TCREUR_Public/160405.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, April 5, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 066


                            Headlines


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

EP ENERGY: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating


D E N M A R K

OW BUNKER: Institutional Investors File Suit Over 2014 IPO


F R A N C E

CMA CGM: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'B', Outlook Negative


G E O R G I A

GEORGIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings


I R E L A N D

CVC CORDATUS VI: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating to Class E Notes
* IRELAND: Demand for Examinership as Rescue Mechanism Falls


I T A L Y

INTESA SANPAOLO: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Rating on AT1 Notes
UNICREDIT BANK: Fitch Says Outlook Revision No Impact on 'bb-' VR


M A C E D O N I A

MACEDONIA: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


N E T H E R L A N D S

ALTICE NV: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B+' CCR
PROSPERO CLO II: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. D Notes to Ba3


P O R T U G A L

DOURO MORTGAGES: Moody's Puts B2 Rating on Review for Downgrade


R O M A N I A

HIDROELECTRICA SA: Expects to Exit Insolvency by Next Month


R U S S I A

CB BALTICA: Deemed Insolvent, Prov. Administration Halted
CB RENAISSANCE: Deemed Insolvent, Prov. Administration Halted
CENTROBUV: Under Observation, Sept. 6 Bankruptcy Hearing Set
GLOBAL PORTS: Fitch Assigns 'BB+(EXP)' Rating to Proposed Notes
KOMI REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term IDR, Outlook Negative

TOMSK OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Credit Rating


S P A I N

* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 5 Spanish RMBS Transactions


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALPARI UK: April 18 Claims Filing Deadline Set
MORTGAGE NO.7: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
TATA STEEL: Meyohas Brothers Near Scunthorpe Plant Rescue Deal
TATA STEEL: Fitch Cuts LT Foreign Issuer Default Rating to 'BB'


X X X X X X X X

* Fitch Says EU SME CLO Performance Remains Stable in March 2016


                            *********



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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


EP ENERGY: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Czech Republic-based EP Energy a.s.'s
(EPE) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+', and its
EUR1.1 billion senior secured notes at 'BBB-'. Fitch has also
affirmed holding company CE Energy a.s.'s (CEE) Long-term IDR at
'B+', and its EUR500 million 7% senior secured notes due in 2021
at 'B+'/'RR4'. The Outlooks on the IDRs are Stable.

"The affirmation reflects our expectation that after the disposal
of the German assets the majority of EPE's cash flow (about 70%)
will be generated by quasi-regulated district heating operations
and from regulated network assets. The volatility of the
remaining business, which consists of power generation, trading
and supply, is mitigated, in our view, by EPE's intention to
strengthen its balance sheet with the proceeds from the disposal.
We forecast average funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net
leverage of around 3.6x for 2016-2018, assuming the
deconsolidation of Stredoslovenska energetika, a.s. (SSE). We
forecast some leverage headroom at the current ratings; however,
the developing group structure and lack of track record in its
business strategy increase EPE's credit risk, in our view."

CEE has deposited funds with its trustees for the remaining
outstanding EUR375 million 7% notes that are due in 2021 to be
redeemed and cancelled. After the cancellation of the 2021 notes,
Fitch intends to withdraw CEE's rating since there will be no
outstanding bonds issued by CEE and CEE may be reorganized.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Pending Reorganization

EPE has disposed of its German operations (Mibrag, Schkopau and
Buschhaus), including mining and lignite generation. The German
businesses benefit from long-term off-take contracts, but the
country's energy policy represents incremental long-term risks.
These assets represent about 35% of the previous group EBITDA,
assuming the full consolidation of SSE, and about 40% of EBITDA
if SSE is proportionately consolidated.

"The disposals reduce EPE's geographical diversification, with
the majority of cash-flows now generated in the Czech Republic
and Slovakia, and also somewhat decrease EPE's vertical
integration through the loss of the mining business. EPE remains
active in district heating, electricity distribution, generation
and trading and supply. We are maintaining our leverage guidance
unchanged for the 'BB+' IDR for the future EPE."

Transaction Proceeds to Reduce Leverage
The German operations were sold to Energeticky a prumyslovy
holding, a.s (EPH), an ultimate owner of EPE, for EUR157m (equity
price) with proceeds supplemented by the settlement of certain
intercompany loans amounting to EUR335m. The transaction is not
constrained by anti-monopoly laws and as such it should close
with immediate effect. The proceeds of the transaction will be
used to strengthen EPE's balance sheet and reduce leverage.

Emerging Structure and Integration

"Despite the divestment of the German operations, EPE's group
structure remains complex with a number of separate operating and
holding companies. Operational integration is moderate, despite
EPE's presence in the energy chain from power generation to
retail supply. EPE's ratings remain constrained, in our view, by
the company's continuing restructuring and lack of track record
in pursuing a clear strategy."

Leader in District Heating

EPE is the largest heat supplier in the Czech Republic with an
installed thermal capacity of 3.2 gigawatts (GW), mostly lignite-
fired, and heat supplies of 15.6 peta joules (PJ) in 2014, mostly
to households (57%) and large industrials (20%). The company
supplies around 360,000 households in Prague and other major
cities, which represent a stable customer base. It also operates
one of the largest low-cost cogeneration plants in the country.
EPE's heat prices are typically below the market average and
those of alternative heating.

Cash Flow Visibility

EPE's credit profile is supported by low-cost heat supplies,
cogeneration power sales as well as by regulated regional
distribution monopolies and long-term power purchase agreements.
These core divisions represent about 70% of EPE's cashflows, with
the rest derived from power generation and supply, making its
earnings and cash flows fairly predictable.

Leverage above Peers

"EPE's leverage is higher than most Fitch-rated central European
peers. Its bond terms allow restricted payments (including
dividends) providing that leverage (net debt-to-EBITDA) is no
higher than 3.0x (with SSE on a fully consolidated basis) and
also limit further indebtedness once gross debt exceeds 3.25x
EBITDA (full consolidation of SSE). On funds from operations
(FFO) adjusted basis Fitch expects EPE's net leverage to be
around 3.6x for 2016-2018 (assuming deconsolidating SSE and
including only the dividend thereof), compared with the upper
limit of our leverage guidance for the current rating at 4.0x."

CEE Restructuring and Merger

CEE represents a simple holding company structure for EPE, solely
reliant on dividends as the only source of cash flow. Its own
debt service and payments to the parent company EPH are the two
main uses for its cash. No withholding or income taxes are
expected to be incurred.

Following the early redemption of the CEE notes Fitch expects to
withdraw CEE's rating when the notes are cancelled.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for EPE include:

-- Electricity baseload prices achieved gradually declining to
    EUR26/MWh by 2018 from EUR30/MWh currently;

-- Average capital expenditure of EUR90m/year, peaking in 2016
    at about EUR110 million;

-- Average dividends up-streamed of about EUR70m/year;

-- The CZK to EUR exchange rate strengthening to CZK 25/EUR by
    2018 from about CZK 27/EUR currently;

-- A gradual decline in net debt to about EUR650 million by 2020
    from EUR1.2 billion in 2015;

-- The proceeds from the disposal of German assets will be used
    to strengthen EPE's balance sheet and reduce leverage.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

FOR EPE:

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

-- Longer track record of the current business structure with a
    clear financial strategy for the medium- to long-term

-- Reduction of target leverage to, and Fitch-expected leverage
    remaining at, a level comparable with regional peers' (FFO
    adjusted net leverage below 3.5x) on a sustained basis

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

-- A more aggressive financial policy (including opportunistic
    M&A or higher dividends) that would increase Fitch-expected
    FFO adjusted net leverage to 4.0x or above on a sustained
    basis (this level would likely be in breach of EPE's bond
    covenants)

-- A significant deterioration in business fundamentals due to
    structural regulatory shifts or structural decline in heat
    demand

FOR CEE:

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

-- A reduction of Fitch-expected consolidated FFO adjusted net
    leverage of CEE (including EPE, but deconsolidating SSE) to
    below 4.75x on a sustained basis, combined with sustainable
    dividend cover of CEE in excess of 3.5x

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

-- A sustained drop in dividend cover to below 2.5x and an
    increase in the consolidated FFO adjusted net leverage to
    over 5.5x

-- A dividend lock-up at EPE level triggered by a breach of the
    3.0x net debt/ EBITDA covenant

-- Available liquidity falling below six months' debt service

LIQUIDITY

"At end-September 2015, cash and cash equivalents were EUR203
million for EPE and EUR40m for CEE. Some EUR100m of EPE's cash
was pledged as security for bond holders and readily available
for the EPE group. We expect EPE's free cash flow to be neutral
during 2016-2017, depending on the company's dividend policy and
wider financial strategy."



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D E N M A R K
=============


OW BUNKER: Institutional Investors File Suit Over 2014 IPO
----------------------------------------------------------
Nikolaj Skydsgaard at Reuters reports that a group of 26
institutional investors has issued a summons against bankrupt
Danish ship fuel supplier OW Bunker in the latest stage of a
legal campaign for allegedly misleading them in its 2014 initial
public offer (IPO).

The investors had said last year they would sue Bunker, private
equity fund Altor and the company's board over their
responsibility for the company's flotation prospectus, after the
company filed for bankruptcy just months after listing, Reuters
recounts.

The investors, which include two of the largest pension funds in
Denmark, ATP and PFA, have now subpoenaed those parties to appear
in court in their attempt to claim DKK769 million (US$118
million), reflecting the money which they say they lost in the
float, Reuters relates.

The company, which had been valued at US$1 billion when it
floated at the end of March 2014, came to grief in November the
same year after suffering hedging losses of almost US$300
million, Reuters relays.

The lawsuit was filed at Copenhagen's city court, Reuters
discloses.

                      About O.W. Bunker

OW Bunker AS is a global marine fuel (bunker) company founded in
Denmark.  The company declared bankruptcy on Nov. 7, 2014,
following its admission that it had lost US$275 million through a
combination of fraud committed by senior executives at its
Singaporean unit.

The Danish company placed its U.S. subsidiaries -- O.W. Bunker
Holding North America Inc., O.W. Bunker North America Inc. and
O.W. Bunker USA Inc. -- in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Bankr. D. Conn.
Case Nos. 14-51720 to 14-51722) in Bridgeport, Conn., on Nov. 13,
2014.

The U.S. cases are assigned to Judge Alan H.W. Shiff.  The U.S.
Debtors have tapped Patrick M. Birney, Esq., and Michael R.
Enright, Esq., at Robinson & Cole LLP, as counsel.   McCracken,
Walker & Rhoads LLP is serving as co-counsel.  Alvarez & Marsal
is the financial advisor.ne fuel (bunker) company founded in
Denmark.  The company declared bankruptcy on Nov. 7, 2014,
following its admission that it had lost US$275 million through a
combination of fraud committed by senior executives at its
Singaporean unit.

The Danish company placed its U.S. subsidiaries -- O.W. Bunker
Holding North America Inc., O.W. Bunker North America Inc. and
O.W. Bunker USA Inc. -- in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Bankr. D. Conn.
Case Nos. 14-51720 to 14-51722) in Bridgeport, Conn., on Nov. 13,
2014.

The U.S. cases are assigned to Judge Alan H.W. Shiff.  The U.S.
Debtors have tapped Patrick M. Birney, Esq., and Michael R.
Enright, Esq., at Robinson & Cole LLP, as counsel.   McCracken,
Walker & Rhoads LLP is serving as co-counsel.  Alvarez & Marsal
is the financial advisor.



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F R A N C E
===========


CMA CGM: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'B', Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on France-based container ship operator
CMA CGM S.A. to 'B' from 'B+'.  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue rating on the company's
senior unsecured debt to 'CCC+' from 'B-'.  The recovery rating
remains '6', reflecting S&P's expectation of negligible recovery
in the 0%-10% range in the event of payment default.

The downgrade reflects S&P's expectation that CMA CGM will see
constrained earnings, owing to the depressed conditions in
container shipping and S&P's discounted freight rate assumption
for 2016 and 2017.  S&P believes this weakness -- combined with
CMA CGM's acquisition of Singapore-based container liner Neptune
Orient Lines Ltd. (NOL), which is subject to antitrust approvals
expected by mid-2016, for a total consideration of $2.4 billion
in a partly debt-funded transaction, and CMA CGM's further fleet
expansion -- will likely lead to the company's credit measures
falling short of the levels S&P considers commensurate with the
previous 'B+' rating in 2016-2017.  This includes a pro forma
ratio of Standard & Poor's-adjusted funds from operations (FFO)
to debt of more than 12%.

