TCREUR_Public/160401.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, April 1, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 064



FINANCIERE QUICK: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'B-' CCR


ACA EURO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
HARVEST CLO XV: Moody's Assigns (P)B2(sf) Rating to Class F Notes


E-MAC NL 2006-III: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to B-(sf)
FAB CBO 2005-1: Moody's Hikes Class B Notes Rating to Caa1(sf)
HALCYON STRUCTURED 2006-II: S&P Raises Rating on E Notes to BB+


NORSKE SKOG: GSO, Cyprus Inject US$130-Mil. of New Capital


MIRAF-BANK JSC: Deemed Insolvent, Prov. Administration Halted
RUSSIAN CONSTRUCTION: Deemed Insolvent, Administration Halted


MLEKARA SABAC: Mi Finnance Buys Business for RSD950 Million


ALTERNATIFBANK AS: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2(Hyb) Rating

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ASHTEAD GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Positive & Affirms 'BB' CCR
BEALES: Deal to Avoid Administration is Approved
BHS GROUP: In Advanced Talks to Sell Flagship Store
ECO-BAT TECHNOLOGIES: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' CCR, Outlook Negative
ELEMENT MATERIALS: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR, Outlook Stable

HEALTHCARE SUPPORT: S&P Puts 'B+' Sec. Debt Rating on Watch Pos.
IPSA GROUP: Trading of Shares Suspended Amid Financial Woes
PLYMOUTH ALBION: In Administration After Failure to Clear Debts
SEADRILL PARTNERS: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'B-'

TATA STEEL: Value "Almost Zero", Bidders Weigh Up Rescue Deal
TROD LTD: In Administration After FBI Probe for Price-Fixing
UK: High Street Shops at Risk Of Going Into Administration


* European Union Considers Easing Bank-Failure Rules
* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit



FINANCIERE QUICK: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'B-' CCR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on French
fast food chain Financiere Quick S.A.S. to negative from stable.
S&P also affirmed its 'B-' long-term corporate credit rating on
the company.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' issue rating on the
EUR44.5 million super senior secured revolving credit facility
(SSRCF).  The recovery rating of '1+' on this instrument is
unchanged, indicating S&P's expectation of full recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default.

S&P also affirmed its 'B-' issue rating on Quick's EUR360 million
senior secured floating rate notes.  The '3' recovery rating on
this debt remains unchanged, indicating S&P's expectation of
modest recovery in the event of a payment default, in the upper
half of the 50%-70% range.

In addition, S&P affirmed its 'CCC' issue rating on Quick's
EUR145 million senior unsecured floating rate notes.  The '6'
recovery rating on these notes remains unchanged, indicating
S&P's expectation of negligible recovery (in the 0%-10% range) in
the event of a payment default.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that Quick's planned
business transition exposes the group to high execution risk.  If
the group's rebranding effort does not translate into sufficient
EBITDA generation, it could result in an unsustainable capital
structure and a higher likelihood of a covenant breach.

In December 2015, Groupe Bertrand acquired the French fast food
chain Quick through its operating subsidiary Burger King France
S.A.S.  As part of the integration initiative, Quick plans to
rebrand about 340 of its restaurants in France under the Burger
King brand between 2016 and 2020.

Management believes that Quick's rebranding to Burger King would
allow the group to benefit from a stronger brand identity and
customer franchise, providing a competitive edge to improve the
group's revenue and cash flow generation in the long term.  The
four-year business transition would also enable the Burger King
brand to rapidly expand its presence in France.  However, S&P
expects the fast food market in France will remain intensely
competitive with exposure to fluctuation in commodity prices,
rising labor costs, and wider event risks such as food safety
scares and terrorism.  S&P therefore continues to assess Quick's
business risk profile at the lower end of weak category.

Quick's planned business transition will, in S&P's view, require
significant capital expenditure (capex) upfront, as well as
careful management planning, and carries high level of execution
risk.  Quick plans to begin its rebranding process by converting
about 40 of its restaurants to Burger King in the last quarter of
2016, followed by the conversion of about 90 restaurants a year
in 2017 and 2018.  Each rebranded restaurant is expected to close
for about two months to facilitate the transition process.  S&P
takes the view that the execution risk surrounding the business
transition exposes the Quick group's EBITDA and free operating
cash flow (FOCF) generation to fluctuation.  Given the high debt
level, this could challenge the sustainability of the capital
structure and the group's ability to maintain adequate covenant

S&P continues to assess Quick's financial risk profile as highly
leveraged given the group's high debt level relative to its
earnings, as well as a sizable operating lease profile.
Notwithstanding the group's recent covenant reset and EUR90
million early repayment of the floating rate notes in January
2016, S&P anticipates that Quick will continue to experience a
challenging year in light of increasing competition, recent
terrorist events in France and Belgium, and evolving consumer
perceptions towards fast food offerings.  S&P also expects that
Quick's FOCF will remain significantly negative over the medium
term due to substantial capex required for rebranding, as well as
the company's refurbishment and expansion plan.

Under S&P's methodology, the combination of a weak business
profile and a highly leveraged financial profile yields an
initial analytical outcome (anchor) of 'b' or 'b-'.  In the case
of Quick, we choose the 'b-' anchor, reflecting Quick's relative
weakness in the financial risk profile.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- French real GDP growth of around 1.6% in both 2016 and

   -- French consumer price index inflation of 1.1% in 2016 and
      1.4% in 2017.

   -- A revenue drop of about 1.5% in 2016, with sales hindered
      by the temporary closure of its 40 restaurants for
      rebranding, and small negatively like-for-like sales
      growth.  This could improve to growth of 2.0% if the
      execution is well managed, as management expects Quick to
      benefit from a larger customer base from its rebranded

   -- Adjusted EBITDA margin of around 23% in 2016 and 2017.

   -- Substantial capex of about EUR65 million in 2016, rising to
      about EUR95 million in 2017 and 2018.  The majority of the
      capex will be spent for converting Quick restaurants into
      Burger King operations.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- S&P's lease adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 7.7x in
      2016 (7.0x when excluding the euro mezzanine instrument
      issued by Group Bertrand).  This could increase to 8.0x in
      2017 (7.2x when excluding the euro mezzanine instrument
      issued by Group Bertrand) if the group draws on its SSRCF
      for funding capex.

   -- S&P's reported EBIDTA before deducting rent covering cash
      interest plus rent costs (EBITDAR) cash interest coverage
      of around 1.4x in 2016 and 2017.

   -- Significantly negative FOCF of about EUR20 million in 2016
      and about EUR50 million in 2017, indicating the need for
      external financing for funding the business transition.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that Quick's planned
business transition exposes the group to a high level of
execution risk.  If the group's rebranding effort does not
translate into sufficient EBITDA generation, this could result in
an unsustainable capital structure and a higher likelihood of a
covenant breach.

S&P could lower the ratings if Quick's operating performance
deteriorates, resulting in a sharp EBITDA decline and therefore
leading to S&P's view of an unsustainable capital structure.
This could occur if Quick experiences any setbacks or
difficulties in its business transition.  S&P could also lower
the ratings if the net leverage covenant headroom falls below
S&P's expectations or if its liquidity weakens.

S&P could also lower the ratings if the group implements an
exchange offer, which S&P would view as distressed in nature and
tantamount to a default.  However, as far as S&P know, Quick is
currently not taking any steps in this direction.

