TCREUR_Public/160420.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Wednesday, April 20, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 077


                            Headlines


G R E E C E

GREECE: Creditors Seek Extra Austerity Measures


I T A L Y

BUZZI UNICEM: S&P Affirms BB+/B CCRs, Outlook Stable
CEMENTIR HOLDING: Creditors OK Composition, Acquisition Offer
UNIPOL GRUPPO: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB' ICR


K A Z A K H S T A N

NOSTRUM OIL: Moody's Confirms B2 CFR, Outlook Negative


L U X E M B O U R G

GBP INT'L: S&P Assigns BB+/B Counterparty Credit Ratings


R U S S I A

MECHEL OAO: Reaches Debt Restructuring Agreement with Sberbank
OCEAN BANK: Placed Under Provisional Administration
STELLA-BANK JSC: Placed Under Provisional Administration


S E R B I A

RTB BOR: To File for Pre-Packaged Bankruptcy for Four Units


S P A I N

CIRSA GAMING: Moody's Raises CFR to B1, Outlook Stable


S W I T Z E R L A N D

VISTAJET GROUP: S&P Assigns B Long-Term CCR, Outlook Negative


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

POINT VILLAGE: Receivers Sue Dunnes Stores Over EUR15MM Funds
RHINO MIDCO: Moody's Withdraws B1 CFR Following Take-Over
TATA STEEL: Greybull Eyes Acquisition of Speciality Steels Arm


                            *********


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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Creditors Seek Extra Austerity Measures
------------------------------------------------
Marcus Walker and Viktoria Dendrinou at The Wall Street Journal
report that Greece's creditors are considering seeking extra
austerity measures that would be triggered if Athens misses its
fiscal targets, in a bid to bridge differences between Europe and
the International Monetary Fund and break a deadlock threatening
to unravel the Greek bailout.

According to the Journal, under the proposal, say officials
involved in the discussions, Greece would have to sign up to
so-called contingency measures of up to about EUR3 billion, on
top of the package of about EUR5 billion in tax increases and
spending cuts Greece and its lenders are already negotiating.

The officials say the country would only have to implement the
extra measures if falls short of targeted budget surpluses for
coming years that were set out in last year's bailout agreement,
the Journal discloses.

The idea, which has support from the eurozone's dominant power
Germany, hasn't yet been agreed upon, and officials on the
creditors' side say it would be politically hard for Greece's
embattled government to swallow, the Journal notes.

Without billions of euros in fresh bailout funds, Greece faces
bankruptcy in July, when large debts fall due, the Journal
states.



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I T A L Y
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BUZZI UNICEM: S&P Affirms BB+/B CCRs, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+/B' long-term
and short-term corporate credit ratings on Buzzi Unicem SpA.  The
outlook is stable.

S&P also assigned its 'BB+' long-term rating to the proposed bond
of up to EUR500 million that Buzzi will launch shortly.  S&P has
assigned a recovery rating of '3H' to the bond, indicating its
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery for debtholders in
the event of a payment default, in the higher half of the 50%-70%
range.

In addition, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' issue ratings on the two
EUR350 million senior unsecured bonds due 2016 and 2018, issued
by Buzzi.  The recovery ratings on this debt remain unchanged at
'3H'.

Buzzi Unicem's current solid operating performance benefits from
its currently favorable geographic positioning.  The group posted
very good results in both the U.S. and Mexico in 2015, which
together accounted for three-quarters of total EBITDA.
Furthermore, the U.S. dollar appreciation helped to boost
reported profitability.  The completion of capital expenditure
(capex) in 2016 in the U.S. and Mexico should support Buzzi's
profitability in these two countries over the next few years.

At the same time, performance is relatively stable in Germany and
pretty weak in Italy and Russia.  The Italian cement market still
has significant overcapacity, and the presence of a high number
of small players has not helped prices, which have dropped in
past few years.  In 2015, Buzzi decided not to enter into a
competitive bidding with Cementir for the acquisition of troubled
Sacci.  S&P believes this illustrates Buzzi's prudent financial
policy.  In S&P's opinion, initial signs of consolidation in the
Italian market may support a better environment for cement prices
in 2016 and 2017.  In the Russian market, Buzzi's reported
revenues and EBITDA in 2015 benefited from the contribution of a
new plant acquired at year-end 2014.  As such, the decline in
profitability in 2016 should be more marked, in the absence of an
improvement in local trading conditions.

S&P's leverage metrics for Buzzi progressed significantly in 2015
in addition to improved operating performance, they also
benefited from positive a translation effect, given that most of
the debt is denominated in euros.  At year-end 2015, debt to
EBITDA was 2.5x and funds from operations (FFO) to debt 27.5%,
compared with 3.1x and 20.8% one year earlier.  The completion of
current capex investments in Mexico and the U.S. in 2016 should
help metrics to improve further, in the absence of new
investments or acquisitions.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Buzzi's operating
performance in local currency terms will remain solid in most of
its markets over the next 12-18 months, with the exceptions of
Russia and Italy.  As a consequence, S&P expects Buzzi's key
credit metrics, on average, to remain commensurate with its 'BB+'
ratings.

S&P may consider a positive rating action if Buzzi's core
leverage metric, FFO to debt, improves to above 30% for a
sustained period of time, while debt to EBITDA remains below 3x.
A positive rating action would also require liquidity to remain
at least adequate. S&P believes this scenario could materialize
if the Italian market recovers faster that in S&P's base-case
expectation, while other core markets of the U.S., Mexico, and
Germany continue to perform at least at current levels.  S&P
would also expect Buzzi to keep its current moderate financial
policy in terms of dividend distribution and acquisitions.  S&P
believes that such a scenario is unlikely in 2016, as Buzzi has
still to complete its rather heavy capex plan.

S&P could consider lowering the ratings if the group's
performance in its key markets is worse than S&P's expectations
and there is no potential for a swift recovery.  S&P would view
debt to EBITDA above 4x and FFO to debt below 20% as thresholds
for a downgrade. S&P believes such a scenario is unlikely in the
next 12-18 months, given Buzzi's strong performance in most of
its core regions.  Additionally, debt-funded acquisitions,
leading to debt to EBITDA and FFO to debt deteriorating beyond
the above thresholds could also lead to a downgrade.  S&P might
also consider a negative rating action if the group's liquidity
profile deteriorated.


CEMENTIR HOLDING: Creditors OK Composition, Acquisition Offer
-------------------------------------------------------------
Cementir Holding on April 19 disclosed that, following the
hearing with creditors held on March 14, 2016, the final results
of the voting process on Sacci Spa's composition, which includes
the offer to purchase its business divisions submitted by the
subsidiary Cementir Italia Spa, have been officially
communicated.

The composition with creditors was approved by the majority of
creditors with voting rights.

It is further noted that the composition will then be subject to
endorsement by the Court of Rome, the date for which has been
fixed for May 18, 2016.

The closing of the transaction is expected to take place by the
end of July 2016, unless extended or delayed.

Cementir Holding is an Italian multinational company that
produces and distributes grey and white cement, ready-mix
concrete, aggregates and concrete products.


UNIPOL GRUPPO: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB' ICR
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its long-term
counterparty credit and insurer financial strength ratings on
Italy-based multiline insurer UnipolSai Assicurazioni SpA and its
subsidiary SIAT - Societa Italiana Assicurazioni e
Riassicurazioni SpA at 'BBB-'.

At the same time, S&P affirmed at 'BB' its issuer credit ratings
on Unipol Gruppo Finanziario (UGF), UnipolSai's holding company.
S&P also affirmed the counterparty credit ratings on Unipol Banca
at 'BB-/B' and the senior, subordinated, and junior subordinated
debt ratings of the group.

S&P subsequently withdrew all of the above ratings at Unipol's
request.

The affirmation reflected S&P's view that the ratings on the
Unipol group's core operating entities remained constrained by
the level of the long-term rating on the Republic of Italy (BBB-
/Stable/A-3) owing to the group's material exposure to Italian,
predominantly sovereign, investments.  The constraint was in line
with S&P's global, cross-sector criteria for ratings above the
sovereign.  At year-end 2015, S&P estimates that over 80% of
Unipol's investments (including sovereign bonds, corporate bonds,
loans, equities, and real estate) for which the group carries the
credit risk (i.e., excluding unit-linked and third-party
investments) were in Italy.  These represented close to 8x
Unipol's consolidated Solvency II regulatory capital, including
Unipol Banca's exposure, at year-end 2015.

At the time of the withdrawal, Unipol's indicative group credit
profile (GCP), which is S&P's assessment of the group's
creditworthiness prior to incorporating sovereign risk, was
unchanged at 'bbb', one notch above S&P's ratings on Unipol's
core operating entities.  This reflected S&P's view of its
satisfactory business risk profile and lower adequate financial
risk profile. S&P's view of Unipol's adequate enterprise risk
management (ERM), fair management and governance, and exceptional
liquidity were all neutral rating factors.

S&P's view of Unipol's satisfactory business profile balanced its
strong competitive position with the moderate insurance and
country risk insurers face in the Italian life and
property/casualty (P/C) markets.  Unipol's leading market share
in Italian P/C and well-diversified premium generation between
life and P/C sustain its competitive position.  Insurance risks
are increased by what S&P views as Italy's weak real and nominal
economic growth prospects, the difficult conditions in which the
Italian banking sector operates, and the slow legal system.

S&P regarded Unipol's financial risk profile as lower adequate,
in line with S&P's assessment of its prospective risk-based
capital adequacy.  S&P expects capital adequacy to stabilize at
lower adequate levels over 2016-2017, reflecting S&P's forecast
that capital will remain mostly flat while the life and P/C
business volumes will contract, leading to a similar decline in
capital requirements.  S&P estimates Unipol's net income (before
minority interests) to normalize above EUR500 million in 2016 and
2017, which S&P expects to be mostly allocated to minority
interests and dividends.

Unipol recently disclosed a 150% Solvency II ratio at the
consolidated level at the end of 2015, which included the use of
undertaking specific parameters (USP) for P/C liability risks.
S&P's measurement of Unipol's capital adequacy was constrained by
certain factors under S&P's criteria that differ from Solvency
II's specifications, including:

   -- The average ('BBB') credit quality of the group's
      investments;

   -- About EUR1 billion of hybrids that S&P excludes from
      capital because they do not meet its criteria in terms of
      deferability and permanence; and

   -- The neutralization of unrealized gains on bonds backing
      life liabilities.

In addition, based on 2014 data, S&P considered that Unipol's P/C
claims reserves, especially in the ex-Fondiaria motor third-party
and general liability lines, continue to be understated versus
S&P's actuarial best estimate--even though S&P has observed a
significant improvement over the past four years.  S&P uses
generally accepted actuarial techniques and analytical judgement
to determine our view of loss reserves.

S&P viewed Unipol's financial flexibility as adequate, balancing
its capacity to regularly access debt markets with a financial
leverage ratio (30%) that remains relatively high compared to
peers.

S&P considers that Unipol's enterprise risk management has well-
defined risk appetites but it has yet to be fully integrated into
the group's strategic decision-making process.

S&P's assessment of the group's management continued to reflect
the recurrence of unexpected costs and the poor performance of
Unipol Banca, which have historically made it more difficult for
Unipol to reach its ambitious financial targets.  On the other
hand, S&P considers that the successful integration of Fondiaria-
SAI highlights the strong capabilities the group has developed in
restructuring its operations.

The counterparty credit rating on UGF reflected S&P's standard
two-notch downward adjustment from the insurer financial strength
rating on Unipol's core operating entities.  This accounted for
the structural subordination of UGF creditors to the core
entities' policyholders and UGF's dependence on UnipolSai's
dividend streams.

The affirmation of the 'BBB-' ratings on SIAT, the group's marine
insurer, reflected S&P's unchanged view of its strategic
importance to Unipol and 'bbb' indicative stand-alone credit
profile (SACP).  The ratings were constrained by S&P's ratings on
the Italian sovereign and the parent group's core operating
entity, UnipolSai.

The affirmation of the 'BB-' ratings on Unipol Banca reflected
S&P's unchanged view of its strategic importance to Unipol and
'b-' SACP.  While the stock of nonperforming loans stabilized in
2015, the ratings were still constrained by the bank's limited
market share, weak asset quality, and poor profitability.

The outlook on all entities was stable at the time of withdrawal,
in line with S&P's outlook on Italy.  The stable outlook on
Unipol Banca reflected S&P's belief that its risk profile had
stabilized and that Unipol would continue to provide timely and
sufficient support to the bank.



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K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


NOSTRUM OIL: Moody's Confirms B2 CFR, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the B2 corporate family
rating and the B2-PD probability of default rating of Nostrum Oil
& Gas Plc.

Moody's has also confirmed the B2 senior unsecured rating of
Zhaikmunai LLP, a wholly owned subsidiary of Nostrum, the issuer
of senior unsecured $400 million and $560 million notes, jointly
and severally guaranteed by its parent, Nostrum, and all of its
subsidiaries.

The outlook on the ratings is negative.  The action concludes the
rating review initiated by Moody's on Jan. 22, 2016.

"Our confirmation of Nostrum's B2 rating reflects the positive
impact of oil hedge on the company's credit metrics in 2016-
2017," says Denis Perevezentsev, a Moody's Vice President --
Senior Credit Officer.  "However, we expect the impact of the
"lower for longer" oil price environment on the correlation
between the company's production profile and drilling program to
make it challenging for Nostrum to ramp up production, leading to
a negative outlook", added Mr Perevezentsev.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The confirmation of Nostrum's rating reflects Moody's view that
the company's financial, operating and liquidity profile remains
commensurate with the B2 rating category.

Nostrum's B2 rating also reflects (1) the company's positive
track record of implementing large investment projects (gas
treatment units (GTU) 1 and 2) and converting reserves; and (2)
beneficial field geology, geographic positioning and reserves'
quality, which account for the company's low production costs.

However, Nostrum's rating remains constrained by the company's
(1) weakening credit metrics owing to low oil prices; (2)
relatively modest scale of operations by international standards
(with average daily production of approximately 40 thousand
barrels of oil equivalent (boe) per day in 2015); (3) high field
concentration, with only one field currently in operation; (4)
large-scale investment plan until 2017, encompassing GTU 3, which
the company expects to complete until the end of 2017; and (5)
Moody's view that the company's liquidity will be largely
absorbed to fund the GTU 3 project, albeit expected to remain
sufficient over the next 18-24 month period.

Brent crude currently oscillates at around $42/barrel (bbl) down
from $112/bbl in June 2014.  Under the base case scenario Moody's
expects that oil prices will rise only gradually in 2016 and 2017
from late 2015 levels in a "lower for longer" environment, with
Brent crude averaging $33/bbl in 2016, rising to $38/bbl in 2017.

In 2015, Nostrum's revenue fell 43% y-o-y to $449 million, and
Moody's-adjusted EBITDA was down 54% to $244 million.  Broadly
stable debt, together with lower EBITDA resulted in leverage
(Moody's-adjusted total debt/EBITDA) rising to 4.2x at end-2015
from 1.9x at end-2014.  With the low oil price environment
expected to remain in 2016-17, this will likely contribute to
leverage remaining elevated at about 4.0x.  Moody's does not
expect a noticeable improvement in leverage, unless oil prices
recover sustainably above the base case assumption.  Substantial
capex requirements associated with the GTU 3 project will result
in negative free cash flows, which Moody's estimates at about
$100-$130 million in 2016-2017 under Moody's base case oil price
scenario, largely depending on the ability of the company to ramp
up production in 2017.

Despite the scaling down of its drilling program and lower
overall capex due to push back of GTU 3 completion from 2016 to
2017, the overall capex program is still ambitious, estimated by
the company at about $250 million in 2016 and at about $180
million in 2017, compared with $271 million in 2015.  About $242
million from the total capex program in 2016-17 relates to GTU 3
construction and has been committed.

The company intends to further grow its reserves base via
investment into licenses and appraisal exploration activities
aimed at transferring possible and probable reserves into proved
reserves.  However, the company had to scale down its drilling
program in the light of the low oil price environment, which
exposes it to the risk that GTU 3 will operate below its capacity
owing to insufficient feedstock, by the time it's commenced at
the end of 2017, if oil prices remain below $44/bbl.  Following
completion of GTU 3, overall capacity will reach 4.2 bcm by the
end of 2017, up from 1.7 bcm currently, and will help to double
production by 2019-20, which could restore the company's credit
metrics.

                  RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook is primarily driven by falling oil prices
and the rating agency's view that it could be challenging for the
company to maintain the same credit profile over the next 12-18
months, in light of the recent sharp decline in earnings as a
result of the continued low oil prices.  This could nevertheless
be mitigated if the GTU 3 is put into operation as planned at the
end of 2017, and if it materially contributes to cash flow
generation from 2018, if oil prices recover substantially.

                WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the negative outlook, upward pressure on Nostrum's ratings
is unlikely at present.  The outlook could be stabilized if
Nostrum were to see a reversal in the recent trend in earnings,
with the EBITDA/interest ratio remaining above 3.5x, while
maintaining an adequate liquidity profile.  Commencement of GTU 3
on time and budget could help achieve adherence to these metrics.

Moody's could downgrade the ratings as a result of any
developments that weaken Nostrum's operational or financial
profile, including (1) a decline in production; (2) deterioration
of debt leverage to over $30,000 per boe of average daily
production on a sustained basis; (3) deterioration of
EBITDA/interest ratio to below 3.5x on a sustained basis; (4)
deterioration in the company's liquidity and financial profile;
and (5) the imposition by the Government of Kazakhstan of
material regulatory and/or contractual changes adversely
affecting the economics of Nostrum's operations.

                      PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Independent Exploration and Production Industry published in
December 2011.

Registered in England and Wales, Nostrum Oil & Gas Plc via its
indirectly owned subsidiary Zhaikmunai LLP, incorporated in
Kazakhstan, is engaged in (1) the exploration, development and
production at the Chinarevskoye oil and gas field; and (2)
exploration of oil and gas at the Rostoshinskoye, Darjinskoye and
Yuzhno-Gremyachinskoye fields under the framework of production
sharing agreements with the Government of Kazakhstan.

Nostrum Oil & Gas's main shareholders are its founder Mr. Frank
Monstrey and his spouse (13%); Mayfair B.V. (25%); and Baring
Vostok Capital Partners via its affiliate Dehus Dolmen Nominees
Limited (15%).  The remaining 43% of total shares are traded in
the form of Ordinary Shares on the London Stock Exchange.

In 2015, Nostrum Oil & Gas reported revenue of $449 million and
its Moody's-adjusted EBITDA amounted to $234 million.  Nostrum's
production in 2015 was approximately 40.4 thousand boe per day
and its proven reserves stood at 147 million boe as of end-2015.



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L U X E M B O U R G
===================


GBP INT'L: S&P Assigns BB+/B Counterparty Credit Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB+' long-term
and 'B' short-term counterparty credit ratings to Luxembourg-
based subsidiary of Gazprombank, Bank GPB International S.A.  The
outlook is negative.

S&P considers Bank GPB International S.A. to be a core subsidiary
of Gazprombank because, in S&P's view, it is integral to the
parent's business growth strategy and highly integrated with its
parent.  S&P expects the subsidiary to receive support from the
parent under any foreseeable circumstances.  In accordance with
S&P's criteria, it rates the subsidiary at the level of S&P's
group credit profile (GCP) for Gazprombank, which is 'bb+'.  S&P
don't assign a stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to Bank GPB
International S.A. because S&P believes that the bank depends on
the rest of the group for its administrative and operational
activities and infrastructure.  These ties make it highly
improbable that the subsidiary would operate independently from
the group.

S&P's assessment of Bank GPB International S.A. as a core
subsidiary to Gazprombank is based on:

   -- The important role the subsidiary plays in servicing
      Gazprombank's clients, notably large Russian corporates
      that conduct a significant part of their business with
      foreign customers through their respective subsidiaries
      established in the EU;

   -- Bank GPB International S.A.'s close integration with the
      parent bank's business strategy and very high degree of
      operational integration with the parent bank in terms of
      business origination, risk management and control, and
      funding allocation; and

   -- The parent bank's strong commitment to this wholly owned
      subsidiary in terms of funding, credit underwriting, risk
      management, and capital, which has been demonstrated to
      date and which S&P expects to continue in the future.

The negative outlook on Bank GPB International S.A. mirrors that
on the parent bank.

S&P could lower the rating if it lowered the foreign currency
ratings on Gazprombank.  A downgrade of Bank GPB International
S.A. could also follow if S&P saw a diminished commitment from
the parent, which would affect its assessment of the bank's group
status.  This could happen if S&P saw a significant strategy
shift by the parent bank, for example if it no longer involved
the subsidiary in servicing its foreign operations in the EU.  At
the moment, however, S&P considers this scenario to be remote.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it took a similar
action on the ratings on the parent.  S&P considers this unlikely
in the near term.



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R U S S I A
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MECHEL OAO: Reaches Debt Restructuring Agreement with Sberbank
--------------------------------------------------------------
Andrey Kuzmin and Jack Stubbs at Reuters report that Mechel on
April 18 said it had agreed a debt restructuring deal with the
country's biggest bank Sberbank totalling RUR30 billion (US$446
million) and US$427 million.

The company controlled by businessman Igor Zyuzin, borrowed
heavily before Russia's economic crisis and has struggled to keep
up repayments as demand for its products weakened alongside
tumbling coal and steel prices, Reuters relates.

It is now in talks to restructure US$5.1 billion, about 80% of
its total debt, with four large creditors: Sberbank, Gazprombank,
VTB and a syndicate of foreign banks, Reuters discloses.

According to Reuters, Mechel said on April 18 its subsidiaries
had reached an agreement with Sberbank to restructure the US$427
million and RUR13 billion of the RUR30 billion total.

The company said a separate agreement regarding the remaining
RUR17 billion owed by its Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant is due
to be completed shortly, Reuters relays.

The company, as cited by Reuters, said it must now repay RUR2.8
billion to Sberbank and its Sberbank Leasing subsidiary to
complete the restructuring deal.

The grace period for Mechel's main debt could be extended until
January 2020, with loans maturing in April 2022, Mechel said, but
only if VTB agrees to similar conditions, Reuters notes.

Mechel is a Russian steel and coal producer.


OCEAN BANK: Placed Under Provisional Administration
---------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1214, dated April 13,
2016, revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit
institution OCEAN BANK JSC from April 13, 2016.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, repeated violations within a year of the
requirements of Bank of Russia regulations issued in accordance
with the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation (Laundering)
of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of Terrorism"
and application of measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)".

OCEAN BANK JSC implemented a high-risk lending policy connected
with the placement of funds in low-quality assets.  Besides, the
bank failed to meet the requirements of Bank of Russia
regulations on countering the legalization (laundering) of
criminally obtained incomes and the financing of terrorism,
including customer identification procedure, and also the
credible notification of the authorized body about operations
subject to obligatory control.  Also, OCEAN BANK JSC was involved
in dubious operations, including dubious transit operations.  The
management and owners of the credit institution did not take
effective measures to normalize its activities.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1215, dated April 13,
2016, has appointed a provisional administration to OCEAN BANK
JSC for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant
to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

OCEAN BANK JSC is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than 1.4 million per one
depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of April 1, 2016, OCEAN
BANK JSC ranked 457th by assets in the Russian banking system.


STELLA-BANK JSC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
--------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1259, dated April 14,
2016, revoked the banking license of Rostov-on-Don-based credit
institution JSC JSCB Stella-Bank from April 14, 2016.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, repeated violations within a year of the
requirements of Bank of Russia regulations issued in accordance
with the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation (Laundering)
of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of Terrorism",
and application of measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)",
considering a real threat to the creditors' and depositors'
interests.

JSC JSCB Stella-Bank implemented high-risk lending policy and
failed to create loan loss provisions adequate to the risks
assumed.  Besides, the bank failed to meet the Bank of Russia
regulations on countering the legalization (laundering) of
criminally obtained incomes and the financing of terrorism,
including, but not limited to, compliance of internal control
rules and submission of credible information to the authorized
body on operations subject to obligatory control.

The credit institution was focused on aggressive fund raising
from the general public.  Under the conditions of restrictions
and bans to encourage deposits introduced by the supervisory
authority JSC JSCB Stella-Bank actively continued accepting them,
including its business units in Moscow, at rates significantly
exceeding the market rate.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1260, dated April 14,
2016, has appointed a provisional administration to JSC JSCB
Stella-Bank for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with the federal laws, the
powers of the credit institution's executive bodies have been
suspended.

JSC JSCB Stella-Bank is a participant in the deposit insurance
system.  The revocation of the banking license is an insured
event as stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance
of Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the
bank's retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said
Federal Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than 1.4 million per one
depositor.

According to financial statements, as of April 1, 2016, JSC JSCB
Stella-Bank ranked 467th by assets in the Russian banking system.



===========
S E R B I A
===========


RTB BOR: To File for Pre-Packaged Bankruptcy for Four Units
-----------------------------------------------------------
Misha Savic at Bloomberg News reports that RTB Bor intends to
file for pre-packaged bankruptcy for all four units before May 31
when its government protection from creditors expires.

According to Bloomberg, the Commercial Court in Zajecar, eastern
Serbia, is expected to approve the plan by end-November, which
extends protection by up to six months.

Priority liabilities include state-backed loan from Export
Development Canada taken to build a new smelter and sulphuric
acid plant, Bloomberg discloses.

RTB Bor, Bloomberg says, is now unable to take new loans and
needs EUR30 million in working capital to boost output from own
mines to feed its smelter.

RTB Bor is Serbia's sole copper miner and smelter.



=========
S P A I N
=========


CIRSA GAMING: Moody's Raises CFR to B1, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded leading Spanish gaming
company Cirsa Gaming Corporation S.A.'s corporate family rating
to B1 from B2 and its probability of default rating to B1-PD from
B2-PD.

At the same time, the rating agency upgraded to B2 from B3 the
ratings of the EUR500 million senior unsecured notes due 2023 and
EUR900 million (EUR450 million outstanding) senior unsecured
notes due 2018, which are both issued by Cirsa Funding Luxembourg
S.A, a wholly owned subsidiary of Cirsa.  The outlook on all
ratings is stable.

"We have upgraded Cirsa to B1 based on its successful efforts to
reduce leverage in 2015 and expectations that it will remain free
cash flow positive, despite an anticipated slowdown in growth
from its operations in Italy and Latin America," says Donatella
Maso, a Moody's Vice President -Senior Analyst.

Concurrently, Moody's assigned a provisional (P)B2 rating to
Cirsa's proposed EUR300 million senior unsecured notes due 2021,
which will also be issued by Cirsa Funding Luxembourg S.A.  The
proceeds from the 2021 notes together with balance sheet cash
will be used to redeem EUR300 million of the outstanding EUR450
million 2018 notes and pay transaction fees.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only.  Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign a definitive rating to the facilities.  A definitive
rating may differ from a provisional rating.

                       RATINGS RATIONALE

   -- UPGRADE OF CFR TO B1

The upgrade of Cirsa's CFR to B1 primarily reflects the company's
robust operating performance in fiscal year (FY) 2015 with
reported revenues up by 18% to EUR1.6 billion, EBITDA up by 16%
to EUR380 million and improved free cash flow generation, which
resulted in Moody's adjusted leverage falling to 3.1x from 3.6x
in FY 2014.

However, Moody's remains cautious on 2016 outlook as the material
depreciation of the Argentinian peso towards end-2015 coupled
with higher taxes in Italy are likely to erode any expected
growth prospects from recent acquisitions and investments.
Therefore, Moody's foresee stable credit metrics in the near
term.

That said, the rating agency expects Cirsa to continue to
generate positive free cash flow.

   -- ASSIGNMENT OF (P)B2 RATING

The assignment of a (P)B2 rating to the proposed 2021 senior
unsecured notes is the same as that of the existing 2018 and 2023
notes, as they rank pari passu.  The proposed refinancing
transaction is credit positive because it will allow Cirsa to
extend the debt maturity profile, and to slightly reduce future
interest expense whilst remaining leverage neutral.

The three sets of notes share a similar guarantee package, that
currently comprise guarantees by material subsidiaries
representing 34.2% and 32.9% of the consolidated assets and
EBITDA.  The (P)B2 rating of the 2021 notes reflects their
position as unsecured obligations within the capital structure.

At the end of December 2015, approximately EUR149 million of
drawn debt effectively ranked senior to the notes due to being
either secured debt or the debt of subsidiaries that are not
guarantors. The capital structure also includes a EUR75 million
revolving credit facility, which is secured by share pledges,
benefits from operating companies' upstream guarantees and ranks
ahead of the notes upon enforcement.

Cirsa's B1 CFR continues to reflect (1) the company's significant
presence in certain emerging markets and therefore exposure to
high operational risk; (2) regulatory risk inherent to the gaming
industry; (3) ongoing weak free cash flow generation, primarily
owing to the capital expenditure required to maintain and grow
the business, albeit improved in FY 2015; (4) exposure to foreign
exchange fluctuations owing to the discrepancy between the main
currency of the debt and its cash flow generation; and (5) its
reliance on its ability to access cash from Latin American
operations to support debt servicing at the parent level.
Moody's also notes that the existence of minority interests
results in pro-rata leverage being higher than reported (fully
consolidated) leverage and cash leakage through dividend outflows
to minorities.

Conversely, the CFR is supported by (1) the company's position as
one of the leading gaming operators in Spain and Latin America,
with diversification in terms of business lines, gaming assets
and geographies; and (2) its moderate leverage following a strong
2015 operating performance; (3) Cirsa's track record in
successfully managing a difficult operating environment; and (4)
the rating agency' s expectation that the company will continue
to mitigate challenges derived from unfavorable macroeconomic
conditions, particularly in Argentina, and adverse regulatory
changes.

                             LIQUIDITY

Cirsa's liquidity profile is adequate as underpinned by (1)
EUR115 million of cash on balance sheet at the end of 2015, but
not excluding any fees related to this transaction; (2) a EUR75
million revolving credit facility, entirely undrawn; and (3) no
imminent debt maturities.

Although it has a reasonable cash balance, approximately EUR60
million of this is needed to run operations.  Additionally,
potential acquisitions and short-term debt repayments, unless
renewed, are likely to erode such buffers over the next 12 to 18
months.  Given its presence in certain emerging markets, the
liquidity profile is also contingent on it being able to access
cash and cash flow successfully on an ongoing basis from these
jurisdictions.

                   RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on Cirsa's ratings reflects Moody's
expectation that the company will be able to mitigate worsening
macro conditions, unfavorable currency movements and higher
taxes, maintaining credit metrics broadly at the current level.
The stable outlook also incorporates the rating agency's
assumption that there will be no further materially adverse
regulations and/or taxation changes, there will no deterioration
in the liquidity and the licenses will be successfully renewed.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Upward pressure could be exerted on the rating if Cirsa's strong
operating performance enables the company to improve its credit
metrics such that the debt/EBITDA ratio (as adjusted by Moody's)
trends to below 2.5x and the EBIT/interest coverage ratio stays
above 2.5x on a sustainable basis.  Upward rating pressure would
also require sustained and meaningful cash flow generation and a
financial policy consistent with a Ba rating category.

Conversely, downward pressure could be exerted on the rating if
Cirsa's adjusted leverage were to increase above 3.5x or its
EBIT/interest coverage ratio were to trend towards 1.5x, whether
as a result of a change in financial policy or a deterioration in
operating performance.  The rating could also come under pressure
if Moody's were to consider Cirsa's liquidity to have become
inadequate to support the company's operations or debt servicing
or if criteria set for the stable outlook were not met.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS:

Upgrades:

Issuer: Cirsa Funding Luxembourg S.A.
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to B2 from B3

Issuer: Cirsa Gaming Corporation, S.A.
  Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to B1 from B2
  Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to B1-PD from B2-PD

Assignments:

Issuer: Cirsa Funding Luxembourg S.A.
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned (P)B2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Cirsa Funding Luxembourg S.A.
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

Issuer: Cirsa Gaming Corporation, S.A.
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

                      PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Gaming
Industry published in June 2014.

Headquartered in Terrassa, Spain, Cirsa is a leading Spanish
gaming company, with substantial operations in Italy and Latin
America. As of April 2016, the company operated 75,309 gaming
machines, 133 casinos, 70 bingo halls, 1,450 betting locations
and 120 arcades. For the year ended December 2014, Cirsa reported
net operating revenues of approximately EUR1.6 billion and EBITDA
of EUR380 million.  The company is controlled by a single
individual, Manuel Lao Hernandez, who owns 100% of Cirsa's
ordinary shares (47.1% directly and 51.0 % indirectly, with the
remainder owned indirectly by members of Mr. Lao's immediate
family).



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


VISTAJET GROUP: S&P Assigns B Long-Term CCR, Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating to private jet services
provider VistaJet Group Holding S.A.  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P assigned 'B' corporate credit ratings to
VistaJet's core subsidiaries VistaJet Malta Finance PLC and
VistaJet Co Finance LLC.  S&P assigned a 'CCC+' issue credit
rating to the $300 million notes due 2020 guaranteed by VistaJet.

The rating on VistaJet reflects S&P's view of its high financial
leverage, as demonstrated by Standard & Poor's-adjusted ratio of
funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 6%, partly offset by
its strong competitive position in the private jet hire industry.

VistaJet's business risk profile reflects S&P's expectation that
its market-leading position in Europe, the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), and the Middle East will enable it to
generate EBITDA margins of around 40%, higher than its peers in
the aviation industry.  The company's profitability is unlikely
to be as volatile as the general aviation industry because its
wealthy customers' spending habits should be less affected by
economic conditions than those of the general public.  This was
highlighted in 2008-2010 when VistaJet, unlike most of the
industry, did not see a material decrease in revenues or EBITDA.
Furthermore, VistaJet's near-global reach and its high retention
rate should act as a key barrier to entry.  The company can serve
most of the globe without charging its customers for empty return
flights.

Offsetting these positive factors, S&P notes that VistaJet
operates at a relatively small scale, although it has been
growing fast.  It operated only 57 aircraft on Dec. 31, 2015.
VistaJet is looking to expand its fleet to about 75 planes by the
end of 2017. This rapid growth increases risks to creditors, in
S&P's view, despite its strong track record in delivering
profitable growth.  A declining proportion of VistaJet's business
comes from countries where S&P assess the risk of doing business
as moderately high or high.  These regions include Russia, Middle
East, and Africa. However, VistaJet has performed well during a
period in which several events have affected its markets.

VistaJet's rapid growth and expansion in new markets such as
China and the U.S. has affected the average utilization per
aircraft in 2015.  It takes time for the company to reach a
mature and efficient operation level, with optimal customer
network coverage. In addition, some planes have been unable to
operate due to delays in gaining permits.  As a result, revenue
growth was slower than fleet growth.  However, S&P understands
that these permit issues have now been solved and S&P expects the
company to start performing in the underpenetrated U.S. market,
where its global network offers a large growth opportunity.

In 2015, VistaJet's financial performance was hampered by changes
to exchange rates, particularly the weakening of the euro against
the U.S. dollar -- about 50% of its revenue is euro-denominated.
The company's revenues were also hit by the falling price of
fuel. VistaJet does not take oil price risk; instead it passes
the risk to customers, who benefit from lower oil prices.  When
fuel costs increase, S&P would expect to see these passed onto
the customer as well.  Despite these issues, S&P expects the
company to deliver EBITDA of about $145 million-$150 million in
2015, compared with $123 million in 2014.  VistaJet's leverage is
likely to remain high as it raised new debt to fund its business
expansion plan.

In S&P's base-case scenario, it anticipates that VistaJet will
remain highly leveraged in the coming years.  The key base-case
assumptions include:

   -- Revenues to grow materially in 2016 as the number and
      utilization of its aircraft increases, partly offset by the
      lower price per flying hour caused by the lower price of
      jet fuel.

   -- Variable costs to increase in line with growth in the total
      number of hours flown.  This should allow EBITDA margins to
      reach about 40%.

   -- A further 15 aircraft to be delivered in 2016, leading to
      further increase in debt.

   -- As a result of its high rate of expansion, VistaJet's cash
      flow measures will lag its capital structure -- aircraft
      and the associated leverage will be on balance sheet before
      the aircraft start to contribute.  Weighted-average funds
      from operations (FFO) to debt of about 6% for 2016-2017.
      Supplemental ratios, such as free operating cash flow to
      debt and cash flow from operations will also indicate a
      highly leveraged capital structure.  The interest cover
      ratios will be slightly stronger, with an EBITDA interest
      cover ratio of about 2.4x.

   -- Despite its relatively strong operating cash flow, S&P
      expects the company to raise additional financing to
      maintain its liquidity levels while supporting debt
      amortization and aircraft financing.

S&P's issue ratings incorporate the material number of aircraft
and key operating entities that are domiciled in Malta.  Because
S&P has not performed a jurisdictional survey of Malta, S&P
determines the difference between the corporate credit rating and
the issue rating by considering the amount of priority
obligations ranking ahead of the senior unsecured bondholders.
As VistaJet's current capital structure mainly consists of
finance leases and nearly all aircraft are secured, it has a
limited number of unencumbered assets.  S&P calculates that
priority obligations would take up more than 70% of the group's
total assets, and therefore S&P assigns an issue rating two
notches below the corporate credit rating, at 'CCC+'.

The liquidity assessment is less than adequate, primarily because
the ratio of liquidity sources to uses for the upcoming 12 months
stands slightly above 1x.  Liquidity has been constrained because
the number of aircraft has expanded quickly, but the company has
encountered delays in delivering improved cash flow from those
aircraft.  This will likely to result in liquidity pressures if
the company underperforms S&P's base-case expectations and does
not succeed in raising additional funds to offset new aircraft
deliveries and the amortization of debt financing.

S&P forecasts that the company's main liquidity sources for the
12 months from March 31, 2016, will include:

   -- About $57 million in unrestricted cash;
   -- About $110 million-$120 million in operating cash flows
      after interest and taxes paid, as calculated in S&P's base-
      case operating scenario;
   -- About $30 million-$50 million in working capital related to
      deposit on new Flight Solutions Program hours; and
   -- About $532 million in committed credit financing for
      aircraft orders and other business-related activity.

S&P estimates that VistaJet's main liquidity needs over the same
period will include:

   -- About $180 million in debt amortization; and
   -- About $576 million in committed capital expenditure.

S&P understands that VistaJet could access liquidity through
other, noncommitted sources, such as by raising equity in the
market or selling aircraft.

The negative outlook reflects the potential liquidity pressure if
VistaJet's high expansion rate does not translate into stronger
cash flow generation over the next few quarters or if the company
does not succeed in raising additional liquidity sources to
finance committed aircraft deliveries while paying down its
mandatory aircraft financing.

S&P could lower the rating in the next few quarters if it sees
that VistaJet's strategy of expanding the business is leading to
further delays in ramping up cash flow generation.  This could
erode the company's liquidity sources, unless there are
sufficient offsetting factors, such as timely aircraft disposal
or alternatives to improve sources of liquidity.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if VistaJet's liquidity
position stabilizes, owing to measures to boost liquidity sources
or significant improvement to cash flow generation above S&P's
base-case scenario.

A revision of the outlook to stable would also be contingent on
S&P's view of VistaJet's ability to maintain a ratio of FFO to
debt of more than 7%, which S&P views as commensurate with the
'B' rating.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


POINT VILLAGE: Receivers Sue Dunnes Stores Over EUR15MM Funds
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ann O'Loughlin at Irish Examiner reports that Dunnes Stores, by
refusing to release EUR15 million funds allegedly due under a
settlement agreement, is frustrating the ability of the receivers
over the Point Village Development to fund the continuing works
at the Point Village Centre in Dublin's docklands.

The receivers of Point Village Development Ltd., PVDL, have gone
to court in a bid to get Dunnes Stores to release EUR15 million
it says is due under a settlement agreement, Irish Examiner
relates.

Mr. Justice Brian McGovern on April 19 entered the case into the
Commercial Court list, the big business division of the High
Court, Irish Examiner discloses.

The receivers, Stephen Tennant and Paul McCann of Grant Thornton,
have claimed there is an urgent need for the dispute to be
determined, Irish Examiner relays.


RHINO MIDCO: Moody's Withdraws B1 CFR Following Take-Over
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service withdrew the B1 corporate family rating
and Ba3-PD probability of default rating of Rhino Midco 2 Limited
(Rhiag), following the acquisition of the company by LKQ
Corporation (Ba1 negative) and repayment of the entire debt
structure.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Based on the early redemption of the EUR200 million Floating Rate
Senior Secured Notes and EUR265 million 7.25% Senior Secured
Notes on March 24 2016, Moody's has withdrawn the B1 CFR and Ba3-
PD PDR ratings of Rhiag as the obligation is not outstanding.


TATA STEEL: Greybull Eyes Acquisition of Speciality Steels Arm
--------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Bounds, Jim Pickard and Michael Pooler at The Financial
Times report that the private equity group that is reviving the
British Steel brand is considering making a bid for another chunk
of Tata's UK business.

According to the FT, Greybull Capital, which is close to buying
the Scunthorpe-based long products division, is also assessing
Tata's speciality steels arm, which employs about 2,000 people.

The business produces high-end steel for aircraft, oil drilling
and cars from two sites in Rotherham and Stocksbridge near
Sheffield, with customers including Rolls-Royce and Jaguar Land
Rover, the FT discloses.

Two people close to the process have confirmed Greybull's
interest and that representatives of the family-owned fund
visited Rotherham on April 11, the FT relays.  Greybull, as cited
by the FT, said it would not comment on speculation, adding that
its focus was on completing the Scunthorpe transaction, which
could save 4,800 jobs.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April, 14,
2016, The Financial Times related that the day of reckoning for
the British steel industry has been set for May 28, with Tata
Steel planning to close down its UK arm if it is unable to
negotiate a viable sale by that date.  The Indian steel group
caused shockwaves at the end of March when it announced that it
would sell its British division, either as a whole or in parts,
after making substantial losses for several years, the FT
disclosed.  Ministers at the time urged the company to give four
to six weeks to try to find a buyer for the business, which
includes a vast steelworks at Port Talbot in south Wales,
according to the FT.

Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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