TCREUR_Public/160427.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Wednesday, April 27, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 082



BANK OF CYPRUS: Fitch Hikes LT Issuer Default Rating to B-


MAISONS DU MONDE: S&P Puts B CCR on CreditWatch Positive


CREGSTAR BIDCO: Moody's Withdraws B2 CFR, Outlook Stable
T&A KERNOGHAN: To Enter Administration, 50 Jobs at Risk
TITAN EUROPE 2007-2: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. A2 Notes to B+


BANK OF ASTANA: S&P Puts B/B Ratings on CreditWatch Negative


INTRALOT CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws Negative Outlook on 'B' Rating


TRANSBALKAN AD: Shares Delisted Following Bankruptcy


DANIELS SHOPPING: Investors, Directors Appeal Insolvency Ruling


HARBOURMASTER CLO 4: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to Dsf


EURASIA DRILLING: S&P Affirms BB CCR, Outlook Negative
GLOBEXBANK: S&P Affirms BB-/B Counterparty Credit Ratings
IBA-MOSCOW BANK: Fitch Assigns Final BB Rating to RUB3BB Bonds
INTERACTIVE BANK: Placed Under Provisional Administration
RUSSIA: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Sovereign Rating, Outlook Negative

SAMARA OBLAST: S&P Affirms BB ICR, Outlook Remains Negative
SVIAZ-BANK: S&P Affirms BB-/B Counterparty Ratings, Outlook Neg.
TENEX-SERVICE: S&P Affirms BB/B Counterparty Credit Ratings
X5 RETAIL: S&P Revises Outlook to Positive & Affirms BB- CCR


EMPARK FUNDING: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3, Outlook Stable
ENAITINERE SAU: S&P Affirms Prelim. BB- CCR Then Withdraws
TELE PIZZA: Moody's Puts B2 CFR on Review for Upgrade


OVAKO GROUP: Moody's Affirms B3 CFR, Outlook Stable

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ASCENTIAL PLC: Moody's Withdraws Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
AUSTIN REED: Enters Administration, 1,000+ Jobs at Risk
BHS GROUP: MPs to Investigate Impact of Collapse on Pensions
GALAXY FINCO: Moody's Affirms B2 CFR & Changes Outlook to Pos.
GREEN CITY: Euro Insol Appointed as Judicial Liquidator

ODEON & UCI: S&P Raises Long-Term CCR to B-; Outlook Stable
TESCO PLC: Egan-Jones Cuts FC Sr. Unsecured Rating to BB



BANK OF CYPRUS: Fitch Hikes LT Issuer Default Rating to B-
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Bank of Cyprus Public Company Ltd's
(BoC) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B-' from 'CCC' and
Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited's (HB) Long-Term IDR to 'B'
from 'B-'. The Outlooks for the two banks' Long-Term IDRs are
Stable. A full list of rating actions is at the end of this Rating
Action Commentary.

These rating actions reflect Fitch's expectation that some
improvement in the economic environment in Cyprus and the
implementation of reforms to its insolvency framework will support
domestic banks' efforts to manage and reduce very high non-
performing loan volumes and enhance recoveries, primarily via
forbearance. Investor confidence is also improving following the
completion of the international bailout program in March 2016 and
customer deposits in the system have remained broadly stable since
capital controls were fully lifted in April 2015.

Nevertheless, these banks' ratings remain deeply sub-investment
grade, in particular because their capitalization is still highly
vulnerable to their very weak asset quality. Their internal
capital generation capacity is also weak given that modest pre-
impairment operating profits are eroded by impairment charges.



BoC's and HB's Long-Term IDRs are based on their VRs, which
reflect their respective standalone creditworthiness. The very
weak asset quality and its capital encumbrance to unreserved
problem loans are factors that have a high influence on both
banks' VRs.

As a result of the deep recession and restructuring of the banking
sector in the past three years, both banks are exposed to
exceptionally large non-performing exposures (NPEs, as per the
EBA's definition) representing 62% of gross loans at BoC and 56%
at HB (excluding suspended income) at end-2015. However, we
believe that 2015 was an turning point for these banks' asset
quality as they experienced a decline in 2H15. At the same time,
the composition of NPEs is also improving as a larger proportion
of them are being restructured.

The NPE reserve coverages also improved in 2015 as both banks
allocated their pre- impairment profits to build additional
provisions. However, at end-2015 coverage for NPEs remained low by
international standards.

Both banks have reinforced their loss-absorption buffers since
September 2014 through equity issuance and as of end-2015 had
acceptable Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratios (12.1% for BoC and
13.4% for HB). However, their capital is tied up with their large
unreserved NPEs, which at end-2015 represented around 360% of FCC
at BoC and around 246% of FCC at HB.

The stability of customer deposits in Cyprus since the full
removal of capital controls in April 2015 has supported the banks'
funding profiles. At end-2015 HB had a low gross loans/deposit
ratio (excluding suspended income) 66% of which underpins its good
liquidity position. At the same date, BoC's gross loan/deposit
ratio remained high at 159%. To fund the gap between loans and
deposits BoC relies on central bank funds, largely from the
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) facility. However, BoC has
been progressively reducing this reliance and we expect this trend
to continue in 2016 in the absence of any unforeseen liquidity


BoC's and HB's Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'No Floor' reflect Fitch's expectation that support from
the state, while possible, cannot be relied upon despite the two
banks' systemic importance to Cyprus, with deposit market shares
of around 28% for BoC and 14% for HB at end-2015. This belief is
due mainly to the limited resources at the Cypriot authorities'
disposal, as demonstrated primarily by the receipt of an
international support package of EUR10bn and the March 2013
imposition of losses on BoC's senior creditors.



Upside rating potential is limited in the short term, but BoC's
and HB's VRs, and hence their IDRs, could be upgraded if they
accelerate the recoveries on their exceptionally large problem
loan stocks, thus reducing the vulnerability of their capital to
further stress in asset quality. We believe that the new
insolvency framework and the improvement in the economic prospects
for Cyprus could help the banks to make progress in sustainably
restructuring larger loan volumes. In the case of BoC, the VR
would also benefit from a reduction in the funding imbalances. We
expect the bank to continue reducing its reliance on central bank
funding progressively in the next 18 months.

A material deterioration in asset quality that jeopardizes
solvency, or any unforeseen shocks to the stability of the banks'
customer deposit bases could result in a downgrade of the VRs. In
the latter scenario, Fitch believes that BoC would be more at risk
of a VR downgrade than HB.


Fitch believes there is little upside potential for BoC's and HB's
SR and SRF. This is due to the authorities' limited capacity to
provide future support, the presence of a resolution scheme with
bail-in tools that have already been implemented, but also in
light of a clear intention to reduce implicit state support for
financial institutions in the EU, following the implementation of
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and Single Resolution

The rating actions are as follows:

Bank of Cyprus

Long-Term IDR: upgraded to 'B-' from 'CCC'; Stable Outlook

Short-Term IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'C'

Viability Rating: upgraded to 'b-' from 'ccc'

Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Hellenic Bank

Long-Term IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'B-'; Stable Outlook

Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'

Viability Rating: upgraded to 'b' from 'b-'

Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'


MAISONS DU MONDE: S&P Puts B CCR on CreditWatch Positive
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it placed its 'B'
corporate credit rating on France-based decoration and furniture
retailer Magnolia (BC) S.A. (Maisons du Monde) on CreditWatch with
positive implications.

At the same time, S&P placed the 'BB' issue rating on Maisons du
Monde's EUR60 million super senior revolving credit facility
(RCF), and the 'B' issue rating on its EUR325 million senior
secured notes on CreditWatch positive.  The recovery rating of
'1+' on the EUR60 million super senior RCF is unchanged,
indicating S&P's high expectation of full (100%) recovery in the
event of a payment default.  The recovery rating on the EUR325
million senior secured notes is also unchanged at '3', indicating
S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-70%) in the event of
a default.

S&P expects to withdraw the issue and recovery ratings on these
debt issues after the IPO, when the notes will be refinanced with
new facilities.

The CreditWatch placement follows the announcement of the group's
registration of its "document de base," the first step toward an
IPO on the regulated market of Euronext Paris.  In the proposed
transaction, Maisons du Monde plans to utilize proceeds from the
IPO, as well as new senior credit facilities, to meaningfully
reduce leverage.  S&P's CreditWatch placement reflects the
likelihood it could raise the ratings by at least one notch on
completion of the IPO and planned debt reduction.

In the proposed transaction, Maisons du Monde looks to raise about
EUR150 million-EUR180 million in equity capital via an IPO.  The
company also announced that it has entered into a new senior
credit facilities agreement with a pool of banks that will provide
Maisons du Monde with EUR250 million of term loan and EUR75
million of RCF on the IPO settlement date.  The company has
indicated its intention to utilize proceeds from the proposed
transaction to meaningfully reduce debt, which is expected to
result in debt to EBITDA of below 4x on a Standard & Poor's-
adjusted basis.  Additionally, all preferred equity certificates
(PECs) and related interest will convert to equity in the proposed

S&P understands that, after the transaction, current financial
sponsor Bain Capital will retain effective control of company
decisions as Bain will hold a shareholder majority on the board of
directors.  Any positive rating action will be dependent upon
S&P's view of a more conservative financial policy and an
assessment of the sponsor's capacity and willingness to sustain
adjusted debt to EBITDA of below 5x.  If S&P viewed the company's
financial policy as supportive of a stronger financial risk
profile, and the risk of releveraging beyond 5x debt to EBITDA as
low, S&P could revise upward the company's financial risk profile
from the highly leveraged category.

S&P's current 'B' corporate credit rating continues to reflect its
view of Maisons du Monde's fair business risk profile, reflecting
its operations in a fragmented French decoration and furniture
market that is sensitive to declines in disposable income and real
estate volumes.  In S&P's view, Maisons du Monde's business model
entails some degree of fashion and inventory risks.  Nevertheless,
the company has managed to outperform the industry over the past
few years, thanks to an attractive offering, above-average
operating efficiency, and a good multichannel strategy --
translating into steady market share gains over the same period.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch after Maisons du Monde
completes the IPO, which is likely to occur over the coming

S&P will likely raise the corporate credit rating on Maisons du
Monde by at least one notch if the IPO is successful and the group
is able to reduce debt as planned.  Before resolving the
CreditWatch, S&P will assess Maisons du Monde's capital structure
and financial policies following the IPO, together with any
potential changes to the group's use of proceeds.


CREGSTAR BIDCO: Moody's Withdraws B2 CFR, Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the B2 corporate family
rating and the B2-PD probability of default rating of Cregstar
Bidco Limited (Creganna).  The outlook on all ratings was stable
prior to the withdrawal.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.

Cregstar Bidco Limited (Creganna), headquartered in Galway,
Ireland, is a manufacturer of delivery devices and related
components used in minimally invasive surgical procedures.  In
2014, Creganna reported revenue of USD188 million.  On April 4,
2016, TE Connectivity Ltd. (unrated), a parent company of Tyco
Electronics Group SA (Baa1/stable) and a leading provider of
engineered electrical components, acquired Creganna for USD895
million (GBP622 million) from funds advised and controlled by
private-equity company Permira.

T&A KERNOGHAN: To Enter Administration, 50 Jobs at Risk
Margaret Canning at Belfast Telegraph reports that T&A Kernoghan
Ltd. is to go into administration, putting 50 jobs at risk and
leading to major losses for its creditors.

The insolvency of the long-established Newtownabbey firm is
expected to have a grave impact on sub-contractors engaged by the
firm to carry out work, Belfast Telegraph says.

According to Belfast Telegraph, business advisory firm BDO is
expected to be appointed administrators of the company this week.

BDO on April 25 said it would not be commenting on the
administration process, Belfast Telegraph notes.  But it's
understood BDO is being appointed as administrator by Upstream
Capital, a finance house which had provided initial invoice
financing of รบ650,000 to T&A Kernoghan, Belfast Telegraph states.

Last week the company faced a winding-up order from Michael Moore
Contracts, a one-man painting and decorating business in Co Down,
Belfast Telegraph relates.

And earlier this year, Paw Structures, a structural engineering
firm based in Yorkshire, also took a winding-up petition against
the firm, though that petition has also been delayed until later
this year, Belfast Telegraph recounts.

T&A Kernoghan was last year removed from two major contracts in
Scotland following delays in delivery, Belfast Telegraph

According to Belfast Telegraph, a hearing over the winding-up
petition brought against the firm by Michael Moore Contracts was
adjourned until June in a court hearing on April 21.

T&A Kernoghan Ltd. is a Co Antrim building firm.

TITAN EUROPE 2007-2: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. A2 Notes to B+
Standard & Poor's ratings Services lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from
'BB- (sf)' its credit rating on Titan Europe 2007-2 Ltd.'s class
A2 notes.

The downgrade follows S&P's review of the transaction in light of
the approaching April 2017 legal final maturity date.

Since closing in June 2007, 15 loans have repaid with six
experiencing total losses of EUR20.05 million.  In this
transaction, principal losses materialize through non-accruing
interest amounts.  The transaction is now backed by three loans
(MPC loan, Cobalt loan, and Skoduv Palace loan) secured by 72
commercial properties located throughout Europe.

S&P's ratings on Titan Europe 2007-2's notes address timely
payment of interest and repayment of principal not later than the
April 2017 legal final maturity date.

Although S&P considers the class A2 notes' available credit
enhancement to adequately mitigate the risk of principal losses
from the underlying loans in higher stress scenarios, S&P notes
that the transaction's legal final maturity date is now 12 months
away.  S&P believes that property sales will likely occur before
the legal final maturity date.  However, S&P is not certain that
these sales will happen in time to allow the issuer to repay these
notes by their legal final maturity date in April 2017.

Taking the above factor into account, S&P considers that the
transaction has become increasingly exposed to timing risk
relating to the repayment of principal no later than the legal
final maturity date.  Therefore, in accordance with S&P's credit
stability criteria and its European CMBS criteria, S&P has lowered
to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' its rating on the class A2 notes.


Titan Europe 2007-2 Ltd.
EUR1.669 bil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes
Class             Identifier              To            From
A2                XS0302921381            B+ (sf)       BB- (sf)


BANK OF ASTANA: S&P Puts B/B Ratings on CreditWatch Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it placed its 'B/B'
long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings and 'kzBB'
Kazakhstan national scale rating on Bank of Astana on CreditWatch
with negative implications.

S&P's rating action reflects the materially reduced capitalization
of Bank of Astana at year-end 2015, a delay in the planned capital
injection until later in 2016, and uncertainty about whether the
bank will be able to restore its capitalization and maintain it at
strong levels in 2016-2017.

The bank's risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio, calculated according
to S&P's methodology, halved to 6.7% at year-end 2015, from 13.1%
at year-end 2014.  Contrary to S&P's previous expectations based
on the budgeted 10% growth of loan book, the bank's assets
increased by 76% in 2015.  S&P estimates that less than half of
this increase was accounted for by high depreciation of the Kazakh
tenge (KZT) since August 2015.  Such high asset growth was not
supported by proportionate shareholder capital injections, while
internal capital generation remained low.  This led to significant
depletion of the bank's capital levels in the second half of 2015.

The bank's management intends to implement the following to
restore and maintain capitalization above 10%, as measured by
S&P's RAC ratio, in 2016-2017:

   -- Replacement of higher risk-weighted corporate loans with
      less risky exposures, which would result in a reduction in
      risk-weighted assets by about 10% in 2016;

   -- Growth of risk-weighted assets of not more than 5% in 2017;

   -- A KZT8 billion (about $24 million as of April 22, 2016)
      shareholder capital injection in 2016;

   -- Full earnings retention;

   -- A return on adjusted assets of about 1%; and

   -- Cost of risk of about 3.0%-3.5%.

S&P views the capital injection and ability of the bank to
maintain capitalization at strong levels as uncertain (S&P views a
strong level as a forecast RAC ratio sustainably above 10% in
2016-2017).  If the bank does not register new capital injection
or is not on track in reducing its risk-weighted assets within the
next three months, S&P will revise its assessment of its capital
and earnings to adequate from strong.

The ratings on Bank of Astana reflect the 'bb-' anchor, which is
the starting point for rating commercial banks operating in
Kazakhstan.  They also reflect the bank's weak business position
due to its small asset base and modest franchise in the Kazakh
banking sector, as well as a short track record of the new
strategy implemented by the new management team.  S&P currently
assess the capital and earnings position as strong, subject to new
capital provision, as described above.  S&P's moderate risk
position assessment reflects the risks associated with managing
rapid loan growth and S&P's expectation of moderate asset quality
deterioration reflecting seasoning of loans amid a less favorable
economic environment.  S&P assess the bank's funding as average
and its liquidity as adequate and in line with other rated small
Kazakh banks.  The issuer credit rating on the bank is at the
level of its stand-alone credit profile (SACP) of 'b' because S&P
considers the bank to be of low systemic importance and S&P do not
expect support from the Kazakh government.

The CreditWatch status reflects S&P's uncertainty regarding Bank
of Astana's ability to restore and maintain its capitalization at
a strong level in 2016-2017.  S&P plans to resolve the CreditWatch
within the next three months.

S&P expects to lower our long-term rating on the bank to 'B-', and
the short-term rating to 'C' if the bank has not registered the
KZT8 billion capital increase within the next three months, or if
the capital injection is insufficient to maintain strong
capitalization in light of the bank's future asset growth.

S&P could affirm the ratings and revise the outlook to stable if
it receives sufficient evidence that the KZT8 billion capital
increase has been registered and will be sufficient to maintain
strong capitalization buffers, with S&P's forecast RAC ratio being
comfortably above 10% in 2016-2017.  This scenario also assumes
that the bank's risk position will not deteriorate and its funding
and liquidity metrics will remain adequate.


INTRALOT CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws Negative Outlook on 'B' Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has corrected by
withdrawing the negative outlook it had assigned to the rating on
the senior unsecured notes issued by Intralot Capital Luxemburg
S.A. and Intralot Finance Luxemburg S.A.  The ratings were
incorrectly assigned an outlook on July 10, 2015.  The ratings on
the notes remain 'B' and are unaffected by the action.


TRANSBALKAN AD: Shares Delisted Following Bankruptcy
The Board of Directors of the Macedonian Stock Exchange at a
session held on April 25 decided to remove the ordinary shares
issued by Transbalkan AD Gevgelija from listing on the Macedonian
Stock Exchange, due to an opened bankruptcy procedure.

Shares issued by Transbalkan AD Gevgelija will be delisted from
the Sub-segment Obligatory Listing starting from April 27.


DANIELS SHOPPING: Investors, Directors Appeal Insolvency Ruling
Times of Malta reports that the shareholders and directors of
Daniels Shopping Complex have appealed a court order which
declared the company insolvent, claiming a breach of their right
to a fair hearing and their right not to be discriminated against.

According to Times of Malta, they said in a statement, "It results
from the acts of the case instituted by Panta Contracting Limited
that the shareholders, the directors and the company were
prevented from adequately defending themselves against the claims
of the creditor company".

They pointed out that even before the court declaration was
issued, they had instituted a constitutional case claiming that
their right to a fair hearing and their right not to be
discriminated against had been violated, Times of Malta notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 26,
2016, legal action was taken against the owners of the complex in
2014 by one of its creditors, Panta Contracting Ltd., over an
outstanding debt of EUR1.5 million.  According to Times of Malta,
the court heard that, apart from the debt with Panta Contracting,
the company responsible for the shopping complex, D.A. Holdings,
had several other creditors, who were owed over EUR12 million plus
interest.  Panta Contracting argued that D.A. Holdings was in a
state of insolvency and only appeared solvent on paper due to a
EUR20 million revaluation of its properties in 2012, the last time
the company filed its accounts, Times of Malta disclosed.


HARBOURMASTER CLO 4: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to Dsf
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn Harbourmaster CLO 4
B.V.'s notes, as follows:

  Class B2E (ISIN XS0203062467): downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'
  and withdrawn

  Class B2F (ISIN XS0203063945): downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'
  and withdrawn

Harbourmaster CLO 4 B.V. was a 2004 vintage CLO securitization of
a portfolio of mainly European senior secured and unsecured loans.
The portfolio was managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Management
Europe Limited.


The transaction has liquidated the portfolio and repaid in full
the class B1 notes. All senior notes have previously repaid in
full. There is currently no portfolio outstanding and Fitch has
been informed that the B2 notes have been cancelled and delisted.
The class B2E and B2F notes, which were originally rated 'BBsf' by
Fitch, were not repaid in full on the last payment date as per the
11 April trustee report. Fitch has therefore downgraded the notes
to 'Dsf' and withdrawn the ratings.

At issuance, the class B2 notes had 5.2% credit enhancement, which
is below the average credit enhancement for 'Bsf' rated tranches
in current CLO 2.0 transactions. The B2E notes were issued at an
original face value of EUR4m whereas the B2F notes were issued at
EUR6m. Both notes received principal repayments due to a reverse
turbo mechanism in the transaction and so were 73% and 74.4%
outstanding, respectively.

The notes were downgraded to 'B-sf' in January 2010 and then to
'CCCsf' in February 2013, 'CCsf' in January 2014 and 'Csf' in
December 2015.


Not applicable.


No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's initial
closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


EURASIA DRILLING: S&P Affirms BB CCR, Outlook Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB' long-term and
'B' short-term corporate credit ratings on Russia-based oilfield
services company Eurasia Drilling Co. (EDC).  The outlook is

At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'ruAA' Russia national scale
rating on EDC.  S&P also affirmed its 'BB' issue rating on EDC's
senior unsecured debt.

The affirmation reflects S&P's expectation that Eurasia's
operating performance in 2016-2017 will remain robust, despite the
current difficult market conditions in the oilfield services

Global spending in the oil and gas exploration and production
industry plunged by nearly 25% in 2015, and S&P expects a further
fall in 2016.  The Russian oil market, however, is more resilient
to the continuously low oil price than the global market, mostly
owing to the recent ruble devaluation and supportive tax
regulation.  Russian oil and gas producers have consequently cut
their capital expenditures (capex) only moderately so far, with
LUKoil at the top of the list, leading to more stable domestic
demand for oilfield services.  The increased complexity of
services provided (due to the mature nature of the key oil-
producing fields) is providing additional support.

S&P expects 2016 will be the weakest year for EDC in terms of
credit metrics, with the main ratios likely to be lower than what
S&P sees commensurate with the rating.  However, S&P foresees
improvement already as of 2017, thanks to debt reduction and some
strengthening in industry conditions.  Specifically, S&P expects
funds from operations (FFO) to debt will dip below 25% in 2016,
but improve to at least 30% in 2017.

EDC's liquidity remains supportive for the rating.  The company
continues to proactively manage its capital structure and has
recently extended the maturity of a $40 million shareholder loan
until 2019 and a $150 million loan from its key customer, LUKoil,
until year-end 2017.  S&P also views positively the company's plan
to further strengthen its capital structure via additional
extensions of current maturities and the partial replacement of
U.S. dollar-denominated debt with ruble-denominated debt.  S&P
expects EDC will benefit from sustainably positive free operating
cash flow generation, supported by materially lower capex compared
with historical levels since the completed construction of jack-up
rigs and finalization of the fleet renovation program.  S&P also
views positively the absence of dividends until the company
achieves its internal target of net leverage (debt to EBITDA) of
less than 2.0x.

EDC's business risk, which we assess as fair, continues to be
supported by its leading positions on the domestic drilling market
and long-term relations with its key customers, LUKoil and Gazprom
Neft.  S&P regards EDC's resumed cooperation with Russia's largest
oil company, Rosneft, as favorable and think it should somewhat
offset the declining volumes from LUKoil and further strengthen
EDC's customer mix.

In S&P's base case for EDC, S&P assumes:

   -- Revenues dropping by about 20% in 2016, and growing by
      about 5% in 2017-2018;

   -- An EBITDA margin of about 25% for our 2016-2018 forecast

   -- Capex at close to maintenance levels of about $115 million
      for 2016, mainly thanks to completed construction of jack-
      up rigs and finalization of the fleet renovation program.
      S&P thinks the company will be able to maintain capex of
      $120 million-EUR130 million over the next few years, in the
      event the oil price recovery stretches out longer than S&P
      currently expects; and

   -- No dividend payments in 2016-2017.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Forecast unadjusted EBITDA of about $350 million in 2016
      and recovering to $400 million and higher thereafter
     (taking into account the impact on EDC's profits of the
      weakening ruble, in which most contracts are denominated);

   -- FFO to debt of 23%-27% in 2016 and then increasing to more
      than 30% in 2017; and

   -- Debt to EBITDA at about 3.0x in 2016 and then decreasing to
      below 3.0x thereafter.

S&P applies a downward notch of adjustment to its rating on EDC to
incorporate S&P's comparable ratings analysis, under which it
takes into account the company's high geographic concentration and
its credit metrics, which are currently at the lower end of the
range for the current rating.

S&P considers EDC's liquidity as adequate based on a ratio of
liquidity sources to liquidity uses at about 1.2x for the 12
months started Feb. 29, 2016.

S&P notes the company's efforts to improve liquidity, including
its extension of loan maturities and replacement of some dollar-
denominated loans with loans in rubles.

S&P forecasts these principal liquidity sources during the 12
months to Feb. 28, 2017, to include:

   -- Cash and equivalents of about $265 million;
   -- Expected FFO slightly exceeding $240 million; and
   -- About $30 million guaranteed in the form of a returned

S&P projects that liquidity uses for the same period will include:

   -- Contractual debt amortization of about $245 million;
   -- Capex of about $115 million; and
   -- The remaining payment to Global Depository Receipts holders
      of just below $80 million.

EDC is subject to certain covenants under existing facilities.
S&P estimates the headroom under these covenants as adequate as of
March 1, 2016.

The negative outlook primarily reflects the current tough
conditions in the oilfield services market, which may result in
lower cash flow generation at EDC, especially given that its
revenues are ruble denominated.  S&P expects 2016 to be the
weakest year for EDC in terms of credit ratios, with modest
recovery in FFO to debt starting only in 2017 as hydrocarbon
prices recover.

S&P might downgrade EDC if demand for oilfield services declines
more than S&P currently anticipates and does not recover in 2017.
S&P could also lower its rating on EDC if its FFO to debt stays at
below 30% for a prolonged period of time.  In addition, weakening
liquidity could trigger rating downside.

S&P might revise the outlook to stable if EDC's credit metrics
improve, such that FFO to debt improves to 35%-40%, and the
company continues to demonstrate proactive liquidity management.
For a higher rating, S&P would expect markedly stronger credit
metrics, with FFO to debt sustainably above 45%.  Additional
factors that would support rating upside are lessening exposure to
exchange-rate volatility and a longer-term debt maturity profile.

GLOBEXBANK: S&P Affirms BB-/B Counterparty Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Russia-based GLOBEXBANK.
The outlook is negative.

S&P also affirmed its 'ruAA-' Russia national scale rating on the

S&P removed the global scale long-term and Russia national scale
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they
were placed on Dec. 9, 2015.

The rating actions reflect S&P's understanding that
Vnesheconombank (VEB) has decided to postpone the divestment of
GLOBEXBANK for time being and that the bank will continue to
receive support from VEB.  Although VEB has restated its intention
to sell some assets that don't fit into its long-term strategy,
including GLOBEXBANK, S&P sees disposal of GLOBEXBANK as highly
unlikely over the next 12-18 months, given the subsidiary's weak
financial profile as well as a lack of appetite from acquirers.
The divestment of GLOBEXBANK is only possible with government
approval, because of VEB's special role as a government
development group.  This, combined with the recent confirmation of
support from VEB, leads S&P to expect the parent will continue
providing timely and sufficient support to GLOBEXBANK in form of
liquidity and capital in most foreseeable circumstances.

Therefore, S&P continues to assess GLOBEXBANK as a strategically
important subsidiary within the VEB group and incorporate an
additional three notches of support to the stand-alone credit
profile (SACP) into S&P's rating on the bank.  However, S&P might
revise its assessment of the bank's status within the group if S&P
observes that VEB's ability to provide support to GLOBEXBANK is
increasingly limited because of its own financial constraints.

S&P believes that GLOBEXBANK's SACP has deteriorated over past
several months due to elevated credit costs over 2015 and a
pending Russian ruble (RUB) 10 billion (about $150 million) Tier 1
capital increase.  S&P understands that the capital increase was
delayed due to ongoing discussions with regard to the VEB group
structure.  Currently, S&P expects higher capital support from the
parent in the form of a Tier 1 capital injection of RUB20 billion-
RUB27 billion (about US$300 million-US$409 million) to be provided
over 2016.  S&P believes that such a capital increase will likely
support our forecasted risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio (before
adjustments for diversification) for the bank within the 3.0%-3.5%
range in the next 12-24 months.  Thus, S&P's view of the stand-
alone rating factors, and therefore S&P's 'b-' SACP, remain

The negative outlook reflects increased pressure on GLOBEXBANK's
financial profile, in particular its declining capitalization
level due to elevated credit costs.  S&P expects GLOBEXBANK's
capitalization will remain under pressure due to declining
revenues and increasing credit costs over the next 12-18 months.

S&P could lower the ratings if it continued to see GLOBEXBANK's
SACP weaken and revised downward S&P's SACP assessment,
considering that the bank's viability could be jeopardized,
particularly if capitalization fell.  This would be reflected in a
RAC ratio before adjustments at about 3% or below in the next 12-
18 months, due to significant credit costs, low earnings
generation capacity, and a lower-than-expected amount or quality
of capital injection (for example a sizable Tier 2, rather than a
Tier 1 capital injection).  S&P could also lower the ratings by up
to three notches if it perceived over the next 12-18 months that
the bank's disposal is being accelerated or the parent's
commitment to provide timely and sufficient support had
diminished.  The latter could occur if VEB's own financial
constraints make support to its subsidiaries less predictable.
This could lead the expected capital injection to be substantially
delayed (beyond 2016), reduced, or abandoned, which would signal a
revision of the bank's importance within the VEB group.

Although unlikely at this stage, S&P could revise the outlook to
stable if it revised the outlook on Russia to stable and, at the
same time, S&P sees a pronounced strengthening of GLOBEXBANK's
capital or better-than-expected loss performance.

IBA-MOSCOW BANK: Fitch Assigns Final BB Rating to RUB3BB Bonds
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia-based IBA-Moscow Bank's (IBAM)
RUB3 billion issue of fixed-rate rouble-denominated bonds (series
BO-01) a final Long-term rating of 'BB'. The issue benefits from
recourse to IBAM's ultimate parent, International Bank of
Azerbaijan (IBA, BB/Negative/b-).

The bonds have a tenor of three years with a put option in one
year. The coupon for the first year has been set at 11.5%. The
proceeds from the issue are being used solely for IBAM's corporate
purposes. Should IBAM fail to make a coupon or principal payment
under the terms of the bonds, bondholders will benefit from a
public irrevocable offer (PIO) that would allow them to sell the
bonds to IBA.

IBA's offer to purchase the bonds in case of a default by IBAM
represents an irrevocable undertaking and ranks equally with IBA's
other senior unsecured obligations, save those preferred under
Azerbaijan law. Under Azerbaijan law, retail depositors rank ahead
of other senior unsecured creditors. Retail deposits accounted for
16% of IBA's total liabilities at end-2015, according to the
bank's unconsolidated statutory accounts.


The issue's rating is equalized with IBA's Long-term foreign-
currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR), reflecting Fitch's view that
default risk on the bonds and on IBA's other senior unsecured
obligations is essentially the same. In Fitch's view, it could be
challenging for bondholders to enforce the put option in an
Azerbaijan court, in case of need. However, the agency believes
that a selective default on the put option is very unlikely, given
the reputational risks for IBA, the small size of the issue and
the potential for such a default to trigger acceleration of IBA's
other debt. Furthermore, in Fitch's view, IBA would have a high
propensity to provide support to IBAM, its fully-owned subsidiary,
to ensure that that IBAM could itself service its obligations.

IBA's Long-term IDR in turn reflects Fitch's view of a moderate
probability of support for the bank, if needed, from the
Azerbaijan sovereign (BB+/Negative). This view factors in (i)
IBA's high systemic importance, stemming from the bank's dominant
market shares and substantial funding from state-owned entities;
(ii) the bank's majority state ownership; (iii) IBA's moderate
size relative to the sovereign's available resources; (iv) the
potentially significant reputational damage for the authorities in
case of IBA's default; and (v) the recently improved track record
of support (for details see 'Fitch Affirms IBA and Pasha Bank;
Downgrades AccessBank on Sovereign Action' dated 9 March 2016 on

The one notch differential between the sovereign's and IBA's
ratings reflects (i) the still short track record of significant
support for the bank after a more extended period when sufficient
support was not forthcoming; (ii) moderate risk that, in case of
extreme sovereign stress, the authorities would cease to provide
full support to IBA and other quasi-sovereign entities ahead of a
sovereign default; and (iii) the authorities' stated intention to
ultimately privatize the bank.


The bond's rating is likely to move in tandem with IBA's
Long-term IDR, which is currently on Negative Outlook.

INTERACTIVE BANK: Placed Under Provisional Administration
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1350, dated April 26,
2016, revoked the banking license of the Moscow-based credit
institution Interactive Bank Ltd. from April 26, 2016.

The Bank of Russia took the extreme measure of banking license
revocation because of the credit institution's failure to comply
with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia regulations, due to
the application of measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)",
considering a real threat to the creditors' and depositors'

Interactive Bank Ltd. implemented high-risk lending operations
connected with the placement of funds in low-quality assets.  The
appropriate assessment of the risks assumed and the reliable
recognition of the bank's assets value resulted in the grounds
arising for the credit institution to implement measures to
prevent the bank's insolvency (bankruptcy).  Also, the credit
institution was involved in dubious operations, including dubious
transit operations.  The management and owners of the bank failed
to take effective measures to normalize its activities.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1351, dated April 26,
2016, has appointed a provisional administration to Interactive
Bank Ltd. until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under
Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".
In compliance with federal laws the powers of the credit
institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

Interactive Bank Ltd. is a member of the deposit insurance system.
The revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than 1.4 million per

According to the financial statements, as of April 1, 2016,
Interactive Bank Ltd. ranked 457th by assets in the Russian
banking system.

RUSSIA: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Sovereign Rating, Outlook Negative
Moody's Investors Service confirmed Russia's Ba1 government bond
and issuer ratings, concluding the review for downgrade that was
initiated on March 4, 2016, and assigned a negative rating

The key drivers for the decision to confirm Russia's rating at Ba1

  1. The economy has exhibited resilience to the renewed drop in
     oil prices early this year thanks to an effective blend of
     macro policy responses.

  2. The fiscal adjustment underway appears sufficient to reduce
     the 2016-18 deficits to a level that can be financed in the
     domestic capital markets and through fiscal reserve

The negative outlook reflects the likely further erosion of the
government's fiscal savings in the context of Moody's medium-term
projections for oil prices.  Moreover, a set of policies that
would address the economy's low growth potential has been slow to
emerge, while the election calendar over the next two years will
likely interfere with the implementation of politically unpopular
reforms that could achieve a more fundamental budget

Russia's country ceilings, which include its Ba1/NP country
ceilings for foreign currency debt, its Ba2 country ceiling for
foreign currency deposits and its Baa3 country ceiling for local
currency debt and deposits, remain unchanged.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE


The first driver for Moody's decision to confirm Russia's current
Ba1 rating relates to the economy's demonstrated resilience to the
renewed drop in oil prices, which has been facilitated by exchange
rate flexibility and the authorities' additional fiscal
adjustments.  The new oil price fall did not add lasting headwinds
to the economy, inflation or financial stability, with growth
taking only a brief and quite mild additional hit.  While the
ruble initially depreciated by around 15% in January when oil
prices dropped, it has since strengthened in line with the
subsequent recovery in oil prices and declining inflation, leading
to limited economic disruption.

Another sign of the economy's resilience is that inflation
continued to fall despite the temporary fall in the exchange rate.
Year-on-year inflation subsided to 7.3% in March -- compared to
12.9% at the end of 2015 -- mainly owing to base effects from the
same period of 2015.  Moody's expects end-year inflation to be
around the same level, assuming relative stability in the exchange
rate and the maintenance of tight monetary policy, and to decline
further in 2017 to about 5% by the end of 2017.  The central bank
has demonstrated its commitment to containing inflation, keeping
its policy rate at 11% since last July to anchor inflation
expectations, and we expect any loosening to be gradual in light
of still-high inflation expectations.

Recent high-frequency indicators such as industrial production,
services, construction and agricultural output, suggest that
growth is likely to resume after a brief lull in December-January,
driven by net exports, which are benefiting from the roughly 30%
real effective depreciation of the exchange rate over the past two
years.  Still, the rating agency expects that household
consumption will be a drag on the economy this year; real wages
continue to fall though at a slower pace, while employment and
unemployment rates have been quite stable.

Based on these recent indicators, which suggest that the impact of
the renewed fall in oil prices was relatively mild and short,
Moody's has reduced its forecast for the economy's contraction in
2016 marginally to 1.5% from 2%.  The rating agency expects to see
positive growth in the second half of the year on a quarter to
quarter basis that could lead to a better annual outcome as well
as positive growth on a yearly average basis in 2017-18, assuming
no further terms of trade shock.

Over the course of 2015, the balance of payments adapted almost
completely to the fall in oil prices.  Even though the value of
oil and gas exports continues to fall due to weaker oil prices,
significant import compression means that the current account
surplus remains large enough to finance a significant share of
external debt payments and most capital outflows over the next two
years, both of which have shrunk considerably since 2014.  It
narrowed in the first quarter of 2016, according to just-released
statistics, but the capital outflow also declined.  Foreign
exchange reserves have stabilized since the introduction of the
floating exchange rate regime in late 2014 and even moved up
slightly recently.  Still, at $319 billion, they remain
substantially below their recent peak of $473 billion at the end
of 2012.


The second driver for confirming Russia's Ba1 rating is the
government's fiscal response to the renewed fall in oil prices and
its plan to contain its net funding needs by restraining the size
of federal budget deficits in the coming years.  The government
has undertaken a sizeable fiscal adjustment this year.  A 10% cut
in discretionary expenditures was decided in mid-January, along
with a decision later in the first quarter to take a reported 5%
cut in the defense budget and to trim ministerial appropriations.
In addition, various revenue-raising measures were undertaken,
such as increases in excise taxes, a doubling of dividends from
state-owned enterprises and the maintenance of oil export duties
that had been scheduled to be reduced this year and going forward.

The January-February 2016 federal budget deficit illustrates the
effectiveness of the fiscal response.  The budget shortfall was
cut to 0.9% of GDP from 5.9% of GDP in the same period of last
year despite a significant fall in oil and gas revenues to 5.6% of
GDP from 9.1% of GDP.  The improvement in the deficit reflects
cuts in primary expenditure, mainly defense spending.  Given the
budget consolidation measures being pursued and using Moody's own
oil price assumption of $33/barrel for 2016, Moody's expects the
federal budget deficit to increase to roughly 3% of GDP this year,
followed by deficit roughly half that size in 2017 as oil prices
rise toward the government's assumed level of $40/barrel,
narrowing the gap between Moody's oil price forecasts and theirs.
More substantial fiscal adjustment will depend on the political
willingness to undertake reforms in the pension system and
elsewhere in the public sector.

The confirmation of the rating also reflects Moody's assessment of
the availability of domestic financing for the budget deficit in
view of ongoing international sanctions that have limited
international debt issuance, and expectations that the government
can avoid an early depletion of its Reserve Fund this year.  The
government's original financing plan for 2016 was to rely on the
bond market to finance part of the deficit, or R1 trillion in
gross terms, and to use the Reserve Fund for almost all of the

In Moody's view, the planned issuance levels are credible given
its estimates of the banking system's liquidity.  In addition, the
Russian government announced a privatization program to fill the
financing gap as oil revenue prospects fell earlier this year.
While the government's motivations for the program are stronger
now than in the past, in view of the need to raise financing,
Moody's is skeptical that the program will deliver the planned
levels of financing: Russia's track record in following through
with such sales is poor, with programs announced in both 2009 and
2012 being later abandoned by the government.


The negative outlook relates to the lack of a comprehensive
strategy to address the quicker depletion of the government's
fiscal savings that would occur should deficits remain above 2%-3%
of GDP and privatization proceeds not materialize to the extent
the government anticipates, which would leave it increasingly
reliant on domestic debt financing at rising cost and shortening
maturities.  Mooted reforms, such as of the pension system, aimed
at tackling the underlying causes of fiscal deficits in a low oil
price environment, have not yet materialized.  Upcoming elections
are likely to play a role here, undermining the political will to
implement far-reaching structural reform.  The parliamentary
election will be held in September, and the next presidential
election must be held before April 2018.

By the same token, no strategy has yet emerged to address the
economy's low growth potential and chronic underinvestment.  Many
years of dependence on oil and gas receipts have distorted
domestic price formation and substantially deterred investment in
other sectors of the economy.  The longer-term challenges posed by
this dependence have become more urgent in a low oil price
environment, since the lack of economic dynamism reduces the
flexibility of fiscal policy and limits the government's ability
to deal with a further shock.


Moody's would downgrade Russia's Ba1 rating were Russia's credit
metrics to deteriorate meaningfully, reducing its room to maneuver
in the event of another oil price or other shock.  Indicators that
might lead Moody's to anticipate such a deterioration would
include the exhaustion of fiscal reserves or a material reduction
in foreign currency reserves, sharply rising yields on government
debt or deficits large enough to require monetization by the
central bank.  Further stress in the banking system would also
contribute to downward pressure on Russia's ratings because the
government needs a stable source of domestic financing in order to
fund its budget deficits, especially in the context of ongoing
international sanctions.  Finally, deterioration in the domestic
or regional political environment that resulted in disruptions to
oil production or spurred renewed capital flight or an expansion
of existing sanctions would also be credit negative.


Upward pressure on the rating would derive from the enunciation of
a clear and credible economic policy agenda for the medium term,
such as the enactment of reforms to sustainably address the
underlying sources of economic and fiscal vulnerability and
thereby boost the country's growth potential.  Such measures might
include reducing the economy's heavy dependence on the hydrocarbon
sector for growth and public finance revenue, lowering the
structural deficit of the pension system and improving the weak
investment climate.

  GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 26,138 (2014 Actual) (also
   known as Per Capita Income)
  Real GDP growth (% change): -3.7% (2015 Actual) (also known as
   GDP Growth)
  Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 12.9% (2015 Actual)
  Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3.5% (2015 Actual) (also
  known as Fiscal Balance)
  Current Account Balance/GDP: 5% (2015 Actual) (also known as
   External Balance)
  External debt/GDP: 38.9% (2015 Actual)
  Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
  Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
   loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On April 19, 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of Russia, Government of.  The main points raised during
the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including
its economic strength, have not materially changed.  The issuer's
governance and/or management, have materially increased.  The
issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile,
has not materially changed.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2015.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.

SAMARA OBLAST: S&P Affirms BB ICR, Outlook Remains Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB' long-term
issuer credit rating on the Russian region of Samara Oblast.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed the 'ruAA' Russia national scale
rating on Samara Oblast.  The outlook remains negative.


The ratings on Samara Oblast are constrained by S&P's view of the
oblast's economy as weak, due to only modest wealth levels, and
weak financial management.  The ratings also reflect S&P's view of
Russia's volatile and unbalanced institutional framework, which
limits the oblast's revenue and expenditure autonomy and
translates into weak budgetary flexibility.  In addition, the
oblast's less-than-adequate liquidity position also constrains the
ratings, in S&P's opinion.  The oblast's average budgetary
performance is neutral for its creditworthiness.  The ratings are
supported by S&P's view of the oblast's low debt and very low
contingent liabilities.

The long-term rating is at the same level as S&P's assessment of
Samara's stand-alone credit profile at 'bb'.

Samara Oblast is one of Russia's key industrial regions, home to
over 2% of the total country's population and historically
contributing around 2% of the national GDP.  Nevertheless, the
oblast's wealth levels remain low in an international comparison.
Because of the ruble depreciation over the last few years, S&P's
forecast gross regional product (GRP) per capita could drop to
below US$6,000 in 2016-2018.  Moreover, the oblast's revenues
remain exposed to the volatility of the tax regime on oil
production and the refining industry, which together provide about
16% of GRP, as well as the financial strategies of a few holding
companies operating in this sector.  Tax payments, primarily
corporate profit tax from oil production and refinancing, dropped
significantly in 2013-2015.  In 2013, large diversified holding
companies started to use consolidated taxpayer groups.  This tax
regulation allowing corporate entities to consolidate profit and
losses of subsidiaries resulted in a lower overall tax bill,
reducing these companies' contribution to the oblast's budget;
while in 2014-2015 their profits dropped because of foreign
currency and exchange losses.

Under Russia's volatile and unbalanced institutional framework,
the federal government regulates the majority of regional revenues
and expenditure responsibilities.  Samara Oblast's modifiable
revenues (mainly transport tax and nontax revenues) are low and
don't provide much flexibility -- S&P forecasts they will account
for only 5% of the oblast's operating revenues on average in the
next three years.  On the expenditure side, although the leeway
remains limited, S&P expects the oblast's management to continue
implementing austerity measures aimed at reducing the deficit
after capital accounts, which will be possible also thanks to some
easing of the requirements of President Putin's 2012 decrees to
increase public sector expenditures.

S&P views Samara Oblast's budgetary performance as average.  S&P
projects that the oblast's five-year (2013-2018) average operating
surplus will be around a moderate 3.3% of operating revenues,
while the deficit after capital accounts will tighten slightly, to
an average of about 7% of total revenues over the same period.  In
the past two years, the oblast had to rebate significant amounts
of tax overpayments from its largest tax payers, which were
negatively affected by the ruble depreciation and a wide economic
slowdown of the national economy.  In the future, S&P expects
revenue growth in the oblast to recover progressively, supported
by stronger performance of the chemicals, manufacturing, and food
processing industries, as well as larger tax contributions from
domestically oriented oil production and refinancing companies,
which are benefiting from the positive dynamics of domestic petrol
prices and increased production.  At the same time, S&P forecasts
the total amount of subsidies and transfers will remain flat in
nominal terms, given ongoing fiscal consolidation at the federal

In 2015, faced with economic contraction on the national level and
weaker local tax collections, the oblast's management applied
tough budget-consolidation measures, resulting in only 1.7% year-
on-year operating expenditure growth.  Cost-control measures
focused on containing public salary growth, cuts in administrative
expenses, maintenance, and repairs, as well as subsidies to the
lower levels of the budget.  However, given upcoming federal
parliamentary elections in 2016 and presidential elections in
2018, S&P believes that Samara Oblast might find it difficult to
keep budgetary austerity at the level demonstrated in 2015,
especially in the context of relatively high inflation and low
visibility on the dynamics of grants from the federal government
to the regions beyond 2016.

S&P anticipates that the deficits after capital accounts will
progressively decrease to an average of about 5.5% of total
revenues in 2016-2018, compared with over 11% in 2014.  In 2015
the oblast cut its year-on-year capital expenditures by 18% using
the flexibility within the self-financed part.  The oblast intends
to keep its capital program on average below the levels
demonstrated in 2013-2014.  However capital investment needs will
remain high in the coming three years, as the oblast continues to
cofinance infrastructure projects for hosting games during the
football World Cup in the city of Samara in 2018.  The total cost
is currently estimated at about Russian ruble (RUB) 56.4 billion
(about US$1.2 billion).  The oblast plans to provide at least 50%
of the needed amount and the rest will be contributed from the
federal budget and private investors.

The oblast's tax-supported debt will continue to grow but will
likely stay below 60% of consolidated operating revenues through
2018.  S&P considers this debt level as still low in an
international context.  S&P includes the minor guaranteed and
nonguaranteed debt of Samara Oblast's government-related entities
(GREs) into our calculations of tax-supported debt.

S&P views Samara Oblast's outstanding contingent liabilities as
very low.  The oblast administration continues to reduce its
presence in the local economy by privatizing the oblast's GREs.
S&P estimates GRE payables at about 2% of the oblast's operating
revenues, and believe that its municipal sector is relatively
healthy financially.  S&P therefore don't expect any significant
extraordinary support to be required from the budget in the coming

S&P views Samara Oblast's financial management as weak in an
international context, as S&P do that of most Russian local and
regional governments.  This is mainly due to S&P's view of the
oblast's lack of reliable long-term financial and capital
planning, and limited visibility regarding its policy for GREs.
At the same time, S&P believes the oblast's debt management is
more sophisticated than the Russian average.


S&P views Samara Oblast's liquidity position as less than
adequate.  This is because S&P expects the oblast's debt service
coverage ratio to be adequate, with free cash and committed credit
facilities covering more than 80% of debt service falling due
within the next 12 months.  S&P also applies a negative adjustment
for what it views as the oblast's limited access to external
liquidity, given the weaknesses of the domestic capital market.

S&P forecasts that, throughout 2016, the oblast will have average
cash -- net of the deficit after capital accounts -- of about
RUB7.5 billion (about US$100 million).  This amount includes
RUB2.6 billion from the accounts of its budgetary units that the
oblast can temporarily borrow during the year.  The cash will
cover about 57% of debt service falling due in this period.

At the same time, the oblast may rely on regular loans from the
federal government aimed at refinancing half of commercial debt of
about RUB4.36 billion (about US$58 million).  In early 2016, the
oblast had already received RUB2.88 billion (about US$38 million).

S&P also understands that the government is planning to place a
new RUB10 billion (US$133 million at the time of publication) bond
program with 10-year maturity and will hold an auction for a new
bank facility in the first half of 2016.

S&P anticipates that, in the coming three years, the upcoming debt
maturities and the increase in the oblast's debt burden will
translate into relatively high debt service (approximately 13% of
operating revenues on average in 2016-2018) that will require
proactive management of credit and liquidity facilities.


The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that, over the next 12
months, the upcoming electoral cycle and the volatile
macroeconomic environment might constrain Samara Oblast's efforts
to maintain tight cost control, resulting in weaker budgetary
performance which would undermine its liquidity position or lead
to a higher debt burden.

S&P could take a negative rating action if higher budget deficits
put pressure on the oblast's cash reserves and the debt service
ratio fell below 80%, resulting in a weaker liquidity assessment,
and/or if tax-supported debt structurally exceeded 60% of
consolidated operating revenues by 2018.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if over the next 12 months
Samara Oblast's management remained committed to austerity
measures and kept deficits after capital accounts on a reducing
trend, so that the oblast's cash and committed facilities exceeded
80% of debt service in the following 12 months and tax-supported
debt stayed below 60% of consolidated operating revenues.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating


                                 To                From
Samara Oblast
Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency     BB/Neg./--        BB/Neg./--
  Russia National Scale          ruAA/--/--        ruAA/--/--
Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency                 BB                BB
  Russia National Scale          ruAA              ruAA

SVIAZ-BANK: S&P Affirms BB-/B Counterparty Ratings, Outlook Neg.
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
foreign and local currency long- and short-term counterparty
credit ratings on Russia-based Sviaz-Bank at 'BB-/B'.  The outlook
is negative.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the Russia national
scale rating at 'ruAA-'.

S&P removed the long-term global scale and national scale ratings
from CreditWatch, where S&P had placed them with negative
implications on Dec. 4, 2015.

The rating action reflects S&P's understanding that Russian
government-owned development bank Vnesheconombank (VEB) recently
set aside its plan to divest Sviaz-Bank.  Although VEB has
restated its intention to sell some assets that don't fit into its
long-term strategy, including Sviaz-Bank, S&P still sees the
disposal of Sviaz-Bank as highly unlikely over the next 12-18
months, given both the subsidiary's weak financial profile and a
lack of appetite from acquirers.  The divestment of Sviaz-Bank is
possible only with government approval because of VEB's special
role as a government development group.  This, combined with the
recent confirmation of support from VEB, leads S&P to expect that
VEB will continue providing timely and sufficient support to
Sviaz-Bank in the form of both liquidity and capital in most
foreseeable circumstances.

Therefore, S&P continues to assess Sviaz-Bank as a strategically
important subsidiary within the VEB group, incorporating three
notches of support above Sviaz-Bank's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) into S&P's rating.  However, S&P might revise its
assessment of the bank's status within the VEB group if S&P
observes that VEB's ability to provide support to Sviaz-Bank is
increasingly limited because of VEB's own financial constraints.

"In our view, Sviaz-Bank continues to face challenges in building
capital internally, given increased losses incurred over 2015
resulting from deteriorated asset quality and increased credit
costs over 2015.  We note that our already weak assessment of
capital and earnings largely depends on VEB's commitment to
provide support.  We currently expect VEB to provide a capital
injection into Sviaz-Bank's Tier 1 capital over 2016 in the amount
of at least Russian ruble (RUB) 16 billion (about US$241 million).
We believe that such an increase in capital will likely support
our forecast of a risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio (before
adjustments for diversification) for Sviaz-Bank within the 3.0%-
4.0% range in the next 12-24 months.  Thus, our view of the stand-
alone rating factors for Sviaz-Bank, and therefore our 'b-' SACP,
remain unchanged," S&P said.

The negative outlook on Sviaz-Bank reflects the likely impact of
Russia's deteriorating operating environment on the bank's
financial profile.  S&P expects the bank's capitalization will
remain under pressure, owing to declining revenues and elevated
credit costs over the next 12-18 months.

S&P could lower the rating if weakening in Sviaz-Bank's SACP
continued and S&P revised downward its SACP assessment,
considering that the bank's viability could be jeopardized,
particularly if capitalization fell.  This would be reflected in a
RAC ratio before adjustments at about 3% or below in the next 12-
18 months, due to a significant credit costs, low earnings
generation capacity, and a lower-than-expected amount of capital
injection.  Moreover, S&P could lower the rating by up to three
notches if it perceived over the next 12-18 months that the bank's
disposal had been accelerated or VEB's commitment to provide
timely and sufficient support had diminished, particularly if
VEB's own financial constraints make support to its subsidiaries
less predictable.  This could result in the expected capital
injection being substantially delayed (beyond 2016), reduced, or
abandoned, which would signal a change in Sviaz-Bank's importance
within the VEB group.

Although unlikely at this stage, S&P could revise the outlook to
stable if it revised the outlook on Russia to stable and, at the
same time, S&P saw a pronounced strengthening of Sviaz-Bank's
capital or better-than-expected loss performance.

TENEX-SERVICE: S&P Affirms BB/B Counterparty Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Russian nuclear
equipment leasing company TENEX-Service (TENEX).  The outlook
remains negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'ruAA' Russia national
scale rating on TENEX.

"The affirmations reflects our opinion that, despite a
deteriorating domestic economy and the company's highly
concentrated, captive-like business model, TENEX enjoys business
stability thanks to its links to the government, based on the
sovereign's indirect ownership of the company via state-owned
Atomic Energy Power Corp. JSC (AtomEnergoProm; BB+/Negative/B).
Our long-term rating on TENEX includes three notches of uplift
from its stand-alone credit profile, which we assess at 'b'.  This
reflects our view of its highly strategic status to
AtomEnergoProm, and we therefore rate TENEX one notch below its
parent, which is rated at the level of the sovereign.  TENEX
currently provides leasing services to AtomEnergoProm's
subsidiaries, which operate the bulk of Russia's nuclear power
sector.  As such, TENEX's strategy, risk management, funding, and
client base are shared with, or provided by, AtomEnergoProm, and
it has limited business scope outside the group," S&P said.

TENEX's business stability is underpinned by limited competition
in the market.  This is because its activities are secured by
Presidential Act No. 556, which allows only TENEX to lease nuclear
equipment in Russia.  In S&P's view, TENEX's protected position is
unlikely to change in the near future because other leasing
companies could not quickly achieve the same level of integration
with companies in the nuclear industry.  As such, S&P expects
TENEX to maintain its status as the sole integral leasing operator
for the Russian nuclear power industry.

S&P expects that TENEX's risk-adjusted capital ratio will increase
slightly from pro forma 8.6% at end-2014 and will remain higher
than 9% at end-2016 and end-2017.  S&P's base-case forecast is
based on a contraction of the total assets in 2016, considering
our expectations of GDP contraction of 1.3% in 2016 in Russia and
an increase of total assets in 2017, because S&P expects
approximately 1% of GDP growth in 2017.  S&P also assumes that
TENEX will have minimal credit losses, its profitability will
recover slightly from 2013 levels, and the dividend pay-out will
be 100%.

S&P's adequate risk position assessment for TENEX reflects S&P's
view that the risks associated with TENEX's significant single-
name concentration are balanced by its outstanding asset quality,
stemming from concentration on a protected niche of companies
within the structure of AtomEnergoProm.  These companies have good
payment discipline and are closely monitored and influenced, if
needed, by the parent company.

In S&P's view, TENEX's funding position supports its business
performance, and the company can manage its liquidity requirements
on an ongoing basis and in periods of stress.  S&P's view is based
on ongoing support from AtomEnergoProm, which provides 100% of
TENEX's financing.

The negative outlook on TENEX mirrors that on its government-
related parent, AtomEnergoProm.  This means that S&P could
downgrade the ratings on TENEX over the next 12-18 months if S&P
downgraded Russia.

Furthermore, S&P could downgrade TENEX if AtomEnergoProm modified
its approach to using leasing to favor direct purchases, which
would signal a decrease of TENEX's importance to, and integration
with, the AtomEnergoProm group.  S&P might also take a negative
rating action if TENEX's strategy were substantially extended
beyond serving AtomEnergoProm's companies leading to a marked
weakening of TENEX's SACP, alongside clear evidence of diminishing
parent support or more restrained parent participation in TENEX's
management and supervision.

A revision of the outlook on TENEX to stable would follow the same
outlook revision on the Russian Federation and consequently on

X5 RETAIL: S&P Revises Outlook to Positive & Affirms BB- CCR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlooks on Russian
grocery chain X5 Retail Group N.V. (X5) and its subsidiary OOO X5
Finance to positive from stable.  The 'BB-' long-term corporate
credit ratings on both companies were affirmed.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' rating on X5 Finance's
senior unsecured ruble bond.

The rating actions reflect the group's continuing strong top-line
growth, with revenues up 27.6% in 2015 versus 2014 and net retail
sales growth of 26.7% in the first quarter of 2016 year-on-year.
Like-for-like sales growth was robust at 13.7% in 2015 and 7.8% in
first-quarter 2016.  The EBITDA margin, nevertheless, declined by
41 basis points compared with the previous year, as a result of
significant one-time payments to X5's management under long-term
incentive program for achieving specific operating targets.  S&P
thinks the group should be able to sustain similar or stronger
operating performance, with the Standard & Poor's adjusted EBITDA
margin returning to 7% and credit measures becoming stronger,
despite ongoing difficult economic conditions in Russia.

S&P continues to assess X5's business risk profile as fair,
reflecting S&P's view of the company's exposure to emerging-market
risks, such as currency volatility, persistent cost inflation, and
political uncertainty.  Moreover, the ban on food imports to
Russia implemented in August 2014 has increased operating pressure
on the industry and forced retailers to modify their supply
chains.  However, X5 has effectively adjusted to the new operating
environment without impairing its credit metrics and has made
overall performance improvements.  X5's competitive position as
Russia's second largest food retailer and its strong position in
the lucrative Moscow and St. Petersburg markets support the
business risk profile.  The company benefits from the resilience
and predictability of the retail food industry.  Its operations
are concentrated mainly in Russia's Central and North-West
Regions, and it has good format diversity through supermarkets,
hypermarkets, and convenience retail stores, with more than 70% of
sales coming from proximity stores.  S&P views the company's
profitability of below 10% as average and in line with that of
major food retail industry peers.

"We now regard X5's financial risk profile as significant rather
than aggressive.  We expect that X5's adjusted debt to EBITDA will
not exceed 3.0x over 2016-2017, and that funds from operations
(FFO) to adjusted debt will likely remain between 20% and 30%,
supported by revenue and EBITDA growth.  These core ratios are
commensurate with our significant category under our base-case
scenario for 2016-2017.  We also take into account X5's high
capital expenditure (capex) for expansion and further
refurbishment of existing stores over the medium term.  In our
view, this would weigh on X5's cash flows and we do not expect the
company to deleverage materially over the next one to two years.
At the same time, we expect those investments to gradually
contribute to X5's earnings and cash flows," S&P said.

"The combination of our assessments of a fair business risk
profile and a significant financial risk profile results in our
'bb' anchor for X5.  The stand-alone credit profile is at 'bb-'
because we regard X5's financial risk profile as weaker than that
of similarly rated peers.  This leads us to deduct one notch from
the anchor, based on our comparable rating analysis.
Specifically, X5 has a weaker FFO cash interest coverage ratio and
generates negative free operating cash flow (FOCF), reflecting, in
part, its very high capital investments.  Our comparable rating
analysis also offsets the boost to X5's credit metrics and
financial risk profile from not adding operating lease adjustments
to debt.  We do not make this adjustment to X5's reported debt,
since X5's financial statements under International Financial
Reporting Standards do not disclose the commitments under future
lease payments, owing to the cancellable nature of these rental
contracts," S&P noted.

The positive outlook reflects the possibility of an upgrade over
the next 12 months if X5 further improves its operating
performance and credit metrics, while adhering to a prudent
financial policy.  S&P expects debt to EBITDA to remain
sustainably below 3x and FFO cash interest coverage higher than

S&P will likely raise the ratings if X5's revenues, EBITDA, and
like-for-like sales continue to strengthen significantly over the
next 12 months.  This would indicate the company's resilience
against the challenges of operating in Russia's current economic
environment, as well as the sustainability of its operating
performance.  An upgrade would, however, require the company to
improve its FFO to debt such that it approaches 30% and continue
strengthening its market position, while displaying sound
profitability and adequate liquidity.  It would also require the
financial policy to remain disciplined and conservative, without a
significant increase in capex or debt-financed acquisitions.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if X5's operating
performance and leverage metrics are weaker than S&P's forecasts
or if ambitious financial policy, particularly regarding capex,
caused X5's adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio to weaken to 20%-25%.  S&P
could also lower the ratings if adjusted FFO cash interest
coverage fell below 3x or if, in S&P's view, X5's liquidity had
deteriorated to below adequate levels.


EMPARK FUNDING: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3, Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to Ba3 from B1 the senior
secured rating on the notes issued by Empark Funding S.A., a
financing conduit of Empark Aparcamientos y Servicios S.A..
Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded to Ba3 from B1 the corporate
family rating of Empark and to Ba2-PD from Ba3-PD the probability
of default rating.  The outlook on the ratings is stable.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action recognizes the continued positive growth in
Empark's off-street division and the deleveraging of the company
with funds from operations (FFO)/debt currently at around 7%.

Empark reported like-for-like revenue growth of 4.1% in 2015 in
its off-street concessions segment, which is a key contributor to
the company's cash flow.  The increase in revenue was driven
primarily by growth in volumes as low inflation means tariffs are
not increasing.  Better volume performance reflects the improved
macroeconomic environment in Spain and Portugal, where Empark
primarily operates.

The rating upgrade also reflects Moody's expectation that Empark
will continue to prudently manage contract renewals so that they
maintain or grow operating cash flow contributions without
requiring substantial investment.  Empark's portfolio is
diversified with a mixture of long-term concessions and short to
medium term contracts to operate parking facilities.  Whilst the
company's off-street division benefits from concessions with a
relatively long remaining life, some 25% of the company's EBITDA
is represented by concessions and contracts that are up for
renewal by 2020.  The need to replace the maturing concessions and
contracts will drive investments given the upfront payments
typically associated with acquisitions.  In this regard, the Ba3
rating assumes that Empark will continue to manage its spending so
that the funds from operations (FFO)/debt ratio remains above 6%.

Empark's Ba3 rating reflects (1) the company's long track record
of operations and well-established position as a leading car park
operator in the Iberian Peninsula, (2) the strategic location of
the company's assets, which somewhat mitigate competitive threats
and demand risk, and (3) strong volume trends in the off-street
concessions segment, which accounts for around 80% of the group's
EBITDA.  The rating is, however, constrained by (1) high financial
leverage, (2) the competitive nature of the car parking sector and
the company's more limited scale in comparison with other
infrastructure assets, and (3) the renewal risk associated with
maturing concessions and contracts.


The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Empark's
traffic volumes will continue to grow offsetting some of the
negative impact associated with expiring concessions.


Upward rating pressure could develop if Empark continued to
deleverage so that its FFO/debt ratio were to exceed 8% on a
sustainable basis.  Deleveraging would need to be coupled with
satisfactory liquidity arrangements, in the context of successful
renewal rates and steady demand for parking services.

Downward rating pressure could develop, if (1) Empark's FFO/debt
were to decline below 6%; or (2) liquidity concerns were to arise.


The methodologies used in these ratings were Privately Managed
Toll Roads published in May 2014, and Global Surface
Transportation and Logistics Companies published in April 2013.

Empark Aparcamientos y Servicios S.A. is the largest car parking
operator in the Iberian Peninsula.  The company's major geographic
focus is on Spain and Portugal, where it generates some 70% and
30% of EBITDA respectively.

ENAITINERE SAU: S&P Affirms Prelim. BB- CCR Then Withdraws
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
preliminary 'BB-' long-term corporate credit rating on Enaitinere
S.A.U., the financing entity within Spain's second largest toll
road network operator by network length and revenues, Grupo
Itinere.  S&P subsequently withdrew the rating at the issuer's

S&P is also withdrawing its 'BB-' issue rating as the expected
bond issuance did not occur.

The affirmation follows Enaitinere's refinancing completion and
S&P's review of the company's operating and financial performance.
This has so far been in line with S&P's base-case scenario and the
outlook was stable before the withdrawal at the issuer's request.
Instead of the initially contemplated bond issuance, the company
completed its planned refinancing with a EUR300 million bullet
loan due in 2025 and by extending its current bank loan maturities
until 2025.

TELE PIZZA: Moody's Puts B2 CFR on Review for Upgrade
Moody's Investors Service has placed the B2 corporate family
rating and the B3-PD probability of default rating of Tele Pizza
S.A.U. on review for upgrade after Telepizza filed for an initial
public offering (IPO) on the Spanish Stock Market.  The B2 rating
of the EUR285 million senior facility B and EUR10 million
revolving credit facility remains unchanged on the expectation
that these facilities will be repaid from the IPO proceeds.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action follows Telepizza's definitive IPO filing and
the publication of the IPO prospectus on April 15, 2016.
Telepizza plans to raise gross proceeds of EUR118.5 million from
the issuance of new ordinary shares.  The company has also
announced it had arranged on April 8, 2016, new bank credit
facilities with a pool of ten banks, which include an amortizing
term loan of around EUR200 million and a revolving credit facility
of EUR15 million.  Most of the IPO proceeds from the new ordinary
shares will, in addition to the new bank credit facilities, be
applied towards debt redemption and refinancing of the existing

The execution of the IPO as proposed will lead to a material
reduction in debt.  Based on Moody's preliminary assessment, after
the IPO the Moody's adjusted leverage will decrease to around 4.2x
from 5.2x as of year-end 2015, a level commensurate with a higher
CFR than B2.  Moody's anticipates that the debt reduction and the
concurrent refinancing of existing bank credit facilities will
provide Telepizza with substantial interest expense savings and a
strengthening of free cash flows.  Telepizza has reported improved
performance in 2015 with good organic growth across major
geographical segments and positive like-for-like sales in the last
two years.

The IPO is expected to close and the price expected to be
determined on April 25, 2016.  Shares are expected to start
trading on April 27, 2016, and the settlement is expected to occur
on April 29, 2016.


Prior to placing the ratings on review, Moody's stated that
positive rating pressure could develop for Telepizza if the
company's Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio falls below 4.5x on a
sustainable basis, and the like-for-like sales in Telepizza's core
market show a sustainable recovery.

Conversely, downward pressure on the rating could arise if the
company's Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio increases to 5.5x, or
liquidity concerns emerge.

                      PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Restaurant
Industry published in September 2015.

Founded in 1988 and headquartered in Madrid, Telepizza operates a
chain of 461 directly managed and 850 franchised stores as of
December 2015, principally in Spain (644 stores), but also
internationally.  Additionally, Telepizza owns and operates seven
regional dough manufacturing and seven logistics centers, through
which the franchisees procure dough and other ingredients.
Telepizza has a strong market share in the delivery and take-away
pizza sector in Spain, with a market share of 53% as of 2015.  The
company also enjoys the leading market position in Portugal,
Poland, Chile and Colombia.  As a group, the company generated
world-wide chain sales of EUR492 million in 2015; chain sales
represent Telepizza's total owned and franchised outlet sales.  In
2015, Telepizza reported total revenues of EUR329 million and
recurring EBITDA of EUR58 million.


OVAKO GROUP: Moody's Affirms B3 CFR, Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Sweden based steel producer
Ovako Group AB's corporate family rating and probability of
default rating at B3 and B2-PD, respectively.  Moody's also
affirmed the rating of the EUR300 million senior secured notes due
2019 issued by Ovako AB at B3.  The outlook on all ratings is

"We have affirmed Ovako's ratings to reflect our expectation that
group profitability will start recovering in 2016, owing to the
company's ongoing restructuring plan and growing demand from its
core automotive end-market.", says Hubert Allemani, a Vice
President -- Senior Analyst at Moody's.



Issuer: Ovako Group AB
  Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B3
  Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed B2-PD

Issuer: Ovako AB
  Backed Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B3 (LGD
   5, 72%)

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Ovako Group AB
  Outlook, Remains Stable

Issuer: Ovako AB
  Outlook, Remains Stable

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of Ovako's ratings with a stable outlook reflects
Moody's expectation that the company's credit metrics will
gradually recover in the next two years from the low point reached
in 2015, to levels in line with its rating category.

In 2015, both volumes and end-product prices were negatively
affected by the global drop in steel prices and the lower demand
in the mining, oil and gas, and engineering sectors, resulting in
the significant deterioration of the group's profitability.  The
company's EBITDA and EBITDA margin, as adjusted by Moody's, fell
to EUR53 million and 6.4% respectively, compared to EUR84 million
and 9.7% in 2014.  Moody's considers that those levels were a low
point for the company.

For 2016, Moody's expects that demand from the automotive sector,
which represented approximately 40% of Ovako's 2015 revenue, and
to a lesser extent the capital goods industry is likely to remain
solid and support the company's volumes.  However, the mining and
oil & gas sectors, which represented about 10% of Ovako's 2015
revenues, should provide low contributions to the company's

Moody's expects that Ovako's profitability in 2016 will also find
support from recovering steel prices.  Although prices are likely
to remain low, they could recover slightly throughout the year,
because of (1) the implementation of anti-dumping duties in Europe
to protect producers against cheaper Asian imports of cold rolled
coils; and (2) the opening of investigations by the EU commission
on imported hot rolled coils and heavy plates.

The company expects its ongoing restructuring plan, launched in Q4
2015, to generate around EUR19 million of savings in 2016
(approximately 40% of Ovako's EUR48 million of EBITDA before
restructuring reported in 2015), which will support the recovery
of its EBITDA.  Moody's expects that Ovako's adjusted debt/EBITDA,
which was high at 7.6x at year-end 2015, will decrease to around
6.0-6.5x by the end of 2016.  In addition, the ratings agency
expects that Ovako's EBITDA margin is likely to improve from 6.4%
in 2015 to around 7.5-8.0% and gradually increase towards 9% in
the next two to three years.

More broadly, Ovako's B3 CFR reflects the company's (1) high
financial leverage of 7.6x at year-end 2015; (2) cyclical end-
markets, resulting in a volatile earnings profile; (3) competitive
market; (4) small scale of operations; and (5) limited geographic
and customer diversity.

However, these negatives are mitigated by Ovako's (1) leading
local positions in the European engineering steel market; (2)
focus on specialty products; (3) pricing mechanism, which allows
it to pass-through changes in raw material costs with a limited
time lag; and (4) adequate liquidity profile.

                        LIQUIDITY PROFILE

Despite the recent deterioration in its operating performance, and
therefore cash flow generation, Ovako's near-term liquidity
remains adequate.  At the end of 2015, the company had EUR49
million of cash on the balance sheet and access to the fully
undrawn EUR40 million revolving credit facility (RCF).  The latter
has only a minimum EBITDA covenant, which Moody's expects will be
met in 2016.  Furthermore, the company has an adequate debt
maturity profile as its notes mature in 2019.

Longer-term pressure on liquidity could arise through increases in
working capital, or if steel prices or the company's end-markets
weaken, resulting in the deterioration of Ovako's operating cash
flow generation.


The senior secured notes, RCF, pension insurance line and hedging
liabilities all share the same security and guarantee package,
with guarantors representing around 90% of sales, EBITDA and
assets.  However, the pension insurance line has first priority in
respect to enforcement proceeds, followed by the RCF and hedging
liabilities up to EUR10 million.  The notes are subordinated to
these instruments in respect of enforcement proceeds, although its
instrument rating of B3 is in line with the CFR.

As per Moody's loss given default (LGD) model, we consider a
recovery rate of 35% for Ovako's capital structure due to its all-
bond and covenant-light features, resulting in a probability of
default rating of B2-PD .


The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that Ovako's
ongoing restructuring efforts will enable its credit metrics to
recover over the next 12 to 18 months, to levels more adequate for
the rating category.  The outlook also incorporates Moody's
assumption that the company will maintain an adequate liquidity


Although unlikely at present, an upgrade of the rating could occur
if (1) Ovako's adjusted debt/EBITDA approaches 4.0x; (2) its EBIT
margins were consistently above 5%; and (3) its free cash
flow/Debt approaches 10%.

The rating could be downgraded if (1) the company fails to
implement its restructuring program and to restore its
profitability to levels trending towards 3%; (2) its liquidity
deteriorates materially as a result of sustained weak operating
performance and cash burn; (3) its adjusted debt/EBITDA remains
sustainably above 6.0x; and (4) free cash flow remains negative
over a prolonged period of time.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Steel
Industry published in October 2012.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ASCENTIAL PLC: Moody's Withdraws Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the Ba3 corporate family
rating and the B1-PD probability of default rating of Ascential
plc at the request of the company.

The company has no outstanding rated debt.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

Headquartered in London, Ascential is a business-to-business media
company focusing on Events, Information Services and Subscription
Content with international operations.

AUSTIN REED: Enters Administration, 1,000+ Jobs at Risk
Aliya Ram at The Financial Times reports that Britain's high
street suffered its second casualty of the week on April 26 when
upmarket suit retailer Austin Reed fell into administration,
putting more than 1,000 jobs at risk.

AlixPartners, an advisory consultancy, has been appointed as
administrator to the retailer, which will continue trading out of
its roughly 150 stores while its future hangs in the balance, the
FT relates.  The administrator, as cited by the FT, said it had
already received 20 expressions of interest to buy the
"well-regarded and iconic brand", including from rival retailers
and private equity firms.

Austin Reed, whose suits were once worn by celebrities and
dignitaries from Winston Churchill and The Beatles to Christine
Lagarde, has struggled to reverse languishing sales despite
efforts to reinvent itself and make a push online, the FT relays.

In February last year, it carried out a compulsory voluntary
arrangement when it offloaded 31 stores, reduced its debt and
pledged to "achieve a structure more appropriate in the new
digital age", the FT recounts.

Austin Reed is a Thirsk-based fashion retailer.

BHS GROUP: MPs to Investigate Impact of Collapse on Pensions
Josephine Cumbo at The Financial Times reports that Sir Philip
Green, the billionaire businessman, will be called on to give
evidence to MPs probing the impact of the BHS collapse on the
pensions lifeboat fund.

BHS, formerly owned by Sir Philip, went into administration on
April 25 after 88 years on the high street, putting almost 11,000
jobs at risk, the FT relates.

According to the FT, many of the 20,000 members of the BHS pension
scheme face cuts to their retirement income as responsibility for
payments passes to the Pension Protection Fund, the lifeboat fund
for members of schemes where sponsors have gone bust.

The influential Work and Pensions committee said on April 26 it
would investigate how the BHS pension scheme, which had an
estimated deficit of GBP571 million at the time of the collapse,
would affect the PPF, the FT relays.

The PPF is funded by a levy on defined benefit pension schemes,
the FT discloses.  At the end of the last financial year, it had a
surplus of GBP3.6 billion, the FT states.

"We need, as a committee, to look at the Pension Protection Fund
and how the receipt of pension liabilities of BHS will impact on
the increases in the levy that will now be placed on all other
eligible employers to finance the scheme," the FT quotes the MPs
as saying.  "We will then need to judge whether the law is strong
enough to protect future pensioners' contracts in occupational

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs 10,000
people and has 164 shops.

GALAXY FINCO: Moody's Affirms B2 CFR & Changes Outlook to Pos.
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Galaxy Finco Limited's
("Domestic & General", "D&G" or "the company") B2 corporate family
rating, probability of default rating (PDR) of B1-PD and the
instrument rating of B2 for the GBP200 million Senior Secured
Notes, and the GBP175 million Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
both issued by Galaxy Bidco Limited, and B3 instrument rating on
the GBP125 million Senior Notes, issued by Galaxy Finco Limited.
At the same time the outlook on the ratings has been changed to
positive from stable.


"The change in outlook to positive from stable has been triggered
by D&G's solid current trading in the nine months to December 2015
and gradual improving operating margins resulting in Moody's
adjusted gross leverage ratio to reduce to 5.5x", says
Pieter Rommens, Moody's lead analyst for D&G.

However, the rating is constrained by (1) the company's expected
negative free cash for the full financial year ending March 2016;
(2) the highly competitive environment, in which D&G is
challenging large retailers and utility suppliers such as Dixons
Carphone plc and National Grid Gas Plc (British Gas, A3 stable) in
the UK that substantially control the sale of extended warranties
for many appliances; (3) D&G's international growth strategy,
which depends on winning profitable contracts with retailers and
OEMs in countries in which the warranty service product is still
underdeveloped; (4) the company's large exposure to its core UK
market where (i) it generates 79% of revenues, (ii) it suffers
from some client concentration; (5) continued pressure on
profitability from competitive retail contracts, higher repair and
claim costs and lower investment income; and (6) regulatory event
risk for the company's insurance-regulated subsidiary.

D&G's corporate family rating (CFR) of B2 is supported by D&G's
(1) solid market position in the UK as the largest independent
extended warranty provider for domestic appliances; (2) long-
standing relationships with 10 of the 12 largest white goods OEMs
in the UK; (3) strong revenue visibility driven by 12-24 months
revenue earned from sales and high renewal and retention rates
with 83% of 2015 sales based on direct-debit; (4) track record of
stable operating performance and cash flow generation throughout
the economic cycle; and (5) adequate capital management in the
insurance-regulated subsidiaries to support ongoing claim costs
and regulatory requirements.

Moody's views D&G's liquidity profile as adequate.  The company
benefits from a GBP80 million covenant-lite revolving credit
facility of which GBP47 million is available at the end of
December 2015 with GBP33 million reserved for letters of credit.
The company's liquidity profile is supported by GBP201 million
capital position as of Dec. 31, 2015, (consisting of GBP31 million
unrestricted cash and GBP169 million investments).  As of Dec. 31,
2015, the company's regulated entity held GBP70 million of
qualifying capital resources, exceeding the minimum capital
requirements of GBP46 million.

                          RATING OUTLOOK

The positive outlook reflects the expectation that D&G will start
to generate positive free cash flow (as defined by Moody's after
debt service, dividends and tax payment) in the next 12 months as
working capital outflows will reduce as a result of a lower
expected run-off from the MSH Germany contract ceased in August
2014 and the finalizing of the company's strategic shift toward
shorter renewal periods.


Upward rating pressure could occur if D&G were to successfully
execute its domestic and international growth plans such that its
Debt/EBITDA ratio remains below 5.5x, the company starts to
generate positive free cash flow and improves its liquidity


Negative rating pressure would arise if D&G's Debt/EBITDA ratio
were to rise above 6.25x or if its free cash flow were to remain
negative.  In any case, a weakening liquidity profile would create
downward rating pressure.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in December 2014.

Galaxy Finco Limited is the holding company of UK-based warranty
and warranty service provider Domestic & General (D&G).  The
company offers various warranty products for domestic appliances
and consumer electronics to end-customers and households,
primarily through original equipment manufacturers (OEM) but also
through retailers at the point-of-sale (PoS).  In the fiscal year
ended March 2015, D&G generated revenues of GBP669 million and
company-reported adjusted EBITDA of GBP84 million.  The company
generates the largest part of its revenues in the UK (79% of
FY2015 revenues) with the remainder in the largest economies in
Europe and Australia (21% in international division).  D&G was
acquired by the private equity firm CVC Capital Partners Ltd in
December 2013.

GREEN CITY: Euro Insol Appointed as Judicial Liquidator
Romania Insider reports that the insolvency house Euro Insol was
appointed the judicial liquidator of the real estate complex Green
City, located in the Ilfov county, near Bucharest.

Green City is a residential project developed on a 120-hectare
plot that belonged to the royal family, Romania Insider discloses.
It includes 650 villas, Romania Insider notes.

Local investor Dumitru Bucsaru developed the project, through
several companies that are now bankrupt or insolvent, Romania
Insider relays.  According to Romania Insider, three of them,
namely Valahorum, Clean Optim Serv, and Green City, are bankrupt
and managed by Euro Insol.

ODEON & UCI: S&P Raises Long-Term CCR to B-; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised to 'B-'
from 'CCC+' its long-term corporate credit rating on U.K.-based
cinema operator Odeon & UCI Cinemas Group Ltd.  The outlook is

At the same time, S&P raised its debt rating on Odeon's super
senior revolving credit facility (RCF) to 'BB-' from 'B+' and
S&P's ratings on the senior secured notes due in 2018 to 'B-' from
'CCC+'.  The recovery ratings of '1+' on the super senior RCF and
'4' on the senior secured notes are unchanged and reflect S&P's
expectation of full (100%) recovery and average (30%-50%)
recovery, respectively, in the event of default.  S&P assess the
senior secured notes' recovery as being at the higher half of the

S&P estimates Odeon had GBP2.2 billion in adjusted debt
outstanding as of Dec. 31, 2015.

The upgrade reflects S&P's expectation that continued good
operating performance in all Odeon's markets will result in credit
measures that indicate that the capital structure is sustainable
over the long term.  For example, S&P's adjusted debt-to EBITDA
leverage of 10.0x-10.5x over the next two years corresponds with
about 6.5x-7.0x excluding shareholder loans, and EBITDA-to-
interest cover of about 1.3x reflects EBITDA to interest of about
2.5x-3x, excluding S&P's adjustments.  S&P therefore believes that
Odeon will be able to refinance the senior secured debt issues due
in 2018, in order and on time.

S&P forecasts that the group will achieve adjusted EBITDA of about
GBP230 million-GBP245 million in 2016, a 27% uplift from the
GBP180 million posted in 2014.  The GBP270 million EBITDA that
Odeon generated in 2015 has benefitted from about GBP30 million of
one-off items and S&P therefore considers that this level does not
represent future performance.  Management undertook various
commercial strategies and estate management measures in the last
few quarters, which S&P sees as supporting earnings generation and
profitability over the medium term.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Revenue growth of about 2.5%-3.0% a year, underpinned by
      growth in market attendance and retail revenue per head but
      moderated by ongoing promotional activities that lower
      average ticket prices.  Adjusted EBITDA margin of about 30%
      based on improved volumes and control over the cost base.

   -- Capital expenditure (capex) of about 4.5% of revenues,
      including an expansionary element.

   -- Odeon's credit measures will be volatile and difficult to
      predict, as was the case in the past.  The company will be
      able to refinance its 2018 maturities in order and on time.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- An adjusted debt-to-EBITDA of about 10x (6.5x-7.0x
      excluding shareholder loans) in 2016 and 2017.

   -- Reported free operating cash flow (FOCF) largely neutral in
      2016 and about GBP5 million-GBP10 million a year

The stable outlook for the next 12 months reflects S&P's
expectation that Odeon's operating performance will continue
benefitting from the strong film slate in 2016 and 2017, supported
by contribution from local content in Odeon's international
markets.  S&P considers its forecast of about GBP90 million EBITDA
in 2016, on a reported basis, and at least as much in the next 12
months, to be commensurate with the 'B-' rating.  S&P's outlook
further assumes that the company will generate largely neutral
FOCF and maintain its adequate liquidity.  S&P believes that Odeon
will be able to refinance its debt due in 2017 and 2018 in order
and on time, provided that its operating performance does not
deviate materially from S&P's base case.

S&P could lower the rating if Odeon faced a material decline in
EBITDA compared with the GBP95 million reported in 2015 (excluding
one-off items), which could lead to an increase in leverage and
put timely refinancing of the senior secured debt coming due 2018
at risk.  Persistently negative FOCF on a reported basis or
weakening of Odeon's liquidity could also trigger a downgrade.

S&P sees limited upside potential for the rating because of the
relatively high level of leverage and S&P's assessment of Odeon's
financial policy as aggressive due to financial sponsor ownership.

TESCO PLC: Egan-Jones Cuts FC Sr. Unsecured Rating to BB
Egan-Jones Ratings Company lowered the foreign currency senior
unsecured rating on debt issued by Tesco PLC to BB from BB+ on
April 20, 2016.

Tesco PLC is a British multinational grocery and general
merchandise retailer headquartered in Welwyn Garden City,
Hertfordshire, England, United Kingdom.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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