S&P could revise the outlook back to stable if Quick scales back
the pace of its rebranding efforts, such that FOCF turns positive
sustainably on the back of positive revenue growth and an
improving EBITDA margin.  S&P could also considers a positive
rating action if Quick reduces debt through asset disposals or
common equity contribution from the family-controlled owner Group


ACA EURO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by ACA Euro CLO 2007-1 P.L.C.:

-- EUR25.6 million Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 3,
    2015 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

-- EUR24 million Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
    due 2024, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015
    Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

-- EUR32 million (current outstanding balance of EUR 25.4
    million) Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024,
    Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa

-- EUR13.6 million Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2024, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015
    Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

ACA Euro CLO 2007-1 P.L.C., issued in June 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Avoca Capital Holdings Limited. The transaction's
reinvestment period finished in June 2014.


The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
deleveraging since last rating action in September 2015 and the
improvement in the credit quality of the portfolio.

In December 2015 payment date, the Class A notes have fully
repaid the EUR33.5 million outstanding and Class B paid down by
approximately EUR6.6 million (20.8% of closing balance), as a
result of which over-collateralization (OC) ratios of all classes
of rated notes have increased significantly. As per the trustee
report dated February 2016, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class
E OC ratios are reported at 391.3%, 194.7%, 132.4% and 112%
compared to July 2015 levels of 212.1%, 152.3%, 120.4% and
107.7%, respectively.

The credit quality has improved as reflected in the improvement
in the average credit rating of the portfolio (measured by the
weighted average rating factor, or WARF) and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers with ratings of Caa1 or
lower. As of the trustee's February 2016 report, the WARF was
2152, compared with 2603 in July 2015. Securities with ratings of
Caa1 or lower currently make up approximately 1.0% of the
underlying portfolio, versus 9.4% in July 2015.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR93.4 million
and GBP4.3 million, defaulted par of EUR0.8 million, a weighted
average default probability of 14.9% over a 4.7 year weighted
average life (consistent with a WARF of 2170), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 44.2% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 12 and a weighted average spread of

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is

HARVEST CLO XV: Moody's Assigns (P)B2(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Harvest
CLO XV DAC (the "Issuer"):

-- EUR232,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2029, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR54,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2029, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR26,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

-- EUR21,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR25,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR13,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.


Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2029. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, 3i Debt Management
Investments Limited ("3iDM"), has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Harvest CLO XV DAC is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of
the portfolio must consist of secured senior loans and up to 10%
of the portfolio may consist of Second-lien loans, unsecured
loans, Mezzanine loans. The portfolio is expected to be
approximately 70% ramped up as of the closing date and to be
comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled
in Western Europe. The remainder of the portfolio will be
acquired during the six month ramp-up period in compliance with
the portfolio guidelines.

3iDM will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
improved and credit impaired obligations, and are subject to
certain restrictions.

In addition to the six classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR 42,000,000 of subordinated notes. Moody's
will not assign ratings to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. 3iDM's investment decisions
and management of the transaction will also affect the notes'

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
December 2015. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of 0 occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR 400,000,000

Diversity Score: 40

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.20%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 44.25%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Moody's has analysed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries. As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below. Following the effective date, and given
the portfolio constraints, only up to 10% of the pool can be
domiciled in countries with foreign currency government bond
rating below A1. Given this portfolio composition, there were no
adjustments to the target par amount, as further described in the

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the provisional rating
assigned to the rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes
increased default probability relative to the base case. Below is
a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3220 from 2800)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3640 from 2800)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3


E-MAC NL 2006-III: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to B-(sf)
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
E-MAC Program B.V. Compartment NL 2006-III's class A2 and E
notes. At the same time, S&P has lowered its ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Dutch residential
mortgage-backed securities (Dutch RMBS criteria), S&P placed
those ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction and the application of its Dutch RMBS criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the current outlook for the Dutch residential
mortgage and real estate market is benign.  The generally
favorable economic conditions support S&P's view that the
performance of Dutch RMBS collateral pools will remain stable in
2016.  Given S&P's outlook on the Dutch economy, S&P considers
the base-case expected losses of 0.5% at the 'B' rating level for
an archetypical pool of Dutch mortgage loans, and the other
assumptions in S&P's Dutch RMBS criteria, to be appropriate.

The portfolio's collateral performance has been stable and in
line with S&P's expectations since its May 2013 review.  Total
arrears in the pool have increased marginally to 1.8% from 1.5%
at S&P's previous review and remain slightly above S&P's Dutch
RMBS index level of 1.2%.  Cumulative losses remain low, at

This transaction has a fully funded reserve fund, which is
amortizing, and provides 0.45% of credit enhancement.  Since
S&P's previous review, CMIS Nederland B.V. (previously GMAC-RFC
Nederland B.V.) has informed S&P that, due to a re-interpretation
of the supporting documents, as of the January 2016 interest
payment date, the class E notes will receive principal payments
equal to the amortization amount of the reserve fund.

As a result of principal repayments, available credit enhancement
for all classes of notes has increased since S&P's previous

After applying S&P's Dutch RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show an increase in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) at a 'AAA' level due to S&P's
increased base foreclose frequency levels under its updated
criteria.  At lower rating levels, this is offset by the
increased seasoning credit received.  S&P has also seen an
increase in the weighted-average loss severity (WALS) for each
rating level, compared with those at our previous review, due to
S&P's updated market value decline adjustments.

Rating     WAFF      WALS
level        (%)      (%)
AAA       17.97     41.54
AA        12.49     38.05
A          9.53     31.47
BBB        6.50     27.95
BB         3.71     25.48
B          2.84     23.17

The overall effect is an increase in the required credit coverage
for all rating levels.

S&P's revised cash flow analysis is based on the application of
its Dutch RMBS criteria and now assumes an additional late
recession timing at the start of year three, which is affecting
our cash flow results.

Taking this into account, S&P considers the increased available
credit enhancement for the class A2 notes to be sufficient to
withstand the expected loss at higher rating levels than the
currently assigned rating.  However, under S&P's current
counterparty criteria, its rating on the class A2 notes is
constrained by S&P's long-term issuer credit ratings (ICRs) on
Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. (A+/stable/A-1) and Credit Suisse
International (A/Stable/A-1), who are the guaranteed investment
contract (GIC) account provider and swap provider, respectively.
Due to noncompliance with S&P's current counterparty criteria,
the maximum rating achievable for the class notes is S&P's long-
term ICR on Cooperatieve Rabobank, or our long-term ICR plus one
notch on  Credit Suisse International, i.e., 'A+ (sf)'.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its 'A+ (sf)' rating on the class A2 notes

At the same time, it is S&P's view that the available credit
enhancement for the class B, C, and D notes is not commensurate
with the expected losses at their currently assigned rating
levels.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'A (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' its
rating on the class B notes, to 'BB- (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' its
rating on the class C notes, and to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' its
rating on the class D notes.

The class E notes are not supported by any subordination or the
reserve fund.  The full redemption of the class E notes relies on
the full release of the reserve fund at the end of the
transaction, which will follow the full redemption of the class
A2 to D notes.  S&P previously reported that it considers that
there is a one-in-two chance of a default on the class E notes in
seven of the E-MAC NL transactions.  S&P's view on this is
unchanged and it has therefore affirmed its 'CCC (sf)' rating on
the class E notes.

E-MAC NL 2006-III is a Dutch RMBS transaction, which closed in
November 2006, and securitizes first-ranking mortgage loans
originated by CMIS Nederland (previously GMAC-RFC Nederland).


Class     Rating             Rating
          To                 From

E-MAC Program B.V. Compartment NL 2006-III
EUR803.2 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A2        A+ (sf)
E         CCC (sf)

Ratings Lowered

B         A (sf)             A+ (sf)
C         BB- (sf)           BBB (sf)
D         B- (sf)            BB- (sf)

FAB CBO 2005-1: Moody's Hikes Class B Notes Rating to Caa1(sf)
Moody's Investors Service took rating actions on FAB CBO 2005-1

Issuer: FAB CBO 2005-1 B.V.

-- EUR237 million (current outstanding balance: EUR7.15M) Class
    A1 Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
    Oct 29, 2015 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR38 million Class A2 Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Baa1
    (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2015 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR18 million Class B Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Caa1
    (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2015 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

-- EUR12.6 million (current rated balance: EUR7.85 million)
    Class C Subordinated Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on
    Oct 29, 2015 Affirmed Ca (sf)

This transaction is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation ("SF CDO") referencing a portfolio of European ABS
assets. At present, the portfolio is composed mainly of CDO of
RMBS and prime RMBS.


The rating actions on the notes are a result of the material
improvement in the credit quality of the collateral and the
deleveraging of the Class A1 notes. Since the last rating action
in October 2015, about 45% of the assets included in the current
portfolio performing par have been upgraded and on average the
magnitude of the upgrades was 2.94 notches.

Over the last two payment dates, the Class A1 has repaid
EUR13.04M or 5.50% of the tranche original balance. The
amortization of class A1 has also improved the
overcollateralization ratio for class A and B notes. As per the
February 2016 trustee report, the collateral coverage test is
reported at 110.20% compared to 105.45% as per the August 2015
trustee report. In addition, Caa rated assets have decreased to
0.0% from 14.2% of the portfolio.

The rating on Class C addresses the repayment of the rated
balance on or before the legal final maturity. The 'rated
balance' at any time is equal to the principal amount of the
combination note on the issue date minus the sum of all payments
made from the issue date to such date, of either interest or
principal. The rated balance will not necessarily correspond to
the outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee.

HALCYON STRUCTURED 2006-II: S&P Raises Rating on E Notes to BB+
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Halcyon Structured Asset Management European CLO 2006-II B.V.'s
class A-1, A-1D, A-1R, B, C, D, and E notes.

The upgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction's
performance and the application of its relevant criteria.

Since S&P's July 15, 2014 review, the class A-1, A-1D, and A-1R
notes have continued to amortize.  Taking into account the notes'
amortization and the evolution of the total collateral amount,
overcollateralization has increased for all the rated classes of
notes since S&P's previous review.

S&P subjected the capital structure to our cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each class of
notes at each rating level.  The BDRs represent S&P's estimate of
the level of asset defaults that the notes can withstand and
still fully pay interest and principal to the noteholders.

S&P has estimated future defaults in the portfolio in each rating
scenario by applying its updated corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) criteria.

S&P's analysis shows that the available credit enhancement for
all of the rated notes is now commensurate with higher ratings
than those previously assigned.  Therefore, S&P have raised its
ratings on the class A-1, A-1D, A-1R, B, C, D, and E notes.

None of the ratings were capped by the application of S&P's
largest obligor test or S&P's largest industry test--two
supplemental stress tests that S&P outlines in its corporate CDO

Halcyon Structured Asset Management European CLO 2006-II is a
cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by Halcyon Loan Investors LP. A portfolio of loans to
U.S. and European speculative-grade corporates backs the
transaction. Halcyon Structured Asset Management European CLO
2006-II closed in January 2007 and its reinvestment period ended
in January 2013.


Halcyon Structured Asset Management European CLO 2006-II B.V.
EUR407.8 mil secured floating-rate notes

                                  Rating           Rating
Class             Identifier      To               From
A-1               40536QAA9       AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)
A-1D              40536QAB7       AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)
A-1R              40536QAC5       AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)
B                 40536QAD3       AAA (sf)         AA (sf)
C                 40536QAE1       AA+ (sf)         A (sf)
D                 40536QAF8       BBB+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)
E                 40536QAG6       BB+ (sf)         B+ (sf)


NORSKE SKOG: GSO, Cyprus Inject US$130-Mil. of New Capital
Luca Casiraghi at Bloomberg News reports that Blackstone Group
LP's GSO Capital Partners and Cyrus Capital Partners provided
about US$130 million to Norske Skogindustrier ASA to keep the
paper maker afloat.

According to Bloomberg, the company said in a statement on
March 31 the funds injected NOK142 million (US$17 million) of new
capital and provided as much as EUR100 million (US$113 million)
under a new securitization facility backed by receivables,
inventories and certain bank accounts.

The proceeds of the securitization, which will replace existing
agreements with SpareBank1 Gruppen Finans AS, will be used to
fund working capital expenses and other operational liquidity
needs for the group's paper mills, Bloomberg discloses.

GSO and Cyrus increased their stakes in Norske Skog to 25% and
10%, respectively, following the capital injection, Bloomberg
relays, citing two separate statements.  Norske Skog said in its
statement other shareholders will be given the chance to
subscribe to shares in a repair offering, Bloomberg relates.

Norske Skog has been trying to restructure its debt since
September, Bloomberg notes.

                      About Norske Skog

Norske Skogindustrier ASA or Norske Skog, which translates as
Norwegian Forest Industries, is a Norwegian pulp and paper
company based in Oslo, Norway and established in 1962.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe in mid-
November 2015, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Norske
Skogindustrier ASA's (Norske Skog) Corporate Family Rating
("CFR") to Caa3 from Caa2 and its Probability of Default Rating
(PDR) to Ca-PD from Caa2-PD.  Standard & Poor's Ratings Service
also downgraded the Company's long-term corporate credit rating
to CC from CCC.


MIRAF-BANK JSC: Deemed Insolvent, Prov. Administration Halted
The Court of Arbitration of the Omsk Region issued a ruling dated
March 1, 2016, with regard to case No. A46-1008/2016, recognizing
that credit institution Miraf-Bank, JSC is insolvent (bankrupt)
and ordering the appointment of a receiver for the entity.

Accordingly, by virtue of the Arbitration Court's ruling, the
Bank of Russia entered a decision, Order No. OD-985, to terminate
from March 24, 2016, the activity of the provisional
administration of Miraf-Bank, JSC.

The Bank of Russia previously appointed the provisional
administration of  Miraf-Bank, JSC, by Order No. OD-138 dated
January 21, 2016, following the revocation of the entity's
banking license.

RUSSIAN CONSTRUCTION: Deemed Insolvent, Administration Halted
The Court of Arbitration of Moscow entered a ruling dated
March 15, 2016, on case A40-226048/15-38-631B, on recognizing
that credit institution Russian Construction Bank, JSC is
insolvent (bankrupt) and ordering the appointment of a receiver
for the entity.

Accordingly, by virtue of the Arbitration Court ruling, the Bank
of Russia decided (via Order No. OD-984, dated March 23, 2016)
to terminate from February 15, 2016, the activity of the
provisional administration of Russian Construction Bank.

The Bank of Russia previously appointed the provisional
administration of Russian Construction Bank, by Order No. OD-
3660, dated December 18, 2015, following the revocation of the
entity's banking license.


MLEKARA SABAC: Mi Finnance Buys Business for RSD950 Million
SeeNews reports that a local commercial court said on March 30
Serbian company Mi Finnance bought Mlekara Sabac for RSD950
million (US$8.8 million/EUR7.7 million).

The Valjevo commercial court said in a statement bidding for the
bankrupt company started from RSD792.6 million, SeeNews relates.

Bids were also placed by Swiss company Bernd Matthias Dietel,
which offered RSD50 million less than Mi Finnance, and by Imlek,
SeeNews relays.

Mlekara Sabac's previous owner was troubled local concern
Farmakom MB, SeeNews discloses.

The company's accounts have been blocked since April 2013, over
RSD3.6 billion of debts, the court, as cited by SeeNews, said,
adding that total creditor claims amount to RSD41.3 billion.

The Valjevo commercial court opened bankruptcy proceedings
against Mlekara Sabac in March 2015, SeeNews recounts.

Mlekara Sabac is a Serbian dairy producer.


ALTERNATIFBANK AS: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2(Hyb) Rating
Moody's Investors Service assigned a provisional (P)Ba2 (hyb),
under review for downgrade, long-term foreign-currency
subordinated debt rating to Alternatifbank A.S. 's (ABank:
deposits Baa3/Prime-3, under review for downgrade; standalone
baseline credit assessment (BCA) ba3, under review for downgrade)
planned US dollar-denominated contractual non-viability Tier 2
bond issuance.


The provisional rating assigned to the subordinated debt
obligations of ABank is positioned two notches below the bank's
adjusted BCA of baa3, under review for downgrade, in line with
Moody's standard notching guidance for subordinated debt with
loss triggered at the point of non-viability, on a contractual
basis, and reflects the uncertainty associated with the timing of
principal write-down. The review for downgrade of the
subordinated debt ratings reflects the review for downgrade of
the BCA and adjusted BCA of the bank. The planned subordinated
debt issuance is expected to be Basel III-compliant and eligible
for Tier 2 capital treatment under Turkish law.

ABank's adjusted BCA of baa3 reflects Moody's view of very high
affiliate support from majority shareholder The Commercial Bank
(Q.S.C.), (Commercial Bank; deposits A1 under review for
downgrade, Prime-1; BCA baa2, under review for downgrade), that
results in three notches of uplift from the Abank's ba3 BCA. As a
result, the review for downgrade of the adjusted BCA of ABank
reflects: i) the review for downgrade on the baa2 BCA of The
Commercial Bank, reflecting Moody's view of weakening capacity of
the parent to provide support in case of need, and ii) the review
on ABank's BCA due to declining core capitalization and Moody's
expectation of rising credit risk and funding cost in the context
of increasing challenges in the Turkish operating environment and
at group level.

As Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final
issuance of the notes, these ratings only represent the rating
agency's preliminary credit opinion and do not immediately apply
to the issued securities. The rating on the debt notes issued
will be subject to Moody's review of the terms and conditions set
forth in the final base and supplemental offering circular and
pricing supplements of the notes to be issued. A definitive
rating may differ from a provisional rating if the terms and
conditions of the issuance are materially different from those of
the preliminary prospectus reviewed.


An upgrade of ABank's subordinated rating is unlikely in the
foreseeable future given that they are under review for downgrade
in line with ABank's definitive long-term ratings, and adjusted

The subordinated debt rating is notched off the adjusted BCA.
Therefore, any upwards or downwards pressure on the bank's
adjusted BCA will result in a similar rating action on the bank's
subordinated debt.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ASHTEAD GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Positive & Affirms 'BB' CCR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Ashtead
Group PLC to positive from stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB' long-term corporate
credit rating on Ashtead and S&P's 'BB' senior secured debt
ratings on the company's $900 million and $500 million second-
lien notes.  The recovery rating on this debt is '3', and
indicates S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery of principal
in the event of default, in the higher half of the 50%-70% range.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that Ashtead will
continue its good operating performance and ongoing healthy
credit metrics.  The equipment rental industry has been enjoying
positive trends in 2016, with the nonresidential construction
market remaining strong in the U.S. and U.K.  As a result,
Ashtead's operating performance for the first nine months of
fiscal 2016 (year ending April 30, 2016) was stronger than S&P
expected, leading to improved profitability, with a reported
EBITDA margin of about 46%.

At the same time, Ashtead has been increasing its capital
expenditure (capex) to take advantage of market conditions.  S&P
expects this will continue to lead to negative free operating
cash flow (FOCF) in fiscal 2016.  S&P believes that Ashtead is
entering a phase of the cycle where replacement capex will
moderate and operating cash flow will be stronger due to past
investments.  On this basis, S&P sees potential for positive FOCF
in fiscal 2017 and thereafter.  This should allow Ashtead to
continue to adhere to its stated financial policy framework of
1.5x-2.0x going forward.

The positive outlook reflects the possibility that S&P may
upgrade the long-term rating on Ashtead by one notch within the
next year.

An upgrade could occur if S&P expects Ashtead to maintain FFO to
debt consistently above 45%, and to remain within its financial
policy framework.  An upgrade would also depend on the company
balancing the level of capital investments with cash flow
generation, to mitigate further increases in debt.  Positive FOCF
would also be a supportive factor.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Ashtead's operating
performance deteriorates or if an unexpected increase in fleet
capex, dividend payout, or acquisition occurs.  More
specifically, S&P would revise the outlook to stable if it
expects FFO to debt to be consistently below 45%, or if S&P did
not envisage the potential for stronger cash flow.

BEALES: Deal to Avoid Administration is Approved
The Daily Echo reports that the honorary president of Beales has
heaped praise on its management, who won backing for a deal which
may have saved it from going into administration.

Creditors voted 90 per cent in favor of a company voluntary
arrangement (CVA), which drastically cuts the rent on 14 of the
department store sites while terms are renegotiated, according to
The Daily Echo.

The report notes that Nigel Beale, whose great-grandfather John
Elmes Beale started the business in 1881, said morale had been
turned around under chairman Stuart Lyons.

Mr. Lyons was appointed last year after the investor Andrew
Perloff bought the business for just GBP1.2million.

Mr. Beale said: "I was very flattered that the new regime invited
me to remain as honorary president of the company.  I have to say
I have enormous respect and affection for Stuart Lyons, whom I've
known for many, many years.

"The staff love him, the managers love him.  There's the sort of
commitment and morale which I think will pick the business up,"
he added.

The report discloses that company had warned it could go into
administration if creditors did not back the CVA and drastically
reduce the rent on loss-making stores.

Beales had said the rents on the 14 stores -- which did not
include Poole or the flagship Bournemouth branch -- were
"dragging the group down".

The CVA proposal before creditors said: "If the CVA is not
approved at the relevant meetings, it is very likely that the
company and Beale Limited will no longer be able to trade as a
going concern, which would result in the appointment of
administrators," the report notes.

The report says Beales proposed paying 30 per cent of the rent
due on the shops in question for 10 months, while it

It has 29 stores across the country and made pre-tax losses of
GBP4.6 million in the year ending November 2014, the report

Since the takeover, Beales says it has reduced headquarters and
operating costs by more than GBP1 million a year, negotiated
improved terms for suppliers and concessionaires and discontinued
loss-making activities, including its "non-productive
transactional website," the report says.

Mr. Lyons introduced a Back to Beales campaign to encourage
customers to return to the store.

BHS GROUP: In Advanced Talks to Sell Flagship Store
Arabian Business reports that Troubled British retailer BHS is in
advanced talks to sell its flagship store in London to the Abu
Dhabi royal family.

According to reports in the UK, Abu Dhabi is close to snapping up
the 45-year lease on Oxford Street, Arabian Business relates.

Local media said negotiations had "accelerated" and a deal could
be announced in the coming days, Arabian Business notes.

                 Company Voluntary Arrangement

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 29,
2016, Reuters related that BHS won support from its creditors for
a rescue plan that should allow the retailer to stay in business
thanks to big cuts in its rent bill.  The 88-year-old firm, hit
hard by intense competition in the retail sector, said on
March 23 creditors to BHS Limited, which covers 125 of its 164
stores, had voted to approve its proposal for a company voluntary
arrangement (CVA) -- a form of compromise agreement to avoid
administration or liquidation, Reuters disclosed.  The CVA was
supported by more than 95% of creditors, above the 75% required
for the proposal to succeed, according to Reuters.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.

ECO-BAT TECHNOLOGIES: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' CCR, Outlook Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised the outlook on U.K.-
based lead recycler Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd. to negative from
stable.  The 'CCC+' long-term corporate credit rating was

S&P also affirmed its 'CCC+' issue rating on the EUR300 million
senior unsecured notes held by Eco-Bat Finance PLC, due February
2017.  The recovery rating remains unchanged at '3', indicating
S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery (in the higher half of
the 50%-70% range) for noteholders in the event of a payment

The outlook revision to negative reflects S&P's opinion that EB
Holdings II, Inc., Eco-Bat's parent and 87% owner, is likely to
default on or restructure its estimated GBP1.2 billion PIK loan
due March 2017.  As such, S&P has revised down its assessment of
EB Holdings II's group credit profile to 'ccc' from 'ccc+',
signaling a likely event of default at the parent within the next
12 months. The 'CCC+' ratings on Eco-Bat are one notch above the
group credit profile on EB Holdings II, although lower than the
'b+' anchor, because S&P cannot rule out that a potential default
or loan restructuring would adversely affect Eco-Bat's credit

"Also, we have reassessed Eco-Bat's liquidity as less than
adequate from adequate previously given the Eurobond maturity and
potential calls for a dividend to cover the parent's PIK loan
maturity within the coming 12 months.  EB Holdings II holds an
87% stake in Eco-Bat, and as such controls its strategy and
financial policy.  We continue to take into account, however,
that there is no cross-default between Eco-Bat and its parent,
that the PIK loan is non-recourse to the subsidiaries' assets,
and that the senior unsecured notes mature prior to the PIK
loan's due date, while ranking structurally prior to the PIK
loan.  For these reasons, we rate Eco-Bat one notch higher than
the parent's group credit profile," S&P said.

The 'b+' anchor score incorporates Eco-Bat's significant cash
balances at end-2015 (about GBP440 million) and that S&P expects
the company to generate positive free cash flow in 2016.  This is
supported by fair resilience of the company's operating
performance, despite lower lead prices, and expected working
capital inflows. Business in the U.S. performed fairly well in
2015, showing relatively stable demand for lead from the
automotive batteries market.  This helped the company extend its
$50 million available bank line to 2020.  European operations
continue to suffer from the market's structural overcapacities,
weighing on utilization rates and prices.  S&P expects the
company to report around GBP70 million of EBITDA in 2016, broadly
in line with 2015, reflecting a moderate improvement in supply
and demand balance both in Europe and in the U.S., and limited
further downside risk on lead prices.  Further support should
come from newly signed contracts and the prudent ramp-up of the
silver expansion project in Germany.

The negative outlook reflects the potential adverse impact on
Eco-Bat's ability to redeem the senior secured notes due February
2017 and its credit profile, if EB Holdings II were to involve
Eco-Bat in the default or restructuring of its PIK loan.

S&P continues to take into account our view that Eco-Bat's
existing bondholders could be repaid in early 2017 when the bond
matures from accumulated cash balances.

S&P could lower the rating if Eco-Bat pays a dividend that
jeopardizes it ability to redeem the Eurobond in February 2017 or
leaves it with an unsustainable capital structure after the bond

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the PIK loan at the
parent is successfully repaid or restructured without materially
weakening Eco-Bat's capital structure.

ELEMENT MATERIALS: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR, Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service assigned a definitive B2 corporate
family rating (CFR) and a B2-PD probability of default rating
(PDR) to Element Materials Technology Limited (Element).
Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a definitive B2 rating to the
$US225 million term loan B1 facility due 2023, raised by EMT
Finance Inc., and a definitive B2 rating to the $US210 million
term loan B2 facility due 2023 (to be raised in EUR), $US70
million capex/acquisition facility due 2023 and $US30 million
revolving facility (RCF) due 2022 raised by EMT 2 Holdings
Limited and EMT Finance Inc., both subsidiaries of Element. The
outlook on all ratings is stable.

Moody's has also withdrawn the ratings of Element Materials
Technology Group Holdings CC2 Ltd, including its CFR of B2 and
PDR of B2-PD. Concurrently Moody's has withdrawn the B2
instrument ratings on the $US 285 million Term Loan B due 2021
and the $US40 million Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) due 2019
raised by Element Materials Technology Group US Holdings Inc.
(the US borrower) and Element Materials Technology Holding UK Ltd
(the UK borrower), both subsidiaries of the company.
Additionally, Moody's has withdrawn the B2 instrument rating on
the $US70 million incremental Term Loan B due 2021 raised by the
UK borrower.


The rating action follows the completion of the acquisition of
Element by Bridgepoint on March 22, 2016, and the repayment of
the facilities raised under 3i's ownership. The final terms of
the legal documentation are in line with the drafts reviewed for
the provisional ratings assigned on February 9, 2016. Moody's
notes though that the 4% original issue discount (OID) on the
company's senior secured term loan B2 will be funded through c.
$US8 million of drawings under the $US 30 million RCF while the
$US15 million cash balance at the closing of the transaction will
be mostly used to fund transaction expenses and other fees.
Despite the drawings under the RCF, Moody's considers that
Element benefits from an adequate liquidity position due to the
c. $US22 million remaining availability under the RCF and the
expectation of free cash flow (FCF) generation at around 5% of
total adjusted debt over the period 2016-2018.

Element's B2 CFR reflects (1) the company's well-established
position in its niche markets supported by high barriers to entry
into the technically demanding testing market and significant
switching costs for customers, (2) the critical and non-
discretionary nature of its testing services dedicated to
industries with zero tolerance for failure, and (3) the company's
good liquidity position supported by the RCF and expectation that
FCF-to-debt will remain at around 5%.

However, the rating is constrained by (1) the company's high
adjusted leverage (as adjusted by Moody's mainly for operating
leases) at the closing of the transaction at 5.4x with Moody's
expectation of limited de-leveraging due to the company's
acquisitive behavior in a consolidating industry, (2) the small
size of the business as evidenced by its geographical and sector
concentration with increasing reliance on the US aerospace
sector, and (3) the cyclicality of its end-markets as
demonstrated for example by the recent pressure on Element's Oil
& Gas segment in the context of decreasing oil prices.

HEALTHCARE SUPPORT: S&P Puts 'B+' Sec. Debt Rating on Watch Pos.
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B+' issue rating
on the senior secured debt issued by U.K.-based special-purpose
vehicle Healthcare Support (Newcastle) Finance PLC (ProjectCo) on
CreditWatch with positive implications.  The debt comprises a
GBP115.0 million senior secured European Investment Bank loan due
March 2038 and GBP197.82 million of senior secured bonds due
September 2041.

Both debt tranches benefit from an unconditional and irrevocable
payment guarantee of scheduled interest and principal provided by
Syncora Guarantee U.K. Ltd.  According to Standard & Poor's
criteria, a long-term rating on a monoline-insured debt issue
reflects the higher of the rating on the monoline and the
Standard & Poor's underlying rating (SPUR).  As S&P do not rate
Syncora, the long-term ratings on the above issues reflect the

The recovery rating on these debt instruments remains unchanged
at '2'.  S&P's expectations are for substantial recovery, in the
higher half of the 70%-90% range.

The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's view that progress is
being made to resolve the ongoing dispute between ProjectCo,
Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (Trust), and
the project's construction contractor, Laing O'Rourke (LOR),
relating to the completion sign-off of the clinical office block
(COB) and to the disputed unavailability and performance
deductions.  ProjectCo, which started judicial proceedings
against the Trust with respect to COB sign-off in November 2015,
has entered into a four-week "stay" period in the proceedings.
During this period, which is in place until April 1, 2016, the
parties have engaged in constructive dialogue, with the objective
of negotiating a settlement agreement.  If successful, the
agreement could lead to the end of the dispute that has strained
relationships and over-shadowed the project since the original
targeted construction completion date of May 2012.  It could also
be a significant step toward reaching phase 8 construction
completion and completion of the project's construction phase as
a whole, allowing the transition of the project into the
operations phase.  This is an important development for the
project as successful conclusion of the negotiations would, in
S&P's opinion, diminish the threat of project termination by the

Based on S&P's observation of the current relationship between
the Trust and ProjectCo, S&P has increased its risk assessment of
the project's operational performance to reflect S&P's view that
it could take time for the Trust and ProjectCo to establish a
fully constructive working relationship that would minimize the
level of performance deductions and disputes during operation.
As a result, S&P has revised down its assessment of the operation
phase stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to 'bbb' from 'a-'.  The
ratings continue to be constrained by S&P's assessment of the
construction phase SACP.

The CreditWatch positive placement reflects S&P's view that a
number of positive steps have been taken by the Trust, ProjectCo,
and LOR in recent weeks that could lead to the resolution of
long-running project disputes and ultimately to the completion of
the project's construction phase.  S&P expects to resolve the
placement over the next 90 days, or as soon as the negotiations
are completed.  The magnitude of the rating change will depend
upon the terms of the settlement agreement.

S&P could raise the rating by one or more notches if the
settlement agreement is concluded successfully and maps out a
route to end the project's construction phase.  An upgrade would
reflect that, following successful dispute resolution, the
relationship between ProjectCo and the Trust was improving,
termination risk had reduced, and the project was transitioning
to its operational phase.  S&P notes that the timing of a
transition to an investment-grade rating to reflect the operation
phase SACP will depend upon many factors, including evidence that
all parties can work constructively together to minimize the risk
of future relationship strains and material penalty deductions.

S&P could assign a negative outlook or lower the ratings by one
or more notches if the settlement agreement is not finalized
within the anticipated timeframe and the negotiations between
ProjectCo and the Trust break down.  This scenario is likely to
lead to a significant increase in availability and performance
deductions and a heightened chance of project termination.

IPSA GROUP: Trading of Shares Suspended Amid Financial Woes
Further to the announcements by IPSA Group plc of March 15, 2016
and March 29, 2016, and notwithstanding that the Company has now
published its final and interim results in accordance with AIM
Rules 18 and 19, the Company has requested a suspension in
trading of the Company's shares pending clarification of the
Company's financial position.

As detailed in the previous announcements of March 15 and March
29, 2016, the Company's financial position remains difficult and
uncertain.  The Company is reliant upon the forbearance of its
creditors and notably Ethos Energy Italia SpA, while it seeks to
realise proceeds from the sale of assets held for resale, being
ancillary plant held by the Company together with the receipt of
funds due from Rurelec plc in relation to deferred consideration.

The Company has creditors totalling approximately GBP3.95 million
of which approximately GBP3.7 million is owed to Ethos.  The
Company's principal assets are the balance of plant held on the
balance sheet at GBP4 million and receivables currently due of
approximately GBP1.28 million although the Company's auditors
issued an adverse audit opinion in the financial statements for
the year ended March 31, 2015 as a result of it believing there
should be a provision against the carrying values of these

The focus of the Company is to realise sufficient funds from
these assets to repay all the Company's remaining creditors.
However, there can be no guarantee that the Company will be
successful in any sale or that the proceeds from the realisation
of these assets will be sufficient to repay the creditors and the
risk remains that the Company may need to be placed into

Following the disposal of the Company's operating business on
February 29, 2016, the Company is now an AIM Rule 15 cash shell
and is seeking to conduct a reverse takeover.

Headquartered in London, IPSA Group plc is an expanding
independent power producer with operations in South Africa.

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised to stable
from positive its outlook on U.K.-based visitor attractions
operator Merlin Entertainments PLC (Merlin).  At the same time,
S&P affirmed the 'BB' long-term corporate credit rating on Merlin
and the 'BB' issue ratings on the company's bank facilities and
bonds.  S&P's recovery ratings on the debt are unchanged at '3',
indicating its expectation of recovery prospects in the higher
half of the 50%-70% range in the event of a payment default.

S&P previously anticipated that Merlin's Standard & Poor's-
adjusted credit metrics would strengthen in 2015.  The outlook
revision reflects that this failed to materialize due to the
group's flat operating performance, which was hampered by
material underperformance at the Resort Theme Parks division.
S&P sees this underperformance as a one-off that has postponed
improved metrics by about a year.  S&P still expects a recovery,
but it's now a less clear prospect.

In the 52 weeks to Dec. 26, 2016, Merlin reported like-for-like
revenue growth of just 0.4%, to GBP1,278 million, while EBITDA at
constant exchange rates fell by 2.1%, to GBP402 million.  The
result was mainly due to a 46.5% drop in EBITDA at the Resort
Theme Parks division, which was affected by the incident at the
"Smiler" ride at Alton Towers that led to a number of serious
injuries and negative press coverage.  The division's results
more than offset a strong performance at the Legoland Parks
division, where EBITDA at constant exchange rates rose by 19.7%.
The Midway division saw EBITDA rise moderately by 2.0%, due to
some drag on inbound traffic to London from Europe and to
Hong Kong from China.

As a result of Merlin's 2015 operating performance, S&P assess
that adjusted ratios are relatively unchanged against 2014,
compared with S&P's expectation of a material improvement.  S&P
considers the incident at Alton Towers a one-off event and expect
the strengthening of metrics will resume in 2016, but S&P has
less visibility on the strength of the recovery.  For this
reason, S&P sees the likelihood of an upgrade in the next 12
months as less than one-in-three.

Merlin has strong diversification in terms of geography and
operations and an above-average market position as a leading
visitor attractions operator.  Merlin's satisfactory business
risk profile is also strengthened by S&P's view of the company's
track record of above-average profitability and robust earnings.

In S&P's view, the visitor attractions industry is exposed to
variable discretionary consumer spending trends, heavy
seasonality, and health and safety risks.  Offsetting these
industry risks are high barriers to entry, Merlin's well-known
brands, and its geographically diverse portfolio of indoor and
outdoor attractions.  Merlin also enjoys a growing proportion of
revenues from all-year sites, resilience to economic cycles, and
industry-leading margins.

Merlin's aggressive financial risk profile has benefited from the
removal of private equity ownership following the IPO, and
subsequent deleveraging strategy.  A longer and sustained track
record of maintaining the existing financial policies in a
supportive operating environment could cause S&P to revise
Merlin's financial risk profile assessment up to significant, if
S&P's upgrade triggers are met.  In 2015, Merlin's ratio of funds
from operations (FFO) to debt was 17.5%, and its adjusted debt-
to-EBITDA ratio was 3.8x.

S&P has revised its assessment of Merlin's management and
governance to fair from satisfactory.  In S&P's opinion, a
neutral assessment better reflects that Merlin is not immune from
event risks such as the recent incident at Alton Towers.  The
revision has no impact on S&P's overall rating assessment.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Revenue growth of about 7%-8% in 2016 and 2017 due to
      growth in all three major operating segments.

   -- A recovery in EBITDA margins in 2016 and 2017 following a
      moderate decline in 2015, supported by cost control and
      good cash conversion of revenues.

   -- Capital expenditure (capex) of about GBP250 million in 2016
      and 2017.

   -- Dividends in line with its policy of 35%-40% of underlying
      profit after tax.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 3.7x in 2016 and
      about 3.6x in 2017.

   -- Adjusted FFO to debt of 18%-19% in 2016 and about 20% in

   -- Adjusted free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt of about
      5%-7% in 2016 and 2017.

   -- Adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of about 5x in 2016 and

The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that Merlin will
maintain comfortable headroom at the current rating level, with
adjusted FFO-to-debt rising toward 20% and a debt-to-EBITDA ratio
of less than 4x.  The stable outlook further assumes that Merlin
will report positive FOCF, and that management will maintain a
supportive financial policy aimed at further deleveraging.

S&P would consider an upgrade if Merlin were to adhere to a
conservative financial policy and achieve an operational
performance that would allow the company to sustain credit
metrics well into the significant financial risk profile category
on a sustainable basis.  This means, essentially, an Standard &
Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA ratio substantially and
sustainably below 4x, an adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio substantially
and sustainably exceeding 20%, and an adjusted FOCF-to-debt ratio
sustainably more than 10%.

S&P considers a downgrade to be less likely, in light of the
comfortable headroom in Merlin's current rating.  However, S&P
could lower the ratings if Merlin experiences adverse operating
developments, or if S&P sees signs of Merlin reverting to a more-
aggressive financial policy, for example, if it pursued a large
debt-financed acquisition or paid out high shareholder returns.
Specifically, S&P could lower the ratings if adjusted debt to
EBITDA approached 5x, if adjusted FFO to debt fell below 12%, or
if FOCF to debt fell below 5%.

PLYMOUTH ALBION: In Administration After Failure to Clear Debts
iTV reports that the Plymouth Albion Rugby Football Club has
announced it has gone into administration.

The club says it has struggled to raise enough money to clear
long-standing debts and needs to sell to a new investor to keep
going, according to iTV.

The report notes that the club almost entered administration in
2015 but the club was saved by a GBP250,000 cash injection from
local businesses.

The report discloses that in a statement the board said:

"It is with regret that the Board of Plymouth Albion Rugby FC has
given notice to appoint an Administrator in order to sell the
club to a new owner."

"The Board have put in substantial funds and worked hard with all
parties to keep the club going over the past 12 months but
believe this is the only way for the club to achieve its
ambitions in the future."

"The Board has failed to attract enough income from sponsorship
and corporate hospitality has not reached expectations. The core
support has been fantastic, turning out in extreme weather to
cheer on their team."

The report relays Director of Rugby Graham Dawe had put together
a young squad at the start of the season after many of the club's
senior players had moved on.

The board said one of the factors in its decision had been the
desire to ensure the Director of Rugby would be able to retain
players in his squad for next season, the report notes.

The board says it has taken the decision to go into
administration because it could see the club could not meet its
objectives in its current debt situation and with its current
spending, the report relays.

It said finding a solvent solution to the club's future was now
unlikely, the report notes.

The club says it will make further statements when it has more
information, the report adds.

SEADRILL PARTNERS: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'B-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had lowered its
long-term corporate credit rating on U.K.-domiciled offshore
drilling company Seadrill Partners LLC and its Marshall Islands-
domiciled subsidiary Seadrill Capricorn Holdings LLC to 'B-' from
'B' and affirmed the 'B' short-term corporate credit rating on
the two entities.  S&P placed both the long- and short-term
ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications.

S&P lowered and placed on CreditWatch negative the issue rating
on the $100 million super senior revolving credit facility (RCF)
due in 2019 to 'B' from 'B+', one notch higher than the corporate
credit rating.  This was co-issued by Seadrill Operating LP and
Seadrill Capricorn Holdings LLC.  The recovery rating on this
instrument is '2', indicating substantial (70%-90%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default, in the higher half
of the range.

S&P also lowered and placed on CreditWatch the issue rating on
the $2.9 billion term loan B due in 2021 to 'B-' from 'B'.  This
was issued by Seadrill Operating LP and guaranteed by Seadrill
Capricorn Holdings.  The recovery rating is '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery prospects in the
event of a payment default, in the higher half of the range.

The sharply and potentially long-lasting deterioration of the
industry outlook and consequent business risk impact has spurred
S&P's downgrade of Seadrill Partners.  Because the company is
closely linked with its main shareholder, Seadrill Ltd., which
has announced funding plans, we are also placing Seadrill
partners on CreditWatch with negative implications, reflecting
S&P's view of the potential contagion to Seadrill Partners.

S&P anticipates market conditions will continue to deteriorate at
least through 2017, with high uncertainty on industry recovery
timing as drastic cuts to capital spending at the level of oil
companies could hit offshore drilling for several years, even if
oil prices recover ahead of our assumptions.  That is because
caution at oil companies would likely persist for a certain time.
The time magnitude of the downturn and the uncertainty around
recovery weighs negatively on our business risk assessment,
because competitive advantage is being negatively affected by
shrinking backlog, and profitability will, in S&P's view, weaken
as contract coverage and unemployed rigs weigh negatively on
operating cash flow capabilities and margins.  Over time, this
could also negatively affect leverage, as S&P foresees a material
decrease in EBITDA, especially from 2018.

The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's understanding that
Seadrill Ltd. will announce funding plans in the first half of

S&P believes, however, given the close links between the two
entities that any repercussions could have a material effect on
Seadrill Partners and could lead to a further downgrade below
S&P's current 'B-' rating. Nevertheless, we note that a positive
outcome from the funding plans at Seadrill Ltd. could ease the
threat of exceptional negative intervention from Seadrill Ltd.

The CreditWatch also reflects the increased risks stemming from
contract terminations in the industry and continued uncertainty
around any potential recovery.  If there is a continued rapid
deterioration, including contract terminations or cancellations,
leading S&P to view the capital structure as unsustainable in the
long term, S&P could also further lower the rating.

The ratings on Seadrill Partners reflect S&P's assessment of the
company's weak business risk profile and its aggressive financial
risk profile.  S&P's business risk assessment recognizes Seadrill
Partners' very modern, high-specification fleet of contracted
vessels, but S&P believes the very weak market outlook will
continue to reduce backlog and average remaining contract term.
For example, Seadrill Partners' reduced by about 10% each between
Sept. 30, 2015, and Feb. 29, 2016.  However, S&P notes that, with
a backlog of $4.3 billion and an average remaining contract term
of 2.5 years, the company still has decent visibility.  The
increasing risk of terminations and contract cancellations are
clearly more likely than in the strong market environment S&P saw
prior to the oil price drop, however.  Nevertheless, the contract
coverage is sufficient to maintain our financial risk profile
assessment at aggressive, as key risks are concentrated in 2018
in terms of operating performance, given that, absent a recovery,
EBITDA could fall to materially lower levels, in turn further
pressuring Seadrill Partners' financial risk profile.

The CreditWatch placement reflects the possibility that S&P could
lower the ratings on Seadrill Partners by one or more notches if
S&P concludes that the company may be affected by the balance
sheet difficulties at Seadrill Ltd.

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch as soon as possible within
the next three months, when it has obtained more clarity about
Seadrill Ltd.'s funding plans.

TATA STEEL: Value "Almost Zero", Bidders Weigh Up Rescue Deal
Marion Dakers at The Telegraph reports that the race to save Tata
Steel's British operations could leave the Government temporarily
owning the troubled firm's factories, ministers suggested on
March 30 as potential bidders start to weigh up their chances of
rescuing the ailing industry.

Tata has fired the starting gun on a sale of its entire UK
business, which employs 15,000 people, after the group's board in
India dismissed its own rescue plan as "unaffordable" and "very
risky," The Telegraph relates.

According to The Telegraph, the firm has written off more than
GBP5 billion since it took over Corus in 2006, and its finance
director Koushik Chatterjee said the British assets were now
valued at "almost zero".

Tata said it wanted to size up potential bidders "in a time bound
manner", although there are several hurdles for the sites' future
owner, The Telegraph relays.

Liberty House, which has already agreed to rescue two of Tata's
sites in a deal brokered by the Scottish government, said it
would consider some of the firm's other manufacturing sites but
was unlikely to take on the biggest plant at Port Talbot, in
South Wales, The Telegraph notes.

Better Capital, the turnaround specialist, has also ruled itself
out, The Telegraph states.

With Tata's Port Talbot site losing GBP1 million a day, pressure
is growing on politicians to intervene, The Telegraph discloses.

Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company.

TROD LTD: In Administration After FBI Probe for Price-Fixing
The Shuttle reports that Trod Ltd., a rubery online toy retailer,
and its director Daniel Aston have been indicted by the FBI over
alleged price fixing.

Trod Ltd. -- which trades under the names Buy 4 Less, Buy for
Less, Buy-For-Less-Online, 247 Toys and Global Trader -- could
face a $100 million fine after Mr. Aston and his co-conspirators
allegedly fixed the price of certain posters sold online through
Amazon Marketplace from as early as September 2013, according to
The Shuttle.

The report notes it has now been confirmed that the company has
gone into administration, putting around 60 members of staff
employed at its base on Frankley Industrial Estate on Tay Road,
Rubery at risk of redundancy.

Chris Pole -- -- director at KPMG
Restructuring and joint administrator to Trod Ltd., said: "The
Company has experienced significant trading difficulties over a
number of years, incurring losses which have ultimately proved to
be unsustainable.

"We will be trading the business as a going concern while we seek
a buyer for the business and its assets.  We would advise any
interested parties to contact the joint administrators as soon as
possible to express their interest," Mr. Pole added.

KPMG said there have been no initial redundancies as a result of
the administration, which was announced Thursday, March 24, the
report notes.

The report says West Midlands Police have confirmed they worked
on behalf of the FBI to carry out a warrant on the premises based
on Frankley Industrial Park in Rednal on December 1, 2015.

Speaking after the FBI's raid of Trod Ltd.'s headquarters,
Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer of the Justice Department's
Antitrust Division in America, said: "This company and its owner
conspired to fix the prices for poster art and consumers
unknowingly suffered the consequences.  It doesn't matter whether
price-fixers operate from an office in California or a warehouse
in England.  We will continue to prosecute conspiracies that
subvert online competition," the report relays.

The report notes Mr. Aston is charged with price fixing in
violation of the Sherman Act, which carries a maximum sentence of
ten years in prison and an individual fine of $1 million.

UK: High Street Shops at Risk Of Going Into Administration
Geoff Ho at The Express reports that BHS managed to avoid going
into administration, but because of the slowing economy, others
will not be so lucky.

The first quarter of the year is traditionally bad for retailers,
who having experienced a dizzying Christmas sales rush, then have
to go through a painful new year slowdown, according to The

The report notes it is suspected that this upcoming quarterly
rent day will result in more firms joining the likes of Brantano,
toys retailer Trod and department store McEwens of Perth on the
casualty list.

However, it is the looming economic slowdown that will really do
the damage, the report relays.

The report notes that the retail sector is already ultra-
competitive and any slowdown will make it tougher, even for
juggernauts like Next.

Given that chief executive Simon Wolfson fears that the clothing
and homeware group faces its toughest year since 2008, one can
only imagine how lesser retailers will cope, the report says.

According to the Centre for Retail Research, 25 firms went under
in 2015, with nine more so far this year, the report discloses.

That list will grow as consumer spending, for so long the engine
of Britain's growth, slows as people tighten their purse strings,
the report notes.

A slowdown combined with the fact that too many retailers have
poor offerings, stores in the wrong locations, rent bills that
are far too high and price deflation, points to a growing number
of business failures, the report discloses.

Although the level of retail insolvencies is unlikely to match
the 54 recorded in 2008, do not be surprised if they comfortably
exceed last year's tally, the report adds.


* European Union Considers Easing Bank-Failure Rules
Rebecca Christie and Boris Groendahl at Bloomberg News report
that the European Union is considering easing bank-failure rules
introduced to end the era of expensive taxpayer-funded bailouts.

According to Bloomberg, a discussion paper prepared by the
European Commission, the EU's executive arm, envisions setting EU
loss-absorbency requirements for its biggest banks, led by HSBC
Holdings Plc and Deutsche Bank AG, in line with those issued in
November by the Financial Stability Board for the world's 30 most
systemically important lenders.

The paper, dated last month and seen by Bloomberg, "explores
possible options" for implementing the FSB rule in the EU and
isn't binding on the Brussels-based commission.

Yet Elke Koenig, head of the euro area's bank resolution
authority, has repeatedly said that the currency bloc would
exceed global standards to ensure its biggest banks can be
restructured and recapitalized without threatening financial
stability, Bloomberg notes.

The commission's discussion paper states that European firms on
the FSB list would be held to the greater of the two standards --
based on risk-weighted assets or a leverage ratio exposure
measure -- as laid out by the Basel-based global regulator,
Bloomberg discloses.

In addition to the potentially lower minimum loss-absorbing
requirement for big lenders, the paper sets out a series of
conditions to be met before bank-specific add-ons could be
applied, Bloomberg relays.

* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
Author: Frank H. Knight
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 381 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Order your personal copy today at

The tenets Frank H. Knight sets out in this, his first book,
have become an integral part of modern economic theory. Still
readable today, it was included as a classic in the 1998 Forbes
reading list. The book grew out of Knight's 1917 Cornell
University doctoral thesis, which took second prize in an essay
contest that year sponsored by Hart, Schaffner and Marx. In it,
he examined the relationship between knowledge on the part of
entrepreneurs and changes in the economy. He, quite famously,
distinguished between two types of change, risk and uncertainty,
defining risk as randomness with knowable probabilities and
uncertainty as randomness with unknowable probabilities. Risk,
he said, arises from repeated changes for which probabilities
can be calculated and insured against, such as the risk of fire.
Uncertainty arises from unpredictable changes in an economy,
such as resources, preferences, and knowledge, changes that
cannot be insured against. Uncertainty, he said "is one of the
fundamental facts of life."

One of the larger issues of Knight's time was how the
entrepreneur, the central figure in a free enterprise system,
earns profits in the face of competition. It was thought that
competition would reduce profits to zero across a sector because
any profits would attract more entrepreneurs into the sector and
increase supply, which would drive prices down, resulting in
competitive equilibrium and zero profit.

Knight argued that uncertainty itself may allow some
entrepreneurs to earn profits despite this equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs, he said, are forced to guess at their expected
total receipts. They cannot foresee the number of products they
will sell because of the unpredictability of consumer
preferences. Still, they must purchase product inputs, so they
base these purchases on the number of products they guess they
will sell. Finally, they have to guess the price at which their
products will sell. These factors are all uncertain and
impossible to know. Profits are earned when uncertainty yields
higher total receipts than forecasted total receipts. Thus,
Knight postulated, profits are merely due to luck. Such
entrepreneurs who "get lucky" will try to reproduce their
success, but will be unable to because their luck will eventually

At the time, some theorists were saying that when this luck runs
out, entrepreneurs will then rely on and substitute improved
decision making and management for their original
entrepreneurship, and the profits will return. Knight saw
entrepreneurs as poor managers, however, who will in time fail
against new and lucky entrepreneurs. He concluded that economic
change is a result of this constant interplay between new
entrepreneurial action and existing businesses hedging against
uncertainty by improving their internal organization.
Frank H. Knight has been called "among the most broad-ranging
and influential economists of the twentieth century" and "one of
the most eclectic economists and perhaps the deepest thinker and
scholar American economics has produced." He stands among the
giants of American economists that include Schumpeter and Viner.
His students included Nobel Laureates Milton Friedman, George
Stigler and James Buchanan, as well as Paul Samuelson. At the
University of Chicago, Knight specialized in the history of
economic thought. He revolutionized the economics department
there, becoming one the leaders of what has become known as the
Chicago School of Economics. Under his tutelage and guidance,
the University of Chicago became the bulwark against the more
interventionist and anti-market approaches followed elsewhere in
American economic thought. He died in 1972.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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