TCREUR_Public/160329.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, March 29, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 061


                            Headlines


B O S N I A

BH AIRLINES: Sarajevo Airport Files Bankruptcy Petition


G E R M A N Y

STEILMANN SE: Files for Insolvency Few Months After IPO


G R E E C E

HELLENIC TELECOMS: S&P Affirms B+/B CCRs, Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

B&N BONDS: S&P Rates US$150MM Loan Participation Notes 'B-'
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class F Debt '(P)B2'
BOSPHORUS CLO II: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating to Cl. F Notes
BOSPHORUS CLO II: Fitch Assigns 'B(EXP)' Rating to Class F Notes
MERCATOR CLO II: Moody's Hikes Class B-2 Debt Rating to Ba2(sf)


I T A L Y

BANCO POPOLARE: Moody's Says BPM Merger is Credit Positive
GRANDI HOTEL: March 31 Bid Deadline Set for Varese Hotel
GESTHOTELS SPA: March 31 Bid Deadline Set for Hotel Campo
UNICREDIT SPA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' AT 1 Notes Rating; Outlook Neg


K A Z A K H S T A N

KAZAKHMYS INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Financial Strength Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

LOWLAND MORTGAGE I: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Cl. D Notes


P O R T U G A L

NOVO BANCO: Plans to Meet Investors to Discuss Share Sale


R U S S I A

BOGORODSKY LLC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
EVRAZ GROUP: Fitch Puts 'BB-' Long-Term IDR on CreditWatch Neg.
FCRB BANK: DIA to Oversee Provisional Administration
MIKO-BANK LLC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
NIZHNEKAMSKNEFTEKHIM PJSC: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Corporate Rating

RADIOPRIBOR: To Declare Bankruptcy, Workers Mull Hunger Strike
RUSSIA: Reduced RH Ownership Won't Hit Ba1 Rating, Moody's Says


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: Obtains EUR137 Million in Emergency Loans
ABENGOA SA: Creditors Agree to Extend Debt Restructuring Talks


S W I T Z E R L A N D

* SWITZERLAND: Number of Bankruptcy Proceedings Up 9.9% in 2015


T U R K E Y

DOGUS HOLDINGS: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB-', Outlook Stable
SEKERBANK TAS: Moody's Lowers LT Deposit Ratings to Ba3


U K R A I N E

UKRAINIAN RAILWAY: Fitch Cuts IDR to 'RD' then Upgrades to 'CCC'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Creditors Back Company Voluntary Arrangement Proposal
BHS GROUP: CVA Won't Impact Franchised Stores in Middle East
INMARSAT PLC: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Corporate Family Rating
JOHNSTON PRESS: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC+', Outlook Stable
MCEWENS OF PERTH: Faces Closure Following Administration

RMAC 2005-NS1: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Cl. B1 Tranche
TATA STEEL: Board to Decide Today on Fate of Port Talbot Plant


                            *********



===========
B O S N I A
===========


BH AIRLINES: Sarajevo Airport Files Bankruptcy Petition
-------------------------------------------------------
Bosnia's Sarajevo International Airport told SeeNews on March 24
it has filed a request with a Sarajevo court for the initiation
of bankruptcy proceedings against air carrier BH Airlines.

"After reviewing the legal requirements, Sarajevo International
Airport has concluded that the conditions prescribed by the law
on bankruptcy proceedings have been met," a spokesperson for the
airport told SeeNews via e-mail.

According to SeeNews, the spokesperson said that in February, the
government of Bosnia's Muslim-Croat Federation advised Sarajevo
airport to explore the possibility of opening bankruptcy
proceedings against the air carrier, which has found itself in a
very difficult situation due to outstanding liabilities.

The government of Bosnia's Federation said earlier that BH
Airlines owes asset resolution company HETA BAM25.4 million
(US$14.5 million/EUR13 million) under a finance lease agreement
for two aircraft, SeeNews recounts.

The flag carrier owes Sarajevo International Airport BAM6.4
million, while foreign suppliers have claims to a total of BAM4.3
million, SeeNews discloses.  Employees are owed BAM2.7 million on
the basis of unpaid gross salaries, while debts to postal
operator JP BH Posta amount to BAM1.4 million, SeeNews states.

The government also said that from 2005 until 2014, BH Airlines
had generated a total of BAM99.2 million in losses, SeeNews
notes.

BH Airlines was the flag carrier of Bosnia and Herzegovina with
its head office in Sarajevo.  It operated scheduled and charter
passenger services as well as small cargo services from its home
base at Sarajevo International Airport.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


STEILMANN SE: Files for Insolvency Few Months After IPO
-------------------------------------------------------
Eyk Henning at The Wall Street Journal reports that Steilmann SE
jolted investors on March 24 by saying it would file for
insolvency less than five months after going public, a move that
raises questions about its bank advisers and auditor.

The clothing maker, which focuses on women over 45, said on
March 23 recent developments and failed restructuring
negotiations led to its financial problems, the Journal relates.

"In the course of its current business developments, Steilmann SE
is illiquid," the company, as cited by the Journal, said in a
brief disclosure.

"We're shocked, especially considering how fast this went from
IPO to insolvency," the Journal quotes Marc Tuengler, general
manager of shareholder protection organization DSW, as saying.
Mr. Tuengler called the insolvency "a pure catastrophe for
investors" and said DSW would examine the circumstances closely,
the Journal relays.

The insolvency casts doubt on the advice given by banks handling
the IPO, Oddo Seydler Bank AG and Banca Imi S.p.A, and auditor
KPMG LLP, the Journal states.

Steilmann went public on the main market segment in November,
issuing more than EUR8 million in new shares after scaling back
initial plans to seek EUR100 million in fresh funding, the
Journal recounts.

Steilmann SE is a German fashion company.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


HELLENIC TELECOMS: S&P Affirms B+/B CCRs, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B+/B' long- and
short-term corporate credit ratings on Greek integrated
telecommunications operator Hellenic Telecommunications
Organization S.A. (OTE).  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+' issue ratings on the
senior unsecured debt issued by OTE's wholly owned financing
vehicle OTE PLC.

The affirmation reflects S&P's expectation that, despite the
still unfavorable economic situation in Greece, OTE will continue
to generate consistent free cash flow and further improve its
already solid credit metrics.  S&P expects the company's debt-to-
EBITDA ratio will decline below 1.5x in 2016 from 1.7x at year-
end 2015, and that its funds from operations (FFO)-to-debt ratio
will increase to about 60% from 47%.  As a result, S&P now
considers OTE's financial risk profile to be modest, compared
with intermediate previously, and S&P has raised its stand-alone
credit profile (SACP) assessment on OTE to 'bb' from 'bb-'.
Nevertheless, the corporate credit rating remains constrained at
this stage by the still very high country risk and the adverse
economic conditions in Greece, with capital controls still in
place.

S&P believes there remains uncertainty regarding Greek companies'
future access to capital markets.  S&P also sees a continued risk
that the company's credit metrics, liquidity, and free cash flow
generation could materially weaken from currently strong levels
if the economic situation in Greece were to deteriorate again.
OTE also continues to face adverse regulation, since the company
is subject to pricing restrictions imposed by Greek regulators
and generates moderate revenues from government entities.

S&P acknowledges OTE's resilient top-line performance, with
near-stabilized revenues in 2015 (-0.4%) despite the still
adverse economic situation in Greece, where the company generates
about 71% of its revenues and about 79% of EBITDA.  The good
operating performance was mainly driven by its Greek fixed-line
operations, supported by subscriber growth in broadband, VDSL,
and particularly in OTE TV, due to attractive and exclusive
content. S&P had previously expected the company's sales to
decline by 4%-6% in 2015.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation of only modest
pressure on revenues, resilient margins due to ongoing cost-
cutting, and an improvement of the Standard & Poor's-adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA ratio below 1.5x in 2016.

S&P could raise the rating by one notch if the very high country
risk in Greece moderates, including lifting of capital controls
and improving economic prospects.  A further strengthening of
OTE's liquidity profile could also support rating upside.

S&P could also raise its rating if S&P observed that 40% owner
Deutsche Telekom's (DT's) commitment to OTE had strengthened.
Stronger support could take the form of a substantial increase in
DT's stake in OTE or other explicit forms of financial support.

S&P currently sees limited ratings downside.  S&P could lower the
rating by one notch to 'B' if the likelihood of a Grexit
increased again to above one-in-three or if materially weaker
economic conditions in Greece had significantly adverse
implications for OTE's operating prospects or liquidity, or if
S&P believed that OTE's FOCF generation prospects had weakened
considerably.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


B&N BONDS: S&P Rates US$150MM Loan Participation Notes 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B-' long-term
rating to the $150 million loan participation notes issued by B&N
Bonds D.A.C., a related Ireland-based special-purpose vehicle of
Russian B&N Bank PJSC (B-/Negative/C).  The notes will be issued
for the sole purpose of financing a loan to B&N Bank.  The
proceeds from the loan will be used by the bank for general
corporate purposes.

The loan is of equivalent currency, amount, and timing, and
therefore will back the notes issued under the program.  S&P
understands that obligations under the loan will rank at least
pari passu with all of B&N Bank's other direct, unconditional,
unsecured, and unsubordinated debt.  S&P has equalized its rating
on the bonds with its rating on B&N Bank.

In rating this transaction, S&P is applying its principles of
ratings to borrow these Standard & Poor's structured finance
criteria:

   -- "Europe Asset Isolation And Special-Purpose Entity
      Criteria -- Structured Finance," published on Sept. 13,
      2013, for S&P's review of the orphan special-purpose
      vehicle (SPV).  S&P believes that the bankruptcy-remote
      nature of the SPV mitigates the potential for the notes to
      experience a default while the underlying loan is still
      performing.

   -- "Criteria For Global Structured Finance Transactions
       Subject To A Change In Payment Priorities Or Sale Of
       Collateral Subject To A Change In Payment Priorities Or
       Sale Of Collateral Upon A Nonmonetary EOD," published on
       March 2, 2015, for S&P's review of the risk of non-
       monetary events of default;

   -- "Global Framework For Assessing Operational Risk In
      Structured Finance Transactions," published on Oct. 9,
      2014, to assess operational risk related to the
      transaction.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class F Debt '(P)B2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following provisional
ratings to notes to be issued by BlueMountain EUR CLO 2016-1
Designated Activity Company ("BlueMountain EUR CLO 2016-1 D.A.C."
or the "Issuer"):

-- EUR212,400,000 Class A1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR20,000,000 Class A2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR31,200,000 Class B1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR20,000,000 Class B2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR21,600,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

-- EUR20,400,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR26,600,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR13,400,000 Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2030. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, BlueMountain Fuji
Management, LLC, acting through its Series A ("BlueMountain A"),
has sufficient experience and operational capacity and is capable
of managing this CLO.

BlueMountain EUR CLO 2016-1 D.A.C. is a managed cash flow CLO. At
least 90% of the portfolio must consist of secured senior
obligations and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of senior
unsecured obligations, second-lien loans, high yield bonds and
mezzanine obligations. The portfolio is expected to be
approximately 75% ramped up as of the closing date and to be
comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled
in Western Europe. The remainder of the portfolio will be
acquired during the six month ramp-up period in compliance with
the portfolio guidelines.

BlueMountain A, will manage the CLO. It will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit improved and credit impaired
obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR 44,200,000 of subordinated notes. Moody's
will not assign ratings to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. BlueMountain's A investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
December 2015. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of 0 occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR400,000,000

Diversity Score: 36

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.00%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.25%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

As part of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential
exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with local currency
country risk ceiling (LCC) of A1 or below. As per the portfolio
constraints, exposures to countries with a LCC of A1 or below
cannot exceed 10%, with exposures to countries with LCCs of Baa1
to Baa3 further limited to 5%. Following the effective date, and
given these portfolio constraints and the current sovereign
ratings of eligible countries, the total exposure to countries
with a LCC of A1 or below may not exceed 10% of the total
portfolio. As a worst case scenario, a maximum 5% of the pool
would be domiciled in countries with LCCs of Baa1 to Baa3 while
an additional 5% would be domiciled in countries with LCCs of A1
to A3. The remainder of the pool will be domiciled in countries
which currently have a LCC of Aa3 and above. Given this portfolio
composition, the model was run with different target par amounts
depending on the target rating of each class of notes as further
described in the methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a
function of the exposure size to countries with LCC of A1 or
below and the target ratings of the rated notes, and amount to
0.75% for the Class A1&A2 notes, 0.50% for the Class B1&B2 notes,
0.38% for the Class C notes and 0% for Classes D, E and F.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the provisional rating
assigned to the rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes
increased default probability relative to the base case. Below is
a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3220 from 2800)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class B1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class B2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3640 from 2800)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class A2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class B1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class B2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -3


BOSPHORUS CLO II: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating to Cl. F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has assigned preliminary
credit ratings to Bosphorus CLO II Designated Activity Company's
class A, B, C, D, E, and F secured deferrable and nondeferrable
floating-rate notes.  At closing, Bosphorus CLO II will also
issue unrated subordinated notes.

Bosphorus CLO II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction securitizing a portfolio of senior secured
loans and bonds granted to speculative-grade European corporates.
Commerzbank AG, London Branch will manage the transaction.

The portfolio is 100% ramped-up, which is a relatively rare
feature in a new issue CLOs.  It has a tightly controlled one-
year reinvestment period allowing only unscheduled prepayments to
be reinvested.

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes will pay
quarterly interest unless there is a frequency switch event.
Following this, the notes will switch to semiannual payment,
after which subsequent switching is restricted under the
transaction documents.

The portfolio will be fully ramped up at closing.  The
transaction features a one-year reinvestment period where only
unscheduled proceeds on the underlying assets (coming from
prepayments, optional redemptions, accelerations, or offers) can
be reinvested into new assets, subject to the satisfaction of the
reinvestment criteria.  However, the portfolio manager will have
the option to identify and dispose of credit-impaired and
defaulted assets during the transaction's life.

At closing, the portfolio will represent a well-diversified pool
of corporate credits, with a fairly uniform exposure to all of
the credits.  S&P has conducted its credit and cash flow analysis
by applying its criteria for corporate cash flow collateralized
debt obligations.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used a portfolio target par
amount of EUR275.01 million, using the weighted-average spread
(4.40%) and the weighted-average recovery at each rating level.

The rated notes benefit from the par value ratio tests.  These
ratios track the degree to which the performing collateral is
sufficient to repay principal to the debt investors.  Once the
par value ratios fall below documented minimum levels, the
transaction will redirect available interest and principal
proceeds, if required, toward the redemption of senior
liabilities.

The numerator of the par value ratios is adjusted to reflect the
quality of the performing assets.  For example, loans rated 'CCC'
(above a certain threshold) and loans that have defaulted are
included in the numerator of the par value ratios at a value that
is less than the full par.

The Bank of New York Mellon, London Branch will be the bank
account provider and custodian.  At closing, S&P anticipates that
the participants' downgrade remedies will be in line with its
current counterparty criteria.

At closing, S&P expects that the issuer will be bankruptcy remote
under its European legal criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
and operational risks, it believes that its preliminary ratings
are commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each
class of notes.

RATINGS LIST

Preliminary Ratings Assigned

Bosphorus CLO II Designated Activity Company
EUR277.70 Million Secured Deferrable and Non-Deferrable
Floating-Rate Notes

Class            Prelim.             Prelim.
                 rating               amount
                                    (mil. EUR)
A                AAA (sf)             163.60
B                AA+ (sf)              30.50
C                A+ (sf)               22.20
D                BBB+ (sf)             13.90
E                BB (sf)               16.20
F                B (sf)                 8.00
Sub. notes       NR                    23.30

NR--Not rated.


BOSPHORUS CLO II: Fitch Assigns 'B(EXP)' Rating to Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Bosphorus CLO II, Designated Activity
Company notes expected ratings, as:

  EUR163.6 mil. class A: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR30.5 mil. class B: 'AA+(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR22.2 mil. class C: 'A(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR13.9 mil. class D: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR16.2 mil. class E: 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR8 mil. class F: 'B(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR23.3 mil. subordinated notes: not rated

Bosphorus CLO II, Designated Activity Company is a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation.  Net proceeds from the notes are
being used to purchase a EUR275 mil. portfolio of European
leveraged loans and bonds.  The portfolio is managed by
Commerzbank AG.

The assignment of final ratings is contingent on the receipt of
final documentation conforming to information already received.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Limited Reinvestment Period

The portfolio will be 100% ramped up at closing and the manager
is only allowed to reinvest unscheduled principal proceeds for
one year.  Sales proceeds from credit-impaired and defaulted
obligations are not allowed to be reinvested and will be used to
redeem the notes.

Higher Obligor Concentration

The transaction is exposed to higher obligor concentration than
other CLO transactions, with the portfolio consisting of 57
assets from 45 obligors.  The largest obligor represents 2.61%
and the 10 largest obligors represent 26.08% of the portfolio
notional.

Shorter Risk Horizon

The transaction's weighted average life (WAL) is 5.35 years and
the maximum WAL covenant is set at six years.  The shorter risk
horizon means the transaction is less vulnerable to underlying
price movements and economic and asset performances.

Portfolio Credit Quality

The average credit quality of obligors will be in the 'B'
category, with the weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio being 33.43.  Fitch has credit opinions or public
ratings on 100% of the identified portfolio.  There are no 'CCC'-
rated assets in the portfolio.

High Recovery Expectations

The portfolio will comprise senior secured loans and bonds.
Recovery prospects for these assets are typically more favorable
than for second-lien, unsecured, and mezzanine assets.  Fitch has
assigned Recovery Ratings for all assets in the portfolio.  The
weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio is expected to be
68.27%.

Class F Turbo Feature

Twenty-five per cent of the interest proceeds remaining after
payment of the subordinated management fee are diverted from the
interest waterfall to pay down the class F notes on each payment.
The effectiveness of this turbo feature is enhanced on the first
payment date by the presence of the first period interest reserve
account.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transaction documents may be amended, subject to rating
agency confirmation or noteholder approval.  Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings.  Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final
maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective Fitch may decline to comment.  Noteholders
should be aware that confirmation is considered to be given if
Fitch declines to comment.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability could lead to a
downgrade of up to three notches for the rated notes while a 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates could lead to a downgrade of
up to four notches for the rated notes.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

                           DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies.  Fitch has relied
on the practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

                   REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

A description of the transaction's Representations, Warranties
and Enforcement Mechanisms ("RW&Es") that are disclosed in the
offering document and which relate to the underlying asset pool
was not prepared for this transaction.  Offering documents for
EMEA leveraged finance collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
typically do not include RW&Es that are available to investors
and that relate to the asset pool underlying the CLO.  Therefore,
Fitch credit reports for EMEA leveraged finance CLO offerings
will not typically include descriptions of RW&Es.


MERCATOR CLO II: Moody's Hikes Class B-2 Debt Rating to Ba2(sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Mercator CLO II Plc:

-- EUR25 million Class A-3 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating
    Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug
    26, 2015 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

-- EUR25.5 million Class B-1 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating
    Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug
    26, 2015 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

-- EUR19.5 million Class B-2 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating
    Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug
    26, 2015 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued
by Mercator CLO II Plc:

-- EUR274 million (Current balance outstanding: EUR 28.7M) Class
    A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa
    (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR25.5 million Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2015
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Mercator CLO II Plc, issued in January 2007, is a Collateralised
Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly senior
secured high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by
NAC Management (Cayman) Limited, and this transaction ended its
reinvestment period in February 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of
deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes and subsequent increase in
the overcollateralization (the "OC") ratios. Moody's notes that
on the November 2015 and February 2016 payment dates, the Class
A-1 notes were paid in total EUR40.1 million (or 14.6% of their
original balance). As a result of this deleveraging, the OC
ratios of the notes have increased. As per the latest trustee
report dated February 2016, the Class A-2, Class A-3, Class B-1
and Class B-2 OC ratios are 263.49%, 180.35%, 136.43% and 115.02%
respectively, versus September 2015 levels of 193.67%, 153.09%,
126.13% and 111.16%.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR115 million and GBP 18.6 million, principal
proceeds balance of EUR7,481, a weighted average default
probability of 20% (consistent with a WARF of 2,683 with a
weighted average life of 4.86 years), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 47.5% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 20 and a weighted average spread of 3.80%. The
GBP denominated assets are fully hedged with a macro swap, which
Moody's also modelled.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate of
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it lowered the
weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio by 5%; the model
generated outputs that were within two notches of the base-case
results for Class B-1 and consistent with the base-case results
for other rated tranches.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

3) Around 6% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed large
concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate as
described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates
in Rated Transactions", published in October 2009 and available
at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCO POPOLARE: Moody's Says BPM Merger is Credit Positive
----------------------------------------------------------
The merger between Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa (Banco, Ba2
stable Deposits / Ba3 stable Issuer rating, b2 BCA) and Banca
Popolare di Milano S.C.a.r.l. (BPM, Ba2 stable Deposits / Ba3
negative Issuer rating, b2 BCA), announced on March 23, 2016,
will be credit positive for the two banks as well as for the
wider Italian banking system, says Moody's Investors Service in a
report published on March 24.

Moody's report is entitled "Merger Between Banco Popolare and BPM
Has Long-Term Positive Credit Implications."

The rating agency's report is an update to the markets and does
not constitute a rating action.

Moody's believes that a combined Banco-BPM -- which would become
the third largest banking player in Italy subject to approval --
will be able to weather a more competitive banking environment.

Specifically, in the long-term, the merger should lead to cost
savings and greater revenue diversification, according to the
rating agency. Both Banco and BPM mostly operate in the
relatively wealthy northern Italy, an overlap which offers the
opportunity to rationalize their branch networks. In addition, a
larger group could offer a wider range of products in a more
efficient manner, which would in turn improve revenue
diversification.

The merger is also supported by additional capital, another
credit positive, in Moody's view. Banco has agreed on a EUR1
billion capital increase, the proceeds of which will be used to
increase the coverage of problem loans up to 49% from 43% while
the bank's Common Equity Tier 1 ratio will remain at its current
level; this is credit positive for the senior debt and deposit
ratings on both institutions.

Moody's also believes that the merger will contribute to improved
governance, which has so far been a weakness for BPM. The new
Banco-BPM group will be a joint-stock company, in which the
balance of power will be better distributed according to the
number of shares owned by each shareholder.

Nevertheless, several risks remain in the short-term, according
to Moody's. The merger is still subject to final approvals by
relevant authorities and by the banks' shareholders, for example.
In addition, there will be execution risks in the short-term, in
Moody's view. These challenges include IT integration,
discussions with the unions on redundancies, and the appointment
of management that represents shareholders and the two legacy
banks.

The Banco-BPM group will also have significant challenges in
terms of asset risk and profitability. In particular, the stock
of problem loans is very high, mostly coming from legacy issues
at Banco and its subsidiary Banca Italease (now merged into
Banco). While the coverage of bad loans will be augmented, the
bank has refrained from taking a view as to whether it will make
use of the recently announced Italian "bad bank" framework.

Furthermore, the combined entity will begin to operate from a
challenging operating environment, according to the rating
agency. Profitability is likely to be challenged by the low
interest rate environment and low loan growth; high reliance on
gains on securities, which are volatile in nature; a high level
of operating costs; and continued doubts on asset quality.


GRANDI HOTEL: March 31 Bid Deadline Set for Varese Hotel
--------------------------------------------------------
Avv. Claudio Franceschini, Prof. Simone Manfredi and Ing. Marco
Sogaro, the Official Receivers of Grandi Hotel s.r.l. under
Extraordinary Administration, in execution of the Disposal Scheme
approved by the Ministry of Economic Development, call all
interested parties to submit by March 31, their expression of
interest in the purchase of the company brand Hotel Palace in
Varese, in accordance with the procedures set out in the tender
specifications, available on the Web site www.astragrandhotel.it
based on a binding offer already in the hands of the procedure.


GESTHOTELS SPA: March 31 Bid Deadline Set for Hotel Campo
---------------------------------------------------------
Avv. Claudio Franceschini, Prof. Simone Manfredi and Ing. Marco
Sogaro, the Official Receivers of Grandi Hotel s.r.l. under
Extraordinary Administration, in execution of the Disposal Scheme
approved by the Ministry of Economic Development, call all
interested parties to submit by March 31, their expression of
interest in the purchase of the properties Hotel Palace and Grand
Hotel Campo dei Fiori, in accordance with the procedures set out
in the tender specifications, available on the Web site
www.astagesthotels.it  based on a binding offer already in the
hands of the procedure.


UNICREDIT SPA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' AT 1 Notes Rating; Outlook Neg
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Unicredit S.p.A.'s Outlook to Negative
from Stable and affirmed its Long-term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) at 'BBB+'.

The rating actions follow a periodic review of the banking group.
The bank's Long-term IDR is driven by its standalone financial
strength as expressed by its Viability Rating (VR).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

VR, IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

UniCredit's ratings are underpinned by its broad and diversified
international franchise, which supports resilient but modest
earnings, and an adequate funding and liquidity profile.
However, the Negative Outlook reflects asset quality weaknesses,
particularly from its sizeable stock of impaired exposures in
Italy, and capital pressures, underlined by modest buffers over
minimum regulatory capital requirements and a relatively high
ratio of unreserved impaired exposures to capital.

Geographical diversification, particularly in more stable and
highly rated economies such as Germany and Austria has proved key
in supporting earnings resilience and the group's overall risk
profile.  However, Fitch considers that the bank's risk profile
remains correlated with that of the Italian sovereign and the
domestic operating environment.  In Fitch's view, this
correlation is, among other factors, reflected in the bank's
domestic performance and asset quality, which have proven
sensitive to the economic environment.

Fitch expects Italy's economy to grow by just 1.0% in 2016 and
1.3% in 2017, and we note that there is momentum in Italy for
legislative initiatives aimed at reducing the impaired loans
build-up which has taken place since 2007.  However, the impact
of these initiatives is likely to be relatively limited in the
near term.

The group's risk profile is negatively influenced by
approximately EUR80bn impaired exposures at end-2015, largely
generated by its Italian corporate business during the protracted
recession that the country recently exited.  While the large
impaired loan stock is being reduced thanks to focused
strategies, more actively so than at peers, the pace of reduction
is still limited relative to the outstanding stock.  There are
risks around UniCredit's ability to achieve a significant
acceleration in the pace of impaired loan reduction as this
largely depends on how the operating environment in Italy evolves
and on the effectiveness of recently implemented changes to
encourage problem loan disposals.  Asset quality weaknesses are
partly mitigated by a reasonable loan impairment coverage ratio
of over 55% at end-2015.

UniCredit's capital ratios are at the lower end of the range of
its direct Italian and international peers and existing buffers
over regulatory requirements are small.  Unicredit's phased-in
CET1 ratio was 10.73% at end-2015, only 73 basis points higher
than its combined buffer requirements.  Combined with its large
unreserved impaired loans to capital ratio, this limits the
bank's flexibility to absorb unexpected losses, which weighs
heavily in our assessment of the group's capitalization.
UniCredit targets a fully loaded CET1 ratio of 11.5% at end-2018
but its plans include some flexibility to further increase its
buffers over its combined requirements at that date in case of
need.

In Fitch's assessment of capital, it also considers that capital
and funding are gradually becoming more fungible across the group
as its structure is evolving to reflect regulatory developments
and make UniCredit more resolvable.  This is supported by the
group's decision to transfer all its CEE subsidiaries from the
Austrian sub-holding to the parent.  Excess capital continues to
be allocated at its German subsidiary UniCredit Bank AG.

UniCredit's operating returns remain modest despite benefits
derived from its geographical diversification.  The bank is
trying to address this with a recently updated strategic plan
including additional business restructuring and further revision
of its geographic presence and workforce levels.  However, it is
early to assess the group's ability to execute on its revised
plans and a meaningful track record is needed in order to do so.
A continuation in the reduction of loan impairment charges
observed in the past couple of years in its Italian activities
combined with lower administrative and personnel costs as per its
strategic plans would, in Fitch's opinion, support improvements
in overall profitability levels.

Funding is stable and well diversified and benefits from the
group's direct presence in and market access to various
geographies.  The group's liquidity profile is commensurate with
the ratings.

The rating of the senior debt issued by UniCredit's funding
vehicles, UniCredit Bank (Ireland) plc, and UniCredit
International Bank Luxembourg SA is equalised with those of the
parent since it is unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by
UniCredit.

          SUPPORT RATING (SR) AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR (SRF)

The SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors can no
longer rely on receiving full extraordinary support from the
sovereign in the event that a bank becomes non-viable.  The EU's
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for eurozone banks provide a framework
for resolving banks that require senior creditors participating
in losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving
sovereign support.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

VR, IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

The bank is sensitive to the operating environment in Italy, also
in relation to the recent initiatives aimed at helping to address
Italian banks' asset quality.  Fitch expects to review the bank's
ratings before end-2016 to assess progress on the relevant
factors affecting the VR.

Unicredit's ratings are sensitive to management's stance on
improving asset quality and capitalization.  In Fitch's opinion,
the ratings are particularly vulnerable to its ability to
reinforce its capitalization, including buffers over minimum
regulatory requirements, and to reduce capital at risk from
unreserved impaired loans.  The ratings may be downgraded if
capital is insufficiently reinforced and/or if it fails to
materially reduce its large stock of impaired loans, including
via an acceleration of disposals.  Positive progress on
capitalization and asset quality could result in the ratings
being stabilized.

Because capital and funding are progressively becoming more
fungible across the group and excess capital is held at German
subsidiary UniCredit Bank AG, which is subject to direct
supervision by the ECB like its parent in Italy, it is possible
that Fitch will at some point assign common VRs to UniCredit and
its large banking subsidiary in Germany to reflect the then close
integration between the two entities.

The rating of the senior debt issued by UniCredit's funding
vehicles, UniCredit Bank (Ireland) plc, and UniCredit
International Bank Luxembourg SA is sensitive to the same
considerations as the senior unsecured debt issued by the parent.

           SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings of the securities are sensitive to a change in the
bank's VR.  The ratings are also sensitive to a change in the
notes' notching, which could arise if Fitch changes its
assessment of their non-performance relative to the risk captured
in the VR. For AT1 issues this could reflect a change in capital
management or flexibility or an unexpected shift in regulatory
buffers and requirements, for example.

In particular, UniCredit's current CET1 ratio provides the group
with only a limited buffer above its combined requirement.
Breaching this requirement might lead to restrictions on coupon
payments, although its current plans to 2018 include some
flexibility to enlarge this buffer, subject to the group's
ability to generate capital internally and its decisions on how
to remunerate shareholders.  There are some regulatory
developments that might lead to a less strict interpretation of
these requirements in relation to AT1 coupon payments.  Depending
on these regulatory developments as well as on the authorities
approach to the bank's Pillar 2 requirements following the
completion of the EBA stress-test exercise in 2016 Fitch might
consider applying more than the standard three notches for non-
performance risk to UniCredit's AT1 instruments ratings.

                              SR AND SRF

An upgrade of the SR and upward revision of the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support UniCredit.  While not impossible, this is highly
unlikely, in Fitch's view.

The rating actions are:

UniCredit S.p.A.
  Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook revised to Negative
   from Stable
  Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  VR: affirmed at 'bbb+'
  SR: affirmed at '5'
  SRF: affirmed at 'No Floor'
  Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB+'/'F2'
  Tier 2 notes: affirmed at 'BBB'
  Legacy Upper Tier 2 notes: affirmed at 'BB+'
  Preferred stock: affirmed at 'BB'
  AT 1 Notes: affirmed at 'BB-'

UniCredit Bank (Ireland) p.l.c. (no issuer ratings assigned):
Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'/F2

UniCredit International Bank (Luxembourg) S.A. (no issuer ratings
assigned):
  Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KAZAKHMYS INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Financial Strength Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed JSC Kazakhmys Insurance Company's
(Kazakhmys Ins) Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) rating at 'B+'
and its National IFS rating at 'BBB(kaz)'.  The Outlooks are
Stable.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings reflect Kazakhmys Ins's strong capital position for
the rating level, its solid, albeit moderately declining,
profitability and low average credit quality of the investment
portfolio.  The affirmation also reflects the challenges
Kazakhmys Ins faces in relation to its planned growth strategy
and high dependence on outwards reinsurance.

Kazakhmys Ins's shareholders injected KZT3.6 bil. to increase the
insurer's share capital to KZT4.25 bil. in 2M16.  There has been
some redistribution between individual shareholders of the
company, but their overall participation remained stable at
90.01%.  Kazakhmys Corporation, the sole corporate shareholder
and also a key customer of Kazakhmys Ins, has stayed at the
current 9.99%.  Kazakhmys Ins has indicated that strong top line
growth, improved diversification of the portfolio and reduced
utilization of reinsurance are key aims of the planned capital
increase in early 2016.

After the capital increase Kazakhmys Ins's investment strategy
has remained mainly focused on fixed-income instruments (92% of
the portfolio at end-February 2016), but of modest credit
quality. 56% of the portfolio is USD-denominated instruments from
local banks, mainly rated in the 'B' category.  Fitch views this
combination as particularly risky given the Kazakhstan
macroeconomic context.

Based on unaudited 2015 results, the insurer reported strong
premium growth of 74% on a gross basis and 48% on a net basis in
2015.  The reinsurance utilization ratio remained very high, with
84% of premiums ceded to reinsurers in 2015 (2014: 82%).

Fitch views the growth of the insurer's portfolio as
undiversified.  On a net basis, it was largely supported by the
compulsory motor third party liability (MTPL) and, to a lesser
extent, workers' compensation insurance written as inwards
business from life insurers.  As a result, the weight of MTPL in
net written premiums grew to 52% in 2015 from 25% in 2014.  This
trend has continued in 2016 with this share growing to 74% in
2M16 from 49% in 2M15.

Kazakhmys Ins's net income improved to KZT921 mil. in 2015 from
KZT128 mil. in 2014.  This was achieved through KZT1.4 bil. FX
gains on investments (2014: KZT0.1 bil. FX loss), which arose in
the context of a severe devaluation of Kazakh tenge in 2015.  In
the absence of FX gains the insurer's net result weakened to a
KZT66m loss in 2M16 (2M15: net profit of KZT307 mil.).

The insurer's underwriting result was negative KZT209 mil. in
2015 with the combined ratio at 106.7%, a moderate weakening from
105.1% in 2014.  The loss ratio improved to 82.1% in 2015 from
97.8% in 2014 supported by reserve releases in significantly
reduced accident insurance and to a smaller extent release of
prior year reserves in property insurance.  The combined ratio
also benefited significantly from KZT850 mil. subrogation income
received on workers compensation insurance in 2015.  Fitch has
treated this item as an 'other underwriting income' component of
the combined ratio.

Along with the sector-wide trend, Kazakhmys Ins is facing a
deteriorating loss ratio on the compulsory MTPL line.  The
insurer's MTPL loss ratio weakened to 77% in 2015 from 56% in
2014.  The subrogation income on MTPL remained stable in both
years at 5% of the line's premiums earned.  Fitch anticipates a
further deterioration of the line's loss ratio in the Kazakh
sector in 2016, which is a particular challenge for Kazakhmys Ins
with its growing exposure to the line.

The insurer's commission ratio weakened but remained modest at
13.3% in 2015 from 7.5% in 2014.  The administrative expense
ratio remained burdensome at 46.7% in 2015 from 41.4% in 2014.
Fitch believes that a reduction in the expense ratio is essential
for a healthier underwriting result, particularly in the context
of a major drop in commissions earned on outwards reinsurance in
2015.

Under Fitch's Prism factor-based capital model, Kazakhmys Ins's
score was 'Strong' based on 2015 results.  It weakened from 2014
due to the overlapping growth of net business volumes and
investment portfolio relative to the available capital.  The
recent capital injection is likely to improve Kazakhmys Ins's
score to 'Extremely Strong' in 2016, if the insurer does not face
substantial net losses or major dividend outflow.  The insurer's
regulatory solvency margin strengthened to 388% at end-2M16 from
147% at end-2015.  Kazakhmys Ins remains highly dependent on the
quality of reinsurance purchased.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings could be upgraded if Kazakhmys Ins improves the
average credit quality of its investment portfolio.

The ratings could also be upgraded if the company successfully
executes its growth strategy, with a sustainable improvement of
the underwriting profitability and diversification of the
portfolio.

The ratings could be downgraded if Kazakhmys Ins depletes capital
either due to underwriting or investment losses and demonstrates
long-term inability to return to profitable underwriting.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


LOWLAND MORTGAGE I: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Cl. D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Lowland Mortgage Backed Securities
series and Green Lion 1 B.V.'s class A and B notes and upgraded
the class C notes.

The mortgages in the Lowland transactions were originated and
serviced by SNS Bank N.V. (SNS, BBB/Stable/F3) and its
subsidiaries.  NHG loans comprise 38.6% of the current
outstanding pool in Lowland 1 and around 1% in Lowland 2 and 3.
Green Lion 1's portfolio was originated and serviced by Westland
Utrecht Bank (WUB), which is part of ING Bank (A/Stable/F1).

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Arrears within Expectations, Increasing Repossessions

As of January 2016, loans with more than three monthly payments
overdue were reported between 0.6% (Lowland 3) and 0.8% (Lowland
1) of the current portfolio balance.  Fitch notes that late
arrears in these transactions remain close to the Fitch
Netherlands All Deals Index (0.6%).  Late arrears in Green Lion 1
and Lowland 1 decreased 30bps over the period, which is also in
line with the market trend (-20bpd yoy).

Over the same period, the cumulative balance of mortgages whose
property has been repossessed and sold increased in all
transactions.  While sold repossessions remained negligible in
Lowland 2 and 3 (about 0.2% of the original balance in both
deals), they were reported at 0.9% in Lowland 1.  Green Lion 1
benchmarks the Index at 1%.  The decrease of arrears in the older
vintages and limited repossessions contribute to Fitch's
expectation of sound future performance for these deals, as
reflected in the Stable Outlooks.

Unhedged Transactions
There is no swap in place to hedge the interest rate mismatch
between the notes and the mortgage loans in any of the Lowland
transactions.  Instead, the proportions of fixed- and floating-
rate notes issued are similar to the proportions of fixed- and
floating-rate loans in the pool, thereby providing natural
hedging for the interest rate risk.

