TCREUR_Public/160617.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, June 17, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 119


                            Headlines


A Z E R B A I J A N

AZERBAIJANI UNIBANK: Fitch Affirms Then Withdraws 'CCC' Ratings


B E L G I U M

OPTIMA: Declared Bankrupt by Gent Court, License Revoked
SARENS BESTUUR: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB-', Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

PETROCELTIC INTERNATIONAL: Hearing on Survival Scheme Adjourned


N E T H E R L A N D S

AI AVOCADO: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating on New EUR230MM 1st Lien Loan
EA PARTNERS: Fitch Rates $500MM Notes Due 2021 'B-'


S P A I N

BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL: Egan-Jones Hikes Sr. Unsec. Ratings to BB
FONCAIXA FTGENCAT 4: Fitch Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB'


S W E D E N

VIKING SUPPLY: Norseman Offshore Withdraws Bankruptcy Petition


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ATLANTICA YIELD: S&P Affirms 'B+' CCR, Outlook Stable
BHS GROUP: Green Apologizes for Collapse, To Address Pension Woes
BHS GROUP: Documents Reveal Role of Goldman Sachs Execs in Sale
FAB UK 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Ratings on 3 Note Classes


X X X X X X X X

* Atradius Warns for Insolvencies in Eurozone Periphery
* PJT Partners, Kirkland & Ellis Join Brexit Breakfast Seminar
* BOOK REVIEW: Oil Business in Latin America: The Early Years


                            *********


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A Z E R B A I J A N
===================


AZERBAIJANI UNIBANK: Fitch Affirms Then Withdraws 'CCC' Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Azerbaijan-based Unibank Commercial
Bank's (Uni) ratings and simultaneously withdrawn them.

Fitch has chosen to withdraw the ratings of Uni for commercial
reasons.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch has affirmed the ratings of Uni prior to withdrawal due to
limited changes to its credit profile since the last rating
action in May. On May 27, 2016, Fitch downgraded Uni's Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' and then upgraded the rating
to 'CCC' on completion of a distressed debt exchange.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Not applicable

The following ratings have been affirmed and withdrawn:

Long-Term Issuer Default Rating: 'CCC'
Short-Term Issuer Default Rating: 'C'
Viability Rating: 'f'
Support Rating: '5'
Support Rating Floor: 'No Floor'



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B E L G I U M
=============


OPTIMA: Declared Bankrupt by Gent Court, License Revoked
--------------------------------------------------------
Adrien Paredes-Vanheule at Investment Europe, citing Belgian
newspaper Le Soir, reports that Belgian bank Optima has been
declared bankrupt on June 15 by the commercial court in Gent.

Optima initiated a procedure earlier in June to renounce its
banking license since the firm has decided to drop its
traditional banking activities, deposits having slumped
dramatically since 2014, Investment Europe recounts.

Other factors having pushed Optima to cut its banking services
include difficulties to meet Bale III's requirements and the
lasting low interest rate environment, Investment Europe
discloses.

Le Soir explains that the bank still tallies thousands of clients
whose accounts have been blocked since last week by the National
Bank of Belgium, Investment Europe relays.


SARENS BESTUUR: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB-', Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term corporate credit rating
on Belgium-based Sarens Bestuur N.V. to 'BB-' from 'BB'.  In
addition, S&P is assigning its 'BB- long-term corporate credit
rating to 100%-owned financing subsidiary Sarens Finance Co N.V.
(Sarfin NV).  The outlook is stable.

S&P also lowered to 'BB-' from 'BB' its issue rating on the
group's EUR125 million senior unsecured notes, issued by Sarfin
NV.  The recovery rating on this debt instrument is unchanged at
'3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%)
recovery in the event of a payment default.

"The downgrade reflects our view that Sarens' credit metrics for
the fiscal year 2016 are likely to be weaker than we previously
forecast.  More specifically, we anticipate debt to EBITDA of
about 4.6x and FFO to debt of about 15%-16% for fiscal 2016,
gradually strengthening through 2017.  This is due to
persistently challenging trading conditions and project delays in
some of the group's end markets, specifically the oil and gas and
commodity industries, which have resulted in lower-than-expected
revenues and absolute EBITDA.  This has also led to increased
pricing pressure in other industries in which Sarens and its
direct competitors are active," S&P said.

Sarens is exposed to several particularly cyclical and volatile
end markets, which has resulted in revenue contraction and
absolute EBITDA declines in the past, when demand has suddenly
fallen.  The group's recent rapid expansion into countries that
S&P considers carry higher risk could increase volatility of
demand in the future.

S&P continues to assess the group's business risk profile as
fair. Sarens is a leading global provider of large crane
equipment, servicing a diverse range of industries and clients.
The group owns one of the world's most extensive fleets of large
cranes and has a strong track record and reputation.  S&P
considers there are high barriers to entry for potential
competitors in this niche market.  The group's wide geographic
and end-market diversity reduces the cyclicality that S&P sees in
many equipment rental providers.  However, geographic diversity
also increases logistical and subcontracting costs.  The group's
cranes are always supplied with drivers and, if required, a
specialist team of engineers and support workers to assist the
build-in and build-out process as well as advise end clients on
site.  These factors lead to lower margins compared with more-
traditional equipment rental companies.

S&P's base case for fiscal 2016 assumes:

   -- Revenue contraction of about 4% to about EUR570 million.
   -- EBITDA margins of about 26%-27%.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 4.6x at
      year-end fiscal 2016, improving to about 4.1x at fiscal
      year-end 2017; and

   -- FFO to debt of about 15% and 17%, respectively, over the
      same period.

Compared with many other issuers that have a fair business risk
profile, Sarens' business offering is quite niche.  It
continuously manages the age, size, location, and composition of
its fleet of cranes to successfully maintain a healthy project
pipeline and cash flows.  The group is very capital intensive and
currently exhibits below average return on capital.

S&P considers Sarens' operating cash flow to be sufficient to
cover debt service, working capital requirements, and capital
spending for maintenance.  Historically, the group has invested
heavily to expand its global fleet and meet growing demand,
resulting in negative free operating cash flow.  This trend has
reversed in the past 12 months and S&P considers management's
ability to pare back capital expenditure (capex) rapidly when
demand slows as an important factor for the rating.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Sarens will
comfortably maintain credit metrics commensurate with an
aggressive financial risk profile, and that these metrics will
gradually improve as end markets recover.  To maintain a 'BB-'
rating, S&P expects Sarens to exhibit debt to EBITDA trending
toward 4x and FFO to debt trending toward 20%.

S&P could lower the ratings on Sarens if its debt to EBITDA and
FFO to debt were to weaken toward the lower end of its aggressive
financial risk profile, specifically toward 5x and 12%,
respectively.  This could happen if market conditions,
specifically in oil and gas and commodities, are weaker than S&P
expects for the next 12 months.  S&P could also lower the ratings
if Sarens' liquidity were to weaken beyond S&P's base case,
specifically if it anticipated that headroom under covenants were
to fall to below 15%.

S&P could raise the ratings if Sarens' credit metrics recover to
a level commensurate with a significant financial risk profile,
specifically if the company were to sustain FFO to debt of more
than 20% and debt to EBITDA of less than 4x, and if S&P believes
that near-to-mid-term macroeconomic and industry conditions
support those improved levels.



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I R E L A N D
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PETROCELTIC INTERNATIONAL: Hearing on Survival Scheme Adjourned
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ann O'Loughlin at Irish Examiner reports that a hearing aimed at
getting High Court approval for a survival scheme Petroceltic has
been adjourned after day-long talks over employees concerns about
the survival proposals failed to end in agreement.

According to Irish Examiner, the hearing was set to open on June
16 by which time lawyers for the employees said they hoped
agreement might be achieved.

All senior staff at Petroceltic had voted against the survival
proposals put to them by examiner Michael McAteer at creditors
meetings which provided they would get just 5% of monies owed
under "change of control" clauses in their contracts, Irish
Examiner recounts.  About 30 staff are owed some EUR3.6 million,
Irish Examiner discloses.

Secured lenders and other creditors are expected to either
support the scheme or adopt a neutral position, Irish Examiner
states.

The examiner's application for approval of the scheme was due to
open before Mr. Justice Brian McGovern on June 15 but was
adjourned at the outset to facilitate talks arising from the
employees concerns, Irish Examiner recounts.

Michael Collins, for the examiner, said, while there had been
optimism about a resolution, that had not worked and he was
instructed to proceed immediately with the application for
approval, Irish Examiner relays.

Petroceltic International is a Dublin-based oil and gas explorer.



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N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


AI AVOCADO: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating on New EUR230MM 1st Lien Loan
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it assigned its 'B' issue rating
with a recovery rating of '3' to the proposed EUR230 million
first lien facility to be borrowed by Dutch software vendor Unit4
N.V., issued by AI Avocado Holding B.V.  Concurrently, S&P has
placed its 'B+' issue rating on the existing EUR440 million term
loan B, the $30 million incremental facility, and the EUR50
million revolving credit facility (RCF) on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

S&P's 'B' long-term corporate credit rating on Unit4 remains
unchanged following this transaction.  The outlook is stable.

The CreditWatch placement on Unit4's senior secured debt follows
the company's intentions to issue a EUR230 million first lien
facility.  The company plans to use the proceeds of the proposed
facility to repay the EUR165 million second lien facility in
full. As part of the contemplated partial refinancing, the
company is looking to: include a new incremental RCF, thereby
increasing the total RCF to up to EUR80 million from EUR50
million currently; and relax debt incurrence ratios.

Indicative recovery prospects are at the lower half of the 50%-
70% range, reflecting the large amount of first lien debt in
Unit4's capital structure pro forma for the proposed transaction.
Moreover, recovery prospects are very sensitive to any further
increase in indebtedness.

The proposed financing transaction has no impact on S&P's long-
term corporate credit rating on Unit4 (B/Stable/--).  This is
mainly because S&P expects the issuance to reduce the company's
interest payments, despite the minor debt increase, and provide
it with an additional liquidity buffer.  Although the company's
year-to-date operating performance is weaker than budgeted, S&P
thinks recently solid software bookings and declining exceptional
and restructuring expenses will enable Unit4 to improve revenue
trends and S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA in coming quarters.
S&P continues to view this operating stabilization as key to
maintaining the current rating.


EA PARTNERS: Fitch Rates $500MM Notes Due 2021 'B-'
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned EA Partners II B.V.'s $US500 million
6.750% notes due 2021 a final senior secured rating of 'B-' with
a Stable Outlook. The Recovery Rating is 'RR4'.

Fitch said, "EA Partners II B.V. will on-lend the proceeds from
the notes' issue to respective obligors (defined as debt
obligations). These notes are secured over assets that represent
senior unsecured claims to the respective obligors. The rating
reflects our view of the credit profiles of the obligors and is
constrained at 'B-' by the obligors of the weakest credit
quality. EA Partners II B.V. is a private company with limited
liability established solely for the purpose of this transaction,
and whose sole shareholder is a foundation."

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Unsecured Claims

The proceeds from the notes' issue represent separate debt
obligations of six obligors, including Etihad Airways PJSC (17.8%
of the issue), Air Berlin PLC (19.9%), Alitalia Societa Aerea
Italiana S.p.A. (19.9%), Air SERBIA, a.d. Belgrade (12.6% of the
issue), Air Seychelles Limited (10.0%) and Etihad Airport
Services LLC (19.8%). On-lending of proceeds from this
transaction's secured notes create back-to-back senior unsecured
claims upon the relevant obligors, which rank behind each
obligor's other prior ranking debt, including secured debt.

Weakest Obligor Credit

Fitch said, "Given the transaction's recourse to each obligor on
a several basis, the rating is constrained at the 'B-' level by
the weakest credit quality obligations. The rating on the notes
reflects our view of the creditworthiness and the senior
unsecured ranking of the obligors, including our assessment of
their links with their respective parents."

This is due to the sole cash flow for the service and repayment
of the proposed notes being the individual cash flow streams from
the obligors under their respective loans. Failure of any obligor
to make interest or principal payments under its respective debt
obligation, which remains uncured following the remarketing of
the respective debt obligation and/or through the liquidity pool,
may lead to an event of default under the notes. As a result, the
transaction's noteholders are exposed to the underlying
creditworthiness of each obligor.

Obligors' Credit Quality Varies

In addition to Etihad Airways, the other obligors are either
Etihad Airways' subsidiaries (eg Etihad Airport Services) or its
equity airline partners (eg Air Berlin, Air Serbia, Air
Seychelles, Alitalia). These, and its other equity airline
partners, are key to Etihad's growth strategy, which aims at
establishing a global network with competitive operational scale
and diversity.

The credit quality of the obligors varies substantially, from
that of Etihad Airways (A/Stable), whose rating incorporates
strategic, operational and, to a lesser extent legal, ties with
its sole shareholder Abu Dhabi (AA/Stable), to that of the
obligors with the weakest credit quality, which constrains the
proposed notes' rating. While the obligors with the weakest
credit profiles also benefit from the shareholder support of
their minority parent, Etihad Airways, their standalone profiles
remain weak largely due to weak credit metrics.

Liquidity Pool

The proposed transaction contains a liquidity pool, the only
cross-collateralized feature (excluding its ratchet account
component, which is not cross-collateralized), which is available
to service the interest or principal on the notes if an obligor
fails to pay an interest or principal on its respective debt
obligation when due.

However, the amount of the liquidity pool is limited to 4.75% of
initial amounts raised. Fitch estimates that this amount is
sufficient to cover about eight months of interest payments under
the proposed notes. It also represents 11 months of interest
payments for all obligors, except for the stronger Etihad Airways
and Etihad Airport Services. If over 25% of the initial deposits,
which account for most of the liquidity pool, are drawn to cure a
default of an obligor to pay interest on its debt obligation,
this may trigger the re-marketing of the respective debt
obligation. Contractually, the liquidity pool does not have to be
replenished if it is being used to service the notes.

Cross Default

The notes do not have a cross-default provision, which means that
a default by one obligor under its debt obligation does not
constitute an event of default under other debt obligations
incurred under this transaction by the other obligors. However,
events of default under each debt obligation include a customary
cross-default provision, which states that a failure by the
respective "obligor or any of its material subsidiaries to pay
any of its own financial indebtedness when due" will lead to an
event of default under the debt obligation of this obligor but
not of any other obligor other than in the case of Etihad Airways
and Etihad Airport Services as described below.

Theoretically, upon an uncured event of default by one of the
weakest entities (after use of the liquidity pool and no take-up
under the re-marketing mechanism) the notes are in default and
can be accelerated. Noteholders would look to non-defaulted
entities to meet their obligations under this transaction but any
shortfall resulting from the defaulted entity would not be an
obligation of these other transaction parties.

Etihad Airport Services is considered to be a material subsidiary
of Etihad Airways under this transaction's documentation.
Therefore, an uncured failure by Etihad Airport Services to make
payments under this transaction's debt obligation will constitute
an event of default under Etihad Airways' debt obligation under
this transaction. Etihad Airways or any other non-defaulting
obligor may also provide support to other obligors by purchasing
their debt obligations through the "re-marketing event", if it
takes place upon default of another obligor on its payments under
the debt obligation. However, this can be exercised at Etihad
Airways' or any other non-defaulting obligor's discretion and is
not an obligation under this transaction.

This lack of legal obligation to support other entities underpins
this transaction's rating approach based on the credit profile of
the weakest obligors rather than on the stronger entities
supporting the weakest.

Foundation-Owned Issuer

The issuer is a private company with limited liability
incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands and has no
authorized share capital. Stichting EA Partners II, a foundation
incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands, is the sole
shareholder of the issuer. The issuer was established for the
purpose of the issue of the notes and lending of the notes'
proceeds to six obligors. Stichting has contributed additional
equity to the issuer of EUR2m.

Proceeds for Refinancing and Capex

The purpose of the transaction is to provide a financing platform
to the airline, cargo and ground services businesses that are
part of Etihad's partner network. Air Berlin and Air Seychelles
plan to use the proceeds of their debt obligations mostly for
refinancing purposes whereas Etihad Airways, Etihad Airport
Services, Air Serbia and Alitalia intend to use the proceeds
mainly to finance capex and/or working capital, and for other
general corporate purposes.

FX Risk

The debt obligation of all obligors and the notes are denominated
in US dollars.

Average Recovery Prospect

Fitch said, "we assess the recovery (given default) prospect of
the notes as average (31%-50%, RR4) based on the average of our
assessment of the recovery prospects of the obligors and their
respective country caps and adjusting for the volatility in the
recovery percentages. Recovery prospects can be supported by
successful re-marketing of performing debt obligations at higher
than par."

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

-- The proceeds from the notes' issue will be on-lent to six
    obligors.

-- This transaction's notes are secured over assets that
    represent senior unsecured claims to respective obligors.

-- The notes do not have a cross-default provision.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Developments that could lead to positive rating action
include:

-- The improvement of the credit quality of the obligors with
    the weakest credit profiles.

-- Sustained improvement of the recovery prospects for the
    senior unsecured creditors of the obligors of the weakest
    credit quality, unless there are limitations due to country-
    specific treatment of Recovery Ratings.

Negative: Developments that could lead to negative rating action
include:

-- The deterioration of the credit quality of the obligors with
    the weakest credit profiles.

-- Worsening of the recovery prospects to below-average for the
    senior unsecured creditors of the obligors of the weakest
    credit quality.



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S P A I N
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BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL: Egan-Jones Hikes Sr. Unsec. Ratings to BB
----------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company raised the senior unsecured ratings on
debt issued by Banco Popular Espanol SA to BB from B+ on May 26,
2016.

Banco Popular Espanol, S.A. is the fourth largest banking group
in Spain.


FONCAIXA FTGENCAT 4: Fitch Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3, FTA's senior and
mezzanine notes and Foncaixa FTGENCAT 4, FTA's mezzanine notes as
follows:

Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3 FTA:
Class A(G) notes (ISIN ES0337937017): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from
'A+sf', Outlook Stable
Class B notes (ISIN ES0337937025): upgraded to 'Asf' from
'BBB+sf', Outlook revised to Stable from Negative
Class C notes (ISIN ES0337937033): upgraded to 'BBBsf' from
'BBsf', Outlook Positive
Class D notes (ISIN ES0337937041): upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf',
Outlook Stable
Class E notes (ISIN ES0337937058): affirmed at 'CCsf', Recovery
Estimate 0%

Foncaixa FTGENCAT 4 FTA:
Class A(G) notes (ISIN ES0338013016):affirmed at 'BBBsf', Outlook
revised to Positive from Negative
Class B notes (ISIN ES0338013024): upgraded to 'BB+sf' from
'BBsf', Outlook Stable
Class C notes (ISIN ES0338013032): upgraded to 'BB-sf' from
'Bsf', Outlook Stable
Class D notes (ISIN ES0338013040): affirmed at 'CCCsf', Recovery
Estimate 0%
Class E notes (ISIN ES0338013057): affirmed at 'CCsf', Recovery
Estimate 0%

Both transactions are cash flow securitizations of a static pool
of loans granted by Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de Barcelona (la
Caixa) to small and medium-sized Spanish enterprises.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade reflects increases in credit enhancement as a result
of natural portfolio amortization of the senior and mezzanine
notes of both transactions. Credit enhancement on the class A(G)
notes increased to 36.3% from 30.1% for Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3 and
to 19.3% from 16.9% for Foncaixa FTGENCAT 4. The Outlooks on most
tranches are now Stable, reflecting the stabilization of the
transaction's performance.

The ratings of Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3's class C notes and Foncaixa
FTGENCAT 4's class A(G) notes are capped by the rating of the
swap counterparty CaixaBank (BBB+/Positive/F2). Both transactions
feature an unusual swap whereby the issuer pays the swap
counterparty interest received on the portfolio and receives the
weighted average spread of the class A to D notes plus a
guaranteed spread of 50bps multiplied by the class A to D note
notional. Although the swap could be collateralized if necessary,
the swap is considered fairly illiquid and no credit has been
given to the receipt of interest payments from defaulted assets
in rating stresses above the swap counterparty rating.

The transactions also include 53% (FTGENCAT 3) and 59% (FTGENCAT
4) of flexible loans, which allow borrowers to redraw monies up
to a maximum agreed amount. As any redraws will not form part of
the securitization, but are ranked pari pasu with the securitized
amount in a default event, Fitch treated all flexible loans as
fully drawn and adjusted the collateral backing the respective
securitized loans accordingly.

Overall, performance of Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3 has improved over the
past year with delinquencies over 90 days decreasing to 3.4% from
3.94% and current defaults to EUR6.2 million from EUR6.4 million,
while the weighted average recovery rate has increased to 73%
from 71%. Delinquencies over 90 days for Foncaixa FTGENCAT 4
decreased to 4% from 4.9%, while current defaults increased to
EUR8.4 million from EUR6.9 million, with weighted average
recoveries decreasing to 58.6% from 60%.

Increases in portfolio concentration have been marginal over the
past 12 months with the top ten obligors now representing around
5.7%, compared with 4.9% for Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3 and 5.5%,
compared with 5.1% for Foncaixa FTGENCAT 4.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Increasing the default probability by 1.25x or reducing recovery
expectations by 0.75x to all assets in the portfolio would not
lead to a downgrade of Foncaixa FTGENCAT 4, but could lead to a
downgrade of Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3's class D notes.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to the applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.



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S W E D E N
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VIKING SUPPLY: Norseman Offshore Withdraws Bankruptcy Petition
--------------------------------------------------------------
Viking Supply Ships A/S ("VSS A/S") on June 16 disclosed that
Norseman Offshore AS has withdrawn the petition for bankruptcy
against VSS A/S which had been filed with the Maritime and
Commercial High Court in Copenhagen on June 9 2016.

Viking Supply Ships AB -- http://www.vikingsupply.com-- is a
Swedish company with headquarter in Gothenburg, Sweden.  Viking
Supply Ships A/S is a subsidiary of Viking Supply Ships AB
(publ).  In addition, Viking Supply Ships AB has the subsidiary
TransAtlantic AB.  The operations are focused on offshore and
icebreaking primarily in Arctic and subarctic areas as well as on
Shipping services mainly between the Baltic Sea and the
Continent.  The company has in total about 500 employees and the
turnover in 2015 was MSEK 1,977.  The company's B-shares are
listed on the NASDAQ Stockholm, Small Cap segment.



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U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ATLANTICA YIELD: S&P Affirms 'B+' CCR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on Atlantica Yield PLC
(ABY), including the 'B+' corporate credit rating, and removed
them from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative
implications on Nov. 26, 2015.  The outlook is stable.

S&P has also affirmed the 'BB' ratings on the senior secured
debt; the recovery rating on this debt is '1', indicating
expectations for very high (90%-100%) recovery for investors in
the event of default.

In addition, S&P affirmed the 'B+' rating on the senior unsecured
debt.  The recovery rating on this debt is '3', indicating
expectations for meaningful (upper half of the 50%-70% range)
recovery in a default.

The rating action affects about $670 million of debt, consisting
of $415 million of the revolver credit facility due December 2017
and December 2018 (both unrated) and $255 million of senior
unsecured obligations.

"From a methodology standpoint, we view the ratings on ABY as
distinct from those on Abengoa S.A., its 41.5% owner, because of
its minority ownership position, as well as the corporate
governance provisions at ABY," said S&P Global Ratings credit
analyst Aneesh Prabhu.  Specifically, Abengoa S.A.-related
decisions must be agreed by a majority of the independent
directors (Abengoa S.A. has the right to name three board members
out of eight based on its ownership).  The company is
implementing measures to further insulate itself from its sponsor
and has changed its name to Atlantica Yield after a shareholder
vote in May 2016.

The outlook is stable, reflecting S&P's base-case expectation
that the company will be able to secure the required waivers
subsequent to its efforts of distancing itself from sponsor
Abengoa S.A. as well as canceling its distributions pending the
receipt of such waivers.  While S&P's base-case projection is
that the company can generate FFO to debt levels of higher than
25%, S&P expects ABY to maintain FFO to debt of at least 20% even
if some distributions are delayed.  These estimates assume that
it will incur higher spending than projected as well as retain
distributable cash at projects seeking waivers.

S&P continues to monitor developments as ABY seeks to secure
waivers related to the change-of-control and cross-default
provisions.  In a scenario whereby a default triggered at one or
more of these projects is not cured, dividends from these
projects to ABY could be halted, resulting in weaker credit
measures.  S&P would lower the ratings if projected FFO to debt
levels decline below 20%.  S&P thinks an outlook change or lower
ratings are more likely from the company's inability to secure
waivers rather than from operating underperformance.

S&P would likely raise the ratings if the company is able to
secure all waivers for projects that cross-default to a potential
Abengoa S.A. bankruptcy, and if it maintains financial
performance of about 25%-27% FFO to debt.  It is likely that if
the company is able to receive all waivers and generates cash
flow at this level S&P will likely improve its financial risk
profile assessment.


BHS GROUP: Green Apologizes for Collapse, To Address Pension Woes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
James Davey and Sarah Young at Reuters report that retail tycoon
Philip Green admitted to British lawmakers on June 16 he had
erred in selling BHS to a former bankrupt and promised to help
fix a gaping hole in the pension scheme of the collapsed
department store chain he owned for 15 years.

The loss-making BHS fell into administration in April, little
more than a year after Mr. Green sold it to Dominic Chappell's
Retail Acquisitions Ltd for a nominal sum, resulting in the
likely loss of 11,000 jobs as it is wound down, Reuters recounts.
Mr. Chappell was a serial bankrupt with no retail experience,
Reuters notes.

BHS's demise left its pension fund with a deficit of GBP571
million (US$809 million), while Topshop-owner Green's reputation
as a leading British businessman was tarnished, Reuters
discloses.

In a six-hour session in front of parliament's Business and Work
and Pensions committees, Mr. Green was at times contrite, at
times exasperated and at one point came close to walking out,
Reuters relays.

He apologized for BHS's "sad ending" and his role in it, Reuters
relates.

Mr. Green, as cited by Reuters, said he had trusted Mr. Chappell
as a buyer because he had been approved by Mr. Green's adviser
Goldman Sachs and was being represented by law firm Olswang and
financial adviser Grant Thornton, names he called "reputable,
well-regarded".

He said Mr. Chappell's status as a former bankrupt was not a
reason not to do business with him, Reuters notes.

Mr. Green, Reuters says, was critical of the pension regulator
for failing to engage with BHS as its deficit increased and said
the retailer's pension trustees were also responsible.

He said he had not received one phone call or email from
Lesley Titcomb, the pension regulator's CEO, calling for a
meeting in the three years since 2013 when it started examining
BHS, Reuters relays.

Mr. Green also denied he scuppered a last-ditch rescue of BHS by
Sports Direct owner Mike Ashley and said he considered buying
back the business, Reuters recounts.

He did not provide details on the plan he is working on with
Deloitte to plug the pension deficit -- a figure based on how
much it would cost to address the shortfall between assets and
future liabilities with either insurance or a buyout -- as he
sought to reassure BHS's 20,000 pension-holders, Reuters notes.

"We will sort it, we will find a solution," Reuters quotes
Mr. Green as saying.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


BHS GROUP: Documents Reveal Role of Goldman Sachs Execs in Sale
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Vandevelde at The Financial Times reports that three top
Goldman Sachs executives made contact with people outside the
bank 95 times as part of their unpaid work to help Sir Philip
Green sell troubled retail chain BHS Group for GBP1.

The exchanges included meetings and telephone calls, as well as
79 emails that have been made public by a parliamentary inquiry
into the April collapse of the retailer, the FT discloses.

According to the FT, the documents reveal details of the highly
unusual assignment Goldman took on when it agreed informally to
vet a consortium headed by ex-bankrupt Dominic Chappell.  The
former race car driver's vehicle was seeking to buy BHS at a time
when the chain was weighed down by falling sales and a large
pension deficit, the FT relays.

MPs have been scrutinizing Goldman's role in the transaction as
part of their investigation into the collapse of the retailer 13
months after it was sold, the FT relates.  Administrators
announced this month that BHS is to close with the likely loss of
11,000 jobs, triggering a GBP275 million official rescue of the
chain's pension fund, the FT recounts.

Michael Sherwood, who has counted Sir Philip as a client since he
advised the tycoon on an unsuccessful 2004 bid for retailer
Marks and Spencer, is the most senior banker involved, the FT
notes.  The co-head of Goldman's international division was one
of the people who traded emails about BHS, the FT states.

But most of the work fell to Anthony Gutman, Goldman's co-head of
European investment banking, the FT says.  According to the FT,
he has said that Goldman had no formal role in the sale and
received no fees from Sir Philip's fashion empire, Arcadia.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


FAB UK 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed FAB UK 2004-1 Limited's notes as
follows:

Class A-1E: affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A-1F: affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A-2E: affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A-3E: affirmed at 'CCsf'
Class A-3F: affirmed at 'CCsf'
Class S1: affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class S2: affirmed at 'CCsf'

The transaction is a securitization of UK structured finance
assets. At closing the SPV issued GBP204.5 million of fixed- and
floating-rate notes, using the proceeds to buy a GBP200 million
portfolio managed by Gulf International Bank (UK) Ltd.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Portfolio Performance
Portfolio performance has been stable over the last 12 months
with minimal changes in portfolio characteristics. The weighted
average rating factor -- a measure of credit quality -- stands at
11.8, compared with 12.2 in June 2015. There have been no
defaults in the portfolio since June 2015.

The portfolio comprises only UK assets and is heavily
concentrated in RMBS (85.9% of the performing portfolio). Fitch
maintains a stable outlook on the UK prime and non-performing
RMBS sector.

Long Expected Life
Fitch based its analysis on a time-to-repayment assumption for
the portfolio. The agency made the following bullet repayment
assumptions for assets which are not CMBS and are not currently
amortizing: 25 years from closing for RMBS assets and five years
from closing for ABS assets. For non-CMBS assets which are
currently amortizing Fitch used an average repayment date
assuming linear amortization between the analysis date and the
expected final payment date derived earlier. CMBS assets, as well
as those assets where the above calculation yielded an expected
repayment date prior to the analysis date, were assumed to repay
on their legal final maturity date.

Fitch's overall weighted average life assumption for the
portfolio is 12.4 years.

Combo Notes Linked to Components
The ratings of the class S1 and S2 combination notes are linked
to the ratings of the class A-1F and A-3F components
respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
A 25% increase in the asset default probability would lead to a
downgrade of one notch for the class A-1E, A-1F and S1 notes and
no impact on the remaining notes. A 25% reduction in expected
recovery rates would not lead to a downgrade of the rated notes.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE
No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY
Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Atradius Warns for Insolvencies in Eurozone Periphery
-------------------------------------------------------
The Atradius outlook for global economic growth is "slower for
longer", with five primary downside risks that could drag down
the economic and insolvency outlooks.

While the turbulence experienced in the first months of 2016 has
subsided the underlying issues persist.  Low commodity prices,
tepid international trade growth, debt overhang, and ineffective
monetary and fiscal policies are key contributors to the current
global slowdown.  The baseline growth forecast for 2016 is only
2.4%, 1.6% in the Eurozone, and this may deteriorate further
through the year.  After an overall picture of improving
insolvency ratios in 2015, the insolvency forecasts for 2016 are
less optimistic.  In most countries, the current default level
will stabilize but at generally high levels.

In its biannual Economic Outlook, Atradius identifies the five
top global risks that would drive this:

   -- A hard landing in China, defined by GDP growth below 5%
this year, would have a strong impact worldwide, reinforcing the
negative effects already seen on global trade, commodity prices
and financial turbulence.

   -- US monetary policy has a similar global impact.  A steady,
well-communicated tightening schedule is expected.  Still, a
poorly communicated, or even a well communicated but badly
received course of action, is a clear threat.  The accompanying
financial turbulence would pose a large drag on global growth,
particularly in emerging markets.

   -- Persistently slower growth in the eurozone, despite
aggressive ECB monetary stimulus, could lead to longer term
stagnation and elevate political uncertainty, already heightened
due to the Brexit referendum.

   -- A rapid rise in the oil price would increase costs for oil
importers, removing a key benefit for growth in many advanced
markets such as the eurozone.

   -- Deleveraging taking off would also hold back growth in
advanced markets, suppressing demand.

These last three risks would have a moderately negative impact on
EU countries, with most becoming more acute in the periphery
countries.

Global financial market volatility would especially hurt emerging
market economies whose economic outlook is already under
pressure.  More restrictive access to finance at a higher cost
would further drive up the already high insolvencies that we now
predict in key markets like China and Brazil.


* PJT Partners, Kirkland & Ellis Join Brexit Breakfast Seminar
--------------------------------------------------------------
Join PJT Partners and Kirkland & Ellis, along with a host of
speakers from investors and industry experts, for the following
panel sessions and Q&A:

Breakfast and opening on Brexit voting results implications for
business and politics in the UK and the EU

Session 1
TMT Consolidation and M&A Opportunities in the Next 2-3 Years
Simon Lyons -- PJT Partners, Partner (Moderator)
Johannes Groeller --PJT Partners, Partner
Burkhard Koep -- Altice, Head of Business Development and M&A

Session 2
What Does "Smart" M&A in Healthcare Look Like?
Rakesh Patel -- PJT Partners, Partner (Moderator)
Basil Geoghegan -- PJT Partners, Managing Director
Gavin Gordon -- Kirkland & Ellis, Partner
Drew Gillanders -- Och Ziff Capital, Portfolio Manager

Session 3
Commodities -- Distressed Opportunities and Impact on Governments
Martin Gudgeon -- PJT Partners, Head of EMEA Restructuring and
Special Situations Group (Moderator)
Shirish Joshi -- PJT Partners, Managing Director
Kon Asimacopoulos -- Kirkland & Ellis, Partner European
Restructuring Group
Stephen Hall -- McKinsey & Company, Director Energy and Mining
Phil Kirk -- Chrysaor, Chief Executive Officer

Session 4
A-Z of Bond Restructuring and Exchange Offers Trends
David Riddell -- PJT Partners, Partner (Moderator)
Tom Campbell -- PJT Partners, Partner
William Burke -- Kirkland & Ellis, Partner Capital Markets Group
Justin Jewell -- BlueBay, Co-Head of Global Leveraged Finance
Long-Only Business
Santiago Pardo - Special Situations Investing

Tuesday, 28 June 2016
08:15 a.m. Registration and Breakfast
08:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. Programme

Four Seasons, Park Lane
Hamilton Place
London W1J 7DR

Please respond by June 20.  Spaces are limited and will be on a
first come, first served basis.

You can register to the event at http://goo.gl/9L6dHD

Kirkland & Ellis International LLP is a limited liability
partnership established in Delaware, and the liability of its
partners is limited in accordance with section 15-306(c) of the
Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act.  It is a multinational
practice, the partners of which are Solicitors and Registered
Foreign Lawyers (admitted in the U.S. and other jurisdictions),
and is authorized and regulated in the UK by the Solicitors
Regulation Authority (SRA number 349107).


* BOOK REVIEW: Oil Business in Latin America: The Early Years
-------------------------------------------------------------
Author: John D. Wirth Ed.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 282 pages
List price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Buy a copy for yourself and one for a colleague on-line at
http://is.gd/DvFouR

This book grew out of a 1981 meeting of the American Historical
Society. It highlights the origin and evolution of the stateowned
petroleum companies in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and
Venezuela.

Argentina was the first country ever to nationalize its
petroleum industry, and soon it was the norm worldwide, with the
notable exception of the United States. John Wirth calls this
phenomenon "perhaps in our century the oldest and most
celebrated of confrontations between powerful private entities
and the state."

The book consists of five case studies and a conclusion, as
follows:

* Jersey Standard and the Politics of Latin American Oil
Production, 1911-30 (Jonathan C. Brown)
* YPF: The Formative Years of Latin America's Pioneer State
Oil Company, 1922-39 (Carl E. Solberg)
* Setting the Brazilian Agenda, 1936-39 (John Wirth)
* Pemex: The Trajectory of National Oil Policy (Esperanza
Duran)
* The Politics of Energy in Venezuela (Edwin Lieuwen)
* The State Companies: A Public Policy Perspective (Alfred
H. Saulniers)

The authors assess the conditions at the time they were writing,
and relate them back to the critical formative years for each of
the companies under review. They also examine the four
interconnecting roles of a state-run oil industry and
distinguish them from those of a private company. First, is the
entrepreneurial role of control, management, and exploitation of
a nation's oil resources. Second, is production for the private
industrial sector at attractive prices. Third, is the
integration of plans for military, financial, and development
programs into the overall industrial policy planning process.
Finally, in some countries is the promotion of social
development by subsidizing energy for consumers and by promoting
the government's ideas of social and labor policy and labor
relations.

The author's approach is "conceptual and policy oriented rather
than narrative," but they provide a fascinating look at the
politics and development of the region. Mr. Brown provides a
concise history of the early years of the Standard Oil group and
the effects of its 1911 dissolution on its Latin American
operations, as well as power struggles with competitors and
governments that eventually nationalized most of its activities.
Mr. Solberg covers the many years of internal conflict over oil
policy in Argentina and YPF's lack of monopoly control over all
sectors of the oil industry. Mr. Wirth describes the politics
and individuals behind the privatization of Brazil's oil
industry leading to the creation of Petrobras in 1953. Mr. Duran
notes the wrangling between provinces and central government in
the evolution of Pemex, and in other Latin American countries.
Mr. Lieuwin discusses the mixed blessing that oil has proven for
Venezuela., creating a lopsided economy dependent on the ups and
downs of international markets. Mr. Saunders concludes that many
of the then-current problems of the state oil companies were
rooted in their early and checkered histories." Indeed, he says,
"the problems of the past have endured not because the public
petroleum companies behaved like the public enterprises they
are; they have endured because governments, as public owners,
have abdicated their responsibilities to the companies."
Jonh D. Wirth is Gildred Professor of Latin American Studies at
Standford University.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *