TCREUR_Public/160715.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, July 15, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 139



ELMA: Solid-85 Acquires Assets for BGN2.15 Million


MAPLE BANK: Canada's Banking Regulator Liquidates German Unit


ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI: Moody's Affirms Ba1(hyb) Stock Rating
TELECOM ITALIA: Moody's Affirms Ba1 CFR, Outlook Remains Negative


KOKS JSC: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to B3


BBVA CONSUMO 8: Moody's Assigns (P)B1 Rating to Series B Notes


CHORNOMORNAFTOGAZ PJSC: Court Cancels Bankruptcy Proceedings
MYKHAILIVKSY BANK: Faces Liquidation, License Revoked

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

GHA COACHES: In Administration, 320 Workers Affected
J H MAUNDERS: Bought Out of Administration by Unnamed Buyer
TRINITY EXPLORATION: Shares Suspended After Lender Talks Fail


* BOOK REVIEW: The Rise and Fall of the Conglomerate Kings



ELMA: Solid-85 Acquires Assets for BGN2.15 Million
SeeNews reports that a recently-registered Bulgarian real estate
company, Solid-85, has won an auction for the sale of insolvent
electric motor plant Elma, offering to pay BGN2.15 million
(US$1.2 million/EUR1.1 million) for its assets.

The plant's administrator Rosen Miloshev told SeeNews the
starting price in the auction was set at BGN1 million.

Apart from Solid-85, bids were filed by textile company Kalinel,
construction firm Perfekt Stroy and the Troyan municipality,
where the plant is located, SeeNews discloses.

In 2013, Elma's assets were put up for sale for BGN10.4 million
after the company was declared insolvent in 2012 at the request
of two of its creditors, SeeNews relates.


MAPLE BANK: Canada's Banking Regulator Liquidates German Unit
Doug Alexander at Bloomberg News, citing an internal memo from
the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions,
reports that Canada's banking regulator pushed to liquidate Maple
Financial Group Inc.'s German unit after warning that Canadian
creditors may be short-changed by Germany's insolvency proceeding
against the lender.

German banking watchdog BaFin shuttered Maple Bank GmbH in
February after a dispute over tax refunds threatened the firm's
stability, Bloomberg recounts.  Authorities in that country are
seeking to hold Maple Bank liable for alleged tax liabilities of
as much as EUR392 million (US$436 million), Bloomberg says,
citing court documents.

"The best avenue to protect depositors and creditors of the
Canadian branch is to liquidate" under the Winding-Up and
Restructuring Act, Bloomberg relays, citing a Feb. 11 memo from
Jamey Hubbs, an assistant superintendent at Canada's banking
regulator, to Superintendent of Financial Institutions Jeremy
Rudin.  The memo was obtained by Bloomberg under Canada's Access
to Information Act.

The memo states Maple's Canadian branch, whose main businesses
involve securitization of mortgage receivables, fixed-income
trading and structured finance, had assets and liabilities of
C$5.4 billion ($4.2 billion), including C$563 million of
wholesale deposits, Bloomberg relays.  As of Sept. 30, Maple Bank
GmbH had assets of EUR6.5 billion, Bloomberg discloses.

"While there may be sufficient assets in Canada to satisfy the
depositors and creditors of the Canadian branch, given the
expected over-indebtedness of the foreign bank there may be
insufficient global assets to satisfy all depositors and
creditors," Bloomberg quoted the memo as saying.  "Relying on the
German insolvency proceeding could result in Canadian assets
being used to satisfy German liabilities."

                   About Maple Bank and MBTOR

Maple Bank Gmbh is a German bank with 5 billion in assets and
equity capital of 300 million euros before it shut operations in
February 2016.  Maple Bank is a unit of Canada-based Maple
Financial Group Inc. and specializes in market transactions.  The
bank played a prominent role in attempts by the Porsche family to
take over Volkswagen in 2008.

On Feb. 6, 2016, Germany's Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority, or BaFin, closed Maple Bank's operations in Germany.
Four days later BaFin filed an application for the opening of
insolvency proceedings for Maple Bank before the Frankfurt Lower
District Court (Amtsgericht Frankfurt am Main), Case No. 810 IN
128/16 M.

Michael C. Frege -- -- was appointed
Maple Bank's insolvency administrator.

The insolvency proceedings were a culmination of an investigation
by German prosecutors into trading activities involving tax years
2006 to 2010.  German authorities are seeking to hold Maple Bank
liable for tax evasion of 450 million euros in connection with
dividend-stripping trades.

On Feb. 15, 2016, the insolvency administrator commenced a
Chapter 15 bankruptcy case in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in New
York (Case No. 16-10336) to seek U.S. recognition of the
insolvency proceedings in Germany as a foreign main proceeding.
Dentons US LLP serves as counsel to the insolvency administrator
in the Chapter 15 case.

Maple Bank GmbH, Toronto, Canada Branch ("MBTOR") is the Canadian
branch of Maple Bank.  Canada's top banking regulator announced
on Feb. 15, 2016, it has taken "permanent control" of the assets
of MBTOR.  The Attorney General of Canada on Feb. 15 filed an
application with a Canadian court for an order administering the
winding-up of MBTOR.  Regional Senior Justice Morawetz of the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice issued a winding up order and
appointed KPMG Inc. as the Canadian Liquidator in respect of the
winding up of MBTOR's business in Canada on Feb. 16, 2016.


ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI: Moody's Affirms Ba1(hyb) Stock Rating
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed all the ratings of
Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A (Baa1 insurance financial strength;
Baa2 senior debt; Baa3 senior subordinated debt; Ba1(hyb)
preference stock), the third largest insurance group in Europe
headquartered in Italy, with a stable outlook.  Moody's also
affirmed the ratings of Generali's main subsidiaries.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of Generali's ratings with a stable outlook
reflects the group's strong and diversified business profile, as
well as the improvements in profitability and capitalization over
the recent years.  Moody's views Generali's business profile as
strong thanks to very good market positions in its main markets,
notably Italy, Germany and France, a predominance of retail
business, which is typically less volatile than the commercial
business, and very good geographic and business diversification.
The stable outlook also reflects Moody's expectations that the
impact of low interest rates and of the volatility in financial
markets will remain moderate on Generali's profitability and

Moody's adds that Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A's Baa1 insurance
financial strength rating remains constrained by the credit
quality of the sovereign of Italy (Baa2, stable outlook) given
the group's operating and asset exposure to Italy.  Italian
sovereign bonds represented 17% of Generali's total investments
(at market value) and 257% of the group's shareholders' equity as
of 31 March 2016, while the group sourced 34% of its premiums and
39% of its life and P&C operating profits from Italy in 2015.
The Baa1 rating is one notch above the sovereign rating, given
the group's diversification outside of Italy and the group's
ability to share potential investment losses with policyholders
in its life business.

According to Moody's, Generali has been improving its resilience
to a hypothetical scenario of stress on Italian assets, thanks to
(1) a decrease in the exposure to Italian government bonds, both
on an absolute nominal value basis and as a proportion of its
investments, (2) a change in business mix in life insurance with
an increased weight of unit-linked policies (unit-linked
represented 17% of the life Italian premiums in 2015 vs 4% in
2012) and (3) an improvement in capital, as illustrated for
example by the increase in the group's economic capital ratio
(which increased to 202% at year-end 2015 from 186% at year-end

Nonetheless, Moody's mentions that Generali's economic capital
ratio declined in the first quarter of 2016 (to 188%), following
the sharp decline in interest rates and decline in equity
markets, and has likely further been affected by market movements
in the second quarter of the year, even if the sensitivities of
this ratio to market movements are moderate.  Positively, Moody's
expects this ratio to recover over time thanks to the group's
earnings generation (which represented 16 percentage points of
the ratio in 2015 before dividend distribution and 11 percentage
points after dividend).

Commenting on the impact of low interest rates, Moody's says that
the decline in rates will affect the group's investment return.
Nonetheless, the rating agency believes that Generali has a high
ability to pass a meaningful portion of this decline to
policyholders by reducing credited rates in its life business.
Moody's mentions that Generali's current investment return was
3.4% in 2015, which is 160bps higher than the average guaranteed
rate (1.8%).  Moody's adds that the group's ability to reduce
credited rates is very high in France and Italy, but lower in
Germany (which represents around one third of the group's life

Commenting further on profitability, Moody's mentions that some
of the recent improvements in the group's profitability resulted
from a strong performance of the Italian business.  Moody's
expects the profitability of the Italian P&C business to
deteriorate in the next 12-18 months given the strong price
competition in this market.  Recent volatility in financial
markets will also likely affect the group's ability to shift its
new life production from traditional guaranteed products to unit-
linked products. Nonetheless, Moody's believes that these
negative developments will be partly offset by improvements in
other areas, including for example a continued focus on cost


Moody's says that upwards pressure on Generali's ratings could
arise in case of an improvement in the credit quality of Italy or
in case of a continued improvement of the group's solvency and/or
a continued reduction in exposure to Italian assets.

Conversely, Moody's says that (1) a deterioration in the credit
quality of Italy, (2) a material deterioration of solvency or a
significantly higher exposure to Italian assets or (3) a
deterioration in operating performance also resulting in a
deterioration in the group's financial flexibility, would lead to
downward pressure on Generali's ratings.  In addition, a
deterioration in the cash flows at the holding, for example with
a reduction in the cash flow coverage (available cash flows over
holding interests and expenses) below 2x would place pressure on
Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A's debt ratings.


