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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Wednesday, May 18, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 097


                            Headlines


B U L G A R I A

FIRST INVESTMENT: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Rating


G E R M A N Y

RWE AG: Moody's Lowers Rating on Subordinated Debt to 'Ba2'


I R E L A N D

* R3 Says Struggling Firms Need More Time for Recovery


I T A L Y

BANCA CARIGE: Fitch Lowers LT Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'
BANCA POPOLARE DEL'EMILIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LongTerm IDR


K A Z A K H S T A N

KAZKOMMERTS-POLICY JSC: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-'
KAZKOMMERTSBANK JSC: S&P Cuts Counterparty Credit Rating to CCC+


L U X E M B O U R G

PENTA CLO 1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

ACISION BV: S&P Revises CreditWatch on B CCR to Developing
EA PARTNERS: Fitch Rates Proposed Notes B-(EXP)
LEOPARD CLO IV: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1


R U S S I A

X5 FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Rating to RUB5-Billion Bond


S E R B I A

RTB BOR: Seeks Court Approval of Pre-Pack Bankruptcy Plan


S W E D E N

CORRAL PETROLEUM: S&P Assigns B+ Long-Term CCR, Outlook Stable


T U R K E Y

TURKIYE IS BANKASI: Moody's Reviews Ba3 Debt Rating for Downgrade


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Bhailok Pulls Out of Bidding Race to Rescue Business
BHS GROUP: Goldman Sachs Linked to 2015 Sale of Business
GENWORTH FINANCIAL: S&P Affirms B IFS Rating Then Withdraws
INTELLIGENT ENERGY: Mediator to Take Control in Exchange for Loan
MOY PARK: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms BB CCR

ONCILLA MORTGAGE 2016-1: Moody's Rates Two Note Classes (P)B2
RANGERS FOOTBALL: Two Men Cleared of Fraud Allegations


                            *********


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


FIRST INVESTMENT: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Bulgarian-based First Investment Bank
AD's (FIBank) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-'. The
Outlook on FIBank's Long-Term IDR is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND VR

The IDRs of FIBank are driven by its standalone financial
strength, as expressed by its Viablity Rating (VR).

The bank's VR reflects weak capitalization relative to
significant concentrations in the loan book, and low reserve
coverage of a large stock of impaired exposures, resulting in
significant unreserved impaired loans relative to Fitch Core
Capital (FCC). The rating also reflects a high share of impaired
exposures and repossessed assets on FIBank's balance sheet as
well as weak, albeit improving profitability.

At the same time, the ratings also reflect positive changes in
the bank's corporate governance and risk management framework;
and a recovery in the funding base and liquidity position,
allowing the bank to fully repay debt on schedule the liquidity
support it has received from the Bulgarian State.

Fitch considers FIBank's capitalization a rating weakness. Its
capitalization is negatively impacted by large concentrations in
the loan book (at multiples of FCC at end-2015). The bank is
targeting a reduction of large exposures, but this will take time
given the long-term nature of many of these loans and only
gradual amortization.

Despite significant impairment charges booked in 2015 (equivalent
to 5.2% of average gross loans) the growth of impaired loans,
which almost doubled over the same period, resulted in a fall in
the reserve coverage ratio to around 52% (2014: around 70%). The
unreserved portion of impaired loans accounted for a high 93% of
FCC at end-2015 (2014: 32%), negatively impacting the bank's loss
absorption capacity and ultimately Fitch's view of FIBank's
capitalization.

Asset quality is another rating weakness. The reported impaired
loans-to-total gross loans ratio more than doubled to close to
24% at end-2015, above the 20.4% average for the sector. The
increase was, in Fitch's view, driven by a more conservative and
consistent application of impairment triggers rather than abrupt
deterioration of underlying asset quality. Exposures more than 90
days overdue were much lower relative to impaired loan levels,
although still high at 14.8% of total gross loans (2014: 10.9%)
and were 54% covered by specific provisions (83% including
provisions for all impaired exposures and provisions for incurred
but not reported losses (IBNR).

On top of the large stock of impaired exposures, FIBank carries
on its balance sheet a significant amount of repossessed assets
(BGN932m, equivalent to around 1.3x FCC), mostly in the form of
real estate. These do not generate recurring income, negatively
impacting profitability, and are likely to be monetized only
gradually.

Pre-impairment profitability is adequate; however, large
impairment charges resulted in negative operating profitability
in 2015 and 2014. The bottom-line has been supported by large
one-offs gains over the last two years (in 2015 due to a
revaluation of investment property), allowing FIBank to post
positive net income for the year. Results for 1Q16 are
encouraging with sound pre-impairment profitability and modest
net impairment charges, the latter supported by rather
significant recoveries. Based on 1Q16 results, the bank could
incur annual net impairment charges equivalent to around 4% of
gross loans without denting its capital.

In line with its restructuring plan approved by the European
Commission following the state aid extended to FIBank in 2014,
some of the key weaknesses in corporate governance were addressed
with the introduction of CFO and CRO functions and their
appointment to the management board, the introduction of an
experienced independent member to the Supervisory Board and
clearer segregation of duties. Changes in risk appetite and the
risk management process at both the origination and underwriting
stage as well as during the monitoring process were also
introduced.

Fitch believes that the implementation of these changes is likely
to have a positive impact on the risk profile of the newly
underwritten exposures and lead to better control over the legacy
portfolio. Nevertheless, a positive impact on FIBank's risk
profile will require a longer record of consistent application of
the new governance framework.

Liquidity has recovered and stabilized following the deposit
outflows in 2014, which had triggered the extraordinary liquidity
support from the sovereign. The bank is on track with the
scheduled repayment of state deposits. The final repayment,
comprising a small amount, is expected by end-May 2016.

The bank enjoys a fairly granular deposit base with a large share
of retail deposits. These, however, are mostly term deposits that
are more expensive than current account balances. Fitch believes
that a strengthening of customer relationships, as evidenced by a
larger share of current accounts in retail deposits, would be
positive for funding costs and margins, and further improve the
stability of the deposit base.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The bank's Support Rating of '5' and Support Rating Floor of 'No
Floor' reflect Fitch's opinion that potential sovereign support
for the bank cannot be relied upon. This is underpinned by the
EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), transposed
into Bulgarian legislation, which provides a framework for
resolving banks that is likely to require senior creditors
participating in losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a
bank receiving sovereign support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND VR

The bank's IDRs and VR could be downgraded in case of (i) a
further marked deterioration in FIBank's loan performance or
underlying asset quality, resulting in increased pressure on the
bank's capitalization; or (ii) renewed and sustained pressure on
the bank's liquidity, if this is not offset in a timely fashion
by external liquidity support.

Upside potential for the VR is limited in the short- to medium-
term given that the potentially positive impact of actions taken
under the restructuring plan, including stronger internal capital
generation, will take time to feed through and affect the
capitalization, while legacy issues are going to weigh on the
bank's risk profile.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Any upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks. While not impossible, this is highly unlikely
in Fitch's view.

The rating actions are as follows:

First Investment Bank AD

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


RWE AG: Moody's Lowers Rating on Subordinated Debt to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Baa3 and (P)Baa3 from
Baa2 and (P)Baa2 the senior unsecured ratings of RWE AG (RWE),
and RWE Finance B.V. its guaranteed subsidiary.  Concurrently,
Moody's has downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1 the subordinated debt
ratings.  The short term ratings of RWE and RWE Finance BV are
downgraded to Prime-3 and (P)Prime-3 from Prime-2 and (P)Prime 2.
The outlook is stable.  This concludes the review of the ratings
initiated on Feb. 13, 2016.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects (1) a weak power price environment,
which is likely to maintain pressure on RWE's operating cash
flows from generation; (2) the risk that the recent
recommendation by the government-appointed nuclear commission
that a significant premium should be paid by the German nuclear
generators will be an additional financial burden for RWE.  These
factors are likely to result in RWE having a financial profile
that is no longer consistent with the guidance for the Baa2
rating category.  In addition, the action factors in; (3) the
company's exposure to coal and lignite generation in the context
of a political environment that is likely to remain challenging
over the longer term, given the government's commitment to clean
energy.

Forward baseload prices in Germany have declined significantly
over the last twelve months and whilst there has been some
rebound in recent weeks to around EUR 24/MWh, they are likely to
remain low and volatile.  RWE's generation fleet is primarily
fixed-cost in nature, with over half of output represented by
lignite and nuclear, making it exposed to movements in wholesale
power prices as RWE's hedges roll off, although the company
remains rather well hedged over 2016-18.

The rating action also takes into account the recent unanimous
recommendation by the German government-appointed nuclear
commission that (1) the liabilities of the German nuclear
generators for interim and final storage should be externalized
into a separate public fund backed by liquid financial assets
from the companies; and (2) a premium, of around 35%, should be
paid by 2022 in order to release the generators from these
obligations. The nuclear generators have objected to the level of
premium to be paid.  In Moody's view, there is a good likelihood
that, while there may be further negotiations on the final
calculations of the underlying liabilities, a solution will be
found and passed into law.  The requirement to fund the
externalized liabilities will reduce the companies' financial
flexibility and the premium will result in a direct additional
debt burden of several billion euros for the industry.  Should an
agreement not be reached and passed into law this year, Moody's
believes the issue will remain a significant overhang for the
companies.

If the nuclear commission's proposal is passed into law, Moody's
will remove the "equity credit" that it has previously applied to
these unfunded nuclear obligations on the assumption that the
companies would raise equity to fund them if so required.  This
will apply both to the liabilities to be externalized, where the
funding obligation will crystallize, as well as those which
remain with the companies.  This is because the costs and timing
of payments of these residual nuclear obligations, which relate
to the dismantling of the plants, restoring the sites and dealing
with low level waste, are significantly shorter term and more
certain than the long term storage costs.  All plants will shut
by 2022, the dismantling operations are already in progress for
those plant that have already shut down and most of the
operations will be completed around twenty years after final
closure.  Moody's will recognize the companies' efforts, as they
are implemented, to either raise equity or take other measures to
pay for these obligations.

Moody's notes as mitigating factors that (1) the companies will
likely have some time to make payments into the fund; and (2)
political, business and financial risk will be reduced through
the removal of these long dated interim and final storage
liabilities which carry a significant number of uncertainties
relating to final location and costs.  Separately, the companies,
including RWE, have outstanding laws suits against the government
in relation to nuclear fuel taxes and early nuclear
decommissioning on which a formal decision is expected this year.
This may result in some compensation being paid to the companies.