Interest Only Maturity concentration in Lowland
More than 20% of each of the Lowlands portfolios is made up of
interest-only loans maturing in a three-year period.  In Fitch's
view, this represents a concentration risk.  The agency applied
an increased probability of default to the concentrated portion
of the portfolio.  Despite this additional stress, the credit
enhancement (CE) available to the rated notes is sufficient for
the ratings to be affirmed.

Deposit and Insurance Set-off risk
SNS is a deposit-taking institution.  A borrower could
potentially set-off their savings deposit against the outstanding
mortgage balance in case of the insolvency of the seller.  After
accounting for the deposit guarantee scheme, which protects
saving deposits up to EUR100,000, the set-off exposure has been
sized at 0.36%, 0.31% and 0.16% in Lowland 1, 2 and 3,
respectively.  The securitized loans in Green Lion 1 are not
connected with any current account or savings deposit.

The intention of insurance policies is that the proceeds of the
investments can be used to repay the mortgage loan in full or in
part at maturity.  If the policy providers are no longer able to
meet their obligations, for example as a result of insolvency,
borrowers may seek to set-off the claim over the insurance
provider against their mortgages, on the basis that the intention
is for the loan to be repaid using the proceeds from the policy.

The risk that set-off could be successfully exercised depends on
whether the lender and insurance policy provider are the same
legal entity, or whether the mortgage and insurance policies are
offered as one product.  If they are, Fitch assumes a set-off
probability equal to 100%.  This figure is reduced to 25% if
insurance provider and lender are different institutions or if
the mortgage and insurance policy are not a joint product.

Currently, mortgage loans that have an insurance policy attached
represent 15% in Green Lion 1 while for Lowlands Fitch relied on
the information available at closing.

The derived deposit and insurance set-off exposures are accounted
for in the analysis of the available CE.

Sufficient CE

CE is reported between 1.7% (Lowland 1's class D notes) and 23.7%
(Green Lion 1's class A notes).  CE is provided by both the
collateralized assets and a reserve fund equal to 2.5% of the
outstanding notes balance in Green Lion 1, while no reserve
provides credit protection to the Lowland series.  Fitch's
analysis of the current CE resulted in the affirmation of the
Lowland series and of the class A and B notes in Green Lion 1.
Fitch deemed the CE sufficient to upgrade Green Lion 1's class C
notes.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Deterioration in asset performance may result from economic
factors, in particular the increasing effect of unemployment.  A
corresponding increase in new defaults and associated pressure on
excess spread levels, beyond Fitch's assumptions, could result in
negative rating action, particularly for the junior tranches.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

                          DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions.  The agency notes that the Lowland's
pool tapes did not include the information related to the amount
of insurance loans and information on the insurance provider was
not provided for any of the deals under review.  Fitch relied on
the information available at transactions' closing.

Fitch has not reviewed the results of any third party assessment
of the asset portfolio information or conducted a review of
origination files as part of its ongoing monitoring.

Prior to Green Lion 1's closing, Fitch reviewed the results of a
third party assessment conducted on the asset portfolio
information, which indicated no adverse findings material to the
rating analysis.

Prior to the closing of each of the Lowland deals, Fitch reviewed
the results of a third party assessment conducted on the asset
portfolio information, which indicated errors or missing data
related to the Foreclosed property value and valuation date
information.  These findings were considered in this analysis by
reducing the property values by 0.6% in Lowland 1 and 2 and by 2%
in Lowland 3, which is in line with the initial rating analysis.

Prior to the transactions closing, Fitch conducted a review of a
small targeted sample of the originators' origination files and
found the information contained in the reviewed files to be
adequately consistent with the originator's policies and
practices and the other information provided to the agency about
the asset portfolio.  Overall and together with the assumptions
referred to above, Fitch's assessment of the information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

                   REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

A comparison of the transaction's Representations, Warranties &
Enforcement Mechanisms to those typical for the asset class is
available by accessing the appendix that accompanies the initial
new issue report.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Lowland Mortgage Backed Securities 1 B.V.
  Class A1 (XS0729888924) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class A2 (XS0729892108) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B (XS0729892959) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class C (XS0729893411) affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class D (XS0729893767) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

Lowland Mortgage Backed Securities 2 B.V.
  Class A1 (XS0887366135) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class A2 (XS0887366481) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B (XS0887378064) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class C (XS0887378577) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
  Class D (XS0887378908) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

Lowland Mortgage Backed Securities 3 B.V.
  Class A1 (XS0988484878) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class A2 (XS0988486493) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B (XS0988487202) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
  Class C (XS0988487970) affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class D (XS0988488606) affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

Green Lion I B.V.
  Class A2 (NL0009704147) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class A3 (NL0009704154) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class A4 (NL0009704162) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B (NL0009704170) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class C (NL0009701488) upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBB+sf'';
   Outlook Stable



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


NOVO BANCO: Plans to Meet Investors to Discuss Share Sale
---------------------------------------------------------
Martin Arnold and Peter Wise at The Financial Times report that
Portugal's Novo Banco is planning to meet investors in the US and
UK as early as next month to discuss a potential share sale,
joining a growing list of southern European banks seeking to
raise equity.

According to the FT, the bank, which was carved out of the ruins
of Banco Espirito Santo after its government bailout in 2014,
needs more capital to cover expected losses from selling unwanted
assets that amount to a fifth of its balance sheet.

The EUR10 billion of assets it has shifted into an internal "side
bank" and hopes to sell include an interest in the M6 toll road
in the UK, a luxury yacht, a stake in an Angolan bank and a
private jet that a borrower dismantled in an attempt to stop it
being repossessed, the FT discloses.

Novo Banco, which declined to comment, hopes that by selling some
of its most problematic assets it will achieve a higher valuation
from investors and potential acquirers, the FT states.

However, Novo Banco could meet a frosty reception from investors
after some of its bonds were moved late last year to the "bad
bank" left behind by Banco Esp°rito Santo, the FT notes.  The
move boosted its capital levels but sparked outrage from the
bondholders hit by heavy losses, the FT relays.

Novo Banco, the FT says, is still owned by the Portuguese
resolution fund, which has been given by European regulators
until August 2017 to sell 100% of the bank.

A share sale to cornerstone investors could open the door to a
full public listing by Novo Banco, which made a net loss of
almost EUR1 billion in 2015 according to the FT.  But the
resolution fund is also seeking strategic bidders to acquire the
bank outright, the FT relates.

Portugal is hoping that Spain's Caixabank will soon reach a deal
to take full control of Banco BPI, the fourth largest Portuguese
bank, which could then act as a springboard to merge with Novo
Banco, the FT states.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Novo Banco, S.A. provides various
financial products and services to private, corporate, and
institutional customers.

                        *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 6,
2016, Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Caa1 from B2 the
senior debt and long-term deposit ratings of Portugal's Novo
Banco, S.A. and its supported entities.  This follows the Bank of
Portugal's (BoP) announcement on Dec. 29, 2015, that it had
approved the recapitalization of Novo Banco by transferring
EUR1,985 million of senior debt back to Banco Espirito Santo,
S.A. (BES unrated).  Moody's said the outlook on Novo Banco's
deposit and senior debt ratings is now developing.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


BOGORODSKY LLC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
-------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by Order No. OD-988, dated March 24, 2016,
revoked the banking license of the credit institution Commercial
Bank Bogorodsky, LLC, as of March 24, 2016.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, equity capital adequacy ratios below two per cent,
decrease in bank equity capital below the minimum value of the
authorized capital established as of the date of the state
registration of the credit institution, due to repeated
application within a year of measures envisaged by the Federal
Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of
Russia)".

Bank Bogorodsky LLC implemented a high-risk lending policy
connected with the placement of funds in low-quality assets.  As
a result of meeting the supervisor's requirements on creating
provisions adequate to the risks assumed, the credit institution
fully lost its equity (capital).  The management and owners of
the credit institution did not take effective measures to
normalize its activities.  Under these circumstances, the Bank of
Russia performed its duty on the revocation of the banking
license from the credit institution in accordance with Article 20
of the Federal Law 'On Banks and Banking Activities'.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-989, dated March 24,
2016, appointed a provisional administration to Bank Bogorodsky
LLC for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant
to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with the federal laws, the
powers of the credit institution's executive bodies have been
suspended.

Bank Bogorodsky LLC is a member of the deposit insurance system.
The revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than 1.4 million per one
depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of March 1, 2016, Bank
Bogorodsky LLC ranked 476th by assets in the Russian banking
system.


EVRAZ GROUP: Fitch Puts 'BB-' Long-Term IDR on CreditWatch Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Russia-based Evraz Group SA's and
holding company Evraz plc's Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDR) of 'BB-' on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

The RWN follows the release of the group's 2015 annual results,
which were below our base case expectations.  This reflected
generally weak demand trends for steel in the Russian market and
in particular with respect to construction steel -- a key market
for Evraz.  Fitch believes there is now a higher risk that Evraz
Group's credit metrics will not return within expected parameters
for the current rating, including funds from operations (FFO)
gross leverage sustainably below 3.5x, over the next two to three
years.

Fitch expects to resolve the RWN over the next three to six
months.  Over this period we expect to meet with company
management to better understand expectations for future operating
performance as well as potential options to reduce absolute debt
levels.  Fitch will also monitor the development of near-term
market conditions and prices.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

Weak Financial Performance, High Leverage

Weak end-market conditions had a significant impact on Evraz's
financial performance in 2015.  Revenues were down 33% compared
with 2014 due to the combination of materially lower product
prices and lower production volumes.  However, a favorable
foreign exchange impact on rouble-denominated costs, together
with the cost efficiency measures implemented by management, have
largely contained the drop in EBITDA margins, going down to 16%
from 17.6%.

Results were materially below our expectations from the base
rating case in September 2015, both in terms of debt reduction
and profitability.  Fitch expected then that EBITDA would amount
to USD1.8 bil. for 2015 and FFO gross leverage would be
approximately 4.0x in 2016 and not exceed 3.5x over the rating
horizon.  Instead, the company achieved USD1.4 bil. of EBITDA,
largely due to a further drop in domestically sold long products
prices.  FFO gross leverage was 5.4x, and Fitch now forecasts it
to exceed 5.0x in 2016 and remain over 3.5x until end-2019.

No Recovery Expected in Key End-Markets in 2016

Evraz's key domestic end-markets are construction, which made up
37% of 2015 sales volumes, and railway products (8%), while about
45% of Russian production was exported in the form of semi-
finished products.  Russian GDP declined by 3.8% in 2015, driving
consumption and prices significantly down.  Construction and
railways prices dropped by 32% and 29%, respectively, and are not
expected to recover in 2016, in line with Russian GDP.  Fitch's
main assumption behind this assessment is our view on oil prices
in 2016.  Fitch believes that there is a strong correlation
between the prices of oil and gas and the Russian economy, and
therefore, in turn, with the steel market in general, and the
construction and railway markets in particular.  Fitch do not
believe that oil prices will recover enough this year to reverse
the trend.  Exports of semi-finished product have followed the
same trend in 2015, with prices down by 33%, and are expected to
remain equally strained in 2016.

Raspadskaya Ratings Linked to Evraz

Stronger ties between Evraz plc and Raspadskaya developed after
Evraz increased its ownership to 82% in January 2013.  The
companies have since merged several support departments, such as
treasury, logistics and other operations to increase synergies.
Evraz also refinanced all of Raspadskaya's bank debt in 3Q13.
Evraz remains a top-three offtaker for Raspadskaya, which plays a
crucial part in Evraz's integration into coal.  Despite these
factors, a one-notch differential remains appropriate and
reflects the absence of formal downstream corporate guarantees
for Raspadskaya's debt from Evraz.

High Raw Material Self-Sufficiency

Evraz Group benefits from high self-sufficiency in iron ore and
coking coal, including supplies of coal from its subsidiary
Raspadskaya.  Consequently, it is better placed across the steel
market cycle to control the cost base of its upstream operations
than less integrated Russian and international steel peers.  The
cash cost of slab production at Evraz's Russian steel mills is
estimated to have fallen by around 50% in absolute terms to
USD193/t since 2013, reflecting a combination of operating cost
efficiencies and the fall in value of the rouble, which have
enabled the company to maintain high plant capacity utilization.

Corporate Governance
Fitch regards Evraz's corporate governance as reasonable compared
with its Russian peer group, but we continue to notch down the
rating in respect of corporate governance by two notches relative
to international peers.  This factor in Fitch's view of the
higher than average systemic risks associated with the Russian
business and jurisdictional environment.

                         KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Evraz
plc/Evraz Group/Raspadskaya include:

   -- USD/RUB exchange rate: 75 in 2016, 68 in 2017 and 62 in
      2018
   -- Fall in steel sales volumes in 2016 of 5.3%, progressive
      recovery thereafter (+1% in 2017 and 4% in 2018 and 2019)
   -- Fall in coal sales volume in 2016 of 2%, flat in 2017 and
      steady growth thereafter (+2% in 2018-2019)
   -- Decrease in prices of steel products and coal in 2016 (-14%
      for steel and -2% for coal), progressive increase
      thereafter
   -- USD450 mil. capex spend in each of 2016 and 2017,
      USD500 mil. thereafter
   -- No dividend payments or share buybacks over the period to
      2018

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Evraz plc/Evraz Group SA

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- FFO-adjusted gross leverage above 4.0x by end-2016 or
      sustained above 3.5x
   -- FFO-adjusted net leverage sustained above 3.0x
   -- Persistently negative free cash flow (FCF)
   -- Failure to extend debt maturities falling due in 2017 and
      2018

Positive: Future developments that could lead to an affirmation
include:

   -- Further absolute debt reduction with FFO gross leverage
      moving sustainably below 3.0x
   -- FFO-adjusted net leverage sustained below 2.5x
   -- Sustained positive FCF

OAO Raspadskaya

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

   -- Stronger operational and legal ties with Evraz, including a
      corporate guarantee of Raspadskaya's debt, which could lead
      to the equalization of the companies' ratings.
   -- Positive rating action on Evraz plc, which could lead to a
      corresponding rating action on Raspadskaya.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Evidence of weakening operational and legal ties between
      Evraz and Raspadskaya
   -- Negative rating action on Evraz plc, which could lead to a
      corresponding rating action on Raspadskaya.

                            LIQUIDITY

The refinancing of approximately USD970 mil. of the company's
2015-2018 debt maturities with proceeds from USD750 Eurobond
issue in December 2015 and RUB15 bil. in March 2016 rebalanced
the company's overall maturity profile.  Fitch believes that the
company is in a position to service all of its mandatory
repayments until 2017 out of FCF, cash and an available undrawn
revolving credit facility.

At end-2015, Evraz had USD1,375 mil. unrestricted cash, USD317
mil. in undrawn committed bank facilities and strong FCF
generation of USD760 mil.  Fitch expects the company to generate
around USD350 mil.-USD450 mil. FCF between 2016 and 2017.

                     FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Evraz Group SA
   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR of 'BB-' placed on RWN
   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR of 'B' affirmed
   -- Senior unsecured rating of 'BB-' placed on RWN

Evraz plc
   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR of 'BB-' placed on RWN
   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR of 'B' affirmed

OAO Raspadskaya
   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR of 'B+' placed on RWN
   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR of 'B' affirmed
   -- Long-term local currency IDR of 'B+' placed on RWN
   -- Senior unsecured rating of 'B+'/RR4 placed on RWN
   -- National Long-term rating of 'A(rus)' placed on RWN


FCRB BANK: DIA to Oversee Provisional Administration
----------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia took a decision to appoint the state
corporation Deposit Insurance Agency to perform the functions of
the provisional administration of LLC FCRB Bank from March 24,
2016.

In the nearest time, the provisional administration shall prepare
proposals on conditions of the Bank's future operations.

The provisional administration of the Bank performs the functions
stipulated by article 18934 of the Federal Law "On the Insolvency
(Bankruptcy)" and has due authority pursuant to Article 18931 of
the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" and related Bank
of Russia regulations.


MIKO-BANK LLC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-990, dated March 24,
2016, revoked the banking license of the Moscow-based credit
institution COMMERCIAL BANK MIKO-BANK, LLC from March 24, 2016.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, due to the application of measures envisaged by the
Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank
of Russia)", considering a real threat to the creditors' and
depositors' interests.

With its poor assets quality LLC CB MIKO-BANK failed to
adequately assess the risks assumed.  An adequate assessment of
the credit risk and a reliable recognition of the bank's assets
resulted in the grounds for the credit institution to implement
measures to prevent the bank's insolvency (bankruptcy). Besides,
in mid-March 2016 the bank actually terminated its operational
activities.

The management and owners of the bank failed to take effective
measures to bring the situation back to normal.  Under these
circumstances, the Bank of Russia took a decision to revoke the
banking license of the credit institution LLC CB MIKO-BANK.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-991, dated March 24,
2016, appointed a provisional administration to LLC CB MIKO-BANK
for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to
the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator
under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In compliance with federal laws the powers of the
credit institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

LLC CB MIKO-BANK is a member of the deposit insurance system.
The revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than 1.4 million per
depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of March 1, 2016, LLC
CB MIKO-BANK ranked 392nd by assets in the Russian banking
system.


NIZHNEKAMSKNEFTEKHIM PJSC: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Corporate Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba3 corporate family
rating and Ba3-PD probability of default rating of Russian
Petrochemical company Nizhnekamskneftekhim PJSC (NKNK). This
follows the Republic of Tatarstan's (Ba2 under review for
downgrade) sale of almost its entire stake in NKNK to Tatneft
PJSC (Tatneft, Ba1 under review downgrade). The outlook on the
ratings remains stable.

"While the sale somewhat distances the Tatarstan government from
NKNK, and lessens the likelihood of the government's
extraordinary support, NKNK's credit quality remains commensurate
with the Ba3 rating given the sizable cushion provided by its
strong financial profile, which mitigates both domestic and
international market pressures," says Ekaterina Botvinova, a Vice
President -- Senior Analyst at Moody's.

On March 17, 2016, the Tatarstan government sold almost its
entire stake in NKNK: 22.01%, representing 24.99% voting shares.
The shares were sold to Tatneft, a government (36%) owned entity
and one of the key assets of the republic. As a result,
Tatarstan's direct share in NKNK has decreased to approximately
3.2% (3.6% voting shares) plus the "golden share", which gives
the government veto power over certain major corporate decisions.
TAIF Group (not rated) continues to maintain 50.0% of NKNK's
capital (52.3% of voting shares), while the remaining 24.8%
shares are free float. The reduced government ownership means
that NKNK is no longer classified as a government-related issuer
(GRI) under Moody's rating methodology for GRIs.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of NKNK's ratings reflects the robustness of
NKNK's strong credit quality within the Ba3 ratings. For the 12
months to June 2015, NKNK's debt/EBITDA ratio stood at
approximately 0.2x, and its EBITDA margins were strong at 20.1%.
The sustainability of NKNK's financial profile is supported by
NKNK's strong domestic market position and sizable exports as
well as its cost efficiency, leveraged by the weak Russian rouble
and the company's high capex flexibility.

NKNK's Ba3 rating remains constrained by (1) its exposure to the
weakening of Russia and Tatarstan's operating environment; (2)
the risk associated with the high concentration of NKNK's
operations at two adjacent sites; (3) the company's
susceptibility to risks inherent to the petrochemical industry,
heightened by NKNK's moderate size; and (4) a pending large
olefin project, which creates a degree of uncertainty over the
long-term evolution of NKNK's financial profile and liquidity.

"NKNK is a key player in the Tatarstan oil and petrochemicals
sector, and we expect that the government will continue to
consider it as strategically important for the Republic's
economy. As such, NKNK will maintain a strong relationship with
the government, even if the government's formal direct presence
in the NKNK ownership structure becomes minor."

RATING OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on NKNK's ratings reflects the significant
cushion under the company's financial metrics within its current
rating, with the company's leverage being well below the
threshold level of 3.0x debt/EBITDA.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - UP

Currently there is limited potential of any upward rating
pressure on the company's rating, unless operating conditions in
Russia and Tatarstan stabilize or improve.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- DOWN

Conversely, downward pressure could be exerted on the company's
rating if there is (1) a significant downgrade of Russia's
sovereign rating and Tatarstan's sub-sovereign rating; or (2) a
deterioration of NKNK's standalone credit quality, with
debt/EBITDA sustainably trending up above 3x and retained cash
flow/debt down below 30%.

Nizhnekamskneftekhim PJSC (NKNK) is a major Russian
petrochemicals company, part of the oil and petrochemicals sector
of the Republic of Tatarstan. In the last 12 months to June 2015,
the company reported sales of RUB145.3 billion (around $3.1
billion) and adjusted EBITDA of around RUB29.1 billion (around
$620 million).


RADIOPRIBOR: To Declare Bankruptcy, Workers Mull Hunger Strike
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that the Primorsky regional
administration announced on March 24 that Radiopribor will
declare bankruptcy and become a subsidiary of the Dubnensky car
factory.

Russian media on March 22 reported that approximately 1,000
factory workers had said they would go on hunger strike if there
was not a favorable outcome to talks with the Radiopribor
administration over eight months of unpaid salaries, the AP
relates.

Earlier reports indicated that Radiopribor has liabilities of
over RUR223 million (US$3.24 million), the AP recounts.

Radiopribor is a government-owned electronics manufacturer.


RUSSIA: Reduced RH Ownership Won't Hit Ba1 Rating, Moody's Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has said that a limited reduction in
government ownership in civilian and military helicopter designer
and manufacturer Russian Helicopters JSC (RH) will not affect
RH's rating (Ba3 stable), so far as the agency believes that the
cut does not reduce the strong probability of the Russian
government's (Ba1 review for downgrade) support to RH in case of
need.

The announcement follows the news, which appeared earlier this
month that 100% government ownership over RH may be reduced by a
new potential equity investor.  On March 10, Mr Chemezov, the CEO
of Rostec (unrated), a Russian-government-owned industrial group,
which includes RH, confirmed in an interview that a 20%-25% stake
in RH can be sold to a foreign investor, Mubadala Development
Company PJSC (Aa2 review for downgrade), a strategic investment
and development company wholly owned by the Government of Abu
Dhabi (Aa2 review for downgrade).  RH is the sole Russian
designer and manufacturer of civilian and military helicopters,
fully owned by Oboronprom (unrated), an industrial holding
company within the Rostec group.

The sale of the blocking stake in RH, in our view, would be
credit neutral for RH because the Russian government, through
Rostec and Oboronprom, will maintain a controlling stake in RH
and, given RH's strategic importance to Russia, will not distance
itself from RH and/or allow its control over the company to
weaken.  As such, Moody's do not expect that the government's
involvement and the likelihood of government support -- factors
that currently enhance Russian Helicopters credit quality -- will
decrease.

At the same time, Moody's understands that discussions with the
potential investor are continuing and that the terms and
conditions of the transaction and its timing remain uncertain.
This uncertainty makes it difficult to forecast what, if any, the
particular benefits of the transaction will be for RH, given that
(1) the new shareholder's involvement will be limited to its
stake and (2) the funds to be raised from the sale of the stake
in RH would go not to RH but to its government-related owner.

Nevertheless, Moody's notes that if the transaction materializes,
Moody's believes the new shareholder may help the company
strengthen its presence in the Middle East and Asian markets.

RH's credit quality continues to benefit from Russian government
involvement, government helicopter orders and the strong
probability of support in case of need.  Potential weakness in
the sovereign rating does not threaten RH's credit quality within
the Ba3 category, provided that any downgrade of the sovereign is
restricted to one notch.  As a result, the outlook on RH's rating
remains stable.

The robustness of RH's credit quality is underpinned by its
strong financial profile, at this rating level, which is driven
by a large order book, sizable exports (around 75% of revenue),
cost advantages associated with the weak ruble and prudent debt
management.  For the 12 months to June 2015, RH's debt/EBITDA was
3.3x and its retained cash flow/net debt reached 27.2%, which
provides RH with some cushion within its rating category despite
current pressures at the sovereign level.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: Obtains EUR137 Million in Emergency Loans
-----------------------------------------------------
Alistair Dawber at The Financial Times reports that Abengoa SA
raised EUR137 million in emergency loans on March 22, days ahead
of a court hearing that it hopes will give it more time to
persuade investors to agree to restructuring proposals.

The capital raising was evidence, a source close to the company,
as cited by the FT, said that lenders are supportive.

The money, provided by a number of funds, will be used for
working capital, specifically to pay suppliers and its workers'
salaries in March, the FT discloses.

"Nobody wants this company to go bankrupt and the backing from
existing lenders is a clear indication that it has support," the
FT quotes the source as saying.

If a judge in its home city of Seville is satisfied at a
scheduled hearing on March 28, that the company has sufficient
support, the court may be persuaded to grant Abengoa extra time,
the FT states.

According to the FT, it needs backing from 75% of creditors for
its full-scale restructuring plan, and about 40% have already
given their approval.

Abengoa SA is a Spanish renewable-energy company.


                        *       *       *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 17,
2016, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the corporate family
rating (CFR) of Abengoa S.A. (Abengoa), and the senior unsecured
ratings at Abengoa, Abengoa Finance, S.A.U. and Abengoa
Greenfield, S.A., to Ca, from Caa3.  Moody's said the outlook on
the ratings remains negative.


ABENGOA SA: Creditors Agree to Extend Debt Restructuring Talks
--------------------------------------------------------------
Katie Linsell and Charles Penty at Bloomberg News report that
Abengoa SA won support from creditors to allow more time to
approve a EUR9.4 billion (US$10.5 billion) debt restructuring and
avoid insolvency.

According to Bloomberg, Seville-based Abengoa said in a
regulatory filing on March 28 that more than 75% of the company's
lenders agreed to continue talks for as much as seven months.
Abengoa said in a separate e-mailed statement the support from
creditors is higher than the 60% required to extend the
acceptance period and puts the engineering-services company on
track to approve its final restructuring plan, Bloomberg relates.

Terms of a restructuring were agreed with its main bank creditors
and bondholders earlier this month, which would leave existing
shareholders including the founding Benjumea family with 5% of
the firm, Bloomberg recounts.

Abengoa had until March 28 to reach an agreement or start
insolvency proceedings after seeking preliminary creditor
protection in November, Bloomberg notes.  The support from
creditors, who agreed not to demand repayment for the extended
period, means Abengoa may avoid becoming Spain's largest
corporate failure, Bloomberg states.

Abengoa SA is a Spanish renewable-energy company.


                        *       *       *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 17,
2016, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the corporate family
rating (CFR) of Abengoa S.A. (Abengoa), and the senior unsecured
ratings at Abengoa, Abengoa Finance, S.A.U. and Abengoa
Greenfield, S.A., to Ca, from Caa3.  Moody's said the outlook on
the ratings remains negative.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


* SWITZERLAND: Number of Bankruptcy Proceedings Up 9.9% in 2015
---------------------------------------------------------------
Swissinfo.ch reports that the number of bankruptcy proceedings
opened in Switzerland rose by almost 10% last year.

In all, there were 13,016 cases opened against companies and
individuals in Switzerland in 2015, up 9.9% from a year earlier,
mainly due to personal bankruptcies in the commercial registry,
Swissinfo.ch discloses.

Some 22 of the 26 Swiss cantons saw a rising number of bankruptcy
proceedings, Swissinfo.ch relays, citing the latest figures from
the Federal Statistical Office.

The office said Lake Geneva, with a yearly increase of 361 cases,
and Zurich, with 213 more cases than in 2014, were the hardest
hit regions, Swissinfo.ch notes.

According to Swissinfo.ch, the office said in terms of financial
losses, the total amount resulting from ordinary procedures and
summary liquidation bankruptcies grew more slowly than in 2014,
when there was a sharp increase.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


DOGUS HOLDINGS: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB-', Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
term corporate credit rating on Turkey-based Dogus Holdings S.A.
to 'BB-' from 'BB'.  The outlook is stable.

"The downgrade follows weakening in Dogus' business risk profile
in 2015, in our view, following the group's reallocation of cash
proceeds from its sale of a 14% stake in Garanti Bank
(BB+/Negative/--) toward weaker assets.  The sale of the shares
implies, to us, that the average asset credit quality of Dogus'
investees has weakened, given that Garanti's creditworthiness is
comparatively stronger than the rest of the portfolio and that
its reduced size in Dogus' portfolio of companies has not been
offset by any new investment with similar credit quality.
Instead, management has used $900 million for capital injection
at investee companies. Of this, $571 million was used to reduce
debt at the holding company level, which we use in our analysis
to form our view of Dogus' credit profile, rather than
consolidated figures. We currently assess Dogus' business risk to
be in the lower end of our weak category and include a one-notch
downward adjustment to arrive at our final rating on the group to
reflect our comparable ratings analysis against peers," S&P said.

"The downgrade also reflects that Dogus' industrial operations
display modest profitability and are not a reliable source of
dividend streams.  For example, its construction and media
companies generate limited EBITDA and cash flows.  Following its
disposal of the stake in Garanti, Dogus' asset portfolio has a
relatively low percentage of liquid assets (around 30% at end-
2015), which, in our view, weighs negatively on the overall
business risk profile.  The group's heavy exposure to the Turkish
market, which is slightly lower than in the past following its
recent transactions in tourism, represents another weakness.  At
end-2015, it derived the bulk of its revenues and EBITDA from
Turkey (BB+/Negative).  We assess Dogus' management and
governance as fair.  On the positive side, we note that,
following its decreased ownership of the bank, Dogus'
diversification has increased because the stake had somewhat
dominated the portfolio," S&P noted.

S&P's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on Dogus stood at 21% at end-
2015, with Standard and Poor's standard adjustments.  S&P expects
the LTV to remain below 30%.

The group is exposed to exchange-rate swings, because a large
portion of its financing is denominated in U.S. dollars.
However, this is also somewhat mitigated by cash in hard currency
and part of the group's operating activities offering a natural
hedge.

The short-term rating is 'B'.  S&P classifies Dogus' liquidity as
adequate because S&P anticipates that its sources of funds will
exceed uses by more than 1.2x over the 12 months started Dec. 31,
2015.  S&P thinks the group has a good standing and a well-
recognized name in its local market.  S&P also considers that
management has a sound relationship with banks, along with
generally prudent practices.  S&P understands, however, that
following foreign exchange volatility, headroom under one
financial covenant could be tight at the end of the 2015
financial year.

The stable outlook on Dogus reflects S&P's expectations that its
management will maintain an LTV ratio at below S&P's 30%
threshold at all times, and that business risk will not weaken
further, for example through further sales of shares in listed
assets or good credit quality assets.

S&P could lower the ratings if its LTV calculation for Dogus
rises above the 30% threshold.  S&P considers that Dogus' three
listed assets shape its business risk profile to a large degree,
so there would likely be pressure on the ratings if Dogus was to
further reduce listed assets within its portfolio, without
redeploying capital toward listed assets with similar
creditworthiness.

S&P could also lower the ratings if economic prospects for Turkey
worsen and limit the turnaround of more fragile and subdued
businesses within the group's portfolio of assets.  Further
depreciation of the Turkish lira may also weigh negatively on the
ratings, if it translates into a weakening of the LTV ratio to
more than 30%.  Downside could also come from a breach of any
financial covenant, if S&P as a consequence, were to re-classify
the liquidity as less than adequate.

Conversely, S&P could revise the outlook to positive or raise the
ratings if Dogus improved its average asset credit quality or
significantly strengthened the level of listed investees.  An
outlook revision to positive would also hinge on stronger-than-
expected improvements in the Turkish economy in 2016, leading to
a positive impact on the operating performance of Dogus' main
subsidiaries.


SEKERBANK TAS: Moody's Lowers LT Deposit Ratings to Ba3
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term local and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of Sekerbank T.A.S. (Sekerbank)
to Ba3 from Ba2. The short-term local and foreign currency
deposit ratings at Not-Prime were affirmed. The standalone
baseline credit assessment (BCA)/adjusted BCA was downgraded to
b1 from ba3, as was the bank's long-term Counterparty Risk
Assessment (CRA) to Ba2(cr) from Ba1(cr). The short-term CRA was
affirmed at Not-Prime. The outlook on the long-term deposit
ratings is negative.

The NSR long-term deposit rating was downgraded to Baa1.tr from
A3.tr and the short-term deposit rating of TR-2 was affirmed.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrade of Sekerbank reflects: 1) higher asset risk
(stemming from the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME)
portfolio and sector concentrations), leading to higher non-
performing loans and an elevated cost of risk; 2) a material
decline in profitability driven by higher loan loss provisioning
costs and an increased cost of funding; 3) a reduction in Tier 1
capitalization; and 4) an increasing reliance on confidence-
sensitive market funding.

The primary driver for the downgrade is the weakening in
Sekerbank's asset quality, with the bank's gross non-performing
loan (NPL) ratio increasing to 5.7% at year-end 2015, from 5.5%
in the previous year, a level which remains weaker than the
Turkish banking system average of 3.1%. Moody's considers that
the bank's asset risk remains high due to its elevated exposure
to SMEs compared with its rated Turkish peers (72% of the total
book at end-2015), and its significant exposure to the real-
estate and construction sector, accounting for around 19% of the
total loan book at year-end 2015 -- higher than the system
average.

A second rating driver is the decrease in the bank's net income
by 61%, year-on-year to TRY97.7 million in 2015 from TRY247.7
million in 2014, mostly due to higher loan loss provisioning and
the increased cost of funding when including the cross currency
swaps. Consequently, return-on-average assets and return-on-
average equity decreased to 0.4% and 3.9%, respectively, in 2015
from 1.2% and 11.2% in 2014.

As a result of lower profitability, combined with a 14% year-on-
year loan growth and Turkish lira depreciation, the bank reported
an 11.16% consolidated Tier 1 capital ratio and a 13.06% total
capital ratio at end-2015, declining from 11.82% and 14.11%,
respectively, at end-2014. Moody's also expects that pressure on
Sekerbank's capitalization will arise from regulatory changes
which could result in up to 1% deterioration in Tier 1 capital
after March 31, 2016; the bank will need to apply a 50% risk
weight to the required foreign currency reserves at the Central
Bank of Turkey, up from 0%. This, combined with other factors,
could represent a challenge for the bank to maintain a total
capital adequacy ratio higher than 12%, which is the minimum
recommended by the regulator in order to be able to open new
branches.

Lastly, Sekerbank's reliance on confidence-sensitive market
funding increased to 32% of its tangible banking assets at end-
2015, up from 26% at end-2014. Consequently, the gross loans-to-
deposits ratio deteriorated to 122% at end-2015 from 117% last
year. Moody's also notes that the bank's short-term
collateralized funding with repo agreements increased by 29%
year-on-year, outpacing the growth of other forms of funding.

Rationale for Negative Outlook

The negative outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that the bank's asset quality, profitability and capital will
continue to face headwinds over the next 12 to 18 months from the
challenging operating environment in Turkey. In particular,
Moody's expects the challenges to be more pronounced for smaller
banks, such as Sekerbank, given its more limited scale of
operations, weaker competitive position and constrained financial
position, particularly in terms of capital.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Currently, there is no upward pressure on the standalone BCA and
the long-term deposit ratings, as reflected by the negative
outlook.

A downward pressure on the standalone BCA and the long-term
deposit ratings could develop as a result of: 1) further
weakening of asset quality; (2) continued deterioration of
profitability; (3) a material reduction in the bank's
capitalization; and/or (4) depletion in customer deposit funding.

NSR DOWNGRADED TO BAA1.TR FROM A3.TR

The bank's NSR reflects its creditworthiness within the Turkish
credit environment and is derived from the mapping of the bank's
global long-term deposit ratings. Therefore, the change in the
long-term ratings triggers adjustment to these ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Downgrades:

-- LT Bank Deposits (Foreign Currency and Local Currency),
    Downgraded to Ba3 Negative from Ba2 Negative

-- NSR LT Bank Deposits (Local Currency), Downgraded to Baa1.tr
    Negative from A3.tr Negative

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Downgraded to b1 from
   ba3

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, Downgraded to b1 from ba3

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Downgraded to Ba2(cr)
    from Ba1(cr)

Affirmations:

-- ST Bank Deposits (Foreign Currency and Local Currency),
    Affirmed NP

-- NSR ST Bank Deposits (Local Currency), Affirmed TR-2

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Outlook Actions:

-- Outlook, Remains Negative



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRAINIAN RAILWAY: Fitch Cuts IDR to 'RD' then Upgrades to 'CCC'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Public Joint Stock Company Ukrainian
Railway's (Ukrainian Railway) Long-term foreign currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' (Restricted Default) from 'C',
following completion of the company's Eurobonds exchange.  The
rating is then upgraded to 'CCC'.

Following the exchange, Fitch had withdrawn the Long-term foreign
currency rating 'C' on Shortline Plc's USD500 mil. loan
participation notes (LPNs) due 2018. Simultaneously the agency
has assigned 'CCC' to Shortline Plc's new USD500 mil.  LPNs due
2021 that were issued in exchange to the original 2018 LPNs.

Ukrainian Railway's Long-term local currency IDR of 'RD' and
National Long-term rating of 'RD (ukr)' are unaffected.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade follows the completion of the restructuring of
Ukrainian Railway's USD500 mil. Eurobonds due 2018 structured via
Shortline Plc's LPNs.  In accordance with Fitch's distressed debt
exchange (DDE) criteria, a DDE is deemed to have occurred, among
others, if a restructuring imposes a material reduction in terms
(including extension of maturity) compared with the original
contractual terms of an entity's financial obligations.

The restructuring terms included a maturity extension to Sept.
15, 2021 from May 21, 2018; coupon step-up to 9.875% from 9.5%;
and an amortization schedule of principal with 60% of the
principal to be repaid in 2019, 20% in 2020 and 20% in 2021.
Fitch views that the coupon step-up does not fully compensate the
extension of maturity so we consider that our DDE criteria have
been met.

The upgrade of Ukrainian Railway's Long-term foreign currency IDR
to 'CCC' indicates that Ukrainian Railway has successfully
completed the exchange of Shortline's LPNs, leading to a
lengthening of the company's external debt maturity profile,
thereby reducing refinancing risks.  The company remains current
on foreign currency loans from international financial
institutions -- EBRD, European Investment Bank and Korea
Eximbank.

The exchange of Ukrainian Railway's Eurobonds was part of
Ukraine's (CCC/C/CCC) state debt restructuring as part of IMF's
Extended Fund Facility program.  This reflects the ongoing
linkages between Ukrainian Railway and its sponsor, Ukraine.
Therefore the agency continues to view Ukrainian Railway as a
credit-linked public-sector entity (PSE) as per Fitch's PSEs
rating criteria (see Fitch Withdraws Ukrzaliznytsia's Ratings;
Rates Ukrainian Railway 'C').  Ukrainian Railway's foreign
currency IDR is equalized with that of the sovereign.

The notes' rating is equalized with Ukrainian Railway's Long-term
foreign currency IDR, reflecting Fitch's view that default risk
on the notes is the same as Ukrainian Railway's other foreign
currency senior unsecured obligations.  The notes benefit from
the suretyship agreement made between Shortline and Ukrainian
Railway.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Ukrainian Railway's Long-term foreign currency IDR is
equalised with that of its sponsor, Ukraine, it will likely
mirror any rating action on the sovereign's Long-term foreign
currency IDR.

Adverse changes to the company's ability and capacity to service
its foreign liabilities would lead to a downgrade of the Long-
term foreign currency IDR.

The rating on Shortline Plc's LPNs is equalized with Ukrainian
Railway's Long-term foreign currency IDR therefore will move in
tandem with Ukrainian Railway's Long-term foreign currency IDR.

Fitch will also review and re-rate the company's local currency
IDR and National Long-term rating once the company has completed
its domestic debt restructuring and information is available on
its post-restructuring credit profile.

The rating actions are:

Public Joint Stock Company "Ukrainian Railway"

  Long-term foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'RD' from 'C' and
   subsequently upgraded to 'CCC'

  Short-term foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'RD' from 'C' and
   subsequently upgraded to 'C'

Shortline Plc

  USD500 mil. LPNs (ISIN XS0934134312, US825262AA68) Long-term
   foreign currency rating 'C' withdrawn

  USD500 mil. LPNs (ISIN XS1374118658, XS1374118906) Long-term
   foreign currency rating assigned at 'CCC'



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS GROUP: Creditors Back Company Voluntary Arrangement Proposal
----------------------------------------------------------------
James Davey at Reuters reports that BHS has won support from its
creditors for a rescue plan that should allow the retailer to
stay in business thanks to big cuts in its rent bill.

The 88-year-old firm, hit hard by intense competition in the
retail sector, said on March 23 creditors to BHS Limited, which
covers 125 of its 164 stores, had voted to approve its proposal
for a company voluntary arrangement (CVA) -- a form of compromise
agreement to avoid administration or liquidation, Reuters
relates.

The CVA was supported by more than 95 percent of creditors, above
the 75% required for the proposal to succeed, Reuters discloses.

"The renegotiated rents at BHS's loss-making stores will
drastically improve the financial viability of BHS, giving the
group the necessary financial flexibility to invest in the future
of the company through resetting, refocusing and rebuilding the
business," Reuters quotes the firm as saying.

BHS said in a later statement that creditors to BHS Properties
Limited, which represents 23 BHS stores, had also voted to
approve the CVA, Reuters relays.

BHS still has some issues to work through, however, Reuters
notes.  It has a pension fund deficit of more than GBP200 million
(US$283 million) at its last valuation in 2014 that is still to
be resolved, Reuters states.

The CVA, outlined by BHS's owners earlier this month, proposed
that 77 of its most viable stores would be retained at current
rents, though paid monthly rather than quarterly, for three
years, while a further 47 stores would have a reduced equivalent
monthly rent of either 75% or 50%, Reuters relays.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


BHS GROUP: CVA Won't Impact Franchised Stores in Middle East
------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Townsend at Arabian Business reports that franchised BHS
stores in the Middle East will not be affected by a major
restructuring of the British homewear brand in the UK.

Last week, the struggling retailer approved a roots-and-branch
restructuring plan -- known in the UK as a company voluntary
arrangement (CVA) -- intended to avoid the company going into
administration, Arabian Business relates.

Under the plan, more than 40 of BHS' 160-plus stores across the
UK will close within months, and commercial landlords have agreed
to reduce rent on more than half of the remaining stores, meaning
they stand to lose millions of pounds of annual rent, Arabian
Business discloses.

BHS' creditors, mainly landlords, are owed nearly GBP517 million
(US$730 million), while the retailer is struggling to fill a
pension pot shortfall valued at between GBP250 million (US$350
million) and GBP550 million (US$770 million), Arabian Business
relays, citing reports in the UK. The Government-run Pension
Protection Fund is set to take control of that fund, Arabian
Business says.

In the Middle East, Dubai-based Alshaya Group manages 26
franchised BHS stores across the Gulf -- 13 in Saudi Arabia, 12
in Kuwait and one in Oman, Arabian Business discloses.  In the
UAE, the franchise is owned by Almaya, Arabian Business notes.

According to Arabian Business, while Alshaya Group itself would
not comment on the likely impact of the UK restructuring, a
spokesperson for BHS in the UK told Arabian Business: "I can
confirm that no international BHS franchise stores will be
affected by the CVA."

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


INMARSAT PLC: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Corporate Family Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of Inmarsat
plc ("Inmarsat"), CFR at Ba1 and PDR at Ba1-PD, as well as the
Ba2 rating of the USD1.0 billion Senior Notes due 2022 issued by
Inmarsat Finance plc ("Inmarsat Finance"), which are
unconditionally guaranteed by Inmarsat. The rating outlook has
been revised to negative from stable.

"The negative outlook on Inmarsat's ratings recognizes the strong
likelihood that Inmarsat's leverage and free cash flow will be
weak vis-a-vis our expectations for a Ba1 rating due to its
sizeable capex program in 2016-2018. Whilst noting the commercial
case for Inmarsat's Aviation connectivity and Inmarsat-6 fleet
projects, the company's modest retained cash flow after payment
of dividends suggests that these investments will be partly
funded through incremental debt which will further weaken the
company's financial metrics," says Alejandro Nunez, a Moody's
Vice President -- Senior Analyst and lead analyst for the issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating affirmation reflects: (1) Inmarsat's successful launch
of its I-5 F2 and I-5 F3 satellites and the entry into commercial
service of its Global Xpress (GX) program; (2) improved
visibility on the revenue stream from LightSquared LP ("L2",
unrated); and (3) modest organic annual revenue growth (excluding
LightSquared) in line with the industry average of 2-3%
reflecting declining growth in legacy maritime segments offset to
an extent by new maritime and aviation broadband products.

"Nevertheless, in assigning a negative outlook, Moody's noted:
(1) Inmarsat's announcement during its FY15 results that it would
increase its capex spend to at least $500 million per year during
the 2016-2018 period to invest in its Inmarsat-6 (I-6) fleet and
to more fully address the success-based capital expenditure
expected for the Aviation cabin connectivity opportunity which
should benefit future operations; (2) the concurrence of the
company's increased capex during a time of already negative free
cash flow (post-dividends) and (3) our view that the incremental
capex announced will be partly funded via additional debt which
will move financial metrics close to the thresholds previously
identified for possible negative rating action."

Upon announcing its FY 2015 results, Inmarsat increased its capex
guidance over the 2016-2018 period to reflect the increased
expenditures anticipated for two dual-band (L and Ka) I-6
satellites and the success-based capital expenditure for the
Aviation cabin connectivity opportunity. These expenditures are
approximately $100 million per annum higher than previously
anticipated over the 2016-2018 period and would encompass the
build of those two I-6 satellites. These investments, both of
which are expected to be earnings and cash flow accretive, are
also in addition to the launch costs for I-5 F-4 (a reserve
satellite in the I-5 constellation) and the costs of migrating
XpressLink capacity to its newer GX system.

"Although we recognize the Aviation connectivity and I-6
projects' revenue potential from 2018 onward, we note that the
combined investment spend associated with those programs comes at
a time when Inmarsat's free cash flow (post-dividends) is
currently negative. Inmarsat's negative free cash flow (post-
dividends) is primarily due to a relatively high dividend payout
level which has typically exceeded the amount of cash flow
remaining after capex, interest, taxes and acquisitions/disposals
are accounted for. In fiscal years 2014 and 2015 Inmarsat
generated free cash flow of negative $63 million and
approximately negative $56 million, respectively, after paying
out over $212 million of dividends in each of those years. We
anticipate that the company's higher capex spend over the next
three years will exacerbate the extent of its negative free cash
flow generation (post-dividends), and that incremental debt
funding to cover the shortfall will pressure financial metrics,
with leverage (Gross Debt/EBITDA measured using Moody's standard
adjustments) approximating the 3.5x threshold previously defined
for a negative rating action."

Moody's also recognizes the revenue paid to and due to Inmarsat
by L2 in FY 2015-2016 and qualitatively acknowledges the
possibility of additional future revenue from L2. L2 has a call
option exercisable only until 31 March 2016 which would allow L2
to utilize up to 40 MHz of Inmarsat spectrum (in the 1627MHz-
1680MHz and 1526MHz-1536MHz bands) in exchange for annual
payments to Inmarsat of up to $145 million over a long lease
period which would decrease adjusted leverage by the end of FY
2017 below the 3.5x level expected for the rating.

The Ba1 CFR also considers encroaching competition from other
mobile satellite services (MSS) and fixed satellite services
(FSS) companies (for example, Intelsat). The rating further
reflects the company's exposure to sector-typical technological
risks of launch failures and satellite malfunction.

Inmarsat has adequate near-term liquidity, supported primarily by
external sources comprised of a fully available and undrawn $500
million revolving credit facility due May 2020 and a $186 million
credit facility available until November 2016. In addition, as of
31 December 2015, the company had a cash balance of $177 million.

RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook indicates Moody's expectations that Inmarsat
will manage its capital expenditure and shareholder return
policies over the next three years such that its gross leverage
(gross debt/EBITDA, as adjusted by Moody's) will approach the
3.5x leverage ceiling appropriate for the rating level. The
outlook also reflects Moody's view that the company will continue
to be free cash flow negative (after dividends) over the course
of 2016 to 2018 and particularly in 2016-2017.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP

Positive pressure on the rating could develop should Inmarsat's
adjusted gross debt/EBITDA decrease sustainably below 3.0x and
its adjusted free cash flow/gross debt (post-dividends) be
sustainably and substantively above 0%.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN

Downward rating pressure would materialize if Inmarsat's debt
load increases such that gross leverage (gross debt/EBITDA, as
adjusted by Moody's) materially and persistently exceeds 3.5x
and/or adjusted free cash flow/gross debt fails to improve toward
a level of at least negative 5% over the 2016-2018 period. There
could also be pressure on the rating if liquidity were to
significantly deteriorate.


JOHNSTON PRESS: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC+', Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had lowered its
long-term corporate credit rating on U.K.-based newspaper
publisher Johnston Press PLC to 'CCC+' from 'B'.  The outlook is
stable.

As a consequence, S&P also lowered its issue rating on Johnston
Press' GBP225 million senior secured notes due 2019 to 'CCC+'
from 'B'.  The recovery rating is unchanged at '4', indicating
S&P's expectation of recovery in the lower half of the 30%-50%
range in the event of a payment default.

The downgrade stems from S&P's opinion that, despite the lack of
short-term debt and positive free cash flow generation, Johnston
Press' current capital structure is unsustainable when combined
with its vulnerable operations, primarily reflecting S&P's view
of declining trends in the publishing industry.

Specifically, S&P projects that the Standard & Poor's-adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA ratio will remain close to 5.5x in 2016 (similar
to 2015 and down from 7.5x in 2014), and will likely be close to
5x in 2017.  In calculating the group's debt, S&P excludes
balance-sheet cash, and include operating leases and the pension
deficit, which reduced materially to GBP27 million in 2015 from
GBP90 million in 2014.  S&P's adjusted EBITDA figure is after
restructuring costs and includes, among other things, some
adjustments for pensions and operating leases.

However, the group continues to suffer from the structural
decline of the print newspaper industry, in particular print
advertising, and of circulation.  At the same time, the group's
digital operations have been expanding slower than S&P previously
anticipated because of difficulty in deriving revenue from the
growing digital audience.  This segment still represents only a
small portion (13%) of the group's total revenue.

S&P now anticipates that the group is unlikely to stop the
erosion of its revenues before 2017-2018, even after factoring in
some upside from the potential disposal of declining assets, as
announced by the company.  However, this forecast excludes the
impact of Johnston Press' recently approved acquisition of U.K.
national newspaper i, which is likely to bring some revenue
growth from the development of i's online operations.  S&P
understands that i, which currently has no online operations, has
a track record of increasing revenues and generating positive
free cash flow; i reported revenue of GBP26.1 million in 2015,
after GBP24.5 million in 2014 and GBP21.8 million in 2013.

Moreover, S&P recognizes the group's history of tight cost
management and lack of debt maturing before June 2019, when the
GBP225 million notes fall due.  In addition, the group's GBP25
million revolving credit facility maturing in December 2018
remains undrawn.  Combined with S&P's forecast that the group
will continue to generate positive--albeit modest--annual free
cash flow of about GBP15 million annually, S&P do not foresee any
liquidity issues over the next 12 months.

The stable outlook reflects that S&P do not forecast any
liquidity issues for Johnston Press over the next 12 months,
despite S&P's view of the group's unsustainable capital
structure, declining revenues, and need for further
restructuring.

S&P could lower the rating if it saw a steep deterioration in the
group's operations and credit metrics, or if free cash flow
turned negative, thereby increasing the risk of short-term
liquidity issues or debt restructuring that S&P would view as
tantamount to default.

Given the highly leveraged capital structure, an upgrade will
hinge on earnings and credit metrics improving sustainably,
ensuring orderly refinancing of the GBP225 million notes due in
June 2019.


MCEWENS OF PERTH: Faces Closure Following Administration
--------------------------------------------------------
Jane Bradley at The Scotsman reports that McEwens of Perth is to
close its doors after falling into administration.

Owners the Bullough family, who bought the shop in 1982, said on
March 23 that negotiations with the bank had failed and they had
been forced to put the company into administration with KPMG,
with 110 staff now facing redundancy, The Scotsman relates.

According to The Scotsman, a total of 64 workers have already
been told they have lost their jobs, while 46 are being retained
to wind up the store's operations.

"Despite our exhaustive search for investor and partner
solutions, all negotiations with the bank have failed and
unfortunately we have run out of options," The Scotsman quotes
John and Georgina Bullough as saying.

Joint administrator Blair Nimmo, as cited by The Scotsman, said
"Despite the directors' best efforts, McEwens of Perth continued
to incur trading losses as a result of the many challenges being
felt by the retail sector."

In recent years, the retailer has struggled to turn a profit,
with its last set of accounts showing a pre-tax loss of GBP56,328
for the year to 31 January 2015, although this was down from a
deficit of GBP79,724 the previous year, The Scotsman discloses.

McEwens has two outlets in Perth, as well as premises in Oban,
Argyll and Bute, and Ballater, Aberdeenshire, The Scotsman notes.

The firm's Ballater and Oban stores were closed on March 23 with
immediate effect, while a closing down sale in Perth was due to
start on March 24, The Scotsman relays.

McEwens of Perth is a Scottish independent and family-run
department store chain.


RMAC 2005-NS1: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Cl. B1 Tranche
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 85 tranches of the RMAC RMBS series.

The RMAC transactions are securitizations of UK non-conforming
loans, originated by GMAC-RFC Limited.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Credit Enhancement (CE)

The high seasoning of the transactions has led to the portfolios
deleveraging to between 3.1% (RMAC 2003-2) and 48.6% (RMAC 2007-
1) of their initial pool balances.

The structures of the earlier deals (RMAC 2003-2, 2003-3, 2003-4,
2004-1 and 2004-2) in the series do not include reserve funds but
are instead over-collateralized.  The reserve funds for all other
transactions have either amortized to floor level or are no
longer allowed to amortize as a result of a breach of the
cumulative loss trigger (set at 1.25% of the initial portfolio
balance for all transactions).  As a result, CE across the series
has continued to build up steadily.

In December 2015 60 tranches were placed on Rating Watch Positive
following the publication of the Criteria Addendum: UK -
Residential Mortgage Assumptions on 16 December 2015.  Given the
current levels of CE Fitch has affirmed those ratings and
assigned Stable Outlooks.

Solid Performance

The affirmations across all transactions reflect the strong
performance of the underlying portfolios.  The volume of loans in
arrears by more than three months remains on a decreasing trend
and as of end-December 2015, ranging between 4.2% (RMAC 2004-NS1)
and 9.2% (RMAC 2007-NS1) of their respective portfolio balances
compared with between 5.7% (RMAC 2004-NSP2) and 12.5% (RMAC 2007-
NS1) as of end-December 2014.  For the 2006 and 2007 deals, the
arrear levels remain comparable with the UK non-conforming
average of 9.2% while those for the 2003-2005 deals remain far
below this level.

Unhedged Interest Rate Risk

The portfolios of RMAC 2003-2, 2003-3, 2003-4 and 2004-1 comprise
solely LIBOR-linked loans.  All other RMAC portfolios contain
varying proportions of BBR-linked loans, between 26% (RMAC 2004-
NS3) and 82% (RMAC 2006-NS1).  These transactions are not hedged
against the basis risk between the LIBOR-linked notes and BBR-
indexed mortgages.  In its analysis, Fitch stressed the excess
spread to account for this risk and found the CE available to the
rated notes sufficient to withstand the stresses.

Interest-only Concentration
The transactions have material concentration of interest-only
loans maturing within a three-year period during the lifetime of
the transaction.  As per its criteria, Fitch carried out a
sensitivity analysis assuming a 50% default probability for these
loans.  No rating action was deemed necessary as a result of the
interest-only loan concentration.  Nevertheless, Fitch will keep
monitoring this risk as the transactions continue to amortize.

Currency Swap Obligations
The affirmation of the currency swap ratings are based on Fitch's
view that the swap payment obligations rank pro rata and equally
with the referenced notes.  Consequently, the credit profiles of
the currency swap payment obligations are consistent with the
long-term rating on the referenced notes.

Loans Previously in Arrears
Under Fitch's Criteria Addendum: UK - Residential Mortgage
Assumptions dated 16 December 2015 loans that are currently
performing but have been in arrears in the past 24 months have an
additional 30% hit in their weighted average foreclosure
frequency.  As Fitch was not provided with the date the loans
were last in arrears the agency made conservative assumptions in
its analysis and found no impact on the ratings due to strong CE.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The transactions are backed by floating-interest-rate loans.  In
the current low interest rate environment, borrowers are
benefiting from low borrowing costs.  An increase in interest
rates could lead to performance deterioration of the underlying
assets and consequently downgrades of the notes if defaults and
associated losses exceed those of Fitch's stresses.

Changes to the ratings of the swap-referenced notes will likely
lead to an equal change in the rating of the SPV's currency swap
obligations.  The rating sensitivity will primarily be driven by
the rating analysis applicable to the corresponding note.  The
rating of the SPV's currency swap obligations will be withdrawn
if the currency swap agreement is terminated due to non-
performance by the swap counterparty or a non-credit related
event.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

                          DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing.  The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

The rating actions are:

RMAC 2003-NS2 Plc
  Class A3 (ISIN XS0171105439): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable

RMAC 2003-NS3 Plc
  Class A3 (ISIN USG7603WAH19) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable

RMAC 2003-NS4 Plc
  Class A3 (ISIN XS0179780803) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable

RMAC 2004-NS1 Plc
  Class A3 (ISIN XS0185375325) affirmed at 'A+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable

RMAC 2004-NS3 Plc
  Class A2a (ISIN XS0200800943) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class A2c (ISIN XS0200802568) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1 (ISIN XS0200802725) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M2 (ISIN XS0200803962) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B (ISIN XS0200804770) affirmed at 'A-sf'; off RWP;
    Outlook Stable

RMAC 2004-NSP2 Plc
  Class A3 (ISIN XS0194465653) affirmed at 'A-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable

RMAC 2004-NSP4 Plc
  Class A2 (ISIN XS0206944240) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1 (ISIN XS0206944596) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M2 (ISIN XS0206944836) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1 (ISIN XS0206945056) affirmed at 'A-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable

RMAC 2005-NS1 Plc
  Class A2a (ISIN XS0212187826) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class A2c (ISIN XS0212189103) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1 (ISIN XS0212190028) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2 (ISIN XS0212191851) affirmed at 'A-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1 (ISIN XS0212192669) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable

RMAC 2005-NS3 Plc
  Class A2a (ISIN XS0230220443) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class A2c (ISIN XS0230220872) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1a (ISIN XS0230221250) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M1c (ISIN XS0230221334) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2a (ISIN XS0230221763) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2c (ISIN XS0230222068) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1a (ISIN XS0230222225) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1c (ISIN XS0230222498) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable

RMAC 2005-NS4 Plc
  Class A3 (ISIN XS0235775854) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable
  Class M1 (ISIN XS0235781159) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2 (ISIN XS0235778106) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1 (ISIN XS0235782801) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable

RMAC 2005-NSP2 Plc
  Class A2a (ISIN XS0220953235) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class A2b (ISIN XS0220954712) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class A2c (ISIN XS0220957061) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1a (ISIN XS0220957657) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1c (ISIN XS0220959356) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M2a (ISIN XS0220958036) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2c (ISIN XS0220959604) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1a (ISIN XS0220958465) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1c (ISIN XS0220961097) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1c Cross Currency Swap affirmed at 'BBBsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class A2b currency swap obligation affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class A2c currency swap obligation affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1c currency swap obligation affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M2c currency swap obligation affirmed at 'AA-sf'; off
   RWP; Outlook Stable

RMAC Securities No 1 Plc (Series 2006-NS1)
  Class A2a (ISIN XS0248588047) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class A2c (ISIN XS0248595091) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1a (ISIN XS0248589524) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M1c (ISIN XS0248596735) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2a (ISIN XS0248590613) affirmed at 'Asf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2c (ISIN XS0248595687) affirmed at 'Asf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1c (ISIN XS0248597543) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1 currency swap obligation affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2c currency swap obligation affirmed at 'Asf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class A2c currency swap obligation affirmed at 'AAAsf'; outlook
   Stable
  Class M1c currency swap obligation affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Off
   RWP; Outlook Stable

RMAC Securities No 1 Plc (Series 2006-NS2)
  Class A2a (ISIN XS0257367960) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class A2c (ISIN XS0257369073) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1a (ISIN XS0257369156) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M1c (ISIN XS0257370329) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2c (ISIN XS0257371137) affirmed at 'Asf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1a (ISIN XS0257371301) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1c (ISIN XS0257372374) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1c currency swap obligation affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2c currency swap obligation affirmed at 'Asf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M1c currency swap obligation affirmed at 'AA+sf'; off
   RWP; Outlook Stable

RMAC Securities No 1 Plc (Series 2006-NS3)
  Class A2a (ISIN XS0268014353) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1a (ISIN XS0268021721) affirmed at 'AAsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M1c (ISIN XS0268024071) affirmed at 'AAsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2c (ISIN XS0268027769) affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable

RMAC Securities No 1 Plc (Series 2006-NS4)
  Class A3 (ISIN XS0277409446) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1a (ISIN XS0277411004) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M1c (ISIN XS0277437223) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2a (ISIN XS0277457841) affirmed at 'A-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2c (ISIN XS0277445671) affirmed at 'A-sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1a (ISIN XS0277450838) affirmed at 'Bsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1c (ISIN XS0277453691) affirmed at 'Bsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable

RMAC Securities No 1 Plc (Series 2007-NS1)
  Class A2a (ISIN XS0307493162) affirmed at 'AAsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class A2b (ISIN XS0307489566) affirmed at 'AAsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class A2c (ISIN XS0307505601) affirmed at 'AAsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M1a (ISIN XS0307496264) affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M1c (ISIN XS0307506674) affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class M2c (ISIN XS0307511591) affirmed at 'BB+sf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1a (ISIN XS0307500479) affirmed at 'Bsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable
  Class B1c (ISIN XS0307512219) affirmed at 'Bsf'; off RWP;
   Outlook Stable


TATA STEEL: Board to Decide Today on Fate of Port Talbot Plant
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Pickard and Michael Pooler at The Financial Times report that
the British government has warned Tata Steel that it faces damage
to its international reputation if it decides to close the UK's
biggest steelworks at a crunch board meeting in India today,
March 29.

Ministers hope the company will give some "breathing space" to
help management of the Port Talbot plant in south Wales turn it
round as it navigates an "extremely difficult" situation, the FT
relays.

"But our fear is that they will simply close it," the FT quotes
one senior government figure as saying.  "That would put Tata's
reputation through a shredding machine."

A global supply glut and low prices have severely damaged the UK
steel industry, which has shed thousands of jobs and is
struggling to survive after decades of decline, the FT discloses.

The Port Talbot site is the UK's biggest steel plant, with a
workforce of 4,000, the FT notes.

The management at Port Talbot has put forward a restructuring
package, with the target of moving from heavy losses into profit,
the FT relays.  The two-year plan involves cost savings of GBP350
million -- partly through 750 job cuts announced in January — and
would require new investment, the FT states.

According to the FT, the government is on standby to offer
support but is first waiting for a commitment from Tata.
Ministers also believe the business could raise money by selling
land and making more use of the local port, the FT says.

However, the steelworks is ultimately at the mercy of Tata's
board in India, which today, March 29, will discuss the matter
and must sign off any plan, the FT notes.

Possible options before the Tata Steel board include a full
closure of the site, one of the UK's last two remaining
integrated steelworks that produce the metal from raw materials,
the FT relays.

An alternative is to close the "heavy end" of raw steelmaking,
keeping only rolling and pressing functions, according to the FT.

However, people familiar with the business, as cited by the FT,
said it was possible no final decision would be taken today,
March 29.

Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *