TCREUR_Public/160615.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, June 15, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 117



EFG BANK: Moody's Cuts Non-Cumulative Pref. Stock Rating to Ba1


GREECE: Yannis Stournaras Wants Creditors to Rework Bailout
HELLENIC REPUBLIC: DBRS Confirms CCC(high) LT Issuer Ratings
NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B', Outlook Negative


ZSOLNAY PORCELANMANUFAKTURA: Foreign Investor Loses Business


LAURELIN 2016-1: S&P Gives Prelim. B Rating to Class F Notes
QUINN GROUP: Family Must Pay Own Living Expenses, Receivers Say
ST. PAUL'S III: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class F Notes


CADOGAN SQUARE III: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+


RAPID BUCHAREST: Declared Bankrupt by Romanian Court
ROMANIAN FOOTBALL: May Face Bankruptcy Over RON1-Bil. Fine


MOBILE TELESYSTEMS: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Negative


BBVA INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Affirms Ba2(hyb) Pref. Stock Rating


TURKIYE IS: Moody's Lowers Sub. Debt Instrument Rating to B1(hyb)

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Mike Ashley Seeks Fresh Dialogue on Asset Sale



EFG BANK: Moody's Cuts Non-Cumulative Pref. Stock Rating to Ba1
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded EFG Bank AG's long-term
deposit ratings to A1 from Aa3, following the downgrade of EFG
Bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA to baa1
from a3.  Concurrently, the rating agency downgraded EFG
International AG's (EFGI or the group) issuer ratings to A3 from
A2 and its non-cumulative preferred stock rating (Bons de
Participation) to Ba1(hyb) from Baa3(hyb).  The outlook on the
long-term ratings is negative.

Furthermore, Moody's downgraded the long-term Counterparty Risk
Assessments (CR Assessment) of EFG Bank and EFGI to A1(cr) from
Aa3(cr).  The rating agency has affirmed EFG bank P-1 short-term
deposit ratings as well as the bank and the group's P-1(cr)
short-term CR Assessment.

The downgrade of EFG Bank and EFGI's ratings reflects a weakening
of the credit metrics of both entities, as a result of the
announced acquisition of Swiss-based private bank BSI Group (BSI
unrated; BSI AG: deposits A3 positive, BCA ba1).

The negative outlooks on the bank and the group's long-term
ratings reflects Moody's view that elevated risk exists regarding
assets under management (AuM) attrition at BSI, as well as
integration risks, which are likely to persist over an extended

The rating action concludes Moody's review for downgrade,
initiated on Feb. 25, 2016, following EFGI's announcement of the
acquisition of BSI.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE


The downgrade of EFG Bank's BCA and adjusted BCA by one notch to
baa1 reflects Moody's assessment that the bank's credit profile
will weaken noticeably following the completion of the
acquisition of BSI.  In particular, the rating agency expects
capital ratios to decline significantly.  Furthermore, the
downgrade reflects the short- to medium-term challenges on the
bank and the group's capital generation capacity.  This is
because its earnings will likely be compressed owing to
restructuring and integration costs in 2016 and 2017.

On May 11, 2016, EFGI raised CHF295 million of capital in a
rights offering from existing shareholders and the market to
finance the BSI acquisition, well below the CHF500 million that
it was aiming for when the deal was announced.  To compensate for
the lower capital raising, EFGI will issue additional shares to
Brazil's Banco BTG Pactual S.A (BTG; deposits Ba3 negative, BCA
ba3), including AT1 instruments.  In its assessment, the rating
agency also takes into account meaningful indemnities and the
escrow account negotiated with BSI's current owner, BTG, to cover
for BSI's numerous legal and litigation risks, mitigating
additional pressure on EFG Bank and EFGI's capital ratios.

Moody's believes that EFG Bank and EFGI are increasingly unlikely
to sustain the anticipated level for combined AuM.  This is
because of the rating agency's expectation of higher-than-
anticipated AuM outflows following the announcement of fines and
other significant measures imposed on BSI by the Swiss and
Singapore regulators on May 24, 2016, in relation to the
Malaysian money-laundering case (1MDB).  As a result, the rating
agency anticipates that the combined group's earnings and capital
generation strengths will remain below previous expectations when
the transaction was announced.

At the same time, Moody's expects mitigating effects from the
purchase price reduction for BSI, which will decline due to the
announced fines and penalties according to EFGI's announcement
dated May 24, 2016.  Furthermore, the Swiss regulator's (FINMA)
approval of the planned BSI take-over by EFGI and its obligation
to accelerate the integration of BSI into EFGI has meaningfully
increased deal certainty, and constitutes an important milestone
prior to the expected closing of the transaction in Q4 2016.
FINMA has further ordered that BSI must be immediately dissolved
after the integration of BSI into EFGI has been completed.

As a result of these considerations, Moody's has assessed the
financial strength of the combined entity in the rating action.
Post the absorption of BSI by EFGI, which Moody's expects to
occur by mid-2017, the rating agency expects EFGI's franchise to
stabilize despite the risk of shorter-term client defections that
may have a negative impact on the combined entity's deposit base
and/or AuM and thus, ultimately, its earnings generation
capacity.  While Moody's does not anticipate the private bank's
low balance-sheet risk profile to change, restructuring and
integration costs for BSI will likely negatively impact EFG Bank
and EFGI's short- to medium-term earnings capacity.  Moody's
expects the positive effects from a combined private banking
platform to become visible only in 2018.


The one-notch downgrade of EFG Bank and EFGI's long-term ratings
follows the one-notch downgrade of the bank's BCA and adjusted
BCA.  The notching applied to EFG Bank and EFGI's rated
liabilities under Moody's Advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF)
analysis remains unchanged following the rating action and takes
into account the rating agency's expectation of EFG Bank and BSI
AG's combined balance sheet.

EFG Bank's A1 deposit ratings continue to benefit from an
extremely low loss-given-failure reflecting the high volumes of
deposits as well as the high volume of subordinated debt classes
protecting deposit holders in the unlikely event of failure or
resolution, leading to three notches of rating uplift from its
baa1 adjusted BCA.

For EFGI's A3 issuer ratings, Moody's LGF analysis indicates a
low loss-given-failure for EFGI's senior debt instruments,
reflecting the volume of senior debt outstanding and the cushion
through equity and subordinated liabilities available at the
holding company level, leading to one notch of rating uplift from
its baa1 adjusted BCA.  However, the negative outlook on EFGI's
issuer rating also reflects the possible lower relative volume of
subordinated liabilities resulting from the combination of EFG
Bank and BSI AG's balance sheets.

The Ba1(hyb) ratings of EFGI's Tier 1 hybrid capital instrument
(Bons de Participation) are positioned three notches below the
bank's baa1 adjusted BCA reflecting additional loss severity
notching and its non-cumulative coupon-skip mechanism, which is
based on a balance-sheet loss trigger as well as optional
conversion language at the issuer's discretion (at a fixed


The negative outlook assigned to EFG Bank and EFGI's long-term
ratings reflects Moody's assessment of risks that could develop
from the proposed combination with BSI, specifically regarding
the longer-term complexities of fully integrating a global
private banking franchise of the same size into EFGI (and EFG
Bank).  In addition, the negative outlook also takes into account
additional integration and reputational risks for EFG Bank and
EFGI, which are not covered under the negotiated indemnity caps
with BTG, as well as the potential for significantly lower AuM
acquired from BSI following the recent announcements on May 24,

Over the next 12 to 18 months, Moody's will continue to assess
the transaction details including the group's post-acquisition
capitalization and any measures that EFG Bank and EFGI have taken
or will propose to conduct in order to improve their capital, as
well as leverage ratios towards levels more commensurate with
their closest private banking peers.  Furthermore, the rating
agency will assess any visible or foreseeable effects that the
acquisition could have on the bank and the group's client
business, specifically with regards to the evolution of AuM
and/or any key client or relationship officer defections that
could negatively affect EFG Bank's and/or EFGI's franchise


There is no upward pressure on the bank and the group's long-term
ratings as expressed by the negative outlook.

EFG Bank's BCA could be upgraded if the acquisition was not
completed.  Conversely, unforeseen risks from the
transformational nature of the transaction on all parts of the
enlarged group represents considerable integration and execution
challenges that could put further downward pressure on EFG Bank's
standalone BCA and thus its deposit ratings.

An upgrade of EFGI's issuer rating would likely follow an upgrade
of EFG Bank's BCA.  A downgrade of EFGI's issuer ratings would
likely arise from a downgrade of EFG Bank's BCA and/or if the
volume of senior debt/structured notes or subordinated
instruments falls meaningfully such that it no longer provides
additional loss absorption.  This may result in no rating uplift
under Moody's Loss Given Failure framework for the combined
entity of EFG Bank and BSI AG compared to one notch of rating
uplift on EFGI's issuer ratings at present.


EFG Bank AG:

These ratings and rating inputs for EFG Bank have been downgraded
after being on review for downgrade:

   -- Baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA to baa1,
      from a3
   -- Long-term bank deposit ratings (local and foreign currency)
      to A1 negative from Aa3 rating under review
   -- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessments (CR Assessment) to
      A1(cr), from Aa3(cr)

These ratings and rating inputs for EFG Bank have been affirmed:

   -- Short-term bank deposit ratings (local and foreign
      currency) at Prime-1
   -- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment (CRA) at

EFG International AG:

These ratings and rating input for EFGI have been downgraded
after being on review for downgrade:

   -- Long-term issuer ratings (local and foreign currency) to A3
      negative from A2 rating under review
   -- Foreign-currency non-cumulative preferred stock (Bons de
      Participation) to Ba1(hyb), from Baa3(hyb)
   -- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment to A1(cr), from

This rating input for EFGI has been affirmed:

   -- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment at Prime-1(cr)

The outlooks on the issuers changed to negative from rating under


GREECE: Yannis Stournaras Wants Creditors to Rework Bailout
Kerin Hope at The Financial Times reports that Greece's central
bank governor has urged the country's creditors to rework a core
element of Athens' new bailout, saying ambitious budget surplus
targets agreed with the leftwing Syriza government are
"unrealistic and socially unattainable."

According to the FT, Yannis Stournaras called for "a new deal"
that would reduce the fiscal surplus, before debt payments,
Athens must achieve -- from 3.5% to 2% of national output --
beginning in 2018.

The lower target would allow "for a more balanced economic policy
mix with emphasis on the reduction of taxation, encouraging
private investment and contributing to sustainable growth rates,"
Mr. Stournaras wrote in an article published in the FT.

According to the FT, Mr. Stournaras's stance puts him in league
with the International Monetary Fund, which has argued for months
that the surplus targets are unrealistic.  But it puts him at
odds with both the German government and Alexis Tsipras, the
Greek prime minister, who has been in an open war of words with
the IMF about its efforts to revamp the program, the FT notes.

Despite its call for debt relief and lower surplus targets, the
IMF remains highly unpopular in Greece, the FT discloses.
Mr. Tsipras has long railed against the fund and has for months
sought to force it out of the third bailout program -- in part
because Syriza officials believe their EU partners will, over
time, prove more lenient, the FT states.

Mr. Tsipras accepted the higher target demanded by the EU last
year in an eleventh-hour agreement that spared the country
bankruptcy and a chaotic exit from the eurozone, the FT recounts.
He restated his willingness to abide by it last month to ensure
disbursement of EUR7.5 billion in bailout aid needed to avert
default on a sovereign debt repayment that falls due in July, the
FT relays.

HELLENIC REPUBLIC: DBRS Confirms CCC(high) LT Issuer Ratings
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the Hellenic Republic's long-term foreign
and local currency issuer ratings at CCC (high) with a Stable
trend. DBRS has also confirmed the short-term foreign and local
currency issuer ratings at R-5 with a Stable trend.

The Stable trend reflects DBRS' view that the current financial
support program is reinforcing the stabilization of the Greek
economy and banking sector. The three-year EUR86 billion Third
Adjustment Program has eased the liquidity squeeze and, following
Greek parliamentary approval of the latest fiscal and structural
measures in the first program review last month, appears to cover
the remainder of this year's debt service payments. This should
help foster the economy to return to growth.

However, given Greece's social and political constraints to
meeting the program objectives, there is a risk of delays in
funding support in 2017 should Greece fail to comply with the
second program review, to be concluded in October 2016. The
program has set ambitious targets that will require sustained
fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. Implementation risk
and large external imbalances make the recovery fragile and
exposes Greece to shocks.

Greece's credit strengths include the benefits the country enjoys
from Eurozone membership and access to financial support from
European institutions. Since 2009, the country has enacted a
large fiscal adjustment, and has made progress in reforming the
labor market, improving the tax code and streamlining public
administration. The external sector has also shown sustainable
improvement, with the conversion of the current account from a
large deficit into a small surplus.

However, Greece continues to face considerable challenges in
restoring financial stability and returning to sustainable growth
while consolidating public finances under a fragile coalition
government. After a delay of several months, the ruling SYRIZA-
ANEL coalition has approved most of the conditions of the support
program. However, meeting the fiscal and structural reform
adjustments of the program amid social constraints and a slim
three-seat majority in the parliament will be challenging.

Following the recapitalization of the banking sector in 2015,
bank balance sheets remain weak. Non-performing loans are high,
there has been a persistent withdrawal of bank deposits, and bank
capital contains a high percentage of deferred tax assets.
Combined with capital controls that have yet to be dismantled,
these conditions have prevented an easing of financial
constraints, and both the supply and demand for credit has
remained low.


Given the high dependence on official sector financing, triggers
to a rating upgrade include ongoing cooperation between Greece
and the institutions to ensure viable policies in return for cash
injections, and measures that smooth the debt servicing profile
and facilitate the payment of public sector arrears. Structural
reforms that enhance product markets to raise potential GDP
growth, and structural fiscal adjustment measures such as
broadening the tax base and reducing spending on wages and
pensions, would improve creditworthiness. (The program includes a
provision to cut pension spending by 1% of GDP this year.)
Strengthening bank balance sheets to facilitate the supply of
credit to the economy would put further upward pressure on the

Downward pressure on the ratings could result in the event of
political instability that jeopardizes relations with the
institutions, calling debt servicing into question; significant
fiscal slippage or a reversal of reforms; or an inability to
weather external shocks, such as a UK vote to leave the EU on
June 23.

NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B', Outlook Negative
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term corporate credit rating
on Marshall Islands-registered drybulk and container shipping
company Navios Maritime Partners L.P. (Navios Partners) to 'B'
from 'B+'.  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue rating on the company's
senior secured debt to 'B' from 'BB-'.  S&P revised down the
recovery rating to '3' from '2', reflecting S&P's expectation of
meaningful recovery in the 50%-70% range in the event of payment

The downgrade reflects S&P's expectation that Navios Partners
will continue facing depressed drybulk and container shipping
industry conditions that S&P anticipates will remain so over the
next 12 months.  The downgrade also reflects the potential
further -- and presently unpredictable -- cash drain on Navios
Partners to remedy loan-to-value covenant breaches, amid an
environment characterized by very low vessel values, which S&P
cannot confidently quantify and forecast in its liquidity
analysis.  S&P notes that Navios Partners has recently undertaken
a few measures to avoid breaching its covenants, including a
$28.4 million cash prepayment of an entire ABN AMRO loan and a
$25 million cash prepayment under a term loan B.  Dividend
suspension -- and therefore cash flow savings -- provides
flexibility for Navios Partners, but S&P sees limited leeway for
the liquidity sources-to-uses ratio to remain above 1x, which is
commensurate with the current 'B' rating.  S&P calculates, for
example, that a drop in the term loan B's collateral value by 15%
(from the value as of March 31, 2016) would result in a liquidity
shortfall for Navios Partners (absent corrective actions).

Furthermore, the weak credit standing of Navios Partners' crucial
counterparties under the long-term charter agreements, namely
South Korean container liner Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM; of
which charters accounted for 27% of Navios Partners' EBITDA in
2015) and South Korean ship operator Hanjin Shipping (Hanjin;
11%) -- both counterparties are currently undergoing financial
restructuring -- inevitably poses a risk of amendments to the
existing contracts and ensuing strain on Navios Partners' cash
flows and liquidity.

The combination of these factors prompted S&P to apply a negative
comparable rating analysis modifier.  This, in turn, led S&P to
lower the rating on Navios Partners to 'B' from 'B+'.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that Navios Partners
might find it difficult to preserve the rating-commensurate
liquidity profile, and that there is mounting refinancing risk
given a large bullet debt repayment due June 2018.

S&P could lower the rating if the vessel values drop considerably
below their current historical lows resulting in a further cash
drain on Navios Partners to remedy loan-to-value covenant
breaches, if the company's EBITDA trends significantly below
S&P's base-case forecast (for example due to material amendments
to its existing charter agreements), and consequently if the
company appears unable to maintain the liquidity sources-to-uses
ratio above 1.0x.

S&P could also downgrade Navios Partners if S&P believed that the
company would not be able to refinance the US$386 million term
loan B due June 2018 in a timely fashion, which S&P considers to
be at least 12 months ahead of the maturity.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the company achieves a
more comfortable level of headroom under its loan-to-value
covenants and if the possibility of the sources-to-uses ratio
falling below 1.0x is remote.  The stable outlook would also
depend on timely refinancing of term loan B and the company's
ability to maintain its core credit ratios commensurate with the
'B' rating.  Specifically, such ratios would include adjusted FFO
to debt of more than 6%.


ZSOLNAY PORCELANMANUFAKTURA: Foreign Investor Loses Business
Christian Keszthelyi at Budapest Business Journal reports that a
foreign businessman who partnered with a city is apparently
losing his business after losing the support of state and local

A liquidation proceeding was launched against Pecs's Zsolnay, a
porcelain manufacturer whose majority owner expressed concerns of
a "hostile takeover" by city representatives, BBJ relates.

The procedure was launched by an unnamed Hungarian-owned
construction company, who purchased a debt that Zsolnay had with
the state-owned Hungarian Development Bank (MFB), BBJ relays,
citing local portal

Bachar Najari, a Syrian-born businessman who acquired a 74.5%
majority stake in the company from now minority owner Pecs local
council in 2013, in a statement earlier aired concerns about what
he believes could be an "intended hostile takeover" supported by
"representatives of the minority owner", BBJ recounts.

According to BBJ, Hungarian news agency MTI reported on June 10
that the Municipal Court of Pecs has until June 16 to appoint a

Lazar, as cited by BBJ, said on June 9 that the Hungarian
government "backs the efforts by the municipal council of Pecs",
which is the minority owner of porcelain maker Zsolnay
Porcelanmanufaktura.  He added that the Hungarian government has
taken the side of the local council of Pecs in the "Zsolnay
matter", BBJ notes.  He said that the "apparent owner" of Zsolnay
cannot count on further support from state-owned MFB or the
government, BBJ relates.

Zsolnay Porcelanmanufaktura is a Hungarian porcelain maker.


LAURELIN 2016-1: S&P Gives Prelim. B Rating to Class F Notes
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary credit ratings to
Laurelin 2016-1 DAC's floating-rate class A, B, C, D, E, and F
notes.  At closing, Laurelin 2016-1 will also issue an unrated
subordinated class of notes.

Laurelin 2016-1 is a European cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO), securitizing a portfolio of primarily senior
secured euro-denominated leveraged loans and bonds issued by
European borrowers.  GoldenTree Asset Management LP is the
Investment manager.

Laurelin 2016-1 expects to purchase more than 50% of the
effective date portfolio from AO Funding Ltd. (the originator).
The assets from AO Funding that can't be settled on the closing
date will be subject to participations.  The transaction
documents require that the issuer and the originator use
commercially reasonable efforts to elevate the participations by
transferring to the issuer the legal and beneficial interests in
such assets as soon as reasonably practicable.

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes will pay
quarterly interest unless there is a frequency switch event.
Following this, the notes will permanently switch to semiannual
payment.  The portfolio's reinvestment period will end
approximately four years after closing.

S&P's preliminary ratings reflect its assessment of the
preliminary collateral portfolio's credit quality, which has a
weighted-average 'B' rating.  S&P considers that the portfolio at
closing will be well-diversified, primarily comprising broadly
syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans and senior
secured bonds.  Therefore, S&P has conducted its credit and cash
flow analysis by applying its criteria for corporate cash flow
collateralized debt obligations.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used the EUR400 million target
par amount, a weighted-average spread (4.30%), a weighted-average
coupon (5.25%), and a weighted-average recovery rates at each
rating level.  S&P applied various cash flow stress scenarios,
using four different default patterns, in conjunction with
different interest rate stress scenarios for each liability
rating category.

Elavon Financial Services Ltd. is the bank account provider and
custodian.  At closing, S&P anticipates that the documented
downgrade remedies will be in line with its current counterparty

Following the application of S&P's non-sovereign ratings
criteria, it considers that the transaction's exposure to country
risk is sufficiently mitigated at the assigned preliminary rating
levels. This is because the concentration of the pool comprising
assets in countries rated lower than 'A-' is limited to 10% of
the aggregate collateral balance.

At closing, S&P considers that the issuer will be bankruptcy
remote, in accordance with S&P's European legal criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, S&P believes its preliminary
ratings are commensurate with the available credit enhancement
for each class of notes.


Laurelin 2016-1 DAC
EUR407.4 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes
(Including Subordinated Notes)

Class         Prelim.          Prelim.
              rating            amount
                              (mil. EUR)

A             AAA (sf)          221.00
B             AA (sf)            67.50
C             A (sf)             27.00
D             BBB (sf)           19.50
E             BB (sf)            21.00
F             B (sf)              7.00
Sub           NR                 44.40

Sub--Subordinated loan.
NR--Not rated.

QUINN GROUP: Family Must Pay Own Living Expenses, Receivers Say
The Irish Times reports that receivers appointed over the assets
of family members of businessman Sean Quinn say their living
expenses should first be paid out of their personal accounts
before any expenses are paid out of accounts frozen four years

According to The Irish Times, lawyers for the Quinns said the
receivers' Commercial Court application was a "punitive" attempt
to stop them getting on with their lives when they had been
waiting years for legal proceedings to be heard.

The receivers claim the situation has changed in that most of the
family members concerned are now working for a company run by two
of their cousins, while one member, Ciara Quinn, works as an
agency nurse, The Irish Times discloses.

Mr. Justice Brian McGovern reserved judgment, The Irish Times

Quinn Group (ROI) Ltd. was the ultimate holding company of 95
firms which comprise the Quinn Group which was involved in a
diverse range of businesses, from the manufacture of cement and
concrete products, glass and radiators and plastics, to
insurance, hotels, property and financial services.

ST. PAUL'S III: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class F Notes
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its credit ratings on St. Paul's CLO
III Ltd.'s class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes.

The affirmations follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the March 2016 trustee report.  S&P
performed a credit and cash flow analysis and applied its current
counterparty criteria to assess the support that each participant
provides to the transaction.

Taking into account the scheduled end of the reinvestment period,
S&P subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class
of notes at each rating level.  The BDR represents S&P's estimate
of the maximum level of gross defaults, based on S&P's stress
assumptions, that a tranche can withstand and still pay interest
and fully repay principal to the noteholders.  In S&P's analysis,
it used the reported portfolio balance that S&P considered to be
performing (EUR532.96 million), the covenanted weighted-average
spread (4.3%), and the weighted-average recovery rates for the

In S&P's analysis, it considered the increased credit enhancement
available to the outstanding classes of notes.  S&P's review of
the transaction highlights that the available credit enhancement
for all the classes of notes has increased marginally since S&P's
2014 review.

S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using its
standard default patterns and timings for each rating category
assumed for each class of notes, combined with different interest
stress scenarios as outlined in S&P's corporate cash flow
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

The transaction's assets have exposure to the Kingdom of Spain,
which equates to 3% of the transaction's total performing asset
balance.  Accordingly, S&P did not make any adjustments to the
asset balance through the application of S&P's nonsovereign
ratings criteria.

S&P also applied its supplemental tests, as outlined in its
corporate cash flow CDO criteria, and found that these did not
constrain the modeled rating results for any tranche.  Overall,
the results of S&P's credit and cash flow analysis are
commensurate with the currently assigned ratings.

St Paul's CLO III is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans granted to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
December 2013, with the reinvestment period due to end in January


St. Paul's CLO III Ltd.
EUR556.5 Million Secured And Secured Deferrable Floating-Rate
Notes And Subordinated Notes

Ratings Affirmed

Class       Rating

A           AAA (sf)
B           AA (sf)
C           A (sf)
D           BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)
F           B (sf)


CADOGAN SQUARE III: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on Cadogan Square
CLO III B.V.'s class B, C, D, and E notes.  At the same time, S&P
has affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction's
performance and the application of its relevant criteria.

Since S&P's previous review on July 3, 2015, the weighted-average
spread earned on the collateral pool has decreased to 4.13% from
4.20% and the transaction's weighted-average life has decreased
to 3.92 years from 4.26 years.  A lower weighted-average spread
would generally result in lower break-even default rates (BDRs)
while a lower weighted-average life would generally result in
lower scenario default rates (SDRs).  The BDR is the maximum
default rate that a tranche can withstand while the SDR measures
the expected default rate.

S&P has also observed that the proportion of assets that it
considers to be rated in the 'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', and
'CCC-') has increased in both notional and percentage terms to
14.7% from 11.2% over the same period.  Assets that S&P considers
to be defaulted (i.e., debt obligations of obligors rated 'CC',
'SD' [selective default], or 'D') have decreased notionally, but
increased in percentage terms to 1.7% from 1.4% at S&P's previous
review.  Counteracting this have been increases in the 'BB'
category (to 18.3% from 13.9%) and 'BBB' category to (1.8% from

As a result of portfolio amortization the class A notes have
repaid by EUR61.1 million since S&P's previous review and now
have an outstanding balance of EUR82.4 million.  Due to the
repayment of the class A notes, credit enhancement has increased
for all classes of notes.  In S&P's analysis, it also considered
that the transaction is in its post-reinvestment period, which
ended in January 2013.  The par value tests comply with the
required trigger under the transaction documents for all classes
of notes and have been in compliance since July 2013.

S&P subjected the capital structure to its cash flow analysis, by
applying its corporate cash flow collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) criteria, to determine the BDR at each rating level.  S&P
used the portfolio balance that it considered to be performing,
the principal cash balance, the weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates calculated using S&P's criteria.

S&P applied various cash flow stress scenarios, using various
default patterns, in conjunction with different interest rate
stress scenarios.  To assess the collateral pool's credit risk,
S&P used CDO Evaluator 6.3 to generate SDRs at each rating level.
S&P then compared these SDRs with their respective BDRs.

Taking into account our observations outlined above, S&P
considers the available credit enhancement for the class B, C, D,
and E notes to be commensurate with higher ratings than those
currently assigned.  S&P has therefore raised its ratings on
these classes of notes.

The results of S&P's analysis support its view that its rating on
the class A notes is commensurate with the available credit
enhancement.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on
the class A notes.

Based on S&P's counterparty risk analysis, it has concluded that
the transaction documents for the derivative counterparty
(JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.) are not in line with S&P's current
counterparty criteria.  As such, S&P has conducted its cash flow
analysis assuming that the transaction does not benefit from
support from the derivative counterparty in rating scenarios that
are one notch above the counterparty's issuer credit rating (ICR)
plus one notch.  S&P uses the ICR plus one notch as the downgrade
provisions are in line with S&P's previous counterparty criteria.

Cadogan Square CLO III is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  It is managed by Credit
Suisse Asset Management Ltd.


Cadogan Square CLO III B.V.
EUR507 mil senior secured floating-rate notes

                                         Rating       Rating
Class            Identifier              To           From
A                12760LAA6               AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
B                12760LAB4               AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
C                12760LAC2               AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
D                12760LAD0               A+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)
E                XS0277189576            BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)


RAPID BUCHAREST: Declared Bankrupt by Romanian Court
The Associated Press reports that three-time Romanian champion
Rapid Bucharest has been declared bankrupt by a Romanian court.

The club, which has debts of EUR4 million (US$4.48 million),
filed for insolvency in 2012, the AP recounts.  Half of the debts
are unpaid taxes, the AP notes.

According to the AP, the club has until June 21 to appeal the
ruling by the Bucharest Court.

The club was founded by railway workers in 1923.

ROMANIAN FOOTBALL: May Face Bankruptcy Over RON1-Bil. Fine
Iulian Ernst at bne Intellinews reports that a Romanian court has
ruled that the Romanian Football Federation (FRF) and the
Professional Football League (LPF) have to pay over RON1 billion
(EUR225 million) to the now defunct Universitatea Craiova
football club, after its membership in the two organizations was
terminated in 2011.

The decision is not final and can be appealed, bne Intellinews
says.  However, if upheld, the fine would send the FRF into
bankruptcy, since its budget last year was only EUR15 million,
bne Intellinews notes.

The dispute between Universitatea Craiova, a professional
football club from the town of Craiova, and the associations
started in 2011, when the club's management fired its coach
Victor Piturca, bne Intellinews recounts.

Mr. Piturca, helped by FRF officials, asked for compensation from
Universitatea, but the request was turned down by the club, which
said it was inappropriate, bne Intellinews relates.

The FRF manages football activity in Romania, including the
country's national team, which is currently competing in the Euro
2016 championship, according to bne Intellinews.  LPF is an
association of football clubs and has an even smaller budget.


MOBILE TELESYSTEMS: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Negative
S&P Global Ratings recently affirmed its 'BB+' long-term
corporate credit rating on Russia's largest telecommunications
operator, Mobile TeleSystems (OJSC) (MTS).  The outlook is

S&P also affirmed its 'BB+' ratings on MTS' senior unsecured

S&P had been applying its "Corporate Criteria--Parent/Subsidiary
Links; General Principles; Subsidiaries/Joint
Ventures/Nonrecourse Projects; Finance Subsidiaries; Rating Link
to Parent," published on Oct. 28, 2004, in conjunction with
"Parent and Subsidiary Ratings," published on Aug. 29, 2000, to
assess the nature of the link between MTS and Sistema.

However, when S&P published "Methodology: Investment Holding
Companies" on Dec. 1, 2015, MTS came into the scope of S&P's
"Group Rating Methodology," published on Nov. 19, 2013.  S&P
should then have reassessed the link under the group rating

S&P has now corrected this error in the application of criteria
by reassessing the link between MTS and Sistema under that
methodology.  S&P continues to view MTS as an insulated
subsidiary of Sistema and have therefore affirmed the rating.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that MTS is an insulated
subsidiary of Sistema, because:

   -- MTS' 'bbb-' stand-alone credit profile (SACP) is higher
      than the 'bb' group credit profile (GCP), which is in line
      with the rating on Sistema.

   -- MTS' operating and financial performance is independent of

   -- MTS' shares are listed and liquid, and Sistema could sell
      its 53.5% stake in Sistema (although S&P believes this
      event has very low probability).

   -- Sistema is interested in preserving MTS' credit quality
      because MTS is the main asset in Sistema's portfolio and
      its key dividend stream comes from MTS.

   -- There is no cross-default between MTS and Sistema.

   -- MTS acts as a separate entity, holds its own books, and
      does not commingle funds with Sistema or with other assets
      within Sistema's portfolio.

   -- MTS does not depend on Sistema to pay its liabilities.

In S&P's view, MTS' rating could be two notches higher than the
GCP, because S&P considers it unlikely that MTS' assets and
liabilities will be consolidated with Sistema's if the latter
were to declare bankruptcy.  S&P also takes into account that
MTS' board includes independent directors who have effective
influence over decision making.

That said, S&P's 'BB+' rating on MTS is only one notch above the
GCP, because S&P has capped its rating on MTS at the 'BB+'
transfer & convertibility (T&C) assessment for Russia.

The negative outlook on MTS mirrors that on Russia.  S&P caps its
rating on MTS at the 'BB+' T&C assessment for Russia because MTS
does not have any meaningful hard currency earnings.  S&P's T&C
assessment for Russia is currently at the same level as the
foreign currency sovereign credit rating.

S&P could lower the rating on MTS if S&P revises the T&C
assessment on Russia further downward, or lower S&P's ratings on
Russia.  S&P could also lower the ratings on MTS if S&P revised
down the SACP on MTS, which could occur if S&P's adjusted debt-
to-EBITDA ratio were consistently higher than 2x and
discretionary cash flow generation turned strongly negative.
That said, S&P do not currently expect this to occur.

S&P could also lower the rating if industry or regulatory
conditions in any important jurisdictions where MTS operates
significantly deteriorate.  S&P currently do not see downward
pressure from the ratings on Sistema, given that S&P recently
revised Sistema's outlook to stable.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable or raise the rating if S&P
took a similar action on Russia.


BBVA INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Affirms Ba2(hyb) Pref. Stock Rating
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Banco Bilbao Vizcaya,
S.A.'s (BBVA) long-term bank deposit ratings at A3, short-term
deposit ratings at P-2, senior unsecured debt and medium-term
note (MTN) program ratings at Baa1/(P)Baa1, subordinated debt and
MTN program ratings at Baa3/(P)Baa3, and short-term commercial
paper rating and other short-term obligations at P-2/(P)P-2.  At
the same time, Moody's has affirmed the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) at baa2, adjusted BCA at baa2, and counterparty
risk assessment (CR Assessment) at Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr).

The outlook on the bank's long-term deposit and senior unsecured
ratings remains stable.

The rating action follows the confirmation of BBVA Bancomer,
S.A.'s debt and deposit ratings at A3 with a negative outlook and
the downgrade of its BCA to baa2 from baa1 on June 8, 2016.

Moody's confirms A3 deposits and senior debt ratings of BBVA
Bancomer and Banamex; negative outlook:

All other ratings of BBVA and its supported entities have also
been affirmed.



The ratings affirmation follows the conclusion of the review of
the ratings of its Mexican subsidiary (BBVA Bancomer) initiated
on April 4, 2016, that concluded on June 8, 2016, with the
confirmation of BBVA Bancomer's debt and deposit ratings at A3,
with a negative outlook, and the downgrade of its BCA by one
notch to baa2 from baa1.  The rating action also takes into
account a lower weighted Macro Profile for BBVA (from 'Strong --'
to 'Moderate +) following the change of Mexico's Macro Profile on
April 4, 2016.

The confirmation of BBVA Bancomer's A3 deposit and senior debt
ratings reflects Moody's continued assessment of a very high
likelihood the Mexican government would support this systemically
important institution should it face severe financial stress.  In
turn, in lowering BBVA Bancomer's BCA Moody's took into account
that this bank, along with other Mexican banks, faces increased
medium-term tail risks because of the country's less favorable
operating environment stemming from a combination of the oil
price shock and the slower than expected economic growth.  At the
same time, the structural reforms adopted in 2013-14, which were
expected to deliver a boost to economic activity, have not
provided the anticipated benefit.  While Moody's does not project
an economic deceleration, together these factors have undermined
expectations for improved economic performance and shifted the
balance of risks and opportunities for the country's banking
sector to the downside.  In this context, although BBVA
Bancomer's recent performance has remained strong, the bank's
historically lower core capitalization relative to other large
Mexican banks and high loan concentrations leave it exposed to a
potential crystallization of rising tail risks.

With only a 12% share of BBVA's loan book, BBVA Bancomer has been
one of the key contributors to the Spanish banking group's bottom
line in the recent past, accounting for close to 50% of profits
at end-March 2016 (up from around one-third pre-crisis) and
mitigating the poor performance of the domestic business in
Spain, particularly between 2012-2014 when it was loss-making.
Since then, BBVA's domestic operations have been gradually
recovering against the backdrop of strong economic growth in
Spain (GDP to grow at 2.9% in 2016 according to Moody's
estimates) resulting into a lower cost of risk alleviating the
downward pressure on earnings from the current low interest rate
environment.  Although profits generated domestically remain at
weak levels and are below pre-crisis levels, the trend is for
further improvement as asset quality continues to improve and
expected cost synergies start to materialize in the medium-term.

The affirmation of BBVA's ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that the recovery of its domestic franchise should mitigate
increased medium-term downside tail risks for Mexican banks,
including BBVA Bancomer, stemming from the country's less
favorable operating environment.  Spain accounted for close to
50% of the group's loan book but only 12% of its earnings at end-
March 2016 compared to close to 50% pre-crisis levels.

Along these lines, Moody's notes that BBVA enjoys an ample
geographical diversification that has allowed the group to remain
profitable throughout the recent crisis, despite sizeable losses
incurred by its domestic franchise in the recent past.

The affirmation of BBVA's long-term deposit at A3 and senior
unsecured debt ratings at Baa1 with a stable outlook also
reflects: (1) The result from the rating agency's Advanced Loss-
Given Failure (LGF) analysis which results in an unchanged two
notches of uplift for the deposit ratings and one notch of uplift
for the senior debt ratings; and (2) Moody's assessment of a
moderate probability of government support for BBVA (which
nevertheless results in no further uplift given that BBVA's
Preliminary Rating Assessments (PRAs) are already exceeding the
sovereign rating).


As part of the rating action, Moody's has also affirmed at
Baa1(cr)/Prime-2(cr) the CR Assessment of BBVA, one notch above
the adjusted BCA of baa2.

The CR Assessment, prior to the sovereign's cap, is positioned
three notches above the adjusted BCA of baa2, based on the
cushion against default provided to the senior obligations
represented by the CR Assessment by subordinated instruments
amounting to 17.5% of tangible banking assets.  The CR Assessment
is, however, capped at Baa1(cr).  The CR Assessment will not
typically exceed the sovereign's own rating by more than one
notch, or two notches where the adjusted BCA is already above the
sovereign rating, which is not the case for BBVA.


Upward pressure on BBVA's deposit ratings are dependent on: 1) An
upgrade of the government of Spain (Baa2 stable) as the bank's
home country sovereign given that our current A3 deposit rating
already exceeds the sovereign ratings by two notches and are
constrained at that level under our methodology; together with 2)
an LGF outcome resulting in a higher notching.  The Baa1 senior
debt rating could be upgraded if: 1) The bank's BCA was upgraded;
or 2) a higher notching resulted from our LGF analysis.

In terms of the BCA, our assessment already incorporates some
expected further improvements in the bank's fundamentals, namely
in asset risk, capital and profitability factors, and as such,
Moody's do not expect to increase the BCA over the medium term.
In addition, any upward pressure on BBVA's BCA is unlikely to
materialize as long as the Spanish government's bond rating
remains at Baa2.

Downward pressure on BBVA's BCA could develop from: (1)
Inadequate risk-absorption capacity; (2) evidence of the bank's
inability to withstand our liquidity stress test; (3) a lower
share of recurring earnings; and (4) a turnaround in the
currently positive asset-quality trends and/or any evidence of a
weaker-than-anticipated performance in the bank's international
activities, primarily in Mexico, which is BBVA's largest profit

The bank's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the standalone
BCA; as such, any change to the BCA would likely also affect
these ratings.  BBVA's senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings
could also change as a result of changes in the loss-given-
failure faced by these securities.

Negative pressure on the BCA and in turn on the debt and deposit
ratings could also result from a downgrade of the Spanish
government ratings, which are currently at Baa2 stable.


Issuer: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.

  Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, affirmed baa2
  Baseline Credit Assessment, affirmed baa2
  Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-2(cr)
  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed Baa1(cr)
  Long-term Issuer Rating, affirmed Baa1 Stable
  Short-term Deposit Ratings, affirmed P-2
  Other Short Term, affirmed (P)P-2
  Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa3
  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa1
  Senior Unsecured Shelf, affirmed (P)Baa1
  Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, affirmed Ba2(hyb)
  Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa3
  Commercial Paper, affirmed P-2
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa1 Stable
  Long-term Deposit Ratings, affirmed A3 Stable

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: BBVA Capital Funding Limited

  Backed Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa3
  Backed Subordinate Shelf, affirmed (P)Baa3

Outlook Actions:
  No Outlook

Issuer: BBVA Capital Finance, S.A Unipersonal

  Backed Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, affirmed Ba3 (hyb)

Outlook Actions:
  No Outlook

Issuer: BBVA Global Finance Ltd.

  Backed Other Short Term, affirmed (P)P-2
  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed
  Backed Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa3
  Backed Senior Unsecured Shelf, affirmed (P)Baa1

Outlook Actions:
  No Outlook

Issuer: BBVA Global Markets B.V.

  Backed Other Short Term, affirmed (P)P-2
  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed
  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa1

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: BBVA International Limited

  Backed Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, affirmed Ba3 (hyb)
  Outlook Actions:
  No Outlook

Issuer: BBVA International Pref S.A. Unipersonal

  Backed Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, affirmed Ba3 (hyb)

Outlook Actions:
  No Outlook

Issuer: BBVA Senior Finance, S.A. Unipersonal

  Backed Commercial Paper, affirmed P-2
  Backed Other Short Term, affirmed (P)P-2
  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed
  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa1

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: BBVA Subordinated Capital, S.A. Unipersonal

  Backed Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa3

Outlook Actions:
  No Outlook

Issuer: BBVA U.S. Senior, S.A. Unipersonal

  Backed Commercial Paper, affirmed P-2

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook, changed to No Outlook from Stable

Issuer: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, SA London Br

  Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-2(cr)
  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed Baa1(cr)
  Short-term Deposit Rating, affirmed P-2
  Commercial Paper, affirmed P-2
  Long-term Deposit Ratings, affirmed A3 Stable

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, SA Paris Br

  Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-2(cr)
  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed Baa1(cr)
  Short-term Deposit Rating, affirmed P-2
  Deposit Note/CD Program, affirmed P-2
  Long-term Deposit Rating, affirmed A3 Stable

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria,SA, New York

  Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-2(cr)
  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed Baa1(cr)
  Short-term Deposit Ratings, affirmed P-2
  Long-term Deposit Ratings, affirmed A3 Stable

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Banco de Credito Local de Espana, S.A.

  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa1

Outlook Actions:
  No Outlook

Issuer: BCL International Finance Limited

  Backed Senior Unsecured, affirmed Baa1 Stable

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable


TURKIYE IS: Moody's Lowers Sub. Debt Instrument Rating to B1(hyb)
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the subordinate debt
instrument ISIN:XS1003016018 to B1(hyb) from Ba3 of Turkiye Is
Bankasi AS (Isbank: deposits Baa3 negative/Prime-3; standalone
baseline credit assessment (BCA) ba2).  This concludes the review
for downgrade initiated on May 13, 2016.

The downgrade follows the completion of the consent of
bondholders responding to consent solicitation memorandum
published by the issuer to modify the terms and conditions of the
notes.  The intent of the issuer's proposal was to convert the
"plain vanilla" subordinated debt security into a Basel III-
compliant Tier 2 capital instrument, keeping the same
aforementioned ISIN number.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating assigned to foreign-currency subordinated debt
ISIN:XS1003016018 (initial face amount of USD400,000,000) rating
is positioned two notches below the bank's BCA of ba2, in line
with Moody's standard notching guidance for subordinated debt
with loss triggered at the point of non-viability, on a
contractual basis.  The subordinated rating does not incorporate
any uplift from systemic (government) support.

The subordinated debt instrument is Basel III-compliant and
eligible for Tier 2 capital treatment under the Turkish law.  The
positioning of Isbank's provisional rating one notch below the
bank's current Ba3 foreign-currency "plain vanilla" subordinated
debt rating reflects the potentially greater uncertainty
associated with the timing of principal write-down.  In this
respect, Moody's highlights that -- as a way for the bank to
avoid a bank-wide resolution -- Isbank is exposed to the risk
that the notes may be forced to absorb losses ahead of any losses
incurred on the "plain vanilla" subordinated debt.


The assigned rating is notched from the BCA of Isbank and further
movements will be contingent on the changes in this reference

                      PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in January 2016.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Mike Ashley Seeks Fresh Dialogue on Asset Sale
Mark Vandevelde and Scheherazade Daneshkhu at The Financial Times
report that retail tycoon Mike Ashley has opened a new front in
the war of words surrounding the fate of BHS, claiming there is
still time to save thousands of jobs as he made a third approach
for the collapsed department store chain once owned by rival
billionaire Sir Philip Green.

However, people briefed on the process dismissed Mr. Ashley's
interventions as a publicity stunt at a time when his Sports
Direct retail group faces damaging revelations surrounding its
treatment of contract workers, the FT relates.

According to the FT, a senior lieutenant of Mr. Ashley wrote to
administrators Duff & Phelps over the weekend, asking to "reopen
a further dialogue about our rescue plan for BHS".  The letter
conceded that it was no longer possible to rescue the entire
business, but urged the administrators to recognize the value of
a deal that would save jobs, the FT notes.

Sports Direct was among five groups who in May signalled their
interest in buying BHS as a going concern, the FT discloses.
Four of the bidders gave details of how much they would pay and
which assets they would buy, the FT relays.  However, several
people with knowledge of the process, as cited by the FT, said
that Mr. Ashley's bid failed to name a price and was not

Two people briefed on the latest approach said it, too, omitted
crucial details, such as which assets Mr. Ashley was seeking to
buy and how much he was willing to pay for them, the FT recounts.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *