TCREUR_Public/160726.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Tuesday, July 26, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 146



MAISONS DU MONDE: S&P Raises LT Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'


OTP BANK: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'BB+'
ZSOLNAY: Court Rejects Bailiff's Liquidation Request


HOUSING FINANCING: S&P Raises ICR to 'BB', Outlook Stable


AVOCA CLO IV: Moody's Affirms Caa2(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
LAURELIN 2016-1: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
LAURELIN 2016-1: S&P Assigns B Rating to Class F Notes
TAURUS 2015-3: Moody's Affirms B3(sf) Rating on Class F Notes


DEMM SPA: Sept. 12 Deadline Set for Expressions of Interest
ITALCEMENTI SPA: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to Ba1
ITALY: Finance Minister Rejects "Bail-in" for Banks
SILENUS EUROPEAN: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to D


AVAST HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable
CAIRN CLO VI: Moody's Assigns B2 Definitive Rating to Cl. F Debt
CAIRN CLO VI: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes


NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC+', Outlook Stable


NOVO BANCO: Unsuccessful Sale Attempts to Hit Portuguese Banks

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: MPs Criticize Advisers for Overlooking Weaknesses
COLCHESTER ENGLISH: In Administration After 'Significant Losses'
DECO 11 - UK: Moody's Affirms B3(sf) Rating on Class A-1B Notes
DMG STEELWORKERS: CVR Global Sells Firm Out of Administration
FAIRFIELD (CROYDON): Operator Enters Administration

INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR, Outlook Stable
JOSHUA JAMES: In Administration Amid Cash Flow Difficulties
MAXWELL COMMUNICATION: Scheme Distribution Scheduled Today
PLASRECYCLE: In Administration, Seeks Buyer

* UK: Insolvency Fee Hike to Hit Insolvent Companies' Creditors


* Moody's Says European Firms' Diversity to Protect Profitability



MAISONS DU MONDE: S&P Raises LT Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'
S&P Global Ratings said that it raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on France-based decoration and furniture retailer
Magnolia (BC) S.A. (Maisons du Monde) to 'B+' from 'B'.  At the
same time, S&P removed the rating from CreditWatch with positive
implications, where it placed it on April 25, 2016.

S&P subsequently withdrew the long-term rating at Maisons du
Monde's request.

The outlook was stable at the time of the withdrawal.

The upgrade follows Maisons du Monde's successful listing on the
Euronext Paris Stock Exchange.  Maisons du Monde raised
EUR160 million from newly issued shares; with an additional
EUR220 million sold by shareholders Bain Luxco and Compagnie
Marco Polo after the over-allotment option was exercised,
bringing the total offer to about EUR380 million.  Maisons du
Monde used the proceeds to repay its EUR325 million high-yield
bond.  All preferred equity certificates (PECs) and related
interest were also converted to equity in the transaction.

The company also put in place new senior credit facilities with a
pool of banks, providing Maisons du Monde with a EUR250 million
term loan and EUR75 million revolving credit facility.  As a
result, S&P now forecasts reported debt to EBITDA to reduce to
less than 3x in the fiscal year ending Dec. 31, 2016, (about 4x
on an S&P Global Ratings-adjusted basis). Despite the improvement
in leverage, S&P's view of Maisons du Monde's financial risk
profile remains constrained by its controlling ownership by a
financial sponsor, Bain Capital.  Prior to withdrawal, S&P
revised its assessment of Maisons du Monde's financial policy to
the FS-5 category (a one-category improvement from our previous
FS-6 assessment).  This primarily reflected that the reduction of
debt and of the private equity sponsors' shareholdings should, in
S&P's opinion, lead the company to pursue a more moderate and
predictable financial policy, particularly with respect to
shareholder returns.  It also reflected that no clear timeframe
has yet been provided for when Bain Capital may ultimately
relinquish control, and S&P do not currently anticipate this to
occur in the near-to-medium term.

Finally, S&P's 'B+' rating also incorporated its view of Maisons
du Monde's limited scale, minimal diversity relative to broader
sector peers, and a limited financial policy track-record since
becoming a publicly listed company.

At the time of the withdrawal, S&P assessed Maisons du Monde's
liquidity as adequate.  Based on S&P's current forecasts,
following the IPO and debt reduction, S&P expected sources of
liquidity to exceed uses by more than 1.2x over the following 12
months.  This assessment reflects Maisons du Monde lack of short-
term debt maturities and the significant headroom under its
covenants under the new credit facilities.


OTP BANK: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'BB+'
S&P Global Ratings Services said that it has raised its long-term
foreign and local currency counterparty credit ratings on
Hungary-based OTP Bank PLC (OTP Bank) and its core subsidiary OTP
Mortgage Bank (OTP Mortgage) to 'BB+' from 'BB'.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term foreign and local currency
counterparty credit ratings on both banks.  S&P also affirmed its
'BB/B' long- and short-term foreign and local currency
counterparty credit ratings on Hungary-based Magyar
Takarekszovetkezeti Bank ZRt. (Takarekbank).  The outlooks on the
long-term ratings on all three banks are stable.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of economic and industry
risks for Hungarian banks.  S&P has observed several positive
developments since its last review of the banking industry in
July 2015.  Among these are regulatory changes, including the
completed conversion of households' housing and consumer loans in
foreign currency to Hungarian forint, as well as the
establishment of a new asset management company to deal with
problem commercial real estate loans.  As a result, households
now have comparatively lower debt burdens and debt service, and
domestic real estate prices have started recovering.  Most
importantly, this conversion has eliminated the most prominent
credit risk for domestic banks. Although households' demand for
new loans is still weak, S&P thinks their appetite for credit
will rise gradually.  Following several years of deleveraging,
Hungarian banks' overall funding metrics have improved visibly,
and their reliance on the external bank debt decreased.  Yet, S&P
thinks that the competitive landscape is now tougher because
credit demand has picked up only in the past few months and banks
are increasingly investing in lower-yield domestic government
debt, in line with the government's "self-funding" scheme.

Based on the above, S&P considers that economic risks for
Hungary's banks has lessened and have revised its assessment of
economic risk for Hungarian banks to '7' from '8' under S&P's
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) methodology.
S&P now views the trend for economic risks in Hungary as stable.

At the same time, S&P has maintained its assessment of industry
risk at '7' and continue to regard the trend in this risk as
stable.  S&P therefore classifies Hungary in S&P's BICRA group
'7', versus '8' previously.  Combined, these changes mean that
S&P has raised the anchor--the starting point for constructing
its bank ratings--to 'bb' from 'bb-'.

                     OTP BANK and OTP MORTGAGE

The upgrade of OTP Bank largely mirrors S&P's revised view of the
domestic banking system, while also taking into account the
bank's strengthened overall risk profile.  The latter mainly
follows the positive domestic developments described above but
also incorporates the OTP group's increased loss coverage across
markets where it's active, including Ukraine and Russia.  Also,
operations in these countries are returning to profitability, and
their share of loans within the group has decreased.  They
consequently represent less of a drag on the group's risk
position.  Concurrently, S&P revised its assessment of OTP Bank's
liquidity to strong from adequate.  The bank has a sizable amount
of liquid assets that cover its short-term funding needs more
than adequately.  More than half of its deposits in Hungary fall
under the coverage-of-savings deposits guarantee, therefore
making the bank resilient to reasonable stress in the next 12
months.  The bank has a high amount of unencumbered assets that
can be repurchased with the National Bank of Hungary and its
counterparties.  Its exceptionally good liquidity metrics are
also attributable to its deleveraging in the recent past.  S&P
expects its liquidity metrics will gradually weaken but remain
well above peers' when credit growth potentially accelerates in
Hungary starting from 2017.  S&P do not foresee the bank more
actively funding lending growth with short-term wholesale

S&P's assessment of capital and earnings remains unchanged,
already taking into account the continued gradual recovery of
operational performance in 2016-2017.  S&P consequently expects
its forecast risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio for OTP Bank will
improve to more than 8% in next 18 months but still remain below
S&P's threshold for a stronger capital assessment.

S&P equalizes the ratings on OTP Mortgage with those on parent
OTP Bank because S&P continues to regard it as a fully integrated
subsidiary that is integral to the group's strategy.

The stable outlook on OTP Bank and OTP Mortgage is based on S&P's
anticipation that the group's business and financial profiles
will remain commensurate with the current ratings over the next
12 months, all else remaining equal.

The likelihood of a positive rating action on OTP Bank over the
next 12 months is limited because it would hinge on a similar
rating action on Hungary and strengthening in our stand-alone
credit profile (SACP) assessment for the bank, both of which S&P
views as remote at present.  In addition, S&P typically do not
rate a bank higher than its country of domicile.  To consider an
upward revision of the SACP, S&P would expect to see the bank's
RAC ratio above 10% on a sustained manner, along with better
assessments of other bank-specific factors.

A negative rating action on OTP Bank, on the other hand, could
stem from a similar rating action on the sovereign or
deterioration in S&P's SACP assessment for the bank.  A weakened
SACP could stem from a deterioration of the RAC ratio to below
7%, owing to rapid loan growth to the detriment of
capitalization, or internal capital generation weakening because
of a surge in risk costs.  These are not our base-case scenarios


The ratings on Takarekbank factor in S&P's view that the bank
compares poorly, in terms of profitability and earnings
generation, with other peers operating in countries with similar
economic and industry risk and rated at 'BB+' or lower.  They
also take into account S&P's upward revision of the group credit
profile to 'bb+' from 'bb', reflecting S&P's view of Hungary's
reduced economic risks.  The bank has reported negative capital
sustainability levels, as measured under S&P's methodology, and
an overall low earnings buffer.  Historical returns on equity
have also been generally modest.  Consequently, S&P applies a
one-notch negative adjustment to the rating to reflect its view
that the bank is and will likely continue to be a relatively poor
performer in its peer group.  In addition, Takarekbank only
recently enacted a radical transformation.  Therefore, it remains
to be seen if the bank's recent overhaul of its business model
and enterprise risk management will prove efficient.

S&P also thinks that Takarekbank will benefit less than other
larger domestic peers from Hungary's recent regulatory
initiatives to address foreign currency-denominated mortgages and
large commercial real estate project finance loans, because it
had lower exposure to these problematic asset classes.

The stable outlook on Takarekbank balances the improving domestic
economic environment and the bank's tighter integration into
Hungary's group of savings bank cooperatives with limited
business prospects because the demand for credit remains subdued.
Moreover, as a niche bank with weaker earnings capacity than the
sector average, Takarekbank will in S&P's view benefit less than
private banks from improved domestic economic growth.  The bank'
now operates more closely aligned with the savings cooperatives'
group strategy, with harmonized marketing, product, and
Information Technology systems.  S&P thinks that this could
create stronger risk management, better efficiency, and wider
business opportunities over the next 12 to 18 months, which S&P
already factors into its ratings on Takarekbank.  Therefore, S&P
expects these factors will help the bank maintain financial and
business profiles that S&P regards as commensurate with the
current ratings over the next year.

S&P could take a positive rating action on the bank if S&P
concluded that conditions in the domestic economy and the
purchasing power of households had further improved, while credit
demand picked up, leading to better earnings for the group. This
would also necessitate a stronger commercial strategy with higher
earnings margins and better efficiency, with improved earnings
buffers and capital sustainability.

Conversely, S&P could take a negative rating action on the group
if its profitability and earnings buffer remain below peers
leading S&P to weaken its assessment of its business position and
if the group's projected RAC ratio deteriorated below 3% at the
same time.  S&P would also consider a negative rating action if,
contrary to its base-case expectations, S&P observed significant
weakening in Takarekbank's links with the integrated savings
cooperatives, which would trigger a change in S&P's view of its
core subsidiary status.

Hungary                          To                 From

BICRA group                      7                  8

Economic risk                   7                  8
   Economic resilience           High risk        Very high risk
   Economic imbalances           High risk          High risk
   Credit risk in the economy    Very high risk   Very high risk
  Trend                          Stable             Positive

Industry risk                   7                  7
   Institutional framework       Very high risk   Very high risk
   Competitive dynamics          High risk      Intermediate risk
   Systemwide funding            High risk        Very high risk
  Trend                          Stable             Stable

*Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments (BICRAs) and economic
risk and industry risk scores are on a 1 (lowest risk)-to-10
(highest risk) scale.


Upgraded; Ratings Affirmed
                                To              From
Counterparty Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency    BB+/Stable/B    BB/Positive/B
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency    BB+             BB

OTP Mortgage Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency    BB+/Stable/B    BB/Positive/B

Ratings Affirmed
Magyar Takarekszovetkezeti Bank ZRt.
Counterparty Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency    BB/Stable/B

ZSOLNAY: Court Rejects Bailiff's Liquidation Request
MTI-Econews reports that a court in western Hungary has rejected
a bailiff's request to liquidate Zsolnay.

Imre Bodnar, the company's counsel, told MTI the court said the
bailiff should have allowed Zsolnay to repay a loan as it served
the interest of the company's creditors.

Mr. Bodnar, as cited by MT, said the behavior of the bailiff was
"very concerning" and called Zsolnay's situation a "pivotal
point" in the history of liquidations in Hungary.

He also suggested the bailiff may not have been acting primarily
in creditors' interest, MTI notes.

Officials of the local council of Pecs, which owns a minority
stake in Zsolnay, have said the business is on the verge of
bankruptcy and set up a company to take over its operation, MTI

Zsolnay is a Hungarian porcelain maker.


HOUSING FINANCING: S&P Raises ICR to 'BB', Outlook Stable
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term foreign and local
currency issuer credit ratings on Iceland's Housing Financing
Fund Ibudalanasjodur (HFF) to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term ratings on HFF.  The outlook is

The upgrade primarily reflects S&P's upward revision of forecasts
for HFF's earnings and capitalization, largely stemming from the
improving economic conditions in Iceland having a more pronounced
positive impact on HFF then S&P previously anticipated.

The upgrade also reflects the several steps HFF has taken to
reduce its prepayment problem.  In S&P's view, this will underpin
stronger earnings in the future.  Consequently, S&P has revised
up its assessment of HFF's SACP to 'b' from 'b'.  S&P also
believes that there is a high likelihood that the government of
Iceland would provide timely extraordinary support to HFF in the
event of financial distress.  As a result, S&P's long-term
ratings on HFF are three notches higher than its 'b' SACP.

HFF's future role and operations remain unclear.  In May 2014,
the project committee appointed by Iceland's Minister of Social
Affairs and Housing called for a reform of the Icelandic housing
system.  Under the committee's proposals, HFF's operations were
to be gradually discontinued over the medium term.

Under the existing system, HFF provides mortgage loans -- as do
commercial banks, and, to a lesser extent, pension funds.  The
new approach provides for the establishment of specialized
mortgage companies financed through the issuance of covered
bonds, which will only be allowed to provide mortgage loans.  The
proposals specify that HFF will cease lending and its portfolio
will be allowed to expire.  Meanwhile, the government would
establish a new state-owned housing loan company, which would
operate on the same terms as other specialized mortgage companies
and, unlike HFF, will not benefit from a state guarantee.

Even though S&P's baseline scenario continues to assume broad
implementation of the proposals, it notes that the government has
taken no tangible steps toward enacting the proposals since they
were presented in May 2014.  During that time, HFF has continued
to operate, although its market share in new lending has been low
(below 10% of new lending in both 2014 and 2015).  The
institution has maintained a larger presence in certain niches --
such as lending to rural areas and to lower income households --
whereas other market segments have been increasingly taken over
by commercial banks.

Although its role has diminished in recent years, S&P sees HFF as
still being important for the government of Iceland.  S&P
believes that until the new housing system is implemented, HFF
will maintain its presence in the rural and lower income segments
of the market -- which are important for the authorities for
social reasons -- and in regions in which the banks have little

S&P also understands there is a proposal in place under which HFF
would administer government grants for the construction of social
housing; the corresponding bill was passed by the Icelandic
Parliament in June 2016.  There are also plans to potentially
explicitly entrust HFF with the social role in the future,
whereby the institution would undertake lending under specified
household income-based criteria rather than be completely
wound-up.  That said, even in that case the entity would likely
be several times smaller compared to current levels as the
majority of mortgage lending would be gradually taken over by
commercial banks.

"We also assess HFF's role for the government as important based
on the consequences for the government and the domestic capital
market of a default by HFF.  HFF's outstanding bonds amounted to
about 35% of Iceland's GDP as of end-2015 and close to 80% is
held by Icelandic pension funds.  A default would therefore
entail losses for the pension funds; we do not expect the
government to view this as politically acceptable.  The
government also provides an ultimate, but not timely, guarantee
on HFF's outstanding debt. In our view, HFF's default could
undermine confidence in other companies that benefit from similar
guarantees by the government," S&P said.

In S&P's view, HFF continues to maintain an integral link with
the government of Iceland.  Based on its 100% government
ownership and the consequences of its default, the authorities
are highly likely to provide timely extraordinary support should
the need arise.  As a state agency, HFF is not subject to
bankruptcy proceedings and is exempt from taxation.  The
government has provided support to HFF through capital injections
three times during 2010-2014, contributing a total of more than
Icelandic krona (ISK)50 billion.

Given positive earnings, improving asset quality, and an orderly
downsizing of the balance sheet, S&P now sees the need for
further injections as less likely over the next few years.  S&P
expects the government will only inject sufficient capital to
ensure that HFF honors its obligations in a timely manner rather
than tie up extra capital within the institution.  For example,
even though the government planned to capitalize the entity in
both 2014 and 2015, this was cancelled once it became apparent
that HFF would post net profits.

S&P's revision of HFF's SACP to 'b' from 'b-' reflects its
better-than-expected improvements in capital and earnings, which
S&P now thinks will remain above its previous forecast.  HFF's
capitalization has considerably improved following an almost
ISK2 billion (around EUR15 million) capital increase from net
profits in 2015.  The largest difference from S&P's previous
forecast was the more-than ISK1 billion net impairment reversals,
as opposed to an expected net loss.  In S&P's view, the reversals
indicate a stronger-than-anticipated positive impact on HFF from
improving economic conditions in Iceland.  Although subject to
risks, these include robust projected economic growth and an
increase in real incomes.

Moreover, the entity has taken initiatives to ease its prepayment
problem and bolster capitalization.  These include the sale of
the subsidiary Leigufelagio Klettur ehf (Klettur) in May 2016 and
the active sales of repossessed properties, supported by
favorable real estate market dynamics.  Both have an immediate
positive impact on capital.  In addition, improved interest
income and reduced costs have also led S&P to revise upward its
forecast of earnings and capital.  The main driver of this is the
investments in asset-backed bonds (in December 2015 and in March
2016), as well as cost management initiatives, including
organizational changes and a lower headcount, which has already
yielded some results.

Overall, S&P expects positive net earnings of ISK2.75 billion and
total adjusted capital of ISK19.43 billion in 2016, which is a
notable improvement from S&P's previous forecast.  While S&P's
forecast is somewhat more conservative, it notes that HFF's
management anticipates regulatory capital ratios reaching 8% by
2020 (from 5.5% at end-2015) and positive earnings over the
coming five years.

S&P's assessment of other factors that contribute to the SACP,
such as moderate business position and moderate risk position,
remain unchanged.  Even though S&P now expects HFF to benefit
from the improving economic conditions in Iceland more so than
S&P thought previously, the impact will still be smaller than
that on Iceland's commercial banks.  In particular, the
continuing prepayments and only marginal new lending activity
undertaken by HFF preclude it from attaining a stronger market
position or growth in core business.

"We consider HFF's funding profile to be below average, based on
its reliance on the capital markets without any central bank
access.  Although HFF has not issued bonds since 2012 due to high
prepayments and low new lending, we consider that its ability to
access the domestic bond market remains stable.  In our view,
this is mainly due to HFF's close link with the government and
the outstanding government guarantee and does not signify a
stand-alone strength.  We assess HFF's liquidity position as
adequate, taking into account the expected contractual cash flows
from prepayments and amortizing loans, and the cash liquidity
buffer, which is heavily invested in long-dated covered bonds
issued by Arion Bank to reduce the maturity mismatch.  We expect
that HFF would receive state support to meet any liquidity needs,
although we do not currently anticipate that it will need such
support in the next few years," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that HFF's SACP will
remain unchanged, and that the likelihood of the government of
Iceland providing timely extraordinary support to HFF in the
event of financial distress will remain high over the next 12
months.  We do not expect to take a rating action on HFF if we
raise or lower our long-term local currency sovereign credit
rating on Iceland by one notch, all else being equal," S&P noted.

S&P could lower the ratings if it concluded that the effects of a
potential HFF default for the government and the capital markets
had reduced, which would reduce the incentive for the government
to provide timely extraordinary support to the institution.

S&P could raise the ratings if it believed that the risks
inherent in unwinding the mortgage portfolio had reduced
substantially, for instance based on materially improved asset
quality and resilient pre-provision earnings generation.


AVOCA CLO IV: Moody's Affirms Caa2(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of Class D
notes issued by Avoca CLO IV plc:

-- EUR20.5 million Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
    Apr 13, 2016 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Moody's affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued by
Avoca CLO IV plc:

-- EUR31 million (current balance outstanding: EUR2.3 million)
    Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
    2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2016 Affirmed
    Aaa (sf)

-- EUR27 million Class C1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13,
    2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR5 million Class C2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
    Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2016
    Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR20.5 million (current balance outstanding: EUR22.78
    million) Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2022, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
    2016 Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Avoca CLO IV plc, issued in January 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of high-yield senior
secured European loans managed by Avoca Capital Holdings Limited.
The transaction's reinvestment period ended in August 2012.


The rating upgrade of the Class D notes is primarily a result of
the expected increase in the Class D over-collateralization (OC)
ratio at the next payment in August 2016 due to the expected
redemption of the Class B notes in full and deleveraging of the
Class C1 and Class C2 notes as a result of amortization of the
underlying portfolio since the last payment date in February

As per the June 2016 trustee report, the principal proceeds
balance is EUR27.05 million compared with EUR4.2 million in March

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR47.51 million, principle proceeds of
EUR26.84 million, no defaulted assets, a weighted average default
probability of 25% (consistent with a WARF of 3,645 over 3.98
years), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 52.64%
for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 7 and a
weighted average spread of 3.69%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is

LAURELIN 2016-1: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by Laurelin 2016-1
Designated Activity Company (the "Issuer"):

-- EUR221,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR67,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR27,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR19,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR21,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR7,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)


Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2029. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, GoldenTree Asset
Management LP ("Golden Tree"), has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Laurelin 2016-1 Designated Activity Company is a managed cash
flow CLO. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of secured
senior loans and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
Second-lien loans, unsecured loans, Mezzanine loans. The
portfolio is expected to be approximately 70% ramped up as of the
closing date and to be comprised predominantly of corporate loans
to obligors domiciled in Western Europe. The remainder of the
portfolio will be acquired during the six month ramp-up period in
compliance with the portfolio guidelines.

Golden Tree will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
improved and credit impaired obligations, and are subject to
certain restrictions.

In addition to the six classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR44,400,000 of subordinated notes. Moody's
will not assign ratings to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Golden Tree's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

LAURELIN 2016-1: S&P Assigns B Rating to Class F Notes
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to Laurelin 2016-1
DAC's floating-rate class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes.  At
closing, Laurelin 2016-1 also issued an unrated subordinated
class of notes.

Laurelin 2016-1 is a European cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO), securitizing a portfolio of primarily senior
secured euro-denominated leveraged loans and bonds issued by
European borrowers.  GoldenTree Asset Management LP is the
Investment manager.

Laurelin 2016-1 purchased more than 50% of the effective date
portfolio from AO Funding Ltd. (the originator).  The assets from
AO Funding that couldn't be settled on the closing date are
subject to participations.  The transaction documents require
that the issuer and the originator use commercially reasonable
efforts to elevate the participations by transferring to the
issuer the legal and beneficial interests in such assets as soon
as reasonably practicable.

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes pay quarterly
interest unless there is a frequency switch event.  Following
this, the notes permanently switch to semiannual payment.  The
portfolio's reinvestment period ends approximately four years
after closing.

S&P's ratings reflect its assessment of the collateral
portfolio's credit quality, which has a weighted-average 'B'
rating.  S&P considers that the portfolio is well-diversified,
primarily comprising broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans and senior secured bonds.  Therefore, S&P has
conducted its credit and cash flow analysis by applying its
criteria for corporate cash flow collateralized debt obligations.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used the EUR400 million target
par mount, a weighted-average spread (4.30%), a weighted-average
coupon (5.25%), and a weighted-average recovery rates at each
rating level.  S&P applied various cash flow stress scenarios,
using four different default patterns, in conjunction with
different interest rate stress scenarios for each liability
rating category.

Elavon Financial Services Ltd. is the bank account provider and
custodian.  The documented downgrade remedies are in line with
S&P's current counterparty criteria.

Following the application of S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria,
it considers that the transaction's exposure to country risk is
sufficiently mitigated at the assigned rating levels.  This is
because the concentration of the pool comprising assets in
countries rated lower than 'A-' is limited to 10% of the
aggregate collateral balance.

The issuer is bankruptcy remote, in accordance with S&P's
European legal criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, S&P believes its ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class
of notes.


Laurelin 2016-1 DAC
EUR407.40 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes (Including
Subordinated Notes)

Class         Rating            Amount
                              (mil. EUR)

A             AAA (sf)          221.00
B             AA (sf)            67.50
C             A (sf)             27.00
D             BBB (sf)           19.50
E             BB (sf)            21.00
F             B (sf)              7.00
Sub           NR                 44.40

Sub--Subordinated loan.
NR--Not rated.

TAURUS 2015-3: Moody's Affirms B3(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of six classes

Moody's rating action is as follows:


-- EUR60.9 million Class A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
    on Sep 29, 2015 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR14.4 million Class B Notes, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously
    on Sep 29, 2015 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

-- EUR15.9 million Class C Notes, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously
    on Sep 29, 2015 Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

-- EUR19 million Class D Notes, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously
    on Sep 29, 2015 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

-- EUR17.7 million Class E Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously
    on Sep 29, 2015 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR17.9 million Class F Notes, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously
    on Sep 29, 2015 Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class X Notes.


The affirmation action reflects the stable performance of the
transaction since closing. The default probability of the
securitized loans (both during the term and at maturity) as well
as Moody's value assessment of the collateral remain unchanged.
Moody's default risk assumptions continue to remain medium for
the Bilux loan and medium-high for the TEIF loan.

Moody's affirmation reflects a base expected loss in the range of
less than 5% of the current balance, unchanged since closing.
Moody's derives this loss expectation from the analysis of the
default probability of the securitized loans (both during the
term and at maturity) and its value assessment of the collateral.


DEMM SPA: Sept. 12 Deadline Set for Expressions of Interest
In execution of the sale program of the business complex approved
by the Ministry of Economic Development with decree dated
April 28, 2016, DEMM S.p.A., under Extraordinary Administration,
intends to begin a procedure for the sale of the business complex
of DEMM.

The business complex covered by the procedure includes complex of
assets, licenses, authorizations, certifications and any other
assets, services or activities for the business activity carried
out by DEMM in the field of gears and high precision mechanical
parts production.  In order to have a complete and detailed
description of the offered products, of the relevant market and
of the Company's profile, please see the document available at

Prof. Avv. Umberto Tombari, DEMM's Extraordinary Commissioner,
invites all parties interested in purchasing the Company's
business complex to submit a non-binding expression of interest
in accordance with terms and conditions set forth in the integral
version of the present call, available, in Italian and in
English, to the website

These expressions of interest shall be submitted, by registered
mail or internationally recognized overnight delivery service,
charges prepaid, not later than 12:00 a.m. on September 12, 2016,
in a closed envelope setting out the wording "Expression of
Interest -- DEMM Procedure" to the Commissioner Prof. Avv.
Umberto Tombari, Piazza Dell'Indipendenza 21, 50129 Firenze (Fi),
and identifying the sender.

Any request of clarification shall be sent, by email only, to the
following address:, mentioning in the object
"Clarification DEMM Procedure".

ITALCEMENTI SPA: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to Ba1
Moody's Investors Service upgraded Italcementi S.p.A.'s (ITC)
Corporate family (CFR) rating and probability of default (PDR)
rating to Ba1 and Ba1-PD from Ba3 and Ba3-PD respectively.
Furthermore Moody's upgraded ITC's MTN programme rating to (P)Ba1
from (P)Ba3 and Ciments Francais S.A.'s bond rating to Ba1 from
Ba2. The outlook on all ratings is positive.

Today's rating action concludes the rating review on ITC
initiated on July 29, 2015 following the announcement from
HeidelbergCement AG (HC) to acquire a 45% stake in ITC.

"The upgrade of Italcementi's ratings to Ba1 follows the takeover
of 45% of the shares by HeidelbergCement and HeidelbergCement's
tender offer for the remaining 55% of ordinary shares and brings
the ratings in line with that of HeidelbergCement (Ba1/positive)
which has a stronger credit profile as indicated in our press
release as of July 29, 2015 when Italcementi's ratings have been
placed under review for upgrade," says Falk Frey Senior Vice
President and lead analyst at Moody's for Italcementi. Although,
Italcementi's debt holders do not benefit from guarantees from
HeidelbergCement, we believe that they are not in a materially
weaker position compared to the debt holders of HeidelbergCement
despite a somewhat weaker cash generation capability of
Italcementi stand alone on a pro forma basis and a somewhat
higher leverage at the outset. However, Moody's expects that
credit metrics will benefit from debt reduction following the
expected refinancing of Italcementi's bank debt at the level of
HeidelbergCement and the refinancing of the legacy Ciments
Francais and ITC bonds over time ," Frey added.

A list of affected ratings can be found at the end of this press


The combination of HeidelbergCement and Italcementi creates a
worldwide leading producer of cement, aggregates, ready-mix
concrete, asphalt and related services. On a combined pro forma
basis, HC and ITC sold 124.5 million tons of cement and 281.9
million tons of aggregates in 2015. On a pro forma basis, the
group recorded net sales of EUR17.8 billion for fiscal year 2015.

Moody's generally views the strategic rationale of the merger as
positive as the merged group will have an even more
geographically balanced presence than former HC and ITC on a
stand-alone basis. ITC's strong market positions in France and
Italy as well as in Egypt, Marocco and Thailand enlarges HC's
global foortprint in mature as well as in emerging markets. This
business profile should provide a better resilience to cyclical
swings in demand for cement, aggregates and ready-mix concrete in
individual countries. Nonetheless, the merged company will remain
exposed to the cyclicality of the cement and aggregates industry.

In addition, the merger bears the potential for a sizable amount
of synergies to be generated over time although leading to some
upfront expenses and cash outflows. Moody's also positively notes
that the targeted proceeds from the asset disposals of at least
EUR1.0 billion will be used to repay debt thus mitigating the
negative impact from the combination with Italcementi, which
exhibits higher leverage, and, hence, a weaker capital structure.

The rating also takes into account the challenges related to the
realisation of the identified synergies and the timeline of the
savings to be generated.


The ratings of ITC could be upgraded in case of an upgrade of
HC's ratings. An upgrade of HC to Baa3 could materialize in case
of (1) a successful and timely execution of the acquisition of
Italcementi; (2) realization of the targeted synergies of EUR400
million by 2018; (3) higher than expected cash inflow from the
planned asset disposals and (4) operating performance and
profitability improvements driven by volume growth and cost
synergies post merger evidenced in RCF/net debt above 20% and a
reduction of the Debt/EBITDA ratio to below 3.5x, sustainably.
Moreover, a rating upgrade to Baa3 would require HC to commit to
financial policies that balance the interest of creditors and
shareholders and maintain credit metrics in line with an
investment grade rating.

A downgrade of ITC's ratings could occur in case of a downgrade
of HC's ratings. Moody's might consider downgrading HC if (1) the
timeline of the integration and achievement of synergies or
realization of asset disposal valuation would fall materially
behind expectations or (2) legal and/or regulatory requirement
would lead to a significant change in the current merger plan;
(3) such events as well as weaker-than-expected performance which
would result in the inability of the company to sustain RCF/net
debt of at least 20% over the following years.

List of affected ratings


-- Issuer: Italcementi S.p.A.

-- LT Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to Ba1 from Ba3

-- Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to Ba1-PD from Ba3-PD

-- Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)Ba1 from (P)Ba3

-- Issuer: Ciments Francais S.A.

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Ba1 from

-- Issuer: Italcementi Finance S.A.

-- BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to
    Ba1 from Ba3

-- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)Ba1 from (P)Ba3

Outlook Actions:

-- Issuer: Italcementi S.p.A.

-- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Rating Under Review

-- Issuer: Ciments Francais S.A.

-- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Rating Under Review

-- Issuer: Italcementi Finance S.A.

-- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Rating Under Review

The Italcementi group, headquartered in Bergamo, Italy, is one of
the top five cement producers globally, with an installed cement
capacity in excess of 60 million tons and sales of EUR4.3 billion
in 2015. The group's cement and clinker business, which accounts
for more than two-thirds of total sales, is supplemented by
aggregates and ready-mix concrete businesses. Italcementi is
active in 21 countries, with an emphasis on the Mediterranean

ITALY: Finance Minister Rejects "Bail-in" for Banks
James Politi, Gabriel Wildau and Yuan Yang at The Financial Times
report that Pier Carlo Padoan, the Italian finance minister, has
denied that Italy's banks are suffering from systemic problems
and rejected a "bail-in" of private investors as he sought to
reassure global markets over the state of Italy's financial

"We are going in the right direction, there is no risk in terms
of systemic stability," Mr. Padoan, as cited by the FT, said at
the end of the G20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank
chiefs in the Chinese city of Chengdu on July 24, adding that
there were a few "contained" critical cases.

The Italian reassurances came as the G20 pledged to use "all
policy tools" to support growth, saying they were ready to
respond to any negative fallout from Brexit amid uncertainty over
protectionism and Britain's future relations with the EU, the FT

Mr. Padoan's comments come ahead of a key week for Italian banks,
which will be closely watched when the results of European-wide
stress tests are published on July 29, possibly leading one or
more of them to rush to raise new capital, the FT notes.

The Italian banks have been disproportionately hit in the market
turmoil following last month's Brexit vote because they are
saddled with non-performing loans dating back to the recession,
the FT discloses.

Results of the stress tests raise the prospect of a public
injection of cash by the Italian government, which would probably
involve a hit to private investors in the banks under tough EU
state aid rules, the FT states.  But Italy has also been trying
to arrange a private-sector rescue to avoid such a scenario and
Mr. Padoan ruled out a so-called bail-in "for the moment",
according to the FT.

SILENUS EUROPEAN: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to D
S&P Global Ratings lowered its credit rating on Silenus (European
Loan Conduit No. 25) Ltd.'s class D notes.  At the same time, S&P
has affirmed its ratings on the class C, E, F, and G notes.

Silenus (European Loan Conduit No. 25) is a commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction that closed in March 2007.
It was originally backed by 17 loans.  Of the loans, 16 have
repaid, including two at a loss.  The rating actions follow S&P's
review of the remaining loan in this transaction.


The loan is secured against a portfolio of three office
properties located in Naples, Rome, and Milan, as well as 41
retail assets in smaller northern Italian cities.  The current
securitized balance is EUR118.6 million.

The loan was transferred to special servicing on May 6, 2011, due
to a breach of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio covenant.  The loan
has since been restructured and all assets and liabilities in the
Orazio senior loan have been transferred to Fondo Virgilio, a new
Italian closed-end speculative common property investment fund,
which will replace the original borrower.  In addition, the
maturity date of the senior loan was extended until November
2017. Until then, the borrower is required to dispose of the
properties by specific periods.

In addition, the Italian issuer special servicer has confirmed
that, on June 29, 2016, the buyer and the Italian special
servicer signed a conditional purchase agreement for the Milan
property for a gross sales price of EUR49,960,000.  The purchase
will become legally effective following the expiry of a 60 day
pre-emption period during which the superintendent to cultural
heritage has the option to purchase the property.

As of the May 2016 interest payment date (IPD), the loan's
securitized LTV ratio was 84.4%.  This is based on a March 2016
valuation of EUR140.5 million.

S&P has assumed principal losses on the loan in its 'B' rating
stress scenario.

                        INTEREST SHORTFALLS

On the May 2016 IPD, only the class C notes received the full
interest due.  The class D notes received only EUR46,356 of the
EUR62,284 interest due, and the class E and F notes did not
receive any interest.  The class G notes did not accrue any
interest as a nonaccruing interest amount has been fully
allocated to these notes.

In S&P's view, the interest shortfalls experienced by the
transaction are due to a combination of spread compression
between the loan and the notes, as well as high prior-ranking
transaction costs that, together, have resulted in insufficient
funds available to meet all interest payments due on the notes.

                        RATING RATIONALE

S&P's ratings in this transaction address the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal no later than the
May 2019 legal final maturity date.

Although S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the
class C notes to be adequate to mitigate the risk of losses from
the remaining loan in higher stress scenarios, S&P has affirmed
its 'B (sf)' rating due to the increased risk of cash flow

S&P also considers the available credit enhancement for the class
D notes to be adequate to mitigate the risk of losses from the
remaining loan in higher stress scenarios.  However, due to
interest shortfalls on this class, S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC+ (sf)' its rating on this class of notes.  The interest
shortfalls represent a failure to pay timely interest, which S&P
believes is unlikely to repay within 12 months.

S&P has also affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class E, F, and
G notes as they have continued to experience interest shortfalls.


Silenus (European Loan Conduit No. 25) Ltd.
EUR1.246 bil commercial mortgage-backed variable- and floating-
rate notes
Class             Identifier      To                 From
C                 826872AD5       B (sf)             B (sf)
D                 826872AE3       D (sf)             CCC+ (sf)
E                 826872AF0       D (sf)             D (sf)
F                 826872AG8       D (sf)             D (sf)
G                 826872AH6       D (sf)             D (sf)


AVAST HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-' long-term corporate credit
rating on Netherlands-based security software company Avast
Holding B.V. and the group's financing subsidiary Avast Software
B.V.  The outlook is stable.

S&P affirmed the issue rating on the existing senior secured debt
issued by Avast Software and expect to withdraw the ratings
following the redemption at closing of the transaction.

S&P also assigned its 'BB-' issue rating on the proposed $1.685
million senior secured debt to be issued by Avast Software.

S&P removed all ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where they were placed on July 12, 2016.

The affirmation follows S&P's review of Avast's business plan and
financial policy after its announced acquisition of AVG
Technologies for a total consideration of $1.3 billion.  In S&P's
view, integration risks and the expected material increase in
leverage to about 4.5x-5.0x at closing (as adjusted by S&P Global
Ratings) are offset by the company's increased scale, significant
cost synergy potential, and strong ability to deleverage quickly
below 4x in 2018 thanks to is solid free operating cash flow
(FOCF) generation and high EBITDA growth.  S&P understands that
Avast targets a significant headcount reduction in the combined
workforce in the next two years.  S&P also understands that the
targeted net leverage is between 2.0x-2.5x, which corresponds to
about 3x-4x S&P Global Ratings-adjusted leverage.  In S&P's view,
key shareholders of Avast, including its founders, will pursue a
moderately conservative financial policy.

Avast is planning to fund the acquisition through committed debt
financing of $1.685 billion, which we understand will also
include an undrawn revolving credit facility and the refinancing
of the outstanding loan at Avast of about $260 million and about
$85 million net debt at AVG.

Despite private equity firm CVC's more than 40% stake in Avast,
S&P do not consider that it has control of the company.  This
primarily reflects S&P's view that the company's other
shareholders (including the founders), who own about 45% of the
company, are not financial sponsors.  S&P also notes CVC's lack
of push rights on the group's strategy or financial policy, as
well as its lack of control over the board of directors.

S&P continues to assess Avast's business risk as weak.  S&P
thinks that there is a meaningful execution risk in integrating
AVG, which is a larger company by revenues and number of
employees. Furthermore, in S&P's view the product diversification
remains limited and SMB and enterprise revenues are only modest
even after merging with AVG.  The combined group's revenues and
EBITDA continue to be reliant on the niche consumer security
software segment, representing more than 60% of the combined
revenues on a pro forma basis.  In S&P's view, consumer security
software is much less "sticky" than the enterprise segment.  In
addition there is a relatively low free-to-premium-user
conversion, although S&P thinks this provides prospects for
improvement over the medium term. We also note that Avast
operates in the highly fragmented
security software market, where there is strong competition from
much larger companies.

These risks are partly mitigated by the combined group's
increased scale and global diversification.  Avast is stronger in
some emerging markets like Brazil, while AVG has a better
position in some developed English speaking countries like the
U.S.  With about 265 million PC users, the combined group will be
the world's largest provider of freemium consumer security
software, and number 3 globally by revenue after Symantec and
Intel.  The group will be better positioned to monetize mobile
customers thanks to AVG's carrier relationships and increased
customer base to attract advertisers (together, 165 million
mobile users).  S&P also thinks that the combined group will
continue to benefit from Avast's solid operating efficiency,
supported by its online sales model and highly automated
detection process, which translates into higher-than-average

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- The acquisition of AVG will be completed by the end of
      2016.  Figures for 2016 are pro forma and include AVG for
      the full year.

   -- A continued shift in demand to smartphones and tablets away
      from PCs, leading to a decline in the PC user base.  This
      is mitigated by the continued increase in conversion of
      free-to-premium PC users, resulting in an annual consumer
      PC antivirus subscription revenue growth of about 5%-7% in

   -- Mobile revenues growing annually by about 20%-30% but still
      representing less than 20% of the total revenues in 2018.

   -- Declining platform revenues mainly due to the decrease in
      browser clean-up sales.  Flattish SMB revenues on the back
      of fairly small size compared to large competitors.

   -- Some increase in underlying operating expenditure mainly
      because of investment in marketing to compete especially
      Chinese competitors.

   -- S&P expects Avast to quickly integrate AVG, including
      harmonizing of products, streamlining R&D and optimizing
      overhead functions, resulting in about $40 million cost
      synergies in 2017, increasing to at least $100 million in

   -- About $80 million integration costs, mainly in 2016 and
      2017, included in EBITDA, and about $90 million transaction
      costs at closing, excluded from EBITDA.

   -- Annual capital expenditure (capex) to sales of about 4% and
      modest cash inflows from working capital thanks to the
     deferred revenue model.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted credit measures in 2016-2018:

   -- EBITDA margin percentage of 40%-45% in 2016, 45%-50% in
      2017, and further increasing to 55%-60% in 2018 once the
      integration is mostly completed.

   -- FOCF to debt above 13% in 2017 and above 18% in 2018.

   -- EBITDA interest coverage of about 4x in 2017 and more than
      5x in 2018.

   -- Gross debt to EBITDA of about 4.5x-5.0x on a pro forma
      at closing, 4.3x-4.7x in 2017, and about 3.3x-3.6x in 2018.

S&P assesses Avast's liquidity position as strong.  This is
primarily supported by S&P's forecast of meaningful FOCF
generation and limited debt amortizations.  As of March 31, 2016,
S&P anticipates that Avast's sources of liquidity will cover its
uses by more than 2x in the following 24 months.  However, given
that Avast is a private company, with no publicly traded debt or
equity, S&P do not view its standing in credit markets as high.
Therefore S&P do not assess Avast's liquidity as exceptional.

Avast's main liquidity sources are:

   -- Cash balances of $187 million as of March 31, 2016;
   -- Undrawn backup revolving credit facility of $40 million, to
      be increased o $85 million;
   -- Annual FFO of $150 million-$170 million pre-acquisition of
      AVG, and well above $200 million including AVG; and
   -- Modest positive working capital inflows thanks to the
      deferred revenue model.

Avast's main liquidity uses are:

   -- Net cash outflow of about $140 million-$150 million
      to the acquisition of AVG;
   -- Annual capex of about $30 million including AVG; and
   -- Modest scheduled annual debt amortization of $80 million
      post-issuing the new debt to acquire AVG.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's assumption that Avast will be
successfully integrating AVG.  In addition, S&P expects that
continued solid growth prospects for software security solutions,
coupled with improving margins post-closing due to meaningful
cost synergies and free cash flow generation, will reduce the
group's leverage comfortably below 4x in 2018.

S&P could lower the rating if Avast is not successful in
integrating AVG reasonably quickly, resulting in revenues not
growing in line with S&P's base case or materially lower cost
synergies, and leading to significantly lower margins than S&P
expects.  S&P could also lower the rating if it considered that
Avast's financial policy would not support a reduction in
adjusted leverage below 4x due to aggressive shareholder
distributions or additional debt-financed acquisitions.

S&P could raise the rating if Avast successfully integrates AVG
and diversifies its revenue portfolio meaningfully outside
traditional consumer PC antivirus segment, while improving its
adjusted EBITDA margin back to about 60%.  A potential upgrade
would assume gross leverage of less than 4x on a sustainable
basis, and FOCF to debt of about 20%.

CAIRN CLO VI: Moody's Assigns B2 Definitive Rating to Cl. F Debt
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by Cairn CLO VI B.V.
(the "Issuer" or "Cairn VI CLO"):

-- EUR212,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR42,100,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR19,600,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR17,150,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR24,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR8,700,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)


Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2029. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Cairn Loan
Investments LLP ("CLI"), has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Cairn VI CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and high
yield bonds. The portfolio is expected to be at least 60% ramped
up as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

CLI will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain

In addition to the six classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue two subordinated classes, Class M-1 (EUR
17.65m) and Class M-2 notes (EUR 20.80m), which will not be

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. CLI's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the notes'

CAIRN CLO VI: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes
Fitch Ratings has assigned Cairn CLO VI B.V.'s notes final
ratings, as:

  Class A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class C: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
  Class D: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class E: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class F: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class M-1: not rated
  Class M-2: not rated

Cairn CLO VI B.V. is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality
The average credit quality of the identified portfolio is in the
'B'/'B-' range.  Fitch has public ratings or credit opinions on
84 of the 85 assets in the identified portfolio.  The Fitch
weighted average rating factor of the identified portfolio is

High Recovery Expectations
At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations.  Fitch views the recovery prospects for these assets
as more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets.  Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings (RRs) to 84 of the
85 assets in the identified portfolio.  The Fitch weighted
average recovery rate of the identified portfolio is 69.74%.

Diversified Asset Portfolio
The transaction documents provide the investment manager with the
flexibility to choose different obligor concentration limits
within the portfolio.  This covenant ensures that the asset
portfolio will not be exposed to excessive obligor concentration.
The investment manager will then have the flexibility to trade
obligor concentration in the portfolio against credit quality and
excess spread.

Unhedged Non-Euro Assets Exposure
The transaction is allowed to invest up to 5% of the portfolio in
non-euro-denominated fixed rate assets.  Unhedged non-euro assets
are limited to a maximum exposure of 5% of the portfolio, subject
to principal haircuts.  The manager can only invest in unhedged
assets if, after the applicable haircuts, the aggregate balance
of the assets is above the reinvestment target par balance.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes are being used to
purchase a EUR350 mil. portfolio of mostly European leveraged
loans and bonds.  The portfolio is managed by Cairn Loan
Investments LLP.  The transaction includes a four-year
reinvestment period.

The transaction documents may be amended, subject to rating
agency confirmation or noteholder approval.  Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyse the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings.  Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective Fitch may decline to comment.  Noteholders
should be aware that confirmation is considered to be given if
Fitch declines to comment.

Fitch's "Criteria for Interest Rate Stresses in Structured
Finance Transactions and Covered Bonds," dated 17 May 2016,
includes stresses to address the risk of negative interest rates
in structured finance transactions.  European CLOs are unlikely
to be affected by negative interest rates due to the prevalence
of Euribor floors in the European loan market.  Therefore, Fitch
applied the standard (positive) interest rate downward stresses
in our analysis.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability would lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes while a 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of
up to three notches for the rated notes.


NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC+', Outlook Stable
S&P Global Ratings said that it has raised its long-term
corporate credit rating on Norway-based publication paper
producer Norske Skogindustrier ASA to 'CCC+' from 'CCC-'.  The
outlook is stable.

The 'C' short-term corporate credit rating was affirmed.

At the same time, S&P raised its issue rating on the company's
senior secured notes to 'CCC+' from 'CCC-'.  S&P revised the
recovery rating to '3' from '4', indicating its expectation of
recovery in the lower half of the 50%-70% in the event of a

S&P also raised its issue rating on the company's senior
unsecured notes to 'CCC-' from 'C'.  S&P's '6' recovery rating on
these notes remains unchanged, indicating negligible (0%-10%)
recovery prospects in a default scenario.

S&P removed all the ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed
them with developing implications on April 29, 2016.

The upgrade follows Norske Skog's repayment of its notes due in
June 2016 and improved operational performance in the first half
of this year.  The company now faces limited debt maturities
until late 2019 and therefore has some time to further strengthen
its earnings base and diversify away from publication paper.
However, our 'CCC+' rating indicates that we still regard the
capital structure as unsustainable in the long term, although S&P
views the risk of a default as limited in the coming 12 months.
S&P thinks that Norske Skog's ability to meet future debt
maturities will remain highly dependent on favorable economic,
financial, and industry conditions.

"We consider Norske Skog's business risk profile to be
vulnerable, since its business model is fully exposed to
publication paper used for newspapers, magazines, direct
advertising, and books.  The market for newsprint and magazine
paper in Europe and Australia is depressed, with structurally
falling demand due to ongoing digitalization and periods of
overcapacity, which lead to recurring price pressure.  Although
capacity closures occur on a regular basis, they often have a
limited impact on pricing because demand keeps declining as the
market remains fragmented.  Several smaller players compete for
market share, which limits sustained improvement in
profitability.  We think that Norske Skog's new business strategy
to diversify away from paper (for example into biogas, pellets,
and tissue paper) makes sense, but that the financial impact will
be relatively small over the next few years compared with that of
the existing paper business.  In addition, these investments come
with execution and timing risks, as highlighted by the
cancellation of a partnership to convert a paper machine to
produce tissue paper at the Bruck mill in Austria," S&P said.

S&P views Norske Skog's highly leveraged financial risk profile
as a constraint to the rating.  Although the company has managed
to cut debt through its recent debt exchange, rights issue, and
repayment of debt maturities, S&P thinks that further
deleveraging is highly dependent on the company's ability to
increase profitability in the paper segment as well as deliver
growth projects on time and on budget.  S&P thinks that adjusted
debt to EBITDA will be at about 7.5x in 2016 and possibly
decrease further in 2017 and 2018, depending on operational
performance and capital expenditure (capex) levels.

"The stable outlook takes into account our forecast that Norske
Skog's EBITDA margins will remain at about 10% and internal cost-
cutting efforts will offset weakness in paper prices.  We expect
the company will manage its growth investments carefully and that
cash flow after investments will stay slightly positive in the
coming three years," S&P said.

S&P could lower the rating if Norske Skog's operational
performance were to deteriorate, for example as a result of
downward pressure on paper prices or rapidly increasing input
costs.  S&P could also downgrade the company if it announced
another financial restructuring.

Although highly unlikely in the coming 12 months, S&P could
consider raising the rating if Norske Skog's operational
performance improved substantially and S&P believed that the
improvement could be sustained for a number of years.  This could
be the result of improved conditions in the European paper
market, likely including consolidation and sustained price
increases, and the company's successful diversification beyond
paper, which would remove uncertainty regarding the refinancing
of debt maturities in 2019.


NOVO BANCO: Unsuccessful Sale Attempts to Hit Portuguese Banks
Peter Wise at The Financial Times reports that Portuguese banks,
already undercapitalized and loaded with bad debt, are bracing
for heavy losses from Lisbon's so far unsuccessful attempts to
sell Novo Banco, the lender salvaged from the collapse of Banco
Espirito Santo.

According to the FT, estimates of the potential bill facing
banks, which finance the resolution fund that bailed out Novo
Banco in 2014, range from EUR2.9 billion to EUR3.9 billion.  Some
bankers are even doubtful that the rescued lender will attract
any acceptable offers, leading to its possible break-up or
liquidation, the FT notes.

The sale of Novo Banco is among critical decisions that will
shortly determine the future shape of Portugal's banking
industry, which the International Monetary Fund has linked with
the problems facing Italian lenders as among potential risks to
global growth, the FT states.

The Bank of Portugal and Lisbon's eight-month-old "anti-
austerity" government are also calling for a "systemic solution"
to deal with more than EUR30 billion in bad debts and problem
assets, adding to other calls for public bailouts of troubled EU
banks, the FT discloses.

In a recent report, Barclays estimated that Portuguese lenders
could need up to EUR7.5 billion to resolve a "systemic banking
crisis" that was bringing the country under "close market
scrutiny", the FT relays.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Novo Banco, S.A. provides various
financial products and services to private, corporate, and
institutional customers.

                        *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 6,
2016, Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Caa1 from B2 the
senior debt and long-term deposit ratings of Portugal's Novo
Banco, S.A. and its supported entities.  This follows the Bank of
Portugal's (BoP) announcement on Dec. 29, 2015, that it had
approved the recapitalization of Novo Banco by transferring
EUR1,985 million of senior debt back to Banco Espirito Santo,
S.A. (BES unrated).  Moody's said the outlook on Novo Banco's
deposit and senior debt ratings is now developing.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: MPs Criticize Advisers for Overlooking Weaknesses
Ashley Armstrong at The Telegraph reports that a scathing report
into the collapse of BHS has criticized advisers who turned a
blind eye to the "manifold weaknesses" of Dominic Chappell's bid
ahead of his ill-fated purchase of the retail chain from Sir
Philip Green.

City firms were scorned by the parliamentary report for appearing
to "provide an expensive badge of legitimacy to people who would
otherwise be bereft of credibility", The Telegraph relates.

"Grant Thornton and Olswang were increasingly aware of Retail
Acquisitions' manifold weaknesses as purchasers of BHS.  They
were nonetheless content to take generous fees and lend both
their names and reputation to the deal", The Telegraph quotes the
report as saying.

The firms received GBP1.7 million while Sir Philip has claimed
they made GBP8 million in total from BHS, The Telegraph relays.
Grant Thornton is a major accountancy firm, while Olswang is a
law firm, The Telegraph discloses.

According to The Telegraph, the 66-page report by MPs determines
that Sir Philip's family extracted billions from BHS since the
Greens bought the business in 2000 and failed to invest
sufficiently to ensure the retailer remained competitive and to
prevent its pension deficit ballooning.

The failure of the 88-year-old retailer in April was the
"culmination of a sorry litany of failures of corporate
governance and greed" as "regulatory concerns were circumvented
and advisers were heavily incentivized to progress the deal", the
MPs, as cited by The Telegraph, said.

The chain collapsed 13 months after Sir Philip sold it to
Mr. Chappell's Retail Acquisitions vehicle, The Telegraph

The MPs also concluded that Sir Philip then failed his own test
for a suitable buyer as Mr. Chappell did not put in any working
capital or find an experienced retail frontman to run BHS when he
bought it.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.

COLCHESTER ENGLISH: In Administration After 'Significant Losses'
---------------------------------------------------------------- reports that a Colchester foreign language
school has gone into administration after making "significant
losses" because of declining student numbers.

Administrators CVR Global has been instructed in a last ditch
attempt to find a buyer for Colchester English Study Centre, in
Lexden Road, according to

The report notes that CVR has confirmed each student enrolled in
the school's summer programs will be unaffected but if no buyer
is found after those programs end, the school, which charges
students up to GBP320 per week, will close.

Lee De'ath and Richard Toone have been appointed joint
administrators of the centre, which is officially named Lexden
Centre (Oxford) Limited, the report relays.

Mr. De'ath, based at CVR Global's Colchester office, said his
appointment has come as a result of "declining student numbers
leading to significant losses," the report notes.

Mr. De'ath said: "The school continues to operate and we are
working with the existing management team to attempt to find a
long-term solution for the school to remain open.

"The school was established in 1969 and historically has a very
strong reputation.

"Unfortunately due to a number of factors, including increased
competition in the market, it has struggled with declining
student numbers in the last few years.

"All staff continue to perform their roles and students have been
made aware of the situation.

"Funding has been secured to enable the school to continue to
trade and deliver summer school programs, however if no one can
be found to take over the school it will have to close.

"We are in the process of talking to a number of parties who are
interested in taking over the running of the school and are
hopeful of reaching a positive outcome."

About half of the school's students, which are aged between 17
and 70, come from southern Europe, the report relays.

The remainder is made up of the rest of Europe, Asia, South
America and Africa, the report notes.

The school caters for beginners and also offers more advanced
exams as well as summer programs, the report adds.

DECO 11 - UK: Moody's Affirms B3(sf) Rating on Class A-1B Notes
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of one class
of Notes and affirmed the ratings of one class of Notes issued by
DECO 11 - UK Conduit 3 p.l.c.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Issuer: DECO 11 - UK Conduit 3 p.l.c

-- GBP220 million Class A-1A Notes, Downgraded to A3 (sf);
    previously on May 23, 2016 Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

-- GBP74.5 million Class A-1B Notes, Affirmed B3 (sf);
    previously on May 23, 2016 Affirmed B3 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class A2, Class B, Class C, Class D,
Class E, Class F and the Class X Notes.


The rating on the Class A1-A Notes is downgraded because Moody's
expectation of the timing of the redemption of the Class A1-A
notes has changed. Moody's now expects the disposal of the 24 UK
office properties securing the largest loan (82.6% of pool
balance), Mapeley Gamma to commence later and conclude closer to
legal final maturity in July 2020.

In June 2016 the special servicer for the Mapeley loan changed to
Solutus Advisors Ltd. (Solutus Advisors) from Hatfield Philips
International Limited (Hatfield Philips) following a vote by the
noteholders. The new asset management plan is still being
developed and is expected to be finalized and agreed upon with
noteholders in the coming months. Moody's expects a protracted
asset management period for this portfolio of secondary quality
office properties which is further exacerbated by the current
heightened uncertainty around UK commercial real estate markets.

Moody's said, "The rating on the Class A1-B Notes is affirmed
because there is no change to Moody's recovery expectations
following our last review in May 2016."

DMG STEELWORKERS: CVR Global Sells Firm Out of Administration
------------------------------------------------------------- reports that North West manufacturer DMG
Steelworkers has been sold out of administration in a pre-pack
deal by insolvency and restructuring firm CVR Global, saving 27

The business and assets have been sold by CVR Global to Time DMG
Steelworkers Limited in a pre-pack deal, according to

The report notes that administrators from CVR Global were called
into DMG Steelworkers Limited earlier this month and Craig Povey
-- --  and Richard Toone -- -
- partners at CVR Global, were appointed joint-administrators on
July 14.

The Wigan-based company operated as a fabricator and erector
within the rail, construction, highways and utilities industries
and was a specialist in bridges and contemporary steel buildings,
incorporating products such as balustrades, railings and radio
masts, the report relays.

The company was launched in 1995 and employed 27 full-time staff.

Craig Povey, of CVR Global, said: "The company was clearly
insolvent on a cash-flow basis and was under pressure from
creditors including its landlord and Her Majesty's Revenue and

"Despite the difficulties previously faced by the business, it
has a strong reputation and good order book. The sale ensures the
survival of the business, preserves 27 jobs, and the company is
now well placed to move forward," Mr. Povey added.

FAIRFIELD (CROYDON): Operator Enters Administration
--------------------------------------------------- reports that the operator of Fairfield Halls has gone
bust just days after the south London music and arts venue closed
for a two-year period of refurbishment.

Fairfield (Croydon) Ltd went into administration after emailing
staff to tell them it was unable to pay their redundancy
settlements, reports the Croydon Guardian, and appointing Herron
Fisher appointed to oversee the bankruptcy proceedings, according

The Fairfield, which includes a 1,800-seat concert hall, 750-seat
theatre and 500-capacity standing concert area, closed on July
15, the report notes.

Its operator had favored a phased redevelopment -- allowing part
of the venue to remain open throughout -- but accepted an offer
from Croydon Council of around GBP500,000 to close for two years,
the report relays.

Before its closure, the Fairfield received an annual council
grant of GBP740,000, the report notes.

Croydon Councillor Tim Godfrey tells the Guardian it has already
also paid the company a quarter of a million pounds to fund
redundancy pay-outs and other expenses related to the closure,
the report says.  Asked why the GBP750,000 was insufficient to
cover redundancy payments, he says: "That's a question for
Fairfield," the report adds.

INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR, Outlook Stable
Fitch Ratings has affirmed International Personal Finance Plc's
(IPF) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+', Short-Term
IDR at 'B' and senior unsecured debt at 'BB+'.  The Outlook on
the Long-Term IDR is Stable.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

IPF's IDRs reflect the group's IPF's significant exposure to
credit risk and adverse regulatory developments in its major
markets.  They also reflect IPF's profitable franchise in
unsecured consumer lending in emerging markets and its
low -- albeit increasing -- balance sheet leverage.

Conducting unsecured lending to consumers of low credit standing
in emerging market countries carries inherent risks.  Loan
impairment is consistently high, and the group can at times be
exposed to unexpected regulatory pronouncements, as demonstrated
in 2015 by the introduction of new rate-capping legislation in
both Poland and Slovakia.

In Poland, IPF's largest single market, this has required
reworking of the group's local product offering, while in
Slovakia the group has elected to withdraw from new lending
altogether, but group management has significant experience in
adapting its business model around such circumstances.

IPF's performance remained stable in 2015.  Reported pre-tax
profit was stable at GBP100.2 mil., but prior to exchange rate
movements, incremental investment costs in the group's digital
business and exceptional costs (principally in relation to the
closure of the Slovakian business), showed a 10% improvement.
Significant arrears are a feature of IPF's business model, with
the group maintaining a target impairment-to-revenue ratio of
25%-30%.  However, there is limited volatility in impairment,
which is adequately provided for and priced into the group's

Revenue growth was most significant in Mexico in 2015, and this
remains one of the group's geographic areas of greater growth
potential, as some of its European markets are by now more
mature. Expansion is also expected in IPF's digital business, a
combination of the group's own 2014 'hapiloans' development in
Poland and the geographically wider operations of MCB Finance, a
consumer finance company acquired in 2015.  IPF does not hedge
accounting profits or losses on its overseas earnings, which had
a net negative impact in 2015, but which could draw benefit from
recent sterling weakness.

IPF has calculated that applying the new Polish pricing regime to
its loan portfolio written in the 12 months to 30 June 2015 would
have reduced its profit by approximately GBP30m, but estimates
that mitigating strategies within its subsequently revised
product structure could offset up to half the negative financial
impact. The legislation was signed in August 2015, but only
became operative from March 2016, so has yet to impact reported
results, with customer and competitor responses further
influences on the total final effect.

IPF's total equity declined 9.5% in 2015 to GBP327m, as
dividends, the repurchase of own shares and exchange losses on
foreign currency translation exceeded net income.  In conjunction
with incurring GBP20.4 mil. of goodwill on the acquisition of MCB
Finance, this increased the ratio of debt-to-tangible equity to
1.98x (from 1.36x), but Fitch regards this as still adequately
conservative for a lending business, notwithstanding the risks
inherent within IPF's customer base.

Funding is wholesale market-focused, but geographically
diversified via local currency bonds and bank facilities.  In
2015 the group raised a further EUR100 mil. (due 2021) under its
euro medium term note program and PLN200 mil. (due 2020) under
its Polish medium term note program, contributing to year-end
headroom under borrowing facilities of GBP133 mil.  Liquidity and
refinancing risks are significantly mitigated by the short
duration of the customer loans made (1-2 years) relative to that
of IPF's own borrowings, which the group seeks to renew on a
rolling basis.

The rating of IPF's senior unsecured notes is in line with the
group's Long-Term IDR, reflecting Fitch's expectation for average
recovery prospects given that IPF's funding is predominantly

The Stable Outlook on IPF's Long-Term IDR reflects our view that
IPF should continue to report adequate profitability while
maintaining leverage at current levels.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES


The high-cost credit business and associated consumer protection
issues remain subject to political and regulatory scrutiny in
many countries.  Should mitigation of the effects of the recent
Polish law prove more difficult than expected, or further new
legislation either in Poland or in other countries in which IPF
operates place pressure on the capacity of its business model to
generate the revenues required to counterbalance the group's
operating costs and impairment risks, a downgrade could result.

Fitch does not expect a rating upgrade in the near term, in view
of the changes taking place within the business, both in adapting
to recent legislation and in developing the group's digital
operations.  However, in the longer term the rating could benefit
from proven success in these areas, while maintaining a
conservative balance sheet structure.

The senior debt rating is primarily sensitive to a change in
IPF's Long-Term IDR.

JOSHUA JAMES: In Administration Amid Cash Flow Difficulties
Insider Media Limited reports that jobs have been lost at an
award-winning East Yorkshire jewelery business which entered
administration after experiencing cash flow difficulties.

Founded in 2009 by managing director Shaun Bell, Joshua James
Jewellery opened its flagship store in Hessle before launching
its website in the same year, according to Insider Media Limited.

The company was an official stockist of brands such as Thomas
Sabo, Trollbeads, Nomination, Links of London and Swarovski, the
report notes.

Since opening, Joshua James Jewellery won Retailer of the Year at
the British Jewellers' Association's (BJA) 125th Anniversary
Awards and was listed as one of six finalists in the E-tailer of
the Year category of the UK Watch and Jewellery Awards in 2012,
2013 and 2014, the report relays.

On July 13, 2016, Keith Marshall and Gareth Harris of RSM
Restructuring Advisory were appointed joint administrators of the
business, the report notes.

Joshua James experienced a number of difficulties which impacted
cash flow and could not be overcome, despite a number of cost
cutting measures and profit improvement initiatives being
deployed, the report notes.

As a result, the company was closed on 6 July by Bell and all 13
employees were made redundant, the report relays.

Mr. Marshall said an agreement was reached for Joshua James'
stock to be sold to a new company, Joshua James Ventures Ltd,
which has provided a live outlet for the remaining stock to be
sold and ultimately realize a "significantly higher" amount for
the company as oppose to selling at auction, the report notes.

"As part of the stock sale agreement it was agreed that customers
who have unfulfilled orders or who are awaiting refunds for
returns would be dealt with by Joshua James Ventures Ltd," added
Mr. Marshall, the report relays.

MAXWELL COMMUNICATION: Scheme Distribution Scheduled Today
The Joint Administrators of Maxwell Communication Corporation plc
disclosed that the 15th and final distribution under the
Company's Scheme of Arrangement and Plan of Reorganization will
be paid on July 26, 2016.

Bonds covered:

   -- DM150,000,000 6% bonds of 1988/1993
   -- ECU75,000,000 8 3/8% bonds of 1988/1993
   -- SFr150,000,000 5% bonds of 1988/1995

Holders of Distribution Certificates relating to the bonds should
present Distribution Coupon No. 15 to their bank, or any branch
of the relevant agent bank or at the address provided in order to
receive the 15th and final distribution.

Failure to present the relevant Distribution Coupon for payment
within six months from July 26, 2016, will result in the funds
being paid into the UK Court with the result in the funds being
paid into the UK court with the result that the holder of the
distribution coupon will thereafter need to apply to the Court in
respect therof.  Please note that funds in SFR will be deposited
with the Court in the equivalent US Dollar amount.

Agent Bank for the ECU and DM Bonds

UniCredit Bank AG (formerly Bayerishce Hypo-un Vereinsbank AG)
Am Eisbach 4
D-80538 Munich
Federal Republic of Germany
Attention: GPF4 Securities Issuance Services

Agent Bank for the Swiss Franc Bonds
Credit Suisse AG
8070 Zurich
Attention: SHDR 9

PLASRECYCLE: In Administration, Seeks Buyer
------------------------------------------- reports that London-based plastic bag recycling
business Plasrecycle is seeking a new buyer after entering

The firm, which has operated a GBP12 million recycling plant in
Woolwich, South East London since 2013, is backed by green
investors including waste advisory body WRAP, the London Waste
and Recycling Board and the Foresight Environmental Fund,
according to

According to a statement from administrators EY, Plasrecycle was
forced to call in administrators after it effectively "ran out of
cash," the report notes.

"The company was seeking additional investment of GBP6 million to
improve efficiencies and increase capacity," EY said, the report
notes.  "However, due to the extent of the ongoing losses at the
lower levels of production and the level of existing debt used to
fund the start-up losses, it was not possible to obtain this
investment and the company effectively ran out of cash."

However, EY said the firm still has "all the fundamentals to be a
significantly profitable business," the report relays.

Plasrecycle's plant is able to process 20,000 tons of plastic
waste every year from retailers, waste management firms and local
authorities -- equivalent to more than 2.5 billion plastic bags,
the report notes. The waste material is processed to create a
plastic granulate for black bin bags, plastic bags and damp proof

Some 20 members of staff have been made redundant, with the
remaining 16 employees staying on to manage the conversion of the
plant's remaining stock while a buyer is sought, the report says.

EY said it is seeking expressions of interest and hopes to
conclude a swift sale before production ceases, the report adds.

* UK: Insolvency Fee Hike to Hit Insolvent Companies' Creditors
New and increased government insolvency fees, introduced on
July 21, will hurt creditors of insolvent companies and
individuals and undermine the UK insolvency regime, warns
insolvency and restructuring trade body R3.

Among other new fees, the government is introducing a fee of
GBP6,000 in every compulsory liquidation or bankruptcy, even when
the case is handled by a private sector insolvency practitioner
rather than the government's Official Receiver.  A further fee of
15% of all realisations will apply in all Official Receiver-run

The government estimates the new fees will cost creditors almost
GBP8 million per year.

The government, which automatically handles compulsory
liquidations and bankruptcies in the first instance, has also
changed its guidance on passing insolvency cases to licensed
insolvency practitioners.

Traditionally, the Official Receiver has only kept cases which
are straight-forward or do not have any assets to be realised.

The change will allow the government to hold onto more cases,
even when a majority of creditors seek an insolvency practitioner

Unlike insolvency practitioners, the government's Official
Receivers are not overseen by an independent regulator and they
do not have their fees approved by creditors.  Official Receivers
do not need to meet the same level of qualifications or standards
as insolvency practitioners.

Andrew Tate, R3 president, says: "The government's new insolvency
fees are a very bad deal for the UK's creditors."

"The insolvency profession understands the government needs money
to fund its Official Receivers.  But disenfranchising creditors,
holding onto cases its staff may not be qualified to handle, and
forcing creditors to pay new, uncompetitive fees undermines the
insolvency regime and will mean fewer returns."

"By threatening creditor returns, the government could undermine
the UK's World Bank insolvency ranking.  Improving this ranking
was one of the government's manifesto commitments."

Andrew Tate adds: "The government is putting creditors at risk of
seeing fewer returns, and is asking them to pay more for the
pleasure.  The additional GBP6,000 charge for every case, even on
the simplest case where the government does nothing, is
essentially a tax on creditors who have already lost money."
Fees are a necessity in insolvency work.  Without them, money
would not be returned to creditors in an orderly and fair fashion
after an insolvency.  However, the ability to charge fees should
come with responsibilities."

"Insolvency practitioners' fees are approved by creditors and
insolvency practitioners are heavily regulated.  The fees regime
for insolvency practitioners was further improved recently to
allow even more creditor oversight.  The government has
introduced new fees without warning or consultation and is not
working to the same standards as insolvency practitioners and is
not treating creditors fairly."

Cost of becoming bankrupt increases -- three months after a

Existing fees have also been increased by the government.
Changes include a GBP25 increase in the cost to an individual
applying for bankruptcy contradicting the government's aim to
improve access to debt solutions.

Andrew Tate says: "When people are in financial distress, it's
important that they can access a debt solution appropriate to
their needs.  It has long concerned us that entering bankruptcy
is only possible with the payment of high, up-front government
and court fees.  Just three months after trumpeting a cut in
these costs, the government has increased them again."

"The government should be making it easier for people to resolve
unsustainable debts, not harder."

Before April 2016, people had to pay GBP705 in government and
court fees before they could enter bankruptcy.  From April,
online applications became available at a reduced fee of GBP655.
Only three months later, the cost of online applications has been
increased again to GBP680.


* Moody's Says European Firms' Diversity to Protect Profitability
European chemical companies' high degree of diversification will
help them maintain operating profitability in 2016, despite
uneven demand conditions across end markets amid weak global
economic growth, says Moody's Investors Service in a new report.

"Despite a challenging macro-economic environment, we expect that
in 2016 European chemical companies' broad product and end-market
diversification will enable them to retain most of the
improvement in operating profitability and cash flow generation
that they reported last year, when EBITDA rose 11% in euro terms
year-on-year on average," says Francois Lauras, a Moody's Senior
Credit Officer and author of the report.

In 2016, Moody's expects that the peer group of 12 rated European
chemical companies covered in the report will generate operating
cash flows and sustain aggregate funds from operations (in euro
terms) close to the EUR22 billion reported in 2015.

However, oil-induced deflation will weigh on companies' top lines
while persistent overcapacities will give rise to further pricing
and margin pressure at the commodity end of certain chemicals
value chains. This will, for example, affect the basic chemicals
and intermediates business of BASF (SE) (A1 stable), the C4 chain
activities of Evonik Industries AG (Baa1 stable), Arkema's (Baa2
negative) acrylics business and Lanxess AG's (Baa3 stable)
synthetic rubbers operation.

Moreover, as opportunities to grow revenues and earnings
organically dry up in the current low global growth environment,
the pressure on chemical companies to pursue large cash and debt-
funded M&A transactions will increase. Such deals could weaken
chemical companies' financial profiles and place negative
pressure on their ratings.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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