"We also believe that the pace and magnitude of a rebound in CMA
CGM's credit measures remains uncertain and vulnerable to weak
industry prospects, owing to structural containership
overcapacity and sluggish expansion of global trade.  This
prompted our reassessment of CMA CGM's financial risk profile to
highly leveraged from aggressive, and the subsequent revision of
our anchor for the company to 'b' from 'b+'.  The rating
previously incorporated our expectation that freight rates will
remain relatively flat in 2016 and increase slightly in 2017,
such that the pro forma credit metrics will deteriorate at the
close of the acquisition of NOL (because of a large spike in
financial leverage following the merger), but remain within
rating-commensurate thresholds, albeit with limited headroom,"
S&P said.

"Furthermore, we believe that CMA CGM's liquidity will
deteriorate over the next few quarters (absent sufficient
offsetting factors, such as timely asset disposals), as a result
of sustained pressure on freight rates.  Although we currently
believe that CMA CGM's liquidity sources will cover uses by about
1.1x in 2016, we consider that the leeway under this ratio has
reduced considerably, because of a large $772 million cash
outflow to an external escrow account in December 2015 (for the
NOL acquisition), aggravated by what we forecast as likely lower
earnings this year.  This makes CMA CGM's liquidity highly
susceptible to underperforming our base-case operating scenario
outlined below.  We note, however, that CMA CGM's liquidity would
improve markedly and immediately at the closing of the
acquisition, given a $1.6 billion pool of available credit lines
at the NOL-level to be fully accessible to CMA CGM post-
acquisition," S&P noted.

"We believe that our current assessment of CMA CGM's business
risk profile as weak will not change following the acquisition's
closing.  We believe the company will benefit from improvements
to its scale and competitive advantage from the merger with NOL.
However, we do not consider these improvements sufficiently
material to revise our view of CMA CGM's business risk profile,
which remains constrained by the shipping industry's high risk
and the company's volatile profitability.  This stems from CMA
CGM's operating margins and returns on capital, which are tied to
the industry's cyclical swings; its heavy exposure to
fluctuations in bunker fuel prices, associated with the company's
typically constrained ability to recover cost inflation; and
fairly low short-term flexibility to adjust its operating cost
base.  These weaknesses are partly mitigated by CMA CGM's top-
tier market positions and global footprint through a broad and
strategically located route network; attractive fleet profile,
supported by a large, young, and diverse fleet; and strong
customer diversification.  We also believe that the group's
established track record of achieving significant cost savings
and proactive efforts to continuously improve cost efficiencies
will continue to support earnings," S&P said.

Container liners are experiencing severe freight-rate volatility
and downward pressure on primary and secondary routes.  This
trend has intensified in the recent months, and S&P expects it
will continue in the next 12-18 months.  Companies are failing to
sustain periodic general freight-rate increases in an environment
characterized by the low bunker price and ongoing deliveries of
ultra-large container ships, which will deepen persistent
oversupply problems.  Furthermore, the recent demand-side trends,
most notably a contraction of exports from Asia to Europe and
slowed intra-Asian trades, are exacerbating the already strained
situation in the container ship sector.  On a positive note, S&P
believes that cost pressures eased sustainably following a drop
in bunker prices, which should help companies better withstand
headwinds the industry will face in the next 12 months.
Furthermore, given the high likelihood that the supply and demand
imbalance will continue in 2016, disciplined capacity management
by the largest liners, in particular, remains critical to
sustained profitability.

The negative outlook reflects the persisting high cyclical
pressure on freight rates and that, given the uncertain short-
term outlook for the container liner sector, CMA CGM's liquidity
might weaken further if the company's financial performance was
below our expectations.

S&P would lower the rating in the next few quarters if it
believes that CMA CGM is experiencing higher contraction in
freight rates than what S&P currently forecasts.  This would
erode the company's cash flow generation and liquidity sources,
absent any sufficient offsetting factors, such as timely asset
disposals.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if CMA CGM's liquidity
position stabilized, owing to EBITDA generation appearing to be
consistent with S&P's expectations or other external measures to
boost liquidity sources.  S&P similarly believes that the closing
of the NOL acquisition would have a positive impact on the
company's liquidity profile.

A revision of the outlook to stable would also be contingent on
S&P's view of CMA CGM's ability to maintain a ratio of FFO to
debt of more than 6%, which S&P views as commensurate with the
'B' rating.



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G E O R G I A
=============


GEORGIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Georgia's Long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-' with Stable
Outlooks. The issue ratings on Georgia's senior unsecured
foreign- and local-currency bonds are also affirmed at 'BB-'. The
Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'BB' and the Short-term foreign-
currency IDR at 'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings balance Georgia's large current account deficit, high
level of external debt, low external liquidity and subdued per
capita income levels with high share of concessional debt,
economic resilience, favorable governance indicators and the
policy anchor of an IMF stand-by arrangement (SBA).

The Georgian economy is vulnerable to external shocks and has
been affected by the recession in Russia and other important
trading partners in the former Soviet Union (FSU). As of end-
2014, 51% of Georgian exports went to countries in the FSU
(equivalent to around 9% of GDP) and remittances from Russia
(around 50% of the total) were equivalent to almost 5% of GDP. In
nominal $US terms, merchandise exports fell by around 23% in
2015. Remittances decreased 25%, with those from Russia falling
39%.

However, despite the negative trends, Georgia's real GDP growth
held up fairly well in 2015, with the economy expanding 2.8% in
real terms. In part, this is because Georgia has diversified its
export markets away from Russia since the war between the two
countries in 2008. 29% of Georgian exports go to the EU, 8% to
Turkey, 6% to China and 5% to the US. Import compression played a
role in maintaining positive headline growth, while the plunge in
oil prices has lowered inflation, boosting real incomes.

2016 will be another challenging year for growth, with key trade
partners in the FSU, notably Russia, set to contract again. While
the real effective exchange rate depreciated by almost 5% in
2015, boosting competitiveness, a narrow export base will limit
Georgia's ability to take advantage of this. However, tourism
could perform well, with Georgia potentially set to benefit from
rising security risk in many competitor destinations. Low oil
prices will continue to boost real incomes and credit growth will
remain strong. Fitch expects the Georgian economy to grow 2.5%
this year, rising to 4.2% in 2017 as external conditions improve.

Owing to the external shock, Fitch estimates that the current
account deficit (CAD) widened marginally to 11.4% of GDP in 2015.
Lower oil prices provided some relief. The depreciation of the
exchange rate saw gross external debt (GXD) jump to an estimated
105.7% of GDP in 2015, up from 82.9% in 2014. The risks are
mitigated by over 20% of GXD being inter-company lending, while a
further 30% is government borrowing, almost 90% of which is
concessional. Nevertheless, while the CAD will narrow gradually
(Fitch forecasts a deficit of 10.2% of GDP in 2016 and 8.6% in
2017), less than half will be funded by FDI inflows, meaning that
GXD will continue to increase. Foreign exchange reserves cover
only 3.1 months of current external payments (CXP), which is in
line with that of recent years but below the 'BB' median of 4.2
months.

Around 78% of total public debt is denominated in foreign
currency. Following the depreciation of the lari in 2015, gross
general government debt reached 41.4% of GDP, up from 35.5% in
2014. Around 65% of total public debt is owed to either
multilateral or bilateral donors, mostly on concessional terms.
The general government deficit widened to 3.8% of GDP, from 2.9%
in 2014, as weaker growth weighed on revenues. Some uncertainty
surrounds fiscal projections for 2016-17 with the government
still negotiating capital spending plans with the IMF. Fitch's
baseline scenario is for general government deficits of 3.4% in
2016 and 3.1% in 2017.

A three-year IMF SBA signed in 2014 remains an important policy
anchor. However, the IMF delayed the second and third reviews
under the SBA in 2015, owing to objections to certain policy
initiatives, including the government's attempt to remove
responsibility for banking supervision from the National Bank of
Georgia (NBG). The government now appears to have accepted the
IMF's position on this issue.

The political environment is quite polarized, and tensions could
remain high in the run-up to the parliamentary election in
October. However, Georgia continues to enjoy very strong
governance indicators by regional and rated peer standards. The
slow normalization of bilateral relations with Russia is positive
for political stability.

The banking sector has so far been resilient to the weakness of
the lari, given that around 65% of loans are in foreign currency.
Non-performing loans (NPLs) have remained at around 3% of total
loans, largely unchanged from before the lari devaluation, helped
by moderate loan restructuring. Banks' return on equity remained
high in 2015 at above 15%. Georgian banks have solid capital
buffers, with the sector's capital adequacy ratio at 17%.
However, private credit growth, part of which is unsecured
lending to households, has been in double digits since 2010.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's assessment that upside and
downside risks to the rating are currently balanced. The main
risk factors that could, individually or collectively, trigger
negative rating action are:

-- Pressure on foreign exchange reserves, for example by a
    widening in the CAD.

-- Deterioration in either the domestic or regional political
    climate that affects economic policymaking or regional growth
    and stability.

-- A material rise in the public debt/GDP ratio, caused by
    fiscal slippage, a crystallization of contingent liabilities,
    or further lari weakness.

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead
to positive rating action are:

-- Smaller CADs that contribute to lower net external
    indebtedness.

-- A revival of strong and sustainable GDP growth accompanied by
    ongoing fiscal discipline.

-- A declining trend in the dollarization ratio.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch expects the Russian economy to contract 1.5% this year,
before growing 1.5% in 2017.

Beyond 2017, Fitch assumes that the government will maintain its
medium-term ambition to keep the fiscal deficit below 3% of GDP,
stabilizing the general government debt ratio below 40% of GDP.



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I R E L A N D
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CVC CORDATUS VI: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned CVC Cordatus Loan Fund VI Designated
Activity Company final ratings, as:

  Class A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class C: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
  Class D: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class E: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
  Subordinated notes: not rated

CVC Cordatus Loan Fund VI Designated Activity Company is a cash
flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO).  Net proceeds from the
issuance of the notes were used to purchase a EUR400 mil.
portfolio of mainly European leveraged loans and bonds.  The
transaction features a four-year reinvestment period and the
portfolio is managed by CVC Credit Partners Group Ltd.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Average Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the
'B' category.  Fitch has credit opinions on 80 of the 83 obligors
in the indicative portfolio.  The covenanted minimum Fitch
weighted average rating factor (WARF) for assigning the final
ratings is 34.5.  The WARF of the identified portfolio is 30.68.

High Recovery Expectation
At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations.  Fitch views the recovery prospects more favorable
than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets.  Fitch has
assigned Recovery Ratings to 98 of the 101 obligations in the
identified portfolio.  The covenanted minimum weighted average
recovery rate (WARR) for assigning the final ratings is 67%.  The
WARR of the identified portfolio is 68.02%

Unhedged Non-Euro Assets Exposure
The transaction is allowed to invest up to 2.5% of the portfolio
in non-euro-denominated assets.  Unhedged non-euro assets are
limited to a maximum exposure of 2.5% of the portfolio subject to
principal haircuts.  The manager can only invest in unhedged
assets if after the applicable haircuts the aggregate balance of
the assets is above the reinvestment target par balance.

Partial Interest Rate Hedge
Between 0% and 10% of the portfolio can be invested in fixed-rate
assets, while the liabilities pay a floating rate coupon.  At
closing the issuer entered into an interest rate cap to hedge the
transaction against rising interest rates.  The notional of the
cap is EUR65 mil., representing 16.25% of the target par amount,
and the strike rate is fixed at 4%.  The cap will expire five
years after the closing date.

Documentation Amendments
The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation or noteholder approval.  Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings.  Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final
maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective Fitch may decline to comment.  Noteholders
should be aware that the structure considers the confirmation to
be given if Fitch declines to comment.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would
lead to a downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes.  A
25% reduction in expected recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to five notches for the rated notes.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

All but three of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch.  Fitch has relied on the practices of the
relevant Fitch groups to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable


* IRELAND: Demand for Examinership as Rescue Mechanism Falls
------------------------------------------------------------
Demand for examinership as a corporate recovery mechanism appears
to be falling, RTE News reports, citing the latest index from the
insolvency experts Hughes Blake.

In the first three months of the year, 138 jobs were saved
through the examinership process, a fall of nearly two thirds on
the same quarter last year, RTE News discloses.

According to RTE News, the figures reflect increased business
owner confidence across the country, where the recovery is
finally beginning to filter through for many businesses.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


INTESA SANPAOLO: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Rating on AT1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.'s (IntesaSP)
and its Italian bank subsidiaries' Long-term Issuer Default
Ratings (IDR) at 'BBB+' with Stable Outlook.

The rating actions follow a periodic review of the Italian
banking group.  The banks' Long-term IDRs are driven by its
standalone creditworthiness as expressed by the Viability Rating
(VR).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

VRs, IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

The ratings of IntesaSP reflect its strong and diversified
domestic franchise as the second- largest Italian bank, which has
supported better-than-peers operating performance.  They also
reflect resilient capitalization, driven by reasonable internal
capital generation, and an adequate funding and liquidity
profile.

