TCREUR_Public/160701.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Friday, July 1, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 129



MUGANBANK OJSC: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings


CHIMCO AD: Metachem Impex Buys Assets for BGN11.7 Million


WINDERMERE XIV: Moody's Affirms Caa1(sf) Rating on Class B Notes


MARINOPOULOS GROUP: Files for Bankruptcy Protection


EUROMAX III MBS: S&P Raises Rating on Class A-1 Notes to B+
MBIA GLOBAL: S&P Lowers Rating on EUR10.3MM Notes to 'CCC'


SAIPEM SPA: Moody's Gives (P)Ba1 Rating to New EUR2BB Note


EURASIAN BANK: S&P Affirms 'B' Counterparty Credit Ratings


AIR NEWCO 5: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-', Outlook Stable
PHARMA FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class B Notes


MARFRIG HOLDINGS: Fitch Rates US$250-Mil. 8% Notes 'B+'
MCGREGOR: Applies for Bankruptcy for 11 Units


BANDAK: Oil Slump Prompts Bankruptcy Filing, 92 Jobs Affected


KROSNO: Tadcaster, Jakubas Submit Bids for Business


CAIXA ECONOMICA MONTEPIO: Amendments No Impact on Moody's BCA


FORTE ASIGURARI: FSA Files Bankruptcy Petition


FINPROMBANK: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Ratings to Caa2
KOKS OAO: S&P Affirms 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Negative
SVYAZINVESTNEFTEKHIM JSC: Moody's Confirms Ba2 CFR, Outlook Neg.


AUTOVIA DEL NOROESTE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to EUR54.0MM Bonds
CELLNEX TELECOM: S&P Revises Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'BB+' CCR

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

JAGUAR LAND ROVER: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Corporate Family Rating
KIVETON PARK: Henry Dickinson to Acquire Business
TAYLOR WIMPEY: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Corporate Family Rating


* BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History



MUGANBANK OJSC: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' long-term and 'C' short-term
counterparty credit ratings on Azerbaijan-based Muganbank OJSC.
The outlook remains negative.

The affirmation balances S&P's view that the deterioration of the
economy in Azerbaijan is likely to continue to put pressure on
Muganbank's financial fundamentals, especially its asset quality
and funding profile.  At the same time, in S&P's opinion, capital
support provided by the shareholder in February 2016 could
support the bank's loss-absorption capacity.

Muganbank is among Azerbaijan's top 15 financial institutions,
with about Azerbaijan new manat (AZN) 520 million (about US$350
million) in assets as of May 1, 2016.  It lends mostly to small
and midsize enterprises, but it is expanding into the retail
segment, namely granting loans to pensioners.  S&P considers
Azerbaijan's retail segment to be risky, given the population's
growing indebtedness and the low payment culture in the country
on the back of deteriorating operating conditions.  Therefore,
S&P views such a strategy as opportunistic and not sustainable in
the current unfavorable economic environment in Azerbaijan.  This
is mitigated, however, by S&P's anticipation that the bank will
curb its risk appetite and demonstrate a risk-averse strategy
amid the currently difficult economic conditions in Azerbaijan.
S&P anticipates negative lending growth in 2016.

In S&P's opinion, economic risks for Azeri banks have increased
because of the slowdown of the domestic economy, given the
pronounced drop in international oil prices and sharp devaluation
of the manat in 2015.  This reflects S&P's opinion of increasing
challenges that could constrain domestic banks' business growth
and earnings prospects.  Furthermore, the poor credit standing of
the nonexport economy and Azerbaijan's weak payment culture
continue to negatively influence asset quality in the banking

S&P's risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio stood at 5.6% as of
Dec. 31, 2015.  S&P anticipates moderate improvement of this
ratio to 5.5%-6.0% in the next 12-18 months, reflecting
deleveraging and the AZN5 million capital injection the
shareholder made in February 2016.  S&P also understands that the
shareholder could inject additional capital support if credit
costs exceed the bank's current management's estimates.

S&P thinks that the deteriorated economic environment in
Azerbaijan might intensify pressure on the bank's financial
fundamentals, especially its asset quality and earnings capacity.
In particular, key risks are a possible increase in credit costs
in the retail loan portfolio and potential one-off events in the
corporate portfolio, due to concentrations.  S&P's base-case
scenario implies that the bank's credit costs will likely remain
manageable, at 4%-5% of its gross loan book.  S&P believes that
the bank's financial results will be close to zero in 2016.
Losses are also potentially likely, in S&P's opinion.

"Asset-quality indicators for Muganbank are in line with the
system average, with nonperforming loans comprising about 5.2% of
the bank's total loan book as of Dec. 31, 2015.  We believe this
ratio will deteriorate to 9%-10% in the next 12-18 months,
though, reflecting households' diminishing real disposable
income, as well as partial transformation of currency risk into
credit risk on the back of significant local currency
depreciation (about 40% of the bank's loan book is denominated in
hard currencies).  Currency mismatches still persist because 85%
of the bank's customers' deposits are denominated in hard
currencies, although we understand that the bank has used foreign
currency swaps with the central bank to cope with recent
turbulence," S&P said.

In December 2015 and in the first quarter of 2016, a turbulent
period in Azerbaijan associated with sharp local currency
depreciation and weakened confidence in the banking sector, the
bank experienced an about 10% outflow of deposits.  This outflow
was compensated by the funds placed within the bank by the
shareholder and its business partners, which helped maintain the
bank's liquidity position.  S&P currently views Muganbank's
liquidity as adequate.  S&P understands that cash and money-
market instruments, namely placements with the National Bank of
Azerbaijan and other banks, account for about 21% of total
assets. At the same time, S&P notes that the bank's funding
profile is vulnerable to customer sentiment, and S&P is closely
monitoring its liquidity management.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view of mounting credit risk
in Azerbaijan, which could increase Muganbank's vulnerability to
operating conditions through pressure on its funding and
liquidity profiles.

S&P could take a negative rating action if it saw the bank's
funding and liquidity deteriorating significantly, or if its
capital position came under more significant pressure than S&P
currently expects, with its forecast RAC ratio falling well below

S&P may revise the outlook to stable if it observes that the bank
has demonstrated resilience to deteriorating market conditions
and kept asset quality and liquidity at sustainable levels
through 2016.


CHIMCO AD: Metachem Impex Buys Assets for BGN11.7 Million
SeeNews, citing Capital daily, reports that recently set up
Bulgarian company Metachem Impex has acquired the assets of
insolvent local fertilizer plant Chimco for BGN11.7 million
(US$6.65 million/EUR6 million).

According to SeeNews, a check in the Trade Registry shows
Metachem Impex was registered on June 10, 2016, prior to the
deal, and it is owned by local businessmen Georgi Pirimov and
Ivan Zhirov.

Last week, regional media ZovNews said that the only offer for
the assets of the plant had been submitted by Pirimov, noting
that he has no experience with industrial projects and plans to
sell the plant's equipment for scrap, SeeNews relates.

Several previous attempts to sell the communist-era fertilizer
giant failed, as no buyers appeared, SeeNews notes.

Metachem Impex operations include production and marketing of
mineral fertilizers as well as scrap metal trade, SeeNews relays,
citing the registry.

                        About Chimco AD

Chimco is located in Vratsa, in the northwest of Bulgaria.  It
used to be Bulgaria's biggest area producer with an output
capacity of 800,000 tonnes annually, accounting for approximately
3.5% of global production.  The plant also produced ammonia,
carbon dioxide, argon and various types of catalysts.  The
company halted operations in 2003 and was declared bankrupt in


WINDERMERE XIV: Moody's Affirms Caa1(sf) Rating on Class B Notes
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of two classes
of Notes issued by Windermere XIV CMBS Limited.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Windermere XIV CMBS Limited

-- EUR836.43 million Class A Notes, Affirmed Ba1 (sf);
    previously on Sep 2, 2015 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

-- EUR97.1 million Class B Notes, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously
    on Sep 2, 2015 Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class C, Class D, Class E, Class F and
the Class X Notes.


The affirmation action reflects the stable performance of the
transaction since last review. One loan has been worked-out since
our last review (GSI loan), leading to an increase of credit
enhancement for Class A Notes to 78.9% from 64.9%. However, with
just less than two years left to legal final maturity of the
Notes, the timing of asset sales continues to be a main factor
driving the ratings on the Class A and B Notes. There have not
yet been any asset sales for the Fortezza II loan and Moody's
continues to closely monitor the progress of the work-out

Moody's affirmation reflects a base expected loss in the range of
40%-50% of the current balance, which is in line with its last
review. Moody's derives this loss expectation from the analysis
of the default probability of the securitized loans (both during
the term and at maturity) and its value assessment of the

Realised losses have increased to 0.0006% from 0.0005% of the
original securitized balance since the last review. Moody's
estimate of the base expected loss, plus realised losses, is now
in the range of 10%-20% of the original pool balance, in line
with the last review.

For a summary of Moody's key assumptions for the loans in the
pool please refer to the section SUMMARY OF MOODY'S LOAN

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the

Main factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of
the ratings are (i) a lack of progress or visibility of the work-
out of the Fortezza II and the Sisu Loans or (ii) vacation of
tenants in the Fortezza II portfolio, potentially leading to
further property value declines.

Main factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of
the ratings are a faster than expected work-out of the Fortezza
II and Sisu Loans and recovery estimates above Moody's current


As of the April 2016 IPD, the transaction balance has declined by
75.85% to EUR279.67 million from EUR1,111.80 million at closing
in November 2007, due to the pay-off of five loans originally in
the pool. The Notes are currently secured by three first-ranking
legal mortgages over 60 commercial properties ranging in size
from 3.5% to 70.0% of the current pool balance. Since the last
review one loan has been worked out. The pool has an average
concentration in terms of geographic location (59.1% Italy, based
on underwriter (UW) market value) and property type (74.2%
Office). Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl Index, in
which a higher number represents greater diversity, to measure
the diversity of loan size. Large multi-borrower transactions
typically have a Herf of less than 10 with an average of around
5. This pool has a Herf of 1.5, lower than at Moody's prior

All remaining loans are in work-out. Both the Fortezza II and the
Sisu Loan assets are being liquidated by the respective borrowers
under the supervision of the special servicer.

The weighted average Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) on the
securitised pool is 152% compared to 127% based on the UW LTV.


Below are Moody's key assumptions for the remaining loans.

1. Fortezza II Loan: LTV 165% (Whole) / 165% (A-loan); Defaulted;
Expected Loss 50% - 60%.

The largest loan in the pool (81% of the securitized pool) is
secured by a portfolio of 11 office properties in Italy, of which
10 are located in Rome and one in Pescara. The loan was not
repaid on its extended maturity date in April 2015. It has failed
to meet the initial debt repayment hurdle of EUR210 million,
which had to be met in order to further extend the loan until
April 2016. The special servicer and borrower are in a long term
standstill until 1 January 2018 to allow sufficient time for a
managed disposal of the assets in line with their most current
business plan.

The properties securing the loan are of average quality and have
a short weighted average unexpired lease term of 2.7 years. The
majority of the tenants are Italian government related entities,
accounting for approximately 76% of the current gross rental
income. Moody's value assumption results in an LTV of 165%
compared to the UW LTV of 148%.

2. Sisu Loan: LTV 83.5% (Whole) / 83.5% (A-loan); Defaulted;
Expected Loss 10% - 20%.

The second largest loan in the pool (15.5% of the securitized
pool) is currently secured by a portfolio of 49 mixed use
properties across Finland. The loan was transferred into special
servicing in April 2013. In January 2014, the special servicer
entered into a conditional standstill agreement with the
borrower. Part of the standstill agreement are debt reduction
covenants which have to be met by liquidating the property
portfolio. The next debt reduction target is in October 2016 when
the outstanding balance must not exceed EUR24 million (currently
EUR43.5 million).

It will be more challenging for the borrower to meet the future
targets due to the deteriorating quality of the remaining assets.
The weakening of the portfolio quality is reflected by the
increasing vacancies. Over the last five years the portfolio's
vacancy has increased to 48.7% from 31.5% in July 2011.

Moody's value assumption results in a MDY LTV of 83.5% compared
to the U/W LTV of 45.1%.

3. Baywatch Loan: LTV N/A (Whole) / N/A (A-loan); Defaulted;
Expected Loss 10% - 20%.

The smallest loan in the pool (3.5% of the securitized pool) is
secured by a single asset located in Germany. After the sale of
the last remaining property, the loss estimate for the loan is in
the range of 10% to 20%, given that net sales proceeds of EUR8.1
million are due to be applied at the July 2016 IPD.


MARINOPOULOS GROUP: Files for Bankruptcy Protection
SeeNews, citing daily Kathimerini, reports that Greece's
Marinopoulos Group, which holds the franchise rights for the
Carrefour supermarkets in Bulgaria, has filed for bankruptcy

According to SeeNews, daily Kathimerini said the application will
be discussed in court today, July 1.

If approved, Marinopoulos, which owes some EUR3 billion (US$3.3
billion) to more than 1,000 creditors, will fall under protection
from its creditors and enforcement measures will be temporarily
suspended until the company, hopefully, gets back on track,
SeeNews states.

Earlier this year, private enforcement agents put up for sale two
Carrefour supermarkets, located in shopping malls in Bulgaria's
capital Sofia, seeking a total of BGN45.3 million (US$25.6
million/EUR23.2 million) over unpaid debts, SeeNews recounts.


EUROMAX III MBS: S&P Raises Rating on Class A-1 Notes to B+
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit rating on EUROMAX III MBS
Ltd.'s class A-1 notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its
ratings on the class A-2 and B notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the latest available trustee report,
dated April 11, 2016.

S&P subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class of
notes at each rating level.  In S&P's analysis, it used the
portfolio balance that it considers to be performing
(EUR54,986,782), the current weighted-average spread (1.05%), and
the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P calculated in
accordance with its criteria for rating collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) of structured finance assets.

S&P's upgrade of the class A-1 notes is primarily due to
structural deleveraging, which has resulted in increased credit
enhancement for the notes.  The class A-1 notes are amortizing
sequentially and currently have a note factor of 19.83%, having
received principal repayments of EUR20.72 million since S&P's
previous review on July 10, 2013.

Since S&P's previous review, the proportion of assets in the
'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-') has increased to
52.87% from 25.09%.  Furthermore, defaulted assets make up 18.32%
of the entire asset pool compared with 15.53% at S&P's previous
review. The weighted-average spread earned on the underlying
portfolio assets has reduced to 1.05% from 1.09%.

The overcollateralization test is below the required documented
threshold.  As a result, the issuer uses any residual interest
proceeds, after the payment of certain senior fees and interest
on the rated notes, to repay the class A-1 notes' principal.  The
failure of the overcollateralization test is due to certain
documented maturity-based haircuts on the underlying portfolio

As a result of deleveraging, the portfolio is now more
concentrated, with only 16 obligors that S&P considers to be
performing.  The largest obligor accounts for 14.55% of the
performing portfolio.  S&P believes that its ratings reflect this
concentration risk.

In S&P's opinion, taking into account the results of its credit
and cash flow analysis, the available credit enhancement for the
class A-2 and B notes is commensurate with their currently
assigned ratings.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'CCC (sf)'
rating on the class A-1 notes and its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the
class B notes.

The portion of performing assets that S&P do not rate is 19.28%.
In this case, S&P applies its criteria "CDOs: Mapping A Third
Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard & Poor's
Global Rating Scale," published on May 8, 2014, to map notched
ratings from another ratings agency and to infer S&P's rating
input for the purpose of its analysis.

EUROMAX III MBS is a cash flow mezzanine structured finance CDO
of a portfolio that comprises predominantly residential mortgage-
backed securities as well as commercial mortgage-backed
securities, and, to a lesser extent, CDOs of corporates and CDOs
of asset-backed securities.  The transaction closed in December
2002 and is managed by CIBC World Markets Inc. Collineo Asset
Management acts as collateral advisor.


Class              Rating
            To                From

EUR195.24 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

A-1         B+ (sf)           B- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A-2         CCC (sf)
B           CCC- (sf)

MBIA GLOBAL: S&P Lowers Rating on EUR10.3MM Notes to 'CCC'
S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'CCC' from 'B' its credit rating on
the EUR10.3 million repackaged MBIA Global Funding LLC variable-
coupon notes series 2005-8 issued by Momentum CDO (Europe) Ltd.

On June 15, 2016, S&P lowered to 'CCC' from 'B' its rating on
MBIA Global Funding's EUR100 million variable-rate medium-term
series 2005B notes, to which S&P's rating on Momentum CDO
(Europe)'s series 2005-8 notes is weak-linked.  S&P has therefore
lowered to 'CCC' from 'B' its rating on the series 2005-8 notes,
in line with the application of S&P's global repackaged
securities criteria.


Momentum CDO (Europe) Ltd.
EUR10.3 mil repackaged MBIA Global Funding LLC variable
coupon notes series 2005-8

                                      Rating       Rating
Class              Identifier         To           From
                   XS0236181334       CCC          B


SAIPEM SPA: Moody's Gives (P)Ba1 Rating to New EUR2BB Note
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba1-PD Probability of
Default Rating (PDR) to Saipem S.p.A. and affirmed its Ba1
Corporate Family Rating (CFR). Concurrently, the rating agency
has assigned a (P)Ba1 rating to the new EUR2.0 billion medium
term note (MTN) programme of Saipem S.p.A. The outlook on the
ratings is stable.


The Ba1-PD PDR is based on an assumed group recovery rate of 50%,
as is typical for structures that consist of a mix of bank and
bond debt. The (P)Ba1 rating assigned to the MTN programme
reflects that it will rank equal with the existing debt,
consisting of a EUR1.6 billion term loan and an undrawn EUR1.5
billion revolving credit facility (RCF) that both mature in 2020
and the remaining portion of a EUR1.6 billion bridge to bond
facility that matures in January 2018 at the latest. Any issuance
under the MTN programme is stated to be used primarily to repay
the bridge facility. The MTN programme will benefit from the same
guarantees that the EUR1.6 billion term loan and bridge facilty
and EUR1.5 billion RCF have, representing at least 75% of group
EBITDA and 70% of assets.

The Ba1 Corporate Family Rating (CFR) reflects Saipem's (1)
investment grade business profile with revenues of approximately
EUR12 billion, a substantial fleet size and asset scale; (2)
strong market position as one of the top engineering and
construction (E&C) companies providing offshore and onshore
construction predominantly for the oil and gas industry, with
leading engineering capabilities providing barriers to entry; (3)
recently upsized substantial cost efficiency plan expected to
generate EUR1.7 billion of cumulative savings between 2015 and
2017 compared to Moody's expectation of reported EBITDA of
approximately EUR1 billion for 2016; (4) long-term customer
relationships with major national oil companies (NOCs) such as
Saudi Aramco (unrated) and large integrated oil companies such as
ENI S.p.A. (Baa1 stable) and TOTAL S.A. (Aa3 stable); (5)
significant EUR14 billion contracted revenue backlog providing
some visibility into 2017 for both the E&C and drilling
businesses; (6) wide geographic diversity and with a significant
presence in the Middle East, which accounts for 37% of 2015
backlog and so far has shown some resilience in the current weak
oil price environment; and (7) demonstration of a conservative
financial policy following an equity raise of EUR3.5 billion in
February to repay debt.

Moody's said, "At the same time, the CFR also reflects (1) the
large exposure to lump sum turnkey E&C contracts, which accounted
for approximately 75% of contracts in the backlog and recent
execution challenges, including large losses in several ongoing
projects; (2) exposure to the highly cyclical oil and gas end
market, where continued low oil and gas prices have led to
reductions in offshore spend on deep and ultra-deepwater
projects, leading to pricing pressure and a lack of new awards in
both the E&C and drilling space; (3) likely strong competition
from existing players in the onshore E&C division, as well as new
entrants in offshore, pressuring margins for new awards; (4) the
potential that Saipem will have to scrap several of its older
floaters as it will be difficult to re-contract them in a market
where we expect strong negative trends to remain deeply
entrenched through 2017; (5) challenges of dealing with companies
under financial pressure such as Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. -
PETROBRAS (B3 negative) and Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA,
Caa3 negative) and Saipem's outstanding and ongoing legal
proceedings; (6) the relatively high gross leverage (adjusted for
leases, pensions and drawing under a factoring facility) that
Moody's expected of at least 3.5x and FFO/Debt to remain below
25% through 2017, despite an increased cost savings programme;
and (7) the potential for liquidity to be negatively impacted by
large working capital swings."


Moody's considers Saipem's liquidity to be good despite
significant working capital swings over the last few years. At
the end of March 2016, it had EUR1.6 billion cash on balance
sheet, and access to a fully undrawn EUR1.5 billion RCF maturing
in December 2020. Moody's expects the company to generate free
cash flow in 2016 of a few hundred million euros and it does not
expect Saipem to pay any dividends. There is no debt maturing in
the next 12 months and Moody's expects the company to have ample
headroom on the 3.0x net leverage covenant that is now being
tested after a downgrade to speculative grade.


The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Saipem (1)
will refinance the EUR1.6 billion bridge-to-bond facility well in
advance of its 18 month maturity date, although there is a six-
month extension option to January, 2018; (2) maintains Moody's
gross adjusted debt/EBITDA in a range of 3.5x-4.0x as the
contract backlog rolls off; and (3) continues to win new orders
and suffer no further losses on existing projects.


As Saipem's rating has recently been downgraded, an upgrade of
the rating is unlikely in the medium-term. That said, over time
Saipem's ratings could be upgraded if it maintains a strong order
backlog and conditions improve in the oil and gas markets leading
to it sustaining: (1) EBITA over $600 million, (2) FFO/debt above
25%, and (3) Moody's adjusted gross leverage is sustained below
3.5x, while maintaining good liquidity and the company builds a
good execution track record. Conversely, Saipem's rating could be
downgraded, if (1) Moody's were to conclude that Moody's adjusted
gross leverage will remain over 4.0x, (2) FFO/debt remains below
20% or (3) if liquidity deteriorates.


EURASIAN BANK: S&P Affirms 'B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term and 'B' short-term
counterparty credit ratings on Kazakhstan-based JSC Eurasian
Bank. The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'kzBB' Kazakhstan national
scale rating on the bank.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view of a Kazakh tenge (KZT) 15
billion (about US$45 million as of June 29, 2016) capital
injection that Eurasian Bank will receive from shareholders by
the end of August 2016.  Thanks to this capital increase, S&P
expects that bank's loss-absorption capacity will remain modest,
with S&P Global Ratings' risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio above
5% in 2016-2017.  S&P notes that the weak operating environment
and unpredictable shocks in the domestic economy could expose
Eurasian Bank to higher-than-expected losses.  However, S&P
believes that these risks are adequately mitigated by the bank's
committed shareholders, risk-averse policy introduced by its
experienced management team, leading market positions in non-
mortgage retail lending, especially auto loans, and diversified
business model among corporate and retail segments.

"We view positively the shareholders' ability and willingness to
support the bank.  We believe that additional equity injections
beyond KZT15 billion this year are possible if needed or if the
bank revises its strategy, which currently entails limited asset
growth.  We project low earnings capacity, given potential sector
instability in 2016, which can be caused by recurrent interest
rate increases on short-term money market instruments and further
local currency temporally movements.  Under our base case,
Eurasian Bank's expected RAC ratio will exceed 5.0% in 2016-2017
against 4.5% on Dec. 31, 2015," S&P said. S&P factors in these

   -- Modest loan portfolio growth of 3%-4% in 2016-2017, due to
      adverse economic conditions;
   -- Slightly positive or flat total assets dynamics in 2016
      followed by a 10%-12% decrease in 2017;
   -- Capital injection of KZT15 billion received by end-August
   -- Cost of risk of about 3% in 2016-2017;
   -- Market sensitive losses of about 7%-8% of operating
      revenues in 2016 due to potential recurrent shortage or
      further moderate devaluation of local currency;
   -- Consequently 2%-3% losses on average equity in 2016 and 0%-
      0.5% return on average equity in 2017; and
   -- Full earnings retention.

Despite a significant tightening of the bank's credit approval
rates since mid-2014 and an enhancement of collection procedures,
a prolonged downturn in the economy led to an increase of
Eurasian Bank's problem assets.  The bank's share of
nonperforming loans (NPLs; overdue more than 90 days) has
increased to 12% of total lending as of March 31, 2016.  Although
this is a jump from 9% as of end-2014, according to International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), it is still broadly in line
with S&P's IFRS sector trend expectations for 2016 of 12%-14%.
In addition, NPL coverage by loan loss provisions was only about
50% as of Jan. 31, 2016, which S&P considers low.  S&P thinks
that Eurasian Bank will likely counter this by raising its
provisioning expenses going forward, which supports S&P's
expectation of 3% cost of risk in 2016-2017.

While S&P has observed that the bank's liquidity position is
weakening, S&P don't anticipate that it will have difficulties
meeting its financial liabilities in 2016-2017, in particular
repaying the National Bank of Kazakhstan foreign exchange swap in
July 2016.  Under this transaction, Eurasian Bank is to repay
KZT27 billion and receive US$150 million.  Therefore, Eurasian
Bank's share of broad liquid assets will increase to 11.5%-13.5%
of the total balance sheet as of Aug. 1, 2016, from 9.0% as of
April 1, 2016.  S&P expects the bank will maintain this ratio at
13%-15% until the end of 2016, and S&P will closely monitor the

The stable outlook on Eurasian Bank reflects S&P's expectation
that, over the next 12-18 months, the bank's experienced
management team will be able to mitigate the pressure on the
bank's modest loss-absorption capacity despite prevailing
downside sector and economy risks.  S&P also expects that the
bank will continue its diversified operations as a leading
provider of financial services, especially in specific retail

"We would take a negative rating action if Eurasian Bank's
projected RAC ratio fell below 5% over the next 12-18 months due
to substantially higher-than-expected market sensitive or credit
losses, or in case of deviation from the current limited growth
strategy in the absence of sufficient equity injections.
Likewise, further deterioration of the bank's liquidity metrics
or a prolonged period of the share of NPLs in total lending
materially exceeding our base-case level of 10%-12% in 2016 would
trigger a downgrade.  If Eurasian Bank were to lose its leading
positions in the auto loans or other non-mortgage retail segments
over the next 12-18 months, we would also view this as negative
for the rating," S&P said.

A positive rating action is unlikely in the next 12-18 months
given the increasing economic and industry risks in the Kazakh
banking sector.


AIR NEWCO 5: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-', Outlook Stable
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term corporate credit rating
on Luxembourg-based holding company Air Newco 5 S.a.R.L. (ACS) to
'B-' from 'B'.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P lowered to 'B-' from 'B' its issue rating
to Air Newco LLC's first-lien loan and revolving credit facility
(RCF).  The recovery rating on these debt instruments is '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-70%;
higher half of the range) in the event of a payment default.

S&P also lowered the issue rating on the GBP128 million second-
lien loan to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'.  The recovery rating is unchanged
at '6', indicating S&P's expectation of negligible recovery (0-
10%) in the event of a payment default.

The downgrade follows ACS' weaker than previously anticipated
operating performance in financial 2016, which meant that S&P's
previous forecast of short-term deleveraging did not materialize.
It also resulted in lower-than-expected interest coverage ratios,
and negative FOCF generation.  S&P currently forecasts that ACS'
near-term operating performance will continue to lag S&P's
previous expectations, notably on the back of uncertainties
within the U.K. public sector.  Such uncertainties are likely to
result in further delays in new IT investments, constraining the
company's growth of non-recurring revenues.  S&P therefore
expects the company's fully adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will
remain above 7x, and funds from operations to debt will stay at
about 5%.

ACS' clients, many of which are from the public sector, face
increased budget constraints, and recent delayed decision-making
within the U.K. public sector led to about 1% revenue decline in
financial 2016.  S&P believes this trend will likely persist in
financial 2017, and have therefore revised downward its base-case
forecast.  In particular, S&P believes the U.K.'s referendum vote
to leave the EU will create some short-term uncertainties,
further curbing new investments especially in the U.K. public

Nevertheless, S&P's assessment of ACS' business risk profile
continues to be supported by its high customer retention rate
(about 95%) and relatively high proportion of recurring revenues,
which have remained stable in financial 2016.

ACS' financial risk profile reflects its very high S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted leverage, which peaked at nearly 8x in financial
2016 and which S&P forecasts to remain above 7x over the next 12
months.  In addition, ACS' interest coverage was 1.7x in
financial 2016, well below S&P's previous forecast of 2.1x.  S&P
expects interest coverage to remain below 2x in financial 2017
due the company's sizable interest charges and slower-than-
previously-anticipated EBITDA growth.

S&P's adjusted debt measure excludes financial sponsor Vista
Partners' preferred equity certificates (PECs) of about
GBP358 million (initial amount without accruals), because, in
S&P's view, the PECs' terms are favorable for third-party
creditors and sufficiently restricted from transfer.  S&P
believes this creates an economic incentive for Vista to not
enforce its creditor rights under the PECs because doing so could
jeopardize its control of the company.

In addition, largely driven by several exceptional items related
to cost initiatives, the company's FOCF was about negative
GBP12 million in financial 2016.  S&P expects exceptional costs
to materially decline in financial 2017, and that ACS will
successfully execute its cost saving initiatives, thereby
improving its EBITDA margins.

S&P's base-case assumes:

   -- Low-single-digit revenue growth in financial 2017,
      following a decline of 1% in financial 2016, driven by
      moderate growth in licenses and services contracts.

   -- Improved EBITDA margin to about 25% (after restructuring
      costs) by the end of financial 2016 due to several cost

   -- Stable capital expenditure (capex) of about GBP6 million

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA of 7.9x in
      financial 2016, reducing to below 7.0x by financial 2018,
      mainly due to an improvement in EBITDA.

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt at around 5% in
      financials 2016 and 2017.

   -- Low EBITDA cash interest coverage of about 1.7x in
      financial 2016, increasing to about 2x in 2017.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation of low-single-digit
revenue growth, declining exceptional costs, adequate liquidity,
and positive FOCF in financial year 2017.

S&P sees limited rating upside over the next 12 months as it
anticipates that credit metrics will remain below S&P's
threshold. S&P could raise its rating if ACS performs
significantly better than it assumes in its base case, supporting
meaningful deleveraging, an increase in EBITDA interest coverage
to more than 2x, and positive FOCF.  This could occur if the
company exhibits above mid-single-digit growth and successfully
implements its cost saving initiative, leading to an adjusted
EBITDA margin (after restructuring costs) of about 30%.

S&P currently does not see any short-term downside for the rating
due to ACS' comfortable liquidity position.

S&P could lower the rating if ACS' liquidity weakened or S&P
viewed its capital structure as unsustainable.  This could occur
if weakening market conditions persisted, leading to a meaningful
deterioration in revenues and negative cash flows.

PHARMA FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class B Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Pharma Finance 3 S.r.l.'s (PF3) notes,

  EUR36.1 mil. class A floating-rate notes: affirmed at 'CCCsf';
   Recovery Estimate: lowered to 65% from 90%

  EUR6.1 mil. class B floating-rate notes: affirmed at 'CCsf';
   Recovery Estimate: 0%

  EUR9.5 mil. class C floating-rate notes: affirmed at 'AAAsf';
   Outlook Stable


Continuous Deterioration of Asset Performance

Until the June 2013 payment date, there were no reported arrears
or defaults.  However, EUR6.9 mil. of defaults were posted in
2Q13. Since then, defaults have rapidly built up to EUR44.2 mil.
(20.4%  of the original portfolio balance plus subsequent
purchases) on a cumulative gross basis.  The total number of
contracts reported as defaulted are 58 on a total of 132 still
outstanding loans.  A further 29 loans are reported as
delinquent. Moreover, the loans in arrears have not been cured,
with delinquencies migrating to default status due to protracted
payment delays.

Back-Up Servicer Stepped In

Comifin S.p.A. (Comifin) has handed over responsibilities for
servicing the portfolio under management to the back-up servicer,
Selmabipiemme Leasing S.p.A. in September 2015.  Due to the
peculiar nature of the collection process, which requires
processing cash flows coming from both debtors and the ASLs
(Italian healthcare units), Comifin still acts as sub-servicer in
charge of daily collections, as agreed by the transaction
parties. Fitch will monitor the new servicer's collection
performance, and in particular its ability to redirect ASL
payments to the issuer.

Lack of Visibility on Future Recoveries

The transaction is currently under-collateralized, with rated
notes of EUR51.7 mil. against performing collateral of EUR34.5
mil.  The repayment of the notes is now heavily dependent on
future recoveries.  Fitch has made a number of assumptions on
future recoveries which can impact the Recovery Estimate, the
most important of which is a base case life time recovery rate
assumption of 30%.

The servicer would be able to extract recoveries from non-
performing assets in different ways: from bankruptcy proceedings,
payment arrangements with the borrowers, or claims on ASL
payments.  However, the overall uncertainty regarding recovery
sources and timing is a driving factor of the ratings of the
class A and B notes.  Should the new servicer be unable to
generate a flow of recovery payments in line with the agency's
assumption, a default of the notes would become more likely.

PDL Build-Up Drains Liquidity

The principal deficiency ledger (PDL) has increased considerably
to EUR38.9 mil. (or 75% of the rated notes) from zero in mid-
2013. Until the PDL is fully cleared, the cash reserve balance
will remain zero, exposing the transaction to increased payment
interruption risk should the receipt of collections be
interrupted due to the default of the appointed servicer.
Furthermore, unlike most Italian ABS transactions, principal
collections cannot be used to cover interest shortfalls.

As long as the PDL is left uncleared, the step-up margin on the
rated notes will not be paid.  Non-payment of these items is not
an event of default of the notes and payment of the step-up
margin is not covered by Fitch's ratings.  Moody's can no longer
verify the degree of disclosure given to investors beyond its
rating report and transaction documentation at the time of
issuance and therefore the transaction documents may not have the
disclosure as prominent as the standards of our criteria, which
constitutes a variation to Fitch's Criteria for Rating Caps and
Limitations in Global Structured Finance Transactions.

Rising Obligor Concentration Risk

The performance deterioration has increased the obligor
concentration risk, which was already high due to the few
securitized loans left in the pool (132).  The decrease in credit
enhancement due to the inability to fully provision for the
numerous defaults increases the exposure of the noteholders to
defaults in this concentrated pool.


Further deterioration of the pool performance and the ensuing
increase of uncleared PDL could put further downward pressure on
the class A and B notes' ratings resulting in a possible default.

Conversely, any future evidence that the recovery sources
available to the new servicer can post significantly higher
recovery rates than Fitch currently expects could result in
upward pressure on the notes' ratings and/or Recovery Estimates.

The rating of the class C notes is linked to the European
Investment Fund's rating (AAA/Stable/F1+), which guarantees the
payments under those notes: any changes in the guarantor's rating
would be reflected by a change in the class C notes' rating.


No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing.  The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


MARFRIG HOLDINGS: Fitch Rates US$250-Mil. 8% Notes 'B+'
Fitch rates the USD250 million reopening of Marfrig Holdings
(Europe) B.V.'s 8% notes due in 2023 'B+/RR4'.  The notes are
unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by Marfrig.  Proceeds
will be used to refinance existing debt and for general corporate

Simplified Business Profile

Marfrig's ratings consider its broad product portfolio and
geographic diversification, which reduces risks related to
disease, trade restrictions and currency fluctuations.  Recent
divestitures allowed Marfrig to simplify its organizational
structure into two business units: Marfrig Beef (50.3% of
revenue; 50% of EBITDA), one of the world's largest beef
producers, and Keystone Foods (49.7% of revenue; 50% of EBITDA),
which processes food for major restaurant chains in the U.S. and

Improved Credit Metrics

Marfrig's net adjusted debt/EBITDA was 3.5x as of March 31, 2016,
as a result of satisfactory performance and the divestment of Moy
Park to JBS in September 2015.  Fitch expects Marfrig's adjusted
net leverage ratio to fall below 3.5x in 2016 supported by EBITDA
growth, better asset and logistics management, steady capex and
lower interest expenses.  Fitch expects Marfrig to generate
positive free cash flow (FCF) in 2016.

Challenging Domestic Environment

The domestic operating environment in 2016 remains difficult for
the Brazilian protein sector due to the economic recession,
elevated inflation, increased interest and unemployment rates,
and declining consumer confidence.  Marfrig responded to these
challenges by reducing processing capacity (five slaughter units
closed in 2015), while exporters reported higher average prices
offsetting lower export volume.

No Acquisitions Anticipated

Marfrig is not expected to execute any major acquisitions over
the next 18 months given management's focus on deleveraging its
balance sheet, improving cash flow generation and reducing
interest expenses.  Key initiatives will include the optimization
of plants and distribution facilities by Marfrig Beef and the
geographic expansion of Keystone.

Negative Rating Triggers: Marfrig's inability to improve FCF over
the next 24 months and maintain net leverage above 4.5x-5.0x on a
sustainable basis could trigger a negative rating action.

Positive Rating Triggers: A combination of a positive FCF track
record, resilience of the group's operating margin in its beef
business in Brazil, and a reduced gross leverage and sustained
net leverage ratio near 3.5x would be viewed positively.