Issuer: Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed Baa1
  Junior Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Ba1
  Senior Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa3
  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa2
  Preferred Stock, affirmed Ba1(hyb)
  Senior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa2

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Generali Deutschland AG

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed A3

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: AachenMuenchener Lebensversicherung AG

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed A3

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: AachenMuenchener Versicherung AG
  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed A3

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Advocard Rechtschutzversicherung AG
  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed A3

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Central Krankenversicherung AG

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed A3

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Cosmos Lebensversicherungs-AG

Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed A3

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Cosmos Versicherung AG

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed A3

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Dialog Lebensversicherungs-AG

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed A3

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Envivas Krankenversicherung AG

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed A3

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Generali Deutschland Pensionskasse AG

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed A3

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Generali Lebensversicherung AG

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed A3

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Generali Versicherung AG

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed A3

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Generali IARD

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed Baa1

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Generali Vie

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed Baa1

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Generali Italia S.p.A.

  Insurance Financial Strength Rating, affirmed Baa1

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Generali Finance B.V.

  Backed Junior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed
  Backed Junior Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed
  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed
  Backed Senior Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed

Outlook Actions:
  Outlook remains Stable

                      PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The principal methodologies used in rating Assicurazioni Generali
S.p.A, Generali Deutschland AG, Generali Italia S.p.A. and
Generali Finance B.V. were Global Life Insurers published in
April 2016, and Global Property and Casualty Insurers published
in June 2016.  The principal methodology used in rating
AachenMuenchener Lebensversicherung AG, Cosmos
Lebensversicherungs-AG, Dialog Lebensversicherungs-AG, Generali
Deutschland Pensionskasse AG, Generali Lebensversicherung AG and
Generali Vie was Global Life Insurers published in April 2016.
The principal methodology used in rating AachenMuenchener
Versicherung AG, Advocard Rechtschutzversicherung AG, Central
Krankenversicherung AG, Cosmos Versicherung AG, Envivas
Krankenversicherung AG, Generali Versicherung AG and Generali
IARD was Global Property and Casualty Insurers published in June

TELECOM ITALIA: Moody's Affirms Ba1 CFR, Outlook Remains Negative
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba1 corporate family
rating of Telecom Italia S.p.A. as well as the ratings of all
debts issued (or guaranteed) by Telecom Italia S.p.A., and all
supported debts within its family of issuers, including the
senior unsecured ratings at Ba1/(P)Ba1.  Concurrently, Moody's
has also affirmed the Ba1-PD probability of default rating (PDR)
of the company.  The outlook on all the ratings remains negative.

"We are affirming Telecom Italia's ratings primarily because we
expect that the new CEO will be able to execute his plan to
accelerate cost savings in order to stabilize domestic EBITDA and
gradually decrease leverage over the next 18 months, despite
uncertainty about how competition in the Italian market will
evolve," says Carlos Winzer, a Moody's Senior Vice President and
lead analyst for Telecom Italia.

"That said, the negative outlook continues to factor in the
company's high cash needs, which hamper its ability to de-lever,
concerns about the future evolution of TIM Brazil, the
competitive threat from Enel's new investments in the fixed
broadband market in Italy and the uncertainties surrounding the
resolution of the merger between Wind and 3 Italy," adds
Mr. Winzer.


The rating affirmation reflects Moody's expectation that
following the financial ratio deterioration in 2015, the new CEO
will take decisive measures to improve cash flow and to
strengthen the company's financial ratios through 2017.  As a
result, the rating agency expects that Telecom Italia will
achieve a Moody's-adjusted net debt/EBITDA ratio of 3.7x by 2016
and 3.5x by 2017.  This is consistent with the rating agency's
guidance for the current rating.

However, in Moody's view, although there are clear signs of
operating improvements in some segments, such as domestic mobile,
and OPEX efficiencies are being introduced to stabilize EBITDA,
there remains uncertainty regarding the pace of execution of the
company's strategy and ability to reverse the declining trend in
its domestic revenues and EBITDA growth to generate sufficient
cash to cover capex needs and reduce debt in line with
management's objective and timing.  Moody's also thinks that
ENEL's fibre investment initiatives to create a nationwide
alternative infrastructure-based competitor creates
uncertainties, which could dent Telecom Italia's revenues in the
long term.

Moody's also expressed concern in relation to the possible
competitive changes in Italy and the impact on Telecom Italia
resulting from a likely remedy package to be implemented by the
regulator as a condition to allow consolidation.  The recent
agreement between France's Iliad Group (Iliad, unrated) and CK
Hutchison Holdings Limited (A3 stable) and VimpelCom Ltd (Ba3
stable) to create another telecom operator resulting from the
acquisition of part of their mobile assets in Italy, can increase
the probability of regulatory approval of their proposed merger.

Moody's also notes that management is struggling to offset the
negative effect on the group of the tougher- than-expected
operating conditions for its domestic fixed broadband business,
even if improvement in some underlying KPIs has emerged.  This
business has experienced intensified competitive pressure.

Moody's expects that operating conditions in Italy will remain
challenging for some time, and recognizes the limited options
that Telecom Italia has to strengthen its balance sheet.  Telecom
Italia plans to de-lever organically through a combination of an
effective restructuring of its domestic operations and a more
efficient capex plan.  Some of these measures will take time to
implement and can imply substantial execution risk.

Moody's considers that Telecom Italia's Ba1 rating is supported
by the company's (1) scale and position as the incumbent service
provider in Italy; (2) integrated telecoms business model, with
strong market positions in both the fixed and mobile segments;
(3) geographical diversification in Brazil; (4) continued
commitment to deleveraging by 2018; and (5) high operating
margins, ongoing opex reductions and strong liquidity.  The Ba1
rating also factors in the deterioration in Telecom Italia's
operating performance, including an expected further mid-single
digit revenue decline this year and the challenges management is
facing to offset the high, although improving, business risk with
a stronger financial profile.


The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Telecom
Italia will continue to face substantial operating challenges
both in Italy and Brazil in 2016 and 2017.  However, Moody's
takes into account the appointment of the new CEO, Flavio
Cattaneo, who is determined to executing a revised strategy
pursuing greater operating efficiencies, already starting from H1
2016, to underpin future EBITDA growth.

Moody's expects that domestic mobile revenues will continue to
grow, although not fully offsetting fixed broadband revenue
pressures.  However, Moody's expects Telecom Italia to be able to
meet its commitments to reduce group Net debt/EBITDA (as reported
by the company) to 3.0x by 2018, despite of high capex needs that
will continue to constrain free cash flow.

Telecom Italia's ratings have remained weakly positioned with a
negative outlook since October 2013, mainly reflecting concerns
related to the deterioration in its financial ratios resulting
from weakening domestic revenues and EBITDA resulting from
management's strategy taking longer time than expected to
materialize in a tough operating environment both in Italy and


Downward pressure on the rating could potentially result if (1)
the overall economic conditions in Italy negatively affect
Telecom Italia's operating performance and management is unable
to offset this by strengthening the balance sheet; and (2) the
company's net adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio remains above 3.5x on a
sustainable basis with no prospect of improvement.  Specifically,
Moody's expects that Telecom Italia will achieve a Moody's-
adjusted net debt/EBITDA ratio of 3.7x by 2016 and 3.5x by 2017.

Moody's could consider stabilizing the outlook if the company
contained the deterioration in its financial metrics on the back
of a coherent strategy and supportive macro and operating
conditions in Italy.

Moody's could consider a rating upgrade if, alongside the
conditions for the stable outlook, credit metrics improved,
including a net adjusted debt/EBITDA comfortably below 3.0x on a
sustainable basis.


The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010.

Telecom Italia Group (consisting of Telecom Italia S.p.A. and its
subsidiaries) is the leading integrated telecommunications
provider in Italy, delivering a full range of services and
products, including telephony, data exchange, interactive content
and information and communications technology solutions.  In
addition, the group is one of the telecoms players in the
Brazilian mobile market, operating through its subsidiary Telecom
Italia Mobile (TIM) Brazil.  Vivendi SA (Baa2 stable) is the main
shareholder with a 24.6% share (direct and indirect shareholding)
in Telecom Italia.  For 2015, Telecom Italia reported EUR19.7
billion in revenue and EUR8.1 billion in organic EBITDA.

List of affected ratings:


Issuer: Olivetti Finance N.V.
  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba1

Issuer: Telecom Italia Capital S.A.
  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba1
  Backed Senior Unsecured Shelf, Affirmed (P)Ba1

Issuer: Telecom Italia Finance, S.A.
  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba1

Issuer: Telecom Italia S.p.A.
  Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed Ba1-PD
  Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed Ba1
  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba1
  Senior Unsecured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed Ba1
  Senior Unsecured Conv./Exch. Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba1
  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Olivetti Finance N.V.
  Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Telecom Italia Capital S.A.
  Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Telecom Italia Finance, S.A.
  Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Telecom Italia S.p.A.
  Outlook, Remains Negative


KOKS JSC: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to B3
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded JSC KOKS's corporate
family rating (CFR) to B3 from B2, and its probability of default
rating (PDR) to B3-PD from B2-PD. The senior unsecured rating
assigned to loan participation notes issued by KOKS Finance
Limited is unchanged at B3 (LGD 4). All the ratings remain on
review for downgrade.


The rating action reflects KOKS's persistently very weak
liquidity and the heightened refinancing risk related to its
significant short-term debt maturities, resulting from the
company's continuing aggressive liquidity management amid the
fragile market environment for pig iron and coke. The company is
increasingly dependent on new external funding to remain liquid
even in the near term. The review for downgrade reflects the
uncertainty over KOKS's ability to procure the necessary funding
in a timely manner to meet its short-term debt maturities over
the next 12 months.

Aside from liquidity issues, Moody's continues to view KOKS as a
fundamentally solid business, owing to its low-cost position,
geographic diversification of sales, improving product mix,
robust projected financial metrics and positive free cash flow.

As of June 30, 2016, KOKS's liquidity comprised only $6 million
in cash and equivalents, $88 million in available committed
credit facilities maturing beyond the following 12 months
(including a new loan signed in July 2016), and around $140
million in operating cash flow, which Moody's expects the company
to generate over the following 12 months. This liquidity is
insufficient to cover the company's short-term debt maturities
and capex over the next 12 months. Moody's estimates the
company's current liquidity gap for the next 12 months at around
$170 million, of which around $150 million is required in Q3

The potential placement of eurocommercial paper (ECP) announced
on July 4, 2016, if successfully completed, will improve KOKS's
liquidity but will likely not be sufficient to fully cover the
company's current liquidity gap. Moody's understands that the
company continues to negotiate several new credit facilities and
the extension of most of its existing near-time debt maturities
with banks, which would cover the Q3 2016 liquidity gap. However,
no legally binding documents are currently signed, which
increases the company's refinancing risk as the large Q3 2016
debt maturities approach.

In addition to the company's very weak liquidity, high
refinancing risk and aggressive liquidity management, KOKS's B3
rating factors in the company's (1) small scale and limited
operational and product diversification; (2) exposure to the weak
global steel market environment; (3) deteriorated leverage and
interest coverage metrics, with its Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA
rising to 4.4x and EBIT interest coverage declining to 1.6x at
year-end 2015 from 2.9x and 4.0x, respectively, a year earlier;
(4) debt-financed expansionary capex program, although
substantially reduced during 2015; and (5) concentrated
ownership-related risks, with significant loans given to related

More positively, the rating takes into account (1) the company's
status as one of the leading merchant pig iron producers
globally, with a diversified customer base and geography of
sales; (2) its low-cost position, owing to the weak rouble and
operational enhancements; (3) Moody's expectation that the
company's financial metrics will improve over the next 12-18
months and that it will continue to generate positive free cash
flow, assuming some stabilization in pig iron and coking coal
prices; (4) the improved product mix, with higher sales of
premium grades of coke and pig iron; (5) KOKS's significant
degree of vertical integration, with a 50% and 71% self-
sufficiency in coking coal and iron ore, respectively; and (6)
its large coking coal and iron ore reserves.

KOKS Finance's loan participation notes' senior unsecured rating
is unchanged at B3, which reflects Moody's estimation that less
than 20% of KOKS's consolidated debt is secured with assets,
which results in KOKS Finance's loan participation notes rating
being at the level of KOKS's CFR. If the share of secured debt
were to be materially higher, the unsecured notes could be rated
below the CFR because of their subordination to substantial
secured debt.

List of affected ratings:


Issuer: JSC KOKS

-- Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to B3 from B2; on Review
    for Downgrade

-- Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to B3-PD from
    on Review for Downgrade

On Review for Downgrade:

Issuer: KOKS Finance Limited

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently B3
    (LGD 4) Review for Downgrade


The rating could be confirmed at the current B3 level if the
company takes immediate measures to address its Q3 2016 debt
maturities and builds up a liquidity cushion covering at least
the next 12 months debt maturities. The rating could be upgraded
if the company (1) improves its liquidity management, so that it
maintains adequate liquidity on a sustainable basis; and (2)
increases the share of longer-term debt in the debt portfolio,
adopting practices of funding long-term investments with
corresponding maturities.

The rating could be downgraded if KOKS fails to materially
improve its liquidity over the next few months, elevating a
default risk on its short-term debt obligations. Downward
pressure could also be exerted on the rating as a result of an
unanticipated significant increase in leverage, decline in
interest coverage, or a sharp weakening in global demand or
prices for pig iron and coke.


BBVA CONSUMO 8: Moody's Assigns (P)B1 Rating to Series B Notes
Moody's Investors Service has assigned these provisional ratings
to notes to be issued by BBVA Consumo 8, FT:

  EUR612.5 million Series A Fixed Rate Asset Backed Notes due
   October 2029, Assigned (P)Aa2(sf)

  EUR87.5 million Series B Fixed Rate Asset Backed Notes due
   October 2029, Assigned (P)B1(sf)


The transaction is a revolving cash securitization of auto loans
extended to obligors in Spain by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria,
S.A. (BBVA) (Baa1/P-2(cr), A3 LT Bank Deposits).  The revolving
period lasts 1.5 years and ends on the payment date falling in
January 2018.

BBVA also acts as asset servicer, calculation agent, collection
and issuer account bank provider.  The previous BBVA Consumo
transactions, which had a similar structure, are currently
performing in line with Moody's expectations.

The provisional portfolio of underlying assets consists of fixed
rate auto loans originated in Spain and has a total outstanding
balance of approximately EUR897.7 million.  The final portfolio
will be selected at random from the provisional portfolio to
match the final note issuance amount.

As at June 2016, the provisional pool cut had 100,571 loans with
a weighted average seasoning of 22.3 months.  The unsecured loans
are used for the purpose of new (64.1%) or used (35.9%) car
acquisition.  Approximately 30.5% are loans which contain a
"reserva de dominio" clause, meaning that the vehicles can be
registered at the seller's option on the Registro de Bienes
Muebles, the Spanish moveable goods register.  The transaction
benefits from credit strengths such as the granularity of the
portfolio, the high average interest rate of 8.1% and the
financial strength and securitization experience of the
originator.  However, Moody's notes that the transaction features
some credit weaknesses such as commingling risk and the high
linkage to BBVA.  In addition, the revolving structure could
increase performance volatility of the underlying portfolio.
Various mitigants have been put in place in the transaction
structure, such as early amortization triggers, performance-
related triggers to stop the amortization of the reserve fund,
substitution criteria both on individual loan and portfolio level
and eligibility criteria for the portfolio.  Commingling risk is
partly mitigated by the transfer of collections to the issuer
account within two days.  If BBVA's long term deposit rating is
downgraded below Baa3, it will either transfer the issuer account
to an eligible entity or guarantee the obligations of BBVA, which
mitigates account bank risk up to a Aa1(sf) level.

Moody's analysis focused, amongst other factors, on (i) an
evaluation of the underlying portfolio of auto loans and the
eligibility criteria; (ii) historical performance provided on
BBVA's total book and past auto ABS transactions; (iii) the
credit enhancement provided by subordination, excess spread and
the reserve fund; (iv) the revolving structure of the
transaction; (v) the liquidity support available in the
transaction by way of principal to pay interest and the reserve
fund; and (vi) the overall legal and structural integrity of the

                      MAIN MODEL ASSUMPTIONS

Moody's determined a portfolio lifetime expected mean default
rate of 6.25%, expected recoveries of 32.5% and a Aa2 portfolio
credit enhancement ("PCE") of 17.5% for both the current and
substituted portfolios of the issuer.  The expected defaults and
recoveries capture our expectations of performance considering
the current economic outlook, while the PCE captures the loss we
expect the portfolio to suffer in the event of a severe recession
scenario. Expected defaults and PCE are parameters used by
Moody's to calibrate its lognormal portfolio loss distribution
curve and to associate a probability with each potential future
loss scenario in its ABSROM cash flow model to rate consumer ABS

The portfolio expected mean default rate of 6.25% is in line with
Spanish auto loan transactions and is based on Moody's assessment
of the lifetime expectation for the pool taking into account (i)
historic performance of the loan book of the originator, (ii)
benchmark transactions, and (iii) other qualitative

Portfolio expected recoveries of 32.5% are in line with the
Spanish auto loan average and are based on Moody's assessment of
the lifetime expectation for the pool taking into account (i)
historic performance of the loan book of the originator, (ii)
benchmark transactions, and (iii) other qualitative
considerations such as quality of data provided and asset
security provisions.

The PCE of 17.5% is in line with other Spanish auto loan peers
and is based on Moody's assessment of the pool taking into
account the relative ranking to originator peers in the Spanish
auto market. The PCE of 17.5% results in an implied coefficient
of variation ("CoV") of 54.4%.


The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS"
published in December 2015.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal with respect to the Class A Notes and Class
B Notes by the legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings address
only the credit risks associated with the transaction.  Other
non-credit risks have not been addressed but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.


Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings of the notes would be (1) better than expected
performance of the underlying collateral; (2) significant
improvement in the credit quality of BBVA; or (3) a lowering of
Spain's sovereign risk leading to the removal of the local
currency ceiling cap. Factors or circumstances that could lead to
a downgrade of the ratings would be (1) worse than expected
performance of the underlying collateral; (2) deterioration in
the credit quality of BBVA; or (3) an increase in Spain's
sovereign risk.

The Class B notes include a clean-up call option which does not
require the Class B notes to be fully redeemed as a condition for
exercise.  The potential for the Class B notes to suffer a loss
as a direct result of this clean-up option has been taken into
consideration in Moody's analysis.


Moody's used its cash flow model ABSROM as part of its
quantitative analysis of the transaction.  ABSROM enables users
to model various features of a standard European ABS
transaction -- including the specifics of the loss distribution
of the assets, their portfolio amortization profile, yield as
well as the specific priority of payments, swaps and reserve
funds on the liability side of the ABS structure.  The model is
used to represent the cash flows and determine the loss for each
tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all loss scenarios that
are then weighted considering the probabilities of the lognormal
distribution assumed for the portfolio loss rate.  In each loss
scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is
calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the
outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.  Therefore,
the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of
(i) the probability of occurrence of each loss scenario; and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each loss scenario
for each tranche.


As described in above, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.


In rating consumer loan ABS, the mean default rate and the
recovery rate are two key inputs that determine the transaction
cash flows in the cash flow model.  Parameter sensitivities for
this transaction have been tested in the following manner:
Moody's tested nine scenarios derived from a combination of mean
default rate: 6.25% (base case), 6.75% (base case + 0.5%), 7.25%
(base case + 1.0%) and recovery rate: 32.5% (base case), 27.5%
(base case - 5.0%), 22.5% (base case - 10%).  The model output
results for Class A Notes under these scenarios vary from Aa2
(base case) to A1 assuming the mean default rate is 7.25% and the
recovery rate is 22.5% all else being equal.  In the same
scenario, Class B would have achieved B3(sf).

Parameter sensitivities provide a quantitative/model indicated
calculation of the number of notches that a Moody's rated
structured finance security may vary if certain input parameters
used in the initial rating process differed.  The analysis
assumes that the deal has not aged.  It is not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time,
but rather how the initial model output for the Class A or B
Notes might have differed if the two parameters within a given
sector that have the greatest impact were varied.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and the above rating reflects Moody's preliminary
credit opinions regarding the transaction only.  Upon a
conclusive review of the final documentation and the final note
structure, Moody's will endeavor to assign a definitive rating to
the above notes.  A definitive rating may differ from a
provisional rating. Please note that the actual definitive
issuance amounts of the rated classes may change from those
stated above given confirmed capital structure and final
portfolio levels.  However, this aspect should not fundamentally
impact the ratings as credit enhancement and portfolio credit
features are expected to be consistent.


CHORNOMORNAFTOGAZ PJSC: Court Cancels Bankruptcy Proceedings
On July 12, 2016, the Kyiv Appeal Commercial Court cancelled the
decision made by the Kyiv Commercial Court on the initiation of a
bankruptcy case against Chornomornaftogaz PJSC.

While passing the decision to institute bankruptcy proceedings,
the Kyiv Commercial Court did not pay due regard to provisions of
the Law of Ukraine "On Pipeline Transport", stipulating that "for
state-owned enterprises engaged in gas transportation via main
pipelines and gas storage in underground storage facilities,
Naftogaz National Joint Stock Company, subsidiary companies
thereof and companies founded thereby, . . . no legal action of
bankruptcy may be brought".  Cancellation of the illegal decision
will enable Chornomornaftogaz to resume work and, in particular,
proceed with recovering its assets that have been lost in Crimea.

In March 2014, Naftogaz lost control over the assets of
Chornomornaftogaz in Crimea because of the Russian occupation of
the peninsula.  The PJSC National Joint Stock Company
Chornomornaftogaz was re-registered in Kyiv.  Chornomornaftogaz
is currently working on restoring its legal documentation and is
engaged in a number of litigation processes.  Chornomornaftogaz's
losses incurred due to the expropriation of assets in Crimea have
been reported in a claim filed by the Ministry of Justice of
Ukraine against Russia (the case Ukraine vs. Russia).  Naftogaz
has recorded losses on the assets from these discontinued
operations of UAH14.9 billion.

MYKHAILIVKSY BANK: Faces Liquidation, License Revoked
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the National Bank of Ukraine has
decided to liquidate Mykhailivksy bank and annul its license.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, the decision was made by the NBU
on July 12.

The NBU said that Mykhailivsky was placed to the list of
insolvent banks on May 23 due to risky transactions, Interfax-
Ukraine relates.

Mykhailivksy is based in Kyiv.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

GHA COACHES: In Administration, 320 Workers Affected
Shropshire Star reports that more than 300 workers were made
redundant on July 14 after bus firm GHA Coaches was plunged into
administration after receiving a winding-up petition from
HM Revenue & Customs for unpaid taxes.

The firm, which employs 320 workers and operated 230 vehicles
from five depots in Shropshire, North Wales and Cheshire,
attempted to secure an emergency funding package but was
unsuccessful, and the company ceased trading on July 13,
Shropshire Star relates.

Jason Bell and Christopher Petts of Grant Thornton UK LLP have
been appointed administrators of GHA Coaches Ltd., Shropshire
Star discloses.  They met with staff at the depot at Ruabon, near
Wrexham, to tell them they were being made redundant, Shropshire
Star relays.

GHA Coaches was a family business run by principal directors
Gareth and Arwyn Lloyd Davies.

J H MAUNDERS: Bought Out of Administration by Unnamed Buyer
Muhammad Aldalou at Insider Media reports that J H Maunders Ltd.
has been acquired out of administration.

Simon Plant and Daniel Plant of insolvency firm SFP were
appointed as joint administrators over Maunders on June 29, 2016,
Insider Media relates.

The business had experienced mounting HM Revenue & Customs debt,
creditor pressure and an uncertain order book, and entered into a
company voluntary arrangement (CVA) in September 2014, Insider
Media relays.  Administrators were called in after the company
experienced further difficulties and failed to meet the
obligations of its CVA, Insider Media recounts.

SFP appointed valuation agents to market the business and
received six expressions of interest from different parties,
Insider Media discloses.  According to Insider Media, Maunders
was sold to an unnamed buyer on July 1, 2016, and all employees
were transferred over to the purchaser via through TUPE process.

J H Maunders is a business, which provides building and
decorating services to housing associations in the South East.

TRINITY EXPLORATION: Shares Suspended After Lender Talks Fail
Jillian Ambrose at The Telegraph reports that Trinity Exploration
has pulled its shares from London's junior AIM market after
restructuring talks with its lender fell apart.

Trinidad-focused Trinity Exploration suspended its shares on
July 13 after Citibank called in repayments on its US$13 million
debt pile, The Telegraph relates.  According to The Telegraph,
the bank had offered the embattled explorer numerous waivers
while negotiating a wider financial restructuring of the
business, but has now scrapped the repayment moratorium and
frozen the explorer's accounts.

In a statement on July 13, the company, as cited by The
Telegraph, said that despite its "positive attempts" at
restructuring it has been unable to agree "suitable terms" with

Trinity added that the shares would remain suspended from trading
on AIM until such time as Citibank advises the company on how it
would like to proceed, The Telegraph relays.

Trinity Exploration is a London-listed independent oil explorer.


* BOOK REVIEW: The Rise and Fall of the Conglomerate Kings
Author: Robert Sobel
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 240 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by David Henderson
Order your personal copy today at

The marvelous thing about capitalism is that you, too, can be a
Master of the Universe. If you are of a certain age, you will
recall that is the name commandeered by Wall Street bond traders
in their Glory Days. Being one is a lot like surfing: you have to
catch the crest of the wave just right or you get slammed into
the drink, and even the ride never lasts forever. There are no
Endless Summers in the market.

This book is the behind-the-scenes story of the financial wizards
and bare-knuckled businessmen who created the conglomerates, the
glamorous multi-form companies that marked the high noon of
postWorld War II American capitalism. Covering the period from
the end of the war to 1983, the author explains why and how the
conglomerate movement originated, how it mushroomed, and what
caused its startling and rapid decline. Business historian Robert
Sobel chronicles the rise and fall of the first Masters of the
Universe in the U.S. and describes how the era gave rise to a
cadre of imaginative, bold, and often ruthless entrepreneurs who
took advantage of a buoyant stock market to create giant
enterprises, often through the exchange of overvalued paper for
real assets. He covers the likes of Royal Little (Textron), Text
Thornton (Litton Industries), James Ling (Ling-Temco-Vought),
Charles Bludhorn (Gulf & Western) and Harold Geneen (ITT). This
is a good read to put the recent boom and bust in a better

While these men had vastly different personalities and processes,
they had a few things in common: ambition, the ability to seize
opportunities that others were too risk-averse to take, willing
bankers, and the expansive markets of the 1960s. There is
something about an expansive market that attracts and creates
Masters of the Universe. The Greek called it hubris.
The author tells a good joke to illustrate the successes and
failures of the period. It seems the young son of a
Conglomerateur brings home a stray mongrel dog. His father asks,
"How much do you think it's worth?" To which the boy replies, "At
least $30,000." The father gently tries to explain the market for
mongrel dogs, but the boy is undeterred and the next afternoon
proudly announces that he has sold the dog for $50,000. The
father is proudly flabbergasted, "You mean you found some fool
with that much money who paid you for that dog?" "Not exactly,"
the son replies, "I traded it for two $25,000 cats."
While it lasted, the conglomerate struggles were a great slugfest
to watch: the heads of giant corporations battling each other for
control of other corporations, and all of it free from the rubric
of "synergy." Nobody could pretend there was any synergy between
U.S. Steel and Marathon Oil. This was raw capitalist power at
work, not a bunch of fluffy dot.commies pretending to defy market

History repeats itself, endlessly, because so few people study
history. The stagflation of the 1970s devalued the stock of
conglomerates and made it useless a currency to keep the schemes
afloat. The wave crashed and waiting on the horizon for the next
big wave: the LBO Masters of the 1980s.

Robert Sobel was born in 1931 and died in 1999. He was a prolific
chronicler of American business life, writing or editing more
than 50 books and hundreds of articles and corporate profiles. He
was a professor of business history at Hofstra University for 43
years and he a Ph.D. from NYU.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *