TCREUR_Public/160412.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, April 12, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 071



HETA ASSET: Investors to Meet with Carinthia's Lawyers Today


BELARUS: S&P Affirms B- Long-Term Sovereign Credit Rating

C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

CE ENERGY: Fitch Affirms Then Withdraws B+ Issuer Default Rating


CARLYLE GLOBAL: Fitch Assigns BB(EXP)sf Rating to Cl. D Debt


ITALY: Draws Up "Last Resort" Bailout Plan for Banking Sector
IVS GROUP: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws BB- Corp. Credit Rating
TEAMSYSTEM HOLDING: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws B- CCR


KAZAKH BANKS: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDRs of Four Institutions


KKR RETAIL: Moody's Changes Ratings Review Direction to Uncertain


BITE FINANCE: Moody's Withdraws B3 Corporate Family Rating
EMF-NL 2008-A: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to B-
METINVEST BV: Fitch Affirms C Rating on Outstanding Notes
NEW WORLD: Owners Seek Last-Ditch Meeting with Gov't Today
STORK TECHNICAL: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 Corporate Family Rating


BANK OTKRITIE: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
ENEL RUSSIA: Fitch Says Reftinskaya GRES Sale May Hurt Firm
EURASIA DRILLING: Fitch Affirms BB IDR, Outlook Negative
KROSSINVESTBANK JSCB: Placed Under Provisional Administration
RENAISSANCE FINANCIAL: Fitch Assigns B-(EXP) Rating to Sr. Bond

SNCO MAIMA: Placed Under Provisional Administration
TAMBOV REGION: Fitch Affirms BB+ LT Issuer Default Ratings
YAROSLAVL REGION: Fitch Affirms IDR at BB, Outlook Negative


SID BANKA: Moody's Withdraws b3 Baseline Credit Assessment Rating




MUNTERS AB: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms B CCR


UKRLANDFARMING PLC: S&P Lowers CCR to SD Then Suspends Rating

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

TATA STEEL: Agrees to Sell Scunthorpe Plant to Greybull Capital
TATA STEEL: Begins Sale Process for Remaining UK Operations



HETA ASSET: Investors to Meet with Carinthia's Lawyers Today
Alexander Weber and Boris Groendahl at Bloomberg News report that
investors in Heta Asset Resolution AG will meet lawyers for the
province of Carinthia to find a way out of the Austrian bad
bank's debt stalemate after it became a test case for a new
European Union law allowing losses to be shared with senior

Legal teams for bondholders and Carinthia, which guaranteed EUR11
billion (US$12.5 billion) of Heta's debt, will meet in London on
today, April 12, Bloomberg relays, citing the province's
governor, Peter Kaiser.  The talks come as the first cracks
appear in the united front of Heta's investors demanding full
repayment, Bloomberg notes.

"We have announced talks of a technical nature because we want to
signal that we're interested in an out-of-court solution with the
scope of what's possible for Carinthia and for Austria,"
Bloomberg quotes Mr. Kaiser as saying in an interview broadcast
on public radio station Oe1.

Austrian banking regulator Finanzmarktaufsicht on April 10 cut
Heta's senior liabilities by 54% and extended the maturities of
all eligible debt to Dec. 31, 2023, to help cover an EUR8 billion
hole in Heta's balance sheet, Bloomberg relates.

According to Bloomberg, creditors allied in a lock-up agreement,
who jointly own more than EUR5 billion of Heta's bonds, said in a
statement they're ready to enter negotiations in order to present
an offer structure that's "acceptable for all stakeholders."
They said the FMA's debt cut isn't a disadvantage because, in
their opinion, it allows creditors to assert their claims against
Carinthia, Bloomberg notes.

Heta Asset Resolution AG is a wind-down company owned by the
Republic of Austria.  Its statutory task is to dispose of the
non-performing portion of Hypo Alpe Adria, nationalized in 2009,
as effectively as possible while preserving value.


BELARUS: S&P Affirms B- Long-Term Sovereign Credit Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-' long-term
and 'B' short-term foreign- and local-currency sovereign credit
ratings on the Republic of Belarus.  The outlook is stable.


The affirmation reflects that S&P believes Belarus' very
vulnerable external position will continue to be balanced by
financial support from Russia or other official credit sources.
The ratings on Belarus are constrained by S&P's view of its low
institutional predictability and effectiveness, very weak
external position, and lack of monetary policy flexibility.  The
ratings are supported by its strong headline fiscal balances as
well as a strong track record of financial support from Russia.

The country's external financing risk remains its key
vulnerability.  Despite ongoing current account adjustment due to
a reduction in imports (which fell by almost 30% in 2015) on the
back of the Belarusian ruble depreciation, the country's
dependence on external financing is extremely high. Belarus'
gross external financing needs will likely account for a material
150% of current account receipts (CARs) plus usable reserves on
average in 2016-2019.  In addition to current account payments,
over one-third of external refinancing needs are accounted for by
external debt repayment, including that of the government.
Despite Russia's waiver of duties on refined oil products,
representing about 1.0%-1.5% of GDP (which Belarus previously
paid to Russia), S&P forecasts that, in the longer-term, economic
recovery and increasing consumption will likely widen current
account deficits to an average of 5.8% of GDP for 2017-2019 from
an average of 3.9% of GDP in 2015-2016.  Unless net foreign
direct investment increases significantly, this will keep
Belarus' external debt, net of financial and public sector
external assets (or narrow net external debt, our preferred
measure of external indebtedness), above the sum of its CARs in

S&P believes that Belarus' external funding gap in 2016 will
likely be covered by official loans and other credit, principally
from Russia.  The $2.0 billion financing facility from the
Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD; formerly
the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund, which is sourced through direct
charges to its members' budgets, principally Russia's) has been
approved and the first disbursement of $0.5 billion was allocated
to the government in late March 2016.  Another $0.6 billion will
come in the second half of 2016, provided the government meets
set performance indicators (such as containing wage and directed
lending growth, maintaining international reserves, etc.), which
the government finds feasible.  S&P regards this as evidence of
Russia's continued willingness to provide timely support to
Belarus.  In 2015, loans from the Russian Federation and a
Russian state-owned bank allowed Belarus to meet about one-half
of its external government debt repayment needs, including a $1
billion Eurobond.  In 2014, Russia provided a $2 billion official
loan to Belarus.

S&P understands Belarus has also applied for a $3 billion loan
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and expects to obtain
at least $1 billion in 2016.  S&P considers this funding option
as less certain, considering some of the fund's reform
requirements--such as material hikes in utility tariffs and
accelerated privatization--might be politically challenging.  In
case negotiations with the IMF take longer than planned, S&P
believes Belarus will likely use other sources of official and
quasi-official support (such as state-owned banks) from Russia or

In addition to official external funding, S&P expects the
government will continue its foreign currency borrowing from the
domestic market to meet its remaining borrowing requirements.
However, S&P notes that the local financial markets are shallow
and their appetite for U.S. dollar-denominated assets depends on
the availability of private sector foreign currency inflows.
Risks might also come from the National Bank of the Republic of
Belarus' (NBRB's, the central bank's) recent placements of
foreign-currency denominated bonds in domestic markets, which
might crowd out government borrowings.

In S&P's view, a combination of funding from the abovementioned
sources will enable Belarus to make timely government foreign
currency debt service in 2016, the majority of which (60%) is
concentrated in the first half of the year.  S&P also expects
this will allow Belarus to maintain its usable reserves, which
declined in 2015 and early 2016.  Of existing international
reserves, about $3.8 billion or approximately 40% is held in
gold.  S&P excludes from reserves about $0.2 billion in
outstanding foreign currency swaps that the NBRB has undertaken
with commercial banks.

On the fiscal side, the reported general government balance has
been relatively strong.  General government accounts have posted
moderate surpluses since 2011.  S&P expects the government will
continue to report surpluses, thanks to new export taxes, mainly
on potash and crude oil, as well as its track record of cost-
containment measures.  S&P also notes that the government has
more clearly formulated its debt-management policy, implementing
a framework that sets internal limits on government debt to GDP
at 45% and annual foreign currency debt service to international
reserves at 45%.

Despite solid headline fiscal performance, S&P expects government
debt will increase annually by 4% of GDP in nominal terms on
average through 2019, due to the depreciation of the Belarusian
ruble and the significant size of quasi-fiscal operations, such
as support for state-owned enterprises and state banks.  In 2015,
the government raised about $0.7 billion of domestic debt to
provide support to a number of state-owned enterprises (including
those in timber processing) to allow them to repay bank loans
obtained under government guarantees, increasing general
government debt as a percentage of GDP by 1.5 percentage points.

Further exchange rate weakening will, in S&P's view, push general
government debt, net of liquid assets, to 40% of GDP in 2016 from
an average of 27% in 2013-2015.  S&P incorporates into its
assessment fiscal vulnerabilities linked to about 90% of
government debt denominated in foreign currency, the relatively
short-term maturity profile (coming mostly from short-term
maturity of domestic bonds), and the contingent liabilities posed
by the state-dominated banking system and its directed lending

S&P thinks that the announced changes to monetary policy that are
being implemented, such as the shift to a more flexible exchange
rate, could to some extent increase the NBRB's room to respond to
domestic financial conditions.  However, annual inflation
averaged over 30% in 2011-2015, which weighs on S&P's assessment
of the NBRB's credibility and effectiveness.  In the context of
further currency depreciation and administrative price
liberalization, inflation is likely to stay in the double digits
in the next few years, following a modest decline to 13.5% in
2015 from 18.1% in 2014.  In addition, the high dollarization of
loans and deposits in the banking system weakens S&P's assessment
of Belarus' monetary policy transmission mechanisms.  The share
of dollar-denominated loans and deposits exceeded 65% of the
total at year-end 2015.  Lending in foreign currency heightens
the banking system's exposure to exchange-rate risk and will
likely increase the country's contingent liabilities,
particularly in light of continuous deterioration of asset

Belarus' economic growth prospects remain depressed.  The weak
external environment (chiefly the recessions in Russia and
Ukraine) and declining domestic purchasing power, as a result of
exchange-rate depreciation and high inflation, will result in a
real GDP decline of about 4% in 2016, in S&P's view.  So-far
modest progress on structural reforms will suppress GDP growth
rates in the longer term, with average growth rates likely
hovering at about 1.3% on average for 2017-2019.

President Alexander Lukashenko was re-elected in 2015 and remains
in control of all branches of power, in S&P's view.  The
president's administration is in charge of making all strategic
decisions and sets the policy agenda, whereas the government is a
technocratic body that implements decisions.  Thus, S&P detects
few checks and balances in Belarus' institutional arrangements.
Belarus also depends heavily on Russia for financial, economic,
and political support, which S&P finds carries attendant risks.
That said, Belarus' past policies have delivered some results, as
shown by its high ranking on the United Nation's Human
Development Index (50 out of 188 in 2015).


The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that over the next
year Belarus' external vulnerability will be counterbalanced by
continued financial support from Russia or other official credit

S&P could lower the ratings on Belarus if external financing were
not as forthcoming as S&P expect.  This could be the result of
Russia and its related financial institutions being less willing
to continue their financial support to Belarus, or the
government's failure to fulfill the lending conditionality
imposed by its lenders, including the agreed progress with its
economic adjustment program.  Negative rating actions could also
follow if the government loosened its fiscal stance, the economy
continued to contract, or further depreciation of the local
currency resulted in a sharp increase in general government debt
as percentage of GDP.

S&P could consider a positive rating action if it observed a
material reduction in Belarus' external financing risks, as
indicated by improved current account balances, lower external
financing needs, a sustained increase in foreign currency
reserves, or more secure long-term financing sources.  In this
regard, policies that result in improved economic competitiveness
and monetary policy flexibility could support higher ratings.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that debt assessment had deteriorated.  All
other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.


                                        To            From
Belarus (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency            B-/Stable/B   B-/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   B-            B-
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency            B-            B-

C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

CE ENERGY: Fitch Affirms Then Withdraws B+ Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Czech Republic-based holding company
CE Energy a.s.'s (CEE) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
'B+' with a Stable Outlook, and its EUR500 million 7% senior
secured notes due in 2021 at 'B+'/Recovery Rating 'RR4'. Fitch
has simultaneously withdrawn the ratings.


Fitch is withdrawing the ratings as CEE is undergoing
reorganization while its senior unsecured notes were recently
redeemed in full and cancelled. Accordingly, Fitch will no longer
provide ratings or analytical coverage for CEE.


Not applicable


CARLYLE GLOBAL: Fitch Assigns BB(EXP)sf Rating to Cl. D Debt
Fitch Ratings has assigned Carlyle Global Market Strategies Euro
CLO 2016-1 Designated Activity Company's notes the following
expected ratings:

Class A-1: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class A-2: 'AA+(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B: 'A(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class D: 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class S-1 subordinated notes: not rated
Class S-2 subordinated notes: not rated

Carlyle Global Market Strategies Euro CLO 2016-1 Designated
Activity Company is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). Net proceeds from the notes issue will be used to purchase
a EUR400 million portfolio of mostly European leveraged loans and
bonds. The portfolio is managed by CELF Advisors LLP. The
reinvestment period is scheduled to end in 2020.

The assignment of final ratings is contingent on the receipt of
documents conforming to information already received.

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch places the average credit quality of obligors in the
'B'/'B-' range. The agency has public ratings or credit opinions
on all of the obligors in the identified portfolio. The
covenanted maximum Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF)
for assigning expected ratings is 34. The WARF of the identified
portfolio is 28.3.

High Recovery Expectations
The portfolio will comprise of a minimum 90% senior secured
obligations. The covenanted minimum weighted average recovery
rate (WARR) for assigning expected ratings is 68.5%. The WARR of
the identified portfolio is 69.6%.

Diversified Asset Portfolio
The transaction contains a covenant that limits exposure to the
top 10 obligors in the portfolio. The asset manager has the
flexibility to switch between 18% and 20% maximum exposure to the
top 10 obligors, subject to a lower minimum WARR covenant of
67.5% in the former.

This ensures that the asset portfolio will not be exposed to
excessive obligor concentration.

Limited Interest Rate Risk Exposure
Between 0% and 5% of the portfolio can be invested in fixed-rate
assets, while the liabilities pay a floating-rate coupon. Fitch
modelled both 0% and 5% fixed-rate buckets and the rated notes
can withstand the interest rate mismatch associated with each

Documentation Amendments
The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation or noteholder approval. Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings. Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders
should be aware that the structure considers the confirmation to
be given if Fitch declines to comment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES (PENDING of final structure to be

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability would lead to a
downgrade of up to three notches for the rated notes. A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of
up to four notches for the rated notes.


All but one of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch. Fitch has relied on the practices of the
relevant Fitch groups to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


ITALY: Draws Up "Last Resort" Bailout Plan for Banking Sector
Rachel Sanderson at The Financial Times reports that Italy's
finance minister Pier Carlo Padoan has called a meeting in Rome
on April 11 with executives from Italy's largest financial
institutions to agree final details of a "last resort" bailout
plan for the banking sector.

Yet on the eve of that gathering, concerns remain as to whether
the plan will be sufficient to ringfence the weakest of Italy's
large banks, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, from contagion, the FT
relays, citing people involved in the talks.

Italian bank shares have lost almost half their value so far this
year amid investor worries over a EUR360 billion pile of
non-performing loans -- equivalent to about a fifth of GDP, the
FT discloses.  Lenders' profitability has been hit by a crippling
three-year recession, the FT relates.

According to the FT, the people involve said the plan being
worked on recalls the Sareb bad bank created in 2012 by the
Spanish government to deal with financial crisis in its smaller
cajas banks.

Although the details remain under discussion, it foresees the
establishment of a private vehicle that will include upwards of
EUR5 billion in equity contributions -- mostly from Italy's
banks, insurers and asset managers -- and then a larger debt
component, the FT discloses.  The fund will then mop up shares in
distressed lenders, the FT states.  A second vehicle will seek to
buy non-performing loans at market prices, according to the FT.

The Italian government can provide only limited financial backing
because of EU state aid rules and because it is already
struggling under a public debt load that amounts to 132.5% of
GDP, the FT notes.

IVS GROUP: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws BB- Corp. Credit Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'BB-' long-term corporate credit rating on Italy-based vending
machine company IVS Group SA.  Subsequently, S&P withdrew its
ratings on IVS and on its debt at the issuer's request.  The
outlook was stable at the time of withdrawal.

On April 1, 2016, IVS announced the successful early redemption
of the company's EUR250 million senior secured notes.  The
company's rated obligation has been satisfied and, as such, S&P
has withdrawn its rating at the issuer's request.

At the time of withdrawal, the rating on the group was supported
by IVS' leading position in Italy, improving EBITDA margins,
positive free operating cash flow generation compared to other
vending machine operators, and track record of deleveraging over
the last three years.

S&P's rating was constrained by the group's relatively small
operations, sensitivity to Italy's economic environment owing to
its lack of geographic diversity, and relatively high capital
expenditure needs compared with broader business services
companies.  S&P notes that ongoing legal proceedings by the
Italian Antitrust Authority could have potential reputation and
regulatory risk for the group's business.  S&P therefore revised
its assessment of IVS' management and governance to fair from

TEAMSYSTEM HOLDING: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws B- CCR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its 'B-'
long-term corporate credit rating on Italy-based software
services provider TeamSystem Holding SpA.  Subsequently, S&P
withdrew its ratings on TeamSystem and its debt, at the issuer's

On March 1, 2016, TeamSystem was acquired by Barolo Bidco SpA --
a company controlled by private equity funds affiliated with
Hellman & Friedman, which now owns a controlling interest of 77%.
The remainder is held by HG Capital with a 7% stake, and
TeamSystem Management, with a 15% stake.  The change in ownership
has triggered the agreement to repay the current outstanding
EUR430 million notes no later than May 31, 2016.

S&P understands from Barolo's management that it has entered into
an alternative committed financing arrangement of new debt and
will use part of the proceeds to fully refinance the current
EUR430 million bonds outstanding at TeamSystem.  S&P has not seen
the actual documentation and do not have further insights into
the new capital structure.

At the time of withdrawal, the group's rating was constrained by
TeamSystem's highly leveraged capital structure with S&P's
forecasted Standard & Poor's-adjusted leverage of 19.0x (about
9.0x excluding shareholder loans) before the new capital
structure was put in place.  It was also constrained by
TeamSystem's private equity ownership, relatively small size of
operations, and weaker geographic diversity.  The ratings were
supported by TeamSystem's leading market share in the small and
midsize enterprise and professional segments.  Other supportive
factors included the high barriers of entry to the industry due
to TeamSystem's unique value added reseller distribution model,
which helps protect strong market share, as well as low working
capital and capital expenditure needs.


KAZAKH BANKS: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDRs of Four Institutions
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term IDRs of JSC SB Alfa Bank
Kazakhstan (ABK) at 'B+', AsiaCredit Bank JSC (ACB) at 'B', Bank
of Astana JSC (BoA) at 'B' and Eximbank Kazakhstan (Exim) at 'B'.
Fitch has revised the Outlooks on ACB and Exim to Negative from
Stable. The Outlooks on ABK and BoA are Stable.


The affirmation of the banks' IDRs, which are driven by their
VRs, reflects Fitch's view that the risks from the slowdown of
the cyclical domestic economy have largely been factored into the
banks' relatively low rating levels, which also reflect the
banks' narrow franchises, high balance sheet concentrations,
vulnerable asset quality and moderate capital buffers.

The Stable Outlooks on ABK and BoA reflect the so far moderate
deterioration of asset quality and some resilience to potential
worsening in the future due to the banks' still positive core
profitability and decent capital buffers (each of these more
robust at ABK).

The revision of ACB's and Exim's Outlooks to Negative reflects
their more vulnerable credit profiles due to greater asset
quality deterioration and weaker core profitability, while
capitalization is undermined by significant volumes of risky


ABK's non-performing loans (NPLs, 90 days overdue) were a
moderate 6.5% of end-2015 gross loans, only slightly up from 5.4%
at end-2014. These were sufficiently 1.3x covered by loan
impairment reserves (LIRs). However, restructured loans also went
up to 10.3% at end-2015, although these are reportedly
performing. Positively, ABK reported exposure lower than its
peers to foreign currency lending (19% of gross loans at end-

Loan concentration was high, with the top 20 exposures making up
60% of corporate loans at end-2015. The quality of ABK's largest
exposures is generally adequate, although of some risk are two
large tenge-denominated loans (in Fitch's view, issued on non-
market terms) for 0.7x of FCC. However, the exposures are backed
by FX-deposits, limiting credit risk. Also, there is a KZT6
billion (0.1x of FCC) receivable related to a portfolio of retail
loans purchased from ABK in 2015-2014. Fitch assesses this
receivable to be at least partially problematic, reflecting the
generally weaker quality of the sold loans compared to the rest
of ABK's book.

ABK's capitalization has improved, with a FCC ratio of 14% and
Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio of 14% (minimum 7%) at end-2015,
up from 10% and 9% at end-2014. This was mainly due to
significant net profit of KZT20.6 billion (or 60% of average
equity), which was largely due to one-off gains from devaluation.
However, even adjusting for these, core pre-impairment profit was
still a solid 7.5% of average loans, providing strong additional
loss-absorption capacity.

Liquidity remains comfortable with liquid assets, including cash,
short-term bank placements and unencumbered repo-able securities,
covering a reasonable 23% of customer deposits at end-1Q16.
However, the depositor concentration level is high (the top 20
made up 51% of customer funding at end-2015), making the bank
vulnerable to sudden outflows of the largest accounts. Repayments
of wholesale debt in 2016 are not significant.

ACB's NPLs increased to a high 17.4% of total loans at end-2015
from 9.7% at end-2014, mainly driven by six defaults among 25
largest borrowers. At end-1Q16, the bank had managed to reduce
its NPLs to a more moderate 9.4%. However, judging by the share
of accrued but not received interest income (24% in 2015), Fitch
believes the real level of problem loans, including NPLs and
restructured, is probably over 20% of gross loans. Therefore we
consider ACB's LIRs of 5% of gross loans at end-1Q16 as low.

Further credit risks stem from high single-name concentrations
(the 25 largest exposures accounted for a high 49% of gross loans
or 2.6x FCC at end-2015). Fitch assesses that half of the top 25
exposures are of high risk with notable accrued interest (11% on
average) and long (three to four years) maturities. Positively,
ACB's share of foreign-currency loans is one of the lowest among
Fitch-rated Kazakh banks at 15% of gross loans at end-2015, which
would limit the potential negative effect of exchange rate swings
on the bank's metrics.

ACB reported a high KZT4.1 billion of net profit in 2015 (17% of
average equity), but excluding one-off FX gains (KZT7.3 billion)
and non-recurring expenses (KZT2.7 billion) it would have been a
net loss of KZT0.4 billion. Pre-impairment profit net of these
one-off gains and accrued but not received interest was a modest
1% of average gross loans limiting the bank's ability to absorb
losses through the income statement.

The capital buffer is also modest (FCC ratio of 13.6% and
regulatory Tier 1 ratio of 13.9%) in the context of high
unreserved NPLs (0.7x FCC at end-2015).

The funding base is concentrated (the 20 largest depositors made
up 56% of total customer funding, and 60% of that amount was
provided by state-related entities). ACB maintains a considerable
liquidity cushion sufficient to cover about 45% of customer
funding at end-2M16 after accounting for 2016 cash needs.

At end-2015, BOA's NPLs stood at around 5% of gross loans and
were 1.2x covered by reserves. However, restructured loans were a
high 19% of gross loans at end-2015, which are weakly reserved,
but reportedly performing.

The corporate loan book is highly concentrated, with the 20
largest exposures comprising around 62% of gross corporate loans
(2.8x Tier 1 regulatory capital) at end-2015. The riskier ones
are those issued for project finance and construction purposes
(at least 23% of gross loans or 1.3x Tier 1 regulatory capital)
and loans to collectors (4.3% of gross loans or 26% of Tier 1
regulatory capital).

BoA's capitalization is reasonable, with Tier 1 and total
regulatory capital ratios of 10.7% and 13.9%, respectively, at
end-2015, down from 14.7% (Tier 1 and total) at end-1H15
following 70% growth of the bank's risk-weighted assets in 2H15.
This would allow the bank to increase its LIR by around 7.5%, to
13.0% of gross loans before it breaches minimum capitalization
ratios. BoA's capitalization is undermined by its high loan book
concentrations and significant share of high risk loans.

BoA's profitability is moderate, with 1.1% ROAA and 7.7% ROAE in

Fitch views the bank's liquidity as moderate due to high
concentrations of its deposit base. BoA's customer funding
concentration has decreased, but remains substantial. The 20
largest customers provided around 57% of customer funding or
around 41% of liabilities at end-2015. At end-2015 BoA's total
available liquidity covered around 22% of its customer accounts

Exim is a part of a broader business of its shareholders, who are
also majority owners of one of the largest private electricity
companies in Kazakhstan, Central-Asian Electric-Power Corporation
(CAEPCo, BB-/Negative). Fitch does not explicitly factor in
support from CAEPCo into Exim's ratings, but the bank's credit
profile benefits from the shareholder's ability to originate
business for the bank on both sides of its balance sheet.

Exim's NPLs were low, at 3% of gross loans, at end-2015. However
its asset quality is still assessed as weak in light of massive
restructured loans of 56% of gross loans (up from 45% at end-
2014). Reserves covered only 34% (end-2014: 46%) of NPLs and
restructured loans, while the unreserved part was equal to a high
2.2x of FCC (1.2x) at end-2015.

Additionally, Fitch estimates that at least 9.1% of Exim's end-
2015 gross corporate book (49% of FCC) was high risk exposures
(not yet overdue or restructured), mainly extended to companies
related to the energy business or construction projects. Also,
around 20% of Exim's gross loans were foreign currency-
denominated, of which technically performing loans (neither NPLs
nor restructured) made 8% of gross loans presenting a further
downside risk. Asset quality weakness is further highlighted by
Exim having by far the highest accrued interest-to-gross loans
ratio in the system, at 37.5% at end-2015 (up by 2.8ppts in 2014)
as opposed to 7.1% for the system.

Profitability is weak with ROAA and ROAE for 2015 of 0.5% and
2.5% respectively. Fitch estimates that on a cash basis the bank
has been loss-making for several years in a row. The already weak
cash-generating ability of Exim's loan book is further aggravated
by the notably heightened macro headwinds, including potential
cuts in state spending on infrastructure development projects and
notably declined consumer spending including that for real estate
(two areas to which Exim is exposed the most).

Capitalization ratios are relatively high (Basel Tier 1 and total
were 21.1% and 24.9%, respectively, at end-2015), but this is to
a high extent a reflection of the under-provisioned loan book. At
end-2015 Exim could reserve an additional 13% of its gross loans
(up to 33%) before breaching the minimum regulatory capital
adequacy requirements, although this would only cover one third
of unreserved problem loans.

Exim is predominantly funded by corporate customer accounts, of
which at least 32% are from shareholders' companies and a further
12.5% are deposits serving as collateral for certain loans - both
of these funding sources are fairly stable. The liquidity buffer
covered a reasonable 28% of non-related customer accounts at end-

The Support Rating of '4' reflects Fitch's view of the limited
probability of support that might be forthcoming from Alfa Bank
Russia (ABR, BB+/Negative) and/or other group entities, if
needed. In Fitch's view, support may be forthcoming in light of
the common branding, potential reputational risk of any default
at ABK and the small cost of any support that may be required.

At the same time, Fitch views ABR's propensity to provide support
as limited because (i) it holds shares in ABK on behalf of ABH
Holdings S.A.(ABHH), to which it has ceded control and voting
rights through a call option, under which ABHH may acquire 100%
of ABK from ABH Financial Limited (entity controlling 100% of
ABR) until end-December 2016; (ii) limited operational
integration between ABK and ABR; and (iii) ABR's tight regulatory
capital preventing it from providing capital to the subsidiary.

Support from other Alfa Group entities, in Fitch's view, also
cannot always be relied on due to ABK's small size. As a result,
support could be withheld under certain circumstances, especially
in a systemic financial crisis in Kazakhstan. Fitch notes ABHH's
failure to provide full support to its Ukraine-based subsidiary
PJSC Alfa-Bank (ABU; CCC) in 2008. However, the agency believes
there is a lower probability of Alfa Group not supporting ABK,
relative to ABU. This is reflected in ABK's higher Support Rating
'4' compared with ABU's of '5'.

ACB, BoA, Exim
The banks' Support Ratings of '5' reflect Fitch's view that
support from the banks' private shareholders, although possible,
cannot be reliably assessed. The Support Rating Floors of 'No
Floor' are based on the banks' low systemic importance.

The banks' senior unsecured local debt ratings are aligned with
their Long-term local currency IDRs and National Long-term
ratings and reflect Fitch's assessment that recoveries are likely
to be average in the event of any default.


Upside potential is limited given the difficult operating
environment, but the ratings could benefit from strengthening of
franchises, while maintaining reasonable asset quality and
performance. Downgrades could result from a substantial
deterioration of asset quality and/or capitalization if that is
not offset by sufficient and timely equity support from the
banks' shareholders.

ACB, Exim
A further deterioration of asset quality and/or capital
erosion/weakening will result in downgrades. However,
stabilization/improvement of asset quality and core profitability
could help to stabilize ratings at the current levels.

The rating actions are as follows:

Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook Stable
National Long-term rating affirmed at 'BBB(kaz)'; Outlook Stable
Viability Rating affirmed at 'b+'
Support Rating affirmed at '4'
Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'B+', Recovery Rating 'RR4'
National senior unsecured debt rating: affirmed at 'BBB(kaz)'

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook revised
to Negative from Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook revised to
Negative from Stable
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'BB(kaz)'; Outlook revised
to Negative from Stable
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'B', Recovery Rating 'RR4'
National senior unsecured debt rating: affirmed at 'BB(kaz)'

Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B',
Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'
National Long Term Rating: affirmed at 'BB(kaz) ', Outlook Stable
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B-',
Outlook revised to Negative from Stable
Short-term foreign-currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'B+(kaz) '; Outlook
revised to Negative from Stable
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior unsecured debt ratings: affirmed at 'B-/B+(kaz)'; Recovery
Rating at 'RR4'


KKR RETAIL: Moody's Changes Ratings Review Direction to Uncertain
Moody's Investors Service changed the direction of the ratings
review of KKR Retail Partners Midco S.a.r.l (SMCP) to uncertain
from review for upgrade. The ratings affected are the B2
corporate family rating (CFR), B1-PD probability of default
rating (PDR) and the the B3 instrument rating on the EUR290
million senior secured notes due 2020 issued by SMCP S.A.S --

The ratings change follows the announcement on March 31 that an
exclusivity agreement has been entered into for a proposed
transaction under which Chinese textile manufacturer Shandong
Ruyi Technology Group will become the majority owner of SMCP.
Existing majority owner, private equity firm KKR, and the
company's management will retain minority stakes.


Today's action reflects Moody's view that completion of the
planned transaction could lead to either an upgrade, downgrade or
affirmation of the company's B2 CFR, depending on how the
transaction affects the company's capital structure and, in turn,
its business and credit profile. In addition to a full evaluation
of the impact of the transaction on SMCP's capital structure,
Moody's review will evaluate the company's new ownership
structure, financial policies and strategic objectives.

In the company's press release last week SMCP confirmed it will
continue to expand in geographies where its brands have an
existing presence and potential for further growth including
Europe, North America, Middle East and in particular Asia, where
they would benefit from Shandong Ruyi Group's experience.

The rating agency placed SMCP's B2 CFR on review for upgrade in
March 2016 following the announcement that it had filed a
document de base with the French Financial Markets Authority, as
a first formal step towards a potential initial public offering
(IPO) of shares on the Euronext Paris stock market. The decision
to place the ratings on review for upgrade followed the company's
plans to use proceeds from a potential IPO to reduce outstanding

Prior to the review for upgrade, the rating agency revised the
outlook on SMCP's ratings to positive from stable in December
2015, recognizing the strong growth in the company's
profitability driven by a combination of solid like-for-like
sales and ongoing significant roll-out of additional points of
sales, particularly outside SMCP's French domestic base. At that
time Moody's highlighted the ratings could be upgraded if,
alongside sustained positive operational performance, adjusted
debt/EBITDA fell comfortably below 4x and adjusted EBIT/interest
expense approached 2.5x. Conversely, the ratings could encounter
downward pressure if operational performance were to weaken,
execution were to be poor and adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio above
5.5x beyond 2015.


BITE FINANCE: Moody's Withdraws B3 Corporate Family Rating
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Bite Finance
International B.V.'s (Bite) B3 Corporate Family Rating (CFR) and
B3-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR).


Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

Incorporated in the Netherlands, Bite Finance International B.V.
(Bite) is the holding company of Bite Lietuva UAB and Bite Latvia
SIA, mobile operators in Lithuania and Latvia, respectively. For
the 12-month period ended September 2015, Bite reported revenues
of EUR181.5 million and EBITDA of EUR51.7 million. Bite is owned
by funds affiliated with Providence Equity Partners, which
acquired the company from private equity firm Mid Europa Partners
LLP in February 2016.

EMF-NL 2008-A: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to B-
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in EMF-NL 2008-2 B.V. and EMF-NL Prime 2008-A B.V.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised its ratings on EMF-NL 2008-2's class A1, A2, and B
      notes, and EMF-NL Prime 2008-A's class A2 and A3 notes;

   -- Affirmed its ratings on EMF-NL 2008-2's class C and D
      notes, and EMF-NL Prime 2008-A's class C and D notes; and

   -- Lowered its rating on EMF-NL Prime 2008-A's class B notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Dutch residential
mortgage-backed securities (Dutch RMBS criteria), it placed those
ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria

Following S&P's review of these transactions, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transactions and the application of its Dutch RMBS criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the current outlook for the Dutch residential
mortgage and real estate market is benign.  The generally
favorable economic conditions support S&P's view that the
performance of Dutch RMBS collateral pools will remain stable in
2016.  Given S&P's outlook on the Dutch economy, it considers the
base-case expected losses of 0.5% at the 'B' rating level for an
archetypical pool of Dutch mortgage loans, and the other
assumptions in S&P's Dutch RMBS criteria, to be appropriate.

The collateral performance in both transactions has stabilized
since S&P's previous review.  The number of arrears of more than
six months, for which borrowers have not fully paid their
scheduled mortgage payments in their previous three payments, has
decreased to 4.9% and 6.3% from 7.5% and 9.4% in EMF-NL 2008-2
and EMF-NL Prime 2008-A, respectively.  That said, S&P has
excluded these loans from its analysis of the collateral pools
and assumed a 50% recovery to be realized after 18 months in EMF-
NL 2008-2 and a 40% recovery to be realized after 18 months in
EMF-NL Prime 2008-A.  As most of the borrowers for these loans
have not been current or paying full mortgage payments for an
extended period of time, S&P believes they will not provide
immediate cash flow credit to these transactions until recovery.

After applying S&P's Dutch RMBS criteria to these transactions,
its credit analysis results show a decrease in the weighted-
average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and an increase in the
weighted-average loss severity (WALS) for each rating level
compared with those at closing.

EMF-NL 2008-2

Rating      WAFF     WALS
level        (%)      (%)
AAA        43.71    54.27
AA         32.62    51.03
A          25.98    44.55
BBB        18.83    40.83
BB         11.73    38.10
B           9.40    35.49

EMF-NL Prime 2008-A

Rating      WAFF     WALS
level        (%)      (%)
AAA        24.20    53.10
AA         17.80    49.74
A          13.92    42.99
BBB        10.12    39.06
BB          6.57    36.15
B           5.34    33.38

The decrease in the WAFF is primarily due to the higher seasoning
credit for performing loans greater than six years that S&P
applies under its Dutch RMBS criteria and the use of original
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios in the WAFF calculation (as opposed to
current LTV ratios).

The increase in the WALS is mainly due to the application of
S&P's updated market value decline assumptions, which are higher
under S&P's updated criteria.

Both transactions no longer benefit from a liquidity facility,
with the reserve funds providing the only source of external
liquidity support to the structures.  Due to the increase in
cumulative losses since S&P's previous review, as of January
2016, the reserve fund has reduced to EUR5.6 million from EUR8.3
million in EMF-NL 2008-2 and the principal deficiency ledger for
EMF-NL Prime 2008-A's class D notes has increased to EUR4.8
million from EUR1.2 million.  The deterioration in available
external liquidity support has negatively affected EMF-NL Prime
2008-A's class B notes.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'B- (sf)'
from 'B (sf)' its rating on this class of notes.

In addition, S&P's credit and cash flow analysis continues to
indicate that the liquidity support available for the class C and
D notes in both transactions is not commensurate with the
stresses that S&P applies at the 'B' rating level.  Consequently,
S&P has affirmed its 'B- (sf)' ratings on the class C notes and
its 'CCC (sf)' ratings on the class D notes in both transactions.

Despite the deterioration in available external liquidity
support, the lower WAFFs generated under the updated criteria
have resulted in a decrease in the liquidity stresses applied in
S&P's cash flow analysis.  This has mostly benefitted the senior
notes in both transactions due to their positions in the payments
waterfall. Consequently, S&P has raised its ratings on EMF NL
2008-2's class A1, A2, and B notes, and S&P's ratings on EMF-NL
Prime 2008-A's class A2 and A3 notes.

EMF-NL 2008-2 and EMF-NL Prime 2008-A are backed by pools of
nonconforming Dutch residential mortgages originated by ELQ
Hypotheken N.V.


Class              Rating
          To                  From

EMF-NL 2008-2 B.V.
EUR285.1 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A1        BBB+ (sf)           BBB (sf)
A2        BBB (sf)            BB+ (sf)
B         BB (sf)             B+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C         B- (sf)
D         CCC (sf)

EMF-NL Prime 2008-A B.V.
EUR200 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A2        BB (sf)             BB- (sf)
A3        BB (sf)             BB- (sf)

Rating Lowered

B         B- (sf)             B (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C         B- (sf)
D         CCC (sf)

METINVEST BV: Fitch Affirms C Rating on Outstanding Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ukraine-based metals group Metinvest
B.V.'s (Metinvest) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD'
(Restricted Default). The company's outstanding notes have been
affirmed at 'C'/Recovery Rating 'RR6'.

"The ratings have been affirmed pending the outcome of current
negotiations between the company and its creditor groups
regarding a comprehensive debt restructuring plan. The current
scheme of arrangement approved in January 2016 provides for a
moratorium on creditors taking enforcement action before
May 27, 2016. While we understand from management that the broad
parameters of a restructuring plan have been agreed with
creditors there is no certainty that an agreement will be
finalized by the expiry of the current agreement, raising the
possibility of an extension to the current agreement."

Scheme of Arrangement Agreed
Key terms under the existing scheme of arrangement include that
the outstanding Eurobonds and Pre-Export Finance (PXF) loans be
combined into two new instruments on a par basis. That two
separate groups are maintained reflects differences in applicable
interest rates and security.

Capex will be limited to $US28 million per month with unspent
capex to be carried forward to subsequent periods. Metinvest also
agreed to pay 30% of accrued interest on the outstanding bonds
and PXF facilities accrued prior to January 31, 2016 and 30% of
interest accrued up to the scheme termination date of May 27,
2016. In addition, Metinvest agreed to pay an additional amount
of accrued interest if unrestricted cash is above $US180 million.
The remaining accrued but unpaid interest is to be capitalized.
To date Metinvest has made all scheduled payments in respect of
interest due up to but excluding 15 March 2016. Dividend and
principal repayments will not be made under the scheme. The
company has also recently confirmed the subordination (turnover
subordination) of shareholder loans and the granting of new or
amended/restated suretyships from Ilyich Steel in favor of PXF
lenders and the Notes Trustee.

No Operational Improvement
Under the terms of the scheme of arrangement Metinvest has
commenced reporting financial and operational performance on a
monthly basis. Latest results for December 2015 and January 2016
indicate no stabilization in operational performance, with
overall revenue continuing to fall and group EBITDA remaining
negative. The group continues to burn cash with reported cash and
equivalents of $US138 million as at January 31, 2016. At present
the group is holding back capex ($US15 million in January 2016
compared with $US32 million in December 2015) to limit cash burn.

Damaged Operations Reduce Cash Generation
Military actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions continue to
severely impact the company's main metallurgical and coal assets
and the regional transport infrastructure. The company's Ilyich
Steel and Azovstal steel plants (77% of total crude steel
production in 9M2015) are located close to the conflict zone and
decreased their steel production by 30% and 8% y-o-y respectively
in 9M2015, while the Yenakiieve steel plant (23% of total crude
steel production in 9M2015) is located in the conflict zone, and
decreased its production by 22% y-o-y.

The Avdiivka coke-processing plant was damaged several times
since August 2014, causing total coke production volume to fall
by 33% yoy in 9M15. The company's iron ore mining activities are
operating normally. Supplies of coking coal are dependent on
third-party supplies, as one of the group's coal companies --
Krasnodon Coal -- significantly decreased delivery of its
production to the processing coke facilities due to the damaged
rail infrastructure.

Exposure to Ukraine

The rating reflects the exposure of Metinvest to Ukraine as the
source of raw materials, the location of its major plants, and as
a key end-market for its products. It also reflects high exposure
to geopolitical risks in the Donbas region, where the company's
main assets are located, generating significant risk of further
operational disruption. Metinvest, as with other Ukrainian
corporates, does not have access to international markets for
refinancing of upcoming maturities and can only rely on its
internally generated cash flows.


Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for Metinvest

-- Fitch iron ore price deck: $US45/t in 2016 and 2017, $US50/t
    in 2018 and in the long term
-- $US/UAH 25 in 2015
-- Production volumes in line with 2015 results
-- No dividends payments
-- Capex of $US300 million in 2015 and $US320 million in 2016


Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

-- Metinvest entering into bankruptcy filings, administration,
    receivership, liquidation or other formal winding-up

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

-- Successful financial restructuring, which will lead to 'RD'
    rating being revised to reflect the appropriate IDR for the
    issuer's post-exchange capital structure, risk profile and
    prospects in accordance with Fitch's relevant criteria.


As of January 31, 2016, Metinvest had $US121 million unrestricted
cash, significantly less than the $US300 million it considers
appropriate in the ordinary course of its business, and $US2.9
billion outstanding current debt, of which $US247m as of 8
January 2016 are trade finance facilities.

The company's operations are reliant on the existence of those
trade finance facilities as they are the company's main source of
the working capital financing. These lines are not committed;
hence Metinvest is exposed to a significant risk of a further
decrease in limits or additional drawing restrictions imposed by
its trade finance banks, as many of them have done over 2014 and
2015 by withdrawing their facilities, reducing the outstanding
amount by $US665 million since 2013.

Absent the successful debt restructuring plan to be agreed by
May 27, 2016 at the end of the standstill/moratorium periods, or
an extension of the standstill/moratorium, the company would be
forced to file for bankruptcy and would be likely to lose all its
trade finance lines. This would have a significant impact on the
company's ability to maintain its business operations. On
January 11, 2016 Metinvest had $US637m current outstanding
payment defaults under its PXF facilities and is liable to repay
another $US140m between January and May 2016.


Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'RD'
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'RD'
Senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'C'/'RR6'
Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'RD'
Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'RD'
National Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'RD(ukr)'
National Short-term Rating: affirmed at 'RD(ukr)'

NEW WORLD: Owners Seek Last-Ditch Meeting with Gov't Today
Ladka Mortkowitz Bauerova at Bloomberg News reports that the
owners of New World Resources Plc are pushing for a last-ditch
meeting with Finance Minister Andrej Babis today, April 12, as
they seek to avoid a bankruptcy that would leave 13,000 miners

Ad Hoc Group, NWR creditors including Ashmore Investment
Management Ltd. that assumed control of the troubled company in
February after the exit of its founder Zdenek Bakala, needs to
reach an agreement with the government on the company's
restructuring by April 13 to avoid default, Bloomberg relays,
citing group spokesman Roman Parik.

The company is facing default less than two years after it
restructured its debt and received a cash injection from
investors, Bloomberg discloses.  Like many European peers, the
company fell victim to the unprecedented slump in commodity
prices, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, David Marek, chief economist at Deloitte
LLP's Czech unit, said failure to reach a deal with the
government would lead to bankruptcy, putting 13,000 miners and
8,000 affiliated workers out of work in the eastern region of
Moravia-Silesia, which has the nation's second-highest
unemployment rate.

New World Resources Plc is the largest Czech producer of coking

STORK TECHNICAL: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 Corporate Family Rating
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Stork Technical Services
Group B.V.'s (Stork) Caa1 corporate family rating (CFR) and Caa1-
PD probability of default rating as well as the stable outlook.
Moody's also withdrew Stork Technical Services HOLDCO B.V.'s Caa2
senior secured EUR273m million notes rating and stable outlook on
March 17, 2016, the date of redemption.


Moody's has withdrawn the ratings following the closing of
Stork's acquisition by Fluor Corporation (A3 stable) and full
refinancing in March 2016 which resulted in repayment of the
company's existing bonds.

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.

Stork is a provider of asset integrity services to the oil and
gas, chemical and refining, and power sectors.


BANK OTKRITIE: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Bank Otkritie Financial
Co. (Bank OFC) and the 'B+/B' long- and short-term counterparty
credit ratings on Bank OFC's subsidiary, Khanty-Mansiysk Bank
Otkritie (KhMBO).  The outlooks on the long-term ratings on both
banks are negative.  S&P also affirmed its Russia national scale
ratings on Bank OFC at 'ruAA-' and on KhMBO at 'ruA'.

At the same time, S&P removed all the ratings from CreditWatch
with negative implications, where S&P had placed them on Feb. 24,

"Contrary to our previous expectations, we now think that
Otkritie Holding will proceed with financial rehabilitation of
Bank Trust on a stand-alone basis and not merge it with other
banks within the group within the next 12-18 months.  We
consequently factor into our ratings on Bank OFC and its
subsidiaries that they are insulated from our 'b' assessment of
the group credit profile (GCP) of Otkritie Holding, Bank OFC's
ultimate parent.  We base this on our view that Bank OFC's credit
standing is somewhat protected from the potential negative impact
that could result from Otkritie Holding's other activities,
including Bank Trust's financial rehabilitation," S&P said.

"In our opinion, the effects of potential weakening in Otkritie
Holding's credit quality on Bank OFC's credit profile will be
limited in the short to medium term.  We consider that the amount
of financial support Bank OFC and its subsidiaries might extend
to other members of the Otkritie Holding group will be modest.
This is because Bank OFC is a regulated bank, and Russia's
prudential regulations limit exposure to related parties to 25%
of its regulatory capital (20% starting from 2017).  Moreover, we
anticipate that the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) would likely
interfere, if needed, to limit financial support from Bank OFC to
Otkritie Holding if it observed a possible negative impact on the
bank's credit standing.  Bank OFC and KhMBO together account for
a sizable domestic market share exceeding 4% based on total
assets, play an important role in interbank transactions, and
service a significant number of corporate and retail clients.
This has led the CBR to assign Bank OFC the status of
systemically important bank," S&P said.

Most transactions between Bank OFC and other entities of the
Otkritie Holding group are repurchase (repo) deals with liquid
securities as collateral.  S&P also understands that, according
to the terms of the subordinated loans provided to Bank OFC by
the Russian government via the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA),
the bank's dividend pay-out ratio is capped at 25% of net income,
unless the bank receives DIA's prior approval for an increase.

S&P continues to access Bank OFCs capital and earnings as weak.
S&P's view balances our projected risk-adjusted capital ratio of
5.2%-5.6% for the bank over the next 12-18 months with a high
volume of double leverage at the Otkritie Holding level (at least
150%) and the weaker quality of Bank OFC's capital relative to
peers', which is due to its higher share of hybrid instruments in
total adjusted capital.  In S&P's forecast, it assumes a slow
recovery in the net interest margin to 2.1% by 2017 from 1.8% in
2015.  S&P foresees that the gradual repricing of liabilities and
the pick-up in commissions will be balanced by cost of risk of
about 4.4% in 2016 and 3.5% in 2017.  Overall, S&P expects Bank
OFC's return on equity will remain in the range of 4%-7% in 2016-

"We note that according to public statements of Otkritie Holding
group's major shareholder Mr. Vadim Belyaev, the group is
considering a merger between Bank OFC and KhMBO.  We nevertheless
continue to consider KhMBO as a strategic subsidiary of Bank OFC.
We will review our ratings on KhMBO relative to those on Bank OFC
when we have received information confirming that legally binding
decisions regarding the possible merger have been made, all
required internal and external approvals have been received, the
proposed merger is supported by additional capital that we think
will be necessary, and we have substantial clarity on the merger
implementation plan.  Similarly, if the strategy of the group
toward Bank OFC, KhMBO, and Bank Trust changes substantially
compared with our current understanding, this might lead us to
reassess the banks' status within the group and, in turn, might
affect our ratings on the banks," S&P said.

The long-term ratings on Bank OFC continue to be one notch higher
than S&P's 'b+' assessment of its stand-alone credit profile
(SACP), based on S&P's view of the bank as having moderate
systemic importance in the domestic banking sector.

The negative outlooks on Bank OFC and KhMBO reflect possible
deterioration in their asset quality in the next 12-18 months,
due to Russia's continued economic slowdown.

S&P may take a negative rating action on either Bank OFC or KhMBO
if it sees that asset quality at either bank has deteriorated
substantially more that S&P currently forecasts in the next 12-18
months, resulting in credit costs exceeding the 3.5%-4.5% level
S&P forecasts for the group.  If this occurred, S&P would revise
down S&P's assessments of the banks' risk positions.  If the
merger between Bank OFC and KhMBO takes place without a
sufficient capital buffer, this could also trigger a downgrade on
the post-merger combined entity.  In addition, S&P may take a
negative rating action if it sees that the Otkritie Holding
group's business stability is at risk due to the specifics of the
merger implementation plan or other changes in group strategy or
corporate actions.  S&P may also revise its assessment of Bank
OFC as an insulated subsidiary toward Otkritie Holding if S&P
sees an indication that Bank OFC might increase its direct or
indirect exposures to other group members, provide a substantial
amount of financial support to the group, or otherwise act in a
way that leads S&P to believe that Bank OFC cannot be considered
as substantially independent from the group in terms of its
financial performance.  Such a lack of independence from the
group would hinder Bank OFC's credit profile, in S&P's view.

S&P may revise the outlooks on both Bank OFC and KhMBO to stable
if S&P sees operating conditions in Russia stabilizing, with a
pick-up of economic growth.  S&P currently considers this
scenario as remote, however.  As regards KhMBO, S&P may change
its outlook to stable if it obtains substantial clarity on the
implementation of the merger with Bank OFC and S&P believes it
will strengthen KhMBO's credit quality.

ENEL RUSSIA: Fitch Says Reftinskaya GRES Sale May Hurt Firm
"The potential sale by Enel Russia PJSC (BB+/Stable) of its
largest plant, Reftinskaya GRES, is likely to materially change
the company's business profile, says Fitch Ratings. The financial
impact will depend on the use of proceeds and capex amendments of
the remaining group. We will likely place Enel Russia's rating on
Rating Watch Negative if the company demonstrates its commitment
to the sale of Reftinskaya GRES or progresses with the sale."

Enel Russia has confirmed that it is not committed to this sale
but is testing the market's appetite for the asset. The planned
disposal of Reftinskaya GRES follows the strategy of the parent
company, Enel S.p.A (BBB+/Stable), which pursues active portfolio
management that provides for about EUR6 billion disposals over
2015-2019. The company has already finalized disposals of EUR3.7
billion, leaving around EUR2.3 billion of asset sales to be
realised during the period.

Reftinskaya GRES is a coal-fired power plant and Enel Russia's
largest asset, accounting for about 40% of its capacity and
EBITDA. The sale of this asset will substantially reduce the
scale of Enel Russia's operations cutting its capacity to about
6GW compared to 13GW for PJSC Mosenergo (BB+/Stable) and 35GW for
PJSC Inter RAO (BBB-/Negative). This will lead to a decline in
its currently sizeable market share in Russia and particularly in
one of the most attractive regions -- Ural District and is likely
to affect diversification of operations by plant and geography.
Given that Reftinskaya GRES is located in the first pricing zone
where electricity prices are driven by gas prices, the company
benefited the most from the high dark spreads related to its
relatively cheap coal-fired generation.

Enel Russia will probably also lose another competitive
advantage -- diversified fuel mix. The company's current fuel mix
is almost equally split between gas and coal with a marginal
contribution of fuel oil, while other Russian utilities use
primarily one source of fuel. If coal-fired Reftinskaya GRES is
sold, the remaining group will comprise gas-fired plants.
Although gas reserves are abundant in Russia, it is much more
expensive than the Kazakh coal that Enel Russia burns.

"The credit profile of the remaining group will be determined by
the use of sale proceeds and capex plans. We expect the proceeds
to be used to reduce debt and potentially for an extraordinary
dividend and/or other investment opportunities. The group's
planned capex of RUB26.1 billion over 2016-2019, which was
revised downward at end-2015, is earmarked mainly for maintenance
and other mandatory projects, many of which are planned for
Reftinskaya GRES. Its sale is likely to lead to further capex
reduction. Enel Russia's financial profile deteriorated in 2015
and the reduction in group debt along with capex adjustments
would be necessary to achieve at least a neutral financial impact
from the Reftinskaya GRES disposal."

EURASIA DRILLING: Fitch Affirms BB IDR, Outlook Negative
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based Eurasia Drilling Company
Limited's (EDC) Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB' and removed them from Rating Watch
Negative (RWN). The Outlook is Negative.

"The rating actions follow our reassessment of EDC's operating
and financial forecasts following its buyout in November 2015 by
some of the company's management and core shareholders and
subsequent de-listing from the London Stock Exchange. We also
obtained clarity with respect to EDC's post-deal operational and
financial policies on dividends and leverage, as well as the
corporate governance and the level of information disclosure."

"EDC is Russia's leading drilling and oilfield services (OFS)
company by onshore metres drilled, with approximately a 21%
market share in 2015. The Negative Outlook reflects the expected
deterioration in EDC's financial performance in 2016-2017, eg,
funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage of around 3x
and FFO interest coverage of around 5x, exceeding our negative
rating guidance, as well as medium-term market pressures that OFS
providers face on volumes and rates, and EDC's high current FX
risk exposure. We forecast that in 2018-2019 EDC's leverage and
coverage will return to within our guidance levels of 2.5x and
6x, respectively."


Rouble, Metres Drive Performance

In 2015, EDC's total metres drilled were down 17% yoy to 4.7
million, as it drilled 21% fewer wells than in 2014, or 1,418 in
total. This was mainly the result of weaker orders from PJSC
LUKOIL (BBB-/Negative), EDC's anchor customer, which accounted
for 61% of EDC's gross revenues (this and other 2015 numbers are
per EDC's 2015 management accounts) and 53% of total metres
drilled in 2015. At the same time, EDC's horizontal metres
drilled increased 27% yoy to a record 1.6 million in 2015, as
Russian oil companies need more complex wells with significant
horizontal metrage for, eg, hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and
flow rate improvement at conventional wells.

"EDC's total revenue from drilling and related services in 2015
was down 41% yoy to $US1.8 billion on a significantly weaker
rouble, lower total drilling metres and a deteriorating Caspian
Sea drilling market. We estimate that the company's 2015 rouble-
denominated revenue declined 6% yoy, while the average $US/RUB
exchange rate dropped 37% yoy. JSC Gazprom Neft (GPN, BBB-
/Negative), EDC's second-largest customer, accounted for nearly
14% of the company's gross 2015 revenues, up from 9% in 2014, and
made up the largest share of EDC's horizontal drilling orders in

Post-Buyout Leverage Increases

"EDC paid $US370 million to holders of global depository receipts
(GDR) in 2015 and projects further total payments of $US107
million to dissenting GDR holders in 2016, with $US28m already
paid to date. We include the remaining $US79 million cash outflow
in our 2016 forecast as we assess the risk that the final payment
to dissenters will exceed this amount as moderate."

"To finance the buyout, EDC used its cash balances and raised
debt, ie, a $US150 million amortizing secured loan from Rosbank
(BBB-/Negative) due in 2018 and a $US150m short-term bullet loan
from LUKOIL, due in late 2016. The Rosbank loan was guaranteed by
EDC and OOO BKE, EDC's largest onshore drilling subsidiary in
Russia. The LUKOIL loan is secured on the BKE stake, valued at
$US180 million (around 23% of BKE's book value at end-2015) and
has an option for LUKOIL to convert the loan principal into a
stake in BKE at any time until the loan is repaid in full. We do
not expect LUKOIL to convert its loan into BKE equity."

No Bond Subordination Expected

"At end-2015, EDC's $US600 million Eurobond benefited from
guarantees provided by EDC and four of its operating subsidiaries
that generated 75% of the group's EBITDA. Moreover, EDC's end-
2015 debt at the operating subsidiaries' level was $US474
million, significantly below our guidance for subordination of
prior-ranking debt of 2.0x-2.5x gross debt to EBITDA, as EDC's
2015 EBITDA was $US466 million. BKE's domestic bond rating is
unaffected because the company is an operating subsidiary that
contributed 55% of EDC's total EBITDA in 2015, and its bond
benefits from a binding legal undertaking given by EDC to
guarantee the repayment."

Capex, Dividend Reduction Boost FCF

"EDC's 2015 capex dropped by 60% yoy on rouble depreciation, the
end of expansionary investments in marine jack-up rigs and lower
land rig orders. EDC's 2015 Fitch-calculated free cash flow (FCF)
reached a record high of $US240 million. The company's management
does not expect large capex in 2016-2019 as its rigs are among
the newest in Russia. Our estimates of EDC's future capex are
higher than the company's. However, we expect that capex can be
reduced due to weakening rouble and fewer fleet upgrades in the
medium term."

"EDC's management intends to pay no dividends in 2016-2019 until
the company substantially reduces its leverage and improves cash
flow generation. EDC did not pay dividends for 2015 and plans no
dividends for 2016. We will assess the impact on EDC's credit
profile should the company deviate from its no-dividend policy."

Positive Long-Term Market Fundamentals

"We expect EDC to remain the largest onshore driller in Russia
over the medium term, despite competitive pressures. As
production from Russian brownfields continues declining, we
expect Russian oil companies to intensify drilling across all
traditional oil regions to maintain overall production levels. We
also forecast a pick-up in greenfield production drilling
following a number of fields being ramped up. According to the
Russian Energy Ministry, total drilling metrage in Russia
increased by 10% in 2015, with OJSC OC Rosneft's metres drilled
up 32% and GPN's up 6%, while LUKOIL drilled 27% fewer metres
than in 2014."

"While demand for oilfield services by Russian oil companies
should benefit EDC over the medium to long term, we
conservatively estimate that its total onshore drilling metres
will edge lower by 5% in 2016 before improving by around 5% per
year from 2017. EDC's management expects a 1% total onshore
metrage decline in 2016. Furthermore, we forecast a very modest
annual increase in rouble-denominated onshore drilling rates, as
the OFS industry operates under a significant cost pressure from
the oil companies, exacerbated by the risk of a taxation increase
in Russia potentially forcing oil and gas producers to optimise
opex including drilling."

Customer Diversification Slowly Improving

EDC's ratings are constrained in the 'BB' category due to high
but declining customer concentration, and limited geographical
diversification. In 2015, LUKOIL accounted for 53% of EDC's total
onshore metres drilled (63% in 2014, 57% in 2013), GPN for 35%
(22% in 2014, 12% in 2013) and Rosneft for 3% (7% in 2014, 24% in
2013). LUKOIL's share in EDC's revenues has historically been
higher as it also includes EDC's drilling services on the Caspian
Sea shelf as well as other onshore non-metre drilling services
such as workover.

"Rosneft has considerably increased drilling orders from EDC in
2016, which should strengthen EDC's operating profile. EDC's
total metrage already contracted by Rosneft increased four times
in 2016 yoy. Rosneft, EDC's second-largest customer in 2013,
contributed 1.5% to EDC's total revenues in 2015. We understand
that EDC is bidding or has already been awarded drilling work for
a number of other Russian oil companies, including PJSOC Bashneft
(BB+/Stable). We expect its customer diversification to improve
gradually over the medium term."

Foreign Currency Debt Exposure

"EDC has traditionally had a significant portion of its
borrowings in US dollars (92% at end-2015), while most of its
cash flow has been generated in roubles. Thus, EDC is
substantially exposed to fluctuations in the rouble-US dollar
exchange rate, which weakens its credit profile. We expect EDC to
reduce its FX exposure in 2016 as one of the covenants under the
$US150m loan from Rosbank demanded hedging at least $US150m of
EDC's debt by January 2016. However, EDC received a waiver from
Rosbank in early 2016, which stipulated that the hedging must be
done by 1 May 2016."

"EDC's management considers both derivative instruments and
refinancing of FX debt with RUB borrowings or domestic bonds to
mitigate the FX debt exposure. As EDC earns most of its revenues
(nearly 90% in 2015) in Russian roubles, we believe that this is
the right step for the company and, once completed, this will
strengthen the company's balance sheet."

Corporate Governance Weakens
"As a private company, EDC does not disclose the names of the
directors, but we understand that there is one at least
independent director on its board. We believe that although EDC's
corporate governance has weakened since the company became
private, it is still commensurate with a 'BB' rating for a
Russia-based issuer. EDC is committed to regularly publishing
accounts and disclosing other operating and financial data.
Should the quality of EDC's corporate governance or financial
disclosures worsen considerably, we may review the company's
ratings and introduce an additional notch down."


Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for EDC include:

-- Moderate drop in total onshore drilling volumes in 2016 and
    moderate increase starting in 2017.

-- Increases in RUB-denominated onshore drilling rates in line
    with changes in Russia's producer price index.

-- Offshore segment revenues falling 35% in 2016 and gradually
    recovering by 2019 due the increase in orders driven by
    higher oil prices.

-- EBITDA margin averaging 25% in 2016-2019.

-- Average exchange rate of RUB70/$US in 2016 and thereafter.

-- Capex for 2016-2019 gradually increasing from $US130m in 2016
    to $US180 million in 2019, excluding payments for rigs
    delivered on credit.

-- No dividends paid to shareholders in 2016-2019.


Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to stabilization of the rating Outlook:

-- FFO adjusted net leverage below 2.5x (2015E: 2.4x) and FFO
    interest cover above 6x (2015E: 7.3x) on a sustained basis.
-- Positive free cash flows in 2016 and thereafter (2015E:
    positive $US240 million).
-- Improved customer diversification.
-- More limited FX exposure.

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to a downgrade:

-- FFO adjusted net leverage above 2.5x on a sustained basis due
    to high dividend payouts, sizeable capex or weak operating
-- FFO interest cover below 6x on a sustained basis.
-- Material weakening of corporate governance or financial
    transparency, timeliness and completeness of information
    disclosures to a level weaker than that of the average Fitch-
    rated Russian corporate.


Liquidity Supported by Bank Facilities

"At end-2015, EDC's unrestricted cash balance of $US259m broadly
matched its short-term debt of $US279 million. EDC's liquidity
improved significantly after the company extended maturity of the
$US150 million loan from LUKOIL to 2017 and $US40 million
shareholder loan to 2019. Rouble balances accounted for 36% of
EDC's cash of $US265 million at end-February 2016, with US
dollars largely accounting for the rest. For 2016, we forecast
EDC will generate FCF of $US132 million and we estimate that it
will be able to maintain sufficient liquidity over the medium

EDC has a good track record of accessing banks and capital
markets for liquidity. It has large undrawn uncommitted
facilities from several international and Russian banks, which it
may draw to cover its 2017 debt maturities of roughly $US330
million. EDC has negligible repayments in 2018-2019 before its
$US600 million Eurobond is due in 2020.


Eurasia Drilling Company Limited

  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BB';
  off RWN; Outlook Negative

  Short-term foreign and local IDRs: affirmed at 'B'; off RWN

  National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA-(rus)', off RWN;
  Outlook Negative

OOO Burovaya Kompaniya Eurasia

  Senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'BB'; off RWN

  National senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'AA-(rus)'; off

EDC Finance Limited

  Senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'BB'; off RWN

KROSSINVESTBANK JSCB: Placed Under Provisional Administration
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1199, dated April 11,
2016, revoked the banking license of credit institution JSCB
KROSSINVESTBANK OJSC from April 11, 2016.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, repeated violations within a year of Bank of Russia
regulations issued in accordance with the Federal Law "On
Countering the Legalisation (Laundering) of Criminally Obtained
Incomes and the Financing of Terrorism", and the application of
measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the
Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)", considering a real threat
to the creditors' and depositors' interests.

With its poor asset quality, JSCB KROSSINVESTBANK OJSC failed to
adequately assess the risks assumed. An adequate assessment of
the credit risk and a reliable recognition of the bank's assets
resulted in the grounds for the credit institution to implement
measures to prevent the bank's insolvency (bankruptcy).  Besides,
the bank failed to meet the requirements of Bank of Russia
regulations on countering the legalization (laundering) of
criminally obtained incomes and the financing of terrorism,
including customer identification procedure, and also the
credible notification of the authorized body about operations
subject to obligatory control. JSCB KROSSINVESTBANK OJSC was
involved in dubious operations.

The management and owners of the bank failed to take effective
measures to bring the situation back to normal.  Under these
circumstances, the Bank of Russia took a decision to revoke the

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1200, dated April 11,
2016, appointed a provisional administration to JSCB
KROSSINVESTBANK OJSC for the period until the appointment of a
receiver pursuant to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency
(Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal
Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".  In accordance with
federal laws, the powers of the credit institution's executive
bodies are suspended.

JSCB KROSSINVESTBANK OJSC is a member of the deposit insurance
system. The revocation of the banking license is an insured event
as stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than 1.4 million rubles
per one depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of April 1, 2016, JSCB
KROSSINVESTBANK OJSC ranked 446th by assets in the Russian
banking system.

RENAISSANCE FINANCIAL: Fitch Assigns B-(EXP) Rating to Sr. Bond
Fitch Ratings has assigned Renaissance Financial Holdings
Limited's (RFHL; B-/Negative) upcoming USD-denominated senior
bond an expected 'B-(EXP)' rating and a Recovery Rating of 'RR4'.
The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final
documents conforming to information already received.

RFHL is a holding company of the Russia-headquartered investment
banking group Renaissance Capital.  RFHL plans to issue a new
bond with a targeted yield of 9.50%-9.75%, maturity in 2021 and a
put option in 2018.

RFHL will also make an offer to the existing holders of
Renaissance Securities Trading Limited's (RSTL) USD325 mil. bonds
due April 2016 to exchange them into the new RFHL senior bond.
Of the USD325m RSTL bond, the remaining outstanding amount is
USD126m, of which USD73 mil. is held by RFHL group and other
related parties, while market investors hold only USD53 mil.
RFHL currently has sufficient unrestricted liquidity (in excess
of its operating needs) of about USD144 mil. to make the
repayment should these investors decline the offer.

The offer does not constitute a distressed debt exchange
according to Fitch's criteria, as there are no material
reductions in terms compared with the original contractual terms,
the company reportedly has sufficient liquidity to make the
repayment and the exchange is fully discretionary and not subject
to any forced quorum decisions.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The expected bond rating is driven by RFHL's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) of 'B-'/Negative and Fitch's assessment that
recoveries are likely to be average in the event of any default.
In turn, RFHL's Long-term IDR reflects RFHL's weak asset quality
and solvency, and potentially vulnerable liquidity.  The rating
also reflects the challenging Russian operating environment,
which will continue to put pressure on RFHL's volumes,
performance and business development.


The RFHL senior bond's rating is likely to move in tandem with
RFHL's Long-term IDR.

The Negative Outlook on RFHL's IDR reflects the possibility of it
being downgraded if (i) funding, which is used to finance the
related party exposure/non-core assets, is withdrawn; or (ii) the
company's performance deteriorates significantly; or (iii) the
performance of Rencredit, a sister retail bank, continues to
weaken, to the extent that it materially increases contingent
risks for RFHL.

Positive rating action would be contingent on (i) a considerable
strengthening of the company's solvency through the unwinding of
at least part of the related-party exposure/ non-core
investments, or recapitalization by the main shareholder Onexim/a
potential new investor; (ii) a decrease of contingent risks
related to sister bank Rencredit and reduced reliance on
securities borrowings to support liquidity; and (iii) a
stabilization of the operating environment.

The RFHL senior bond's rating is also sensitive to a change in
Fitch's assessment of potential recovery levels in the event of

SNCO MAIMA: Placed Under Provisional Administration
The Bank of Russia, by Order No. OD-1183, dated April 8, 2016,
revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit institution
SNCO Maima LLC from April 8, 2016.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution’s
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, repeated violations within a year of Bank of Russia
requirements stipulated by Article 7 (excluding Clause 3 of
Article 7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism", as well as Bank of Russia regulations issued in
accordance with the said law and application of the measures
stipulated by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian
Federation (Bank of Russia)".

Besides, SNCO Maima LLC failed to meet the Bank of Russia
regulations on countering the legalization (laundering) of
criminally obtained incomes and the financing of terrorism with
regard to the procedure for identification of its customers and
credible notification of the authorized body about operations
subject to obligatory control.  Moreover, the credit institution
was involved in dubious transit operations. The management and
owners of the credit institution failed to take effective
measures to bring the situation back to normal.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1184, dated April 8,
2016, appointed a provisional administration to SNCO Maima LLC
for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to
the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator
under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In accordance with federal laws the powers of the
credit institution’s executive bodies have been suspended.

According to the financial statements, as of March 1, 2016, SNCO
Maima LLC ranked 693th by assets in the Russian banking system.

TAMBOV REGION: Fitch Affirms BB+ LT Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Tambov Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+'
with Stable Outlooks and its Short-term foreign currency IDR at
'B'. The agency has also affirmed the region's National Long-term
rating at 'AA(rus)' with a Stable Outlook.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged baseline scenario
regarding Tambov's stable budgetary performance and moderate
direct risk over the medium term.


The 'BB+' rating reflects the region's good operating
performance, moderate direct risk with manageable refinancing
risk and satisfactory current balance, which provides a debt
payback ratio in line with the region's debt maturity. The
ratings also factor in the weak institutional framework for
Russian sub-nationals and the modest size of Tambov region's
economy, resulting in its material reliance on transfers from the
federal budget.

"Fitch forecasts Tambov to record a good operating balance at
about 10% of operating revenue in 2016-2018 supported by the
developing local tax base and stable current transfers from the
federal government, which contribute about 40% of operating
revenue. In 2015, the region's operating margin peaked at 17% due
to sharp 21% tax revenue growth amid operating expenditure growth
remaining a moderate 5%. The tax growth was driven by expansion
of the tax base and increased profit of local producers along
with increased rates of transport tax. We expect tax revenue
growth to decelerate towards 1%-5% pa over the medium term from
21% in 2015 following the economic slowdown."

Fitch projects Tambov to record deficit at about 6% of total
revenue in 2016-2018 as the region continues to invest in
economic development and maintains a high level of capex at above
20% (2010-2015: average 30%) of total expenditure. Tambov's self-
financing capacity is likely to remain strong, comfortably
covering up to about 75% of capex (2010-2015: average 87%) from
the current balance and capital transfers from the federal
government. The remaining 25% of capex will be financed with a
combination of cash balance and new borrowings that will fuel
modest growth of direct risk over the medium term.

Fitch forecasts Tambov's direct risk to remain moderate within
50% of current revenue (2015: 33.7%) in 2016-2018. In 2015,
direct risk moderately grew and reached RUB12.2 billion, up from
RUB10.3 billion in 2014. Positively, this growth was mostly in
low-cost federal budget loans and they amounted to 32% of direct
risk at end-2015 (2014: 25%); RUB2.8 billion of which Tambov
contracted in 2015 to refinance maturing bank loans. This allowed
the region to save on interest payments, mitigating interest rate
risk amid volatile markets.

"Tambov has a smooth debt maturity profile and its refinancing
needs are evenly spread in 2016-2018. In 2016, the region needs
to repay RUB2.3 billion or 18.5% of its direct risk as of 1
January 2016. The risk is mitigated by RUB2.1 billion undrawn
credit lines and Tambov plans to contract new lines later in
2016. We do not expect the region to have any difficulties in
contracting new debt. However, the current margin could be
pressured by volatile interest rates on the domestic market over
the medium term."

The region's credit profile remains constrained by the weak
institutional framework for Russian local and regional
governments (LRGs), which has a shorter record of stable
development than many of its international peers. Weak
institutions lead to lower predictability of Russian LRGs'
budgetary policies, which are subject to continuous reallocation
of revenue and expenditure responsibilities within government

Tambov's economy has been growing at a faster rate than the
national economy, supported by a growing agricultural sector and
processing industries. The region's GRP is estimated by Tambov's
administration to have increased 1.1% yoy in 2015 while Russia's
economy has contracted by 3.7% (Fitch's estimate). Nevertheless,
Tambov's wealth metrics remain modest, which has led to a weaker
tax capacity than its regional peers. Federal transfers
constitute a material proportion of Tambov's budget, averaging
46% of operating revenue annually in 2013-2015, which limits the
region's revenue flexibility.


A continuous budget deficit leading to growth of direct risk
above 50% of current revenue, accompanied by high refinancing
pressure, would lead to negative rating action.

An upgrade is unlikely given the pressure on the sovereign's IDRs
(BBB-/Negative). However, direct risk declining towards 20% of
current revenue and an operating margin at above 15% on a
sustained basis accompanied by a Russian economic recovery, could
lead to an upgrade.

YAROSLAVL REGION: Fitch Affirms IDR at BB, Outlook Negative
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Yaroslavl Region's
Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR)
at 'BB', Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B' and National
Long-term rating at 'AA-(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long-term
IDRs and National Long-term rating are Negative. The region's
outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds have been affirmed at
Long-term local currency 'BB' and National Long-term 'AA-(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged view regarding
Yaroslavl region's budgetary performance, which remains weak
compared with national 'BB' peers, despite a rebound of the
operating margin.


The ratings reflect the region's moderate direct risk and
diversified economy, but also the deteriorated operating balance,
which has been insufficient for debt interest coverage over the
past few years. The ratings also take into account the slowdown
of the national economy and the weak institutional framework for
Russian sub-nationals.

Fitch expects the region's operating margin to consolidate at
3.5% in 2016, close to 2015 actuals and slightly up from a weak
0.6% in 2014. The recovery in 2015 was supported by cost-cutting
measures implemented by the regional administration, which led to
a 5.4% operating expenditure decline and fully compensated a 2.5%
reduction in tax proceeds. Increasing current transfers from the
federal government also underpinned the operating balance. Fitch
expects the region's tax proceeds are likely to grow slowly in
2016 and be close to 2014's levels.

The agency forecasts the region's current balance will remain
negative or close to zero over the medium term. In 2015 the
current balance demonstrated a modest recovery to negative 1% of
current revenue from negative 3.3% in 2014. This was underpinned
by a moderate recovery of operating balance, while an increasing
share of low-cost budget loans in the region's debt structure
limits interest expenditure.

The deficit narrowed to 4.5% in 2015 from a high average of 12.9%
in 2013-2014 on the back of a cut in capex and a strengthened
operating balance. Fitch expects the budget deficit before debt
will narrow to 3.7% of total revenue in 2016, and 3.0% by 2018.
The region aims to reduce the budget deficit to a low 1.5% in
2016 and achieve a balanced budget in 2017. Fitch considers this
scenario as unlikely due to rigid operating spending and a
sluggish national economy. If the region manages to reduce the
fiscal deficit above Fitch's projection and reaches a positive
current balance in 2016, this could lead to a revision of the
Outlook to Stable.

Fitch expects the region's direct risk to grow to 65% of current
revenue over the medium term (2015: 62%). Positively, the
region's debt structure is shifting towards a higher proportion
of subsidized federal budget loans, which reduce refinancing
pressure. In 2015, the region received RUB6.8 billion of federal
budget loans to replace part of its market debt. The budget loans
bear 0.1% interest rates and have a three-year maturity. The
proportion of budget loans in the region's debt portfolio had
increased to 38% by end-March 2016, from 15% a year ago.

Like most Russian regions, Yaroslavl is exposed to some
refinancing risk. At 1 March refinancing needs for 2016 includes
RUB3.7 billion bank loans and RUB4.1 billion bonds, which is
equivalent to 15% of projected full-year current revenue. The
region plans to re-enter the domestic bond market in 2016 with
RUB4.5 billion bond issues to refinance maturing bonds. Fitch
also expects the region will receive a RUB2.7 billion budget loan
for substitution of bank loans due in 2016. The remaining
refinancing needs and budget deficit will likely be covered with
new bank loans.

Yaroslavl has a diversified industrialized economy with wealth
metrics that are in line with the national median. The economy
mostly relies on various sectors of the processing industry,
which provides a large tax base. Tax accounted for 85% of
operating revenue in 2015. The region is following the national
negative economic trend and according to preliminary data it
declined by 3.2% yoy in 2015, close to the national decline of
3.7%. Fitch projects the national economy will continue contract
by 1.5% in 2016, and this will also have negative repercussions
for the region's economy.

The region's credit profile remains constrained by the weak
institutional framework for Russian LRGs, which has a shorter
record of stable development than many of its international
peers. The predictability of Russian LRGs' budgetary policy is
hampered by frequent reallocation of revenue and expenditure
responsibilities between tiers of government.

Inability to restore the current balance to positive territory or
a sharp increase of direct risk to above 70% of current revenue,
driven by short-term debt, could lead to a downgrade.


SID BANKA: Moody's Withdraws b3 Baseline Credit Assessment Rating
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn SID banka, d.d.,
Ljubljana's (SID Banka) Baa3 local-currency Issuer Rating with a
stable outlook and b3 baseline credit assessment.


Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

Moody's most recent rating action on SID Banka was taken on
December 9, 2015, when the rating agency affirmed the bank's Baa3
Issuer Rating with a stable outlook.

Headquartered in Ljubljana, Slovenia, SID Banka reported
consolidated total assets of EUR3.25 billion and net income of
EUR11.39 million in 2015.


DBRS Ratings Limited (DBRS) upgraded the ratings on the following
Notes issued by IM Grupo Banco Popular Empresas VI, FTA (the
Issuer) as follows:

-- EUR1,283,069,970.00 Series A Notes: Upgraded to A (high) (sf)
    from A (sf)

-- EUR660,000,000.00 Series B Notes: Upgraded to CCC (high) (sf)
    from CCC (low) (sf)

DBRS has also removed the Under Review with Positive Implications
(UR-Pos.) designation.

The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized by a
portfolio of bank term loans originated by Banco Popular Espanol,
S.A. (Banco Popular) and Banco Pastor, S.A.U. (Banco Pastor;
together, the Originators) to small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) and self-employed individuals based in Spain.

The rating on the Series A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal payable on or
before the Legal Maturity Date in January 2046. The rating on the
Series B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and
principal payable on or before the Legal Maturity Date in 2046.

The rating action reflects an annual review of the transaction
and concludes the UR-Pos. status of the ratings. The Series A and
Series B Notes were placed UR-Pos. following a material update to
the methodology DBRS applies to monitor the counterparty risks of
the transaction.

This methodology incorporates DBRS's new Critical Obligations
Ratings (CORs), which were introduced in the "Critical
Obligations Rating Criteria" methodology published on 2 February
2016, and also provides more granular rating levels for account
bank institution replacements and eligible investments.

The ratings of the Series A and Series B Notes have been upgraded
based upon the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies and
    defaults, as of the January 2016 payment date.

-- Updated and more granular rating levels introduced by the
    "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
    for account bank institution replacement triggers.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
    flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms
    in which they have invested.

-- The current available credit enhancement to the notes to
    cover expected losses assumed in line with the A (high) (sf)
    rating level for Series A Notes and the CCC (high) (sf)
    rating level for Series B Notes.

The transaction is performing in line with DBRS's expectations.
As of the January 2016 payment date, there were no cumulative
defaults, and delinquencies greater than 90 days were 0.80% of
the original collateral balance.

Credit enhancement has increased considerably as a result of the
deleveraging of the Series A Notes, currently at 54.83% of their
initial balance. The Series B Notes will start to amortize once
the Series A Notes are fully amortized. Credit enhancement for
the Series A Notes (38.60%) is provided by the subordination of
the Series B Notes and the Cash Reserve.

The portfolio annualized probability of default (PD) used has not
changed (2.56%).

Banco Santander SA is the Account Bank of the transaction. The
DBRS Long Term Critical Obligations Rating of Banco Santander SA
of A (high) complies with the Minimum Institution Rating given
the ratings assigned to the Series A Notes as described in DBRS's
"Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"


MUNTERS AB: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms B CCR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its
outlook on Sweden-based air treatment solutions provider Munters
AB to stable from negative.  The 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating was affirmed.

S&P also affirmed its 'B' issue rating on Munters' $280 million
senior secured term loan.  The recovery rating remains at '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of recovery in the higher half of
the 30%-50% range in the event of a payment default.

The rating actions follow the improvement in Munters' earnings
and operating cash flows in 2015, following significant
restructuring costs and weaker-than-expected performance during
2013 and 2014. Thanks to cost efficiency measures during the year
and a strong order book, S&P now expects EBITDA for 2016 to be
between Swedish krona (SEK) 660 million (about $81 million) and
SEK720 million, and the margin at 12%-13%.

Munters experienced organic sales growth of about 12% in 2015 and
delivered savings on its cost-savings program ahead of schedule.
This helped restore the EBITDA margin to 13.0% in 2015 from 7.5%
in 2014, including restructuring charges.  The company's leverage
metrics also strengthened following positive operating cash
flows, with funds from operations (FFO) to debt reaching 11.6% in
2015 after 0.8% in 2014.  S&P expects the leverage metrics to
gradually improve over the next few years, notably because it do
not anticipate further material restructuring costs.
Furthermore, S&P regards as positive the continued strong order
intake last year, with the order backlog totaling SEK1.35 billion
at the end of 2015, up 6% from the previous year.

S&P believes the company's enhanced operating performance should
be sustainable, particularly without large restructuring charges.
As a result, S&P believes the credit ratios will remain aligned
with our assessment of Munters' financial risk profile as highly
leveraged.  The financial risk profile is constrained, in S&P's
view, by Munters' financial policy, which S&P assess as FS
(financial sponsor)-6, due to the company's private equity
ownership.  S&P excludes a SEK2.5 billion shareholder loan from
its debt calculation because we consider that it qualifies as
equity under S&P's criteria.  This loan is deeply subordinated to
all existing and future debt instruments, and no mandatory cash
payments can be associated with this instrument.

In 2015, Munters' Standard & Poor's-adjusted EBITDA improved to
about SEK700 million from SEK315 million in 2014, including
SEK189 million of restructuring costs.  The increase in
profitability was about 30% higher than S&P's forecasts.
Combined with only moderate restructuring costs for 2015 and the
divestment of the loss-making business within HumiCool, this
paved the way for higher profitability, which S&P expects will be

The stable outlook reflects S&P's anticipation that the
improvement in Munters' earnings, operating cash flows, and
leverage ratios is sustainable.  S&P anticipates an EBITDA margin
of at least 10% and FFO to cash interest above 3x for the rating.

S&P could lower the ratings if Munters' profitability
progressively declines, with the EBITDA margin falling below 10%
and FFO cash interest coverage declining to less than 3x.
Ratings pressure could also arise if the operating environment
worsens and Munters' results are weaker than expected, leading to
liquidity shortfalls and covenant headroom of less than 15%.  Any
other cash outflow, such as increased capex or a larger-than-
expected debt-financed acquisition, would also lead S&P to
consider a negative rating action.

Ratings upside is limited, due to Munters' financial-sponsor
ownership, which results in S&P's assessment of its financial
risk profile as highly leveraged.  S&P would consider revising
its assessment upward only if it believed that Munters' leverage
was consistent with S&P's aggressive category and that the risk
of releveraging is low, based on the group's financial policy and
S&P's view of the owner's financial risk appetite.


UKRLANDFARMING PLC: S&P Lowers CCR to SD Then Suspends Rating
Standard & Poor's Rating Services lowered its corporate credit
rating on UkrLandFarming PLC to 'SD' (selective default) from
'CC'.  S&P also lowered the issue rating on its senior unsecured
notes to 'D' from 'CC'.  S&P then suspended the ratings, due to
lack of sufficient information.

The downgrade of UkrLandFarming to 'SD' and the lowering of S&P's
issue rating to 'D' reflects that the company has defaulted on
some of its credit facilities, including payment of interest due
on March 26, 2016, on $500 million notes maturing in 2018.

S&P has suspended the ratings to reflect the lack of sufficient
information to adequately assess the company's corporate
creditworthiness and make a well-informed rating decision.

If the company provides sufficient information within the next 90
days, S&P would assess this information to determine the rating
outcome.  However, if the level of information remains
insufficient or is not of satisfactory quality to form a rating
opinion, S&P will withdraw the ratings.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

TATA STEEL: Agrees to Sell Scunthorpe Plant to Greybull Capital
James Quinn at The Telegraph reports that Tata Steel has agreed a
deal to sell its Scunthorpe site to a management buy-out backed
by distressed debt investors Greybull Capital, saving 4,400 jobs.

According to The Telegraph, Greybull, run by the secretive
Meyohas brothers who are best known in the UK for coming to the
rescue of Monarch Airlines in 2014, has paid a nominal GBP1 for
the business, which will be supported by a GBP400 million
investment package.

Half of the GBP400 million will come from bank funding, with the
rest coming from Greybull and its investors, The Telegraph says.

The Scunthorpe business, known as Tata's Long Products Europe
(LPE) division, will be renamed British Steel once the
acquisition completes, which is expected within eight weeks, The
Telegraph discloses.

The purchase includes the Scunthorpe site as well as two mills in
Teesside, an engineering workshop in Workington and a design
consultancy in York along with a mill in Hayange, France, The
Telegraph notes.

Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company.

TATA STEEL: Begins Sale Process for Remaining UK Operations
James Quinn at The Telegraph reports that Tata Steel confirmed it
has formally begun the sales process for its remaining UK
operations, centred on Port Talbot.

According to The Telegraph, accountancy firm KPMG will run the
sale process, while solicitors Slaughter and May will act as
legal advisers.

A copy of the information memorandum -- a document which will
detail Tata Steel UK's assets and liabilities -- has been sent to
potential bidders, The Telegraph discloses.

Commodities group Liberty House, which recently bought Tata's
Scottish steel plants, is still seen as the most likely buyer,
and German industrial giant ThyssenKrupp is thought to be
interested, The Telegraph notes.

                        Port Talbot Plan

Meanwhile, Kiran Stacey and Michael Pooler at The Financial Times
report that trade association UK Steel said Sanjeev Gupta's plan
to rescue the Port Talbot steelworks in south Wales by ripping
out and replacing its blast furnaces would leave it twice as
exposed to Britain's high electricity prices.

It found that while the arc furnaces are more modern and
efficient, they are twice as dependent on electricity as blast
furnaces, the FT relays.

The paper, published on April 11, increases the pressure on the
government to offer more energy subsidies to potential buyers of
Tata Steel's UK business, according to the FT.

The report does not mention the plan put forward by Mr. Gupta,
whose commodities group Liberty House is the only organization to
say publicly it is interested in Port Talbot, the FT notes.

                     UK Steel Operations

Separately, the FT's Shawn Donnan, Simon Mundy and Michael Pooler
report that Ratan Tata, the Indian industrialist and former
chairman of Tata Group, on April 7 defended the decision to sell
its UK steel operations calling them "underinvested and

His first remarks since the company announced it would look to
shed the lossmaking assets underlined the serious task facing the
government as it desperately seeks to attract a buyer, the FT

Speaking in Washington, Mr. Tata, as cited by the FT, said the
"bottom just opened up" at the UK steel operations amid a huge
rise in exports by Chinese steelmakers in response to slowing
demand in their domestic market.

Tata has estimated it would take roughly GBP2 billion of
investment to transform its plant at Port Talbot, the UK's
biggest steel factory, into a profitable producer of high-grade
metal, the FT relates.

According to the FT, Mr. Tata told a US Export-Import Bank
conference it would be necessary to "cut back on the size and the
scale of the operations and make them profitable".  This he said
was "extremely challenging" but not impossible, the FT notes.

Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
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