Nonetheless, taking into account this combination of factors,
RWE's financial profile is likely to weaken such that is no
longer consistent with the guidance for a Baa2 rating.  RWE
should, however, be well positioned against guidance of FFO/net
debt of low-mid teens and RCF of low double digits/low teens, in
percentage terms, for the Baa3 rating.

RWE's plans to restructure the group and sell down stakes in its
newly established company (NewCo) which will hold lower risk
regulated and contracted activities, will diversify funding
sources for the group, but is not expected to fundamentally
change the business risk profile of the group.  Moody's believe
that settlement of the nuclear issue could reduce business risk
for the company, a credit positive, nonetheless, in order to fund
the payments, RWE could sell stakes in NewCo, introducing
minority shareholders, a credit negative.

The rating is further supported by (1) RWE's commitment to take
measures within its means to shore up its financial profile as
reflected in the dividend cut on its 2015 results; and (2) RWE's
shift toward more regulated and contracted earnings through its
emphasis on growth capex in these areas.

                  RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The outlook is stable and reflects Moody's view that RWE should
be able to sustain a financial profile in line with guidance for
the Baa3 rating.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The ratings could move up if there were a sustained reduction in
risks in its principal operating environments and the company's
financial profile were to improve such that it could sustain
financial metrics of FFO/net debt in the high teens and RCF/net
debt in the low teens.

The ratings could move down if power prices dropped materially
below current levels, political risk were to increase
significantly in relation to its thermal assets or nuclear
assets, such that the financial guidance for the current rating
were no longer sustainable.

Moody's also points out that a future restructuring of the group
could also result in structural issues that affect the ranking,
and hence relative positioning, of senior unsecured and hybrid
ratings.  The greater inclusion of minority shareholders may also
affect the group's financial profile.  Such factors would be
assessed at the time for rating implications.  Moody's may
further adjust financial guidance as the group's business and
financial structure evolves.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Downgrades:

Issuer: RWE AG
  Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1
  Commercial Paper, Downgraded to P-3 from P-2
  Other Short Term, Downgraded to (P)P-3 from (P)P-2
  Senior Unsecured MTN, Downgraded to (P)Baa3 from (P)Baa2
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Baa3
   from Baa2

Issuer: RWE Finance B.V.
  BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN, Downgraded to (P)Baa3 from (P)Baa2
  BACKED Other Short Term, Downgraded to (P)P-3 from (P)P-2
  BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to
   Baa3 from Baa2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: RWE AG
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review

Issuer: RWE Finance B.V.
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review

The methodology used in these ratings were Unregulated Utilities
and Unregulated Power Companies published in October 2014.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


* R3 Says Struggling Firms Need More Time for Recovery
------------------------------------------------------
Simon Cunninghman at The Irish News reports that insolvency trade
body R3 has said struggling firms should be given more time to
plan for their recovery.

It wants companies to be given by to six weeks "breathing space"
from creditor pressure to plan a rescue, The Irish News says.

According to The Irish News, the organization wants a "business
rescue moratorium" which it hopes will help save more companies
under severe financial strain as well as preserve more jobs and
improve returns to creditors.

Under R3's proposals, creditors would not be able to pursue debts
owed by companies in a moratorium for 21 days, The Irish News
says.

R3 said this period could be extended for a further 21 days with
court approval, The Irish News notes.

During the moratorium, companies would be overseen by a
moratorium supervisor who would ensure the directors are using
the moratorium as intended, The Irish News states.

Any company could enter the proposed moratorium, including
insolvent companies, which might otherwise enter a formal
insolvency procedure immediately, The Irish News discloses.

The moratorium could be used to put in place plans to restructure
a company, negotiate alternative payment terms with creditors,
negotiate a company voluntary arrangement, or prepare for an
administration or liquidation, according to The Irish News.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA CARIGE: Fitch Lowers LT Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Banca Carige's (Carige) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B- from 'B' and Viability Rating
(VR) to 'b-' from 'b'. The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is
Stable.

Carige's IDRs are driven by the bank's stand-alone credit
strength as reflected in the VR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDR, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The downgrade mainly reflects the impact of customer deposit
outflows on Carige's funding and liquidity profile, following the
resolution of four Italian banks in late 2015 and throughout
1Q16. These outflows revealed that Carige's liquidity profile is
prone to sudden changes in creditor sentiment and, in Fitch's
opinion, undermined the bank's franchise, including in the retail
space.

Customer deposits stopped contracting in April 2016, when the
bank recorded a small net growth. To date the bank has
implemented effective contingency measures and maintained
liquidity ratios above regulatory minimum, but its overall
liquidity and funding position has nonetheless deteriorated over
the past year. Carige's ratings also reflect weak asset quality,
and the consequent impact on its capital, and a loss-making
business model.

The recently appointed management faces the challenges of setting
new strategic goals for the bank, addressing its weak asset
quality, stabilizing and strengthening its liquidity and funding
profile and restoring the bank's ability to generate sustainable
profits.

Carige's asset quality remains weak with impaired loans close to
a high 28% of gross loans at end-2015, higher than the industry
average. During 2015, inflows of new problem loans decreased more
than at some other medium-sized Italian banks, due to a
strengthened control environment. Carige's weak asset quality is
partly the result of geographical concentration in one region in
Italy, Liguria, which enjoys high per-capita wealth but typically
lags behind economic recovery.

Despite two share issues in 2014 and 2015, capital remains under
pressure from the high level of unreserved impaired loans, which
at end-2015 accounted for close to 150% of the bank's Fitch Core
Capital (FCC).

SUBORDINATED DEBT

Carige's subordinated debt is rated one notch below the VR in
accordance with Fitch's assessment of the instrument's higher
loss severity risk profile compared with senior debt. It has thus
been downgraded in line with the VR.

SUPPORT RATING (SR) AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR (SRF)

The bank's SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors
can no longer rely on receiving full extraordinary support from
the sovereign in the event that the bank becomes non-viable. The
EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for eurozone banks provide a framework
for resolving banks that require senior creditors participating
in losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving
sovereign support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDR, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The bank's ratings are primarily vulnerable to asset quality and
capital deterioration, and to further deposit outflows that would
put pressure on the bank's already weak liquidity. Recent
initiatives aimed at addressing Italian banks' asset quality, if
successful, could over time be positive for the bank, and a
sizeable reduction of unreserved loans relative to FCC could
result in an upgrade.

SUBORDINATED DEBT

Carige's subordinated debt ratings are sensitive to a change in
the bank's VR.

SR AND SRF

An upgrade of the SR and upward revision of the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support Carige. While not impossible, this is highly unlikely, in
Fitch's view.

The rating actions are as follows:

  Long-term IDR downgraded to 'B-' from 'B'; Outlook Stable

  Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  Viability Rating downgraded to 'b-' from 'b'

  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

  Senior unsecured notes (including EMTN): Long-term rating
  downgraded to 'B-'/'RR4' from 'B'/'RR4', Short-term rating of
  'B' affirmed

  Subordinated notes: downgraded to 'CCC'/'RR5' from 'B-'/'RR5'


BANCA POPOLARE DEL'EMILIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LongTerm IDR
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna's
(BPER) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' and
Viability Rating at 'bb'. The Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

Fitch said, "The IDRs are driven by BPER's stand-alone credit
strength as reflected by the Viability Rating (VR). The bank's
capitalization is, in our view, a factor of high importance in
determining the bank's VR. While the bank's regulatory capital
ratios are well above any minimum capital requirements, the risk
introduced by having a high proportion of unreserved impaired
loans to capital (particularly as a proportion of Fitch Core
Capital), renders its capitalization not fully commensurate with
its risk profile and constrains the bank's ratings to below
investment grade. The bank is vulnerable to deterioration in its
medium-term ability to remove impaired loans from its balance
sheet without incurring additional loan impairment charges
(LICs), as well to asset price declines.

"Asset quality is also an important consideration for our
assessment of the VR. Although we consider BPER's lending to be
fairly diversified by borrower and by industry, the stock of
impaired loans on its book is very high relative to broad
industry standards, at around the average for the Italian system.
The problem is exacerbated by the difficulties in selling,
recovering or writing off such loans over the medium-term.

"The VR does not yet take into account the plans set down by the
bank to reduce the stock of impaired loans on its balance sheet
through one-off sales, as we believe that until a concrete
solution is found to remove a high proportion of these loans
without reducing capital excessively, the ratings remain under
pressure.

"We view BPER's earnings as fairly diversified, reflecting the
bank's commercial and retail business model. Profitability
improved modestly in 2015 and while this was partly the result of
large one-offs related to the sale of participations and
government bonds, we expect to see a stabilization in operating
profitability over the medium term as business volumes pick up,
cost remain under control and LICs reduce."

The bank's three-year plan envisages improving cost efficiency by
way of branch reductions, simplifications in its organizational
structure and staff layoffs. However, it is likely that other
administrative expenses will remain under pressure in the short-
term from increasing regulatory, legal and compliance costs as
well as increasing IT investments. Furthermore, overall revenues
remain depressed by the low interest rate environment in Italy as
for the rest of the EU.

LICs have been extremely high in recent years, both in terms of
pre-impairment operating profits and of gross loans. However,
Fitch expects LICs to normalize over the next three years due to
closer management of problem assets as well as the recent
harmonization of underwriting standards across the group.

"We believe that the bank's funding is adequate, supported by a
high proportion of stable and loyal customers. The bank benefited
from a flight to quality following the failure of four small
banks in Italy in 2015, some of them present in BPER's own areas
of operations. Wholesale funding sources are sufficiently
diversified for a second-tier bank through covered bonds and
securitizations. Although utilization of ECB funding has
historically been low we expect access to increase significantly
with the new Targeted Long Term Refinancing Operations," said
Fitch.

Liquidity has been sound, with reported liquidity coverage ratio
(LCR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR) comfortably above 100%.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

"The bank's Support Rating and Support Rating Floor reflect our
view that following the introduction of Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive, the likelihood of BPER being supported, in
case of need, by the Italian authorities has reduced
substantially. We therefore no longer rely on the possibility of
such support in our ratings," Fitch said.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

BPER's subordinated debt is rated one notch below the VR to
reflect the higher loss severity compared with senior debt. Its
affirmation reflects that of BPER's VR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The bank's IDRs, VR and senior debt ratings are sensitive to
changes to capital and asset quality. In particular the ratings
could benefit from a sizeable reduction of the level of
unreserved impaired loans relative to core capital. The bank is
also sensitive to the operating environment in Italy,
particularly to the success of recent initiatives aimed at
addressing Italian banks' asset quality.

Ratings could be downgraded if asset quality fails to stabilize
or if profitability fails to improve from the current low levels,
hence affecting the bank's internal capital generation.

Ratings are also sensitive to changes in the bank's funding or
liquidity profile. These changes could be caused, for example, by
deterioration in the bank's customer or wholesale funding
franchise, due to excessive reliance on central bank funding, or
if asset encumbrance increases to such an extent that it reduces
the bank's access to additional liquidity when required.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

"The SR and SRF are sensitive to a change in assumptions around
the propensity or ability of the Italian state to provide timely
support to the bank. Given progress made on recovery and
resolution, we believe that changes in propensity are highly
unlikely."

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

BPER's subordinated debt ratings are broadly sensitive to the
same considerations that might affect the VR

The rating actions are as follows:

BPER
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'
Support Rating: affirmed at'5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Long-term senior debt and programme ratings: affirmed at 'BB'
Short-term senior debt and programme ratings: affirmed at 'B'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB-'



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KAZKOMMERTS-POLICY JSC: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it lowered its long-term
counterparty credit and financial strength ratings on Kazakhstan-
based Insurance Co. Kazkommerts-Policy JSC to 'B-' from 'B'.  The
outlook is stable.  At the same time, S&P lowered the Kazakhstan
national scale rating on the insurer to 'kzBB-' from 'kzBB'.

The downgrade follows the negative rating action on Kazkommerts-
Policy's parent, Kazkommertsbank JSC.  Kazkommertsbank is
experiencing increasing pressure from a combination of external
and internal factors.  The bank's liquidity and capitalization
ratios suggest that its short-term (under one year) prospects
remain assured.  However, S&P thinks that Kazkommertsbank is
increasingly vulnerable in the long-term, as shown by a loss the
bank made in 2015 (despite the transfer of nonperforming assets
to BTA).  Additionally, the operating environment is likely to
remain weak, and S&P has seen no clear progress from management
in setting out a credible strategy to ensure the bank's long-term
health.

As such, S&P expects that Kazkommerts-Policy's strategy could
undergo shifts.  But, S&P don't anticipate detrimental effects on
the insurer's stand-alone credit characteristics.  In S&P's view,
Kazkommerts-Policy will be able to maintain its top-10 position
among insurance companies in Kazakhstan, with a gradually growing
insurance portfolio, in particular in property and motor
insurance.  S&P expects net premium growth to be flat in 2016.

In S&P's view, the insurance company's capital is sufficient to
support further growth.  The company reported record-high profits
in 2015, driven by investment gains on foreign currency assets,
prompting it to pay dividends of Kazakh tenge (KZT) 14.4 billion
(about US$41 million).  This amount equals the net profit for
2015, but it has a moderate effect on the insurer's capital
adequacy, which remains very strong at 'AA' level, despite a
slight shift down from above S&P's 'AAA' requirements previously.
S&P don't envisage the company's capital adequacy falling below
'AA' level, based on S&P's projection of a declining loss and
expense ratio.  In 2015, Kazkommerts-Policy's net expense ratio
bowed under the pressure from the increased operation costs
linked to the consolidation process of BTA Insurance.  However,
S&P continues to anticipate that the net combined ratio in 2016
will be above 100%, against 128% in 2015.

S&P reassessed the company's risk position to high risk from
moderate risk due to existing currency risk.  S&P considers that
the insurer is gradually decreasing its share of invested assets
in foreign currency, but its share is slightly above 20% of the
invested assets.  This adds volatility to the company's results.
If S&P sees a further decline of foreign currency assets S&P
could revise the risk position back to moderate risk.

S&P considers that Kazkommerts-Policy remains a strategically
important subsidiary of Kazkommertsbank.  However, S&P do not
factor any explicit support from the parent into S&P's ratings on
the insurer, because its assessment of Kazkommertsbank's stand-
alone credit profile (SACP) is lower than that of the subsidiary,
which S&P assess at 'b+'.

S&P rates Kazkommerts-Policy one notch higher than its parent
because S&P considers the insurance company to be insulated from
Kazkommertsbank.  This is because the regulatory framework
provides some protection for the insurer in the event of adverse
intervention from Kazkommertsbank.  The framework also includes
constant oversight from the National Bank of the Republic of
Kazakhstan.

S&P doesn't believe that the insurance company falls under its
'CCC' criteria definition, so the outlook on the insurance
company remains at stable rather than negative, which would be in
line with the outlook on the parent.  S&P currently doesn't
observe any further downward pressure on the insurer's liquidity,
capital, or financial flexibility that would lead the rating
agency to treat the insurer as a 'CCC' entity over the next 12 to
24 months.

The outlook is stable, reflecting S&P's assumption that
Kazkommerts-Policy's creditworthiness will remain intact, even in
case of a further downgrade of Kazkommertsbank, in the next 12
months.  Although S&P's outlook on Kazkommertsbank is negative,
S&P believe that the bank's relatively weaker financial profile
will have only a limited negative impact on the insurer.

S&P anticipates that, over the next 12-18 months, Kazkommerts-
Policy will be able to maintain its top-10 position in the Kazakh
insurance market, based on net premium written, and sustain its
moderately strong capital and earnings.

S&P could lower the rating if it saw evidence that Kazkommerts-
Policy had become heavily dependent upon favorable business,
financial, and economic conditions to meet its financial
commitments.  The potential downgrade of the parent might trigger
the rating revision or widening of the notching between the
ratings on the insurance company and the bank.  S&P could lower
the rating if it saw evidence that Kazkommerts-Policy's
competitive position had deteriorated; for example, if it
experienced a loss of premium income, its underwriting
performance deteriorated, its average asset quality deteriorated
to a weak level, or its dividend payments significantly eroded
the company's financial flexibility and capital adequacy.

S&P considers an upgrade to be unlikely over the next 12-18
months.


KAZKOMMERTSBANK JSC: S&P Cuts Counterparty Credit Rating to CCC+
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it lowered to 'CCC+' from 'B-' its
long-term counterparty credit rating on Kazakhstan-based
Kazkommertsbank JSC (KKB).  At the same time, S&P lowered the
Kazakhstan national scale rating to 'kzB-' from 'kzBB-'.  S&P has
also affirmed the 'C' short-term rating on KKB.  The outlook is
negative.

At the same time, S&P lowered the rating on the subordinated debt
of the bank to 'CCC-' from 'CCC' and on the junior subordinated
debt to 'CC' from 'CCC-'.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that KKB is experiencing
increasing pressure from a combination of external and internal
factors.  The bank's liquidity and capitalization ratios suggest
that its short-term (under one year) prospects remain assured.
However, S&P thinks that KKB is increasingly vulnerable in the
long term, as shown by a loss the bank made in 2015 (despite the
transfer of nonperforming assets to BTA).  Additionally, the
operating environment is likely to remain weak, and S&P has seen
no clear progress from management in setting out a credible
strategy to ensure the bank's long-term health.

Specifically, S&P thinks it will be highly challenging for KKB's
new management team to develop and implement a successful
turnaround strategy and achieve meaningful results promptly.  KKB
remains burdened by a large stock of legacy problem assets, held
directly or via its large exposure to BTA--the former bank that
acquired nonperforming loans (NPLs) from KKB in 2015.  Contrary
to S&P's previous expectations, the deteriorating economic
environment and Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) devaluation in 2015 meant
that this sale of problem assets did not provide as much
improvement to the bank's financial profile as S&P had expected.
KKB reported substantial additional provisioning expense in 2015,
which, in turn, led it to report a significant net loss.

KKB remains the largest bank in Kazakhstan, with a historical
focus on large corporate exposures.  However, reducing these
exposures, with many already nonperforming, and developing a
sustainable new growth strategy would be a major challenge, in
S&P's view.

KKB states that it complies with all regulatory requirements
relating to capital adequacy (as of Jan. 1, 2016, the bank
reported a local capital adequacy K1 ratio of 9.3% and a K2 ratio
of 14%, versus the regulatory minimum of 7.5% and 10%,
respectively).  However, through the lens of S&P's risk-adjusted
capital (RAC) framework, we see KKB's capitalization as very
weak. Furthermore, S&P expects that the RAC ratio will move into
the 2.3%-2.5% range over the next 12-18 months (as of Dec. 31,
2015: 2.7%).  Underlying this projection is that S&P expects
limited lending growth in 2016 and 2017 but also further losses,
not least due to further substantial loan provisions that the
bank will need to create at levels comparable to provisioning
expense reported in 2015.

S&P continues to see downside risks to this projection, given the
bank's large problem loan portfolio, high single-name
concentrations, and the embedded currency risk -- almost half of
KKB's loan book is denominated in foreign currency.  At this
stage, S&P anticipates no improved capacity at the bank to
recover problem loans.  Furthermore, S&P notes that the 2015 sale
of some of KKB's NPLs to BTA was financed by a 10-year loan that
KKB provided to BTA.  After currency revaluation in 2015, this
exposure to BTA was KZT2,278 billion at end-2015, or 60% of KKB's
total loan book.  The carrying value and recoverability of the
exposure depend on BTA's ability to generate cash flows from
these underlying assets.  S&P sees this as uncertain.

KKB continues to show satisfactory liquidity metrics (on par with
peer banks).  S&P continues to see KKB's funding profile as being
in line with peers, reflecting a limited reliance on wholesale
funding and its comfortable stable funding ratio.  We believe
that management's maintenance of a satisfactory (relative to
peers) funding and liquidity profile is critical to ensuring the
bank's viability.

Taking the above factors into account, S&P does not lower its
assessment of KKB's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) -- that is,
its intrinsic creditworthiness.  The SACP remains 'ccc'.  S&P
also continues to include two notches of uplift to reflect
possible further extraordinary government support.  However, S&P
sees incremental default risk for the bank, and it reflects this
in the issuer credit rating, as well as S&P's ratings on the
bank's senior unsecured, subordinated, and junior subordinated
instruments.

The negative outlook on KKB reflects S&P's opinion that the
bank's asset quality and profitability will remain strained, and
could still deteriorate further in the coming 12-18 months.  This
view takes into account KKB's still-sizable portfolio of NPLs,
and S&P's view that already weak macroeconomic conditions are
unlikely to improve soon.  The latter is likely to depress
margins and sustain foreign currency-related risks for KKB and
its clients.  In addition, S&P does not yet see a credible
strategy to restore the bank's health in the long term.

S&P would likely lower the ratings on the bank if it observed
notable deterioration in its short-term prospects, for example,
if its liquidity and funding metrics weakened or if it came close
to its minimum regulatory capital requirements.  S&P could also
lower the ratings if, for example, we saw reducing willingness or
ability of the government to support KKB.  This could be linked
to S&P lowering its sovereign ratings on Kazakhstan.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the bank's operating
conditions stabilize and S&P sees good execution from the new
management team.  Notably, S&P would look for stabilizing asset
quality, a return to profitability, and the delivery of a
strategy that will bolster the bank's long-term health.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


PENTA CLO 1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings on these notes issued by PENTA CLO 1 S.A.:

  EUR21,000,000 Class C Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
   Nov. 18, 2015, Upgraded to A2(sf)

  EUR15,000,000 Class D Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
   Nov. 18, 2015, Upgraded to Baa3(sf)

  EUR5,500,000 Class Q Combination Notes due 2024, Upgraded to
   Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 18, 2015, Upgraded to A1(sf)

  EUR5,000,000 Class R Combination Notes due 2024, Upgraded to
   Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 18, 2015, Upgraded to A1(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes issued by PENTA
CLO 1 S.A.:

  EUR240,000,000 (Current balance: EUR 87.98M) Class A-1 Senior
   Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
   Nov. 18, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR26,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2024,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 18, 2015, Affirmed Aaa
   (sf)

  EUR48,000,000 Class B Senior Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 18, 2015, Upgraded
   to Aaa (sf)

  EUR13,000,000 Class E Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov. 18,
   2015, Upgraded to Ba2(sf)

Penta CLO 1 S.A., issued in April 2007, is a Collateralised Loan
Obligation backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield European
loans.  It is predominantly composed of senior secured loans.
The portfolio is managed by Penta Management Limited, and this
transaction has ended its reinvestment period on April 6, 2014.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the upgrade of the notes is primarily a
result of deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes and subsequent
increase in the overcollateralization.  Moody's notes that on the
December 2015 payment date, the Class A-1 notes have been
redeemed by EUR42.1 million, or 17.5% of their original balance.
As a result of this deleveraging, the OC ratios of the senior
notes have increased.  As per the latest trustee report dated
March 2016, the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E OC
ratios are of 204.31%, 143.76%, 127.26%, 117.62% and 110.37%
respectively, versus September 2015 levels of 180.75%, 138.23%,
125.33%, 117.52% and 111.48%.

The ratings on the combination notes address the repayment of the
rated balance on or before the legal final maturity.  For the
Classes Q and R, the rated balance at any time is equal to the
principal amount of the combination note on the issue date minus
the sum of all payments made from the issue date to such date, of
either interest or principal.  The rated balance will not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR237.4
million, defaulted par of EUR7.8 million, a weighted average
default probability of 24.18% (consistent with a WARF of 3330
with a weighted average life of 4.46 years), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 46.88% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 19 and a weighted average spread of
4.01%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate of
the portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it lowered the
weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio by 5%; the model
generated outputs that were within one notch of the base-case
results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by (1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and (2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
     this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
     underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending
     on market conditions and have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Amortization could accelerate as a
     consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral
     sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase
     in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.  Fast amortization
     would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning
     with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

  2) Around 16.66% of the collateral pool consists of debt
     obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by
     using credit estimates.  As part of its base case, Moody's
     has stressed large concentrations of single obligors bearing
     a credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the
     Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions," published
     in October 2009 and available at:

    http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461

  3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
     trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
     have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
     collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
     and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
     defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
     the market price or the recovery rate to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Recoveries higher
     than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
     the notes' ratings.

  4) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
     liquidation risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes that, at
     transaction  maturity, the liquidation value of such an
     asset will depend on the nature of the asset as well as the
     extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
     liabilities.  Liquidation values higher than Moody's
     expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'
     ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ACISION BV: S&P Revises CreditWatch on B CCR to Developing
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it has revised the CreditWatch
implications on its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating on
U.K.-based software company Acision to developing from positive.

At the same time, S&P also revised the CreditWatch on its 'B+'
issue rating on Acision's senior secured debt to developing from
positive.

The CreditWatch revision reflects that S&P sees both upside and
downside implications for the group credit profile (GCP) in the
short term.  This is primarily because Xura is currently engaged
in exclusive strategic negotiations for the potential sale of the
company to a third party at a purchase price of $25 per share.
However, S&P currently has no visibility on who the buyer is and,
consequently, the effect that this sale could have on Xura's
balance sheet and its currently solid liquidity.  As of fiscal
year ending January 2016, Xura reported significant cash
balances -- including restricted cash -- of about $170 million
and a positive net cash position.

In addition, given the delays in filing the audited accounts for
fiscal 2015, S&P also needs to assess the potential exposures for
the company, notably any potential tax liabilities, and obtain
greater clarity regarding the group's planned uses of excess cash
and evidence of improved free cash flow generation.

S&P expects to analyze the impact of any such transaction on the
GCP when the transaction details are announced.

S&P continues to assess Acision as a core entity within the Xura
group, and view its credit quality as equal to that of the group.
This mainly reflects S&P's view that Acision is a strategic asset
that is unlikely to be sold due to the operational merger between
the two key group subsidiaries, Comverse and Acision, with the
operations coming under a single brand, the strong commitment
from the group's management, and common treasury operations.

S&P's assessment of Xura's business risk profile primarily
reflects the group's strong position in the carrier messaging
market, catering for most of the tier-one carriers; its narrow
product offering, with most of the company's products related to
mobile messaging services; and strong revenue constraints on the
legacy messaging infrastructure products.  Along with exposure to
spending in the telecoms sector, these factors have led to
ongoing restructuring charges, weighing on the group's
profitability.

S&P's financial risk profile reflects its expectations that
adjusted leverage will decline to well below 4x thanks to cost
efficiencies and lower restructuring charges, but that free cash
flow generation will remain negative in fiscal 2016.

Additionally, the GCP reflects the group's ongoing decline in
core legacy revenues and S&P's current view of the relative
uncertainty surrounding the group's medium-term revenue and
margin prospects, compared with its main peers.

S&P hopes to resolve the CreditWatch within the next three
months, upon review of the group's audited accounts, and once S&P
has received sufficient details regarding the potential sale and
analyzed the potential implications for the group's business plan
and mid-term financial policies, including expected cash
maintenance, leverage, shareholder distributions, and M&A
strategy.

S&P could raise its long-term rating on Acision if Xura is
acquired by a strategic owner with a higher credit quality, and
S&P considers it at least moderately strategic to the new group.

S&P could also raise the rating by one notch if:

   -- Negative free cash flow is likely to substantially decline
      in 2016, with prospects of positive free cash flow
      generation thereafter; and

   -- The group maintains a strong balance sheet, including
      significant cash balances.

S&P could lower its long-term rating if Xura is acquired by a
financial sponsor and its leverage materially increases from
current levels.

S&P could also lower the rating if it assess management and
governance as weak, following negative findings on the group's
internal controls and potential findings in its auditing.


EA PARTNERS: Fitch Rates Proposed Notes B-(EXP)
-----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned EA Partners II B.V.'s proposed notes
an expected senior secured rating of 'B-(EXP)' with a Stable
Outlook. The Recovery Rating is 'RR4'.

"EA Partners II B.V. will on-lend the proceeds from the notes'
issue to respective obligors (defined as debt obligations). These
notes are secured over assets that represent senior unsecured
claims to the respective obligors. The rating reflects our view
of the credit profiles of the obligors and is constrained at 'B-
(EXP)' by the obligors of the weakest credit quality. EA Partners
II B.V. is a private company with limited liability established
solely for the purpose of this transaction, and whose sole
shareholder is a foundation."

The assignment of the final rating is contingent on the receipt
of final documents conforming to information already received.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Unsecured Claims

The proceeds from the notes' issue will represent separate debt
obligations of six obligors, including Etihad Airways PJSC (17.8%
of the planned issue), Air Berlin PLC (19.9% of the planned
issue), Alitalia Societa Aerea Italiana S.p.A. (19.9% of the
planned issue), Air SERBIA, a.d. Belgrade (12.6% of the planned
issue), Air Seychelles Limited (10.0% of the planned issue) and
Etihad Airport Services LLC (19.8% of the planned issue). On-
lending of proceeds from this transaction's secured notes will
create back-to-back senior unsecured claims upon the relevant
obligors, which rank behind each obligor's other prior ranking
debt, including secured debt.

Weakest Obligor Credit

"Given the transaction's recourse to each obligor on a several
basis, the rating is constrained at the 'B-(EXP)' level by the
weakest credit quality obligations. The rating on the notes
reflects our view of the creditworthiness, and the senior
unsecured ranking, of the obligors including our assessment of
their links with their respective parents."

This is due to the sole cash flow for the service and repayment
of the proposed notes being the individual cash flow streams from
the obligors under their respective loans. Failure of any obligor
to make interest or principal payments under its respective debt
obligation, which remains uncured following the remarketing of
the respective debt obligation and/or through the liquidity pool,
may lead to an event of default under the notes. This
transaction's noteholders are thus exposed to the underlying
creditworthiness of each individual obligor.

Obligors' Credit Quality Varies

In addition to Etihad Airways, the other obligors are either
Etihad Airways' subsidiaries (eg Etihad Airport Services) or its
equity airline partners (eg Air Berlin, Air Serbia, Air
Seychelles, Alitalia). These, and its other equity airline
partners, are key to Etihad's growth strategy, which aims at
establishing a global network with competitive operational scale
and diversity.

The credit quality of the obligors varies substantially - from
that of Etihad Airways (A/Stable), whose rating incorporates
strategic, operational and, to a lesser extent legal, ties with
its sole shareholder Abu Dhabi (AA/Stable), to that of the
obligors with the weakest credit quality - which constrains the
proposed notes' rating. While the obligors with the weakest
credit profiles also benefit from the shareholder support of
their minority parent, Etihad Airways, their standalone profiles
remain weak largely due to weak credit metrics.

Liquidity Pool

The proposed transaction contains a liquidity pool, the only
cross-collateralized feature (excluding its ratchet account
component, which is not cross collateralized), which is available
to service the interest or principal on the notes if an obligor
fails to pay an interest or principal on its respective debt
obligation when due.

However, the amount of the liquidity pool is limited to 4.5% of
initial amounts raised. Fitch estimates that this amount is
sufficient to cover around nine months of interest payments under
the proposed notes. It also represents 12 months of interest
payments for all obligors, except for the stronger Etihad Airways
and Etihad Airport Services. If over 25% of the initial deposits,
which account for most of the liquidity pool, are drawn to cure a
default of an obligor to pay interest on its debt obligation,
this may trigger the re-marketing of the respective debt
obligation. Contractually, the liquidity pool does not have to be
replenished if it is being used to service the notes.

Cross Default

The notes do not have a cross default provision, which means that
a default by one obligor under its debt obligation does not
constitute an event of default under other debt obligations
incurred under this transaction by the other obligors. However,
events of default under each debt obligation include a customary
cross-default provision which states that a failure by the
respective 'obligor or any of its material subsidiaries to pay
any of its own financial indebtedness when due' will lead to an
event of default under the debt obligation of this obligor but
not of any other obligor other than in the case of Etihad Airways
and Etihad Airport Services as described below.

Theoretically, upon an uncured event of default by one of the
weakest entities (after use of the liquidity pool and no take-up
under the re-marketing mechanism) the notes are in default and
can be accelerated. Noteholders would look to non-defaulted
entities to meet their obligations under this transaction but any
shortfall resulting from the defaulted entity would not be an
obligation of these other transaction parties.

Etihad Airport Services is considered to be a material subsidiary
of Etihad Airways under this transaction's documentation.
Therefore, an uncured failure by Etihad Airport Services to make
payments under this transaction's debt obligation will constitute
an event of default under Etihad Airways' debt obligation under
this transaction. Etihad Airways or any other non-defaulting
obligor may also provide support to other obligors by purchasing
their debt obligations through the 're-marketing event', if it
takes place upon default of another obligor on its payments under
the debt obligation. However, this can be exercised at Etihad
Airways' or any other non-defaulting obligor's discretion and is
not an obligation under this transaction.
This lack of legal obligation to support other entities underpins
this transaction's rating approach based on the credit profile of
the weakest obligors rather than on the stronger entities
supporting the weakest.

Foundation-Owned Issuer

The issuer is a private company with limited liability
incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands and has no
authorized share capital. Stichting EA Partners II, a foundation
incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands, is the sole
shareholder of the Issuer. The Issuer was established for the
purpose of the issue of the notes and lending of the notes'
proceeds to six obligors. Stichting has contributed additional
equity to the Issuer of EUR2 million.

Proceeds for Refinancing and Capex

The purpose of the proposed transaction is to provide a financing
platform to the airline, cargo and ground services businesses
that are part of Etihad's partner network. Air Berlin and Air
Seychelles plan to use the proceeds of their debt obligations
mostly for refinancing purposes whereas Etihad Airways, Etihad
Airport Services, Air Serbia and Alitalia intend to use the
proceeds mainly to finance capex and/or working capital and for
other general corporate purposes.

FX Risk

The debt obligation of all obligors and the notes will be
denominated in $US.

Average Recovery Prospect

Fitch said: "We assess the recovery (given default) prospect of
the notes as average (31%-50%, RR4) based on the average of our
assessment of the recovery prospects of the obligors and their
respective country caps and adjusting for the volatility in the
recovery percentages. Recovery prospects can be supported by
successful re-marketing of performing debt obligations at higher
than par."

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

-- The proceeds from the notes' issue will be on-lent to six
    obligors.

-- This transaction's notes are secured over assets that
    represent senior unsecured claims to respective obligors.

-- The notes do not have a cross-default provision.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

-- The improvement of the credit quality of the obligors with
    the weakest credit profiles

-- Sustained improvement of the recovery prospects for the
    senior unsecured creditors of the obligors of the weakest
    credit quality, unless there are limitations due to country-
    specific treatment of Recovery Ratings.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

-- The deterioration of the credit quality of the obligors with
    the weakest credit profiles

-- Worsening of the recovery prospects to below-average for the
    senior unsecured creditors of the obligors of the weakest
    credit quality.


LEOPARD CLO IV: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on these notes
issued by Leopard CLO IV B.V.:

  EUR20,650,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 14,
  2015, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  EUR11,250,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 14,
   2015, Affirmed B1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  EUR15,500,000 (currently EUR 13,634,254.67 outstanding) Class
   C1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 14, 2015, Upgraded to
   Aaa (sf)

  EUR7,000,000 (currently EUR 6,157,405.34 outstanding) Class C2
   Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on July 14, 2015, Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Leopard CLO IV B.V., issued in May 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield
senior secured European loans.  The portfolio is managed by M&G
Investment Management Limited.  The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in February 2012.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades on the notes are primarily a result of the
significant deleveraging of the senior notes following
amortization of the underlying portfolio since the last rating
action in July 2015.

The Class A and B notes have been fully redeemed since the last
rating action in July 2015.  As a result of the deleveraging,
over-collateralization (OC) has increased.  According to the
trustee report dated March 2016 the Class C, Class D and Class E
OC ratios are reported at 315.0%, 154.2% and 120.6% compared to
May 2015 levels, on which the last rating action was based, of
150.5%, 120.0% and 108.1%, respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR67.1 million,
a weighted average default probability of 22.9% (consistent with
a WARF of 3378), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
46.6% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 15
and a weighted average spread of 3.56%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower weighted average recovery rate for the
portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weighted
average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs that
were within one notch of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by (1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and (2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
     this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
     underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending
     on market conditions and have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Amortization could accelerate as a
     consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral
     sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase
     in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.  Fast amortization
     would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning
     with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

  2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
     trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
     have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
     collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
     and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
     defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
     the market price or the recovery rate to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Recoveries higher
     than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
     the notes' ratings.

  3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
     liquidation risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes that, at
     transaction maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset
     will depend on the nature of the asset as well as the extent
     to which the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities.
     Liquidation values higher than Moody's expectations would
     have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


X5 FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Rating to RUB5-Billion Bond
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia-based X5 Finance LLC's recently
issued RUB5 billion bonds (4B02-06-36241-R) a senior unsecured
rating of 'BB-', a Recovery Rating of 'RR5' and a National senior
unsecured rating of 'A+(rus)'. X5 Finance LLC is a fully
consolidated non-operating subsidiary of X5 Retail Group N.V.
(X5).

Similar to four other bonds issued by X5 Finance LLC, which Fitch
also rates 'BB-', the new bond only features a suretyship from
the holding company, X5. Therefore, Fitch considers these bonds
structurally subordinated to other senior unsecured obligations
of the group, which are represented by bank debt at the level of
operating companies and a RUB8billion bond that is covered by
suretyship from CJSC Trade House Perekrestok, the major EBITDA-
generating entity within the group.

Fitch rates the bond one notch below X5's Long-Term Local
Currency 'BB' IDR (Stable Outlook) as prior-ranking debt exceeds
2x (estimated at 2.2x in the 12 months to March 2016) of group
EBITDA and Fitch expects the debt mix to remain unchanged over
the medium term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Below-average Recoveries for Unsecured Bondholders

The bond rating reflects below-average recovery expectations in
case of default. Fitch has applied a one-notch discount to the
bond rating relative to X5's Long-Term IDR as prior-ranking debt
constitutes more than 2x of group EBITDA, thus constituting
material subordination and lower recoveries for unsecured
creditors under Fitch's criteria 'Recovery Ratings and Notching
Criteria for Non-Financial Corporate Issuers'.

Leading Multi-Format Retailer in Russia

Fitch said, "The rating reflects X5's strong market position as
the second-largest food retailer in Russia. The business model is
supported by X5's own logistics and distribution systems and
multi-format strategy, with a focus on the defensive discounter
format. In our view, these factors should enable X5 to retain and
improve its market position, despite increasing competition from
other large retail chains in the country, as proven in 2015. The
ratings also factor in X5's strong bargaining power over
suppliers due to the group's large scale and growing geographical
presence across Russian regions."

Strong Trading

In 2015, X5 demonstrated strong revenue growth of 28% yoy,
supported by an unprecedented number of new store openings and
industry-leading LfL sales growth (14% yoy). The latter was
driven not only by strong average basket growth but also an
increase in footfall. In 1Q16 X5 maintained strong revenue and
LfL sales growth of 27% yoy and 8% yoy respectively.

Fitch said, "The strong 2015 operating results have led X5 to
approve a large payment to its top management under a long-term
incentive (LTI) program; the payment was accrued in 2015 but paid
in 2016. Together with exit payment to former CEO and other
related expenses these one-off expenses amounted to RUB4.2
billion and led to EBITDA margin decreasing to 6.8% in 2015
(2014: 7.2%). However, adjusted for these one-off expenses,
EBITDA margin would have been stable at 7.3%, despite accelerated
expansion and weaker trading conditions. Our financial forecasts
assume no further LTI payments in 2018-2019 due to our
conservative revenue and EBITDA projections for these years."

Subdued Consumer Sentiment

Fitch said, "As real disposable incomes in Russia continue to
decline, we expect consumers to keep trading down in 2016. This
would hamper average shopping basket growth and lead to stronger
competition among the major retail chains. Therefore, Fitch
expects X5's LfL sales growth to decelerate in 2016-2017 but
remain strong compared with peers due to the group's ongoing
refurbishment program and repositioning of its supermarket and
hypermarket formats.

"We also project a decrease in EBITDA margin to 6.5% by 2019 on
the back of strong promotional activities and gross margin
sacrifices to withstand increased competition and protect
footfall rates. Positively, we factor in some support to margins
from improvements in logistics and slower increases in selling,
general and administrative expenses relative to sales growth."

Weak Coverage Metrics

Fitch expects the funds from operations (FFO) fixed charge
coverage ratio to remain weak for the ratings at 1.6x-1.8x over
2016-2019 (2015: 1.8x), as a result of substantial operating
lease expenses and a high interest rate environment in Russia.
However, this is somewhat mitigated by favorable lease
cancellation terms and the partial dependence of leases on store
turnover.

Stable Leverage

Fitch expects X5's FFO adjusted gross leverage to peak at 4.9x in
2016 (2015: 4.3x), due to large payment under the LTI program
before returning to around 4.5x in 2017-2019. Deleveraging is
constrained by the large capex planned by the group for further
expansion of the retail chain, ongoing store refurbishments and
investments in logistics. X5's capex remains largely scalable and
the group has some flexibility in managing its leverage, due to
strong and growing operating cash flows.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Annual revenue growth of around 20%, driven by mid-single
    digit LfL sales growth and selling space CAGR of 15% over
    2016-2019
-- EBITDA margin gradually decreasing to 6.5% by 2019
-- Capex at around 5%-7% of revenue
-- No dividends
-- Neutral to negative free cash flow (FCF) margin
-- No large-scale M&A activity
-- Adequate liquidity

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

-- A sharp contraction in LfL sales growth relative to close
    peers.

-- EBITDA margin erosion to below 6.5%.

-- FFO-adjusted gross leverage above 5.0x on a sustained basis.

-- FFO fixed charge cover significantly below 2.0x on a
    sustained basis if not mitigated by flexibility in managing
    operating lease expenses.

-- Deterioration of liquidity as a result of high capex,
    worsened working capital turnover and weakened access to
    local funding as rouble bonds mature in 2016.

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

-- Positive LfL sales growth comparable with close peers,
    together with maintenance of its leading market position in
    Russia's food retail sector.

-- Ability to maintain the group's EBITDA margin at around 7%.

-- FFO-adjusted gross leverage below 3.5x on a sustained basis.

-- FFO fixed charge coverage around 2.5x on a sustained basis.

LIQUIDITY

Fitch said: "At end-March 2016 X5's cash of RUB4.5billion,
together with available undrawn committed credit lines of
RUB54.6billion, were not sufficient to fully cover RUB46.1billion
short-term debt and expected negative FCF. However,
RUB28.1billion of debt was related to tranches under revolving
credit facilities, which we expect to be extended upon maturity.

"We believe X5 retains firm access to local funding, due to its
large scale, non-cyclical food retail operations and strong
operating performance. In addition, X5 has flexibility in
managing its capex, which is the major reason for expected
negative FCF, while the group's operating cash flow generation
remains strong."



===========
S E R B I A
===========


RTB BOR: Seeks Court Approval of Pre-Pack Bankruptcy Plan
---------------------------------------------------------
Gordana Filipovic and Misha Savic at Bloomberg News report that
RTB Bor has asked a local court to approve its pre-packaged
bankruptcy plan to give it more time for overhaul and cost cuts.

According to Bloomberg, RTB Bor CEO Blagoje Spaskovski said in a
statement approval of the pre-pack plan would "create conditions
for sustainable operations," resolving "historic debt".

The overhaul will include gradual job cuts over five years to
below 3,500 from around 5,000, Bloomberg says.

RTB Bor is Serbia's sole copper miner.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


CORRAL PETROLEUM: S&P Assigns B+ Long-Term CCR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had assigned its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating to Sweden-based oil refining company
Corral Petroleum Holdings AB (publ), the parent company of Preem
AB (publ).  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to the senior
payment-in-kind (PIK) toggle notes consisting of a EUR570 million
(about US$650 million) tranche and a Swedish krona (SEK) 500
million (about US$60 million) tranche.  The recovery rating is
'5', indicating S&P's expectation of recovery prospects in the
lower half of the 10%-30% range, in the event of a payment
default.

These ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings S&P
assigned on April 19, 2016.

The rating reflects Preem's relatively high exposure to one key
asset (the Lysekil refinery) and the company's participation and
relative concentration in the highly cyclical refining industry,
which implies an inherent volatility in product spread, and, to a
much lower extent, volumes.  This leads to highly volatile
profitability that weighs down S&P's assessment of the financial
risk profile and, to some extent, the business risk profile.

Preem has a strong position in Sweden (about 80% of the country's
refining capacity).  Given the limited size of the domestic
market, about 65% of its refined products are exported to other
important European markets (Scandinavia, France, Germany, and the
U.K.) and, to a lesser extent, the U.S.  This mitigates its
exposure to a single market.

The European refining industry has historically suffered from
excess capacity, and increasing European imports from the Middle
East exacerbate competition, exposing independent players in
particular.  However, Preem produces more diesel than gasoline
and diesel has a more favorable demand-supply market than
gasoline in Europe.  Europe produces sufficient gasoline for its
structural needs, but imports diesel from outside Europe, due to
structurally insufficient production.  Furthermore, in the
Swedish market, its diesel sales benefit from a competitive
advantage and are somewhat protected by Scandinavia's
environmental standards for transportation fuels, which are
higher than those for the rest of Europe.

Sweden currently offers refiners a tax incentive of about
SEK0.42 per liter (US$0.05) to sell cleaner diesel fuel
(miljîklass 1; Mk1), rather than the EU-standard Mk3 fuel
(eurodiesel).  Preem is the largest producer of Mk1 diesel, which
is used in the Nordic region.  In S&P's view, there is limited
risk of the capacity to produce Mk1 diesel increasing.

Preem is able to process a relatively large share of heavy sour
crude oil, which is normally cheaper than Brent crude oil.  For
example, in 2015, oil from the Urals cost about US$1.5 less per
barrel than Brent oil. Preem's flexibility in sourcing crude
allows it to seize opportunities in terms of pricing and reduce
feedstock costs.  S&P estimates that this increased profits by
US$95 million in 2015.

Despite these positive factors, as a refiner, Preem suffers from
highly volatile profitability and depends on the development of
product crack spreads (the price differential between crude oil
and the refined product), which are reinforced by the fluctuating
supply-demand balance in the industry.  Spreads can quickly
fluctuate by a wide margin.  Furthermore, Preem is of limited
size by global standards.  It has two refineries totaling 345
thousand barrels per day, and moderate-to-low diversification.
One refinery contributes the majority of profits (64% of its
daily capacity and higher profits per barrel).  These factors
constrain our assessment of the business risk profile, which S&P
assess as weak overall.

Preem is owned by a single investor, Mohammed Hussein Al-Amoudi,
a Saudi Arabian national who owns numerous and much larger
assets. The company's financial policies, in terms of leverage
targets or shareholder distributions, may not be fully set, in
S&P's view. For example, large dividends in 2005 limited the
company's financial flexibility in a period of high capital
expenditures (capex), which S&P sees as a negative.  However, Mr.
Al-Amoudi has a track record of providing support during moments
of weaker operating environment, and has invested material
amounts into the business.  This is positive for Preem and
counterbalances the potential for important dividends or
increases in leverage, in S&P's view.  Notably, there are
restrictions in various loan documentation regarding permitted
payments.  The bond documentation does not allow for dividend
payments outside the restricted group.

Preem's aggressive financial risk profile is constrained by
significant swings in profits.  Thus, credit metrics and free
operating cash flow (FOCF) generation depend on volatile industry
conditions.  The industry is capital intensive, given the need to
constantly maintain and keep assets competitive.  As a result of
these factors, FOCF can fluctuate widely; it was negative by more
than SEK700 million in 2012, but positive by over SEK1 billion in
2013 and about SEK750 million in 2014.

S&P assumes that the company will use the cash proceeds of the
PIK toggle notes to pay down the 2017 bonds, which totaled US$613
million.  Including the transaction, Preem will also have access
to a US$1.5 billion (about SEK13 billion) revolving credit
facility (RCF), of which about SEK3.8 billion was drawn on the
day of issuance.  Together, this amounts to total gross debt of
about SEK12.5 billion at closing.

The capital structure also contains a shareholder loan and
shareholder subordinated notes, both maturing in 2021, which S&P
treats as equity under its methodology, given their deep
subordination and sufficient provisions, which prevent these
instruments from becoming due and payable until any senior
existing and future debt has been fully repaid.

Because S&P assesses the business risk profile as weak, it does
not give cash credit in its metrics calculations.  Nevertheless,
S&P takes cash balances into account in its liquidity analysis.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Preem will
maintain adequate liquidity, mainly through sizable availability
under the RCF, and that industry fundamentals, particularly
diesel crack spreads, will enable Preem to achieve EBITDA of
about SEK3 billion in 2016 and 2017, S&P Global Ratings'-adjusted
debt to EBITDA of 3x-4x, and FOCF of about SEK1 billion in 2016.

S&P could lower the rating if crack spreads weaken materially,
operating expenses are greater than S&P expects, or the company
has unplanned downtime, such that performance deteriorates,
leading to total adjusted debt to EBITDA above 5x for a prolonged
period.

Given Preem's concentrated product and asset base, and limited
scale by global standards, we currently view an upgrade as
unlikely.  S&P could, however, raise the rating if adjusted debt
to EBITDA sustainably reduced to below 3x under S&P's assumed
mid-cycle market conditions.  Absolute debt below SEK8 billion
could also support an upgrade.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


TURKIYE IS BANKASI: Moody's Reviews Ba3 Debt Rating for Downgrade
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
Ba3 long-term foreign-currency subordinated debt
ISIN:XS1003016018 (initial face amount of USD400,000,000) rating
of Turkiye Is Bankasi AS (Isbank: deposits Baa3 negative/Prime-3;
standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) ba2).

The review for downgrade follows the consent solicitation
memorandum published by the issuer to modify the terms and
conditions of the notes, which is subject to the consent of
bondholders.  The intent of the issuer's proposal is to convert
the "plain vanilla" subordinated debt security into a Basel III-
compliant Tier 2 capital instrument, keeping the same
aforementioned ISIN number.

The review for downgrade reflects the likely introduction of a
contractual feature allowing for principal write-down at the
point of non-viability, if the bondholders agree to the proposed
terms and conditions.  If an agreement is reached, Moody's has
indicated that the security would most likely be downgraded by
one notch to B1(hyb), from Ba3, upon the implementation of the
amendment.  The review for downgrade will be concluded after the
process to obtain the consent of bondholders has been completed.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The primary driver for the downgrade is the issuer-initiated
proposal to convert the "plain vanilla" subordinated debt
security ISIN:XS1003016018 (initial face amount of
USD400,000,000; coupon 7.850 per cent) into a Basel III-compliant
Tier 2 capital instrument.

On May 12, 2016, Isbank published a consent solicitation
memorandum to modify the terms and conditions of the
aforementioned foreign-currency subordinated debt.  After the
modification of the terms and conditions (subject to the
bondholders' consent), the instrument is expected to be Basel
III-compliant and eligible for Tier 2 capital treatment under
Turkish law.

The main modifications in the terms and conditions include, but
are not limited to: (1) a provision for permanent write-down of
the notes in whole or in part upon the occurrence of a non-
viability event; and (2) making other changes to align the
conditions more closely with those of other Tier 2 notes issued
by Turkish banks following the implementation of Basel III in
Turkey.

Moody's has estimated that the likelihood of the consent being
granted was sufficiently high to place the security under review
for downgrade given the incentives in place.  If they agree to
the new terms and conditions and fulfill certain other
conditions, bondholders will obtain a one-time payment equivalent
to 0.50 per cent of the face value of their holdings of the
security.  Also, the current subordinated instrument is not
eligible for Tier 2 capital treatment under Basel III and, in the
absence of consent, the issuer could elect to use a regulatory
capital disqualification clause in the terms of the existing
security to redeem the bond.

The positioning of the rating of the notes is expected to be one
notch lower than the bank's current Ba3 foreign-currency "plain
vanilla" subordinated debt rating, or two notches below the
bank's adjusted BCA of ba2, which is in line with Moody's
standard notching guidance for subordinated debt with loss
triggered at the point of non-viability, on a contractual basis.

The expected positioning of the rating two notches below the
bank's adjusted BCA reflects the potential for greater
uncertainty associated with the timing of a principal write-down
when compared to any "plain vanilla" subordinated debt.  In this
respect, Moody's highlights that - as a way for the bank to avoid
a bank-wide resolution -- the notes may be forced to absorb
losses ahead of "plain vanilla" subordinated debt, if any.
Subordinated ratings do not incorporate any uplift from
government support.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The bondholders consenting to the new terms and conditions would
most likely lead to a downgrade of the instrument to B1(hyb),
whereas a lack of consent would lead to a confirmation of the
current rating at Ba3.

Furthermore, as the subordinated debt rating is notched off the
adjusted BCA, any upwards or downwards pressure on the bank's
adjusted BCA would therefore result in a similar rating action on
the bank's subordinated debt.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in January 2016.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS GROUP: Bhailok Pulls Out of Bidding Race to Rescue Business
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ashley Armstrong at The Telegraph reports that Yousuf Bhailok,
the Preston-based property millionaire, is pulling out of the
race to save BHS after administrators told buyers to sweeten
their offers by tens of millions of pounds.

The administrators are also demanding that all of the retailers
shops are included in any bid, The Telegraph notes.

Mr. Bhailok confirmed to The Telegraph that he had withdrawn his
interest.  He pulled out of the process after being told that he
would have to make an offer to buy all of BHS's 164 shops,
including 40 loss-making stores that are on the administrators'
"red list", The Telegraph relates.

Mr. Bhailok, as cited by The Telegraph, said: "Caution has to be
exercised in light of certain risk factors as far as the overall
level of the bid.  We believe we have to keep within our
parameters if we were to successfully revive the vast majority of
the operation."

According to The Telegraph, rescue bids for BHS are now valuing
the failed retailer well above GBP100 million after interested
parties were told they had to take on the chain's debt
liabilities, all the shops and pump in cash if they were to
succeed.

Sources close to the rescue process said that administrators
appeared "bullish" about the chances of finding a buyer for the
whole business and were asking bidders to raise their offer by
tens of millions of pounds before May 17, The Telegraph notes.

Buyers are having to assume all of BHS's GBP85 million of debt
but will not have to take on responsibility for the fallen retail
chain's GBP571 million deficit as it will pass into the Pension
Protection Fund, The Telegraph states.

The number of buyers is believed to have been whittled down to
four, The Telegraph says.  These include Sports Direct's
Mike Ashley; Edinburgh Woollen Mill and Peacocks owner Philip
Day; as well as a mystery European retailer thought to be working
with existing management, led by BHS's boss Darren Topp, The
Telegraph relays.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


BHS GROUP: Goldman Sachs Linked to 2015 Sale of Business
--------------------------------------------------------
Mark Vandevelde at The Financial Times reports that Goldman Sachs
is among a host of City institutions that have been linked to Sir
Philip Green's sale of BHS for GBP1 last year.

According to the FT, in the next phase of an investigation into
the retailer's collapse, MPs will attempt to untangle whether any
of them was responsible for checking that a consortium led by an
ex-bankrupt was a suitable buyer for a flagging business with a
large pension deficit.

MPs are expected to summon lawyers, accountants and financial
firms who advised companies on both sides of the transaction, the
FT discloses.

Goldman has insisted that it "was not engaged or remunerated in
relation to [the sale of BHS]" and played no formal role, the FT
relays.

But it is understood that Sir Philip's Arcadia Group asked
Anthony Gutman, co-head of UK investment banking at the US
investment bank, to act as an informal gatekeeper during early
stages of the disposal, the FT notes.  Mr. Gutman is expected to
appear before MPs this month to explain what part he played, the
FT states.

The chairman of the work and pensions committee, Frank Field, as
cited by the FT, said on May 16 that he was keen to "shine a
light" on the links between Goldman and Arcadia -- such as the
position of Lord Grabiner, who is a non-executive director of
Goldman Sachs International and former chairman of Arcadia.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


GENWORTH FINANCIAL: S&P Affirms B IFS Rating Then Withdraws
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed and subsequently withdrew its 'B'
financial strength rating on U.K.-based Genworth Financial
Mortgage Insurance Ltd. (GFMI).

Genworth has completed the sale of GFMI to AmTrust Financial
Services Inc. as publicly announced on May 9, 2016.  Genworth has
also provided us advance notice of termination of its guarantee
in support of GFMI policyholder obligations.  S&P's prior rating
on GFMI was based solely on the credit profile of the guarantor,
Genworth Holdings Inc.


INTELLIGENT ENERGY: Mediator to Take Control in Exchange for Loan
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jessica Shankleman at Bloomberg News reports that Intelligent
Energy Holdings Plc said its biggest shareholder will take
control of the company in exchange for a GBP30 million (US$44
million) loan, a lifeline that it says is necessary to avoid
bankruptcy.

Meditor Group Ltd., which currently owns 14.55% of Intelligent
Energy, will be able to increase its stake to as much as 72.2%
through the deal in which it would buy a loan note convertible
into shares of the manufacturer, Bloomberg relays citing a
regulatory filing on May 17. The deal requires approval at a
shareholder meeting on June 30, Bloomberg discloses.

Intelligent Energy lost most of its value in March after failing
to raise funds for a deal to install its technology on more than
27,000 telecommunications towers in India, Bloomberg recounts.
It subsequently announced a "material restructuring" including
200 job cuts that would focus it on smaller fuel cells usable in
mobile phones and drones, Bloomberg relates.

Intelligent Energy Holdings Plc is a U.K. hydrogen fuel-cell
maker.



MOY PARK: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms BB CCR
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on U.K. poultry producer
Moy Park Holdings Europe to negative from stable following the
same outlook revision on its parent, Brazil-based meat processor
JBS S.A.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'BB' long-term
corporate credit rating on Moy Park.

S&P also affirmed the issue ratings on the existing GBP300
million senior unsecured notes due 2021 at 'BB'.  The recovery
rating of '3' on these notes remains unchanged, reflecting S&P's
expectation of average (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

S&P revised the outlook on JBS to negative from stable on May 12,
2016, following weak first-quarter results and ongoing concerns
about the company's financial policy.  The weak first-quarter
performance was a result of underperformance in a number of the
group's business segments, including JBS USA and JBS Foods.  This
was driven by a combination of factors including depressed prices
driven by a temporary oversupply of beef in the U.S. operations,
tighter cattle availability in its Australian division, higher
grain prices, and strong competition in its Brazilian poultry
operations.  In addition, the company also suffered unexpected
cash losses on the derivatives that it closed out in the first
quarter, adversely affecting the level of cash flow generation.
These factors resulted in the downward revision of S&P's
estimates of profitability and free operating cash flow (FOCF)
for 2016 and weaker-than-expected credit metrics.  The delay in
debt reduction, financial policy uncertainty, and a tightening
liquidity position are all viewed as possible triggers for a
downgrade and underpin our negative outlook revision.

S&P continues to view Moy Park -- which is fully consolidated
into JBS' operations and financial reporting -- as strategically
important to the group.  This assessment is supported by S&P's
understanding that JBS is unlikely to sell Moy Park as it is a
part of the group's long-term strategy and reflects S&P's view
that Moy Park is reasonably successful at what it does.  The 'BB'
long-term corporate credit rating on Moy Park benefits from a
one-notch uplift as a result of JBS' 'bb+' group credit profile
(GCP). S&P's negative outlook revision on Moy Park reflects the
potential for a downgrade if S&P lowers the ratings on JBS.

"We continue to assess Moy Park's business risk profile as weak
and its financial risk profile as significant, resulting in an
anchor of 'bb-'.  The business risk assessment reflects Moy
Park's geographic concentration in the U.K., Ireland, and France;
limited product diversity, with over 75% of revenues derived from
poultry products; and significant exposure to private label
retailers, which tend to enjoy lower margins than branded
products.  These weaknesses are offset by Moy Park's position as
the second-largest poultry producer in the U.K., with strong
market positions in the chilled and ready-to-eat segments.  We
also view positively the supporting market conditions as demand
for poultry remains steady in the U.K. and management enjoys a
track record of managing volatile raw material prices and
avoiding disease outbreaks in its operations.  Moy Park enjoys
strong relationships with its farmers as it provides nutrition,
vaccines, and ongoing advisory services to ensure birds are
healthy and achieve the optimal biomass. However, in our view,
product concentration, combined with ongoing price constraints in
a tough retail environment, hinder Moy Park's ability to enhance
profitability and limit the potential for a stronger business
risk assessment at this time," S&P said.

"Our financial risk profile assessment reflects our forecast that
Moy Park's adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will be about 3.0x-3.5x
in 2016 and 2017.  Adjusted debt stood at GBP405 million as of
Dec. 31, 2015, including trade receivables sold, operating
leases, and unamortized borrowing costs which amounted to
approximately GBP78 million.  For the 2015 financial year, the
reported revenue stood at GBP1.44 billion, with adjusted EBITDA
of GBP117 million, and we expect steady top-line growth and
improved profitability going forward.  We forecast that earnings
will continue to increase modestly, driven mainly by volume
growth, continued efficiency gains, and product innovation in
poultry production.  We forecast adjusted FOCF of at least GBP25
million as we expect working capital movements to be largely
neutral and capital expenditure (capex) of 4%-5% annually.  The
EBITDA interest coverage metric is expected to remain strong at
5x-6x and, as such, we expect Moy Park to be able to comfortably
meet the interest payments on its GBP300 million senior notes due
2021," S&P noted.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Low-single-digit revenue growth reflecting modest increases
      in consumer demand, offset by deflationary price pressures.

   -- Modest improvement in profitability driven by management's
      continued efficiency programs and procurement savings.

   -- Annual capex of approximately 4.5%-5.5% of revenues.
      Negligible movement in working capital requirements and no
      acquisitions.

   -- No dividend payments or early redemption of outstanding
      bonds.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit metrics:

   -- Stable operating performance resulting in adjusted EBITDA
      margins of 8.0%-8.5% in 2016 and 2017.

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of 3.0x-3.5x in 2016 and 2017.

   -- Adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of 5.0x-6.0x in 2016 and
      2017.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that it could lower the
ratings on Moy Park if S&P downgraded its parent JBS.  However,
at the same time, S&P maintains its expectations on Moy Park's
financial policy based on discussions with management that the
group has no plans to increase debt leverage from current levels
through debt-financed acquisitions or step-up distribution of
funds to shareholders.  S&P expects Moy Park to maintain fairly
stable revenues and profitability, resulting in continued free
cash flow generation and adjusted debt to EBITDA remaining at
3.0x-3.5x, with EBITDA interest coverage of 5.0x-6.0x over the
next 18-24 months.

S&P could lower the corporate credit rating on Moy Park if S&P
downgraded its parent JBS S.A., all other things being equal,
with Moy Park's SACP remaining at 'bb-' or lower.  This could be
driven by JBS' weaker operating performance and cash flow
generation, resulting in higher leverage metrics than S&P's base-
case forecasts and a deteriorating liquidity position.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable or raise the ratings on
Moy Park if the negative outlook on JBS was revised to stable.
This could occur if JBS' credit metrics were to improve
significantly in the next 12-24 months, with healthy FOCF
generation and an improving liquidity profile.  Alternatively, if
Moy Park's financial risk profile were to strengthen to below
3.0x on a sustainable basis, it could trigger a revision of the
financial risk profile and result in the corporate credit rating
remaining at 'BB', provided the GCP for the group is not lower
than 'bb'.


ONCILLA MORTGAGE 2016-1: Moody's Rates Two Note Classes (P)B2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional credit ratings
to these Notes to be issued by Oncilla Mortgage Funding 2016-1
plc:

Issuer: Oncilla Mortgage Funding 2016-1 plc

  GBP173,600,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due Dec. 2043,
   Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  GBP29,700,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due Dec 2043,
   Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  GBP13,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes due Dec 2043,
   Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  GBP10,200,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes due Dec 2043,
   Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  GBP1,500,000 Class E Floating Rate Notes due Dec 2043, Assigned
   (P)B2 (sf)
  GBP2,000,000 Class ET Floating Rate Notes due Dec 2043,
   Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

The GBP [14,600,000] Class Z Notes due Dec 2043, the GBP3,100,000
Class AXS Notes due Dec 2043 and the GBP1,200,000 Class BXS Notes
due Dec 2043 have not been rated by Moody's.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The transaction is a static cash securitization of residential
mortgage loans extended to borrowers located in the UK.  The
portfolio consists of mortgages on residential properties located
in the UK extended to [2,081] non-conforming borrowers, and the
current pool balance is approximately equal to [GBP259] million
at the end of March 2016.  The assets backing the notes are
first-ranking non-conforming mortgage loans originated by GMAC-
RFC (Not rated).

   -- Expected Loss and MILAN CE Analysis

Moody's determined the MILAN CE of [30.0]% and the portfolio
expected loss of [7.0]% as input parameters for Moody's cash flow
model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution.

Portfolio expected loss of [7.0]%: This is higher than other
recent UK Non-Conforming transactions and takes into account: (i)
the number of loans in arrears at closing including the
performance of the pool since March 2011. [15.5]% of the pool is
in arrears at the end of March 2016, of which [9.4]% is more than
30 days in arrears, (ii) the WA current LTV of [87.45]% together
with [79.34]% of the pool being full and part and part interest
only loans (iii) the originator limited historical performance
information, (iv) the current macroeconomic environment and
Moody's view of the future macroeconomic environment in the UK,
and (v) benchmarking with similar transactions in the UK Non-
Conforming Sector.

MILAN Credit Enhancement of [30.0]%: This is higher than other
recent UK Non-Conforming transactions and takes into account: (i)
the high WA current LTV of [87.45]%, (ii) the presence of
[22.85]% loans where the borrower self-certified its income,
(iii) borrowers with bad credit history with [17.81]% of the pool
containing borrowers with CCJ's ; (iv) the presence of [79.34]%
of full and part and part interest-only loans in the pool, (v)
the weighted average seasoning of the pool of [8.56] years and
(vi) the level of arrears around [15.5]% at the end of March
2016.

   -- Operational Risk Analysis

Capita Mortgage Services Limited (not rated) will be the
servicer. The fact that Structured Finance Management Limited has
been appointed as back-up servicer facilitator is a positive
feature. In case default is made by the servicer on any payments
due under the servicing agreement, Structure Finance Management
Limited will facilitate the search for a suitable back-up
servicer and will use best efforts to appoint a back-up servicer
within 60 days.

Citibank, N.A. (London Branch) (A1/(P)P-1/A1(cr)) is appointed as
cash manager.  There will be no back up cash manager in place at
closing.  To help ensure continuity of payments the deal contains
estimation language whereby the cash flows will be estimated from
the most recent servicer reports should the servicer report not
be available.

The collection account is held at Barclays Bank PLC (A2/P-1).
There is a daily sweep of the funds held in the collection
account into the transaction account.  In the event Barclays
rating is below Baa3/P-2 the collection account will be
transferred to an entity rated at least Baa3/ P-2.  The
transaction account is held at Citibank, N.A. (London Branch)
(A1/(P)P-1/A1(cr)) with a transfer requirement if the rating of
the account bank falls below A2/P-1.  Moody's has taken into
account the commingling risk associated with the collection
account within its cash flow modeling.

   -- Transaction structure

There will be a reserve fund in place at closing sized at [2.5]%
of the Class A to Z note balance at close.  The reserve fund will
be fully funded at closing and will be non-amortizing during the
life of the transaction.  The reserve fund will only be available
to cover interest and senior fees shortfalls and will not be
available to cover credit losses during the life of the
transaction.  For Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class ET
the reserve fund will only be available to pay interest due to
those notes as long as the PDL for the note is below [10]% of the
note's outstanding balance.  The reserve fund can be used to
amortize the outstanding rated notes at the earlier of a)
maturity of the transaction or b) if the reserve fund (after
having paid for any shortfall) together with the principal
proceeds are sufficient to fully amortize the rated notes.  The
Class A liquidity reserve fund ([0.5]% of the Class A balance)
will be fully funded at closing and will amortize during the life
of the transaction in accordance with the amortization of Class
A.  The Class A liquidity reserve fund will only be available to
cover interest on the Class A and senior fees and will not be
available to cover Class A credit losses.  In addition, principal
proceeds may be used to cover senior fees and interest shortfalls
subject to certain conditions being satisfied.

On the interest date falling in [June 2021], the coupon on the
Class A notes will step-up to 3mL +[2.1]%.  The coupon on Class
B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class ET notes will not step up
but additional amounts will be due to the notes after the
replenishment of the reserve fund.  Moody's notes that the
additional note payments are not part of the interest payment
promise to the referenced Classes and as such Moody's ratings
assigned to the Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class ET
do not address the timely and/ or ultimate payment of such
payments.

   -- Interest Rate Risk Analysis

[58.3]% of the pool balance will be exposed to the risk of
variance between the Bank of England base rate (BBR) and three-
month sterling LIBOR payable on the notes. [41.1]% of the pool is
linked to three-month LIBOR and these assets reset at the same
time as the liabilities mitigating the risk of timing mismatch.
As there are no swaps in the transaction, Moody's stressed the
yield of the pool by applying a haircut of [0.50]% to the yield
of BBR-linked loans to take into account the basis mismatch
between these assets and liabilities.

   -- Parameter Sensitivities

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model. If the portfolio expected loss was increased from
[7.0]% of current balance to [12.0]% of current balance, and the
MILAN Credit Enhancement remained unchanged, the model output
indicates that the Class A would still achieve (P)Aaa assuming
that all other factors remained equal.  If the MILAN Credit
Enhancement was increased from [30.0]% to [36.0]% the model
output indicates that the Class A would achieve (P)Aa1.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors that would lead to a downgrade of the ratings include
economic conditions being worse than forecast resulting in worse-
than-expected performance of the underlying collateral,
deterioration in the credit quality of the counterparties and
unforeseen legal or regulatory changes.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade of the ratings include
economic conditions being better than forecast resulting in
better-than-expected performance of the underlying collateral.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the loan facilities.  Moody's ratings
only address the credit risk associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
January 2015.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion.  Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings to the Notes.  A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating.  Moody's will disseminate
the assignment of any definitive ratings through its Client
Service Desk. Moody's will monitor this transaction on an ongoing
basis.


RANGERS FOOTBALL: Two Men Cleared of Fraud Allegations
------------------------------------------------------
James Mulholland at Daily Record reports that two men have been
cleared of allegations that they participated in a large scale
fraud involving The Rangers Football Club.

According to Daily Record, businessmen Gary Withey, 52, and
David Grier, 55, will, at this point in time, not stand trial
alongside former Rangers owner Craig Whyte, 45.

The development occurred following a two-day hearing which ended
late on May 13 at the Court of Criminal Appeal in Edinburgh,
Daily Record notes.

Prosecutors had alleged that Messrs. Withey, Grier and Whyte
participated in criminal behavior during their involvement with
the Glasgow side, Daily Record discloses.

The three men became associated with Rangers following Sir David
Murray's decision to sell Rangers in May 2011, Daily Record
notes.

Mr. Whyte, of Banks, Lancashire, was in charge when the club went
into administration in February 2012, Daily Record states.  He
was also in charge when the side's previous incarnation was
liquidated in July 2012, according to Daily Record.

Mr. Withey, of Woking, was a former partner at Collyer Bristow --
the London based law firm who advised Mr. Whyte during his
takeover at Rangers, Daily Record discloses.

Mr. Grier, of London, worked for Duff and Phelps -- the financial
company which was appointed administrators of Rangers, Daily
Record relays.

                   About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station, RANGERSTV.tv.  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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