The VR faces pressures from IntesaSP's weak asset quality, which
compares unfavorably with international peers, and from a fairly
large proportion of capital being tied to unreserved impaired
loans.

Despite these pressures, the Outlook remains Stable, underpinned
by initial signs of a net reduction of impaired loans (by
EUR1.4 bil. in 4Q15) and, most importantly, Fitch's assumption
that the reduction will accelerate over the course of 2016, while
maintaining the impaired loan coverage ratio at around 50%.  This
should also help to alleviate pressure on capital from high
unreserved impaired loans.

IntesaSP's profitability is a distinctive strength compared with
that of other commercial banks in Italy and its profitability
ratios are also adequate by international comparison.  Its
operating profitability is supported by a greater diversification
of the revenue structure, reflecting a business model that
contains a fairly large portion of fee-intensive activities (e.g.
asset management and insurance), allowing it to better compete in
a low-interest rate environment.  This characteristic, combined
with strict control over operating costs and reduced loan
impairment charges, resulted in improved operating profit in
2015. Fitch expects that if the economy in Italy remains
supportive, IntesaSP will continue generating adequate returns
and capital.

At end-2015, the bank reported a fully loaded CET1 ratio of
13.1%, which compares well with domestic and international peers.
The bank's regulatory leverage ratio of 6.8% is robust and among
the highest reported by international peers in the same rating
category.  Fitch's assessment of the bank's capital also
considers the high ratio of unreserved impaired loans to Fitch
Core Capital (FCC), over 80% at end-2015, which, however, has
remained stable.

With a ratio of gross impaired loans to total loans at above 17%
(as calculated by Fitch) at end-2015, Intesa's asset quality is
weak by international standards.  Asset quality problems reflect
the impact of the prolonged recession in Italy during 2011-2014
on the bank given its domestic focus.  Coverage of impaired loans
by reserves is adequate at above 50% and at the high end of the
range among Italian peers.

Management of impaired loans has not yet resulted in meaningful
reductions as IntesaSP's preferred strategy so far has been to
gradually work them out and protect collateral values rather than
sell larger portfolios.  However, Fitch assumes that the bank is
committed to accelerating the pace of reduction of its large
impaired loans stock over the course of 2016 and beyond, which
should result in a material reduction of impaired loan volumes.
IntesaSP also has some financial flexibility to absorb potential
losses on impaired loans sales.

Progress on asset quality improvement will also depend on Italy's
economy, which we expect to grow only modestly by 1% in 2016 and
1.3% in 2017, and the effectiveness of legislative initiatives
aimed at reducing Italian banks' impaired loans.

The bank's funding is resilient and adequately diversified
through a combination of capability to retain and enlarge
customer deposits via its large domestic franchise and its access
to the international wholesale markets for various debt classes
and maturities.  Liquidity is also commensurate with the ratings
and capital ratios are consistently above the regulatory minimum.

The ratings of the senior debt issued by IntesaSP's funding
vehicles, Intesa Sanpaolo Bank Ireland, Societe Europeenne de
Banque SA and Intesa Funding LLC, are equalised with that of the
parent since the debt is unconditionally and irrevocably
guaranteed by IntesaSP.

            SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by the bank are
all notched down from IntesaSP's VR in accordance with Fitch's
assessment of each instrument's respective non-performance and
relative loss severity risk profiles, which vary considerably.

AT1 notes are currently rated five notches below the bank's VR,
comprising two notches for loss severity relative to senior
unsecured creditors and three notches for incremental non-
performance risk relative to the VR.  The notching for non-
performance risk reflects the instruments' fully discretionary
interest payment.

                 SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY

The ratings of IntesaSP's Italian subsidiaries, Banca IMI and
Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, reflect Fitch's view of the core
function of the subsidiaries within the group.  Cassa di
Risparmio di Firenze's ratings have been withdrawn for commercial
reasons. Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical
coverage of Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze.

         SUPPORT RATING (SR) AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR (SRF)

The SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors can no
longer rely on receiving full extraordinary support from the
sovereign in the event that a bank becomes non-viable.  The EU's
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for eurozone banks provide a framework
for resolving banks that require senior creditors participating
in losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving
sovereign support.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

VR, IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

IntesaSP's ratings are sensitive to the operating environment in
Italy, particularly in relation to the recent initiatives aimed
at addressing Italian banks' asset quality.

IntesaSP's ratings could be downgraded if the bank fails to
accelerate the reduction in the stock of impaired loans or if its
capital remains highly exposed to unreserved impaired loans.
Similarly, a deterioration of the bank's funding and liquidity
profile would put pressure on the ratings as well as signs of an
inflexible dividend policy.

While upside potential is limited, an upgrade would be contingent
on a sovereign upgrade accompanied by marked and consistent
improvements in asset quality and capital, particularly the
amount of capital tied to unreserved impaired loans.

The ratings of the senior debt issued by IntesaSP's funding
vehicles, Intesa Sanpaolo Bank Ireland, Intesa Sanpaolo Bank
Luxembourg, S.A. and Intesa Funding LLC, are sensitive to the
same considerations that affect the senior unsecured debt issued
by the parent.

                  SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY

Banca IMI's ratings are based on its parent's Long-term IDRs,
they are sensitive to changes in IntesaSP's propensity to provide
support respectively and to changes in the parent's Long-term
IDRs.

          SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings of the securities are sensitive to a change in the
bank's VR.  The ratings are also sensitive to a change in the
notes' notching, which could arise if Fitch changes its
assessment of their non-performance relative to the risk captured
in the VR. For AT1 issues this could reflect a change in capital
management or flexibility or an unexpected shift in regulatory
buffers and requirements, for example.

                              SR AND SRF

An upgrade of the SR and upward revision of the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support IntesaSP.  While not impossible, this is highly unlikely,
in Fitch's view.

The rating actions are:

IntesaSP

  Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable
  Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  VR: affirmed at 'bbb+'
  SR: affirmed at '5'
  SRF: affirmed at 'No Floor'
  Senior debt (including debt issuance programmes): affirmed at
   'BBB+'/ 'F2'
  Commercial paper/certificate of deposit programmes: affirmed at
   'F2'
  Short-term deposits affirmed at 'F2'
  Senior market-linked notes: affirmed at 'BBB+emr'
  Subordinated lower Tier II debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
  Subordinated upper Tier II debt: affirmed at 'BB+'
  Tier 1 instruments: affirmed at 'BB'
  AT1 notes: affirmed at 'BB-'

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze:
  Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable; rating
   withdrawn
  Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'; rating withdrawn
  SR: affirmed at '2'; rating withdrawn
  Senior debt (including programme ratings): affirmed at 'BBB+';
   rating withdrawn

Banca IMI S.p.A.:
  Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable
  Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  SR: affirmed at '2'
  Senior debt (including programme ratings): affirmed at 'BBB+'

Intesa Sanpaolo Bank Ireland plc:
  Commercial paper/Short-term debt affirmed at 'F2'
  Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB+'

Intesa Sanpaolo Bank Luxembourg, S.A.:
  Commercial paper and Short-term debt: affirmed at 'F2'
  Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB+'

Intesa Funding LLC:
  US commercial paper programme: affirmed at 'F2'

In accordance with Fitch's policies, the issuer appealed and
provided additional information to Fitch that resulted in a
rating action that is different than the original rating
committee outcome.


UNICREDIT BANK: Fitch Says Outlook Revision No Impact on 'bb-' VR
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Romania-based UniCredit Bank S.A.'s
(UCBRO) Outlook to Negative from Stable, while affirming the
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB'.

The Outlook change follows a similar action taken on UCBRO's
ultimate parent UniCredit S.p.A.(UniCredit, BBB+/Negative/bbb+)
on March 26, 2016.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

The IDRs and Support Rating of UCBRO reflect the high likelihood
of support from its ultimate owner, UniCredit.

The Long-term IDR of UCBRO is notched down once from UniCredit's
Long-term IDR, reflecting Fitch's view that the Romanian
subsidiary and the wider CEE region are strategically important
for the parent bank. The importance is evidenced by the track
record of support from UniCredit to date (in terms of funding and
emergency liquidity support lines) and by UCBRO's deep
operational and management integration within the group. In
addition, the potential cost of support is manageable, given the
small size of the Romanian subsidiary relative to group assets.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

UCBRO's IDRs and Support rating are sensitive to changes in
UniCredit's ratings, or to Fitch's view of UniCredit's commitment
to UCBRO, or to the wider CEE region.

The rating actions are as follows:

UniCredit Bank S.A.

  Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook revised to Negative
  from Stable

  Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'

  Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

  Viability Rating: 'bb-', unaffected



=================
M A C E D O N I A
=================


MACEDONIA: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Republic of Macedonia.  The outlook is stable.

                            RATIONALE

The ratings on Macedonia reflect S&P's view of the country's
relatively low income and wealth levels, weak checks and balances
between political institutions, and limited monetary policy
flexibility arising from the country's fixed-exchange-rate
regime. The ratings are supported by moderate -- albeit rising --
external and public debt.

Macedonia's political situation remains uncertain, as the early
elections, initially scheduled for April 2016 under an EU-
brokered agreement, have been postponed until June 2016.  The
postponement is to allow further work on the electoral roll, as
well as reforms to the country's media, to ensure free and fair
elections. Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether the
opposition will participate in the election or the resulting
parliament. Macedonia's 2015 political crisis also highlights
what S&P views as weak checks and balances between institutions.
Important reforms remain to be made in the areas of public
financial management, media freedom, and the independence of the
judiciary, as highlighted in the EU's 2015 progress report.
These reforms, combined with the ongoing conflict with Greece
over its constitutional name, make Macedonia's EU accession
during S&P's forecast horizon to 2019 unlikely, in S&P's view.

Despite the political gridlock, the economy continues expanding
solidly.  Growth was confirmed at 3.7% in 2015 as exports from
the free economic zones and public consumption grew strongly.
Going forward, increased interconnection between the free
economic zones and the rest of the Macedonian economy will be
crucial to maintain growth. Unemployment remains among the
highest in Europe at 26% on average in 2015, indicative of
Macedonia's large informal sector and continued reliance on
remittances.  S&P believes that ongoing foreign direct investment
(FDI), continued net exports, and public-sector investment
projects will continue to support economic expansion.  However,
S&P believes the government will need to scale back spending if
it wants to stick to its fiscal targets.  S&P therefore maintains
a weaker growth forecast of 3% on average over 2016-2019,
compared with official forecasts of about 4.3%.

Following the 2015 supplemental budget, Macedonia's deficit was
lower, at 3.4% of GDP, than in S&P's previous forecast.
Nonetheless, S&P continues to see risks that the government will
miss its fiscal targets (3.2% of GDP in 2016; 2.9% of GDP in
2017) as negative budgetary pressures may arise from the
uncertain political situation, the ongoing refugee crisis,
support for off-balance-sheet entities, and other potential
external shocks, such as a weaker recovery in the eurozone, one
of Macedonia's most important trading partners.  S&P believes
that if any of these risks materialize, the government may try to
cushion the negative effects through continuation of its more
expansionary fiscal stance.  That said, the refugee crisis has so
far not posed a risk to public finances because additional
outlays on military and police activities have been funded within
the budget envelope with some financial assistance, particularly
on humanitarian aid, from the EU.

The slower pace of fiscal consolidation will also lead to an
increasing debt burden over 2016-2019, in S&P's view.  Gross
general government debt, while still relatively low, more than
doubled between 2008 and 2015 to 43% of GDP.  In addition, off-
balance-sheet financing pushed up the stock of guaranteed debt to
8.5% of GDP in 2015.  In contrast to Macedonia's official
statistics, S&P's general government debt calculation includes
the increasing debt stock of The Public Enterprise for State
Roads (PESR), which the government moved off balance sheet in
2013.  This is because S&P believes that PESR will continue to
rely on government transfers and guarantees.  In particular, a
EUR580 million loan from the Export-Import Bank of China,
contracted in 2013 for the construction of two highway sections,
will continue to contribute to a mounting debt burden over the
coming years. Nonetheless, external refinancing needs remain
relatively contained this year due to the successful Eurobond
issuance in November 2015, so Macedonia may be able to satisfy
its financing needs domestically.

Although the government may be able to rely on domestic issuance
this year, a number of risks exist regarding Macedonia's
government debt profile.  Seventy-five percent of government debt
is denominated in foreign currency, which increases the
vulnerability of the government's balance sheet to any potential
foreign-exchange movements.  In addition, around one-fifth of
Macedonia's government external debt has floating interest rates,
though the share continues to decline.  The banking system holds,
on average, about 12% of its assets in government securities and
central bank bills.

With the public sector increasingly borrowing abroad, Macedonia's
external indebtedness has been on a rising trajectory, despite
deleveraging in the country's banking sector.  S&P estimates
gross external debt will rise to 95% of 2016 current account
receipts (CARs), an increase of 20 percentage points since 2011.
S&P anticipates external borrowing, and to a lesser extent
foreign investment flows, will continue to finance the relatively
low current account deficit.  However, 30% of the stock of
inbound FDI is in the form of debt-like instruments and thus has
lower barriers to exit.  In addition, S&P expects the current
account deficit will widen to 2.4% of GDP by 2019 as investment-
related imports pick up.

The Macedonian denar is pegged to the euro.  At about $2.7
billion, Macedonia's foreign reserves cover the monetary base
about 2x, implying strong backing for the pegged currency regime.
The exchange rate regime restricts monetary policy flexibility.
However, central bank measures, such as lower reserve
requirements for denar-denominated liabilities, have succeeded in
lowering overall euro-ization in Macedonia, with foreign
currency-denominated deposits and claims remaining below 50% of
total deposits and claims.  Rather exceptionally for the region,
bank lending in Macedonia -- including to corporations -- has
continued to grow briskly, increasing by about 9% in 2015.

Although the banking system seems well capitalized, profitable,
and funded by domestic deposits, the two largest bank
subsidiaries operating in Macedonia have Greek and Slovenian
parents -- the National Bank of Greece S.A. and Nova Ljubljanska
Banka.  However, Macedonia's regulatory and supervisory framework
was successful last year in containing the negative effects
resulting from concerns over the parent banks' viability.
Renewed pressure on parent banks to cut exposure to or sell their
subsidiaries in noncore markets could result in a liquidity
squeeze for their Macedonian subsidiaries and associated external
outflows.  Capital flow measures, introduced last year to prevent
corporate entities from borrowing domestically only to lend on to
Greek entities, were phased out in December 2015, since the most
imminent pressures had abated.

                             OUTLOOK

The stable outlook balances the risks S&P sees from rising public
and external indebtedness against Macedonia's economic prospects,
benefiting from recurrent investment inflows.

S&P could raise its ratings on Macedonia if reforms directed
toward higher and broader-based growth led to income levels
increasing faster than in S&P's base-case scenario and were
matched with improved effectiveness and accountability of public
institutions.

S&P could lower its ratings if large fiscal slippages or off-
budget activities were to call into question public debt
sustainability, raise sovereign borrowing costs, and
substantially increase external obligations, given the
constraints of the exchange-rate regime.  In addition, if parents
of systemically important banks operating in Macedonia were to
cut exposure to their subsidiaries, heightening pressure on both
banking sector liquidity and external finances, S&P could also
consider a negative rating action.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and
explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating
factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant
criteria.  Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were
considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the fiscal flexibility and performance
assessment had deteriorated while the debt burden had improved.
All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                             Rating
                                       To           From
Macedonia (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency          BB-/Stable/B   BB-/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment BB              BB
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign Currency[1]                 BB-            BB-
  Foreign and Local Currency          BB-            BB-

[1] Dependent Participant(s): Citigroup Global Markets Ltd.,
Deutsche Bank AG (London Branch), Erste Group Bank AG



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ALTICE NV: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B+' CCR
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its
outlook on cable and telecommunications holding company Altice
N.V. and its core subsidiaries, Altice International S.a.r.l. and
Numericable-SFR S.A., to stable from negative.  At the same time,
the 'B+' long-term corporate credit rating on these entities was
affirmed.

S&P also assigned its 'B+' long-term corporate credit rating to
Altice Luxembourg SA.  The outlook is stable.

S&P affirmed its issue-level ratings on the Altice group's debt,
issued by various subsidiaries.

By error, S&P did not previously assign a rating to Altice
Luxembourg SA, to which the entity Altice SA (which no longer
exists since its merger into Altice N.V.) had transferred
substantially all its assets and liabilities.  This action
corrects this error, and moves S&P's issue-level ratings to
Altice Luxembourg SA from Altice N.V.

S&P's assessment of Altice Luxembourg's stand-alone credit
profile at 'b+' reflects S&P's view of its satisfactory business
risk profile, supported by continued investments in next-
generation networks and lower revenue declines in France.  It
also reflects S&P's view of Altice Luxembourg's financial risk
profile as highly leveraged, based on S&P's anticipation of
leverage of about 5.5x in 2016, and a relatively weak ratio of
free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt of only about 1%.

S&P also views Altice Luxembourg as a core subsidiary to the
Altice group (Altice N.V.) as Altice Luxembourg consolidates the
two core subsidiaries, Altice International and Numericable-SFR,
and is managed by the same management team as Altice N.V.

S&P revised its outlook on Altice N.V., Altice International
S.a.r.l., and Numericable-SFR S.A. because S&P thinks the Altice
group will deleverage to less than 6x in 2016, supported by its
results in 2015, including strong EBITDA growth in France and
margin improvement in Portugal, despite continued topline
pressure in both markets.  S&P expects EBITDA growth in 2016 to
be supported by some initial cost efficiencies to be created at
U.S. cable broadband service provider Suddenlink Communications.
Additionally, S&P anticipates a slowdown in revenue decline in
France in 2016, supported by the recent upgrades and continued
investments in the mobile network, acceleration in fiber
investments, and reduced execution risk, given that the majority
of the merger-related synergies have been created, potentially
enabling Numericable-SFR to refocus on retaining customers.

S&P expects deleveraging to be additionally supported by Altice's
confirmed commitment to refrain from any further meaningful debt-
funded acquisitions in 2016, with the exception of Numericable-
SFR's potential participation in the consolidation in the French
telecom market as part of the ongoing negotiations between Orange
and Bouygues.  S&P understands, however, that Altice's
participation in the consolidation is likely to be credit
enhancing for the group's leverage and cash flows.

S&P has revised its base case to reflect Altice's recent plans to
accelerate investments in "fiber to the home" in France and
Portugal.  S&P expects these investments to meaningfully reduce
the group's FOCF to debt over the next couple of years, but S&P
also expects that annual FOCF will remain positive at EUR500
million-EUR1 billion in 2016-2017.  In S&P's view, however,
despite weaker cash flow generation, higher investment should
support the group's competitive advantage in Portugal and could
enhance its positioning in France.

Altice's business risk profile reflects its meaningful scale and
geographic diversity, its solid market position across all its
European markets as one of the two key players, and the
availability of network-based convergent offers in all its
European assets, with its highly invested networks.  These
strengths are offset by fierce competition in its European
markets, in many cases from better capitalized competitors, and
remaining execution risks, notably in Portugal and the U.S.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that positive EBITDA
growth in the U.S., continued investments in next-generation
networks, and lower revenue declines in France will support S&P's
view of the Altice group's business risk profile and the
maintenance of credit metrics commensurate with the current
ratings.

S&P may downgrade the entities in the Altice group if leverage
(taking into account full-year consolidation of U.S. assets) does
not remain at sustainably less than 6x in 2016.  This may happen,
for example, if S&P do not see declining revenue pressures in
France and Portugal, or if Altice fails to continue to create the
meaningful cost efficiencies that we expect to support EBITDA
growth.

Additionally, S&P could lower the ratings if the group does not
generate positive free cash flows.

S&P sees limited rating upside over the foreseeable future, given
both its forecast of limited free cash flow generation and the
group's high M&A appetite.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action
                                   To              From
Altice International S.a.r.l.
Corporate Credit Rating           B+/Stable/--    B+/Neg./--

Altice N.V.
Corporate Credit Rating           B+/Stable/--    B+/Neg./--

Numericable-SFR S.A.
Corporate Credit Rating           B+/Stable/--    B+/Neg./--
Senior Secured*                   B+              B+
   Recovery Rating                 3H              3H

Ypso Holding Sarl
Corporate Credit Rating           B+/Stable/--    B+/Neg./--

Ratings Affirmed

Altice Financing S.A.
Senior Secured*                   BB-             BB-
   Recovery Rating                 2L              2L

Altice Finco S.A.
Senior Unsecured*                 B-              B-
   Recovery Rating                 6               6

Numericable Finance & Co. S.C.A.
Senior Secured*                   B+              B+

Numericable U.S. LLC
Senior Secured*                   B+              B+
   Recovery Rating                 3H              3H


New Rating; Ratings Affirmed
(issue-level ratings transferred from Altice N.V.)
                                   To                From

Altice Luxembourg SA
Corporate Credit Rating           B+/Stable/--      NR
Senior Secured*                   B                 B
   Recovery Rating                 5H                5H

NR--Not rated.
*Guaranteed by multiple issuers.


PROSPERO CLO II: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. D Notes to Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Prospero CLO II B.V.:

  US$25 mil. B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 5,
   2015, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  US$15 mil. C Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb. 5,
   2015, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  US$13.5 mil. D Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 5, 2015, Affirmed B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed these notes issued by Prospero CLO II B.V.:

  US$80 mil. (currently US$ 6,099,911.60 rated balance
   outstanding) A-1 A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
   Feb. 5, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR64 mil. (currently EUR 4,879,929.29 rated balance
   outstanding) A-1 B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
   Feb. 5, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  GBP10.5 mil. (currently GBP 800,613.40 rated balance
   outstanding) A-1 C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
   Feb. 5, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  US$100 mil. (currently approximately US$ 7,314,016.44 rated
   balance outstanding) A-1 VF Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on Feb. 5, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  US$30 mil. A-2 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 5,
   2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Prospero CLO II B.V., issued in November 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans.  The portfolio
is managed by Alcentra NY, LLC.  The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in October 2012.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades of the notes are primarily a result of the
partial redemption of the senior notes and subsequent increases
of the overcollateralization ratios (the "OC ratios") of the
remaining classes of notes.  Moody's notes that the class A notes
have partially redeemed by approximately USD33.5 million since
July 2015.  As a result of the deleveraging the OC ratios of the
notes have increased significantly.  According to the February
2016 trustee report, the classes A, B, C and D OC ratios are
233.78%, 155.93%, 129.96% and 113.02% respectively compared to
levels in July 2015 of 182.49%, 140.47%, 123.42% and 111.27%
respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
cash and performing par balance of USD 88.1 million and EUR27.0
million, a weighted average default probability of 18.32%
(consistent with a WARF of 2719 and a weighted average life of
4.08 years), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
48.55% for a Aaa liability target rating and a diversity score of
31.  The GBP and EUR denominated liabilities are naturally hedged
by the GBP and EUR denominated assets.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery rates
for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF
CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be
considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these default and
recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash
flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it lowered the weighted average recovery rate by 5
percentage points; the model generated outputs that were in line
with the base-case results for class A and within a notch for
classes B, C and D.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
   portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
   conditions and have a significant impact on the notes'
   ratings.  Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of
   high loan prepayment levels or collateral sales by the
   collateral manager or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-
   and-extend restructurings.  Fast amortization would usually
   benefit the ratings of the notes beginning with the notes
   having the highest prepayment priority.

  Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes that, at transaction
   maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend
   on the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities.  Liquidation
   values higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive
   impact on the notes' ratings.

  Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
   have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
   collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
   defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
   the market price or the recovery rate to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.  Recoveries higher than Moody's
   expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'
   ratings.

  Foreign currency exposure: The deal has exposures to non-USD
   denominated assets.  Volatility in foreign exchange rates will
   have a direct impact on interest and principal proceeds
   available to the transaction, which can affect the expected
   loss of rated tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


DOURO MORTGAGES: Moody's Puts B2 Rating on Review for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
ratings of four notes in Douro Mortgages No.1 and of one note in
Douro Mortgages No.3.  The rating action reflects the review for
downgrade of Banco BPI S.A.'s long term deposit rating and
Counterparty Risk assessment "CR assessment".  Banco BPI S.A.
acts as servicer and swap counterparty in both transactions.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is prompted by the placement on review for
possible downgrade of Banco BPI S.A.'s the long term deposit
rating of Ba3 and Counterparty Risk assessment "CR assessment" of
Ba2(cr) on March 22, 2016.  Banco BPI S.A. acts as servicer and
swap counterparty in the transactions.

Counterparty Exposure

The rating actions took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as servicer, account banks or swap
providers.

Moody's considered how the liquidity available in the
transactions and other mitigants support continuity of note
payments, in case of servicer default, using the CR Assessment as
a reference point for servicers.

Moody's matches banks' exposure in structured finance
transactions to the CR Assessment for commingling risk, and to
the bank deposit rating when analyzing set-off risk.  Moody's has
introduced a recovery rate assumption of 45% for both exposures.

Moody's assessed the exposure to Banco BPI S.A. acting as swap
counterparties.  Moody's analysis considered the risks of
additional losses on the notes if they were to become unhedged
following a swap counterparty default by using the CR Assessment
as reference point for swap counterparties.

As a result of the rating action on Banco BPI S.A., Moody's
reviews for downgrade the five tranches.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
January 2015.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) performance of the underlying collateral that
is better than Moody's expected, (2) deleveraging of the capital
structure and (3) improvements in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties and (4) a decrease in sovereign risk.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk (2) performance
of the underlying collateral that is worse than Moody's expected,
(3) deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement and
(4) deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: DOURO MORTGAGES No.1

  EUR1434 mil. Class A Notes, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade; previously on July 15, 2015, Upgraded to
   A2 (sf)

  EUR24.75 mil. Class B Notes, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade; previously on July 15, 2015, Confirmed at
   Ba2 (sf)

  EUR22.5 mil. Class C Notes, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade; previously on July 15, 2015, Affirmed
   B1 (sf)

  EUR18.75 mil. Class D Notes, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade; previously on July 15, 2015, Upgraded to
   B2 (sf)

Issuer: DOURO MORTGAGES No.3

  EUR1441.5 mil. Class A Notes, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade; previously on July 15, 2015, Upgraded to
   A3 (sf)



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


HIDROELECTRICA SA: Expects to Exit Insolvency by Next Month
-----------------------------------------------------------
Luiza Ilie at Reuters reports that Hidroelectrica expects to
finally exit its insolvency process by next month, and aims to
sell a minority stake in an initial public offering by November.

The company has been run by a court-appointed manager after it
became insolvent for the second time in early 2014, Reuters
discloses.

It first became insolvent in 2012 after losing US$1.4 billion
over six years from contracts under which it sold the bulk of its
output below market prices, Reuters recounts.

It underwent restructuring, cancelled those contracts and posted
record high profits, Reuters relays.  But contract holders
challenged the cancellations and a court ruling pushed the firm
back into insolvency, where it has remained a year longer than
expected due to lengthy court procedures, Reuters notes.

"There are four unsolved challenges left out of 75, and the court
date for them is April 6," Reuters quotes manager Remus Borza as
saying in a telephone interview.

"Hidroelectrica will exit insolvency on April 6 at the earliest,
and in May at the latest.  After that, it is a straight line to
an initial public offering and I stand by a deadline of
November."

Hidroelectrica is a Romanian state-owned electricity producer.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


CB BALTICA: Deemed Insolvent, Prov. Administration Halted
---------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Arbitration of Moscow issued a ruling dated
February 24, 2016, with regard to case No. A40-252160/15-88-477
B, recognizing that the credit institution Joint-stock Commercial
Bank Baltica, public joint-stock company (PJSC JSCB Baltica) is
insolvent  (bankrupt) and ordering the appointment of a receiver
for the entity.

Accordingly, by virtue of the Arbitration Court's ruling, the
Bank of Russia entered a decision, via Order No. OD-938, dated
March 21, 2016, to terminate from March 22, 2016, the activity of
the provisional administration of PJSC JSCB Baltica.

The Bank of Russia previously appointed the provisional
administration of PJSC JSCB Baltica, by Order No.OD-3289, dated
November 24, 2015, following the revocation of the entity's
banking license.


CB RENAISSANCE: Deemed Insolvent, Prov. Administration Halted
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Arbitration court of the city of Moscow entered a ruling
dated February 24, 2016, on case. A40-247973/15-88-471 B, on
recognizing that credit institution commercial Bank RENAISSANCE,
limited LLC (LLC CB Renaissance), is insolvent (bankrupt) and
ordering the appointment of a receiver for the entity.

Accordingly, by virtue of the Arbitration Court ruling, the Bank
of Russia decided (via Order No. OD-937, dated March 21, 2016)
to terminate from March 22, 2016, the activity of the
provisional administration of CB Renaissance.

The Bank of Russia previously appointed the provisional
administration of CB Renaissance, via Order No. OD-3591, dated
December 14, 2015, following the revocation of the entity's
banking license.


CENTROBUV: Under Observation, Sept. 6 Bankruptcy Hearing Set
------------------------------------------------------------
ROS, citing Kommersant, reports that Centrobuv has been placed
under observation by the Moscow Arbitration Court over its debts.

The key claimants include Credit Bank of Moscow and little-known
firm Sandorini, ROS discloses.  The debt to Sandorini amounts to
RUB4 million (approximately USD59,577), ROS says.

There was no information about the debt to Credit Bank of Moscow,
ROS states.

According to ROS, the hearing of the bankruptcy claim against the
retailer is scheduled for September 6, 2016.

Centrobuv co-owner Dmitry Svetlov told Kommersant that the
company's management had not determined the strategy for brining
the company out of the observation procedure yet, ROS relates.
Mr. Svetlov said negotiations on debt restructuring continue, ROS
notes.

Centrobuv is a Russian shoe retailer.


GLOBAL PORTS: Fitch Assigns 'BB+(EXP)' Rating to Proposed Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Global Ports (Finance) PLC's (GPI
Finance) proposed notes an expected senior unsecured rating of
'BB+(EXP)' with Stable Outlook.  Fitch's expected rating assumes
an issue size of up to USD350 mil.  GPI Finance is a fully owned
subsidiary of Global Ports Investments PLC (GPI; BB/Outlook
Stable).

The final rating is contingent on the receipt of final documents
conforming materially to information already received.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Eurobond Rating

GPI Finance will issue fixed-rate notes, which will be
unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed on a joint and several
basis by the group parent GPI (hold co) and its three major
operating subsidiaries (opco) First Container Terminal
Incorporated (FCT), Joint-Stock Company "Petrolesport" (PLP) and
Vostochnaya Stevedoring Limited Liability Company (VSC),
representing 99% of consolidated EBITDA.  GPI intends to use the
bond proceeds to refinance bank loans raised at opco levels.
GPI's consolidated leverage therefore will not increase as a
result of this transaction.

Bond documentation includes cross-default provision with debt
raised at issuer, guarantor and subsidiary levels as well as a
cap on additional debt and restrictions on distributions (both
with carve-outs) when the pro-forma leverage ratio is higher than
3.5x. Fitch notices that the change of control clause does not
prevent APM Terminal -- one of the two co-controlling
shareholders -- to dispose its 30.7% stake in GPI as the
bondholders' put option is exercisable only if a new shareholder
gains 50% or more of GPI share capital.

The 'BB+(EXP)' rating of the notes reflects Fitch's assessment of
GPI's consolidated credit profile as the unconditional and
irrevocable guarantee from the three major opcos give bondholders
full and unconditional access to group cash flow generation.  The
rating of GPI, the holdco, is notched down one level to 'BB' to
reflect the ringfencing features included in some subsidiaries
bank financing.  These ringfencing features, namely financial
covenants at single borrower level and some restrictions to
infra-group loans, prevent GPI rating from being aligned with
Fitch's assessment of the consolidated profile of the group.

GPI's Rating
GPI's ratings reflect GP group's dominant position in the Russian
container market as well as its exposure to the current domestic
economic downturn.  The ratings also reflect our expectation that
GPI's leverage will progressively decline from current relatively
high levels, due to a shareholder-supported zero dividend policy.
Lack of committed liquidity lines is a weakness given the partly
back-ended debt structure and the increasing bullet profile of
group debt.

Peers

GPI is around 7x bigger, has stronger market power and
shareholder structure and more transparent corporate governance
by being listed on the LSE than LLC Deloports (BB-).  Deloports
is more exposed to competition but has a more balanced export and
import mix with grain exports partially offsetting the import-
oriented container business.  Deloport has lower leverage at 1.8x
than GPI at 3.6x but its volume risk assessment is Weaker
compared with Midrange for GPI.

Mersin (BBB-/Stable) has a similar size to GPI at 1.5 million TEU
and, like GPI, plays a dominant role in its home market.  Its
cargo import and export mix is more balanced than GPI, which is
more exposed to the Russian recessionary environment.  Mersin's
current lower leverage than GPI supports its higher rating.

Volume Risk-Midrange

GPI is Russia's largest container port operator handling 41% of
the country's container throughput.  The group dominates the
Baltic Sea with a 61% share of regional throughput in 2015, which
is approximately 3x larger than the 2nd-largest port operator in
the basin.  GPI has also a solid footprint in the Far East where
the group and its main competitor Fesco control a third of the
market each.

GPI can leverage against its portfolio of 10 terminals and 37
berths, which are owned or operated under long-term leasing
agreements, to offer a widespread network to shipping lines.  The
group has long-standing relationships with major shipping
companies although contracts in place are short- term, usually
one year, and without minimum guaranteed revenue. A.P. Moller -
Maersk Group's twofold role as GPI's customer and indirect
shareholder through the APM Terminals is, in Fitch's view, a
supportive factor of GPI's revenue stability.

GPI's throughput is mostly driven by container imports, which are
being severely hit by Russia's current economic downturn and
reduced consumer spending.  In 2015, the group saw its container
volume shrink 35%, compared with a 26% fall in the overall
Russian container market.  This reflects GPI's preference to
maintain prices over volumes as well as its large exposure to the
Baltic basin, which was affected by the downturn more than Far
East and Black Sea Basins.

Under Fitch's rating case container throughput will drop a
further 8% in 2016 and remain flat in 2017.  The downside risk
mainly stems from the limited visibility on the long-term
evolution of oil prices, rouble performance and, ultimately,
Russian economic activity.

Price Risk - Midrange

Federal Tariff Service authority eliminated the price regulation
for ports located in St. Petersburg in 2010 and for Far East
ports in 2012.  Tariffs are market-based and have steadily
increased over the past six years.  Almost all of GPI's tariffs
and revenues are in USD and collected directly in USD or at an
equivalent amount in rouble.  The rouble share of revenue is used
to pay costs denominated in local currency with the remainder
converted into USD.

Infrastructure Development & Renewal-Stronger

Over 2008-2013, GPI invested heavily in terminal upgrades.  These
investments brought group capacity to more than 4 million TEU
(currently less than 50% used), a level sufficient to accommodate
increasing volumes in the future.  On-site connecting
infrastructure is well developed and does not need upgrades.

In view of the difficult market environment and sound asset
conditions, GPI plans to only carry out maintenance capex over
the medium term.  Maintenance capex is manageable at around
USD25m per year and entirely self-funded through free cash flow
(FCF) generation.  The presence of APM Terminals, one of the
world-largest terminal operators, as a shareholder brings
operational expertise and mitigates the risk of cost overrun on
capital spending.

Debt Structure- Midrange

The hold co is currently free of debt.  The debt structure factor
therefore reflects our assessment of consolidated debt, which
comprises several loans raised at Russian opco level.  These
loans are structured as corporate secured debt, are fully USD-
denominated post swap and partially guaranteed by GPI.  Foreign
currency risk on debt is naturally hedged as tariffs are set in
USD.

Part of group's borrowings has financial covenants tested at opco
level.  In some cases covenants are tested also at the
consolidated level to induce moderate deleveraging over the next
two years (2016: less than 4x; 2017: less than 3.5x).

The group is diversifying its funding structure and reducing its
exposure to floating interest rates.  It has recently refinanced
some bank loans through three bond issues of RUB15bn (swapped in
USD) and now plans to refinance additional bank debt via the
upcoming bond issue.  Post planned bond issue, overall group debt
structure will be largely fixed rate, fully USD-denominated post
swap, largely covenanted with cross default and change-of-control
clauses and with a balanced mix of floating and fixed interest
rates and bullet and amortizing maturities.  Should the share of
bullet debt materially increase in the future, Fitch may revise
its current assessment of debt structure to Weaker from current
Midrange.

Lack of committed liquidity lines is a weakness, which the cash
buffer held on balance sheet only partly mitigates.  According to
our liquidity analysis that factors in available cash at end-2015
and the FCF generated under the rating case, group debt
maturities are covered until end-2019.

Fitch considers the presence of APM Terminals a well-reputed
sponsor with a strong but informal commitment to GPI as a
supporting factor in GPI's refinancing process.  Fitch typically
observe this kind of soft support in businesses where sponsors
perceive long-term economic value in the asset and are therefore
incentivized to provide support to smooth temporary liquidity
shortfalls.  A potential change in GPI's ownership may affect
Fitch's assessment of the refinancing risk.  Fitch also views
GPI's listing on London Stock Exchange as a positive factor as it
gives GPI additional financial flexibility.

Debt Service

Fitch-adjusted net debt to EBITDA stood at 3.6x at end-2015.
This high leverage relative to Russian and Turkish peers results
from the partial debt-funded acquisition of the second-largest
Russian container operator in 2013.  Deleveraging is a key
priority of both GPI management and its controlling shareholders,
who are committed to a zero dividend policy until group leverage
reaches 2x.

Fitch's rating case uses more conservative assumptions than
management on volumes, operating and capital spending, interest
rates and dividends received from joint ventures.  As a result,
Fitch expects leverage to fall below 3x over a three-year horizon
and further beyond.  The rating case does not factor in any
shareholder distributions, in line with GPI's stated zero
dividend policy.

When running our sensitivity stresses on a variety of factors,
notably flat tariff over the next three years and a hypothetical
30% rouble appreciation, we found that, all else being equal, the
impact is confined to only a delay to the expected group
deleveraging process.  This said, the sensitivities also show
that a harsher-than-expected drop of container volumes in 2016 of
minus 20% against minus 8% in the Fitch rating case would have a
substantial negative impact on projected leverage metrics.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating of the notes is credit-linked to the Long-term IDR of
GPI; future development that could lead to negative rating
actions on both GPI and the GPI Finance notes include:

   -- Dividend distributions impacting GPI's expected
      deleveraging profile

   -- Fitch-adjusted GPI's consolidated debt/EBITDA remaining
      above 3.0x over a three-year horizon to 2018 in the Fitch
      rating case

   -- Adverse policy decisions or geopolitical events affecting
      the port sector

   -- Failure to maintain adequate liquidity to cover GPI's debt
      service maturities

   -- Failure to comply with covenants at op cos and consolidated
      levels

   -- A material increase in bullet debt or a potential change in
      shareholder structure with the co-controlling shareholder
      APMT disposing partly or entirely its stake in GPI, which
      may affect Fitch's analysis of some rating factors such as
      refinancing risk and potentially GPI's ratings.

Rating upside potential is currently limited.  Fitch does not
expect improvement in the Russian economy in the near term, as
indicated by the Negative Outlook on Russia's sovereign rating.


KOMI REPUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term IDR, Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Republic of Komi's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB',
Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B' and National Long-term
rating at 'AA-(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long-term IDRs and
National Long-term rating are Negative.

The republic's outstanding senior unsecured debt ratings have
been affirmed at 'BB' and 'AA-(rus)'.

The Negative Outlook reflects the republic's weakened fiscal
capacity, and large running budget deficits with low prospects of
then current balance being restored to surplus over the medium-
term. It also factors in continued direct risk growth and high
refinancing pressure. A continuing difficult economic environment
in Russia increases the risk of further debt growth of the
republic.

The rating affirmation reflects the region's weak fiscal
performance in 2015 in line with Fitch's base case scenario and
stabilization of Komi's direct debt, due to support from the
federal government in the form of low-cost budget loans in
2015-2016.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings reflect Komi's weak budgetary performance and
moderate direct risk. The ratings also take into account the
republic's sound economy that is dominated by the oil and gas
sector, which provides the region with a developed tax base.
However, it also exposes the region to potential changes in the
fiscal regime and business cycle or price fluctuations in the oil
and gas sector.

Fitch projects the republic's current balance to remain
consistently negative at about 5% of current revenue in 2016-2018
(2015: -6.3%) due to weak operating performance and growing
interest payments. In 2015, operating deficit slightly narrowed
to 2.6% of operating revenue (2014: -3.3%), supported by large
40% growth of property tax revenue offset flat corporate and
personal income tax revenue. The property tax increase was a
result of an expanded tax base, mostly due to gas pipeline
construction, and a gradual increase in tax rates.

Fitch forecasts deficit before debt variation to average 10% of
total revenue in 2016-2018, below the high 19%-24% seen in 2013-
2014, as the regional government focuses on spending
rationalization and cost control to reduce new borrowings.
Nevertheless, deficit is likely to remain large since the
region's flexibility for both operating and capital expenditure
remains limited; capital expenditure accounted for only 8% (2014:
11%) of total expenditure in 2015. These factors could lead
direct risk to rise above 70% of current revenue, which will not
be commensurate with the region's 'BB' rating.

Fitch's projects direct risk to reach RUB40 billion (2015: RUB33
billion), or 68% (2015: 61%) of current revenue by end-2016 and
further increase to 80% by end-2018. In 2015, direct risk
increased RUB5.1 billion, fuelled by a persistent deficit.
Positively, this growth was mostly in low-cost budget loans. The
federal government substantially extended its support to Komi in
2015, allowing the region to stabilize direct debt at 46% in 2015
(2014: 47%). This support has continued so far in 2016 with a
RUB4.7 billion budget loan approved for Komi to refinance part of
its maturing debt.

Komi is exposed to high refinancing risk as it needs to repay 35%
(RUB11.5 billion) of its direct risk in 2016. Fitch expects most
maturities to be financed through budget loans and the use of
available undrawn credit lines (currently RUB8.4 billion).
Additional liquidity may come from RUB7.2 billion bonds that Komi
plans to issue in 2016. In Fitch's view, the republic has
adequate access to market funding. However, volatile market
interest rates may put further stress on its current balance. The
republic has well-diversified debt portfolio, which at end-2015
was composed of bonds (63%), followed by budget loans (24%) and
bank loans (13%).

The republic's credit profile remains constrained by the weak
institutional framework for Russian local and regional
governments (LRGs), which has a shorter record of stable
development than many of its international peers. Weak
institutions lead to lower predictability of Russian LRGs'
budgetary policies, which are subject to the federal government's
continuous reallocation of revenue and expenditure
responsibilities within government tiers.

Komi's economy is sound, with gross regional product (GRP) per
capita exceeding the national median by more than 2x in 2013. The
republic has a well-developed tax base; taxes contribute about
85% of region's operating revenue. However, the economy is
concentrated in the natural resources sectors, which exposes the
region to commodity price fluctuation and potential changes in
fiscal regulation. The top 10 taxpayers contributed about 50% of
the republic's consolidated tax revenue in 2015.

The republic's GRP is estimated by Komi's government to have
decreased 2.8% yoy in 2015, which is slightly better than the
wider Russian economy (-3.7%) as growing oil extraction activity
offset declining construction and trade output. Fitch projects
national GDP will contract 1.5% in 2016, and the republic of Komi
will likely follow this negative trend.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Growth in direct risk to above 70% of current revenue, coupled
with negative operating balances on a sustained basis and a
reduced capacity to obtain affordable funding for its debt
refinancing needs, will lead to a downgrade.


TOMSK OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Credit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
issuer credit rating and 'ruAA-' Russia national scale rating on
Russia's Tomsk Oblast.  The outlook is negative.

                            RATIONALE

The ratings on Tomsk Oblast are constrained by S&P's view of
Russia's volatile and unbalanced institutional framework, the
region's very weak economy, which has low wealth levels compared
with international peers' and is subject to concentration.  Also,
S&P views Tomsk Oblast's financial management as weak in an
international context, mostly owing to a lack of reliable medium-
term financial planning, a situation common for most of its
Russian peers.  In addition, the oblast's very weak budgetary
flexibility and weak budgetary performance, in S&P's opinion,
constrain the ratings.

S&P's view of Tomsk Oblast's low debt burden, very low contingent
liabilities, and adequate liquidity support the ratings.  The
long-term rating is at the same level as Tomsk Oblast's stand-
alone credit profile.

Tomsk Oblast's economy benefits from its location bordering
economically important Krasnoyarsk Krai, Tyumen Oblast, and
Novosibirsk Oblast.  Tomsk Oblast is rich in oil, natural gas,
ferrous and non-ferrous metals, and underground water.  About 20%
of the West Siberian forest resources are located in Tomsk
Oblast. However, S&P assess the oblast's wealth level as weak in
an international context, because we believe that gross regional
product per capita will remain at less than US$10,000 over the
next three years.  Tomsk Oblast's revenues are also subject to
volatility stemming from reliance on a few large taxpayers for
tax revenues.  S&P estimates that Tomsk Oblast's economy will
remain dependent on mining (mainly oil and gas), which currently
provides an estimated 25% of the gross regional product and over
15% of budget revenues.

S&P views the oblast's budgetary flexibility as very weak.  Like
other Russian regions, Tomsk Oblast has very limited control over
its revenues and expenditures within the centralized
institutional framework.  The federal government regulates the
rates and distribution shares for most taxes and transfers,
leaving only about 5% of operating revenues that the region can
manage.  On the expenditure side, S&P expects the oblast's
management to continue implementing austerity measures aimed at
reducing the deficit after capital accounts.  However, in the
longer term, S&P believes that the flexibility buffer may reduce,
given the relatively small size of the self-financed capital
program and high inflationary pressures.

"Tomsk Oblast's budgetary performance will remain weak over the
next three years, in our view.  We forecast that the operating
balance will improve but remain negative on average over 2016-
2018, at about negative 1.1% of operating revenues.  Revenue
growth in 2014-2015 was supported by the strong results of
domestically oriented OJSC Tomskneft, the largest contributor to
corporate profit taxes, which benefited from the increase in
domestic petrol prices.  We anticipate a reduction of these
contributions in the future, though, as domestic oil prices are
decreasing due to weaker demand in the national economy.  We also
forecast that, in the coming three years, the oblast will receive
a smaller amount of federal transfers compared with 2014-2015.
At the same time, we assume in our base-case scenario that
operating performance will be supported by the oblast's financial
management's cautious spending policies, with ongoing austerity
measures and some easing of the requirements of the 2012
presidential decrees to increase public-sector expenditures.  In
2015, year-on-year growth of operating expenditures dropped to
2.5% compared with 12.7% in 2014, thanks to a slower increase in
salaries of public-sector employees, cuts in health care, and a
reduction of subsidies to the lower levels of the budget," S&P
said.

"We anticipate that the deficits after capital accounts will
decrease to an average of about 4.7% of total revenues in 2016-
2018, compared with nearly 10% in 2013-2015.  Similar to other
Russian local and regional governments (LRGs), Tomsk Oblast will
need to apply budget consolidation measures in order to continue
benefiting from the low-interest budget loans, because this
support from the federal government comes with the provision that
the LRG keeps low deficits and debt," S&P noted.

"We expect, therefore, that tax-supported debt will increase only
gradually over the next three years and remain low in an
international comparison, at less than 60% of consolidated
operating revenues, until the end of 2018.  In December 2015, the
oblast registered a new Russian ruble (RUB) 7 billion (US$93
million at the time of publication) 7.5 year bond and its
management plans to place debt instruments in the framework of
this program in the coming years.  Earlier in 2015, the oblast
successfully placed an outstanding RUB1.5 billion tranche under a
2013 bond.  We anticipate that the oblast's debt burden will be
higher in the coming three years than the average for Russian
regions, translating into relatively high debt service and
growing interest expense, and requiring proactive management of
credit and liquidity facilities," S&P said.

In S&P's view, Tomsk Oblast has a good track record of more
cautious debt and liquidity management and commercial borrowing
than that of many Russian peers.

However, similar to other Russian LRGs, S&P assess Tomsk Oblast's
financial management as weak in an international comparison, due
to a lack of reliable long-term financial planning.  The oblast's
management of its government-related entities (GREs) is also
below the average for international peers, owing to Tomsk
Oblast's limited ability to monitor and manage financial risks in
the sector.  For the past few years, the oblast was twice called
on to honor guarantees it had provided to local enterprises.

Nonetheless, S&P views Tomsk Oblast's outstanding contingent
liabilities as very low.  If faced with financial stress, S&P
estimates that the oblast would need to provide only the
equivalent of less than 2% of its operating revenues to support
the few GREs that it owns.

                              LIQUIDITY

S&P views Tomsk Oblast's liquidity as adequate.  S&P expects the
oblast's debt service coverage ratio will be strong, and that net
average cash, including the cash of the oblast's budgetary units,
and available committed credit facilities will cover debt service
falling due within the next 12 months by more than 120%.  At the
same time, S&P views Tomsk Oblast's access to external liquidity
as limited, given the weaknesses of the domestic capital market.

In S&P's base-case scenario for 2016, it expects that Tomsk
Oblast will keep modest cash reserves on its accounts, net of the
deficits after capital accounts, equaling about RUB3.3 billion
(about US$44 million) on average.  This will cover only about 49%
of debt service falling due within the next 12 months.

At the same time, S&P anticipates the oblast will maintain its
prudent practice of organizing committed bank lines and keeping
undrawn amounts exceeding refinancing needs, for which it has a
strong track record over the previous years.  The average undrawn
amount of the oblast's committed bank lines stood at RUB7.5
billion (about US$100 million at the time of publication) for the
past 12 months.  Also, the oblast has already received RUB2.48
billion in budget loans from the federal government for
refinancing part of its maturing commercial debt.  Tomsk Oblast's
government additionally plans to contract a new medium-term
revolving bank line later in 2016, ahead of the upcoming
maturities in the second half of the year and for 2017.

Debt service will likely remain high, at approximately 16% of
operating revenues in 2016-2018, given the upcoming debt
maturities and the increasing interest rates on new borrowing.

                              OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects S&P's views that, over the next 12
months, wider deficits after capital accounts than it currently
anticipates in its base-case scenario could result in Tomsk
Oblast's tax-supported debt increasing to 60% of consolidated
operating revenues and interest to 5% of adjusted operating
revenues by 2018, while lower average free cash levels lead to
debt service coverage ratio falling below 120%.  This would lead
S&P to revise its assessment of Tomsk Oblast's debt burden to
moderate and S&P's view of liquidity to less than adequate, which
could result in a negative rating action.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Tomsk Oblast -- despite
revenue and expenditure pressures -- successfully implements
austerity measures and keeps the deficit after capital accounts
at about 5% of total revenues in 2016-2018, and if the debt
burden remains below 60% of consolidated operating revenues in
the next three years while the debt service coverage ratio
remains at least at 120%.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                Rating             Rating
                                To                 From
Tomsk Oblast
Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency    BB-/Neg./--        BB-/Neg./--
  Russia National Scale         ruAA-/--/--        ruAA-/--/--
Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency                BB-                BB-
  Russia National Scale         ruAA-              ruAA-



=========
S P A I N
=========


* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 5 Spanish RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken multiple rating actions on Caixa Penedes
1 TDA, FDA (Caixa Penedes 1); Caja Ingenieros TDA 1, FTA (Caja
Ingenieros 1); Caja Ingenieros 2 Ayt, FTA (Caja Ingenieros 2);
TDA 26-Mixto, FTA - Series 1 (TDA 26-1) and TDA 26-Mixto, FTA -
Series 2 (TDA 26-2).

These transactions are Spanish RMBS serviced by Banco Mare
Nostrum S.A (BMN; BB/Stable/B) and Banco de Sabadell for Caixa
Penedes 1; Caja de Credito de los Ingenieros for Caja Ingenieros
1 and 2; and Banco de Sabadell for TDA 26-1 and 26-2.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sufficient Credit Enhancement (CE)

Fitch has upgraded the class B notes of Caja Ingenieros 1 and TDA
26-1 to 'AA+sf' and 'BBB+sf', following an increase in credit
enhancement to 17.4% (February 2016) and 4.7% (January 2016),
respectively, from 16.4%% and 3.1 a year ago.  Other rated
tranches across the five deals have been affirmed, reflecting
their stable CE.

TDA 26-1's class D and TDA 26-2's class C notes are
uncollateralised and can be redeemed solely by means of funds
released from their respective cash reserves upon liquidation.
Given the uncertainty related to their full redemption, Fitch has
affirmed their ratings at 'CCCsf', with recovery estimates (RE)
of 0% and 35%, respectively.

Stable Asset Performance

Asset performance across the five transactions has been firmer
than the Spanish Prime RMBS Index, both in arrears and defaults.
As of the last reporting dates, loans in arrears by three months
or more, ranged from 0% of the current pool balance (Caja
Ingenieros 1) to 1% (TDA 26-2), compared with Fitch's Index
(1.2%).  Cumulative gross defaults range between 0.3% (Caja
Ingenieros 2) and 3.2% (TDA 26-1), well below the average for
Fitch-rated Spanish RMBS (5.5%).

Fitch recognizes that the performance of both TDA 26 Series is
supported by the servicer's refinancing activities.  In TDA 26
Series 2 Fitch found that over the last three years, a
significant portion of the original balance (8.1%) was classified
as delinquent and subsequently redeemed.  Fitch cannot rule out
the possibility that such redemption will be sustained in the
future, which is the reason for maintaining the Negative Outlook
on the class B notes.

TDA 26-1's Reserve below Target
Of the five transactions, only TDA 26-1 has reported a reserve
fund that is below target.  However, given the improved asset
performance over the past 12 months, the reserve fund has
increased to 72.7% of its target level, up from 28.7% as of one
year ago.  The expectation of future stable asset performance,
together with increasing CE, has led to the upgrade of TDA 26-1's
class B notes and revised the Outlook on the class A notes' to
Positive from Stable and on the class C notes to Stable from
Negative.

Counterparty Dependency
The CE available to the class C notes of Caja Ingenieros 1 is
solely provided by the reserve fund, which is held with Societe
Generale (A/Stable/F1).  The junior notes are therefore credit-
linked to the Long-term Issuer Default Rating of Societe
Generale.

Unhedged Transactions
Caja Ingenieros 1 and 2 are both unhedged transaction with no
structure in place to offset the mismatch between the notes
paying 3 month Euribor and loans that primarily reference 12
month Euribor.  In its analysis Fitch has stressed the available
levels of excess spread to account for this mismatch and found
the current level of CE sufficient to withstand this stress.

In Caixa Penedes 1, 39.6% of the pool that was previously paying
Indices de Referencia de Prestamos Hipotecarios (IRPH), is now
paying an all-in fixed rate of 3.75%.  As this rate remains above
the 1.43% paid by the 12 month Euribor-linked portion of the
portfolio the basis risk is mitigated.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

A change in Spain's Long-term IDR (BBB+/Stable/F2) and Country
Ceiling (AA+) may result in a revision of the highest achievable
rating (currently AA+sf).

Given the credit link between Caja Ingenieros 1 class C notes and
Societe Generale, changes in the bank's IDR may result in rating
actions on these notes.

Deterioration in asset performance may result from economic
factors.  A corresponding increase in new defaults and associated
pressure on excess spread levels and reserve funds, beyond those
captured in Fitch's analysis, could result in a negative rating
action.  Furthermore, an abrupt shift of the underlying interest
rates might jeopardize the underlying borrowers' affordability.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

                          DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions.  Loans with missing income data in
TDA 26-1 and TDA 26-2 were assigned to the higher debt-to-income
(DTI) class.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of any third
party assessment of the asset portfolio information or conducted
a review of origination files as part of its ongoing monitoring.

Caixa Penedes 1, Caja Ingenieros 1 and TDA 26-1 and TDA 26-2
Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing.  The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Caja Ingenieros 2
Prior to the transaction's closing, Fitch did not review the
results of a third party assessment conducted on the asset
portfolio information.

Prior to the transaction's closing, Fitch conducted a review of a
small targeted sample of Caja de Los Ingenieros's origination
files and found the information contained in the reviewed files
to be adequately consistent with the originator's policies and
practices and the other information provided to the agency about
the asset portfolio.

Overall and together with the assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

Transaction reporting:

Caixa Penedes 1 dated December 31, 2015 and provided by
Titulizacion de Activos

Caja Ingenieros 2 dated November 25, 2015 and provided by Haya
Titulizacion

Caja Ingenieros 1 dated January 29, 2016 and provided by
Titulizacion de Activos

TDA 26-Mixto 1 dated January 29, 2016 and provided by
Titulizacion de Activos

TDA 26-Mixto 2 dated January 29, 2016 and provided by
Titulizacion de Activos

List of Rating Actions

Caixa Penedes 1TDA, FTA
   -- Class A (ISIN ES0313252001) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Class B (ISIN ES0313252019) affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Class C (ISIN ES0313252027) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable.

Caja Ingenieros TDA 1, FTA
   -- Class A2 (ISIN ES0364376014) affirmed at 'AA+sf' ; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Class B (ISIN ES0364376022) upgraded to 'AA+sf' form
      'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class C (ISIN ES0364376030) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
      Stable.

Caja Ingenieros 2 AyT, FTA
   -- Class A (ISIN ES0312092002) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook
      Stable.

TDA 26-Mixto, FTA - Series 1
   -- Class A2 (ISIN ES0377953015) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
      revised to Positive from Stable;
   -- Class B (ISIN ES0377953023) upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from
      'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class C (ISIN ES0377953031) affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook
      revised to Stable from Negative;
   -- Class D (ISIN ES0377953049) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%.

TDA 26-Mixto, FTA - Series 2
   -- Class A (ISIN ES0377953056) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
      revised to Stable from Negative;
   -- Class B (ISIN ES0377953064) affirmed 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Negative;
   -- Class C (ISIN ES0377953072) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE 35%.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ALPARI UK: April 18 Claims Filing Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------
Samantha Bewick, Joint Special Administrator of Alpari (UK)
Limited, disclosed that pursuant to Rule 2.95 of the Insolvency
Rules 1986 that the Joint Special Administrators of the Company
intend to make an interim distribution to the unsecured creditors
within two months from April 18, 2016.

Creditors who have not already done so, must send details in
writing, of any claim against the Company to the Joint Special
Administrators at 15 Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5GL
by April 18, 2016, or they will be excluded from the benefit of
any distribution.

Any person who requires further information regarding this matter
should contact Julie Wilby on 020 7694 3291.

                          About Alpari

Alpari Group is a UK-based foreign exchange, precious metals and
CFD broker headquartered in London.  The company employs around
170 employees at its offices in Bishopsgate, London.

Upon the application of the directors of Alpari (UK) Ltd, on
Monday, Jan. 19, 2015, the High Court appointed Richard Heis,
Samantha Bewick and Mark Firmin of KPMG LLP as joint special
administrators of Alpari (UK) Ltd, under the Special
Administration Regime (SAR).  Alpari (UK) Ltd is a company
incorporated in the UK.

Alpari (UK) Ltd applied for insolvency on Jan. 19, 2015,
following the decision on Jan. 15, by the Swiss National Bank to
remove the informal peg to the euro at around 1.20 Swiss francs.
"The announcement by the SNB prompted volatility across the
foreign exchange markets which saw the company and many of its
clients make large losses.  After a weekend spent in urgent
discussions with various parties with a view to selling the
company, these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful," KMPG said
in a statement.


MORTGAGE NO.7: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed six tranches of Business Mortgage
Finance 3 PLC, Clavis Securities plc Series 2006-01, Mortgages No
6 Plc and Mortgages No 7 Plc following the discovery and
correction of a model error in Fitch's UK RMBS Surveillance
Model.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating actions follow the discovery of a foreclosure
frequency (FF) adjustment that was not applied in Fitch's
ResiEMEA model, which resulted in weighted average FFs that were
too low.  The correction of this inconsistency has led to an
upward revision of the weighted average FFs and thus expected
losses for these four transactions, across all rating scenarios.

Fitch has reassessed the four transactions mentioned at
the beginning of this commentary and found that the credit
enhancement supporting some classes of notes is sufficient to
withstand the higher rating stresses, considering the performance
of the deals. This view is reflected in the affirmation of the
affected tranches listed below.

As per the Criteria Addendum: UK Residential Mortgage Assumptions
(published Dec. 16, 2015) Fitch applies a 30% increase to the FF
for non-conforming loans where the borrower is currently
performing but has been one month or more in arrears in the past
24 months (or since origination where the loan has been
originated less than 24 months ago).  As Fitch was not provided
with the date that each of the loans in the pools were last in
arrears, conservative assumptions have been made.  As a proxy for
the missing data, in its analysis, Fitch applied a 30% increase
in FF to the difference between the maximum level of one-month
plus arrears in the past 24 months and the current level of one-
month plus arrears.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Clavis Securities plc Series 2006-01 and both Mortgages deals
comprise transactions that are backed by floating-interest-rate
loans.  In the current low interest rate environment, borrowers
are benefiting from low borrowing costs.  An increase in interest
rates could therefore lead to performance deterioration of the
underlying assets and consequently downgrades of the notes if
defaults and associated losses exceed those of Fitch's stresses.

As Mortgages No 6 and No 7 portfolios have shrunk to 10% and 17%
respectively of their original balances, they may experience
natural adverse selection as the better quality loans are being
repaid.  Under these circumstances, deterioration in the asset
performance beyond Fitch's expectations could lead to negative
rating actions.

For Business Mortgage Finance 3 PLC, backed mostly by SME loans,
the probability of financially distressed borrowers of
refinancing at more favorable terms has reduced as lending
standards for new SMEs loans have tightened since 2009.
Conversely the easing of these rather conservative lending
policies could have a favorable effect on the performance of the
collateral as financially distressed borrowers would have a
better chance of refinancing out of the portfolio at better
economic conditions.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

                          DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions.  For Business Mortgage Finance 3
information related to previous county court judgment,
residential properties for investment purpose (buy-to-let) and
re-mortgage loans was not included in the loan by loan data
received from CFML.  The agency used the information provided in
the investor reports and applied the FF adjustments as per
criteria on an aggregate basis.  Fitch assumed that 50% of the
re-mortgage loans were used for debt-consolidation purpose.  In
all other cases there were no findings that were material to this
analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of any third party
assessment of the asset portfolio information or conducted a
review of origination files as part of its ongoing monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing.  The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

For Mortgages No 6 and 7 Prior to the transactions closing, Fitch
conducted a review of a small targeted sample of Mortgages Plc's
origination files and found the information contained in the
reviewed files to be adequately consistent with the originator's
policies and practices and the other information provided to the
agency about the asset portfolio.

Overall and together with the assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

                      SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis.

Business Mortgage Finance 3 PLC:

   -- Loan-by-loan data provided by CFML as at end-November 2015
   -- Transaction reporting provided by CFML as at end-November
      2015

Clavis Securities plc Series 2006-01

   -- Loan-by-loan data provided by Bluestone (Bluestone Group
      acquired Basinghall Finance in December 2014, and
      subsequently renamed the business to Bluestone Mortgages)
      with a cut-off date of 31 August 2015
   -- Transaction reporting provided Bluestone for both deals
      since close and until September 2015

Mortgages No 6 and 7 PLC

   -- Loan-by-loan data provided by U.S. Bank as at Oct. 30,
      2015,
   -- Transaction reporting provided by U.S. Bank as at Oct. 30,
      and Nov. 2, 2015,

MODELS
The models below were used in the analysis.

ResiEMEA.

EMEA RMBS Surveillance Model.

Rating actions following the model error are:

Business Mortgage Finance 3 PLC
  Class B2 notes (XS0223482729): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Stable

Clavis Securities plc Series 2006-01
  Class M2a (ISIN XS0255425414): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
   Positive
  Class B1a (ISIN XS0255425927); affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Positive
  Class B1b (ISIN XS0255440728); affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Positive

Mortgages No 6 Plc
  Class D (ISIN XS0206261603): affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
   Stable

Mortgages No. 7 plc:
  Class E (ISIN XS0225922896): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable

The other tranches of these deals are unaffected and have been
affirmed as:

Business Mortgage Finance 3 PLC
  Class M notes (XS0223481838): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class B1 notes (XS0223482307): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class C notes (XS0223483024): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable

Clavis Securities plc Series 2006-01
  Class A3a (ISIN XS0255457706): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class A3b (ISIN XS0255438748): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1a (ISIN XS0255424441): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1b (ISIN XS0255439043): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class B2a (ISIN XS0255426818); affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
   Stable

Mortgages No 6 Plc
  Class A2 (ISIN XS0206259888): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class B (ISIN XS0206260464): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class C (ISIN XS0206260894): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class E (ISIN XS0206261942): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook
   Stable

Mortgages No. 7 plc:
  Class A2 (ISIN XS0225922110): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class B (ISIN XS0225922383): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class C (ISIN XS0225922466): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
  Class D (ISIN XS0225922623): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Stable


TATA STEEL: Meyohas Brothers Near Scunthorpe Plant Rescue Deal
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Marlow, Christopher Hope and Ben Riley-Smith at The Telegraph
report that Britain's steel industry is set to be saved from
collapse by two little-known financiers who hope to revive the
"British Steel" name.

According to The Telegraph, Marc and Nathaniel Meyohas, two
brothers behind investment firm Greybull, are putting the
finishing touches to buy the Scunthorpe steelworks from Tata
Steel, pumping GBP400 million into the struggling plant and
saving a total of around 9,000 local jobs.

The deal is set to be announced as early as tomorrow, April 6,
The Telegraph discloses.  City sources believe the entrepreneurs
could then look at a possible deal to save the iconic Port Talbot
plant in south Wales, The Telegraph states.

Business secretary Sajid Javid said that he was prepared to offer
Government support to make sure British steel plants could be
saved, including handing responsibility to the taxpayer for
British Steel's pension scheme, which experts say is GBP2 billion
in deficit, The Telegraph relays.  Some 40,000 jobs continue to
hang in the balance, The Telegraph notes.

Tata, The Telegraph says, has been holding talks with Greybull
over a sale of the Scunthorpe site -- where Tata employs 4,500
workers -- while simultaneously reviewing what to do with the
rest of its UK operations, including the sprawling Port Talbot
plant.

As part of the purchase of the Scunthorpe works, Greybull is
negotiating with Tata to rename the steelworks "British Steel",
according to The Telegraph.

Sources close to the talks stressed that this part of the buyout
still needed to be reached, though Greybull was hopeful of
announcing it alongside the deal, The Telegraph relates.

Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company.


TATA STEEL: Fitch Cuts LT Foreign Issuer Default Rating to 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Tata Steel Limited's (TSL) Long-Term
Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB' from
'BB+/Stable' and placed it on Rating Watch Evolving (RWE).

Unsecured notes issued by TSL have also been downgraded to 'BB'
from 'BB+' and placed on RWE. The agency has also downgraded the
Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR for TSL's wholly owned subsidiary,
Tata Steel UK Holdings Limited (TSUKH), to 'B' from 'B+/Stable'
and placed it on RWE. A full list of rating actions is provided
at the end of this commentary.

The downgrade reflects the decline in TSL's profitability and
jump in leverage during the financial year ending 31 March 2016
(FY16), following challenging market conditions for its
operations in India and overseas, especially in the UK. The
downgrade in TSUKH reflects the downgrade of its parent, TSL, and
the weak operating environment in the UK and more broadly across
Europe.

The RWE reflects uncertainty following TSL's announcement on 29
March 2016 that it is exploring all options for portfolio
restructuring in Europe, including the potential divestment of
its UK operations, in part or in whole. Considerable uncertainty
remains on timing and how the group and its debt will be
structured going forward. Fitch believes TSL's disposal of its UK
operations, in part or whole, will result in a change to TSL's
ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Weaker Profitability in India: Profitability of TSL's Indian
operations has been impacted by weak steel price realisation in
9MFY16. Its consolidated EBITDA per ton declined to about
INR7,400/tonne ($US110/t) in 9MFY16 from INR11,400/t in FY15, hit
by a INR7,150/t fall in realisation. Steel producers globally are
suffering from weak demand and overcapacity, with current global
capacity utilization at a low last seen during the 2008 global
financial crisis. In India, demand growth was a tepid 4.7% in
9MFY16, which was met largely by a 29% yoy increase in imports.

Recent actions by the Indian government, such as the imposition
of a minimum import price following a 20% safeguard duty on
imports to protect domestic manufacturers, have provided some
relief, with domestic steel prices rising around INR4,000/t from
January 2016 lows. However, prices are still about 20% lower than
the average for FY15. Fitch says increased competition among
domestic producers to support utilization rates will likely
constrain further price hikes in the near term, given domestic
steel capacity is scheduled to jump about 15 million tonnes over
2H15 and 2016.

European Operations Under Stress: TSL's overseas business
reported EBITDA losses consecutively in 2Q and 3QFY16, hit by
weak performance in the UK. Its operations in Europe and UK in
particular, have faced poor steel-raw material spreads and
relatively high operating costs. Price realisation in Europe has
faced pressure from cheap Chinese and Russian imports amid weak
regional demand.

TSL has taken steps to cut costs, including shutting down its
plates business in the UK and laying off around 3,000 employees.
The company is also focusing on value-added products and
profitable market segments, such as the automotive sector.
Recognising the need for further action, TSL is now exploring the
sale of its UK business, in part or whole.

Jump in Leverage: Fitch estimates TSL's consolidated net debt to
EBITDA leverage will jump to 11.6x in FY16, from 5.8x in the
previous year, due to poor profitability. Leverage is likely to
remain high at 8.2x in FY17 and 5.7x by FY18. Fitch's forecast
assumes a gradual improvement in realisations and a return to
profitability for overseas operations in FY18. However, further
details on restructuring in Europe may change this forecast.

Benefit From Greenfield Plant: TSL is currently commissioning the
first phase of its greenfield plant at Kalinganagar in Odisha,
India, with a capacity of 3 million tonnes per annum. TSL expects
to gradually increase output in FY17. Apart from increased sales,
TSL would benefit from improved product mix from the new plant,
as the plant will specialize in producing high-grade flat
products. It will also be one of the most cost-efficient plant in
the country. The bulk of the capex has been completed and TSL
should begin deriving cash-flow benefits in FY17.

TSUKH Gains from TSL Support: TSUKH is unprofitable, with a weak
standalone credit profile. The business continues to face weak
local demand and high costs. However, TSUKH benefits from
strategic ties with its parent, TSL, so its IDR includes a two-
notch uplift in line with Fitch's Parent and Subsidiary Linkage
methodology.

Tata Group Support: TSL's ratings also benefit from a one-notch
uplift because of potential support from the Tata Group due to
the former's strategic importance to the group.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Sales volume to decline 8% in FY17 due to lower steel
    production in the UK. Thereafter, volume assumed to grow by
    around 6% annually, with a ramp up of Indian capacity.

-- Average sales realisation to improve 3% in FY17 and by 5%
    each over the next two years.

-- Consolidated operating EBITDA margin to improve to 9% in FY17
    then to 11% in FY18 (FY16: 6%). EBITDA per tonne would bounce
    back over FY17-18 to FY15 levels.

-- Average annual capex of around INR70 billion from FY17."

RATING SENSITIVITIES

TSL

The RWE will be resolved following a review of TSL's credit
profile once Fitch has more clarity around the portfolio
restructuring exercise in Europe. An upgrade is likely if the
proceeds of potential asset sales are used to repay debt,
reducing leverage.
However, if leverage increases due to significant closure costs
for the UK operations, Fitch will downgrade the rating.

TSUKH

The RWE will be resolved following a review of the linkages
between TSUKH and TSL and TSUKH's credit profile, once Fitch has
more clarity around the portfolio restructuring exercise in
Europe. If Fitch concludes that the linkage is enhanced or
TSUKH's standalone profile improves, an upgrade in likely. A
downgrade is likely if Fitch views that the linkage has weakened.

The full list of rating actions are:

TSL

  Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+';
  placed on RWE

  Senior unsecured rating: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+' ; placed
  on RWE

  $US500 million 4.85% senior unsecured guaranteed notes due 2020
  and $US1 billion 5.95% senior unsecured guaranteed notes due
  2024 issued by ABJA Investments Co Pte Ltd, a wholly owned
  subsidiary of TSL: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; placed on
  RWE

TSUKH:

  Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR downgraded to 'B' from 'B+';
  placed on RWE



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Fitch Says EU SME CLO Performance Remains Stable in March 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says European SME CLO performance remained stable
in March 2016 with average 90-day delinquencies in Spain only
increasing marginally since October 2015 to 1.9% from 1.7%,
whereas 90 day delinquencies in Italy are continuing their
decreasing trend, dropping to 1.5% from 1.7% over the past month.
.
These statistics are in the April edition of Fitch's SME CLO
Compare, which tracks the performance of all SME CLO transactions
monitored by the agency based on their investor reports. The
report is updated on a monthly basis.

For Germany, Fitch said in a comment released in March that it
expected SME CLOs to see falling default rates as a result of
lower German corporate insolvencies in 2015.

Throughout the month of March, Fitch rated one new Italian SME
CLO and reviewed nine transactions consisting of two Portuguese,
two German and five Spanish SME CLOs. Two tranches were upgraded
while only one was downgraded. Further, one transaction was
called and another saw its rating being withdrawn.

Fitch assigned a final rating of 'A+sf' with Stable Outlook to
BERICA PMI 2 S.R.L.'s class A notes on March 30, 2016. The
transaction is a cash flow securitization of a EUR1,042 mil.
static pool of loans granted to small and medium-sized
enterprises (SME) and corporates located in Italy.

The Outlook on two Portuguese transactions, Sagres, STC
S.A./Douro SME No. 2 and Sagres, STC S.A./Pelican SME No. 2, was
revised to Stable from Positive, reflecting a similar action on
Portugal. Sagres, STC S.A. / Pelican SME No. 2 notes were
subsequently affirmed given the transaction's overall stable
performance.

Fitch upgraded the most junior rated notes of FTPYME TDA CAM 2,
FTA and IM Cajamar Empresas 5, FTA, while affirming their senior
notes, whose ratings are capped at current levels by counterparty
risks. The upgrades reflected significant increases in credit
enhancement as a result of deleveraging of the senior notes,
while delinquencies remained at low and moderate levels,
respectively.

FONCAIXA LEASINGS 2, FTA's ratings were affirmed, as higher
credit enhancement offset volatile delinquencies and increased
portfolio concentration.

Fitch also reviewed AyT Colaterales Global Empresas, FTA, Serie
Caja Granada I and concluded that no rating action was necessary.

Fitch also affirmed PYME Bancaja 5, FTA and revised the Outlook
on the transaction's class B notes to Stable from Negative as a
result of significant decreases in delinquencies, increased
credit enhancement and moderate defaults.

All notes of S-CORE 2007-1 GmbH were affirmed at 'Csf' with 0%
Recovery Estimates. The transaction reached its scheduled
maturity in April 2014 and according to the manager no further
repayments will be received.

On March 21, 2016 IM Grupo Banco Popular EMPRESAS 1, FTA was
called with all notes being paid in full.

Fitch also downgraded FORCE TWO Limited Partnership class D notes
to 'Csf and affirmed class E notes at 'Csf' and has
simultaneously withdrawn the ratings for commercial reasons. The
transaction reached its maturity in January 2014 with class D and
E notes not having been paid in full.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *