
is unchanged, reflecting S&P's expectation of average recovery
for debtholders, at the lower end of the 30%-50% range, in the
event of a payment default.

S&P also raised its issue ratings on the U.S. senior secured term
loans borrowed by FCA US to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'.  The recovery
rating on these instruments is unchanged at '1', reflecting S&P's
expectation of very high (90%-100%) recovery for senior secured
lender in the event of a payment default.

The upgrade reflects S&P's expectation that FCA will maintain
stronger leverage metrics and enhanced liquidity compared with
previously because it has completed the steps needed to remove
contractual restrictions in its financing documentation.  These
restrictions had limited the free flow of capital among FCA
entities, in particular, the payment of dividends to FCA from FCA
US.

As a result, S&P understands that FCA will have full access to
cash flows and the significant retained cash balances of EUR10.4
billion (as at Dec. 31, 2015) in FCA US. FCA US has prepaid $2.0
billion under term loans and FCA has gained access to an
additional EUR2.5 billion tranche of a revolving credit facility
(RCF) that expires in 2020.

In analyzing FCA, S&P now treats the group as a single economic
entity for rating purposes.  The cash flows and retained cash
balances held by FCA US will be included in our leverage and
liquidity analysis.  On a pro forma basis, the ratios of funds
from operations (FFO) to debt and debt to EBITDA were 28% and
2.2x, respectively, for the year ended Dec. 31, 2015.  Before the
change, these ratios were 16% and 3.9x, respectively.

In S&P's view, capital expenditure (capex) will remain
significant, potentially resulting in negative free operating
cash flows (FOCF), which would cause Standard & Poor's-adjusted
debt in 2016 and 2017 to rise.  S&P has factored this potentially
higher level of debt into its base-case scenario.  S&P
anticipates that FCA will maintain FFO to debt of above 25% and
debt to EBITDA of below 3.0x, in line with the expected leverage
metrics at this rating level.

During 2015, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
region -- the U.S., Canada, and Mexico -- accounted for about 60%
of group volumes and revenues and about 85% of reported group
adjusted EBIT.  The group saw strong volume growth in the NAFTA
region and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA), set
against declines in Latin America and Asia-Pacific.

In recent months, automakers that have strong light-truck
portfolios, such as FCA, have been increasing production to keep
up with strong demand as their U.S. customers take advantage of
historically low interest rates and gas prices.  S&P expects that
U.S. auto sales will continue to increase during the remainder of
2016.  That said, the wider economic environment is more
uncertain.  Volume trends in other regions are less clear; S&P
forecasts sales in Western Europe will rise by about 3% in 2016,
and that Latin American markets will remain weak.

In S&P's base-case scenario, it assumes:

   -- Global auto volumes will grow 2%-3% in 2016 and 2017.  This
      is in line with global GDP growth of 3.0%-3.5%, although
      regional differences will continue--GDP growth in the U.S.
      will be stronger at about 2.7% in 2016, but Europe will see
      lower GDP growth of only 1.8%.  Revenue growth of around 3%
      in 2016 and 2017, supported by higher volumes in NAFTA and
      EMEA regions, offsetting continued weak market conditions
      in Latin America and Asia-Pacific.

   -- Reported EBIT margins (before unusual items) of 3.5%-4.0%.
      S&P do not factor in additional costs for restructuring for
      example.

   -- Continued sizable annual capex of EUR8.5 billion-EUR9.5
      billion.

   -- Negative free operating cash flows in 2016 and 2017.  No
      dividends during 2016 and 2017.

   -- No material acquisitions or merger transactions.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
for 2016 and 2017:

   -- FFO-to-debt ratios of 25%-30%.
   -- Adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratios of about 2.5x.

S&P regards FFO to debt of above 25% and adjusted debt to EBITDA
below 3.0x as being in line with the ratings.

S&P's business risk profile assessment is supported by the
group's well-established market positions in passenger cars,
SUVs, and light trucks, good regional diversity, and healthy
market conditions in the U.S.  These strengths are partly offset
by the group's focus on the small-to-midsize car and light truck
segments, as well as very low (albeit improving) profits in
Europe, far weaker profits in Asia-Pacific, and losses in Latin
America.

S&P regards the spin-off of the Ferrari luxury car business --
which was completed in January 2016 -- as having been slightly
negative for FCA's credit quality, as its disposal has slightly
diluted FCA's profitability and business diversity.

S&P's financial risk profile assessment is supported by
significant cash balances of EUR21.1 billion in FCA as at Dec.
31, 2015.  This provides a buffer against a market downturn, and
is a potential source of financing.  This view is partly offset
by S&P's forecast that FOCF could be negative in both 2016 and
2017, because of sizable capex each year, in support of the
company's ambitious expansion plans.  This is a constraining
factor for the ratings.

As at Dec. 31, 2015, FCA's Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt was
EUR24.8 billion.  S&P makes analytical adjustments to reported
gross debt of EUR27.8 billion, mainly by adding EUR6.4 billion
for pensions, EUR1.9 billion for trade receivables sold and
operating leases; and subtracting EUR1.8 billion for captive
finance debt and EUR9.6 billion for surplus cash held in FCA,
excluding FCA US, (after deducting EUR1.0 billion that S&P views
as not being available for immediate debt repayment).  On this
basis, the ratios of FFO to debt and debt to EBITDA were 16% and
3.9x, respectively.

On a pro forma basis, deducting the sizable cash balances in FCA
US of EUR10.4 billion, S&P's adjusted debt figure as at Dec. 31,
2015 reduces significantly to EUR14.4 billion, and the ratios of
FFO to debt and debt to EBITDA strengthen to 28% and 2.2x,
respectively.  S&P has revised upward its assessment of FCA's
financial risk profile to significant from aggressive.

S&P continues to assess FCA US as a core subsidiary of FCA, and
S&P expects that the rating on FCA US will move in tandem with
that on FCA.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that FCA will
maintain leverage metrics of above 25% FFO to debt and below 3.0x
debt to EBITDA during 2016 and 2017.  S&P factors in the
potential for continued high capex to lead to negative FOCF,
which is a constraining factor on the ratings.

S&P could raise the long-term ratings if it felt that FCA could
achieve and sustain stronger leverage, such that the ratio of FFO
to adjusted debt was comfortably in the range of 30%-35%.  This
could occur, for example, if the company further improved profit
margins and reduced debt, despite more difficult macroeconomic
conditions and substantial capex.  Furthermore, FOCF would need
to be positive on a sustainable basis, at a level above 10% of
adjusted debt.

S&P could lower the long-term ratings if FCA's profitability and
cash flows are weaker than S&P expects, and it anticipates that
FFO to adjusted debt will be below 20% on a sustained basis.


JUBILEE CDO VI: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Jubilee CDO VI B.V.'s class A1-b, A2-b, A3, B, C, D, and E notes.
At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the
class A1-a and A2-a notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance and the application of its current counterparty
criteria.

Since S&P's previous review in July 2013, it has observed a
positive rating migration and significant deleveraging in the
portfolio, resulting in an increase in the available credit
enhancement for all classes of notes.

The weighted-average life is now slightly higher (4.3 years) than
at S&P's previous review (4.1 years).  At the same time, the
weighted-average spread has reduced to 3.75% from 4.12%.  The
transaction's exposure to lower-rated sovereigns is now 13.3% of
the performing assets.  In accordance with S&P's nonsovereign
ratings criteria, it can assign a rating to the liabilities of up
to six notches above the sovereign rating, if (among other
things) the exposure to the jurisdiction is no higher than 10% of
the aggregate collateral balance.  As such, as a part of S&P's
analysis it determines the exposure of the transaction to
jurisdictions rated more than six notches below the rated
liability, in order to conclude whether to apply an additional
stress in S&P's cash flow modelling to address sovereign risk.
S&P assessed the excess exposure in Jubilee VI in accordance with
its non-sovereign ratings criteria.

S&P has subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for
each rated class.  The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the
maximum level of gross defaults, based on S&P's stress
assumptions, that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay
the noteholders.  S&P used the portfolio balance that it
considers to be performing, the reported weighted-average spread,
and the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P considers to be
appropriate.  S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using its standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each
rating category assumed for each class of notes, in conjunction
with different interest rate stress scenarios.

Non-euro-denominated assets, denominated in British pounds
sterling, account for about EUR10.4 million of the underlying
portfolio, and the resulting foreign currency risk is hedged via
asset swaps with JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. (A+/Stable/A-1) as the
swap counterparty.  S&P has also stressed the transaction's
sensitivity to and reliance on the swap counterparty, for senior
classes of notes rated higher than the swap counterparties, by
applying foreign exchange stresses to the notional amount of non-
euro-denominated assets.

S&P carried out this analysis as the current downgrade provisions
documented in the swap contracts comply with its previous
counterparty criteria, under which the maximum potential ratings
on the notes can be as high as one notch above the rating on the
counterparty.  Above these levels, S&P performs its cash flow
analysis assuming that there is no swap counterparty.

S&P's analysis showed that the class A1-a, A1-b, A2-a, A2-b, A-3,
B, C, and D notes could still maintain their assigned ratings
under additional foreign exchange stresses.

With increased available credit enhancement (mainly due to
deleveraging), S&P's credit and cash flow analysis shows that the
class A1-b, A2-b, A3, B, C, D, and E notes are able to achieve
higher ratings than previously assigned.  S&P has therefore
raised its ratings on these classes of notes.

S&P's credit and cash flow analysis shows that its 'AAA (sf)'
ratings on class A1-a and A2-a notes are commensurate with their
current credit enhancement.  S&P has therefore affirmed its
'AAA (sf)' ratings on these classes of notes.

Jubilee CDO VI is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction backed primarily by leveraged loans to
speculative-grade corporate firms.  Alcentra Ltd. is the
transaction's manager.  The reinvestment period ended on Sept.
20, 2012.

RATINGS LIST

Jubilee CDO VI B.V.
EUR424.15 mil senior secured floating-rate notes

                                  Rating        Rating
Class             Identifier      To            From
A1-a              48124RAA8       AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A1-b              48124RAB6       AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
A2-a              48124RAC4       AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A2-b              48124RAD2       AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
A3                48124RAE0       AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
B                 48124RAF7       AAA (sf)      AA- (sf)
C                 48124RAG5       AA+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
D                 48124RAH3       A+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)
E                 48124RAJ9       BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)


STORK TECHNICAL: S&P Affirms B- Rating on EUR272.5MM Sr. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had raised its
corporate credit rating on Stork Technical Services Holdco B.V.
to 'A-' from 'B'.

S&P also affirmed its 'B-' issue level rating and '5' recovery
rating on Stork's EUR272.5 million senior secured notes.

All the ratings were removed it from CreditWatch positive, where
S&P had placed them on Dec. 15, 2015.

S&P subsequently withdrew the corporate credit rating on Stork
Technical Services Holdco B.V. at the issuer's request.  At the
time of the withdrawal, the outlook was stable.  At the same
time, S&P withdrew its 'B-' issue level rating and '5' recovery
rating on Stork's EUR272.5 million senior secured notes.

S&P's rating actions follow the finalization of Stork's
acquisition by U.S.-based engineering and construction company
Fluor Corp. (A-/Stable/A-2) announced on March 1, 2016.
Following this transaction, Stork redeemed its EUR272.5 million
senior secured bond, under which the change-of-control clause was
triggered on March 17, 2016.

S&P considers Stork as core subsidiary of Fluor and therefore
aligned S&P's rating on Stork with the 'A-' corporate credit
rating on the parent, as per S&P's group rating methodology.
Fluor controls 100% of Stork's equity and assumed Stork's debt as
part of the transaction.  Fluor refinanced Stork's EUR272.5
million notes by drawing on its $1.7 billion revolving credit
facility, which Fluor will repay with cash and the proceeds of
its recent $500 million bond issue.  Stork's operations will be
combined with Fluor's existing operations and maintenance
organization and will account for more than 10% of Fluor's 2015
revenue.

S&P thinks that Stork will report mostly steady performance for
2015.  Stork is exposed to the rather stable operating spending
of oil and gas companies, as opposed to capital spending.
However, S&P still sees a risk of lower order intake and contract
postponement, given the persistently low oil prices.

The stable outlook at the time of the withdrawal reflected the
stable outlook on Fluor.



===========
N O R W A Y
===========


NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: GSO, Cyprus to Provide EUR120MM in Funds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Luca Casiraghi at Bloomberg News reports that Blackstone Group
LP's GSO Capital Partners and Cyrus Capital Partners agreed to
provide as much as EUR120 million (US$135 million) to Norske
Skogindustrier ASA to keep the Norwegian paper maker afloat.

According to Bloomberg, Norske Skog said in a statement on
March 18 the funds will inject EUR15 million in equity, provide
about EUR95 million in a new securitization facility and may buy
back as much as EUR10 million of secured notes.

The company also started selling some of its assets and expects
the combined initiatives to total as much as EUR140 million,
Bloomberg relates.

GSO and Cyrus hold some of Norske Skog's senior unsecured notes
due 2016 and 2017 and some of its shares, Bloomberg discloses.
The paper maker terminated its plan to exchange the EUR121
million of 2016 notes and amended its offer to exchange the
EUR218 million of 2017 bonds on March 18, Bloomberg relays.

                        About Norske Skog

Norske Skogindustrier ASA or Norske Skog, which translates as
Norwegian Forest Industries, is a Norwegian pulp and paper
company based in Oslo, Norway and established in 1962.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe in mid-
November 2015, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Norske
Skogindustrier ASA's (Norske Skog) Corporate Family Rating
("CFR") to Caa3 from Caa2 and its Probability of Default Rating
(PDR) to Ca-PD from Caa2-PD.  Standard & Poor's Ratings Service
also downgraded the Company's long-term corporate credit rating
to CC from CCC.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


PORTUGAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its unsolicited
'BB+/B' long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign
credit ratings on the Republic of Portugal.  The outlook is
stable.

                            RATIONALE

The ratings on Portugal are supported by S&P's view of export
sector resilience, ongoing budgetary consolidation, a
significantly improved government debt maturity profile, and an
accommodative monetary stance, contributing among other things to
maintaining government borrowing costs at sustainable levels.  At
the same time, the ratings remain constrained by high public and
private sector indebtedness, fragility in the domestic banking
sector, and a weak monetary transmission mechanism, all of which
in S&P's view hinder Portugal's economic growth potential in the
medium-to-long run.

Following two consecutive years of positive economic growth, S&P
expects the economic recovery in Portugal will moderate in 2016.
S&P believes that the deceleration of GDP growth since mid-2015
reflects a slowdown in domestic demand, related primarily to
private consumption and investment.  At the same time, public
demand contributed to growth, given the expansionary fiscal
policy stance in 2015.

"We project that Portugal's robust export performance in 2015 is
unlikely to continue at the same pace, based on the uncertainties
regarding the global economic outlook since the start of 2016.
Still, we think that the recent increase in the minimum wage,
partly offset by a decline in employers' social security
contributions, is unlikely to significantly reduce the restored
price competitiveness of Portuguese goods and services exports,
which is further supported by the decline in oil prices and the
euro's depreciation.  Further substantial increases in the
minimum wage could dim employment prospects, however.  Weakening
Portuguese exports to crisis-affected non-European trade partners
such as Angola are more than offset by increased demand from
Eurozone countries, the U.K. and the U.S., especially on the back
of significant euro depreciation against the pound sterling and
the U.S. dollar, respectively.  Moreover, we do not expect the
downturn in Brazil will have a pronounced impact on the
Portuguese economy," S&P said.

S&P expects that the new government's fiscal policy measures,
which aim to increase disposable income, will support private
consumption and, subsequently, imports.  At the same time, S&P
forecasts that investment activity will likely moderate, given
the ongoing weaknesses in the banking sector and still highly
leveraged private-sector balance sheets.  The government's
reduction in planned public investment spending between the first
and final budgetary proposal also underpins S&P's view.

"As a result of the now more gradual economic recovery and, to
some extent, the recent increase in the minimum wage, we expect
improvements in the labor market to slow after the fall in
unemployment to 12.6% in 2015 from 14.1% in 2014.  Although in
our view the Portuguese job market remains more regulated than
most of its peers, we think the government's plan to simplify the
judicial process for dismissals and the move toward a single
contract to reduce the segmentation between temporary and
permanent labor contracts is a step in the right direction.
Still, in our opinion, transaction, legal, and administrative
costs for doing business in Portugal remain relatively high.  We
therefore consider that the failure to continue tackling
shortcomings in the labor market, and also in products and
services, by implementing structural reforms--including
increasing the efficiency of the public administration and
improving the business environment--could weigh on future
investment activity and dampen Portuguese economic growth," S&P
said.

"A more important increase in equity financing, which is one of
the government's economic policy priorities, would be positive,
in our view, and would also contribute to deleveraging in the
economy.  The private-sector debt overhang is holding back
growth, as resources that would otherwise be spent on consumption
or investment are being used for improving the balance sheets of
households and companies.  In our view, in the absence of
acceleration in deleveraging or improvements in the business
environment, high private-sector leverage will continue to weigh
on growth prospects over the next few years.  In turn, this
carries negative implications for the Portuguese banking system,"
S&P said.

Data from the Portuguese central bank, Banco de Portugal,
indicate that resident private nonfinancial sector gross debt on
a non-consolidated basis was still at a high 225% of GDP at the
end of 2015, albeit down from 260% at the end of 2012.  Portugal
continues to have one of the worst external narrow net external
debt-to-current account receipt ratios (S&P's preferred measure
of external position) among the 131 sovereigns S&P rates.  S&P
estimated this ratio was about 290% in 2015.  The substantial
reduction in borrowing costs for the economy's private sector is
helping deleveraging, but the process is slow and, in S&P's view,
hinders the pace of economic recovery, as it implies inefficient
allocation of capital.  The economy is still vulnerable to a
deterioration in external borrowing conditions, in S&P's opinion,
despite the fall in interest rates for new loans to small and
midsize enterprises in Portugal to 3.61% at year-end 2015, down
from 4.5% at year-end 2014.

"We think the government will post a deficit of about 2.7% of GDP
in 2016, down from 3.1% of GDP in 2015 (or 4.3% of GDP including
the December 2015 bail-out of Banif).  The difference between our
forecast and the government's target of 2.2% of GDP is mainly due
to our lower nominal economic growth projections.  We
nevertheless anticipate that the government will remain committed
to preventing any potential significant budgetary deviation,
possibly due to worse-than-currently assumed macroeconomic
conditions or a larger-than-budgeted spending impact of some of
its budgetary measures, among others, reinstating the 35-hour
working week in the public sector.  We understand that such
measures could include eliminating (existing) exemptions in
social contributions, reducing intermediate consumption,
increasing excise taxes on fuel, or selling state-owned real
estate.  Moreover, we think the government will maintain the non-
replacement rule, which has contributed to reducing headcount in
the public sector," S&P said.

S&P expects Portugal's net general government debt will be about
118% of GDP in 2016-2019, excluding guarantees related to the
European Financial Stability Facility.  At the same time, average
general government interest payments will likely represent
slightly more than 10% of general government revenues in 2016-
2019.  S&P expects that Portugal's cash buffer (which S&P
estimates at about 7% of GDP at end-2016) will decline only
gradually over the coming years.  S&P's debt projection excludes
the reimbursement of the 2014 government loan to the deposit
guarantee fund for the purpose of the recapitalization of Novo
Banco, as well as the government's potential additional fiscal
costs related to the litigation risk associated with state-owned
entities' swap contracts or financial sector support.  In recent
years, Portugal's public debt profile has significantly improved,
with the average maturity of the Portuguese government's debt
stock at the end of 2015 at 8.7 years, including the extension of
theEuropean Financial Stability Mechanism loans.

As S&P expected, the October 2015 general elections have led to a
more fragmented political landscape in Portugal.  S&P expects
that the new government, led by the Socialist Party and supported
by the Left Block and the Communist Party, will remain committed
to policies that underpin further fiscal consolidation broadly in
line with eurozone policies.  Still, S&P believes that the long-
term stability of the government will likely be tested in case of
weaker-than-expected economic growth that underlies the budget
plan, the potential implementation of further deficit reducing
measures, and as it takes up a role in strengthening stability in
the banking sector.  If policy slippages materialize, they could
undermine the economic recovery and budgetary consolidation, for
example, owing to deterioration in external financing conditions.

                             OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on Portugal balances S&P's projections of
steady economic recovery and gradual budgetary consolidation over
the next two years against the risks of a weakening external
growth environment, protracted private-sector deleveraging, and
potential economic and budgetary policy deviations.

S&P could raise its ratings on Portugal if S&P observes:

   -- Marked improvement in the economic growth outlook, for
      example after the implementation of further structural
      reforms;

   -- Continued budgetary consolidation that brings net
      government debt to below 100% of GDP; and

   -- An acceleration in orderly private-sector deleveraging, so
      as to significantly reduce household and corporate
      indebtedness, coupled with a discernible reduction in
      external debt and improvement in the effectiveness of the
      monetary transmission mechanism.

S&P could lower the ratings if it sees:

   -- A risk of significant economic policy deviation, for
      example if the government doesn't implement further growth
      enhancing structural reforms or if it adopts policies that
      could hurt Portugal's access to international financial
      markets.

   -- The government's budgetary position deviating considerably
      and negatively from S&P's expectations or Portugal's
      external adjustment stalling.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the external risk assessment had
deteriorated.  All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                   Rating         Rating
                                   To             From
Portugal (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency|U~    BB+/Stable/B   BB+/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility
  Assessment|U~                    AAA            AAA
Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency [#1]              BB+            BB+
  Local Currency [#2]              BB+            BB+



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


CE HUNEDOARA: At Risk of Bankruptcy, Owes RON1.5 Billion
---------------------------------------------------------
bne Intellinews reports that CE Hunedoara, currently under
insolvency, faces imminent bankruptcy as it owes huge debt to the
state and its power generation units do not hold operating
permits from the environment agency.

The only solution is for the government to accept the company's
mines in exchange for its claims and, as the main creditor of the
company, to support a recovery plan for the power generation
units, bne Intellinews relays, citing report from the company's
court-appointed manager GMC published by hotnews.ro on March 18.

According to bne Intellinews, GMC said the company's difficult
financial situation is the result of short-sighted actions by all
those involved -- management, trade unions, employees, business
partners.

CE Hunedoara owes some RON1.5 billion (EUR337 million), of which
RON1 billion is to the budget, bne Intellinews discloses.

CE Hunedoara delivers 5% of Romania's electricity and employs
6,500 people.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


KALUGA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Kaluga Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'
with Stable Outlooks, and Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.
The agency has also affirmed the region's National Long-term
rating at 'AA-(rus)' with Stable Outlook. Kaluga's senior
unsecured domestic debt has been affirmed at 'BB' and 'AA-(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged base line scenario
regarding the region's sound operating performance and growing
direct risk, which is mitigated by a high proportion of loans
from the federal budget with lower cost of borrowing.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'BB' rating reflects the increasing tension in the national
economic environment, high direct risk with persistent
refinancing pressure and Russia's weak institutional framework.
The ratings also factor in the administration's efficient and
proactive management focused on the region's rapid investment-
driven economic development and sound operating performance.

Fitch expects Kaluga to continue demonstrating a solid operating
performance, supported by its diversified tax base. The agency
expects the operating balance to be close to 14% of operating
revenue in 2016-2018, which is a moderate deterioration from a
high margin of 16.5% in 2015 but in line with the 2011-2014
historical average. Tax revenue growth has decelerated due to a
12% decline in corporate income tax (CIT) as a result of sluggish
economic performance. The CIT contraction was compensated by
growth of other taxes, particularly property tax (+35.4%) and
personal income tax (+6.4%). Absolute tax revenue growth was
supported by increased tax rates and tax bases for some taxes and
also reflected relatively high national inflation, which
accounted for 12.9% in 2015.

Kaluga is focused on local economic development and has
successfully attracted foreign investments and promoted
industrial production. This policy resulted in rapid growth of
the tax base, but also led to a high debt burden of the region,
albeit linked to infrastructure development. At January 1, 2016,
direct risk reached 89.3% of current revenue (RUB35.6 billion)
and was dominated by subsidized loans from the federal budget
(41%) followed by bank loans (32%). The remainder is mostly debt
of the Development Corporation of Kaluga Region (DCKR).

DCKR was established by the region to finance local investment
projects, namely the development of regional industrial zones.
The region provides subsidies to cover the principal and interest
on DCKR's debt. Consequently, Fitch considers DCKR's liabilities
as the region's direct risk. At 1 January 2016, DCKR's
liabilities amounted to RUB8.4 billion of long-term loans from
state development institution Vnesheconombank (BBB-/Negative/F3),
up from RUB6.9 billion a year earlier. This constitutes about 25%
of Kaluga's current revenue at end-2015. Positively, DCKR's
liabilities have a smooth maturity profile between 2018 and 2022.

Fitch expects the region's deficit before debt variation to halve
to 7% of total revenue from an average 12.3% in 2013-2015. This
will mostly result from lower capital expenditure and the overall
intention of the region's government to implement cost control
measures. Fitch therefore forecasts direct risk growth to slow
down in absolute terms during 2016-2018, while operating revenue
growth should allow the overall debt burden to stabilize below
95% of current revenue (2015: 89.3%).

As with most Russian regions, Kaluga is exposed to refinancing
pressure in the medium term. It faces repayment of 74% of its
outstanding liabilities, in 2016-2018. Fitch expects the region
will substitute part of the maturing bank loans with new loans
from the federal budget (RUB3.2 billion have already been
received in 1Q16) and roll over the remaining maturing bank loans
with the same banks. However, volatile interest rates in domestic
markets could make new debt more expensive and may put pressure
on the region's current margin.

The region's credit profile remains constrained by the weak
institutional framework for Russian LRGs, which has a shorter
record of stable development than many of its international
peers. The predictability of Russian LRGs' budgetary policy is
hampered by frequent reallocation of revenue and expenditure
responsibilities between tiers of government.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Sustainably sound operating performance with an operating margin
close to 15% coupled with stabilization of direct risk (including
DCKR's debt) at the current level (2015: 89.3% of current
revenue) and easing of refinancing pressure could lead to an
upgrade.

Inability to limit direct risk growth and weakening in budgetary
performance leading to permanent deterioration in debt coverage
(direct risk to current balance) beyond 12 years (2015: 7.4
years) would lead to a downgrade.


LIPETSK REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Lipetsk Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB',
Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B' and National Long-term
rating at 'AA-(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long-term ratings are
Stable. The region's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds
have been affirmed at 'BB'/'AA-(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects Lipetsk region's improved fiscal
performance, albeit still prone to volatility, and strengthened
liquidity driven by higher tax proceeds in 2015. It also reflects
the region's moderate debt level.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings reflect the expected decline in the region's
budgetary performance, sound liquidity and increasing direct risk
with manageable refinancing risk. They also take into account the
high concentration of the regional economy in ferrous metallurgy,
which makes Lipetsk region vulnerable to steel market
fluctuations, leading to volatile tax revenue.

Fitch projects the region's operating balance will decline to 8%-
10% of operating revenue over the medium term but remain in line
with the past five years' average margin of 9.7%. The margin
peaked at 14%-15% in 2014-2015 boosted by tax proceeds from the
steel sector. The region's top taxpayer, export-oriented PJSC
Novolipetsk Steel Plant (BBB-/Negative), benefited from rouble
depreciation ($US/RUB exchange rate averaged 61.4 in 2015 vs.
38.6 in 2014) and solely contributed to 36% growth of corporate
income tax proceeds in 2015.

Fitch considers that the volatility of the region's finances is
partly mitigated by the administration's prudent approach, which
set aside excess tax proceeds in cash reserves and kept expenses
under control. This led to Lipetsk's cash balance growing 5.4
times during 2014-2015 to RUB7.3 billion, which covers 37% of its
direct risk as of end-2015.

Fitch forecasts the region will demonstrate a moderate budget
deficit of about 6% of total revenue in 2016-2018. Part of the
deficit will be funded by accumulated cash reserves. In 2015, the
region achieved a balanced budget (2014: deficit 0.2%), while in
2011-2013 the deficit averaged 8.5%.

Fitch projects the region's direct risk will increase in 2017-
2018 but remain below 50% of current revenue. In 2015, direct
risk decreased to 43.2% from 45.9% in 2014 due to higher tax
proceeds. Refinancing pressure is moderate as Lipetsk's debt
maturity profile is smooth and stretched until 2020. By end-2016,
the region has to repay RUB4.3 billion of debt, which corresponds
to 22% of its direct risk. Half of this amount will be refinanced
by a new RUB2.1 billion budget loan and the remainder will be
funded by the region's cash reserves.

The region's credit profile remains constrained by weak
institutional framework for Russian LRGs. The latter has a
shorter record of stable development than many of its
international peers. The predictability of Russian LRGs'
budgetary policy is hampered by frequent reallocation of revenue
and expenditure responsibilities between tiers of government.

The region's economy is developed and its wealth metrics are in
line with the national median. In 2015, gross regional product
fell by 0.3%, which is better than the wider Russian economy
(3.7% fall) due to the good performance of the steel sector. The
ferrous metallurgy sector contributed 58% of the region's
industrial output and more than 40% of total tax proceeds in
2015, making its economy vulnerable to fluctuations in the
domestic and international steel markets.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A strong operating balance at about 15% of operating revenue on a
sustained basis accompanied by debt coverage (direct risk to
current balance) below four years could lead to positive rating
action.

Widening deficit before debt variation leading to an increase in
direct risk to above 60% of current revenue could lead to
negative rating action.


RUSSIA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and
short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings and its
'BBB-/A-3' long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit
ratings on Russia.  The outlook on both the local and foreign
currency long-term ratings remains negative.

S&P also affirmed the long-term national scale rating on Russia
at 'ruAAA'.

                            RATIONALE

The ratings reflect S&P's expectation that the Russian economy
and the government's policy-making will adjust such that Russia
will continue to maintain its strong net external asset position
and modest net general government debt burden in 2016-2019.  In
S&P's opinion, the ratings remain constrained by the weak
political institutions that impede the economy's competitiveness,
investment climate, and business environment.  Partly as a result
of policy-making inertia, in S&P's view, Russia's economy began
to slow down earlier this decade, before sanctions and the sharp
fall in oil prices.  S&P projects muted economic growth in 2016-
2019.

S&P assumes an average Brent oil price of US$40 per barrel (/bbl)
in 2016, US$45/bbl in 2017, and US$50/bbl in 2018 and thereafter.
In Russia, the hydrocarbon sector accounted for about 50% of
exports in 2015, down from 58% in 2014, owing to the sharp fall
in oil prices.  In terms of GDP, the ratio is more difficult to
estimate.  The share of mining and quarrying in GDP was almost 8%
in 2014 and 8.8% in 2015, but when one also includes the value-
added of other sectors, such as transport (pipelines) and
wholesale trade, S&P estimates the hydrocarbon sector's
contribution rises to 20%-25%.  Oil and gas revenues were 43% of
central government revenues in 2015, down from 51% in 2014.

S&P expects that declining domestic purchasing power, as a result
of exchange-rate depreciation and elevated inflation, will hamper
Russia's growth prospects.  S&P projects Russia's real GDP per
capita growth will average less than similarly wealthy economies
over its 2016-2019 rating horizon.  It also reflects the lack of
external financing, which has emerged because of economic
sanctions and the sharp decline in oil prices.  S&P expects real
GDP growth to average 0.5% in 2016-2019, and S&P's GDP per capita
estimate for 2016 is US$7,700.

S&P assumes in its base case that the sanctions on Russia will
remain in place over S&P's forecast horizon, absent a resolution
of the conflict in Ukraine.  However, the situation remains fluid
and, should sanctions ease, one possible consequence could be a
boost to the Russian economy.

In S&P's view, the Central Bank of Russia's (CBR) introduction of
a flexible exchange rate regime on Nov. 10, 2014, should afford
the CBR greater ability to conserve its foreign currency
reserves. The flexible exchange rate regime provides a mechanism
via which the economy can adjust to oil price movements.  The
sharp ruble depreciation, which is currently trading around RUB71
to the U.S. dollar, compared with about RUB35 in mid-2014,
supports the local currency value of government oil revenues,
which are priced in dollars.  Historically, there has usually
been a strong correlation between the external value of the ruble
and oil prices, and this has held true over the past 12 months.

Balance-of-payment pressures have hit the economy following the
decline in oil prices (the Urals oil price currently trades at an
about US$3/bbl discount to Brent).  Russia is experiencing a
severe terms-of-trade shock.  S&P nevertheless expects that
Russia's current account will remain in surplus, thanks to a
consistent drop in import demand and a reduction in the deficit
on the income balance due to falling debt interest payments.  S&P
expects a current account surplus equivalent to 3.5% of GDP in
2016. Russia's external debt stock (excluding debt liabilities to
direct investors) declined to US$385 billion as of Dec. 31, 2015,
from US$466 billion a year earlier, as international capital
market financing to Russia remains limited following sanctions.

S&P notes that most of the deleveraging over the period related
to debt repayments by the banking sector (49% of the total
decline in external debt) and corporate sectors (39%).  Banking
accounts for 34% and the corporate sector54% of total external
debt.  S&P estimates Russia's external debt service at about
US$100 billion in 2016 compared with about US$155 billion in
2015.  S&P expects the CBR's provision of foreign currency
liquidity to the domestic banks via repo operations to continue
to support private-sector external debt service, while external
deleveraging is also supported by corporate external earnings.

External interest payments, reflected in the income balance, have
fallen sharply as a result.  Russia maintains a net external
asset position.  S&P expects liquid external assets held by the
public and banking sectors to exceed Russia's external debt by
about 30% of current account receipts (CARs) on average over
2016-2019.

Balance-of-payment pressures have centered on the financial
account.  Private-sector net capital outflows averaged US$57
billion annually over 2009-2013 and increased to US$153 billion
in 2014.  However, these outflows totaled US$57 billion in 2015,
in line with the historical average.  Nevertheless, in S&P's
view, stress could mount for Russian corporations and banks that
have foreign currency debt-service requirements without a
concomitant foreign currency revenue stream.  That said, the CBR
has been providing substantial foreign currency liquidity to
domestic banks via repo operations, which has reduced the central
bank's headline reserves.  S&P notes that the CBR's reverse
foreign currency liquidity operations with resident banks were at
about $20 billion in March 2016, compared with US$25 billion at
the end of December 2015.

S&P estimates Russia's gross external financing requirement for
2016 at just over 70% of CARs plus usable reserves.  S&P's figure
for CBR-usable reserves deducts foreign currency investments made
by the CBR on behalf of the government (about US$100 billion in
2015) from the bank's reported foreign currency reserves (US$368
billion).  By this definition, S&P forecasts reserve coverage of
current account payments at more than seven months.

S&P projects that the general government deficit will average
about 3.5% of GDP in 2016-2019.  Ruble depreciation supports the
central government's fiscal position because its hydrocarbon
revenues are mostly priced in U.S. dollars.  The general
government posted a deficit of 3.6% of GDP in 2015; the central
government deficit was 2.4% of GDP; the local and regional
government deficit was 0.2% of GDP; and there was a deficit of
0.9% on the social security balance due to a one-off transfer
made from the state pay-as-you-go pension system to the private
pension fund.

S&P expects the general government deficit to widen to 4.4% of
GDP in 2016.  This incorporates S&P's opinion that the central
government deficit will reach 3.8% of GDP, the deficit at the
local and regional government level will widen to 0.7% of GDP,
and the social security system will largely return to balance.
S&P's central government deficit estimate for 2016 includes S&P's
expectation that the government will spend 0.3% of GDP in
recapitalizing Vnesheconombank.  S&P expects the government to
present an amended budget to the parliament in the second quarter
of 2016, which incorporates the current market conditions.

The modest general government net debt position is a rating
strength, as is the government's low interest burden as a
percentage of revenues.  The central government's Reserve Fund
and National Wealth Fund together totaled about 11% of GDP in
2015.  S&P adjusts the level of these assets downward by about 2
percentage points of GDP, due to what S&P considers non-liquid
investments.  In S&P's opinion, the central government will
progressively liquidate a substantial portion of its assets to
fund upcoming fiscal deficits and to increase its support to the
economy and the financial system.  S&P projects the government's
net debt position will rise to 13% of GDP by 2019.

Russia's financial system has weakened, which limits the CBR's
ability to transmit monetary policy.  In S&P's opinion, the CBR
faces difficult monetary policy decisions while it targets
inflation of 4% in 2017 and at the same time attempts to support
sustainable GDP growth.  These challenges result from the
inflationary effects of exchange-rate depreciation and sanctions
from the West, as well as the counter-sanctions imposed by
Russia.

S&P anticipates that asset quality in the financial system will
deteriorate, given the economic recession in 2015 and 2016, the
weaker ruble, and pressure on available funding due to reduced
investor confidence and restricted access of key areas of the
economy to international capital markets due to sanctions.

In December 2014, the CBR increased its key interest rate by 750
basis points over five days to 17%.  This was to stem the sharp
depreciation of the ruble and curb inflation.  The CBR has since
reduced its key rate to 11% to support economic growth.  The
interest rate on interbank loans increased substantially in
December 2014, to well above the key rate, although it has since
moderated.

S&P sees such movements in financial instrument rates as strong
indicators of a weak monetary transmission mechanism.  S&P
expects that credit to the economy will be curtailed, which will
likely further undermine growth.  Given the pass-through of more
expensive imports to domestic prices generally, S&P expects
annual average inflation to remain elevated, at about 9% in 2016,
but reduced from 16% in 2015.

S&P views Russia's institutional and governance effectiveness as
a rating weakness.  Political power is highly centralized with
few checks and balances, in S&P's opinion.  S&P do not currently
expects that the government will be able to effectively tackle
the long-standing structural obstacles to stronger economic
growth (perceived corruption, the weak rule of law, the state's
pervasive role in the economy, and the challenging business and
investment climate) over S&P's 2016-2019 forecast horizon.

                              OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that the limited access
to external funding could affect economic activity in the
corporate and banking sector and put renewed pressure on Russia's
foreign exchange reserves.  A failure to reinvigorate the economy
could further undermine Russia's creditworthiness.  S&P could
also lower the ratings if geopolitical events were to result in
foreign governments significantly tightening their sanctions on
Russia, a scenario that S&P currently considers unlikely.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Russia's market access
were to broaden and financial stability and economic growth
prospects improved more significantly than S&P currently
forecasts, possibly due to a loosening of sanctions or a rise in
the oil price above our current assumptions.  Measures to arrest
long-term fiscal challenges caused by Russia's adverse
demographic profile (a shrinking working age population) could
also contribute to stabilizing the rating.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and
explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating
factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant
criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were
considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                      Rating       Rating
                                      To          From
Russian Federation
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign Currency                    BB+/Neg./B   BB+/Neg./B
  Local Currency                      BBB-/Neg/A-3 BBB-/Neg/A-3
  Russia National Scale               ruAAA/--/--  ruAAA/--/--
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment BB+          BB+
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign Currency                    BB+          BB+
  Local Currency                      BBB-         BBB-


STARBANK JSC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
-----------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-920, dated March 18,
2016, revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit
institution JSC StarBank as of March 18, 2016.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, due to repeated application within a year of
measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the
Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)", considering a real threat
to the creditors' and depositors' interests.

JSC StarBank implemented high-risk lending policy and failed to
create loan loss provisions adequate to the risks assumed. At the
same time the credit institution failed to meet the supervisor's
instructions on prohibiting certain operations to protect
interests of the bank's depositors.  Besides, the bank was
involved in dubious operations to withdraw funds overseas as well
as in dubious transit operations.  The management and owners of
JSC StarBank did not take effective measures to normalise its
activities.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-921, dated March 18,
2016, appointed a provisional administration to JSC StarBank for
the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)' or a liquidator
under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities."  In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the
credit institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

JSC StarBank is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than 1.4 million per one
depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of March 1, 2016, JSC
StarBank ranked 166th by assets in the Russian banking system.


TRANSCONTAINER PJSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based transportation company
PJSC TransContainer (TC)'s Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
at 'BB+' with Stable Outlook.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's view that TC will maintain
fairly stable credit metrics in the medium-term due to capex
flexibility, despite projected weaker profitability for 2016-2017
on the back of challenging market conditions.

TC's 'BB+' rating incorporates a single-notch uplift for parental
support from its ultimate key shareholder JSC Russian Railways
(RZD, BBB-/Negative). TC's standalone 'BB' rating reflects its
strong domestic market share of 47% of total rail container
transportation in Russia in 2015, moderate leverage and
diversification in cargoes and customers and modest earnings
relative to other rolling stock peers.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

One-notch Uplift

"TC's ratings continue to incorporate a single-notch uplift for
implied parental support to its 'BB' standalone rating as we
continue to assess the ties between the company and its ultimate
key shareholder RZD (through United Transportation and Logistics
Company (UTLC)), as moderate. The potential return of TC's shares
to RZD's direct ownership following a potential re-modelling of
UTLC will reduce the risk of loss of effective control and
strengthen the likelihood of parental support from RZD to TC if
needed."

RZD has reiterated on several occasions that inter-modal
container shipments are part of its core growth plans, implying
support -- tangible and intangible -- for TC, if needed.

Potential UTLC Remodelling
UTLC's shareholders, including RZD, JSC National Company
Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (BBB/Negative) and Belarusian Railway, are
considering changing the format of UTLC to an 'asset light'
business model with a focus on provisioning logistic services
without assets. This may imply a return to RZD's direct ownership
of its stakes in TC (50%) and JSC RZD Logistics (100%) that it
contributed to the charter capital of UTLC. Also assuming no
further transfer of assets by other shareholders under the UTLC
umbrella as a result of the remodelling, it will reduce the risk
of potential dilution of RZD ownership stake in TC, and the
weakening of ties between the two.

Weak Market Fundamentals

The Russian rail container transportation market remains under
pressure from a contracting domestic economy and the impact of
rouble devaluation. In 2015 rail container transportation volumes
in Russia declined 8% yoy and a further 1% yoy over 2M16, on the
back of lower import/export and transit transportation volumes.
TC reported a 5.3% yoy decline in rail container transportation
volumes in 2015 as international transportation volumes fell
11.9%.

"We expect container transportation volumes to remain weak in
2016 on the back of declining Russian GDP prospects -- Fitch
recently revised its GDP estimate to -1.5% for 2016 from 0.5%
previously -- a weak rouble and decreasing consumer purchasing
power."

Weaker Margins Expected

"We estimate TC's adjusted EBITDA margin will deteriorate to
about 28% in 2015 from 32% in 2014. We expect it to remain under
pressure in the short-to-medium term, due to a stagnating economy
pressuring volumes and rates; faster growth of RZD tariff over
company's rates driving increases in empty run costs; and rouble
devaluation boosting the costs related to the use of neighboring
countries' rail infrastructure."

Lower Capex Supports Credit Metrics

"TC's credit metrics benefit from capex flexibility. We expect TC
to have reduced investments by about 40% yoy in 2015, which would
help limit the deterioration in its credit metrics stemming from
projected lower EBITDA. We estimate TC's FFO adjusted net
leverage to have remained almost flat at 1.4x at end-2015 and to
remain below 2.0x over 2016-2018 as a result of lower capex
(RUB2.8 billion on average over 2015-2017 vs RUB5.2 billion on
average over 2011-2014) and an amortizing debt profile."

Customers and Geography Diversification

TC's standalone profile is supported by the company's leading
domestic position in rail container transportation in Russia, its
strong presence in key locations, growing geographical coverage
via joint ventures and a solid financial profile. The company
maintains a diversified customer base with the top 10 customers
accounting for about 30% of total revenue and the single biggest
customer accounting for only 9.6% of total revenue in 1H15. TC is
seeking to develop its business model to become an integrated
service provider and freight forwarder.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Domestic GDP decline of 1.5% in 2016 and 1.5% growth over
    2017-2019

-- Inflation of 8.6% in 2016 and 7.5% over 2017-2019

-- Freight transportation rates to grow below inflation

-- 2016 capex in line with 2015 level of RUB2.6 billion and
    moderately growing above this level thereafter (mandatory
    capex level of around RUB1 billion, with flexible total capex
    subject to market conditions)

-- Dividend payments of 50% of IFRS net income over 2016-2019

-- Average interest rate for new borrowings of 14.5%."

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to a positive
rating action include:

-- A sustained decrease in FFO net lease-adjusted leverage to
    below 1.25x and FFO fixed charge coverage above 4.5x,
    although this is unlikely in the near term

Negative: Future developments that could lead to a negative
rating action include:

-- RZD losing its effective control of TC, which would remove
    the single-notch uplift for implied parental support,
    although Fitch views this as unlikely given the potential
    UTLC reformatting

-- Changes to the financing structure of UTLC, especially if
    material amount of debt is raised at the holding company
    level, supported mainly by TC's cash flow

-- A sustained rise in FFO net lease-adjusted leverage above
    2.5x and FFO fixed charge cover consistently below 3x, owing
    to decreases in earnings combined with high capex, dividends
    or M&A

LIQUIDITY

"We assess TC's liquidity position as adequate. At end-2015 TC's
cash and cash equivalents stood at RUB2.1 billion, which are
sufficient to cover 2016 maturities of RUB1.9 billion. TC will,
however, need to raise new funding to finance its 2017
maturities. TC did not have any unused credit facilities at end-
2015. We expect TC to generate positive free cash flow over 2015-
2017; subject to actual capex. The latter is, however, flexible
and subject to market conditions, which will support the
company's liquidity and funding profile."

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB+';
  Outlook Stable

  Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'B'

  National Long-term rating affirmed at 'AA(rus)'; Outlook Stable

  Local currency senior unsecured rating affirmed at 'BB+'


TULA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Tula Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB',
Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B' and National Long-term
rating at 'AA-(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long-term ratings are
Stable.

The region's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds have
been affirmed at Long-term local currency 'BB' and National Long-
term 'AA-(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's view that despite a moderate
deterioration of Tula's budgetary performance it will remain
commensurate with the ratings. The operating balance will remain
sufficient to cover annual interest payments, and direct risk
remains moderate.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings reflect Tula's low direct risk and sustainably
positive current balance. They also reflect the region's average-
sized economy and deterioration of the national economic
environment, which will put pressure on Tula's budgetary
performance over the medium term.

"Fitch expects the region's budgetary performance will moderately
deteriorate over the medium term, with an operating balance
around 6% of operating revenue during 2016-2018. This is weaker
than our previous projection of operating balance averaging 10%
and reflects the supressed tax revenue already in 2015 and
onward. Weaker tax revenue reflected the deteriorating financial
results of local companies due to a sluggish national economy in
2015 and Fitch does not expect a fast recovery in the medium
term."

Fitch projects the region will control the budget deficit before
debt at around 3%-5% of total revenue per year in 2016-2018
through limiting capex and continuing cost-efficiency measures.
The budget deficit before debt variation narrowed to 0.9% of
total revenue in 2015 from a 3.3% a year before, supported by a
cut in capital outlays.

Tula's direct risk will remain moderate over the medium term at
below 35% of current revenue (in 2015: 27.1%). As of 1 January
2016, direct risk totalled RUB15.9 billion, unchanged from the
previous year. A modest deficit of RUB0.6 billion in 2015 was
covered solely by outstanding cash, so the region contracted new
debt only for refinancing maturing debt in that year. At 1 March
2016, the debt portfolio was almost equally split between issued
debt accounted for 49% of total direct risk and budget loans from
the federal budget (51%) at subsidised interest rate from 0.100%
to 4.125%, which reduces interest expenditure.

Immediate refinancing risk is moderate as the region's
outstanding RUB2.25 billion bonds due in 2016 are covered by
RUB1.8 billion available bank credit facilities and RUB4 billion
standby short-term credit facilities from the Russian Treasury.

The regional economy has a well-diversified processing industry
and economic growth that has outpaced the national average for
four years in a row. According to preliminary data, in 2015 the
regional economy grew 2.4%, in contrast to the national GRP
decline of 3.7%. Fitch projects the national economy will
contract by 1.5% in 2016, which could have negative repercussions
for the region's economy. Nevertheless, the region's economy
remains moderate in the national context, with GRP per capita at
88% of the national median in 2013.

Tula's credit profile remains constrained by the weak
institutional framework for Russian LRGs, which has a shorter
record of stable development than many of its international
peers. The predictability of Russian LRGs' budgetary policy is
hampered by frequent reallocation of revenue and expenditure
responsibilities between tiers of government.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A sound budgetary performance with an operating balance
sustainably above 10% of operating revenue, accompanied by
moderate direct risk below 40% of current revenue would lead to
an upgrade.

Conversely, deteriorated budgetary performance with an operating
margin consistently below 5% accompanied by weak debt payback
exceeding 10 years (2015: 3.1years) could lead to a downgrade.



===========
S E R B I A
===========


SERBIA: Moody's Affirms B1 Issuer & Sr. Unsecured Debt Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the
Government of Serbia's rating to positive from stable and
affirmed the B1 long-term issuer and senior unsecured debt
ratings.

Moody's decision to assign a positive outlook to Serbia's B1
rating reflects the authorities' commitment to addressing the
deterioration in the sovereign's debt burden through:

  (1) the implementation of structural reforms and enhancements
      in institutional quality against the backdrop of IMF
      technical assistance and progress in EU accession; and

  (2) a fiscal consolidation program which is expected to
      improve Serbia's fiscal outlook

The affirmation of Serbia's B1 rating balances a range of
factors, including the forecast improvement in Serbia's growth
prospects and the fiscal consolidation under way, against the
continued rise in the government's debt burden with debt
projected to peak at slightly less than 80% of GDP in 2016, and
external risks stemming from Serbia's high external debt.

The B2/NP long-term and short-term foreign-currency deposit
ceilings and the Ba2/NP long-term and short-term foreign-currency
bond ceilings remain unchanged.

          RATIONALE FOR CHANGING THE OUTLOOK TO POSITIVE

The first driver for the change in the outlook on Serbia's B1
government bond rating to positive from stable is the expected
impact of past and planned structural reforms and enhancements to
Serbia's institutions.  Serbia has undergone material
improvements, and the authorities plan to go further in the
coming few years. Pursuant to the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA)
signed with the IMF in February 2015, Serbian authorities have
already implemented a number of reforms to remove obstacles to
investment and to support business, to restore confidence in the
financial sector and to consolidate the fiscal position.

These included a set of laws and amendments to previous
regulations introduced in 2015 to enhance investment and
competiveness, as well as to improve the efficiency of the public
administration, incentivize the shift from informal to formal
economy and attract foreign investment.  An exercise similar to
the ECB's Asset Quality Review, the Special Diagnostic Studies
(SDS), was carried out by the National Bank of Serbia in order to
assess the resilience of the major banks in Serbia.  Adopted in
August 2015, The Strategy for Resolving Non-Performing Loans
(NPL) is going to be implemented through legislative actions,
mainly focused on the Bankruptcy Law and creditors' rights, and
strengthened reporting by banks and supervision by the National
Bank of Serbia (NBS).

Separately, Serbia's government formally opened two chapters of
negotiations for EU accession.  The experience of other Accession
Countries suggests that the accession process will yield a number
of enhancements to the quality of Serbia's institutions, for
example higher independence and accountability of key
institutions.  Indeed, recent years have already seen a number of
enhancements, recognized in improvements to Serbia's Worldwide
Governance Indicators on government effectiveness, rule of law
and control of corruption.

The second driver is the improved fiscal outlook in light of the
fiscal consolidation planned within the IMF program.  The
government has already implemented a number of fiscal measures to
improve the collection of tax and social contributions and to cut
public wages and pensions.  Planned reforms of the public
sector -- the downsizing of the Public Administration and the
restructuring of state-owned enterprises -- have been deferred
but are scheduled for implementation in 2016 and 2017.  The
downsizing will aim to reduce the public sector wage bill to 7%
of GDP, down from 10.6% of GDP in 2015.  The restructuring of the
SOE sector will aim to eliminate the costs associated with
subsidies, unpaid taxes and contributions and guarantees for the
sector, which amounted to around 2% of GDP in the years prior to
2012, and 3% of GDP in 2014.

A combination of reform measures implemented, faster than
expected recovery and one-offs amounting to 1% of GDP resulted in
a 2015 fiscal deficit of 3.8% of GDP, significantly outperforming
the targets in the IMF program (from the initial 5.9% at the time
when the SBA was signed to the 4.1% of its Third Review).
Moody's expects deficits of 4% and 2.9% in 2016 and 2017
respectively on the basis of progressive implementation of the
structural reforms of the public sector.  This path of fiscal
consolidation will mark a significant shift in the fiscal
position of Serbia, and will stabilize the debt over GDP ratio at
around 80% in 2017, according to Moody's projections.

These improvements are taking place against the backdrop of a
faster than expected recovery.  Real growth surprised on the
upside in 2015, increasing 0.7% year on year against expectations
of a -0.5% fall.  Amid renewed lending activity, investment
activity drove real growth in 2015, mainly in the construction
sector.  Investment is likely to continue to drive accelerating
real growth in the coming years, supported by continuing FDI
inflows that offset the current account deficits.  In 2015 net
FDI registered a 4-year high, at 5.6% of GDP, attracted by the
enhanced economic climate and expected progress in EU accession.
Moody's projects Serbia's real growth above 3% in the period
2018-20.

Despite risks from the upcoming early elections (24 April 2016)
and the potential impact of the intensifying refugee crisis on
the fiscal outlook, Moody's believes that the balance of risk has
shifted to the positive.  Polls suggest the government will
secure a new mandate, and the cost for Serbia of transiting
migrants through its territory is expected to be limited -- the
IMF estimates to only 0.1% of GDP.

               RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMING THE B1 RATING

Serbia's credit profile exhibits a range of positive features
which could, in themselves, support a higher rating.  Serbia's
economic diversity and per-capita income compare favorably to
rating peers.  Its well-educated workforce makes the economy
attractive to foreign investors, particularly in the
manufacturing and export-oriented sectors.  The institutional
framework also compares well to those of Serbia's rating peers,
and supported Serbia being granted full candidate status by the
EU in 2012.

However, the public debt burden still remains a major credit
challenge.  After years of large fiscal deficits, averaging 5.5%
of GDP between 2009 and 2014, and crystallizing contingent
liabilities, Serbia's debt to GDP ratio rose from 32.1% of GDP in
2009 to 76.5% at the end of 2015, well above the median of B-
rated countries.  While the large share of debt granted by
bilateral and official lenders at concessional terms improves the
affordability of the Serbia's public debt, the upward trajectory
of the debt burden represents an important constraint on the
rating.  This deterioration is expected to continue until 2017,
when fiscal consolidation and real growth will stabilize the
debt-to-GDP ratio at around 80% of GDP.

Serbia's other key credit challenge is its external
vulnerability. In 2015, Moody's estimates that external debt
amounted (in dollar terms) to almost 80% of GDP, up from 71% in
2014 due to significant appreciation of the US dollar against the
Serbian Dinar.  The risks associated with such a large volume of
gross external debt are mitigated by the fact that the external
debt is almost entirely long term, with 47.5% of the public and
publicly-guaranteed share (almost one third of total external
debt) due to official creditors and on concessional terms, and
80% of the private quota represented by intercompany lending.
The current account deficit has narrowed and is expected to
continue to be fully covered by FDI in the coming period.

                WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's would consider upgrading Serbia's government bond rating
if Moody's was to conclude that the government will continue to
make progress on enhancing the quality of its institutions and on
fiscal consolidation, reflected in ongoing reduction in the
fiscal deficit and, eventually, in debt levels.  Evidence that
growth will be sustained at levels which reduce existing
macroeconomic imbalances would also support an upgrade.

Moody's would move the outlook on Serbia's B1 rating back to
stable, and could eventually consider a downgrade, if we saw
fiscal and economic reforms being deferred, leading to further
economic dislocation and a continued weakening in Serbia's fiscal
metrics.

  GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 13,378 (2014 Actual) (also
   known as Per Capita Income)
  Real GDP growth (% change): 0.7% (2015 Actual) (also known as
   GDP Growth)
  Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 1.5% (2015 Actual)
  Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3.8% (2015 Actual) (also
   known as Fiscal Balance)
  Current Account Balance/GDP: -4.8% (2015 Actual) (also known as
   External Balance)
  External debt/GDP: 79.4% (2015 Estimated)
  Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience
  Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
   loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On March 16, 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Serbia, Government of.  The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have materially improved.  The
issuer's institutional strength/framework, have materially
increased.  The issuer's governance and/or management, have
materially improved.  The issuer's fiscal or financial strength,
including its debt profile, has not materially changed.  The
issuer's susceptibility to event risks has not materially
changed.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Bond Ratings published in December 2015.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: Seeks Seven-Month Standstill to Restructure Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Katie Linsell at Bloomberg News reports that Abengoa SA asked
financial creditors for a seven-month standstill to help it
restructure EUR9.4 billion (US$10.6 billion) of debt.

Abengoa, Bloomberg says, wants breathing space during which
creditors won't demand repayment, giving it more time to shore up
support for a restructuring plan.  It still needs participation
from lenders with about 35% of its debt to approve a deal it
agreed with its main bank creditors and bondholders before a
court deadline of March 28, Bloomberg notes.

The company said it needs agreement from 60% of financial
creditors for a court in Seville to make the standstill binding
on all lenders, Bloomberg relates.

Abengoa SA is a Spanish renewable-energy company.


                        *       *       *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 17,
2016, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the corporate family
rating (CFR) of Abengoa S.A. (Abengoa), and the senior unsecured
ratings at Abengoa, Abengoa Finance, S.A.U. and Abengoa
Greenfield, S.A., to Ca, from Caa3.  Moody's said the outlook on
the ratings remains negative.


CATALONIA: At Risk of Default, Wants Spain to Provide Aid
---------------------------------------------------------
Esteban Duarte and Maria Tadeo at Bloomberg News report that
Catalonia is deliberately flirting with default on its bank loans
as the region's separatist government tries to force the Spanish
state to deliver aid payments.

According to Bloomberg, two people familiar with the situation
said officials in the regional capital Barcelona are counting on
Spain to step in and supply the funds they need to meet loan
repayments coming due this year, betting the central government
will be forced to back down because the costs of a default would
be greater for the Spanish sovereign

The region already missed payments on at least two bank loans,
Regional President Carles Puigdemont said earlier this month
according to El Mundo newspaper, Bloomberg notes.

Albert Puig, a spokesman for the Catalan government, said the
region is trying to persuade Spain to release aid money due from
2014, Bloomberg relays.  He said on March 16 there's "no
scenario" in which Catalonia would default, Bloomberg recounts.

The separatist government in Catalonia, Spain's biggest regional
economy, is locked in a battle with the authorities in Madrid as
it fights for independencem Bloomberg discloses.

The latest skirmish between the two administrations is over
Catalonia's plan to extend the maturity of approximately EUR1.6
billion (US$1.8 billion) of bank loans coming due this year,
Bloomberg states.  Such modifications require approval from the
central government under the terms of the region's 2012 bailout
deal and Spain has been dragging its feet, according to
Bloomberg.

The two people, as cited by Bloomberg, said those loans are from
Banco Santander SA, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, CaixaBank
SA and Banco Sabadell SA.


CATALONIA: S&P Lowers ICR to 'B+', Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term issuer
credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on the Autonomous
Community of Catalonia to 'B+' from 'BB-'.  The outlook on the
long-term issuer credit rating is negative.  S&P affirmed its 'B'
short-term issuer credit and issue ratings on the region.

At the same time, S&P removed its long- and short-term ratings on
Catalonia from CreditWatch with negative implications, where S&P
had placed them on March 4, 2016.

As a "sovereign rating" (as defined in EU CRA Regulation
1060/2009 "EU CRA Regulation"), the ratings on the Autonomous
Community of Catalonia, in Spain, are subject to certain
publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA
Regulation, including publication in accordance with a pre-
established calendar.  Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations
from the announced calendar are allowed only in limited
circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed explanation
of the reasons for the deviation.  In this case, the reason for
the deviation is S&P's need to resolve its placement of its
ratings on Catalonia on CreditWatch negative on March 4, 2016.
The next scheduled rating publication on the Catalonia will be on
June 17, 2016.

                            RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that Catalonia's financial
management -- one of the major rating factors S&P assesses in
determining its ratings on local and regional governments -- is
weaker than S&P previously estimated.  S&P bases its view on the
region's approach to refinancing its short-term bilateral bank
loans.  In the fourth quarter of 2015 and first quarter of 2016,
the region sought central government approval to refinance
maturing short-term bank debt with long-term debt.  While
Catalonia's application was pending with the central government,
S&P understands that some bank loans were extended through an
informal overdraft facility.  The extension has since been
formalized through a standard six-month bank loan, and the
negotiations to term the loans out are pending.

S&P understands Catalonia had sufficient cash and undrawn credit
lines to pay down the loans, at the time of the original due
date, and S&P therefore do not views this case as a distressed
exchange or restructuring.

Furthermore, S&P does not view this event as a selective default
on the loans because the bank agreed to extend the maturity of
the loans and it continued to receive interest payments.

In S&P's opinion, however, Catalonia's management of maturing
short-term debt obligations demonstrates greater risks than S&P
previously considered in its assessment of Catalonia's financial
management.  S&P now has a more negative view of the regional
government's handling of debt-related risks, particularly
refinancing risks.  S&P is more uncertain about the region's
ability to manage liquidity pressure points as its short-term
debt comes due.  Consequently, S&P attaches greater weight than
previously to its assessment of the region's financial management
as very weak, prompting its rating action.

Spain's central government has extended more than EUR43 billion
in financing to Catalonia under several liquidity facilities
since 2012.  This amounts to 32% of the EUR134 billion given to
all regional governments.  The long-term rating on Catalonia, at
its current level, is based on S&P's assumption that the central
government will remain willing to provide financial support to
Catalonia to cover its long-term debt maturities and deficits
despite political tensions.

The ratings also reflect S&P's opinion of Catalonia's very weak
budgetary performance and very high debt burden.  S&P assesses
Catalonia's liquidity as less than adequate, given Catalonia's
very low internal ability to generate cash, which is mitigated by
the central government's strong financial support.  S&P regards
Catalonia's budgetary flexibility as weak, given the region's low
leeway to cut expenditures, and its contingent liabilities as
moderate.  The ratings incorporate S&P's views of Catalonia's
strong economy and the evolving but balanced institutional
framework for Spanish normal-status regions, including Catalonia.
The 'B+' long-term rating is at the same level as S&P's
assessment of Catalonia's stand-alone credit profile.

                            LIQUIDITY

The short-term rating is 'B'.  S&P considers Catalonia's
liquidity as less than adequate, based on S&P's view of its weak
debt service coverage ratio, offset by what S&P views as strong
access to external liquidity.

In S&P's assessment of Catalonia's debt service coverage ratio,
S&P factors in its estimate of the region's internal cash
generation capacity and available credit lines.

"To estimate Catalonia's internal cash generation capacity, we
use our main liquidity ratio, which reflects our base-case
scenario of average cash over the next 12 months and available
credit lines. In our base case, these sources will cover less
than 40% of Catalonia's debt service for the next 12 months
(March 2016-February 2017).  We estimate Catalonia's long-term
debt service for the same period at EUR6.7 billion, which the
central government's liquidity facility will cover.  In addition,
Catalonia will roll over an estimated EUR1.6 billion in short-
term loans in 2016, including the six-month extension described
above, for which it has applied for long-term refinancing.  The
region also has about EUR3.16 billion in loans and credit lines
linked to its cash-pooling contracts, which will be automatically
renewed unless the banks that provide them declare their
intention not to renew three months ahead of the first
anniversary of their signature, falling on July 29, 2016," S&P
said.

S&P's view of Catalonia's strong access to external liquidity
takes into account the central government's ability to continue
providing liquidity support to the Spanish regional tier through
liquidity facilities.  S&P thinks these facilities are
sufficiently endowed in the central government's 2016 budget to
cover the regions' debt service.  This support underpins S&P's
ratings on Spanish normal-status regions, including Catalonia.

                             OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that political tensions
between Catalonia and Spain's central government may escalate
further over the next 12 months.  If S&P considers that these
tensions could interfere with the smooth functioning of the
central government's liquidity support to Catalonia, S&P could
lower its long-term rating on the region by one or more notches.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable in the next 12 months if
it observed no material increase in political tensions between
Catalonia and the central government.  For an outlook change to
stable, with an affirmation of the ratings, S&P would also factor
in a budgetary and economic performance remaining in line with
its base case over 2016-2018, where S&P assumes the region's
gradual reduction in budgetary deficits.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                     Rating       Rating
                                     To           From
Catalonia (Autonomous Community of)
Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency         B+/Neg./B    BB-/Watch Neg/B
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency         B+           BB-/Watch Neg
  Foreign and Local Currency         B            B/Watch Neg
Commercial Paper
  Local Currency                     B            B/Watch Neg


CATALONIA: Fitch Says Weak Liquidity Increases Vulnerability
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says the weak liquidity of the Autonomous Community
of Catalonia (Catalonia, BB/B/Negative) as well its large short-
term (ST) debt redemptions due in 2016 call for proactive debt
management and a collaborative relationship with the central
government.

Catalonia has to redeem EUR4,627 million in short-term debt in
2016, representing close to 7.5% of total debt, and roughly 25%
of its current revenue), from EUR5,173 million in 2015. Catalonia
at end-2015 had over 49.4% of the total ST debt of the autonomous
communities of EUR9.9 billion. Catalonia's weak budgetary
performance means the region is likely to roll over the ST debt.

The region is seeking to convert part of these ST liabilities
into longer-term debt, which according to the Budgetary Stability
Law requires approval from the Council of Ministers of Spain
since Catalonia did not meet its fiscal objective. The Catalonian
administration had planned to convert into longer-term debt three
redemptions maturing in November and December 2015 and January
2016 with a financial institution. As approval for this was still
pending from the central government, these maturities were
refinanced as ST debt until August 2016.

The long-term liabilities of Catalonia are currently reimbursed
and controlled by the central government via the liquidity
mechanisms supporting autonomous communities. Liquidity
assistance includes treasury advances to autonomous communities,
on request, to alleviate peak liquidity demands, and Catalonia
will receive a EUR350 million treasury advance soon for such
purpose.

However, even if not explicitly excluded from support, the
current liquidity mechanism does not specifically cover ST
liabilities, which means that autonomous communities will still
rely on the continued willingness of financial institutions to
roll over debt.

Fitch has been informed by government officials that the central
government is considering an extension of the liquidity support
programme for autonomous communities to include ST debt. This
will reduce potential delays to receiving approval and reinforce
the government's intention to ensure that regions fully meet all
financial liabilities when due.

Fitch will continue to closely monitor the liquidity position of
Catalonia and the rest of autonomous communities with significant
ST refinancing risk. If the liquidity support is not
strengthened, Fitch will assess the rating impact on affected
regions.


SANTANDER CONSUMER: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to Cl. D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned these definitive ratings
to the debt issued by Fondo De Titulizacion Santander Consumer
Spain Auto 2016-1:

  EUR650.2 mil. Class A Notes due April 2032, Definitive Rating
   Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  EUR30.6 mil. Class B Notes due April 2032, Definitive Rating
   Assigned A3 (sf)
  EUR42.1 mil. Class C Notes due April 2032, Definitive Rating
   Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  EUR23.0 mil. Class D Notes due April 2032, Definitive Rating
   Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Moody's ratings were not assigned to Class E and Class F Notes
which have also been issued.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

FT SANTANDER CONSUMER SPAIN AUTO 2016-1 is a three year revolving
securitization of auto loans granted by Santander Consumer,
E.F.C., S.A., 100% owned by Santander Consumer Finance S.A.
(A3/P-2 Bank Deposits; A3(cr)/P-2(cr)), to private and corporate
obligors in Spain.  Santander Consumer is acting as originator
and servicer of the loans while Santander de Titulizacion
S.G.F.T., S.A. (NR) is the Management Company ("Gestora").

As of Feb. 25, 2016, the securitized portfolio was composed of
78,745 auto loans granted to obligors located in Spain, 95.7% of
whom are private individuals.  The weighted average seasoning of
the portfolio is 9 months and its weighted average remaining term
is 61 months.  Around 80.5% of the outstanding portfolio are
loans to purchase new vehicles, and the remaining 19.5% are loans
to purchase used vehicles.  Geographically, the pool is
concentrated mostly in Andalucia (18.8%), Catalonia (16.1%) and
Madrid (14.3%). The portfolio, as of its pool cut-off date, did
not include any loans in arrears.

Moody's analysis focused, amongst other factors, on, (i) an
evaluation of the underlying portfolio of loans; (ii) the
historical performance information of the total book and past ABS
transactions; (iii) the credit enhancement provided by the
subordination, the excess spread and the reserve fund; (iv) the
liquidity support available in the transaction, by way of the
liquidity reserve, the principal to pay interest, and the reserve
fund; (v) the commingling reserve provisions, which mitigates
commingling risk; (vi) the exposure to the issuer's account bank;
(vii) the set-off risk related to insurance contracts and (viii)
the overall legal and structural integrity of the transaction.

According to Moody's, the transaction benefits from several
credit strengths such as the granularity of the portfolio,
securitization experience of Santander Consumer, significant
excess spread and the sequential amortization on the notes during
the amortization period.  Moody's, however, notes that the
transaction features a number of credit weaknesses, such as the
relatively high linkage to the unrated originator and servicer,
the exposure to larger cash amounts deposited at the account bank
and the set-off risk related to insurance contracts.  Moody's
also took into account the worse than expected performance of
some Auto ABS in Spain and the relatively stable performance of
the previous Santander Auto ABS transactions.  These
characteristics, amongst others, were considered in Moody's
analysis and ratings.

The high linkage to an unrated originator and servicer is
partially mitigated by the funding of a 1% liquidity reserve if
Santander Consumer's parent is downgraded below Baa2 or below P-
2, or if its ownership of Santander Consumer drops below 75%.  In
addition, the Management Company will act as a back-up servicer
facilitator.

The transaction has medium linkage to the account bank Santander
Consumer Finance S.A. (A3/P-2 Bank Deposits; A3(cr)/P-2(cr)),
which can hold higher amounts of cash due to some structural
features, such as a 2.0% reserve fund, principal cash flows held
up to 5% that cannot be directly reinvested during the revolving
period and quarterly payment dates.  The minimum issuer account
bank's required ratings are Baa2/P-2.  Moody's has assessed the
impact of a default of the issuer account bank on the ratings of
the transaction.

Set-off risk could arise if insurance policies signed together
with the loan contract are not honred in the event of a default
of the insurance provider, also part of the Santander group, and
a default of the originator.  In such a scenario, borrowers may
be able to set-off the unused premium amount, which has been paid
up front, against the outstanding loan.  In the portfolio, 94% of
receivables had one insurance policy connected to the loan
contract and 6% more than one.  Due to legal uncertainty, Moody's
has taken this risk into account in the quantitative analysis.

                      MAIN MODEL ASSUMPTIONS

In its quantitative assessment, Moody's assumed a mean default
rate of 5.0%, with a coefficient of variation of around 60% and a
recovery rate of 30%.  This corresponds to a portfolio credit
enhancement (PCE) of 16%.

The Spanish country ceiling is Aa2, and is therefore the maximum
rating that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer
including structured finance transactions backed by Spanish
receivables.  The portfolio credit enhancement represents the
required credit enhancement under the senior tranche for it to
achieve the country ceiling.  The methodology alters the loss
distribution curve and implies an increased probability of high
loss scenarios.

Under the methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks.  Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for SF and the
applicable credit enhancement for this rating uniquely determine
the volatility of the portfolio distribution, which is typically
measured as the coefficient of variation (COV) for ABS
transactions.  All things equal, a higher applicable CE for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable CE both translate into a higher COV.

As a result, the standard deviation of the default distribution
has been initially defined following analysis of the historical
data, as well as by benchmarking this portfolio with past and
similar transactions and the sovereign-related risk impact.

                         STRESS SCENARIOS

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Moody's principal portfolio
model inputs are Moody's cumulative default rate assumption and
the recovery rate.  Moody's tested various scenarios derived from
different combinations of mean default rate (i.e. adding a stress
on the expected average portfolio quality) and recovery rate.
For example, Moody's tested for the mean default rate: 5.0% as
base case ranging to 6.0% and for the recovery rate: 30.0% as
base case ranging to 20.0%.  At the time the rating was assigned,
the model output indicated that class A would have achieved A1
output even if the cumulative mean default probability (DP) had
been as high as 6.0%, and the recovery rate as low as 20.0% (all
other factors being constant).  Moody's Parameter Sensitivities
provide a quantitative / model-indicated calculation of the
number of rating notches that a Moody's-rated structured finance
security may vary if certain input parameters would change.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.  It is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather, how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if the two parameters within a given sector that
have the greatest rating impact were varied.

                           METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS, published in
December 2015.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Factors that may cause an upgrade of the ratings include a
significantly better than expected performance of the pool
together with an increase in credit enhancement of the notes and
an upgrade of Spain's local country currency (LCC) rating.

Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the overall performance of the pool or a downgrade of
Spain's local country currency (LCC) rating.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal with respect to the Class A, Class B, Class
C and Class D notes by the legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings
address only the credit risks associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

                   LOSS AND CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

In rating this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche.  The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate.  In each default
scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is
calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the
outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.  Therefore,
the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of
(i) the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and
(ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.

Therefore, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress
scenarios.


SANTANDER CONSUMER: DBRS Finalizes D Notes Rating at 'BB(low)'
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has finalized, as follows, the provisional
ratings previously assigned to the notes issued by FT Santander
Consumer Spain Auto 2016-1 (the issuer or the fund):

-- EUR650.2 million Series A Notes at AA (sf) (the Series A
    Notes)
-- EUR30.6 million Series B Notes at A (sf) (the Series B Notes)
-- EUR 42.1 million Series C Notes at BBB (sf) (the Series C
    Notes)
-- EUR23.0 million Series D Notes at BB (low) (sf) (the Series D
    Notes)

The notes are backed by a portfolio of auto loan receivables
granted by Santander Consumer E.F.C., S.A. (SCF) to private
individuals and commercial entities to finance the purchase of
new and used vehicles in the Kingdom of Spain. The transaction
will use the proceeds of the Series A, Series B, Series C, Series
D and Series E notes to purchase the EUR765 million loan
portfolio. The Fund will also issue the Series F notes to fund
the EUR15.3 million reserve fund. The portfolio will be serviced
by SCF. The fund is managed by Santander de Titulizacion, SGFT.

The ratings are based upon review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure and sufficiency of credit
    enhancement in the form of excess spread.

-- Relevant credit enhancement in the form of subordination and
    reserve funds available from the issue date.

-- Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the
    expected cumulative net loss assumption projected under
    various stress scenarios at a AA (sf) for Series A Notes, at
    A (sf) for Series B Notes, at BBB (sf) for Series C Notes and
    at BB (low) (sf) for Series D Notes.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
    flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms
    under which they have invested.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with respect to
    originations, underwriting, servicing and financial strength.

-- The credit quality of the underlying collateral and the
    ability of the servicer to perform collection activities on
    the collateral. DBRS conducted an operational risk review of
    SCF and deems SCF be an acceptable servicer.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions addressing
    the assignment of the assets to the issuer and the
    consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European
    Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

The transaction was modelled in Intex Dealmaker.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


GOLD FIELDS: Moody's Confirms 'Ba1' CFR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the corporate family rating
and probability of default ratings of Gold Fields Limited at Ba1
and Ba1-PD, respectively.  Concurrently, Moody's has confirmed
the Ba1 rating assigned to the $1 billion ($852M outstanding)
senior unsecured notes due Oct. 7, 2020 issued by Gold Fields
Orogen Holding (BVI) Limited, guaranteed by Gold Fields.  The
outlook on all the ratings is stable.  This concludes the review
for downgrade initiated on Jan. 22, 2016.

"The confirmation of Gold Fields' Ba1 ratings with a stable
outlook reflects the company's maintenance of strong credit
metrics and the significant inroads it has made in de-risking its
business profile, specifically starting to deliver consistent
production with a reducing cost at its South Deep mine project in
South Africa", said Douglas Rowlings, a Moody's Analyst.

This rating action resolves a rating placed under review pursuant
to Moody's review of the global mining sector, parts of which
have undergone a fundamental downward shift.  While gold has not
experienced the same magnitude of recent price reductions seen in
base metals, it is nevertheless a volatile commodity, the price
of which is very hard to predict as it is not driven by normal
industrial supply and demand factors.  Moody's expects this price
risk to be tempered with a focus on cost efficiency, prudent
project development and low financial risk, in terms of leverage,
coverage and robust liquidity.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The confirmation primarily reflects Moody's expectations that,
under a new mine management team, Gold Fields' South Deep mine
project could generate free cash flow in 2016 at a gold price of
$1,100/oz and a South African rand/US dollar exchange rate of 16,
bolstering the company's already robust metrics.  Furthermore,
Gold Fields successfully negotiated a three-year wage agreement
with South Deep mine project employees in 2015 averting a
potential labor dispute.

The company has also steeply reduced its all-in cost of gold
production across their portfolio of mines to around $942 per
ounce for the quarter ended Dec. 31, 2015, from $1,572 per ounce
for the quarter ended June 30, 2013.

Gold Field's Ba1 corporate family rating is driven by the
company's strong leverage and interest coverage metrics, exposure
to gold price volatility, moderate scale with reasonable mine and
geopolitical diversity and continuing stable production profile.
The rating is constrained by relatively high mining costs,
limited visibility of reserve replenishment at its orogenic
Australian mines and production ramp-up execution risk at its
South Deep mine in South Africa.

Moody's views favorably the track record of successful delivery
that has been observed over the past year at the company's South
Deep mine under its new mine management team.  Production from
the mine will play an integral part in Gold Fields' longer term
production profile, representing around 73% of its reserve base.

Moody's sees Gold Field's liquidity as good over the next year,
which is supported by the company's $440 million of cash at 31
December 2015 and the $1 billion availability under its revolving
credit facilities.  Moody's expects about $108 million of free
cash flow generation during 2016 at gold price of $1,100 per
ounce.  The company has no debt maturities over the next 12-18
months, and they have a large cushion on their covenants.

                    RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook assumes Gold Fields continues to maintain its
robust liquidity profile and protective all-in production cost
profile, which ensure consistent free cash flow generation in a
volatile gold price environment with leverage remaining at
current levels.  At the same time, the rating assumes Gold
Fields' ability to ensure free cash flow generation from its
South Deep mine project over the long-term.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Upward rating pressure could result if Gold Fields' maintains
adjusted debt/EBITDA below 3.0x (2x for the year ended December
2015 ) and CFO minus dividends /debt above 30% (41.2% for the
year ended December 2015), coupled with continuing to build a
production and cost delivery track record at its South Deep mine
and with production levels being maintained at its Australian
mines through reserve replenishment.

Negative pressure could be exerted on Gold Fields' Ba1 corporate
family rating if leverage, as measured by Moody's adjusted
debt/EBITDA, exceeds 3.5x and cash flow from operations minus
dividends/debt falls below 20% on a sustained basis.

Negative pressure could also be exerted on the company's rating
following increased liquidity risk or should Gold Fields be
unable to access cash flows from any of its important
international operations, namely, Ghana, Australia and Peru.
Similarly any reversal of de-risking the South Deep mine project
could also place negative pressure on the rating and/or outlook.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.

The Local Market analyst for this rating is Douglas Rowlings,
971-4-237-9543.

Headquartered in Johannesburg, Gold Fields Limited (Gold Fields)
is a global gold mining company with sales totaling $2.55 billion
and annual attributable production of 2.2 million ounces for the
financial year ended Dec. 31, 2015, making it the seventh-largest
gold producer globally.

The group is listed on the Johannesburg, New York, NASDAQ Dubai,
Swiss and Brussels stock exchanges.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


KORSAN LLC: Dnipropetrovsk Economic Court Dissolves Business
------------------------------------------------------------
Ukrainian News Agency reports that the Economic Court of
Dnipropetrovsk Region on Feb. 24 decided to dissolve Korsan LLC,
which was holding 48.228,89% of shares in Ukrtatnafta as of
December 2011.

Ukrainian News Agency learned this from a Court's award of
Feb. 24, published on the Uniform State Register of Court
Judgments.

The decision was made in the case involving its bankruptcy, at a
lawsuit filed by Mizar LLC, Ukrainian News Agency relates.

Data from the United State Register of Legal Entities, Individual
Entrepreneurs and Public Organizations of Ukraine, the state
registration of Korsan was terminated on March 9, 2016, Ukrainian
News Agency discloses.

Korsan LLC is based in Dnipropetrovsk.


KYIV CITY: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Ukrainian City of Kyiv's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'CCC'
and its National Long-term rating at 'BBB(ukr)' with Stable
Outlook.

Fitch has also affirmed the city's senior debt ratings at 'CCC'
and 'BBB(ukr)'.

The ratings reflect Kyiv's fragile fiscal capacity, its exposure
to refinancing risk on domestic bonds in 2016, limited access to
debt capital markets and a volatile macro-economic environment in
Ukraine (CCC/C).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch expects Kyiv's finances to remain fragile over the medium
term due to the overall weakness of sovereign public finances,
the reduced predictability of fiscal policy and a short planning
horizon, all exacerbated by the volatile macro-economic trend in
Ukraine.

"Nevertheless, Kyiv's operating surplus widened to 39% of
operating revenue at end-2015 from 21% in 2014, according to our
preliminary estimates. This followed reduced operating
expenditure, high national inflation (estimated at 48% in 2015)
and a change of fiscal regulation in Ukraine in 2015, which
boosted operating revenue annual growth to an average 38% in
2014-2015, from a negative 22% in 2013."

"Kyiv's external debt reduced materially after the city executed
an exchange of its $US550m Eurobonds following a restructuring in
December 2015. As the new Eurobonds were issued by Ministry of
Finance of Ukraine, relieving the city's balance sheet, we have
withdrawn the senior debt 'D' ratings of Kyiv's Eurobonds in
December 2015."

The city also restructured its domestic bonds in 2015 when Kyiv
extended the maturities of its domestic bonds by 12 months, with
new maturities coming due on October 10 and December 19, 2016.
The city's outstanding debt as of March 11, 2016 amounted to
UAH2.3 billion, following the repayment of series 'F' bonds of
UAH875 million and ahead of schedule of series 'H' bonds of
UAH1.975 billion. Against a backdrop of potentially volatile
finances, the city remains exposed to refinancing risk on its
domestic bonds, due to the short- term nature of the debt and
limited access to debt capital markets.

Offsetting these risks is Kyiv's improved liquidity to UAH1.6
billion at end-2015 from UAH647 million in 2014 following cost
optimization and rising revenue from taxes and transfers from the
central government.

According to its recently updated economic forecasts Fitch
projects mild annual growth of the Ukrainian economy in 2016-2017
of 1%-2% after contracting 10.5% in 2015 and 6.8% in 2014, which
hampered the city's prospects for economic recovery.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Adverse changes to the city's ability and capacity to refinance
or repay its domestic bonds would lead to a downgrade.

A sovereign upgrade, coupled with material reduction in
refinancing pressure along with sustained restoration of the
city's financial flexibility, would lead to an upgrade.


UKRNAFTA: Lacks Funds to Pay Debts, At Risk of Bankruptcy
---------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that Roman Nasirov, head of Ukraine's
State Fiscal Service, has said the country's higher
administrative court in February and early March confirmed
Ukrnafta's property used tax collateral to secure debt exceeding
UAH10 billion.

Mr. Nasirov said that the company does not have enough funds to
pay debts, Interfax-Ukraine relates.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, Mr. Nasirov said that the fiscal
agency will continue sending payment collection documents, but if
the situation does not change, the company's property will be put
up for sale or the company will undergo bankruptcy or financial
readjustment procedures.

Ukrnafta is a Ukrainian oil and natural gas extracting company,
the largest producer of oil and gas in the country.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AIR NEWCO: Moody's Affirms B3 CFR & Changes Outlook to Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to stable from positive the
outlook on all the ratings of Air Newco 5 S.A.R.L. and Air Newco
LLC.  Concurrently, the rating agency has affirmed the B3
Corporate Family Rating and B3-PD Probability of Default Rating
(PDR) of ACS as well as the B2 instrument rating on the first
lien secured credit facilities comprising a USD323 million term
loan B, a GBP108 million term loan B and a USD50 million
revolving credit facility, and the Caa2 rating on the USD194
million second lien term loan, borrowed in each case by Air Newco
LLC.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

"The change in outlook reflects our expectation that planned cost
saving initiatives will take longer to implement than originally
envisaged because the business has encountered a period of
disruption due to changes to the management team" says Frederic
Duranson -- a Moody's Analyst and lead analyst for ACS.  "As
such, we believe growth in profitability will be muted in the
fiscal year ended February 2016 and we do not anticipate material
improvements in credit metrics over the course of the next twelve
to eighteen months, with leverage remaining elevated" he added.

When Moody's assigned a positive outlook to the first time
ratings of ACS in January 2015, the rating agency expected the
company to record strong profit growth and a rapid reduction in
leverage from the opening level of around 7.8x (including
capitalized operating leases at 3x) on a Moody's adjusted basis,
driven by cost savings initiatives identified by management and
the company's incoming majority shareholders, Vista Equity
Partners.  However, since that time there has been significant
management turnover with the previous CEO, CFO and joint COO
resigning in early 2015.  Since then, a new CEO and CFO have been
appointed, and the senior management team has been augmented by
the addition of Chief Technology, Sales and Marketing Officers.
During 2015, there were also a number of changes in divisional
management and Moody's believes that this disruption at a senior
level has held back implementation of the planned cost saving
initiatives.

In addition to the slower deleveraging than originally envisaged,
the company's ratings remain constrained by its geographically
concentrated and modest overall revenue base.  Certain ACS
customers, notably in the public sector, operate under tight
budgetary conditions, resulting in slower or delayed bookings
from new and existing customers.  As a consequence, to
meaningfully grow its revenues ACS must look to attract new
customers while maintaining and developing relationships with
existing ones.

More positively, the B3 CFR also recognizes (1) the high levels
of recurring revenues from mission critical products; (2) the
company's leadership in a number of market niches; (3) a historic
track record of solid organic growth and strong margins; (4)
scope for increasing profitability once Vista Equity Partners
implement their established operational best practices and; (5)
the Group's adequate liquidity position.

              WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- UP/DOWN

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's view that ACS should
be able to deliver modest growth in EBITDA in the next 18 months,
driven in part by the cost saving initiatives now in course of
being implemented.  As a result, Moody's expects that adjusted
gross debt to EBITDA will slowly decline.  The outlook assumes no
debt-funded acquisitions and no dividend payments as well as
ongoing good liquidity.

In light of today's rating action, a near-term upgrade is
unlikely but positive pressure could arise if the Group continues
to grow organically and achieve cost savings, to the extent that
increased profitability and cash flows lead to gross adjusted
debt to EBITDA falling towards 6.0x and free cash flow to debt
moving towards the high single digits in percentage terms.

Conversely, the ratings could be downgraded if the company's
operating performance deteriorates or if gross adjusted debt to
EBITDA increases from the current level of close to 8.0x.  A
weakening of the liquidity profile, including tight covenant
headroom, could also put negative pressure on the rating.

                       PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Software
Industry published in December 2015.

                      CORPORATE PROFILE

Headquartered in Berkshire, England, ACS employs more than 2000
staff working from offices in the UK, as well as Ireland, the US
and India.  ACS has approximately 20,000 customers and has three
operating divisions.  Business Solutions is the largest division
and develops and sells accounting and back office software
solutions, generating around two-thirds of total revenue.  The
balance of revenues is split fairly evenly between the Health &
Care and 365 Managed Services divisions.  Health & Care's largest
product, Adastra, is a clinical patient management system to
manage unscheduled telephone advice and face-to-face care
settings, such as A&E urgent care centres, minor injury units,
and walk-in centres.  The 365 Managed Services division provides
a range of fully managed hosting services and cloud services.

In the fiscal year to February 2015, ACS reported revenues of GBP
220 million and EBITDA before exceptional items of GBP 54
million.

ACS is ultimately controlled by funds advised by Vista Equity
Partners following a take-private, which closed in March 2015.


NEDBANK LTD: Stake Sale No Impact on Fitch's 'BB+' Debt Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Nedbank Group Limited's (NedGroup)
and Nedbank Limited's (Nedbank) Support Ratings to '4' and '3'
respectively from '2' following parent Old Mutual PLC's (Old
Mutual/BBB+/Stable) strategic review of its principal
subsidiaries and planned sell down of its stake in NedGroup.

The Support Ratings have been downgraded because of Fitch's view
of a lower support propensity from Old Mutual for NedGroup and
Nedbank given the ultimate parent's intention to sell down its
majority and controlling 54.1% stake in NedGroup (which fully
owns South African domestic bank, Nedbank) expected to be
completed by end-2018.

Fitch does not exclude the possibility of Old Mutual providing
support to NedGroup and/or Nedbank in case of need while it
maintains a meaningful ownership share. However, Fitch assesses
NedGroup's and Nedbank's strategic importance to Old Mutual as
diminishing, and is therefore unable to fully rely on any
potential institutional support from the parent for the
subsidiaries.

NedGroup's and Nedbank's other ratings, including Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs), Viability Ratings (VRs), National Ratings, are
unaffected by the rating action.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
NedGroup's Support Rating (SR) is downgraded to '4', reflecting
Fitch's belief of a limited probability of support from Old
Mutual in the transition phase, up to the point of sale.

The agency has also downgraded the SR of Nedbank to '3',
reflecting that a moderate probability of support from the South
African authorities is more likely than from Old Mutual, due to
its status as a domestic systemically important bank.

Fitch has also assigned a Support Rating Floor (SRF) to Nedbank
of 'BB-' given the ability and propensity of the authorities to
support the bank if required. The ability of the South African
authorities to support is indicated by the sovereign rating of
'BBB-'/Stable. Nedbank's SR and SRF are now in line with the
larger systemically important banks in South Africa.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

SUPPORT RATINGS, SUPPORT RATING FLOORS,

Nedgroup's SR is sensitive to Old Mutual selling its stake in the
group either fully or in parts.

Nedbank's SR and SRF are sensitive to change in the ability or
propensity of the South African authorities to support the bank.
A weaker propensity to support could be indicated by a stricter
application of resolution legislation by the authorities than
Fitch's current expectations.

The rating actions are as follows:

Nedbank Limited

  Long-term foreign currency IDR unaffected at 'BBB-'; Outlook
  Stable

  Long-term local currency IDR unaffected at 'BBB-'; Outlook
  Stable

  Short-term foreign currency IDR unaffected at 'F3'

  Viability Rating unaffected at 'bbb-'

  Support Rating downgraded to '3' from '2'

  Support Rating Floor assigned at 'BB-'

  National Long-term Rating unaffected at 'AA(zaf)'; Outlook
  Stable

  National Short-term Rating unaffected at 'F1+(zaf)'

  Senior unsecured debt: unaffected at 'BBB-'

  Subordinated debt unaffected at 'BB+'

Nedbank Group Limited

  Long-term foreign currency IDR unaffected at 'BBB-'; Outlook
  Stable

  Long-term local currency IDR unaffected at 'BBB-'; Outlook
  Stable

  Short-term foreign currency IDR unaffected at 'F3'

  Viability Rating unaffected at 'bbb-'

  Support Rating downgraded to '4' from '2'

  National Long-term Rating unaffected at 'AA(zaf)'; Outlook
  Stable

  National Short-term Rating unaffected at 'F1+(zaf)'


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
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Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
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Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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