Marfrig's liquidity is adequate.  As of March 31, 2016, the group
held BRL5.2 billion of cash and marketable securities.  This
compares favorably with short-term debt of BRL2.2 billion.
Marfrig's largest refinancing requirement will be in 2020 (BRL3.2
billion), as the company has redeemed most of its 2016 and 2017
bonds.  Proceeds from the divestment of Moy Park are being used
to buy back outstanding bonds (2018, 2019 and 2021 bonds).
Almost 96% of Marfrig debt and 80% of revenues is denominated in
U.S. dollars and foreign currencies.


Fitch currently rates Marfrig as:

   -- Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Rating 'B+';
   -- National scale rating 'BBB+ (bra)'.

Marfrig Holdings Europe B.V.:
   -- Foreign Currency IDR 'B+';
   -- Notes due 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021, 2023 'B+/RR4'.

Marfrig Overseas Ltd:
   -- Notes due 2016, 2020 'B+/RR4'.

The Rating Outlook is Positive.

MCGREGOR: Applies for Bankruptcy for 11 Units
--------------------------------------------- reports that McGregor has applied for bankruptcy for
11 of its 50 units, two weeks after being given court protection
from creditors.

According to, McGregor, which includes the Gaastra,
McGregor and Adam Menswear brands, said all shops and the
webshops will remain open.  The stores will remain open to secure
jobs and to make it possible for a new owner to carry out a
seamless takeover, the receivers said, adding that there are
serious takeover candidates both within the Netherlands and
abroad, relates.

McGregor produces mid-price range classic leisure and sports


BANDAK: Oil Slump Prompts Bankruptcy Filing, 92 Jobs Affected
Niamh Burns at Energy Voice reports that Bandak said it has filed
for bankruptcy with the loss of 92 positions from the company.

The group has been hit with the dramatic fall in oil price, which
has led to reduced activity, Energy Voice discloses.

Chief executive Per Gunnar Borhaug said the company had completed
several demanding cost reductions and downsizing over the last
couple of years as it makes its way through the oil slump, Energy
Voice relates.  He said the move "had not been enough", Energy
Voice notes.

Bandak is a Norwegian industrial group.  The company currently
has 355 employees and had a turnover of NOK612 million last year
and an operating loss of NOK16 million, according to Energy


KROSNO: Tadcaster, Jakubas Submit Bids for Business
Marta Waldoch at Bloomberg News, citing Puls, reports that
Tadcaster, controlled by South Africa's fund Coast-2-Coast,
offered PLN121.2 million for bankrupt Polish glass-maker Krosno.

According to Bloomberg, Centrum Nowych Technologii, controlled by
Zbigniew Jakubas, submitted a bid of PLN110.8 million for the

The Polish court, which is leading sale, was set to pick a buyer
on July 28, Bloomberg discloses.


CAIXA ECONOMICA MONTEPIO: Amendments No Impact on Moody's BCA
Moody's Investors Service announced that certain proposed
amendments to the contractual agreements with respect to the
covered bonds issued by Caixa Economica Montepio Geral (the
"Issuer", deposits B3, adjusted baseline credit assessment caa1,
counterparty risk assessment B1(cr)) would not, in and of
themselves and as of this time, result in the downgrade or
withdrawal of the Baa1 ratings on the above mentioned notes
issued by the Issuer, which remain on review with direction
uncertain. In fact, Moody's believes the proposed changes, if
implemented as proposed, will likely materially lessen default
and refinancing risk and will thus be credit positive for these
covered bonds.

The main contractual amendment is the modification of the
Issuer's existing covered bond programme to a conditional pass-
through covered bond structure whereby an 'Issuer Event' in
relation to one or more series of the covered bonds results in a
move into 'Pass Through' format. An 'Issuer Event' includes i) an
'Issuer Insolvency Event' of the Issuer in which case all series
of 'Covered Bonds' (which up to that point are not yet in 'Pass-
Through' format) will become Pass Through and be due on their
respective 'Extended Maturity Dates'; ii) an 'Issuer Default of
Payment Event' on a Series of Covered Bonds, whereby that Series
will become Pass Through and be due on their Extended Maturity
Date; and iii) a 'Breach' of the 'Overcollateralisation'
percentage in which case all series of Covered Bonds shall become
Pass Through and be due on their respective Extended Maturity

Following an Issuer Event, the affected series will be extended
up to 50 years after the issuance date and the proceeds from the
cover pool will be used to redeem pari passu the Series of
Covered Bonds under Pass Through format. Moody's understands that
the amendments are subject to noteholders' consent.

Moody's analysed the proposed amendments and concluded that the
amendments, if implemented as proposed, would likely materially
reduce the default and refinancing risk with respect to Caixa
Economica Montepio Geral's Covered Bond Programme.

Based on this analysis, Moody's further expects that the change,
if implemented as proposed, will positively impact Moody's Timely
Payment Indicator (TPI) assessment of the covered bond programme,
currently set at "Improbable". As a result, all other variables
being equal, following Moody's methodology on rating covered
bonds, the ratings of the covered bonds could be positively

Moody's has determined that the amendments, in and of themselves
and at this time, will not result in the downgrade or withdrawal
of the Baa1 ratings on the above mentioned notes. However,
Moody's opinion addresses only the credit impact associated with
the proposed amendments, and Moody's is not expressing any
opinion as to whether the amendment has, or could have, other
non-credit related effects that may have a detrimental impact on
the interests of holders of the rated obligations and/or


FORTE ASIGURARI: FSA Files Bankruptcy Petition
Romania Insider reports that Romania's Financial Supervisory
Authority (ASF) has asked the bankruptcy of local insurer Forte
Asigurari, which has insured the Romanian troops operating

The financial regulator revoked the insurer's operating license,
Romania Insider relays, citing an ASF announcement.

A Romanian court will have to rule on ASF's request for Forte
Asigurari's bankruptcy, Romania Insider discloses.

ASF said Forte Asigurari is insolvent, Romania Insider relates.
The insurance firm was among those that failed the stress tests
carried out last year by the ASF at 21 smaller insurers on the
local market, Romania Insider notes.


FINPROMBANK: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Ratings to Caa2
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Finprombank's long-term
local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings to Caa2 from B3. The
outlook on the ratings is negative. Simultaneously, Moody's has
downgraded the bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) and
adjusted BCA to caa2 from b3. Finprombank's long-term
Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment) was downgraded to
Caa1(cr) from B2(cr). The bank's Not Prime short-term local-
currency and foreign-currency deposit ratings, as well as its
short-term CR Assessment of Not Prime(cr) were affirmed.

Moody's rating action is primarily based on Finprombank's audited
financial statements for 2015 and unaudited financial statements
for the first quarter of 2016 prepared under IFRS, the bank's
unaudited financial statements for 2016 year to date prepared
under local GAAP, as well as information received from the bank.


The downgrade of Finprombank's deposit ratings reflects: (1) the
bank's weak liquidity position; (2) the strong deteriorating
trend in its asset quality; and (3) high credit losses exerting
pressure on the bank's capital. Although Finprombank's
shareholders provided capital support to the bank, this support
barely covers the bank's provisioning needs.

Finprombank's funding profile and liquidity position have
recently weakened: in the first five months of 2016,
Finprombank's retail deposits declined by 16%, and corporate
deposits lost 24%. Although Finprombank managed to stabilize its
funding base by mid-June 2016, its liquidity buffer is still weak
at 9.4% of total assets as at 16 June 2016. Furthermore, this
liquidity cushion is predominantly formed by securities, which
are less liquid than cash and cash equivalents, and may require
significant discounts to be converted into cash.

Finprombank's solvency position is undermined by a rapid
deterioration of its asset quality metrics, which Moody's expects
to protract in the next 12-18 months. Its aggregate amount of
loans overdue by more than 90 days increased to 7.9% of total
loans as at March 31, 2016 from 5.2% at year-end 2015 and 1.9%
reported at year-end 2014. In addition, the proportion of
restructured loans (which would have defaulted absent the
restructuring) jumped to 32.4% of total loans at March 31, 2016
from 10.9% and 6.8% reported at year-end 2015 and year-end 2014,
respectively. The loan loss reserves (LLR) ratio stood at 13.3%
at March 31, 2016, providing insufficient coverage of problem and
restructured loans.

Finprombank's loan portfolio bears a riskier-than-market average
risk profile. At March 31, 2016, 23% of all loans were issued to
the borrowers operating in the finance and investment sector and
another 19% of loans were provided to the real estate and
construction borrower segment. In addition, Finprombank's loans
are poorly collateralized: at March 31, 2016, 55% of the bank's
loans were unsecured, while another 13% were secured only by
guarantees or sureties, which is likely to result in heavier-
than-peers' severity of losses in case of borrower defaults.

Finprombank's credit costs (loan loss provisions divided by
average gross loan portfolio) jumped to 15.9% (in annualized
terms) in 1Q 2016 from the already high 7.9% reported in 2015,
thus exerting pressure on capital. The bank reported negative
return on average equity (ROAE) of -45% (annualized) in 1Q 2016
and -31% in 2015. The bank's shareholders have provided
substantial capital injections to compensate for losses. In the
period from December 2015 to June 2016, the bank received in
aggregate RUB15.6 billion of such capital injections.
Additionally, the shareholders have recently announced their
intention to provide another RUB5 billion capital to the bank
until the end of 2016. However, only approximately 40% of the
capital injections made to date were contributed in cash form
qualifying for Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital, while the
rest were made in the form of other, less liquid assets bearing
much weaker loss absorption capacity.

As of June 1, 2016, Finprombank reported a regulatory total
capital adequacy ratio (N1.0) of 11.99%, while its regulatory
CET1 capital ratio (N1.1) stood at 6.42% as of the same reporting
date (the regulatory minimums required are 8% and 4.5%,
respectively). Moody's anticipates that Finprombank's
accumulating credit losses will continue to erode its capital.


Finprombank's failure to reinstate its liquidity cushion to more
comfortable levels (such as 15-20% of total assets reported by
the bank's peers), especially if this is coupled with any further
funding outflows, may lead to a downgrade of the bank's ratings.
The rating agency might also downgrade Finprombank's ratings if
the negative trend in its asset quality is not sufficiently
matched by a LLR buffer and/or capital increases.

Finprombank's Caa2 deposit ratings have low upside potential over
the next 12-18 months, given the negative outlook currently
assigned to the ratings.

Moody's could change the outlook on Finprombank's ratings to
stable from negative if the bank were to demonstrate a
sustainable improvement in its liquidity position. Another
necessary prerequisite for a stabilization of the bank's rating
outlook would be a leveling-off of its asset quality trends, if
this is accompanied by sufficient accumulated LLRs, return to
profitability and comfortable loss-absorbing capital cushion.

KOKS OAO: S&P Affirms 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Negative
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' long-term corporate credit
rating on Russia-based vertically integrated coking coal, coke,
iron ore, and pig iron producer OAO Koks.  The outlook is
negative.  S&P removed the rating from CreditWatch, where it had
placed it with negative implications on March 1, 2016.

At the same time, S&P withdrew its 'CCC+' issue rating on Koks'
$134 million senior unsecured Eurobond because it was repaid on
June 24, 2016.  Prior to withdrawal the rating was on CreditWatch
negative, where S&P placed it on March 1, 2016.

The affirmation follows Koks' repayment of its $134 million
Eurobond on June 24, 2016.  S&P no longer sees immediate risk of
further deterioration in Koks' liquidity.  Although Koks
continues to bear a meaningful short-term debt burden of more
than Russian ruble (RUB) 12 billion, S&P thinks the company
should be able to roll it over.  S&P currently regards Koks'
liquidity as weak, but it notes that the company has a number of
short-term committed credit facilities and approved bank limits,
which should help the company manage its near-term financing
needs.  That said, S&P views the company's capital structure and
aggressive liquidity management as constraints to a higher

S&P notes that Koks' operating performance remains healthy and
its leverage manageable, with projected debt to EBITDA of 3.5x-
4.0x at the end of 2016.  S&P therefore believes that its weak
liquidity is mostly an outcome of its aggressive approach to
refinancing, rather than reduced market access.  S&P understands
the company is currently working on raising new financing, and it
thinks it could see improvements in its capital structure over

"We continue to view Koks' business risk as weak, based on its
exposure to the very cyclical steel industry, particularly in its
coke and pig iron segments -- the company's main business lines.
We believe this exposure underpins our view of the company's
profitability as highly volatile.  Additional pressure stems from
moderately high industry risk and high operating risk in Russia,
where all the company's assets are located.  We view positively
the company's substantial resource base, sufficient for decades
of operations, and the high degree of self-sufficiency in its key
inputs: coking coal and iron ore," S&P said.

S&P's assessment of Koks' aggressive financial risk profile
reflects S&P's expectation of funds from operations (FFO) to debt
of 12%-15% in 2016-2017, supported by healthy performance with
sustainably high margins, largely thanks to a weak ruble.  S&P
notes that the company generates positive free operating cash
flow.  This helps mitigate the impact of revaluation of its
foreign currency debt, which weakened its credit metrics.

S&P continues to see a risk that Koks' leverage might increase
beyond S&P's base-case projection as a result of its involvement
in the steel project OOO Tulachermet-Stal, which is currently not
part of the group.  S&P acknowledges that Koks sold its stake in
the project and it is owned by Koks' ultimate shareholders.
However, the company has previously provided a large long-term
loan to OOO Tulachermet-Stal.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, it do not forecast that Koks will
make additional investments in the project.  However, S&P
reflects the possibility of such an investment or similar
transactions going forward by applying a one-notch negative
financial policy adjustment.

The negative outlook on Koks reflects the residual risks related
to the company's meaningful short-term debt burden.  In S&P's
base-case scenario, it assumes that the company's liquidity
sources should enable it to finance operations and roll over its
other short-term debt maturities.  Still, S&P thinks that Koks'
liquidity will remain sensitive to market conditions and

S&P could lower the rating if it sees a risk that Koks might face
issues extending its short-term debt maturities.  A downgrade,
driven by weaker operating performance or debt to EBITDA
exceeding 6X, appears less likely at this stage.  S&P generally
thinks that such a scenario would hinge on additional investments
in the steel project, which S&P do not anticipate.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Koks strengthens its
liquidity so that its ratio of sources to uses improves to at
least 1x on a sustainable basis.

An upgrade would stem from adequate liquidity and a more
sustainable improvement in the capital structure, including a
material shift toward long-term debt instruments.  Moreover, a
positive rating action would not depend on stronger credit
metrics, given that we would see FFO to debt of above 12% as
commensurate with a 'B' rating.

SVYAZINVESTNEFTEKHIM JSC: Moody's Confirms Ba2 CFR, Outlook Neg.
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the Ba2 corporate family
rating (CFR) and Ba2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) of
Svyazinvestneftekhim JSC (SINEK), a 100% state-owned investment
holding company of the Republic of Tatarstan. Moody's has
assigned a negative outlook to the ratings.

The confirmation considers the following drivers:

-- the strong links between SINEK's ratings and the Ba2 rating
    of the Republic of Tatarstan

-- the continued high probability of government support in the
    event of SINEK's financial need

-- SINEK's weakened standalone credit quality owing to its
    evolving debt profile and credit linkage with related party
    Commercial Bank AK BARS, PJSC (Ak Bars Bank, B2 long-term
    deposit and senior unsecured ratings with negative outlook,
    caa1 baseline credit assessment, BCA)

Moody's said, "The rating action concludes the rating review that
Moody's initiated on March 14, 2016, following the review for
downgrade of the Republic of Tatarstan's Ba2 sub-sovereign
rating. The action factors in Moody's confirmation of the Ba2
Tatarstan sub-sovereign rating with a negative outlook on 26
April 2016 and our assessment of the risks associated with
SINEK's evolving debt profile and exposure to low-rated Ak Bars


The confirmation of SINEK's ratings reflects the company's strong
link to the Ba2-rated Tatarstan government, with the company's
ratings being driven by the government's rating and support. In
Moody's view, the existing high probability of government support
to SINEK in the event of financial need supports the rating at
the current level.

The support assumption continues to add sufficient uplift to
SINEK's standalone credit quality, aligning SINEK's ratings with
the government's rating, despite the weakening of the company's
standalone credit quality to b1 from ba3, as measured by the BCA
under Moody's government-related issuer methodology.

The high support assumption embedded in SINEK's ratings considers
the company's importance to Tatarstan's government as a holder
and manager of the republic's key assets, primarily its stake in
Tatneft PJSC (Ba1 negative), with the government's 100% ownership
and control. Moody's also considers the government's track record
of support to SINEK, including the fact that the government
guaranteed SINEK's Eurobond that matured in August 2015 and, in
case of need, has allowed the company to monetize some portfolio
holdings to increase liquidity.

At the same time, SINEK's standalone credit quality has weakened
after the company refinanced its Eurobond with domestic debt
instruments in August 2015. Since that time, SINEK's debt and
liquidity profile has changed reflecting the company's increased
support to Tatarstan-related businesses, in particular low-rated
Ak Bars Bank. SINEK's debt ($375.6 million at end-2015) and
contingent obligations are short term, pressuring its liquidity.
Its cash reserves ($166 million in dollar terms as of end-2015),
which are largely placed with Ak Bars Bank, have reduced, with
the majority of dividend revenue due in the second half of 2016.
This would create a material liquidity gap in 2016 in the event
that the company's short-term debt obligations are not rolled
over or refinanced in a timely manner.

Given that the government has encouraged SINEK to commit to
support Ak Bars Bank, Moody's remains concerned that SINEK may
not have full access to its cash deposited with the bank and
hence will incur new debt. The fact that the company's debt,
except for contingent liabilities, is due to related parties,
ultimately to Ak Bars Bank, cannot offset the liquidity pressure,
given the low standalone credit quality of the bank.

At the same time, assuming a high level of government support,
Moody's believes that SINEK is likely able to extend its debt
maturity profile and reduce contingent obligations. However,
given the limited visibility of SINEK's target debt structure and
the low transparency around the company's future financial
decisions -- which are made under the government's guidance --
the company's liquidity profile is likely to remain constrained
going forward.


The negative outlook on SINEK's ratings reflects the negative
outlook of the sub-sovereign rating of Tatarstan and the
deterioration in SINEK's debt portfolio and liquidity profile.


A downgrade of Tatarstan's rating would result in a downgrade of
SINEK's ratings, with the magnitude of the downgrade of the
company's ratings dependent on (1) that of the sub-sovereign
downgrade; (2) SINEK's standalone credit strength; and (3) the
likelihood of extraordinary support from the Tatarstan government
for SINEK.

Upward rating pressure for SINEK is currently unlikely, given the
negative outlook. Moody's could change the outlook on the ratings
to stable if (1) it were to change the outlook on the Tatarstan
sub-sovereign rating to stable; (2) SINEK's standalone credit
quality and liquidity improves; and (3) there were no negative
change to Moody's assessment of the likelihood of the Tatarstan
government's extraordinary support for SINEK.


AUTOVIA DEL NOROESTE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to EUR54.0MM Bonds
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB+' long-term issue rating to
the EUR54.0 million fixed-rate senior secured bonds due 2025
issued by Spain-based limited-purpose entity Autovia del Noroeste
Concesionaria de la Comunidad Autonoma de la Region de Murcia,
S.A. (AUNOR).  The outlook is stable.

The recovery rating on the issued bonds is '1', reflecting S&P's
expectation of very high (90%-100%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

AUNOR, the ProjectCo, issued EUR54.0 million in fixed-rate senior
secured bonds due 2025 to refinance an existing loan entered into
by AUNOR to finance the construction, operation, and maintenance
of C-415, a shadow toll road in southeastern Spain, under a 1999
concession with the regional government of Murcia (Comunidad
Autonoma de la Region de Murcia; CARM).  The project receives
revenues from CARM, which are based on a banding mechanism.

Stretching 62.4 kilometers, the C-415 toll road replaced the
existing one and upgraded it to dual carriageway, with two lanes
in each direction.  The project has been in operation since
October 2001.

The 'BB+' rating reflects the relatively simple operations and
the strong track record, as well as the lack of material market
exposure.  Under S&P's base-case scenario, which reflects long-
term growth in volumes in line with its view of GDP growth in
Spain and pricing increases consistent with S&P's long-term
inflation estimates, S&P forecasts that the project will generate
senior debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) of at least 1.17x,
and average annual DSCRs of 1.18x.  This results in an operations
phase stand-alone credit profile (SACP) of 'bb+' and cash flow
resilient to S&P's downside.  The rating is ultimately capped by
the creditworthiness of the key revenues counterparty, CARM.

S&P assesses the operations phase stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) as 'bb+'.  The key elements we use to derive this are:

   -- S&P's expectation of strong operating performance, given
      the project's simple service requirements;

   -- The project's lack of material market exposure, given that
      traffic is well above the maximum band.  As a result,
      revenues are not sensitive to likely changes in traffic

   -- Operations and maintenance being undertaken in-house by

   -- Although the dispute regarding the project's major
      maintenance expenditure profile was settled on September
      2015, S&P believes the relation with CARM is still a risk
      for the project;

   -- A minimum annual DSCR of 1.17x under S&P's base case, an
      average DSCR of 1.18x; and

   -- The rating being capped by S&P's assessment of the
      creditworthiness of CARM, the irreplaceable revenue

All of AUNOR's revenues are sourced from the concession agreement
with CARM.  Therefore, S&P considers the authority to be an
irreplaceable counterparty and believe it will remain important
throughout the project's life.  As S&P's assessment of the
creditworthiness of CARM is lower than the operations-phase SACP
before the counterparty analysis, CARM constrains the preliminary
rating on AUNOR's debt.

Operations and maintenance are undertaken in-house by the AUNOR's
own service personnel.

The project's financial counterparty does not constrain the
rating.  The project bank account provider is Banco Santander
S.A. (A-/Stable/A-2) and the replacement language included in the
transaction documentation is consistent with S&P's criteria.

S&P's rating is currently constrained by its assessment of the
creditworthiness of CARM, the sole provider of the revenues.  The
stable outlook reflects S&P's view of CARM's creditworthiness.
It also reflects S&P's assumption that AUNOR will be
deconsolidated for tax purposes from Autovias de Peaje en Sombra.

S&P could raise the rating if CARM's creditworthiness improves
and the project demonstrates that it can sustain DSCRs in line
with S&P's current expectations.

S&P could lower the rating if CARM's creditworthiness were to
deteriorate.  In addition, S&P could lower the rating if the
forecast minimum annual DSCR deteriorated below 1.10x.  S&P could
also lower the rating if AUNOR is not tax deconsolidated as S&P
expects in its base case and if this risk is not sufficiently

CELLNEX TELECOM: S&P Revises Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'BB+' CCR
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Spanish telecom and
broadcasting infrastructure group Cellnex Telecom S.A. to
positive from stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+'
long-term corporate credit rating on Cellnex.

In addition, S&P affirmed the 'BB+' issue rating on Cellnex's
senior unsecured notes.  The '3' recovery rating is unchanged and
indicates S&P's expectation of recovery in the higher half of the
50%-70% range in the event of a default.

The outlook revision reflects the possibility that S&P could
raise the rating on Cellnex if its credit ratios continue to
strengthen thanks to robust revenue and EBITDA growth, combined
with limited capital expenditures (capex) and returns to
shareholders.  S&P excludes from its forecasts any large debt-
funded acquisitions.

"We anticipate that EBITDA will improve thanks to organic growth
initiatives and the implementation of the efficiency plan.
Despite modest growth in capex to support expansion initiatives
and progressive growth in dividends, we expect free operating
cash flow (FOCF) and discretionary cash flow (DCF) will increase
and support stronger ratios.  Nevertheless, the group does not
have a publicly stated financial policy targeting a maximum
leverage target and it could pursue acquisitions that would
constrain its deleveraging.  However, in the absence of
acquisitions, we expect Cellnex's strong cash flow generation
will allow the group to achieve a S&P Global Ratings-adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA ratio below 4.0x in 2017, underpinning a potential
positive rating action," S&P said.

The positive outlook reflects the possibility that S&P could
upgrade Cellnex in the next 12 months if adjusted metrics for the
group strengthen in 2017 as a result of EBITDA and FOCF growth.

S&P could raise the rating if adjusted leverage improved to less
than 4.0x, FFO to debt to more than 20%, and FOCF to debt
remained above 10%.  Management's adoption of a financial policy
commensurate with these levels, especially in regards to the
group's acquisition appetite, would support an upgrade.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Cellnex raised
additional debt to finance transformative acquisitions or to
increase shareholder returns in a way that would lead to
deterioration of Cellnex's leverage above 4.0x and FFO to debt
below 20%.  It could also be caused by weaker EBITDA on lower
organic growth and slower implementation of the efficiency

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

JAGUAR LAND ROVER: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Corporate Family Rating
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba2 corporate family
rating (CFR), Ba2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) and Ba2
senior unsecured rating of British multinational automotive
company Jaguar Land Rover Automotive Plc (JLR). The outlook on
the ratings remains positive.

The action follows a referendum vote in favour of the UK leaving
the European Union and the recent change in the outlook of the
UK's Aa1 government bond rating to negative from stable.

"We are affirming the ratings on JLR because, while uncertainty
created by the outcome of the referendum could dampen confidence
and weigh on UK car sales, the company will benefit from a weaker
pound; well-diversified geographic profile and efforts to
diversify its manufacturing footprint over the medium-term by
opening a new plant in Slovakia and entering into a manufacturing
contract in Austria. JLR's enhanced product line-up and improved
China sales will drive earnings growth and support our positive
outlook in the next 12 months," says Yasmina Serghini, a Moody's
Associate Managing Director and lead analyst for JLR.


The affirmation reflects Moody's view that the referendum vote
will create a prolonged period of uncertainty that could dampen
confidence and weigh on car sales in the UK, which made up 20% of
JLR's retail sales in 2015-16. This could place downward pressure
on JLR's near and medium-term earnings.

Over the medium term, the impact of Brexit on JLR's operational
performance will largely depend on new trading arrangements with
the EU, with the risk being that trade with other countries will
be subject to tariffs, though this process might take several

That said, Moody's expects that JLR will benefit from a weaker
pound partly offset by hedging arrangements currently in place
and sourcing out of the EU. The company also enjoys an
increasingly diversified geographic profile with 24% of its
2015/16 (ended 31 March 2016) sales in Europe (ex-UK and Russia),
20% in the UK, 19% in each of North America and China and 18%
overseas. This should help offset any potential weakness in sales
in the UK.

Moreover, whilst JLR currently manufactures most of its vehicles
in the UK and in a joint venture plant in China, the company will
be adding new capacity in Continental Europe in the medium term
through a manufacturing contract with Magna Steyr in Austria and
a new plant in Slovakia (initial annual capacity of 150,000
vehicles from late 2018 with the potential to double capacity to
300,000 units over time). This will diversify to some extent
JLR's manufacturing footprint outside of the UK and enhance its
competitiveness especially in light of potentially new trade

Supporting the positive outlook on JLR's rating is Moody's
opinion that (1) the company's enhanced product portfolio
particularly for the Jaguar brand, together with (2) improved
China sales, will drive increased earnings in the current
financial year ending 31 March 2017. This would help JLR fund a
large part of its investment spending, estimated by the company
at around GBP3.75 billion in the current year, from its
internally generated cash flows.

In addition, Moody's anticipates that JLR's credit metrics
(including Moody's adjustments) are likely to gradually
strengthen in the next 12 to 18 months such that the company's
Moody's-adjusted (gross) debt to EBITDA ratio would decrease to
approximately 1.6x from an estimated 1.8x as at 31 March 2016
(1.7x excluding the net charge related to Tianjin). Cash-flow
metrics would also remain robust as evidenced by a Moody's-
adjusted funds from operations to debt of at least 40% in the
next 18 months. These metrics would position JLR strongly in the
Ba rating category.

Overall, Moody's believes that new credit challenges associated
with Brexit currently limit upward pressure on JLR's ratings.


The positive outlook reflects Moody's view that JLR's model line-
up of both Land Rover and Jaguar brands and upcoming product
launches together with expected improved China sales should
support improved earnings in 2016-17 (ending 31 March 2017) and
help JLR fund part of its upcoming large capital spending with
internally generated cash flows.


Moody's could consider upgrading JLR's ratings over time should
the company deliver a robust operational performance on a
sustainable basis such that it appears on track to (1) achieve an
adjusted EBITA margin above 7.5%; (2) achieve a Moody's-adjusted
leverage ratio of 1.5x or lower; (3) achieve a free cash flow
around break-even; and (4) maintain a solid liquidity profile.

Moody's expects that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU could
weigh on JLR sales volumes though these effects may be mitigated
by the company's diversified geographic profile and benefits from
a weaker British pound. To be considered for an upgrade, JLR
would need to build an additional cushion into its earnings
structure and balance sheet to mitigate potential mid-term
adverse effects from new trade tariff barriers.

Conversely, JLR's ratings could come under pressure in the event
of a sustained deterioration in its key credit metrics, as
adjusted by Moody's, reflected by (1) debt/EBITDA rising well
above 2.0x; (2) EBITA margins falling below 6%; and (3) a
deterioration of JLR's negative free cash flow below negative
GBP600 million per annum.

However, Moody's ratings would tolerate a temporary deviation
(i.e., not exceeding 24 months) from these metrics provided that
the company continues its current financial policy with no
substantial increase in dividend payments to its shareholder TML.

Moody's cautions that a potential downgrade of TML's CFR could
weigh on JLR's ratings or outlook especially if there is evidence
that TML's weaker credit quality could result in a higher
financial pressure on JLR.

In addition, evidence of a sustainable erosion in JLR's sales,
market share and/or competitiveness as a result of Brexit could
put pressure on the Ba2 ratings and/or positive outlook.

Headquartered in Coventry, UK, Jaguar Land Rover Automotive Plc
manufactures and sells passenger vehicles (including the
manufacture of in-house engines) under the Jaguar and Land Rover
brands. In the financial year ended 31 March 2016, JLR sold
521,571 units and generated revenues of GBP22.21 billion. JLR is
ultimately/indirectly 100% owned by Tata Motors Limited, India's
largest automobile company.

KIVETON PARK: Henry Dickinson to Acquire Business
Mark Kleinman at Sky News reports that Kiveton Park Steel, whose
major customers include Delphi Automotive, the global car-parts
manufacturer, will be acquired by Henry Dickinson, an owner of
several UK industrial businesses.

According to Sky News, the deal is expected to salvage roughly 50
jobs out of a workforce of more than 100 before Sheffield-based
Kiveton Park Steel fell into administration last September.

Sources said the rescue would enable the company to continue to
trade from its existing premises, a 15-acre site in Sheffield,
Sky News relates.

Administrators at FRP Advisory -- which is also working on the
crisis at BHS after being drafted in last week -- are understood
to have held extensive talks with more than a dozen potential
buyers since last autumn, Sky News discloses.

Kiveton Park Steel has traded continuously since 1922, and under
the administrator's stewardship secured two financial lifelines
from major customers, including Delphi, Sky News relays.

The car-parts manufacturer is now said to have agreed further
financing arrangements with Kiveton Park Steel, Sky News notes.

TAYLOR WIMPEY: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Corporate Family Rating
Moody's Investors Service affirmed major British homebuilder
Taylor Wimpey plc's Ba1 corporate family rating (CFR) and Ba1-PD
probability of default rating (PDR). The outlook on the rating
remains stable.

The action follows a referendum vote in favor of the UK leaving
the European Union and the recent change in the outlook of the
UK's Aa1 government bond rating to negative from stable.

"We have affirmed homebuilder Taylor Wimpey's Ba1 rating to
reflect that its moderate leverage ratio will help the company to
withstand the impact of a more challenging operating environment
following the United Kingdom's vote to leave the European Union,"
says Ramzi Kattan, a Moody's Vice President and lead analyst for
Taylor Wimpey.


The rating action reflects that Taylor Wimpey's low leverage for
its Ba1 CFR provides it with significant flexibility to deal with
adverse market and economic conditions. Furthermore, a continuing
structural undersupply of UK housing will, to some extent, soften
any falls in house prices and volumes.

Moody's rating action takes into account that Taylor Wimpey would
be negatively impacted if the weaker economic climate leads to a
drop in house prices, a reduction in the volume of completed
homes, or a drop in land values. Heightened uncertainty following
the vote to leave the EU is likely to dent trade and investment
flows, as well as consumer and business confidence. This would
translate into weaker economic growth in the UK.

Taylor Wimpey's leverage, as measured by Moody's-adjusted
debt/total capitalization, currently stands at 25.3%. The main
components of Taylor Wimpey's GBP922 million adjusted debt
includes a GBP100 million term loan, a GBP178 million pension
adjustment, and GBP630 million of land creditors. The company
also holds approximately GBP2.7 billion worth of land on its
balance sheet.

Moody's estimates that the company's leverage will peak at just
over 33% even under an adverse three-year scenario that is
broadly 50% less severe than the 2007-09 downturn and assumes
that house prices decrease by around 8%, the volume of completed
homes drops by 20% or so, and land values fall by 30%. However,
under its base case scenario, Moody's still expects that the
company will maintain its debt-to-capitalization ratio well
within the guidance range for the current rating of 30-35%.

Taylor Wimpey's strong liquidity position is credit positive and
underpinned by around GBP300 million of cash currently sitting on
its balance sheet, and access to a GBP550 million undrawn
revolving credit facility that matures in 2020.

Rationale for the Rating Outlook

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that Taylor Wimpey's revenues and profitability will remain
around their current levels. In addition, the outlook reflects
Moody's expectation that the company will maintain its gross
margins and positive cash flow generation, thereby enhancing its
ability to finance growth from internal sources. The current
ratings and outlook also assume that Taylor Wimpey will maintain
an adequate liquidity profile, including ample covenant headroom
at all times.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

Currently, Taylor Wimpey's metrics are strong owing to a lack of
material funded debt. Given the inherent volatility in the
homebuilding industry, further rating improvement would depend on
the company's ability to demonstrate solid execution through the
homebuilding business cycle without an erosion of its current
strength in leverage, interest coverage and free cash flow
generation. At a minimum, leverage below 30% of capitalization
and interest coverage in high single to low double digits (as
adjusted for any changes in the capital structure) would be
important considerations for an upgrade. In addition, Moody's
would consider if Taylor Wimpey were able to maintain the
liquidity and flexibility necessary to withstand the cyclical
downturns inherent in the company's business.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

Although not currently expected, negative pressure could be
exerted on the ratings if the company (1) experienced operating
underperformance or negative free cash flow generation for an
extended period of time, such that its adjusted debt/total
capitalization ratio trends above 35% or interest coverage falls
below 6.0x; or (2) were unable to maintain an adequate liquidity
risk profile.


* BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History
Author: Alfred L. Malabre, Jr.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 256 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry
Order your personal copy today at

Alfred Malabre's personal perspective on the U.S. economy over
the past four decades is firmly grounded in his experience and
knowledge. Economics Editor of The Wall Street Journal from 1969
to 1993 and author of its weekly "Outlook" column, Malabre was in
a singular position to follow the U.S. economy in recent decades,
have access to the major academic and political figures
responsible for economic affairs, and get behind the crucial
economic stories of the day. He brings to this critical overview
of the economy both a lively, often provocative, commentary on
the picture of the turns of the economy. To this he adds sharp
analysis and cogent explanation.

In general, Malabre does not put much stock in economists. "In
sum, the profession's record in the half century since Keynes and
White sat down at Bretton Woods [after World War II] provokes
dismay." Following this sour note, he refers to the belief of a
noted fellow economist that the Nobel Prize in this field should
be discontinued. In doing so, he also points out that the Nobel
for economics was not one originally endowed by Alfred Nobel, but
was one added at a later date funded by the central bank of
Sweden apparently in an effort to give the profession of
economists the prestige and notice of medicine, science,
literature and other Nobel categories.

Malabre's view of economists is widespread, although rarely
expressed in economic circles. It derives from the plain fact
that modern economists, even hugely influential ones such as John
Meynard Keynes, are wrong as many times as they are right. Their
economic theories have proved incomplete or shortsighted, if not
basically wrong-headed. For example, Malabre thinks of the
leading economist Milton Friedman and his "monetarist colleagues"
as "super salespeople, successfully merchandising an economic
medicine that promised far more than it could deliver" from about
the 1960s through the Reagan years of the 1980s. But the author
not only cites how the economy has again and again disproved the
theories and exposed the irrelevance of wrong-headedness of the
policy recommendations of the most influential economists of the
day. Malabre also lays out abundant economic data and describes
contemporary marketplace and social activities to show how the
economy performs almost independently of the best analyses and
ideas of economists.

Malabre does not engage in his critiques of noted economists and
prevailing economic ideas of recent decades as an end in itself.
What emerges in all of his consistent, clear-eyed, unideological
analysis and commentary is his own broad, seasoned view of
economics-namely, the predominance of the business cycle. He
compares this with human nature, which is after all the substance
of economics often overlooked by professional and academic
economists with their focus on monetary policy, exchange rates,
inflation, and such. "The business cycle, like human nature, is
here to stay" is the lesson Malabre aims to impart to readers
interested in understanding the fundamental, abiding nature of
economics. In Lost Prophets, in language that is accessible and
jargon-free, this author, who has observed, written about, and
explained economics from all angles for several decades,
persuasively makes this point.

In addition to holding a top position at The Wall Street Journal,
Malabre is also the author of the books, Understanding the New
Economy and Beyond Our Means, which received the George S. Eccles
Prize from the Columbia Business School as the best economics
book of 1987.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *