TCREUR_Public/160408.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, April 8, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 069


                            Headlines


A U S T R I A

ACTIV SOLAR: Withdraws Restructuring Plan, Payout Ratio Below 10%


C R O A T I A

SUNCANI HVARI: Orco to Sell 15.77% Stake for EUR8.15 Million


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

CE ENERGY: Moody's Withdraws Ba2 Corporate Family Rating


F R A N C E

PEUGEOT SA: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba2, Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

EUROCREDIT CDO VI: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
JUBILEE CDO VI: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes


L U X E M B O U R G

VAT LUX II: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Positive


R U S S I A

SIBUR PAO: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to RUB10BB 10-Year Bonds
TRANSAERO AIRLINES: Repays RUB320-Mil. Debt to Vnukovo Airport


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: Seeks Nasdaq Delisting as Part of Restructuring Plan
IBERCAJA BANCO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Counterparty Credit Ratings


U K R A I N E

PROLETARY: Luhansk Court Opens Bankruptcy Proceedings
RAIFFEISEN LEASING: Moody's Assigns Caa2 CFR, Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

PREMIERTEL PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class B Notes
TATA STEEL: More Potential Buyers Emerge for Plants, Javid Says
VEDANTA RESOURCES: Moody's Says Buybacks Not Distressed Exchanges


X X X X X X X X

* S&P Takes Rating Actions on 8 European Synthetic CDO Tranches
* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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ACTIV SOLAR: Withdraws Restructuring Plan, Payout Ratio Below 10%
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Alexander Weber at Bloomberg News reports that creditor
protection association Creditreform said in an e-mailed statement
the main creditor of Activ Solar is Ukraine's Ukreximbank.

According to Bloomberg, a restructuring plan was withdrawn by
Activ Solar after agreement with Ukreximbank couldn't be reached.

Creditreform said the payout ratio is seen below 10%, "if there
will be a payout at all", Bloomberg relays.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 11,
2016, Bloomberg News related that Activ Solar filed for
insolvency in Vienna.  Creditreform, as cited by Bloomberg, said
in an e-mail the company has 34 creditors and EUR503 million in
liabilities, making for Austria's biggest insolvency this year so
far.

Activ Solar GmbH, headquartered in Vienna, Austria, is engaged in
the production of polycrystalline silicon for the solar PV
industry and the development of large-scale photovoltaic power
stations.



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C R O A T I A
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SUNCANI HVARI: Orco to Sell 15.77% Stake for EUR8.15 Million
------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Orco Property Group said it has entered into
an agreement to exit Suncani Hvar, selling its 15.77% stake in
the company for some EUR8.15 million (US$9.3 million).

The aggregate price of the transaction is based on the nominal
value of the transferred shares, i.e. 20 kuna per share, Orco
Property Group, as cited by SeeNews, said in a statement on
April 5, adding that it sold 3,062,196 Suncani Hvar shares.  It
did not disclose the buyer, SeeNews notes.

In December, Suncani Hvar said that following the successful
completion of the pre-bankruptcy proceedings the company expects
to end the year with an operating profit of almost HRK68 million
(US$10.3 million/EUR9.0 million), SeeNews recounts.

In June, Suncani Hvar said it is inviting eligible creditors to
convert their claims against the company into equity as part of
its court-approved pre-bankruptcy proceedings, SeeNews relays.
As part of the proceedings, the company was obliged to raise its
capital by converting a portion of creditor claims into equity,
SeeNews discloses.

Suncani Hvar is a Croatian hotel group.



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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
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CE ENERGY: Moody's Withdraws Ba2 Corporate Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the Ba2 corporate family
rating and the Ba2-PD probability of default rating of CE Energy,
a.s. (CE Energy) following the announcement of the sale of German
assets by EP Energy, a.s. and given the ongoing reorganization of
the business. CE Energy has no rated debt outstanding following
an early full redemption of the EUR500 million notes completed on
April 1, 2016. The senior secured notes were rated at B1 at the
time of the withdrawal.



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F R A N C E
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PEUGEOT SA: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba2, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to Ba2 from Ba3 the
corporate family rating and to Ba2-PD from Ba3-PD the probability
of default rating of Europe's second-largest maker of light
vehicles, Peugeot S.A.  Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded to
Ba2/(P)Ba2 from Ba3/(P)Ba3 Peugeot's and its rated subsidiary GIE
PSA Tresorerie's ratings and affirmed the NP/(P)NP ratings.  The
outlook on all ratings has been changed to stable from positive.

"The upgrade of Peugeot's ratings recognizes its success in
implementing its industrial reconstruction plan, as well as the
potential for further improvement in earnings in the next 12 to
18 months as Peugeot launches new models, takes advantage of the
positive business momentum in Western Europe and continues its
rationalization efforts," says Yasmina Serghini, a Moody's Vice
President - Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for Peugeot.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded Peugeot's ratings to Ba2 to reflect the
successful execution of the company's turnaround strategy, which
has supported a meaningful improvement in the company's earnings
and cash flow generation since 2014.  In particular, Peugeot last
year delivered a much improved operating margin of 3.0% (with
Moody's adjustments), up from 0.2% in the prior year, also
boosted by favorable operating conditions in Western Europe,
Peugeot's single largest market.

Outside of Europe, Peugeot has also eliminated or narrowed down
its losses in challenged markets such as Brazil and Russia which,
if sustained on the back of a large reduction in fixed costs,
will help build a more resilient business at times of declining
sales volumes.

Moody's expects that Peugeot's margin will increase towards 4% by
2017 on the back of (1) anticipated further demand growth for
passenger cars in Western Europe in 2016 and 2017 of 4.7% and
3.1%, respectively, together with (2) Peugeot's continued efforts
at improving its pricing power, rationalizing its model range and
cost structure and upcoming model launches from late 2016.

Moody's anticipates that by 2017 Peugeot's profitability will
narrow the gap in its profit margin relative to some of its
global rated competitors such as Renault S.A. (Baa3 stable),
General Motors Company (Baa3 senior unsecured bank credit
facility/Ba1 senior unsecured, positive) and Ford Motor Company
(Baa2 stable).

Peugeot's higher profitability and cash conversion in 2015
translated into stronger debt-protection ratios as evidenced by a
Moody's-adjusted (gross) debt/EBITDA ratio of 3.4x (7.3x in
2014), a Moody's-adjusted EBITA/Interest Expense ratio of 1.9x
(0.1x) and a Retained Cash Flow (RCF)/debt of 26.9% (7.8%).
Moody's expects that a gradual increase in margin will support an
incremental improvement in Peugeot's credit metrics in the next
24 months towards 2x leverage and 3.5x interest coverage, a level
that will position the company's rating strongly at the Ba2
level.  However, Moody's anticipates that Peugeot's free cash
flow generation in the next 24 months will not be as strong as in
2014 and 2015 reflecting mostly a moderation in working capital
inflow which lifted free cash flow during the last two years.
Moreover, Peugeot will start paying dividends to its shareholders
starting in 2017, with respect to the 2016 financial year, which,
albeit at a moderate level (25% payout ratio) will constrain free
cash flow to some extent.

Moody's assessment of Peugeot's rating factors in the rating
agency's expectations that the Push to Pass plan for the 2016-21
period largely builds on the previous strategy Back in the Race
announced in 2014.  Having said that, the new plan raises the
company's self-imposed recurring operating margin targets to 4%
on average for the period 2016-18 then to 6% by 2021.  It also
introduces a new 10% group revenue growth by 2018 (compared to
2015; at constant exchange rates) with an additional 15% by 2021.
Peugeot said it will achieve these targets through a combination
of measures aiming at diversifying and expanding its offerings in
the areas of after-sales, leasing, used cars and fleet management
which Moody's believes carry a moderate execution risk and
associated costs.

However, Peugeot's Ba2 CFR is constrained by (1) the highly
competitive nature of the automotive industry; (2) volatility in
operating conditions in certain of Peugeot's markets and in
foreign currency (both in emerging markets and in respect of the
British Pound); (3) the company's high reliance on the European
market, which is generally greater than its rated competitors;
and (4) subdued commercial performance posted by the company
outside of Europe.  In the regard to the last point, the company
has been held back by its lack of new model launches and lower
growth in China year-on-year, the company's second-largest
market, in which Moody's forecasts demand growth for passenger
cars of 6.5% in 2016, decelerating to 2.5% in 2017.  This is
likely to constrain the share of income from Peugeot's Chinese
joint ventures (which totaled EUR300 million in 2015).

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Peugeot's ratings are unlikely to be upgraded in the near-term in
light of the upgrade.  Over time, upward pressure could
materialize on the ratings and/or the outlook if Peugeot (1)
improves its market share on the back of a positive and
consistent sales performance and (2) delivers a longer track
record of operational improvement with stronger and sustained
profitability in its automotive operations.  Quantitatively, (1)
a structurally positive free cash flow from its industrial
operations excluding working capital fluctuations (as defined by
Moody's), (2) a Moody's-adjusted EBITA margin for its industrial
business around the mid-single-digits (in percentage terms), (3)
a Moody's-adjusted EBITA/Interest Expense at or above 3.5x, and
(4) a Moody's-adjusted (gross) debt/EBITDA ratio below 2.5x could
support a rating upgrade.  This assessment is premised on the
maintenance of a cash balance of approximately EUR10 billion.

Conversely, the ratings could be downgraded if Peugeot's
operational performance were to weaken on the back of continued
erosion of its market share, its EBITA margin were to fall to the
low single-digit range (in percentage terms, including Moody's
adjustments), its free cash flow were to turn negative and its
Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA were to rise above 3.5x, on a
sustained basis.

                       PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Automobile Manufacturer Industry published in June 2011.

Peugeot S.A. is Europe's second-largest maker of light vehicles
with its two main brands Peugeot and Citroen.  In addition,
Peugeot holds a 51.7% interest in Faurecia SA (Ba2 stable), one
of Europe's leading automotive suppliers and remains a 25%
shareholder in Gefco, France's second-largest transportation and
logistics service provider.  In 2015, Peugeot generated revenues
of EUR54.7 billion and reported a recurring operating income of
EUR2.7 billion.

List of Affected Ratings:

Upgrades:

Issuer: Peugeot S.A.

  Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to Ba2-PD from Ba3-PD

  Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to Ba2 from Ba3

  BACKED Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Upgraded to
   (P)Ba2 from (P)Ba3

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Ba2 from
   Ba3

  BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Ba2
   from Ba3

Issuer: GIE PSA Tresorerie

  BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Ba2
   from Ba3

Affirmations:

Issuer: Peugeot S.A.

  BACKED Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
   (P)NP

Issuer: GIE PSA Tresorerie

  Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Peugeot S.A.

  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

Issuer: GIE PSA Tresorerie

  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive



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EUROCREDIT CDO VI: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on the following notes
issued by Eurocredit CDO VI PLC:

-- EUR33.5 million (Current outstanding balance EUR25.7 million)
    Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed
    Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR30 million Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 21,
    2015 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

-- EUR24 million Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 21,
    2015 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR20 million (Current outstanding balance EUR15.8 million)
    Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
    2022, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2015 Affirmed
    Ba3 (sf)

Eurocredit CDO VI PLC, issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. It is predominantly composed of
senior secured loans. The portfolio is managed by Intermediate
Capital Managers Limited. The transaction's reinvestment period
ended in January 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades of the Notes are primarily a result of the
redemption of the senior Notes and subsequent increases of the
overcollateralization ratios (the "OC ratios") of the remaining
Classes of Notes. Moody's notes that the Class A-T Notes and
Class A-R Notes have redeemed in full while Class B has redeemed
approximately EUR7.8 million on the last payment date in January
2016. As a result of the deleveraging, the OC ratios of the Notes
have increased significantly. According to the March 2016 trustee
report, the Classes B, C, D and E OC ratios are 409.15%, 188.70%,
131.86% and 110.00% respectively compared to levels just prior to
the payment date in September 2015 of 274.14%, 166.37%, 126.56%
and 109.31%.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balances of EUR100.1
million and GBP2.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 24.08% (consistent with a WARF of 3457), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.94% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 15 and a weighted
average spread of 3.87%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.


JUBILEE CDO VI: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Jubilee CDO VI:

  EUR27 mil. Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 6,
   2015, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  EUR21 mil. Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct. 6,
   2015, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  EUR3.15 mil. (Current rated balance: EUR 0.24 mil.) Class Q
   Combination Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously
   on Oct 6, 2015, Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes issued by
Jubilee CDO VI:

  EUR25 mil. (Current balance outstanding: EUR20.17 mil.) Class
   A1-b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 6, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR112.5 mil. (Current balance outstanding: EUR7.67 mil.)
   Class A2-a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  EUR12.5 mil. Class A2-b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  EUR13 mil. (Current balance outstanding: EUR 2.10 mil.) Class
   A3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on Oct. 6, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR32 mil. Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  EUR17 mil. Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2022, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Jubilee CDO VI, issued in August 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield European
loans.  It is predominantly composed of senior secured loans.
The portfolio is managed by Alcentra Limited.  The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in September 2012.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
improvement in their over-collateralization (OC) ratios since the
rating action in October 2015.  On March 2016 payment date, Class
A1-a, A2-a, A3 and A1-b notes were paid in total by EUR18.22
million or 7% of their original aggregate balance.  As a result
of this deleveraging, the OC ratios have increased.  According to
the March 2016 trustee report the OC ratios of Classes A/B, C, D
and E are 194.00%, 150.22%, 127.79% and 114.01% compared to
162.54%, 136.28%, 121.07% and 111.04%, respectively, in September
2015.

The rating of the Class Q combination Notes addresses the
repayment of the rated balance on or before the legal final
maturity.  The rated balance at any time is equal to the
principal amount of the combination note on the issue date minus
the sum of all payments made from the issue date to such date, of
either interest or principal.  The rated balance will not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR162.95 million, EUR6.4 million of defaulted
assets, a weighted average default probability of 23.76%
(consistent with a WARF of 3,340 with a weighted average life of
4.3 years), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
45.24% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 18
and a weighted average spread of 3.68%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015."

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate of
the portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it lowered the
weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio by 5%; the model
generated outputs that were within one notch of the base-case
results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by (1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and (2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
     this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
     underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending
     on market conditions and have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Amortization could accelerate as a
     consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral
     sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase
     in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.  Fast amortization
     would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning
     with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

  2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
     trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
     have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
     collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
     and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
     defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
     the market price or the recovery rate to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Recoveries higher
     than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
     the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



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VAT LUX II: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on Luxembourg-based vacuum valve producer
VAT Lux II Sarl on CreditWatch with positive implications.

At the same time, S&P puts on CreditWatch positive its 'B' issue
rating on VAT's $405 million senior secured term loan B due 2021
($276 million outstanding after the company's commitment to
prepay $40 million on March 31, 2016).  The recovery rating on
this instrument remains at '3', reflecting S&P's expectation of
meaningful recovery in the higher half of the 50%-70% range in
the event of a payment default.

The CreditWatch placement follows VAT's launch of its IPO on the
SIX Swiss Exchange.  S&P understands that the transaction aims to
enlarge the company's shareholder base and will therefore have no
cash impact for VAT.  However, because a shareholder loan of
CHF405 million has been converted into common equity, S&P expects
the transaction will be positive for VAT's credit profile based
on S&P's anticipation that its debt protection metrics will
improve.

The launch comes a few weeks after the company's public statement
of its intent to float on the SIX Swiss Exchange.  Moreover, S&P
understands that the company targets a quicker turnaround than
initially indicated, given a first listing on April 14, 2016.

S&P thinks that the IPO will markedly improve VAT's financial
risk profile given the conversion of the CHF405 million (as of
year-end 2015) shareholder loan into common equity.  With S&P's
treatment of this instrument as debt, on Dec. 31, 2015, VAT's
adjusted debt reached CHF730 million, of which 42% was composed
of senior secured credit facilities.  After the conversion of
this shareholder loan into equity on March 29, 2016, the
company's adjusted debt would be less than CHF290 million
(accounting for the $40 million prepayment on March 31, 2016).
This would translate into a debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 2x-2.5x
by year-end 2016 and a funds from operations (FFO)-to-debt ratio
significantly improving toward 25%-30%.  VAT's financial risk
profile will also strengthen with its two financial sponsors,
Partners Group and Capvis Equity partners, relinquishing control
of the company.  S&P anticipates that the two sponsors' ultimate
ownership of VAT will be just below 40% (or 45.8% assuming full
exercise of the overallotment option that covers 1,200,000
shares), while the family owners and management would retain an
aggregate stake of 8.3% (assuming full exercise of the
overallotment option).

S&P has not yet revised up its financial risk profile assessment
given the execution risks inherent to an IPO transaction.  Also,
equity markets have been particularly volatile since the
beginning of the year, although there has been some relief in
recent weeks. What's more, if the IPO is unsuccessful, S&P thinks
that the financial sponsors could explore alternatives to
partially monetizing their investment.  In such a scenario, S&P
do not rule out releveraging of VAT's balance sheet back to year-
end 2015 levels.

Consequently, a change in S&P's view of VAT's financial risk
profile would be contingent on the final ownership structure,
particularly if the financial sponsorship stake continues to
exceed our 40% threshold, on which S&P bases its assessment of
the company's financial sponsor ownership.

In S&P's view, VAT's highly attractive dividend policy will weigh
on its financial risk profile.  S&P understands the company
targets dividend payments of CHF60 million in 2016, followed by a
potential payback of up to 100% free operating cash flow after
scheduled amortization of debt (provided reported net debt does
not significantly deviates from 1x EBITDA).

S&P is maintaining its assessment of the business risk profile
given VAT's market leadership, technology edge, and attractive
geographic diversification.  With its focus on premium vacuum
valves, the company has delivered sustainably healthy EBITDA
margins averaging 28% over the past three years.

Yet, VAT remains exposed to the semiconductor industry, which is
inherently volatile and features some customer concentration.
Over the medium to long term, S&P also sees technology risk
attached to VAT's products, if competing products emerge.
Moreover, S&P thinks VAT is small in size in absolute terms, as
reflected through revenues and EBITDA of about CHF411 million and
CHF127 million at year-end 2015.

The CreditWatch reflects the possibility that S&P could raise its
long-term corporate credit rating on VAT by at least one notch on
successful completion of the IPO and full allocation of the
funds.

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch placement over the next 90
days on completion of the IPO.

S&P will assess the impact of any sustainable debt reduction on
VAT's financial risk profile, as well as reviewing the ownership
structure, including reduced financial sponsor ownership.  The
magnitude of any potential ratings upside would depend on S&P's
view of VAT's ability to continue to deliver stronger credit
metrics, its ultimate shareholding structure, and S&P's view of
its liquidity remaining adequate.

S&P would most likely affirm its ratings on VAT if it does not
succeed in placing the IPO.



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SIBUR PAO: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to RUB10BB 10-Year Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned PAO SIBUR Holding's recent issue of
RUB10 billion ten-year rouble bonds a local currency senior
unsecured 'BB+' rating.

Fitch has simultaneously affirmed SIBUR's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+' with Negative Outlook, Short-term
foreign currency IDR at 'B', and SIBUR Securities Limited's five-
year USD1 billion guaranteed Eurobonds due 2018 at 'BB+'.

SIBUR's USD1 billion Eurobonds due 2018 and new RUB10 billion
rouble bonds rank pari passu with the group's senior unsecured
debt and are only structurally subordinated to SIBUR's debt at
its subsidiaries, largely represented by debt at Tobolsk Polymer
and ZapSibNefteKhim (ZapSib-2).  Fitch expects SIBUR's
structurally senior debt to increase with further utilization of
ZapSib-2 project debt funding, but to remain well below Fitch's
2x-2.5x threshold of prior ranking debt-to-EBITDA for notching
unsecured debt rating until the bonds mature.  Thus, Fitch sees
no subordination pressure on the bonds' recoveries, as reflected
in the bonds' ratings being equalized with SIBUR's IDR.

                     KEY RATING DRIVERS

Leveraging Risk Drives Outlook

The Negative Outlook reflects Fitch's expectations of materially
higher leverage during 2017-2019, due to expenditure on the
multi-billion ZapSib-2 project at a time of low and volatile
petrochemical pricing.  Fitch expects funds from operations (FFO)
adjusted net leverage to rise to 2.8x over 2017-2019 before
returning to below our 2x rating guideline in 2020.  This is
despite SIBUR's operational performance benefiting from a weak
rouble and a long-term drawdown/maturity period under its recent
loan facilities obtained for the ZapSib-2 project.  Fitch
believes that, once completed in 2020, ZapSib-2 will materially
enhance SIBUR's operational profile.

SIBUR's ratings are constrained by higher-than-average systemic
risks associated with the Russian business and jurisdictional
environment.  Excluding these risks, Fitch assesses SIBUR's
credit profile in the 'BBB' category, which reflects the group's
leading market and cost position in the petrochemical sector,
diversified portfolio and proven access to competitively priced
feedstock.

Leveraging on Transformational ZapSib-2 Project

SIBUR's USD9.5 billion ZapSib-2 project is expected to add
1.5 million tonnes (mt) of steam cracking capacity and 2mt of
polymer capacity, and will be transformational for SIBUR's
operational profile.  In particular, SIBUR's basic polymer
capacity will triple from its current 1mt level and the share of
internally processed liquefied petroleum gas (50% of SIBUR's
energy product sales) will almost double.  This will further
reduce SIBUR's sales exposure to volatile, oil-linked energy
products towards 30% from 45%, and increase the exposure to more
resilient, higher value added petrochemical products to 60% from
40%.

ZapSib-2 is SIBUR's largest investment, accounting for 80% of
2016-2020 total capex.  SIBUR has already raised long-term debt
financing, including USD2.3 billion of export credit agencies'
funding, a USD1.75 billion loan from the National Wealth Funding,
and a USD210 million loan from Russian Direct Investment Fund and
its partners, with most facilities maturing beyond 2020 when the
project is expected to launch.

While SIBUR has demonstrated flexibility in the past by
postponing some of ZapSib-2's capex, Fitch believes there is
limited scope for this once the financing is raised.  Fitch
expects SIBUR's capex will peak in 2016-2018 at over 35% of
sales.  At a time of low oil prices partly offset by the weak
rouble, this will put SIBUR's leverage under pressure over this
period.  This pressure, coupled with the risks around SIBUR's
limited further flexibility to defer ZapSib-2 capex, is reflected
in the Negative Outlook.

Pricing Pressure Varies Across Products

SIBUR's product portfolio consists of energy products (48% of
1H15 sales) and petrochemical products (48%).  Energy products
are diversified across liquefied petroleum gas, natural gas,
naphtha and other products, but most of these products have
significant pricing correlation with oil.  Petrochemical products
are mostly represented by polypropylene, polyethylene, synthetic
rubbers and other plastics, which are more resilient to oil price
shocks. While the recent oil shock has eroded SIBUR's energy
products performance, it has had a less severe impact on
petrochemical products' sales and aided its margins due to the
decreasing cost of inputs.

Medium-term Margins and Leverage Pressure

Fitch expects SIBUR's revenues to show consistent single-digit
increases over the next five years, driven by rubbers and
polymers volume growth, and oil price recovery and despite the
strengthening rouble.  The strengthening rouble and local
inflation will also contribute to a reduction in SIBUR's margin
to 33%-35% from 2017 from a 37%-39% peak in 2015-2016, which is
more consistent with historical performance.

Aggressive capex exceeding 30% of sales for 2016, 2017 and 2018,
coupled with a 25% dividend payout ratio, will outpace
operational cash flows and translate into a negative high single-
digit free cash flow (FCF) margin and leverage of 2.5x in 2016
and 2.8x in 2017-2018 (2015E: 2.5x).

Over the long term, we expect SIBUR to reduce capex from 2019 as
most of the ZapSib-2 project capex is realised, resulting in
gradual deleveraging towards below 2x post 2019.  This is based
on our assumption that SIBUR will not undertake new large
projects before the ZapSib-2 ramps up.  Fitch assumes the
potential project of Amur gas chemical complex will be financed
with non-recourse project finance.

Sinopec's Stake Neutral to Ratings

In December 2015, China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation
(Sinopec; A+/Stable) acquired 10% of SIBUR's equity and
subsequently nominated one of 10 Directors on SIBUR's Board of
Directors. SIBUR's investment and dividend strategy remains
intact after the change of shareholder structure.  Fitch views
this strategic partnership positively, as China is a growing
market for SIBUR's products and future collaborative
petrochemical projects.

FX has Multiple Implications

SIBUR reports in roubles.  Its costs are dominated in roubles
while its revenues are mostly driven by the US dollar.  Similar
to other petrocurrencies, the rouble becomes weaker during low
oil pricing and vice versa.  As a result, the price contraction
in oil and oil derivatives by two thirds in 4Q15-1Q16 compared
with 2014 was, to a large extent, compensated by more than a
halving of the value of the rouble against the US dollar.  This
translated into reduced sales and margins for SIBUR's oil-linked
energy products.

However, the relative price resilience of polymers and rubbers
compared with oil, coupled with a weaker rouble, translated into
higher sales and margins for SIBUR's petrochemical products.  The
overall effect of a weak rouble and low oil prices is broadly
neutral for rouble-reported sales but positive for margins, as
the rouble mitigates the impact of the weak oil price
environment.

The weak rouble also has had an impact on SIBUR's capex and
dividends.  All other things being equal, a weak rouble increases
the foreign currency element of capex and leads to a higher
dividend payout through higher net profits.  SIBUR's debt is also
mostly in foreign currencies and is thus inflated by a weak
rouble.  Therefore, the overall weak rouble impact is positive on
operational cash flow and moderately positive on leverage despite
driving up capex, dividends and debt, all else being equal.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for SIBUR include:

   -- Oil price at USD35/bbl in 2016, gradually growing towards
      USD65/bbl by 2019.

   -- USD/RUB gradually strengthening towards 57 in 2019 from its
      peak at 75 in 2016.

   -- Energy product prices to follow oil price movements with
      petrochemical product prices dropping 15%-20% in 2016,
      before recovering in single-digit growth after 2016.

   -- Capex/sales peaking at above 35% during 2016-2018, and
      dividend payout of 25% of net income, driving a strongly
      negative FCF margin until 2019.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

   -- Progress towards the completion of ZapSib-2 project
      combined with expectations of FFO adjusted net leverage
      trending towards 2x, which would lead to the Outlook being
      revised to Stable

   -- Sustained positive FCF leading to FFO net adjusted leverage
      at or below 1.5x through the cycle, which would lead to an
      upgrade

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

   -- Material deterioration in the company's cost position or in
      access to low-cost associated petroleum gas.

   -- Aggressive investments leading to inability to keep FFO
      adjusted net leverage well below 3x in 2017-2019 and below
      2x by 2020.

                             LIQUIDITY

Historically, SIBUR has had significant short-term debt
constituting 25%-35% of total debt, which is well above its cash
cushion.  However, SIBUR's continued access to undrawn committed
credit lines mitigates the liquidity gap.  At end-3Q15 SIBUR had
RUB84 billion of short-term debt maturities, which were covered
by RUB15 billion of cash and RUB151 billion long-term committed
credit lines. SIBUR's exposure to uncommitted credit lines (end-
3Q15: RUB106 billion), coupled with its proven long-term
relationships with state-owned banks, bolsters its liquidity
balance.


TRANSAERO AIRLINES: Repays RUB320-Mil. Debt to Vnukovo Airport
--------------------------------------------------------------
Polina Montag-Girmes at Air Transport World reports that Russia's
Transaero Airlines -- which ceased operations in October 2015 --
has paid RUB320 million (US$4.65 million) out of a RUB1.5 billion
debt to Moscow Vnukovo International Airport.

Vnukovo board chairman Vitaly Vancev said on April 5, the
payments were made in November, December, and January, ATW
discloses.

In February 2012, Transaero moved part of its operations from
Domodedovo to Vnukovo airport, where it transferred and launched
several European routes such as London, Rome, Milan, Venice and
Paris, ATW relates.

The airport has had stable growth over the past few years, but is
losing passengers after Transaero's bankruptcy last year, ATW
notes.

OJSC Transaero Airlines is a Russian airline with its head office
in Saint Petersburg.  It operates scheduled and charter flights
to 103 domestic and international destinations.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: Seeks Nasdaq Delisting as Part of Restructuring Plan
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that Abengoa SA says it is asking to
be delisted from the Nasdaq stock exchange as part of its debt-
restructuring plan.

According to the AP, Abengoa, which began bankruptcy protection
proceedings five months ago, is also seeking deregistration of
its shares from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Abengoa said in a statement on April 6 that in future, its shares
will be traded only on the Spanish stock exchange, the AP
relates.

The company, as cited by the AP, said the move aims to remove
administrative burdens and costs associated with being a U.S.
listed company and meeting SEC regulatory requirements.

                        About Abengoa S.A.

Spanish energy giant Abengoa S.A. is a leading engineering and
clean technology company with operations in more than 50
countries worldwide that provides innovative solutions for a
diverse range of customers in the energy and environmental
sectors.  Abengoa is one of the world's top builders of power
lines transporting energy across Latin America and a top
engineering and construction business, making massive renewable-
energy power plants worldwide.

As of the end of 2015, Abengoa, S.A. was the parent company of
687 other companies around the world, including 577 subsidiaries,
78 associates, 31 joint ventures, and 211 Spanish partnerships.
Additionally, the Abengoa Group held a number of other interests
of less than 20% in other entities.

On Nov. 25, 2015 in Spain, Abengoa S.A. announced its intention
to seek protection under Article 5bis of Spanish insolvency law,
a pre-insolvency statute that permits a company to enter into
negotiations with certain creditors for restricting of its
financial affairs.  The Spanish company is facing a March 28,
2016, deadline to agree on a viability plan or restructuring plan
with its banks and bondholders, without which it could be forced
to declare bankruptcy.

On March 16, 2016, Abengoa presented its Business Plan and
Financial Restructuring Plan in Madrid to all of its
stakeholders.

                       U.S. Bankruptcies

Abengoa, S.A., and 24 of its subsidiaries filed Chapter 15
petitions (Bankr. D. Del. Case Nos. 16-10754 to 16-10778) on
March 28, 2016, to seek U.S. recognition of its restructuring
proceedings in Spain.  Christopher Morris signed the petitions as
foreign representative.  DLA Piper LLP (US) represents the
Debtors as counsel.

Gavilon Grain, LLC, et al., on Feb. 1, 2016, filed an involuntary
Chapter 7 petition for Abengoa Bioenergy of Nebraska, LLC
("ABNE") and on Feb. 11, 2016, filed an involuntary Chapter 7
petition for Abengoa Bioenergy Company, LLC ("ABC").  ABC's
involuntary Chapter 7 case is Bankr. D. Kan. Case No. 16-20178.
ABNE's involuntary case is Bankr. D. Neb. Case No. 16-80141.  An
order for relief has not been entered, and no interim Chapter 7
trustee has been appointed in the Involuntary Cases.  The
petitioning creditors are represented by McGrath, North, Mullin &
Kratz, P.C.

On Feb. 24, 2016, Abengoa Bioenergy US Holding, LLC and 5 five
other U.S. units of Abengoa S.A., which collectively own,
operate, and/or service four ethanol plants in Ravenna, York,
Colwich, and Portales, each filed a voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri.  The cases are pending before the Honorable Kathy A.
Surratt-States and are jointly administered under Case No. 16-
41161.

Abeinsa Holding Inc., and 12 other affiliates, which are energy,
engineering and environmental companies and indirect subsidiaries
of Abengoa, filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions (Bankr. D. Del.
Proposed Lead Case No. 16-10790) on March 29, 2016.


IBERCAJA BANCO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Counterparty Credit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed the long- and short-
term counterparty credit ratings on Spain-based Ibercaja Banco
S.A. (Ibercaja) at 'BB' and 'B', respectively.  The outlook
remains positive.

S&P's ratings on Ibercaja continue to reflect the bank's solid
retail banking franchise in Northeastern Spain and conservative
management, as well as its better than average asset quality
indicators.  The bank's nonperforming assets stood at around
12.5% of gross loans and foreclosed real estate assets at end-
2015, with a coverage of problematic exposures of 48%.  In
addition, Ibercaja benefits from ample liquidity, resulting from
its retail banking focus and conservative management approach to
funding and liquidity.  Its liquid assets covered its short-term
wholesale funding 1.7x on Dec. 31, 2015.

Constraining the ratings on the bank are its weak capital (with
an estimated RAC ratio of 3.3%-3.8% as of Dec. 31, 2015), limited
financial flexibility, and modest earnings generation capacity.
Ibercaja is unlisted and its major shareholder is a banking
foundation with limited sources of additional wealth, which
constrains the bank's capital flexibility compared to listed
entities.

This is particularly relevant because Ibercaja's ability to
generate capital organically remains low.  Residential mortgages
represent 65% of its loan book, which renders the bank
particularly exposed to the current low-interest-rate
environment. S&P forecasts its return on equity to remain between
2.5% and 4.0% in 2016 and 2017.

However, Ibercaja is considering undertaking some capital
enhancing measures in the next 12-18 months in order to repay the
EUR407 million contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) subscribed by
the Spanish government.  S&P's total adjusted capital does not
include such CoCos, as S&P considers them to have minimal equity
content.  The CoCos are perpetual, but the government may convert
them into shares in 2018 -- or earlier if the bank is unlikely to
be able to redeem them. As such, Ibercaja amortized 5% of the
CoCos on March 31, 2016, and will likely redeem a further 40% in
March 2017 and the remaining 55% in December 2017.

S&P's positive outlook on Ibercaja reflects the possibility of an
upgrade if its capital position continues improving.  S&P
believes this is more likely to result from a more supportive
economic environment and potential non-organic capital
strengthening measures rather than from internal capital
generation.

Contrary to S&P's previous expectations, it now believes organic
earnings generation will not be enough by itself to drive an
improvement of Ibercaja's RAC ratio.  The bank's earnings
generation capacity remains limited in the current low-interest-
rate environment.  Capital enhancing measures that the bank is
considering include a capital increase ahead of, or at the same
time as, the listing of its shares in the market, as well as an
AT1 issue.  Furthermore, the bank could implement these measures
at a time when the economic risks faced by Spanish banks are
likely to ease.  S&P could therefore raise the ratings if S&P
concludes that Ibercaja will achieve a RAC ratio sustainably
above 4% over the next 12-18 months.

S&P's current outlook doesn't take into account the implications
for the bank's creditworthiness of its potential participation in
additional consolidation moves.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the bank proves unable
to strengthen its solvency.  This would occur if during S&P's
outlook horizon it fails to accomplish the non-organic capital
enhancing measures that it is considering, or if the improvement
in Spain's economic risk does not materialize.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


PROLETARY: Luhansk Court Opens Bankruptcy Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------
Ukrainian News Agency, citing an enterprise's statement in the
information disclosure system run by the National Commission for
Securities and Stock Market, reports that the Economic Court of
Luhansk Region on April 4 opened bankruptcy proceedings in
respect of Lysychansk-based Proletary glass factory, the largest
manufacturer of sheet glass.

Naftogaz of Ukraine national joint-stock company is an initiator,
Ukrainian News discloses.

Total creditor's claim is UAH27,151.685, Ukrainian News notes.

Oleksandr Viskunov has been appointed as a bankruptcy
commissioner, Ukrainian News relates.

Lysychansk-based Proletary glass factory reported loss of
UAH572.316 million for 2015, Ukrainian News recounts.

As of late 2015, the assets of Proletary made up UAH753.629
million, accounts receivable UAH14.348 million, and current
liabilities UAH1.443 billion, Ukrainian News notes.


RAIFFEISEN LEASING: Moody's Assigns Caa2 CFR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned first-time Caa2 Long-term
Issuer and Corporate Family Ratings to Raiffeisen Leasing Aval.
The outlook on the ratings is stable.  Concurrently, the rating
agency has affirmed the company's B2.ua National Scale Issuer and
Corporate Family Ratings.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Raiffiesen Leasing Aval's (RLA) ratings are driven by its very
weak standalone credit profile and very high level of support
from its parent Raiffeisen Bank Aval (caa3 BCA/Caa2 stable LC
deposit rating).  RLA is a highly integrated subsidiary of its
parent and operates as Raiffeisen Bank Aval's leasing division.
Almost all of the company's funding is provided by the parent
bank.  Therefore RLA's Caa2 ratings are in line with the local
currency deposit ratings of Raiffeisen Bank Aval.

RLA's very weak standalone credit profile is constrained by the
highly challenging operating environment in Ukraine, weak asset
quality, low liquidity cushion and lack of shareholders' equity
(the company is not required by regulations to maintain a minimum
capital ratio).

WHAT COULD MOVE RATINGS UP OR DOWN

RLAs ratings will likely move in tandem with the ratings
Raiffeisen Bank Aval.

                        PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Finance
Companies published in October 2015.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


PREMIERTEL PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Premiertel plc's CMBS notes as:

  GBP69.6 mil. Class A (XS0180245515) due May 2029: affirmed at
   'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

  GBP201.5 mil. Class B (XS0180245945) due May 2032: affirmed at
   'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

Premiertel plc is a securitization of a loan financing long-term
rental cash flows from a portfolio of five office properties
located throughout the UK (two in England, two in Scotland and
one in Northern Ireland) fully let to British Telecommunications
plc (BT; BBB+/Stable/F2).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of the class A notes reflects the stable
performance of the underlying real estate as well as the
available liquidity.  The class B notes (capped at BT's rating)
continue to accrue a shortfall against scheduled (deferrable)
principal payments in line with Fitch's expectations.

The source of the shortfall is the increase in transaction costs
due to fees related to the liquidity facility standby drawing.
Fitch does not expect this added cost to be recouped from rental
cash flow, leaving a portion of the class B notes at risk of
being unpaid at the expiry of the lease in 2032 (also legal
maturity). This exposes class B investors to risks associated
with the borrower's ability and willingness to refinance its
portfolio by that time (there is no tail period).

Fitch considers refinancing risk in relation to the sufficiency
of the sponsor's estimated future equity in the vacant possession
value (VPV) of the portfolio in the run up to bond maturity.
While any unpaid debt should be relatively minor (provided the
lease performs in full) reliance on unenforceable financial
incentives so far into the future together with the lack of
applicable liquidity support for the notes precludes an
investment grade rating for the class B notes.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

A weakening in property market conditions could cause a downgrade
of the class A notes by reducing VPV.  On the other hand, as long
as BT performs, the notes will deleverage further, which could
lead to an upgrade of the senior class.

As the rating of the class B notes is capped at BT's rating, a
severe enough reduction in the tenant's rating may lead to a
downgrade of the class B notes.  An upgrade of BT may lead to an
upgrade of the class B notes, subject to estimated future VPV of
the real estate providing sufficient debt coverage i.e.
commensurate with at least one category against the breakeven, as
per Fitch's loan rating methodology as described in its EMEA CMBS
criteria.

Fitch estimates 'Bsf' recovery proceeds of GBP322m.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

                           DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing.  The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


TATA STEEL: More Potential Buyers Emerge for Plants, Javid Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Mundy at The Financial Times reports that more than one
possible buyer has come forward for Tata Steel's UK plants, said
Sajid Javid, the business secretary, as he promised that
investment bankers would formally start the sales process by
April 11.

"A number of people have already started coming forward,"
Mr. Javid, as cited by the FT, said after talks in Mumbai with
Cyrus Mistry, Tata's chairman. "I think more will do so."

So far, only Liberty House, the commodities company founded by
Sanjeev Gupta, has publicly expressed interest in Tata Steel UK,
the FT relates.   Mr. Javid said he was unable to name anyone
else because their interest remained private, the FT notes.

According to the FT, Mr. Javid said the government could offer
help to any buyer, and that EU state aid rules would not be "a
problem at all".

But a person close to Tata said Mr. Javid had not made any
specific offers during his meeting with Mr. Mistry, the FT
relays.

According to The Telegraph's Alan Tovey, the feared collapse of
Britain's steel industry would damage local economies on a
similar scale to that of the end of the coal mining industry in
the 1980's.

New research suggests the closure of Tata Steel's Port Talbot
plant could leave a scar on employment in the community that
would last for decades and be similar in scale to the destruction
of the mining sector, The Telegraph discloses.

According to The Telegraph, research by the Institute for Public
Policy Research (IPPR), warned that if no buyer is found for
Tata's UK business -- which represents the bulk of Britain's
steel industry -- it could see unemployment in areas which rely
on the company rise significantly for at least 20 years.

The IPPR's research also warned that the collapse of Tata's UK
steel business -- which employs about 15,000 people directly but
supports at least 25,000 jobs --could leave the Government facing
a GBP4.6 billion bill, The Telegraph notes.

Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company.


VEDANTA RESOURCES: Moody's Says Buybacks Not Distressed Exchanges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Global diversified metals and mining company Vedanta Resources
plc's (B2 negative) announcement of the initiation of partial
buybacks of its convertible bond maturing July 2016 and senior
unsecured bond maturing June 2016 do not represent distressed
exchanges, Moody's Investors Service said.

Moody's conclusion is based on the consideration that the bonds
are currently trading at close to par value and investors are not
expected to incur any economic loss if they participate in these
buybacks.  More significantly, Moody's does not assess the
buybacks as instances of default avoidance.

On March 31, 2016, Vedanta announced that it had begun the
buyback of up to $148.6 million of its outstanding $743 million
6.75% bonds due in June 2016, currently trading at 98.75 cents;
and up to $200 million of the outstanding $582 million
convertible bonds due July 2016, trading at 99.75 cents.

Vedanta will finance the buybacks from: (1) cash on its balance
sheet; and (2) part repayment of an intercompany loan by one of
its subsidiaries.

Moody's specifies two conditions for a buyback to qualify as a
distressed exchange: (1) the buyback has the effect of allowing
the issuer to avoid default; and (2) as a result of the buyback,
creditors incur economic losses relative to the par value of the
bond.

At the same time, in this instance, the cumulative economic loss
to Vedanta's investors remains extremely low, and therefore
Moody's treats the proposed buybacks as opportunistic.

Following completion of the bond buybacks, Vedanta's balance of
debt maturities for fiscal 2017 -- which ends on March 31,
2017, -- will fall to $2.3 billion from $2.67 billion, and which
the company expects to repay out of fresh term loans, working
capital loans, the stretching of working capital, and the special
dividend from Hindustan Zinc Ltd (unrated).

In addition to the progress in addressing near-term refinancing
risk, Vedanta has also obtained relaxations on its covenants for
testing periods until September 2018.

Vedanta also has large debt maturities in fiscal 2018 of $2.7
billion and in fiscal 2019 of $4.3 billion.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Mining
Industry methodology published in August 2014.

Headquartered in London, Vedanta Resources plc is a diversified
resources company with interests mainly in India.  Its core
operations are held by Vedanta Ltd, a 62.9%-owned subsidiary
which produces zinc, lead, silver, aluminum, iron ore and power.

In December 2011, Vedanta acquired control of Cairn India Ltd
(CIL), an independent oil exploration and production company in
India. CIL is a 59.9%-owned subsidiary of Vedanta Ltd.  On
June 14, 2015, Vedanta Ltd announced the proposed merger of
Vedanta Ltd and CIL, in a cashless all stock transaction, subject
to approvals.  If the merger goes ahead as announced, Vedanta's
shareholding in Vedanta Ltd will fall to 50.1%.

Listed on the London Stock Exchange, Vedanta is 69.8% owned by
Volcan Investments Ltd.  For the year ended March 31, 2015,
Vedanta reported revenues of $12.9 billion and EBITDA of
$3.7 billion.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* S&P Takes Rating Actions on 8 European Synthetic CDO Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on April 6, 2016, took
various credit rating actions on eight European synthetic
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) tranches.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised and removed from CreditWatch positive its ratings on
      seven tranches; and

   -- Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch positive its rating
      on one tranche.

The rating actions are part of S&P's periodic review of various
European synthetic CDOs.  The actions reflect, among other
things, the effect of recent rating migration within reference
portfolios and recent credit events on referenced obligations.
S&P has used its SROC.

WHERE S&P HAS RAISED ITS RATINGS

S&P has raised its ratings on those tranches for which credit
enhancement is, in S&P's opinion, at a level commensurate with a
higher rating.

WHERE S&P HAS AFFIRMED ITS RATINGS

S&P has affirmed its ratings on those tranches for which credit
enhancement is, in S&P's opinion, still at a level commensurate
with their current ratings.

                              ANALYSIS

The rating actions follow the application of S&P's relevant
criteria.

S&P has used its CDO Evaluator model 6.3 to determine the amount
of net losses in each portfolio that S&P expects to occur in each
rating scenario.

S&P has also applied its top obligor and industry tests.

WHAT IS SROC?

One of the main steps in S&P's rating analysis is the review of
the credit quality of the portfolio referenced assets.  SROC is
one of the tools S&P uses when surveilling its ratings on
synthetic CDO tranches with reference portfolios.

SROC is a measure of the degree by which the credit enhancement
(or attachment point) of a tranche exceeds the stressed loss rate
assumed for a given rating scenario.  SROC helps capture what S&P
considers to be the major influences on portfolio performance:
Credit events, asset rating migration, asset amortization, and
time to maturity.  It is a comparable measure across different
tranches of the same rating.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://is.gd/3oWXt7



* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
-------------------------------------------
Author: Frank H. Knight
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 381 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Order your personal copy today at
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1587981262/internetbankrup
t

The tenets Frank H. Knight sets out in this, his first book,
have become an integral part of modern economic theory. Still
readable today, it was included as a classic in the 1998 Forbes
reading list. The book grew out of Knight's 1917 Cornell
University doctoral thesis, which took second prize in an essay
contest that year sponsored by Hart, Schaffner and Marx. In it,
he examined the relationship between knowledge on the part of
entrepreneurs and changes in the economy. He, quite famously,
distinguished between two types of change, risk and uncertainty,
defining risk as randomness with knowable probabilities and
uncertainty as randomness with unknowable probabilities. Risk,
he said, arises from repeated changes for which probabilities
can be calculated and insured against, such as the risk of fire.
Uncertainty arises from unpredictable changes in an economy,
such as resources, preferences, and knowledge, changes that
cannot be insured against. Uncertainty, he said "is one of the
fundamental facts of life."

One of the larger issues of Knight's time was how the
entrepreneur, the central figure in a free enterprise system,
earns profits in the face of competition. It was thought that
competition would reduce profits to zero across a sector because
any profits would attract more entrepreneurs into the sector and
increase supply, which would drive prices down, resulting in
competitive equilibrium and zero profit.

Knight argued that uncertainty itself may allow some
entrepreneurs to earn profits despite this equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs, he said, are forced to guess at their expected
total receipts. They cannot foresee the number of products they
will sell because of the unpredictability of consumer
preferences. Still, they must purchase product inputs, so they
base these purchases on the number of products they guess they
will sell. Finally, they have to guess the price at which their
products will sell. These factors are all uncertain and
impossible to know. Profits are earned when uncertainty yields
higher total receipts than forecasted total receipts. Thus,
Knight postulated, profits are merely due to luck. Such
entrepreneurs who "get lucky" will try to reproduce their
success, but will be unable to because their luck will eventually
turn.

At the time, some theorists were saying that when this luck runs
out, entrepreneurs will then rely on and substitute improved
decision making and management for their original
entrepreneurship, and the profits will return. Knight saw
entrepreneurs as poor managers, however, who will in time fail
against new and lucky entrepreneurs. He concluded that economic
change is a result of this constant interplay between new
entrepreneurial action and existing businesses hedging against
uncertainty by improving their internal organization.
Frank H. Knight has been called "among the most broad-ranging
and influential economists of the twentieth century" and "one of
the most eclectic economists and perhaps the deepest thinker and
scholar American economics has produced." He stands among the
giants of American economists that include Schumpeter and Viner.
His students included Nobel Laureates Milton Friedman, George
Stigler and James Buchanan, as well as Paul Samuelson. At the
University of Chicago, Knight specialized in the history of
economic thought. He revolutionized the economics department
there, becoming one the leaders of what has become known as the
Chicago School of Economics. Under his tutelage and guidance,
the University of Chicago became the bulwark against the more
interventionist and anti-market approaches followed elsewhere in
American economic thought. He died in 1972.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *