TCREUR_Public/160803.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, August 3, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 152


                            Headlines


C R O A T I A

CROATIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings


F R A N C E

NOVARTEX SAS: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'CC'


G E R M A N Y

EUROPROP SA: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to D(sf)
SGL CARBON: S&P Cuts Corp. Credit Rating to CCC+, Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

ADIENT PLC: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating to $2BB Sr. Notes
VALLAURIS II CLO: S&P Affirms B+(sf) Rating on Class IV Notes


I T A L Y

MONTE DEI PASCHI: Other Banks May Need Capital Under Rescue Terms


N E T H E R L A N D S

DEMIR-HALK BANK: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Bank Deposit Rating
GREENKO DUTCH: Fitch Hikes Rating on US$550MM Notes to 'B+'
GRUPO ISOLUX: Seeks U.S. Recognition of Danish Proceedings


R U S S I A

SME BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' ICRs & Revises Outlook to Stable
TULA CITY: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings


S P A I N

GRUPO ISOLUX: Chapter 15 Case Summary
GRUPO ISOLUX: Seeks U.S. Recognition of Spanish Proceedings


T U R K E Y

ASYA KATILIM: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 Long Term Deposits Rating
OYAK: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB+/B' Corp. Credit Ratings


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Lady Judge Wants Green to Compensate Pensioners
GALLOWAY GROUP: Enters Administration, 161 Jobs Affected
GHA COACHES: Administration Raises "Serious Questions"
GULF KEYSTONE: Parties-in-Interest in Favor of Restructuring
MALACHITE FUNDING: S&P Affirms CCC- Ratings on Tier 1 & 2 Notes

PREMIER FOODS: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable
RMAC SECURITIES 2007-NS1: S&P Ups Ratings on 2 Note Classes to B+


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C R O A T I A
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CROATIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Croatia's Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB' with Negative
Outlooks. The issue ratings on Croatia's senior unsecured foreign
and local currency bonds have been affirmed at 'BB'. The Country
Ceiling has been affirmed at 'BBB-' and the Short-Term Foreign
Currency and Local Currency IDRs at 'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
The ratings balance Croatia's high government and external debt
loads and weak growth performance, against favorable governance
indicators and relatively high per capita GDP.

The level of gross general government debt (GGGD) is a rating
weakness. GGGD reached 86.7% of GDP at end-2015, almost double
the 'BB' median (45.5%). It has increased rapidly from below 40%
in 2008, as a result of years of wide fiscal deficits and
negative growth, which reflected delayed post-crisis fiscal
consolidation and a lack of structural reform. Croatia posted
average general government deficits equivalent to 5.6% of GDP in
2009-15, while in real terms the economy contracted by an average
0.5% over the same period.

The deficit narrowed to 3.2% of GDP in 2015 (below the 'BB'
median of 3.6%). This is better than Fitch expected at the time
of the last review, underpinned by improved tax compliance and
the economy's return to positive growth. In 2016 the deficit will
narrow further, to a forecast 2.6% of GDP. The improvement also
reflects under-execution of capital spending. The lack of a
permanent government means some items of spending are on hold.
However, despite the improved fiscal deficit, public debt will
remain very high during the forecast period, with the government
set to continue to post deficits of around 2.5% of GDP, and
nominal growth likely to remain quite subdued. Fitch forecasts
GGGD to be 86.3% of GDP in 2018.

Fitch said, "Our Political risk has risen since our last review,
which could delay progress on fiscal adjustment and structural
reforms. Following a vote of no confidence in the prime minister,
Tihomir Oreskovic, parliament was dissolved on 15 July. A new
election will be held on 11 September. Mr Oreskovic had only
taken power in January 2016, at the head of a short-lived
coalition of the centre-right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and
the pro-reform MOST (Bridge) party. Recent polls indicate that
the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SDP), which was in power
in 2011-15, has a lead over the HDZ."

Some progress on the planning of key reforms was made by the
Oreskovic government, which could allow a new government to take
action quickly. However, regional elections scheduled for May
2017 may delay politically difficult reforms. Moreover, an
outright victory for either the HDZ or SDP is highly unlikely.
Fitch expects the next government to be a coalition between one
of the two largest parties and MOST. This could achieve
significant reforms, but it may not prove durable, as
demonstrated by the previous HDZ-MOST administration

The growth outlook, in the near and long term, remains a rating
weakness. Croatia posted positive growth in 2015 for the first
time since 2008. However, at 1.6%, the rate was quite weak, and
well below the 'BB' median (3.9% on the five-year average). Fitch
forecasts that growth will reach 1.8% this year, and average 1.9%
in 2017-18. In the near term, growth will be driven by domestic
demand, underpinned by lower energy prices, rising real wages,
and another strong tourism season. Tourism will remain a key
growth driver. Heightened security risk in many competitor
markets is likely to boost tourism inflows this year. Transport
connections outside of Europe have improved, increasing Croatia's
potential tourist inflows.

Private investment will also support growth. Although merchandise
exports are performing well, their contribution will be limited
by their low share in overall GDP (24.4% in 2015 according to
Eurostat, the sixth lowest in the EU and the lowest among CEE
member states). This ratio is likely to rise gradually as Croatia
increasingly integrates with international supply chains.

Potential growth is estimated at 1%-2% per year, a very low rate
for a country at Croatia's income level. This is not consistent
with any significant rate of convergence with western Europe, and
will see Croatia fall further behind better-performing CEE
countries. Croatia's low potential growth rate reflects a large
and inefficient public sector, slow resolution of bad loans, weak
progress on structural reform and a challenging demographic
outlook. At the 'BB' level, Croatia's GDP per capita is a rating
strength.

At 47.6% of GDP in 2015 (almost three times the 'BB' median of
16.4%), net external debt is a rating weakness. Most external
debt is owed by corporates, particularly in the real estate and
construction sectors, reflecting the very slow process of post-
crisis deleveraging. Deleveraging in the financial sector has
been quicker, and Croatian banks returned to a positive net
foreign asset position in 2015. Fitch forecasts that net external
debt will fall during the forecast period, to 34.3% of GDP by
2018, helped by continued current account surpluses.

Croatia's banking sector is stable, liquid and well capitalized.
According to estimates provided by banks to the Ministry of
Finance, the conversion of Swiss franc loans into euros carried
out in 2015 and 1H16 cost the banking sector HRK7.3 billion. At
end-1Q16, the share of Swiss franc loans fell to 2% of the total,
from around 7% at end-2015. 66% of loans are now in euros, but
given the kuna's peg to the single currency, the risks are much
smaller. At 7.1 months of current external payments (CXP) in 2015
('BB' median: 4.1 months), the CNB has a healthy level of
reserves and has repeatedly shown itself willing to intervene to
support the kuna. In 2015 non-performing loans remained high at
16.3% of the total. However, this was a drop from 16.7% in the
previous year. High foreign ownership (over 90%) in the banking
sector mitigates contingent liabilities to the sovereign balance
sheet.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)
Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Croatia a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BBB-' on the Long-Term FC IDR scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the
SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative
to rated peers, as follows:
-- Public finances: -1 notch, to reflect the non-linearity of
    public debt at high levels.
-- External finances: -1 notch, to reflect the high level of net
    external debt (which is not captured in the SRM) and the
    vulnerability to kuna depreciation against the euro.

Fitch said, "Our SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple
regression rating model that employs 18 variables based on three
year centered averages, including one year of forecasts, to
produce a score equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a
forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for
adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating,
reflecting factors within our criteria that are not fully
quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the SRM."

RATING SENSITIVITIES
The Negative Outlook reflects the following risk factors that
may, individually or collectively, result in a downgrade:
-- Failure to put the public debt/GDP ratio on a sustained
    downward path, as a result of policy direction, fiscal
    underperformance, rising financing costs, or weaker nominal
    GDP growth.

Future developments that may, individually or collectively,
result in a revision of the Outlook to Stable include:
-- Progress on fiscal consolidation leading to greater
    confidence that public debt/GDP will decline over the medium
    term.
-- Strengthening growth prospects and competitiveness,
    particularly through the implementation of structural
reforms.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Fitch said, "We assume Croatia's track record of monetary and
exchange rate stability remains intact, minimizing the risks to
household, corporate and public sector balance sheets, all of
which are heavily euroized."


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F R A N C E
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NOVARTEX SAS: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'CC'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded French apparel and footwear retail
group Novartex SAS's (Vivarte) Long-term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'CC' from 'CCC'. At the same time, the agency has
downgraded Vivarte SAS's super senior debt to 'CCC-'/RR3 (55%
recovery) from 'B-'/RR2 (75%) and Novarte SAS's EUR780 million
reinstated debt to 'C'/RR6 (0%) from 'CC'/RR6 (0%).

The downgrades follow management's public comments that it is
discussing a new debt restructuring, reflecting the limited
options available outside of the potential conversion of part of
the group's debt into equity to address an over-leveraged balance
sheet. During these restructuring talks, Vivarte remains within
the terms of its liquidity covenant and will continue to service
its debt.

Fitch said, "The latest EBITDA underperformance leads to higher
leverage, eroding the group's liquidity, which was to be
primarily dedicated to its operational restructuring. This
creates a cycle where growing uncertainty over management's
capacity at turning around the business further hampers the
implementation of its strategic initiatives. While the group
should have sufficient liquidity to service its debt in the near-
term, refinancing risks will be excessive as both the absolute
EBITDA level and liquidity are likely to be insufficient by FY19.
In our view, this implies an unavoidable debt restructuring.

"In the event of a successful execution of a distressed debt
exchange (DDE), Fitch will then likely assign an appropriate IDR
for the issuer's post-exchange capital structure, risk profile
and prospects. Key elements in our assessment will be a clear and
stabilized strategic plan, in addition to certainty over near-
term material progress in EBITDA generation."

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Upcoming Debt Restructuring
The downgrade directly reflects management's announcement on
July 25, 2016, that it was starting discussions regarding a new
debt restructuring, following the one completed in December 2014.
Fitch believes this is prompted by the group's clearly
unsustainable capital structure with regard to the progress made
so far in profitability. Under management's current strategic
plan, Fitch projects funds from operations adjusted gross
leverage will remain above 10.0x over FY16-FY19 (FY15: 18.9x).
This would heavily compromise a successful debt refinancing in
FY19.

The ongoing EBITDA underperformance, related to external and
internal factors, further undermines liquidity, which in turn,
inflates the execution risk associated with management's
turnaround initiatives.

Challenging Market Environment
In its rating case, Fitch factors in an increasing competitive
gap -- detrimental to Vivarte -- between the players that have
quickly adapted their business model to new consumer habits (low-
cost and fast-fashion offer, omni-channel model) and the more
traditional ones. These have to face decline in footfall and
strong price pressures that compress their margins. The ongoing
underperformance of Vivarte's main footwear banner, La Halle
Footwear, reflects its lack of adaptation to new market
conditions. Furthermore, we expect abnormal weather conditions to
continue creating additional market disturbances, as this may
lead retailers to continuously undertake deep discounting to keep
their inventories at a reasonable level.

Subdued EBITDA Generation
Fitch said, "We revised its FY16 EBITDA expectations to around
EUR74 million (stable from FY15) down from EUR120 million under
our previous rating case. The successful execution of Vivarte's
cost savings plan and the stronger than expected recovery in its
main clothing business, La Halle Apparel, was more than offset by
the continuous decline of its footwear activities."

Sales were affected by external events such as the November 2015
terrorist attacks and abnormal weather conditions in both autumn
2015 and the spring/beginning of summer 2016. However, the EBITDA
drop of La Halle Footwear primarily stems from an ill-executed
repositioning towards a more attractive offering and lower
prices, making it unable to face strong competition from
Chaussea, Gemo or Kiabi.

Group Complexity
Fitch said, "We view the group's complexity as an additional
factor of execution risk in the current turnaround strategy. This
dilutes management' resources in the context of a highly
competitive environment, while making them consistently oscillate
between a global group and a subsidiary-by-subsidiary turnaround
plan. In our view, this is illustrated by the contrast between La
Halle Apparel's recovery, supported by an improvement in offer,
merchandising and inventory management, and La Halle Footwear's
decline."

Fitch positively views management's recent decision to sell its
Kookai, Chevignon and Pataugas brands. Although it is likely to
result in only marginal proceeds, it should help focus on larger
subsidiaries with higher recovery potential.

Weakening Liquidity
Fitch expects the group to have sufficient liquidity to meet
interest payments in the near term. However, a persistent lack of
EBITDA recovery could lead to growing difficulties at renewing
the group's letters of credit (used to fund its working capital
needs) leading to an accelerating cash burn and diminishing
resources to fund management's turnaround plan. This could turn
into a self-fulfilling liquidity crisis.

Fitch expect that a successful debt restructuring in the coming
months, if agreed, would help management to better focus on the
operating turnaround while improving confidence in the group's
providers of letters of credit. This would ensure easier yearly
renewal and thus a consistent liquidity buffer.

Going Concern Recoveries
Fitch said, "We continue to assess recoveries of the group's debt
under a going concern approach to the business, using a EUR100
million EBITDA (down from around EUR125 million in our previous
analysis) and a 5.0x multiple in deriving a post-distress
valuation. This approach reflects our view that the core
underlying group business remains viable but that profit recovery
could be unpredictable or take longer than previously expected
considering the group's current performance. The multiple
continues to reflect the potential attractiveness of Vivarte's
large physical network."

Under these assumptions, Vivarte's super senior secured debt
lenders could expect a recovery rate in the low end of the RR3
range (51%- 70%), leading to an instrument rating of 'CCC-'/RR3.
Accordingly, we assess the Reinstated Debt's Recovery Rating at
'C'/RR6 reflecting weak recovery prospects in case of default.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Vivarte are
based on management's current strategic plan and include:
-- Sharp decline of sales in FY16 and FY17, due to weak
    performance in spring/summer 2016 and disposal of some
    brands.
-- EBITDA at EUR74 million in FY16, recovering in FY17 and FY18
    mostly thanks to the disposal of some non-profitable
    businesses.
-- Average EUR100 million annual capex over FY16-FY19, including
    EUR50 million strategic capex split between FY17 and FY18.
-- EUR250 million non-recurring items (restructuring,
    discontinuing operations and inventories clearance) split
    between FY16, FY17 and FY18.
-- EUR65 million cash disposal proceeds split between FY16 and
    FY17.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action include:
-- We believe there is a high probability of some form of debt
restructuring (or DDE as defined by Fitch) by end-2016. Assuming
such formal debt restructuring proposal will result in economic
loss or material change in terms to certain set of creditors, on
announcement of the terms of the debt exchange, we will likely
downgrade the IDR to 'C' and subsequently to 'RD' on completion.
--If restructuring talks take longer than expected, we will also
   consider a meaningful deterioration in liquidity buffer or
   suspension of debt service credit negative events.

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to positive rating action include:

Fitch currently does not envisage a positive action under the
existing capital structure.

Fitch said, "After completion of the DDE, Fitch will assign an
appropriate IDR for the issuer's post-exchange capital structure,
risk profile and prospects subject to our assessment of
sustainable leverage and refinancing risk, along with a
turnaround plan (to be announced in September 2016) which is
clear and stabilized."


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G E R M A N Y
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EUROPROP SA: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to D(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its credit ratings on EuroProp (EMC
VI) S.A.'s class A, B, C, D, and E notes.  At the same time, S&P
has affirmed its rating on the class F notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the underlying loans'
credit quality under its criteria for rating European commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions.

EuroProp (EMC VI) closed in June 2007, with a note balance of
EUR489.8 million.  The underlying pool initially held 18 loans
secured on real estate assets in Germany and France.  Thirteen
loans have repaid since closing, including five at a loss.

On the most recent note interest payment date (IPD), in April
2016, five loans remained outstanding and the note balance was
EUR167.7 million.  The five remaining loans are secured by 35
assets in Germany (70% by loan amount) and one in France (30%).
All of the loans have failed to repay at loan maturity, and
consequently, the entire loan pool is in special servicing.

              THE SUNRISE II LOAN (44% OF THE POOL)

The Sunrise II loan is currently secured by 32 secondary retail
properties throughout Germany (down from 48 at closing).  The
current whole-loan balance is EUR144.0 million.  The senior loan
is a syndicated loan, with 50% securitized in this transaction.
The other 50% pari passu piece does not form part of this
securitization.

The loan transferred to special servicing in July 2012 following
a loan payment default at the extended loan maturity date.  Since
defaulting, the loan has been subject to several standstill
extensions to allow the work out process to continue.  The last
standstill agreement expired on June 11, 2016.

In April 2016, the special servicer reported a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 116%, based on a June 2012 valuation of EUR124.6
million. The reported whole-loan interest coverage ratio (ICR) is
6.95x.

S&P has assumed principal losses on the loan in its 'B' rating
stress scenario.

                 THE SIGNAC LOAN (30% OF THE POOL)

The loan, with an outstanding balance of EUR48.4 million,
represents the senior portion (78%) within the whole loan.  The
subordinated portion of the whole loan (the B-note) does not form
part of this transaction.

The whole loan is secured against a multitenant office building
in Gennevillers, an area approximately five kilometers northwest
of Paris.

The whole loan failed to repay at maturity in July 2011, and it
was then transferred to special servicing.

As of April 2014, the property's market value was EUR59.72
million.  Based on this information, the loan's securitized LTV
ratio is 86%.

S&P has assumed principal losses on the loan in its 'B' rating
stress scenario.

           THE HENDERSON - STAPLES LOAN (12% OF THE POOL)

This loan, which was fully securitized at closing, is the third
largest in the pool and has an outstanding principal balance of
EUR19.9 million.

The original loan maturity date for this loan was Jan. 16, 2013.
However, this was extended to Jan. 16, 2014 to allow the
borrowers sufficient time to renegotiate the terms of the leases
and then sell the assets.  This loan failed to repay on the
extended maturity date and has subsequently been transferred into
special servicing.

The loan is secured against a single logistics warehouse in
Buchholz (south of Hamburg) and one office property in
Gelsenkirchen.  The Gelsenkirchen property is currently fully let
to six tenants, with a weighted-average unexpired lease term of
about seven years.

In April 2016, the special servicer reported a securitized LTV
ratio of 163% and an ICR of 0.66x.

S&P has assumed principal losses on the loan in its 'B' rating
stress scenario.

            THE HENDERSON - BERGEN LOAN (5% OF THE POOL)

This loan, which was fully securitized at closing, has a current
outstanding principal balance of EUR7.9 million.  The loan failed
to repay on its extended maturity date in January 2014 and was
subsequently transferred into special servicing.  A standstill
has been entered into with the borrowers to allow the borrowers
to pursue a consensual sale of the property.

The loan is secured by a single mixed-use property in Frankfurt
(Bergen-Enkheim), Germany.  The property, comprising
predominantly retail warehouse, with office and residential
accommodation, is currently fully occupied by multiple tenants,
with a weighted-average unexpired lease term of 5.4 years.

In April 2016, the servicer reported a securitized LTV ratio of
83% and a securitized ICR of 4.05x.

S&P has assumed principal losses on the loan in its 'B' rating
stress scenario.

                 EPIC HORSE LOAN (9% OF THE POOL)

This loan, which is 100% securitized, has a current outstanding
balance of EUR15.47 million.  S&P understands from the special
servicer that all of the properties securing the loan have now
been sold and no additional recoveries are expected on this loan.
Consequently, the outstanding balance of EUR15.5 million is
expected to be written off.

                          RATING RATIONALE

S&P's ratings in Europrop (EMC VI) address the timely payment of
interest, payable quarterly in arrears, and the payment of
principal no later than the legal final maturity date in April
2017.

"Our analysis indicates that the available credit enhancement for
the class A, B, and C notes is not sufficient to mitigate the
risk of principal losses from the underlying loans in a 'B'
stress scenario.  We also believe that these classes of notes
have become more vulnerable to timing risk relating to the
repayment of principal no later than the legal final maturity
date.  In our opinion, these classes of notes face at least a
one-in-two likelihood of default.  Therefore, we have lowered our
ratings on the class A, B, and C notes in line with our criteria
for assigning 'CCC' category ratings," S&P said.

In line with S&P's criteria, it has lowered to 'D (sf)' its
ratings on the class D and E notes because they have experienced
interest shortfalls due to the application of principal
deficiency ledger (PDL) amounts on these classes.

S&P has also affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class F notes as
they continue to experience interest shortfalls due to the
application of PDL amounts on this class of notes.

RATINGS LIST

EuroProp (EMC VI) S.A.
EUR489.775 mil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes
                                    Rating
Class            Identifier         To                  From
A                XS0301901657       CCC (sf)            B (sf)
B                XS0301902622       CCC- (sf)           B- (sf)
C                XS0301903356       CCC- (sf)           CCC (sf)
D                XS0301903513       D (sf)              CCC- (sf)
E                XS0301903943       D (sf)              CCC- (sf)
F                XS0301904248       D (sf)              D (sf)


SGL CARBON: S&P Cuts Corp. Credit Rating to CCC+, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term corporate credit rating
on Germany-based graphite and carbon materials producer SGL
Carbon SE to 'CCC+' from 'B'.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue rating on the EUR250
million seven-year 4.875% fixed rate senior secured notes due
2021 to 'B' from 'BB-'.  The recovery rating on these notes
remains '1'.

"The downgrade reflects our expectation of a material deviation
in performance in 2016 compared to our previous base case, in
which we had expected EBITDA to improve from 2015 to S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted EUR108 million, and free cash flow to recover
back to neutral.  We now expect about EUR70 million adjusted
EBITDA this year, because of the depressed market for graphite
electrodes, and significantly negative free operating cash flow
(FOCF) of about EUR120 million on continued high restructuring
cash-outs.  We now view debt to EBITDA rising again to about 15x
in 2016, similar to in 2014--which had lead the company to
restore its balance sheet via a capital increase.  We therefore
regard the current capital structure as unsustainable, although
we take into account the company's strategy to dispose its
graphite electrodes business during 2016 as part of its
determination to rebuild a stronger balance sheet," S&P said.

"Our EBITDA forecast for 2016 now factors in continued pressure
on the steel markets, particularly the collapse in the price for
graphite electrodes since last year, which will translate to
substantially lower EBITDA from SGL's performance products
division in 2016, in our view.  We also continue to anticipate
significant restructuring costs, including from discontinued
operations, to weigh on FOCF in 2016.  We expect that assets
contemplated by the disposals will be reported as discontinued
operations in 2016.  The dip in FOCF is despite management's cut
in capital expenditure (capex) materially below depreciation
level for 2016," S&P noted.

S&P views SGL's two other divisions -- namely carbon fibers &
materials and graphite materials & systems -- as more
diversified, customer-specific, and profitable with around 12%
EBITDA margin (as reported, before restructuring charges).  S&P
takes into account that the company has now completed the ramp-up
of its joint venture with BMW, although both segments' EBITDA
contributions remain limited at this stage.  For these reasons
S&P continues to view the business risk profile as weak.

S&P views the current capital structure as unsustainable in the
current depressed market for graphite electrodes.  S&P do not
make any assumption on the possible disposal proceeds, although
it takes into account that debt levels will remain very high
compared to the two other divisions' projected EBITDA
contribution.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- 8% revenue decline in 2016 year-on-year, reflecting mostly
      pricing pressure and depressed volumes in the performance
      products division.

   -- Reported EBITDA of about EUR70 million-EUR75 million before
      nonrecurring items.

   -- EUR55 million capex.

   -- About EUR50 million nonrecurring cash-outs, and
      EUR15 million negative impact from discontinued operations
     (Hitco).

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Negative EUR120 million-EUR130 million FOCF.
   -- About 15x adjusted debt to EBITDA.

The stable outlook balances the lack of near-term liquidity
pressure, the potential asset sale -- albeit uncertain -- and the
extent to which this can contribute to restoring leverage to a
more sustainable level, against projected negative FOCF and
ongoing liquidity deterioration S&P expects in the coming
quarters.

S&P could lower the rating absent a recovery in FOCF, notably
from higher-than-expected losses in the graphite electrodes
business, or from higher-than-expected restructuring charges.
S&P could also lower the rating if liquidity deteriorated at a
faster pace, and absent proactive and timely refinancing plans
for the January 2018 maturity.

S&P could raise the rating if asset disposals resulted in a
materially improved capital structure, in combination with
continued growth and profitability resilience at SGL's graphite
specialties and carbon fiber's EBITDA.  A recovery in FOCF, post
restructuring charges, and a firming liquidity position --
together with clear refinancing plans for the 2018 convertible
bond maturity -- could also provide rating upside.


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ADIENT PLC: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating to $2BB Sr. Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary 'BB' issue-level
rating and '5' recovery rating to Adient PLC's proposed $2.0
billion senior unsecured notes, which will be issued by Adient
Global Holdings Ltd.  The '5' recovery rating indicates S&P's
expectation for modest (10%-30%; upper half of the range)
recovery in the event of a payment default.

The company expects to issue the bonds in two tranches, a U.S.
dollar-denominated tranche due 2026 and a euro-denominated
tranche due 2024.

S&P will convert its preliminary ratings to final ratings within
90 days of the consummation of Adient PLC's spin-off into a
separate, independent, publicly traded company following Johnson
Controls' (JCI) transfer of the global assets, liabilities, and
operations of its automotive seating and interiors businesses.
Though the notes will not be guaranteed upon issuance, they will
be guaranteed on an unsecured and unsubordinated basis by Adient.

Initially, Adient Global Holdings Ltd. will be the sole borrower
under the proposed bond offering (similar to its current credit
facilities, which JCI guarantees).  The proceeds from these bonds
will be held in escrow until the spin-off and--at that point--
Adient will assume the obligation of the notes and use the
proceeds in escrow to pay a $3 billion dividend to JCI.

Based on the above capital structure, S&P expects the company's
debt-to-EBITDA metric to remain below 4.0x and its free operating
cash flow (FOCF)-to-debt ratio to remain above 10% in 2016 and
2017, which are appropriate levels for a significant financial
risk profile when factoring in potential volatility.

                            RECOVERY ANALYSIS

Key analytical factors

S&P's simulated default scenario anticipates a default occurring
in 2021 because of a combination of the following factors in the
U.S. auto industry along with continued weak auto production in
Europe: a sustained economic downturn that reduces customer
demand for new automobiles; intense pricing pressure brought
about by competitive actions by other auto suppliers and/or raw
material vendors; and the potential loss of one or more key
customers.  S&P expects these conditions to reduce Adient's
volumes, revenue, gross margins, and net income, causing its
liquidity and operating cash flow to decline.

Simulated default assumptions
   -- Simulated year of default: 2021
   -- EBITDA at emergence: $625 million
   -- EBITDA multiple: 5x

Simplified waterfall
   -- Net enterprise value (after 5% admin. costs): $2.969
      billion
   -- Valuation split (obligors/nonobligors): 38%/63%
   -- Priority claims: $25 million
   -- Value available to first-lien debt claims
      (collateral/noncollateral):
   -- $2.294 billion/$33 million
   -- Secured first-lien debt claims: $2.406 billion
      -- Recovery expectations: 90%-100%
   -- Total value available to unsecured claims: $649 million
   -- Senior unsecured debt/pari passu unsecured claims: $2.060
      billion/$157 million

Note: All debt amounts include six months of prepetition
interest. Collateral value equals asset pledge from obligors
after priority claims plus equity pledge from nonobligors after
nonobligor debt.

RATINGS LIST

Adient PLC
Corporate Credit Rating                   BB+(prelim)/Stable/--

New Ratings

Adient Global Holdings Ltd.
Prpsd $2.0B Sr Unscd Nts                  BB(prelim)
  Recovery Rating                          5H(prelim)


VALLAURIS II CLO: S&P Affirms B+(sf) Rating on Class IV Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' its
credit rating on Vallauris II CLO PLC's class III notes.  At the
same time, S&P has affirmed its 'B+ (sf)' rating on the class IV
notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report, dated May 31,
2015, in addition to S&P's credit and cash flow analysis.  S&P
has also taken into account recent developments in the
transaction.

S&P subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class of
notes at each rating level.  In S&P's analysis, it used the
reported portfolio balance that it considers to be performing,
the reported weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average
recovery rates that S&P considered appropriate.  S&P incorporated
various cash flow stress scenarios using its standard default
patterns and timings for each rating scenario, in conjunction
with different interest stress scenarios.

Since S&P's last review of the transaction on June 2, 2015, it
has observed an increase in the available credit enhancement for
the rated notes due to structural deleveraging.  The portfolio's
credit quality has remained relatively stable since S&P's
previous review, with no new defaults or assets rated in the
'CCC' category.  All of the par coverage tests comply with the
required triggers under the transaction documents, while reported
weighted-average spread increased slightly to 4.25% from 4.23%.

The portfolio is now concentrated, with only a limited number of
obligors representing a small number of industries, and the
credit protection available to the class III and IV notes could
be negatively affected by the performance of individual obligors.
For example, the top obligor accounts for 16.2% of the current
portfolio and if it were to default, the available credit
enhancement for the rated notes would face significant erosion.
This risk is captured by S&P's out-of-model supplemental test, a
stress test that it outlines in its corporate cash flow
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

Taking into account the observations outlined above, while the
results of S&P's cash flow analysis suggest the available credit
enhancement for the class III and IV notes is commensurate with
higher ratings than those currently assigned, these ratings are
capped by S&P's out-of-model supplemental test.  Therefore, S&P
has raised to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' its rating on the class
III notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'B+ (sf)'
rating on the class IV notes.

Vallauris II CLO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.

RATINGS LIST

Vallauris II CLO PLC
EUR324.6 Million Floating-Rate and Subordinated Notes

Class            Rating
            To               From

Rating Raised

III         BBB+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)

Rating Affirmed

IV          B+ (sf)


=========
I T A L Y
=========


MONTE DEI PASCHI: Other Banks May Need Capital Under Rescue Terms
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Sanderson and Mehreen Khan at The Financial Times report
that terms of a rescue plan for Monte dei Paschi di Siena
suggested that other Italian banks might have to raise more
capital.

According to the FT, under the MPS rescue plan, the Tuscan bank
will shift its entire bad loan portfolio of EUR27.7 billion into
a securitization vehicle, priced at 33 cents on the euro.

But investors calculated that if other Italian banks were to take
a similar loss, or "haircut", on their non-performing loans, they
would need to be recapitalized, the FT relays.  Some sold down
their shares in those banks that could be affected, the FT
discloses.

"We've got a plan for Monte dei Paschi . . . and that involves
taking a further haircut to their NPLs," James Sym, a fund
manager at Schroders,a s cited by the FT, said.  "If you were to
then apply that to the other banks, other banks would need
capital, particularly the regional ones."

"That's why you've had this turnaround.  People are looking at
MPS and saying if that's the new fair value, then we're going to
need to see capital raises from other domestic banks we thought
were safe, even though they 'passed' the stress test," Mr. Sym
added, notes the report.

Other investors pointed out that the Monte solution would further
deplete the capital of Altlante, Italy's bank 'backstop' fund,
the FT notes.

"This is a Monte specific solution and it doesn't address the
sector as a whole . . . it will use the remaining capital in the
Atlante fund," the FT quotes Rahul Kalia, an investment manager
at Aberdeen Asset Management, as saying.

Despite emerging as the weakest of 51 banks in the European tests
-- it was the only bank to have its capital wiped out under the
test's adverse scenario -- shares in the Tuscan bank initially
rose as much as 11 per cent when its rescue plan was revealed on
July 29, the FT notes.  This will involve a EUR5 billion
recapitalization of the bank and a clean-up of its bad loans via
the securitization vehicle, the FT states.

                      About Monte dei Paschi

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DEMIR-HALK BANK: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Bank Deposit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has revised the outlook on the deposit
ratings of Demir-Halk Bank (Nederland) N.V. (DHB) to negative
from stable.  Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the bank's
baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA at ba1 and its
long-term and short-term foreign and local-currency bank deposit
ratings at Ba1 and Not Prime, respectively.  Moody's has also
affirmed DHB's long-term and short-term Counterparty Risk (CR)
assessments at Baa2(cr)/Prime-2(cr).

These actions follow the review for downgrade of Turkey's Baa3
government bond rating announced on July 18, 2016, which was
triggered by the military coup attempt.  Even though the coup
failed, Moody's considers it to be a reflection of broader
political challenges and expects credit risks associated with
recent events to remain elevated.

             https://www.moodys.com/research/--PR_352273

After announcing the review of Turkey's rating, Moody's has
placed 17 Turkish banks on review for downgrade on July 19, 2016,
including Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. (THB; deposit and senior debt
Baa3/Baa3 on review for downgrade, BCA ba1 on review for
downgrade), which owns 30% of DHB.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's revised the outlook on DHB's deposit ratings to negative
from stable to reflect increased asset risks in relation to
Turkey, after the country was subject to a military coup.  The
evolving political and economic situation could entail further
deterioration in the domestic operating environment, which might,
in turn, affect DHB's financial strength through a weakening
asset quality and deteriorating profitability.  The bank
disclosed an exposure to Turkey of 34% of total exposures at
year-end 2015, nonetheless declining to 30% as of end-June 2016,
which confirms a multi-year decreasing trend in Turkish exposures
at the bank.  In addition, a noteworthy proportion of assets
originated in the European Economic Area (54% of interest-earning
assets as of year-end 2015, increasing to 60% as of end-June
2016) is comprised of European companies managed by Turkish
entrepreneurs and European subsidiaries of large Turkish groups.

Nonetheless, Moody's has affirmed DHB's BCA and adjusted BCA at
ba1, in reflection of the bank's solid asset performance
throughout the financial crisis and its strong capitalization.
The bank's ba1 BCA reflects DHB's (1) concentrated corporate
banking activities in trade finance; (2) solid financial
fundamentals in terms of capital and liquidity; and (3) volatile
earnings profile.  The bank's adjusted BCA of ba1 does not
incorporate any affiliate support uplift from Turkey-based parent
THB, because the parent is a minority shareholder.  As a result,
the current review for downgrade of THB's BCA has no direct
rating implication for DHB.

DHB's deposits face a moderate loss-given-failure, which results
in no uplift from Moody's Advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF)
analysis to the bank's adjusted BCA.  DHB's deposit ratings of
Ba1 do not incorporate any likelihood of support from external
sources, either from affiliates or governments.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

An upgrade of DHB's BCA and deposit ratings is unlikely in view
of increased country risk and asset risks, as reflected in the
negative outlook on these ratings.

Developments that would likely lead to a downgrade of DHB's BCA
and deposit ratings include (1) a downward trend on profitability
and increased earnings volatility, (2) increased country risk
impacting asset quality, (3) a deterioration of capitalization
metrics, or (4) an increase in related-party lending.

                        PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


GREENKO DUTCH: Fitch Hikes Rating on US$550MM Notes to 'B+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the rating on Greenko Dutch B.V.'s
(GBV) US$550 million notes, which are guaranteed by Greenko
Energy Holdings (GEH), to 'B+' from 'B'. The Recovery Rating is
'RR4'.

The agency has also assigned GEH, which is the ultimate holding
company of the group's assets, including those included in the
restricted group of companies backing GBV's US$550 million notes,
a Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'B+'
with a Stable Outlook.

The upgrade of the notes' rating is driven by Fitch's view that
the group faces lower refinancing risk associated with the notes
and improved risk management policies following the acquisition
by GIC, Singapore's sovereign wealth fund, of a majority stake in
Greenko Mauritius in November 2015 through GEH. GIC's involvement
and support has been demonstrated through new equity infusions to
GEH in 2016 of US$80 million, and the addition of Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority (ADIA) as a minority shareholder in GEH via
a US$150m investment. Under GIC's majority ownership, GEH has
further tightened its financial risk management, which is evident
from the move to hedge the full forex risk of the principal of
the US dollar notes, from only half before.

GBV used the proceeds from the notes to refinance existing debt
at operating entities within a restricted group of companies that
is defined in the indenture to the note issue. The operating
entities within the restricted group issued secured Indian rupee-
denominated bonds to GBV as part of this debt refinancing.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Financial Performance to Improve: Fitch expects the restricted
group's financial profile to improve, supported by increased cash
generation as the impact of the El Nino on wind patterns and
monsoons subsides and more operating assets are added to the
group. The agency expects financial leverage (as measured by
total adjusted debt/operating EBITDA) of the restricted group to
improve to around 5x by the end of the financial year to 31 March
2017 (FYE17), compared with 6.2x in FY16, which was adversely
affected by the effects of El Nino and depreciation of the Indian
rupee against the US dollar. We expect further assets to be added
to the restricted group under GBV over time, subject to terms and
conditions in the bond indenture, including debt to EBITDA
incurrence tests.

Diversified Operations, No Construction Risk: All of the assets
within the restricted group, with total capacity of 623MW, are
now in operation for at least two years. The power projects are
diversified by type and geography, which mitigates risks from
adverse wind patterns or monsoon conditions. Around 60% of the
hydro assets are built around rivers in northern India, which are
glacier fed, while the rest are mainly dependant on the monsoons
for their performance. The wind assets are spread across three
states in India, though wind patterns across larger geographic
areas tend to be correlated.

Price Certainty, but Volume Risks: Long-term power purchase
agreements (PPAs) for all of the restricted group's wind and most
of its hydro assets support the credit profile of the restricted
group. Although the long-term PPAs provide protection from price
risk, production volume will vary with wind and hydro patterns,
as was evident in FY16, despite the diversification of the
assets.

Weak Counterparty Profile: The weak credit profiles of the
restricted group's customers continue to be a rating constraint.
The restricted group's top three customers - state utilities in
Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Himachal Pradesh - accounted for
about 50% of revenue in FY16. The utilities in Andhra Pradesh and
Himachal Pradesh have a track record of timely payments, but the
receivable cycle has been longer for others. The average
receivable days, however, has remained broadly stable, although
it rose to around 97 days in FY16 from around 90 days in 2014.
GBV has demonstrated it can terminate PPAs if payments are
delayed, which may give it the ability to switch customers.
However, this still exposes the restricted group to temporary
loss of revenues and working capital pressures while it
negotiates new agreements.

Guarantee, Structural Enhancements to Notes: The guarantee by GEH
does not enhance the note's rating as the credit risk profiles of
both GEH and the GBV restricted group are assessed at the same
level. However, GEH's guarantee on the notes is beneficial to
note holders as the assets of the restricted group are not
effectively owned by GBV. The structural features created through
the notes indenture provide additional protection via
restrictions and limitations on use of cash and investments at
the restricted group level. Furthermore, note holders benefit
from access to cash generation and assets of the restricted group
through the rupee-denominated notes, via which the proceeds of
the US dollar notes are on-lent to the asset owners of the
restricted group. The rupee-denominated notes have a first charge
on all assets, except the accounts receivables, of the restricted
group. Indirectly, the note holders also benefit from the absence
of any prior-ranking debt in the restricted group, aside from a
working capital debt facility of a maximum of US$30 million,
which is secured against accounts receivable.

Significant Reduction in Refinancing Risk: We believe the
association with GIC and ADIA will improve GEH's access to
funding, including in the banking and capital markets. High
refinancing risk, given the bullet maturity of the entire long-
term debt of the restricted group, together with forex risks,
previously constrained the US dollar bond's ratings at 'B'. There
is evidence that the new shareholders intend to take a less
aggressive approach to the capital structure while seeking growth
in the asset base of GEH. Tighter forex risk management policies
introduced are also beneficial. We expect GIC will continue to
drive tighter risk management practices and financial policies at
GEH, while improving transparency and governance. Five out of the
nine directors on GEH's board are from GIC and one is from ADIA.

Hedged Forex Risk: The restricted group's earnings are in Indian
rupees, but the notes are denominated in US dollars, giving rise
to foreign-exchange risk. However, GBV has hedged the entire
outstanding principal on its US$550 million 8% notes due 2019,
compared with only half of the principal a year earlier. The
coupon payments on the notes continue to be fully hedged.

Fitch said, "GEH's Credit Profile: GEH, including the 623MW of
assets in the GBV restricted group, has about 1,901MW of assets,
of which 998MW are operational. GEH's credit risk profile is
somewhat elevated by the construction risks as well as structural
subordination of cash flows of operational assets with prior
ranking debt, such as the GBV restricted group. However, asset
construction and execution risks in our view are mitigated by
group's established track record and the low construction risks
associated with wind- and solar power projects, which comprise
about 90% of projects under construction. Furthermore, some
operational assets under GEH, dividends from assets, including
some from the GBV restricted group, together with demonstrated
financial support from shareholders places GEH's overall credit
risk profile at 'B+'. Fitch expects GEH's consolidated financial
leverage, as measured by debt to EBITDA to also remain around 5x
in the medium term, based on our expected investment assumptions
for the group."

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for GBV include:
-- The plant load factors for the wind power projects are in
    line with the P75 estimates (25% probability that the
    projects will not meet the estimates) in the medium to
    long term
-- Profitability in line with past trends
-- Addition of operating assets and dividend payments by the
    restricted group of companies as allowed by the conditions in
    the bond indenture

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For rated notes issued by GBV
Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:
-- A weakening of GEH's credit profile, together with weaker
    operations, including increased receivable collection period,
    resulting in the GBV restricted group's total adjusted debt/
    EBITDA sustained above 5.0x or EBITDA interest cover of less
    than 2.0x (FY16: 1.5x)
-- Significant increase in refinancing risks

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:
-- Positive rating action is unlikely in the next 18 to 24
    months given GEH's credit profile, and the expected asset
    additions at the GBV restricted group level, which will
    likely result in no material improvement in credit metrics of
    the restricted group over the medium term

For GEH
Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:
-- Any changes to shareholding that adversely affect the
    company's overall risk profile, including its liquidity and
    refinancing, risk management policies or growth risk appetite
-- Weakening in operational or financial performance of its
    assets and/ or aggressive investments that are not
    sufficiently supported by equity, which lead to debt to
    EBITDA being sustained over 5x and EBITDA interest coverage
    sustained significantly below 2x.

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:
-- No positive rating action is expected in the next 18-24
    months because of the expected capex, capital structure and
    credit metrics.


GRUPO ISOLUX: Seeks U.S. Recognition of Danish Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------------
Grupo Isolux Corsan, S.A., Corsan-Corviam Construccion, S.A.,
Grupo Isolux Corsan Concesiones, S.A., Isolux Ingenieria, S.A.
and Grupo Isolux Corsan Finance B.V. filed Chapter 15 petitions
in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York on July 29, 2016.  The petitions, signed by foreign
representative, Karla Pascarella, sought recognition in the
United States of proceedings currently pending in Spain and The
Netherlands.

Although none of the Spanish Debtors have operations in the
United States, some of their non-debtor affiliates are located,
or otherwise operate, in the United States.

On July 28, 2016, each of the Spanish Debtors filed a petition to
commence proceedings pursuant to Additional Provision Four of the
Spanish Act 22/2003, of July 9, 2014 on Insolvency for judicial
homologation of a Refinancing Agreement, in the Mercantile Court
of Madrid, Spain.  The total financial debt of the Isolux Group
that is subject to the judicial homologation in Spain is
approximately EUR2.4 billion (not including certain contingent
amounts that may become part of the restructured debt).

Also on July 28, 2016, a suspension of payments proceeding was
commenced in the District Court of Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
pursuant to the Dutch Insolvency Act (Faillissementswet) for
Grupo Isolux Corsan Finance B.V.  The Dutch Debtor is an
affiliate of the Spanish Debtors and the issuer of the EUR850
million in 6.625% senior notes due 2021 that are guaranteed by
the Spanish Debtors.

The Spanish Debtors, the Dutch Debtor and their non-debtor
affiliates, collectively the Isolux Group, comprise an
international engineering, construction and concession group,
which provides a comprehensive range of engineering, procurement
and construction services.  The Isolux Group carries out
infrastructure concession operations globally, delivering
projects to both public and private sector clients in over 40
countries on four continents.  At the first quarter of 2016, the
Isolux Group reported current assets of approximately EUR5
billion and current liabilities of approximately EUR5 billion,
Court documents show.

According to Ms. Pascarella, the Isolux Group experienced a
significant decline in financial performance in the first quarter
of 2016, on a year-to-year basis compared to both the first
quarter of 2015 and compared to the fourth quarter of 2015, due
largely to a significant reduction in the Isolux Group's
liquidity and working capital, which, in turn, impaired its
business operations and production rates.

"The decline in financial performance caused significant
financial strain that resulted in delayed payments to suppliers,
which in turn further led to disruptions in the company's
businesses," Ms. Pascarella said.  "Additionally, the curtailment
of bonding line availability due, among other circumstances, to
the economic crisis as well as the effect of the insolvency
proceedings commenced by Abengoa, S.A. (which is one of the
Isolux Group's primary competitors), further inhibited the Isolux
Group's ability to participate in bids for new contracts.
Without access to bonding lines, the Isolux Group found itself
unable to monetize its existing backlog and access new business
to drive future growth," she added.

Faced with mounting liquidity needs, the Isolux Group sought to
restructure its balance sheet and deleverage its capital
structure.  Starting in October 2015, certain financial creditors
began providing additional financing to the Isolux Group in order
to allow for the stabilization of its financial position while
the terms of a restructuring were negotiated.  To assist in its
efforts to achieve a comprehensive restructuring of its financial
indebtedness, the Isolux Group appointed Rothschild, S.A. and
Houlihan Lokey (Europe) as financial advisors.  The Isolux Group
also began negotiating a potential restructuring with the
steering committee of lenders under the Bank Loans, represented
by KPMG, as financial advisor, and Jones Day, as legal counsel.
The Isolux Group engaged D.F. King Ltd, an Orient Capital
company, to compile an updated list of bondholders and on May 16,
2016, requested that bondholders disclose their identities and
holdings of those securities to the Identification Agent.

An ad hoc group of holders of the Unsecured Notes organized and
selected PJT Partners, as financial advisor, and Linklaters,
S.L.P., as legal counsel.

On June 28, 2016, the Debtors presented their financial creditors
with a comprehensive restructuring proposal.  The terms of the
restructuring proposal subsequently were incorporated into a
Refinancing Agreement, dated July 13, 2016, executed by, among
others, GIC, the other Spanish Debtors, the Dutch Debtor, the
Steering Committee, and certain other creditors and equity
holders, which, along with related proxy and consent materials,
was distributed to creditors for accession on July 13, 2016.

As disclosed in Court documents, the RA received overwhelming
support from the affected creditors.  At each of the Spanish
Debtors, Creditors holding in excess of 90% of the debt subject
to the Spanish Foreign Proceedings have acceded to the RA,
including creditors holding approximately 82% of the Unsecured
Notes.

In accordance with the RA, on July 28, 2016, each Spanish Debtor
submitted its petition for homologation of the RA to the Spanish
Mercantile Court of Madrid.  The request for homologation of the
RA is pending before the Spanish Foreign Court.  As agreed in the
RA, issuance of the new securities by GIC may take place after
receipt of the homologation of the RA by the Spanish Court,
irrespective of the court resolutions approving the Homologation
in Spain or the composition agreement in the Netherlands becoming
final and non-appealable.

Concurrently with the petitions, the Spanish Foreign
Representative has filed a provisional relief motion which seeks
to: (i) stay all persons and entities from taking actions against
the Spanish Debtors or the Spanish Debtors' assets; (ii) entrust
the administration or realization of all or part of the Spanish
Debtors' assets located in the United States to the Spanish
Debtors in order to protect and preserve the value of those
assets; (iii) suspend the right of any person or entity other
than the Spanish Debtors to transfer, encumber or otherwise
dispose of any assets of the Spanish Debtors; and (iv) grant the
Spanish Foreign Representative the rights and protections to
which they are entitled under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

"The success of the Isolux Group's efforts to achieve a global
restructuring will depend on cooperation from multiple financial
creditors across many jurisdictions.  To be in the best position
to achieve and implement the restructuring, the Spanish Debtors
must maintain operations, have a stable platform to continue
finalizing their restructuring with their creditors and avoid a
race to the courthouse by some creditors seeking to obtain
advantage over other creditors in a different part of the world,"
Ms. Pascarella maintained.

The Foreign Representative has hired Shearman & Sterling LLP as
her counsel.

Judge Sean H. Lane is assigned to the cases.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


SME BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' ICRs & Revises Outlook to Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on SME Bank to stable from
negative.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the long- and short-
term issuer credit ratings on the bank at 'BB-/B'.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that the setup of the
joint-stock company Russian Small and Medium Business Corporation
(RSMB Corporation) and the procedures surrounding its interaction
with SME Bank have been defined and legislated and S&P now sees
limited risk to the likelihood of timely extraordinary support to
the bank from the Russian government.

The ratings on SME Bank are supported by S&P's view of its
importance and very strong link to the Russian government as well
as its moderate business position and strong capital and
earnings.

However, rating constraints include the bank's exposure to
changes in the government's economic policy and the challenging
and volatile operating environment for banks in Russia, in
particular with increasing credit risk as well as limited
earnings power under the existing business model.

Following the introduction of a presidential decree on the
measures for the further development of small and midsize
enterprises (SMEs) in 2015, the Russian government decided to
transfer the control of SME Bank from VEB group to the newly
created government-related entity (GRE) in charge of SME
development.  In April 2016, 100% of the shares of the bank were
transferred from VEB to the RSMB Corporation, which is owned by
the government.  Until then SME Bank was a subsidiary of VEB
group.

A new governing order, issued in June 2016, specified the RSMB
Corporation's role as the government agency for developing the
SME sector.  The entity's strategy is positioned within the
framework of the government policy for diversification of the
Russian economy as well as the socially important goal of
long-term employment stability.  The institution's objectives
include improving SMEs' access to credit across the country,
implementing the state guarantee programs for SMEs, and
channeling of a portion of state procurement to the SME sector.
SME Bank will play a key role in these programs.

According to the management of the bank, future support to the
SME bank from the corporation could include either a capital
injection or a subordinated loan or a deposit.  However, the RSMB
Corporation's business model is in its early stages and S&P
considers that the mechanism of providing financial support to
the bank is still to be tested.  S&P therefore do not apply any
uplift to the rating on SME Bank for support from the RSMB
Corporation. At the same time, S&P believes that the government
would mitigate the effects of potential negative extraordinary
intervention from the group; yet such interventions are very
unlikely, in S&P's view.

However, S&P regards SME Bank as a GRE with a high likelihood of
timely and sufficient extraordinary support from the Russian
government.  This is based on SME Bank's:

   -- Important role in implementing the state's public policy
      for development of the SME sector.  The bank estimates that
      its loans represent about 1.5% of total bank lending to
      SMEs in Russia, its microcredits to SMEs represent about
      10%, and leasing to SMEs accounts for 2.5%.  S&P estimates
      that the bank accounts for 13% in the overall of long-term
      funding to the SME sector in Russia.  S&P notes, however,
      that from the government's point of view, SME Bank's
      importance is seen not in terms of market share, but in its
      role in the development of SME lending infrastructure and
      new products, closing market gaps, and keeping interest
      rates low.

   -- Very strong link with the Russian Federation.  The state's
      full ownership and strong oversight of the bank's business
      and financial plans will, in S&P's view, continue.  In
      addition to its functions related to supporting SMEs, SME
      Bank is Russia's sole entity with a primary focus on
      financing SME lending infrastructure companies, such as
      leasing and factoring institutions, and providing funding
      to regional banks and other financial institutions.  The
      bank provides financing to 120 banks across Russia.

S&P's long-term rating on SME Bank is therefore two notches
higher than S&P's assessment of the bank's 'b' stand-alone credit
profile (SACP).

SME Bank's SACP reflects the 'bb-' anchor for a bank operating
primarily in Russia.  The rating factor currently supporting SME
Bank's financial strength is its strong capitalization, in S&P's
opinion.  While capital levels are high, with S&P's measure of
risk-adjusted capital of 15.91% at end-2015, it forecasts the
bank will consume capital over the coming years and project
ratios of below 15% in the coming 18-24 months due to the
difficult economic climate for Russian banks and SMEs.  S&P's
assessment of the bank's SACP reflects S&P's view of its business
position as moderate, supported by its public mandate for
maintaining SME lending infrastructure by providing funding to
financial institutions (mainly regional banks) that onlend to the
SME sector; its moderate concentration in the loan book; and its
moderate risk position.

S&P's assessment of the bank's risk position reflects risks
related to lending to many small Russian SME financial
institutions, especially in the current macroeconomic conditions
that S&P considers to be challenging for the Russian banking
sector.  Such specialization generates additional risks given the
situation in the banking sector and the recent withdrawals of a
number of banking licenses by the central bank.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that in the next 12
months, SME Bank will continue to benefit from the high
likelihood of timely and sufficient extraordinary support from
the Russian government and maintain its strong capital and
moderate risk positions.

S&P could take a negative rating action if it considered that the
likelihood of timely extraordinary government support to the bank
had reduced, for instance, if its public policy role for or links
with the government had weakened.  Negative rating actions could
also follow if S&P saw a combination of a lower SACP --
potentially as a result of the bank's risk position or capital
weakening due to high losses or new loan loss provisions -- and
the lowering of the local currency ratings on the bank's ultimate
owner, the Russian Federation.

S&P could take a positive rating action if it considered that the
likelihood of support from the government had increased, for
example, due to the bank's higher public policy role, or if S&P
could factor in the support from the new owner based on its
assessment of its credit quality.


TULA CITY: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian City of Tula's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-'
with Stable Outlooks and Short-Term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.
The agency has also affirmed the city's National Long-Term rating
at 'A+(rus)' with Stable Outlook.

Fitch said, "The affirmation reflects our unchanged baseline
scenario regarding the city's projected satisfactory fiscal
performance and the expected containment of its direct risk below
40% of current revenue in the medium term."

KEY RATING DRIVERS
The ratings reflect Tula's projected structural imbalances,
weaker than historical average fiscal performance in the medium
term and Russia's weak institutional framework amid a
deteriorated macro-economic trend. The ratings also consider the
city's low debt with moderate exposure to refinancing risk along
with continued support from Tula Region (BB/Stable).

Fitch expects Tula to post a close to zero operating margin in
2016-2018 (2011-2015: average 1.9%). It also expects the city to
run a modest deficit before debt variation of about 5%-6% of
total revenue in 2016-2018, after its deficit widened to 8% of
total revenue by end-2015, from 6.6% a year earlier, underpinned
by opex growth."

Fitch expects opex pressure on Tula's fiscal performance to
prevail at least in 2016, with the rate of opex growth surpassing
that of operating revenue. 80% of the city's opex was inflexible
staff costs and current transfers of various kinds in 2012-2015.

Fitch said, "We expect Tula's operating revenue to remain almost
equally split between taxes and current transfers from 2016
onwards. Its operating revenue was primarily supported by taxes
(49% of 2015 operating revenue), followed by current transfers
from the regional budget (2015: 42%)."

Fitch assesses Russia's institutional framework for local and
regional governments (LRGs) as weak and views it as a constraint
on the city's ratings. Weak institutions lead to lower
predictability of Russian LRGs' budgetary policies, narrow their
planning horizon and hamper long-term development plans. The
city's policies tend to be shaped by frequent changes in
allocation of revenue and expenditure responsibilities between
the tiers of government.

Fitch said, "We expect Tula to contain growth of its direct risk
in 2016-2018, which is likely to remain below 40% of current
revenue. We also expect the city to retain use of bank loans as
the prime source of budget deficit financing in 2016-2018,
supplemented by budget loans from the region. Short-term bank
loans comprised 60% of the city's interim debt stock as of end-
June 2016, with the remaining 40% composed of budget loans from
Tula Region.

"We assess the city's exposure to refinancing risk on market-
originated debt as moderate, with maturities on 1 July 2016 of
RUB1.45 billion to be repaid by the year-end. The city's cash
position remains weak with RUB101 million funds accumulated on a
treasury account as of end-June 2016 (2015: RUB220 million)."

With a population of 551,270 inhabitants, the city is Tula
Region's capital and its largest metropolitan area. The region's
economy is fairly well diversified with strong industrial
profile; industries composed 37% of gross value added in 2013.
Economically Tula benefits from its close proximity to the city
of Moscow (BBB-/Negative), the country's capital and its largest
market.

The region's wealth metrics are close to the Russian median
figures, as its average salary was in line with the national
median while GRP per capita was 12% below in 2014. In 2015, the
estimated growth rate of the region's economy was 2.4% in real
terms in contrast to an estimated 3.7% decline of national GDP,
reflecting the deterioration of the macroeconomic environment in
Russia.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
A sustainable fiscal performance with operating surplus at about
5% of operating revenue and maintenance of moderate direct risk
below 50% of current revenue, conducive to sufficient coverage of
interest payments would lead to an upgrade.

Material growth of direct risk above 50% of current revenue,
along with a deterioration in fiscal performance leading to a
weak operating balance that was insufficient to cover interest
payments would lead to a downgrade.


=========
S P A I N
=========


GRUPO ISOLUX: Chapter 15 Case Summary
-------------------------------------
Chapter 15 Debtors:

       Name                                      Case No.
       ----                                      --------
       Grupo Isolux Corsan, S.A.         16-12202
       Corsan-Corviam Construccion, S.A. 16-12203
       Grupo Isolux Corsan Concesiones, S.A. 16-12204
       Isolux Ingenieria, S.A.                   16-12205
       Grupo Isolux Corsan Finance B.V. 16-12206

Type of Business: The Isolux Corsan Group is a Spanish-owned
commercial conglomerate with a worldwide reputation specializing
in the construction and concession of major infrastructure
projects in the fields of engineering, civil engineering, the
environment and installations, with over 80 years of experience
and a presence in over 40 countries on four continents, and with
a professional staff of approximately 6,000 professionals.

Chapter 15 Petition Date: July 29, 2016

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       Southern District of New York (Manhattan)

Debtors' Authorized Representative: Karla Pascarella

Judge: Hon. Sean H. Lane

Chapter 15 Petitioner's Counsel: Fredric Sosnick, Esq.
                                 Stephen M. Blank, Esq.
                                 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP
                                 599 Lexington Avenue
                                 New York, NY 10022-6069
                                 Tel: 212-848-8000
                                 Fax: 212-848-7179
                                 E-mail: fsosnick@shearman.com
                                    stephen.blank@shearman.com

                                    - and -

                                Solomon J. Noh, Esq.
                                Kelly E. McDonald, Esq.
                                SHEARMAN & STERLING (London) LLP
                                9 Appold Street
                                London EC2A 2AP
                                United Kingdom
                                Tel: +44 20 7655 5000
                                E-mail: solomon.noh@shearman.com
                                      kelly.mcdonald@shearman.com

Estimated Assets: EUR5 billion as of first quarter of 2016

Estimated Debts: EUR5 billion as of first quarter of 2016

A full-text copy of the Chapter 15 petition is available for free
at http://bankrupt.com/misc/nysb16-12202.pdf


GRUPO ISOLUX: Seeks U.S. Recognition of Spanish Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Grupo Isolux Corsan, S.A., Corsan-Corviam Construccion, S.A.,
Grupo Isolux Corsan Concesiones, S.A., Isolux Ingenieria, S.A.
and Grupo Isolux Corsan Finance B.V. filed Chapter 15 petitions
in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York on July 29, 2016.  The petitions, signed by foreign
representative, Karla Pascarella, sought recognition in the
United States of proceedings currently pending in Spain and The
Netherlands.

Although none of the Spanish Debtors have operations in the
United States, some of their non-debtor affiliates are located,
or otherwise operate, in the United States.

On July 28, 2016, each of the Spanish Debtors filed a petition to
commence proceedings pursuant to Additional Provision Four of the
Spanish Act 22/2003, of July 9, 2014 on Insolvency for judicial
homologation of a Refinancing Agreement, in the Mercantile Court
of Madrid, Spain.  The total financial debt of the Isolux Group
that is subject to the judicial homologation in Spain is
approximately EUR2.4 billion (not including certain contingent
amounts that may become part of the restructured debt).

Also on July 28, 2016, a suspension of payments proceeding was
commenced in the District Court of Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
pursuant to the Dutch Insolvency Act (Faillissementswet) for
Grupo Isolux Corsan Finance B.V.  The Dutch Debtor is an
affiliate of the Spanish Debtors and the issuer of the EUR850
million in 6.625% senior notes due 2021 that are guaranteed by
the Spanish Debtors.

The Spanish Debtors, the Dutch Debtor and their non-debtor
affiliates, collectively the Isolux Group, comprise an
international engineering, construction and concession group,
which provides a comprehensive range of engineering, procurement
and construction services.  The Isolux Group carries out
infrastructure concession operations globally, delivering
projects to both public and private sector clients in over 40
countries on four continents.  At the first quarter of 2016, the
Isolux Group reported current assets of approximately EUR5
billion and current liabilities of approximately EUR5 billion,
Court documents show.

According to Ms. Pascarella, the Isolux Group experienced a
significant decline in financial performance in the first quarter
of 2016, on a year-to-year basis compared to both the first
quarter of 2015 and compared to the fourth quarter of 2015, due
largely to a significant reduction in the Isolux Group's
liquidity and working capital, which, in turn, impaired its
business operations and production rates.

"The decline in financial performance caused significant
financial strain that resulted in delayed payments to suppliers,
which in turn further led to disruptions in the company's
businesses," Ms. Pascarella said.  "Additionally, the curtailment
of bonding line availability due, among other circumstances, to
the economic crisis as well as the effect of the insolvency
proceedings commenced by Abengoa, S.A. (which is one of the
Isolux Group's primary competitors), further inhibited the Isolux
Group's ability to participate in bids for new contracts.
Without access to bonding lines, the Isolux Group found itself
unable to monetize its existing backlog and access new business
to drive future growth," she added.

Faced with mounting liquidity needs, the Isolux Group sought to
restructure its balance sheet and deleverage its capital
structure.  Starting in October 2015, certain financial creditors
began providing additional financing to the Isolux Group in order
to allow for the stabilization of its financial position while
the terms of a restructuring were negotiated.  To assist in its
efforts to achieve a comprehensive restructuring of its financial
indebtedness, the Isolux Group appointed Rothschild, S.A. and
Houlihan Lokey (Europe) as financial advisors.  The Isolux Group
also began negotiating a potential restructuring with the
steering committee of lenders under the Bank Loans, represented
by KPMG, as financial advisor, and Jones Day, as legal counsel.
The Isolux Group engaged D.F. King Ltd, an Orient Capital
company, to compile an updated list of bondholders and on May 16,
2016, requested that bondholders disclose their identities and
holdings of those securities to the Identification Agent.

An ad hoc group of holders of the Unsecured Notes organized and
selected PJT Partners, as financial advisor, and Linklaters,
S.L.P., as legal counsel.

On June 28, 2016, the Debtors presented their financial creditors
with a comprehensive restructuring proposal.  The terms of the
restructuring proposal subsequently were incorporated into a
Refinancing Agreement, dated July 13, 2016, executed by, among
others, GIC, the other Spanish Debtors, the Dutch Debtor, the
Steering Committee, and certain other creditors and equity
holders, which, along with related proxy and consent materials,
was distributed to creditors for accession on July 13, 2016.

As disclosed in Court documents, the RA received overwhelming
support from the affected creditors.  At each of the Spanish
Debtors, Creditors holding in excess of 90% of the debt subject
to the Spanish Foreign Proceedings have acceded to the RA,
including creditors holding approximately 82% of the Unsecured
Notes.

In accordance with the RA, on July 28, 2016, each Spanish Debtor
submitted its petition for homologation of the RA to the Spanish
Mercantile Court of Madrid.  The request for homologation of the
RA is pending before the Spanish Foreign Court.  As agreed in the
RA, issuance of the new securities by GIC may take place after
receipt of the homologation of the RA by the Spanish Court,
irrespective of the court resolutions approving the Homologation
in Spain or the composition agreement in the Netherlands becoming
final and non-appealable.

Concurrently with the petitions, the Spanish Foreign
Representative has filed a provisional relief motion which seeks
to: (i) stay all persons and entities from taking actions against
the Spanish Debtors or the Spanish Debtors' assets; (ii) entrust
the administration or realization of all or part of the Spanish
Debtors' assets located in the United States to the Spanish
Debtors in order to protect and preserve the value of those
assets; (iii) suspend the right of any person or entity other
than the Spanish Debtors to transfer, encumber or otherwise
dispose of any assets of the Spanish Debtors; and (iv) grant the
Spanish Foreign Representative the rights and protections to
which they are entitled under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

"The success of the Isolux Group's efforts to achieve a global
restructuring will depend on cooperation from multiple financial
creditors across many jurisdictions.  To be in the best position
to achieve and implement the restructuring, the Spanish Debtors
must maintain operations, have a stable platform to continue
finalizing their restructuring with their creditors and avoid a
race to the courthouse by some creditors seeking to obtain
advantage over other creditors in a different part of the world,"
Ms. Pascarella maintained.

The Foreign Representaive has hired Shearman & Sterling LLP as
her counsel.

Judge Sean H. Lane is assigned to the cases.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


ASYA KATILIM: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 Long Term Deposits Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn all ratings of Asya
Katilim Bankasi A.S. and Asya Sukuk Company Limited, following
the Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency's decision
(BDDK) to cancel the entity's banking license and initiate its
subsequently liquidation.

At the time of withdrawal, these ratings for Asya Katilim Bankasi
A.S. were outstanding: long term deposits at Caa1 with a negative
outlook, short term deposits at NP, national scale bank deposits
at B3.tr/TR-4, long and short term Counterparty Risk Assessment
(CRA) at Caa1(cr)/NP(cr), baseline credit assessment (BCA) at ca
and adjusted BCA at ca.

At the time of withdrawal the following ratings for Asya Sukuk
Company Limited were outstanding: backed subordinate at C.

The withdrawal of the bank's deposit ratings at Caa1 reflects the
rating agency's expectation of potential losses for uninsured
deposits.  This expectation is based on the bank's very weak
financial profile as expressed in a ca BCA.

At the same time, Moody's notes that the magnitude of ultimate
losses is difficult to estimate currently and may take some time
to fully materialize for deposit-holders.  This is due to the
fact that the bank's true financial condition could have
deteriorated further since the publication of its latest
financial statements in Q3 2015.  In addition, there are no
comparable precedents of bank liquidation procedures in Turkey in
the recent past to benchmark this case.

As stated in the latest publicly available financial statements
as at Q3 2015, the bank's assets declined to TRY9.5 billion
(USD3.1 billion) in the third quarter of 2015 from TRY16.6
billion (USD7.3 billion) the year before and its loan book and
deposit base had been in persistent decline.  The bank's
liquidity position had also worsened over the same period with a
shortfall to cover uninsured deposits from liquid assets.  The
repayment on uninsured deposits, therefore, would depend on the
recovery potential of the loan book, which experienced an
increase in non-performing assets to 28% of the total as at Q3
2015, from 17% as at end-2014.  Furthermore, Moody's expects that
the bank's financial condition and liquidity may have
deteriorated, due to the on-going deposit outflows and adverse
developments in asset quality trends, since the publication of
the bank's financials.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the rating due to the cancelation of the
entity's banking license by BDDK.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks.  NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.
For further information on Moody's approach to national scale
credit ratings, please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology
published in May 2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings
from Global Scale Ratings".  While NSRs have no inherent absolute
meaning in terms of default risk or expected loss, a historical
probability of default consistent with a given NSR can be
inferred from the GSR to which it maps back at that particular
point in time.  For information on the historical default rates
associated with different global scale rating categories over
different investment horizons, please see: https://is.gd/P7cHkG


OYAK: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB+/B' Corp. Credit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and short-term
corporate credit ratings on Turkey-based investment holding
company OYAK (Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu).  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'trAA+/trA-1' long- and short-term Turkey national
scale ratings.  S&P subsequently withdrew these ratings at the
issuer's request.  At the time of the withdrawal, the outlook was
negative.

At the time of the rating withdrawal, S&P's assessment of pension
fund OYAK's business risk profile risk profile was constrained by
the company's large exposure to Turkey's economy and associated
high country risk, since its equity portfolio is almost fully
composed of Turkish entities.  With the recent integration of
Netherlands-based alumina manufacturer Almatis and U.S.-based
Medicine in its Chemicals division, OYAK has shown its
willingness to expand beyond its domestic boundaries.  But such
developments remain at an early stage.  This is tempered by the
good diversification of OYAK's investment portfolio in terms of
sectors (iron and steel, building materials, automotive and
logistics, energy, chemicals, financial services, and others) and
number of companies (more than 80 subsidiaries).

S&P's assessment of the company's financial risk profile
reflected the company's prudent financial management with
significant headroom under S&P's 10% loan-to-value ratio, given
its adjusted net cash position of broadly Turkish lira (TRY) 5
billion (about $1.7 billion equivalent) as of June 30, 2016.
Given OYAK's sizable cash position of TRY8.6 billion (broadly
equivalent to $3 billion) mostly held in lower-rated Turkish
banks as of June 30, 2016, of which about 36% is in U.S. dollars,
the company withstood our stress test.  Therefore, S&P's long-
term rating on OYAK was one notch higher than its rating on the
sovereign.

At the time of the withdrawal, the negative outlook mirrored that
on Turkey and incorporated the associated political risks.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS GROUP: Lady Judge Wants Green to Compensate Pensioners
----------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Lady Barbara Judge, the former chairman of
the Pension Protection Fund, has called on ex-BHS owner Sir
Philip Green to compensate the company's pensioners.

Sir Philip sold the store chain for GBP1 last year but it
collapsed under new owners with a pension deficit of GBP571
million, BBC recounts.

According to BBC, Lady Judge told BBC Radio 5 live's Wake up to
Money: "He should be writing a cheque and saying 'I'm sorry'".

Her comments echo those of Frank Field MP, who chairs the
committee examining the collapse of BHS, BBC notes.

Mr. Field has asked Sir Philip to "write a cheque" to sort out
the pension fund, BBC relays.

In an angry war of words, the tycoon has responded by accusing
the MP of overseeing a "kangaroo court" in his committee's
parliamentary inquiry into the firm's collapse and of trying to
create a "false narrative", BBC discloses.

Mr. Field has accused Sir Philip of "displacement therapy" and
said he had to "face up to the evil he has done in destroying
BHS", BBC relates.

Sir Philip's spokesman did not respond to Lady Judge's comments
directly, but did reiterate that he is in discussions with the
Pensions Regulator to try to find a solution to the BHS pension
scheme, BBC notes.

Meanwhile Lady Judge, as cited by BBC, said that the Pensions
Regulator needed greater powers to prevent a repeat of what
happened at BHS.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


GALLOWAY GROUP: Enters Administration, 161 Jobs Affected
--------------------------------------------------------
Gareth MacKie at The Scotsman reports that Galloway Group, the
specialist ductwork engineer that worked on Glasgow's Sir Chris
Hoy Velodrome, has collapsed into administration after falling
victim to the oil and gas downturn.

Administrators from EY said that 161 workers have been made
redundant with immediate effect, with the remaining 33 being kept
on to continue trading at the group's Ductmate subsidiary while a
buyer is sought, The Scotsman relates.

"In due course, the administrators will decide how best to take
matters forward.  The business has been under considerable
pressure for a number of years.  Demand in our traditional
construction market has been very weak since 2012 and margins
have been significantly reduced," The Scotsman quotes a
spokeswoman for Galloway as saying.  "In the recent past, the
collapse of the oil and gas sector has applied further pressure.
This has meant that the business has been loss making and under
cash pressure."

According to The Scotsman, the spokeswoman said the firm's
directors, led by managing director Jim Mathieson, had worked
"tirelessly" to avoid insolvency through a number of initiatives,
including cost cutting, modernizing the business and raising
finance.

"Efforts to raise finance are significantly impaired because of
the high debt burden on the business from both previous
borrowings and the final salary pension scheme," the spokeswoman,
as cited by The Scotsman, said.

Galloway Group is based in Dundee.


GHA COACHES: Administration Raises "Serious Questions"
------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that passengers left stranded in parts of
Wrexham following the collapse of GHA Coaches have been told they
could have a service by the end of August.

According to BBC, Wrexham council still has eight routes to fill
after Ruabon-based GHA Coaches suddenly went into administration
in July with the loss of 320 jobs.

The routes are out to tender and the council is willing to
subsidize them, BBC says.  GHA ran public and school services
across Wrexham, Flintshire, Denbighshire and into Cheshire, BBC
discloses.

Plaid Cymru's North Wales AM Llyr Gruffyd said "serious
questions" needed answers from the Welsh Government which he said
knew of the firm's troubles in May, BBC relates.

GHA Coaches was a bus firm run by principal directors Gareth and
Arwyn Lloyd Davies.


GULF KEYSTONE: Parties-in-Interest in Favor of Restructuring
------------------------------------------------------------
UPI reports that the target of a takeover bid, Iraqi oil player
Gulf Keystone Petroleum said most of the parties with an interest
in the company are in favor of restructuring.

"The company announces [August 2] that signatories to the
restructuring agreement now represent approximately 82% of the
aggregate principal amount of the Guaranteed Notes and
approximately 82% of the aggregate principal amount of the
Convertible Bonds," UPI quotes Gulf Keystone as saying in a
statement.

The company, which lists headquarters in London, reached an
agreement last month with the majority of its creditors and
shareholders to restructure its debt obligations, UPI recounts.
Andrew Simon in July stepped down as chairman, opening the door
for non-executive director Keith Lough to help steer a US$500
million debt conversion proposal, UPI relays.

According to UPI, Chief Executive Officer Jon Ferrier said
restructuring was the best possible option to maintain value in
reserves.  Last year, Gulf Keystone, as cited by UPI, said it was
looking for partners or potential buyers as part of a long-term
strategic review and Norwegian Oil and gas company DNO, which
itself has a strong Iraqi portfolio, came forward on July 29 with
a $300 million bid.

Gulf Keystone Petroleum Limited is an oil and gas exploration and
production company operating in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.  It
is listed on the main market of the London Stock Exchange.


MALACHITE FUNDING: S&P Affirms CCC- Ratings on Tier 1 & 2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on Malachite Funding
Ltd.'s tier 1 and tier 2 income notes.  At the same time, S&P has
raised its ratings on all other classes of notes.  S&P has
subsequently withdrawn its rating on the JPY615,000,000 Super
Senior Notes at the issuer's request.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using the latest available data, in addition to S&P's
cash flow analysis.  S&P has taken into account recent
developments in the transaction and reviewed the transaction
under S&P's relevant criteria.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis based
on the methodology and assumptions as outlined by our corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria, to determine the
break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes at
each rating level.  The BDR represents our estimate of the
maximum level of gross defaults, based on our stress assumptions,
that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay interest and
principal on notes.  At the same time, we conducted a credit
analysis based on our assumptions, to determine the scenario
default rate (SDR) at each rating level, which we then compared
against its respective BDR.  The SDR is the minimum level of
portfolio defaults we expect each CDO tranche to be able to
support at the specific rating level using Standard & Poor's CDO
Evaluator," S&P said.

"In our analysis, we used the reported portfolio balance that we
considered to be performing, the weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that we considered to be
appropriate.  We applied various cash flow stress scenarios using
our standard default patterns and timings for each rating
category assumed for all classes of notes, in conjunction with
different interest rate stress scenarios," S&P noted.

The Malachite portfolio comprises predominantly structured
finance securities, of which nearly 56% of the performing balance
comprises European and U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities.  The remaining portion of the structured finance
securities mainly comprises a diversified mix of high-grade
commercial mortgage-backed securities, collateralized loan
obligations, and student loans.

Since S&P's previous review on Nov. 20, 2014, the super senior
notes have amortized to $120.67 million from $1.154 billion.
This amounts to a more than 89% reduction in the notional
outstanding amount and is the primary driver behind the upgrades.
Due to this amortization, the available credit enhancement for
all classes of notes has increased over the same period, and
therefore, the structure can now withstand higher losses.

S&P's credit analysis of the transaction highlights that the
overall credit quality of the underlying portfolio has not
changed since S&P's previous review.  The current weighted-
average rating on the assets in the portfolio is in the 'A-'
category, unchanged from the weighted-average rating in S&P's
previous review.

In S&P's view, the deleveraging of the super senior notes has
increased the available credit enhancement for all other tranches
to a level that is now commensurate with higher ratings.  S&P has
therefore raised its ratings on all super senior and junior
senior tranches.

S&P's cash flow results indicate that the tier 1 and tier 2
income notes cannot withstand its credit and cash flow stresses
at rating levels above 'CCC-'.  In addition, S&P's supplemental
stress tests constrain its ratings on these classes of notes at
'CCC- (sf)'.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' ratings
on the tier 1 and tier 2 income notes.

Malachite Funding is an HSBC-sponsored vehicle that securitizes a
portfolio of predominantly structured finance securities.

RATINGS LIST

Class                    Rating
                  To                From

Malachite Funding Ltd.

Rating Raised And Withdrawn

JPY615,000,000 Super Senior
                  AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)
                  NR                AAA (sf

Ratings Raised

EUR400,200,000 Super Senior
                  AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)

GBP338,000,000 Super Senior
                  AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)

$2,472,669,352.11 Super Senior
                  AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)

$165 Million Junior Senior Series 2010-2 Tranche 1 Tier 6
                  AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)

$165 Million Junior Senior Series 2010-3 Tranche 1 Tier 8
                  AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)

$110 Million Junior Senior Series 2010-4 Tranche 1 Tier 10
                  AAA (sf)          AA- (sf)

$72 Million Junior Senior Series 2010-5 Tranche 1 Tier 12
                  AA+ (sf)          A+ (sf)

GBP39 Million Junior Senior 2010-6 Tranche 1 Tier 14
                  AA+ (sf)          A+ (sf)

EUR40 Million Junior Senior 2010-7 Tranche 1 Tier 16
                  AA+ (sf)          A (sf)

$75 Million Junior Senior 2010-8 Tranche 1 Tier 18
                  AA (sf)           A- (sf)

$70 Million Junior Senior 2010-9 Tranche 1 Tier 20
                  A+ (sf)           BBB+ (sf)

$55 Million Junior Senior 2010-10 Tranche 1 Tier 22
                  A (sf)            BBB (sf)

$50 Million Junior Senior 2010-11 Tranche 1 Tier 24
                  BBB+ (sf)         BBB- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

EUR22.68 Million Tier 1 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

EUR12.60 Million Tier 1 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

EUR27.3 Million Tier 1 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

EUR8.4 Million Tier 1 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

$33.906 Million Tier 1 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

$12.714 Million Tier 1 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

$16.80 Million Tier 1 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

$8.4 Million Tier 1 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

$5.880 Tier 1 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

$8.476 Million Tier 1 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

$47.8 Million tier 1 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

$11.760 Million Tier 1 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

EUR14.320 Million Tier 2 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

GBP4.80 Million Tier 2 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

$31.772 Million Tier 2 Income Notes
                  CCC- (sf)

NR--Not rated.


PREMIER FOODS: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Premier Foods plc's (Premier) Outlook
to Stable from Negative, while affirming the company's Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B'.

Premier Foods Finance plc's senior secured floating-rate GBP175
million and fixed-rate GBP325 million notes have been affirmed at
'B' with Recovery Rating 'RR4'.

The Outlook revision to Stable reflects the company's successful
turnaround plan, as revenue resumed mild growth and free cash
flow (FCF) turned positive. Moreover, profitability has remained
solid for the rating and relative to other peers in packaged
food, a trend which Fitch expects to continue over the financial
year ending April 2, 2017.

Fitch forecast that funds from operations (FFO)-adjusted net
leverage will worsen above the 6.0x threshold compatible with
Premier's 'B' IDR, once pension contributions resume in FY17.
Although this will be above the comfortable level of 4.9x
achieved in FY16, the business model is nonetheless proving to be
sustainable with moderate execution risks. Fitch expects
resilient profitability and the prospect of low single-digit FCF
margin to support de-leveraging towards 5.7x by FY19. Fitch
forecast Premier will, as a result, retain adequate financial
flexibility, translating into limited refinancing risks.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stabilizing Trading Performance
Following several quarters of contraction, Premier's FY16
revenues showed that innovation and marketing efforts undertaken
have started to pay off. This has resulted in organic revenue
growth over the four reported quarters up to July 2, 2016, and
stable FY16 operating profit, confirming a strong EBITDA margin
of over 18%.

This improvement was driven by lower input costs and a shift to
more effective consumer marketing spending away from discounts
and promotions, which increased brand awareness and supported new
product launches. Fitch believes this process represents the
beginning of a virtuous cycle, as management plans to revamp more
product categories and engage in new product launches.

Brexit Poses Challenges
Even though a portion of Premier's input costs are denominated in
US$ or other currencies, Fitch does not expect the company's
profit margin to be immediately affected by the recent GBP
depreciation, as the majority of the company's foreign currency
needs are hedged for FY17. Once these hedges expire, Premier may
find it difficult to pass on higher costs to consumers who in
turn may be pressed by a general increase in prices. However,
these risks are mitigated by the company's ability to introduce
cost-saving measures and increased pricing power, due to ongoing
product innovation.

Deleveraging Delayed to FY19
Fitch said, "According to our projections, Premier's near-term
financial flexibility will be constrained by high interest costs
of approximately GBP40 million per annum and the rise of pension
contributions to nearly GBP60 million annually from FY17 as the
company fulfils its agreements with pension trustees."

Therefore, while management remains focused on paying down debt,
Fitch expects FFO adjusted net leverage to peak at around 6.7x in
FY18. Such leverage will be high for Premier's 'B' IDR but Fitch
expects this to fall back to below 6.0x after FY18 as Premier
generates positive FCF in the low-to-mid single digits of sales
from strengthening trading performance. Fitch also expects
interest cover (FFO fixed charge cover) to rise above 2.0x which
together with Premier's proven access to various financing and
liquidity sources, should help mitigate refinancing risks.

Reliance on Challenging UK Market
Premier's revenue is mainly generated from the "big-four
retailers" in the UK: Tesco (BB+/Stable), Asda, J Sainsbury's and
Morrisons. However, an ongoing shift in consumer shopping
behaviour from these traditional big retailers to hard
discounters, online and convenience stores is challenging
Premier's performance, prompting it to adapt its product offer
and keep a lean cost base.

In addition, the UK market has continued to experience price
deflation and strong competitive pressures, leading to a high
level of promotions. These trends are constraining Premier's
planned recovery, in spite of the company's product launches to
target the discount and convenience channels.

Leading UK Ambient Food Producer
Premier enjoys a strong position as one of the UK's largest
ambient food producers, with an almost 5% share in the fragmented
and competitive GBP28.7 billion UK ambient grocery market.
Despite the benefits in manufacturing, logistics and procurement
Premier derives in the UK from its wide range of branded and non-
branded food products, the company mainly competes in mature
segments such as ambient desserts and ambient cakes. This limits
its growth prospects, making Premier reliant on continuing its
marketing and innovation efforts to protect its market share.

New Shareholder Enhances Growth Opportunities
Fitch said, "The company has been strengthening its marketing
team to expand sales outside the UK, in Australia, the USA and
the Middle East. We believe that so far this effort has affected
group operating profit as, based on our estimates, Premier's
international scale is insufficient to generate material
profitability. We expect the international operations of the new
shareholder Nissin Foods, with which Premier is developing a new
strategy, to enhance Premier's opportunities and ability to
pursue this expansion strategy at little extra costs.
Additionally, Premier now has scope to sell Nissin's products in
the UK, providing further revenue upside.

Average Senior Secured Notes' Recoveries
"The 'B'/'RR4' senior secured rating reflects average recoveries
(31%-50%), albeit at the low end (36%), for senior secured
noteholders in the event of default. Fitch assumes that the
enterprise value (EV) of the company and the resulting recovery
of its creditors (including the pension trustees) would be
maximized in a restructuring scenario under our going-concern
approach rather than in a liquidation due to the asset-light
nature of the business as well as the strength of its brands.
Furthermore, a default would likely be triggered by unsustainable
financial leverage, possibly as a result of weak consumer
spending affecting sales and profits if combined with ongoing
punitive pension deficit contributions.

"Fitch has applied a 30% discount to EBITDA and a distressed
EV/EBITDA multiple of 5.0x, reflecting challenging market
conditions in the UK and the reliance on a single country, which
are partially offset by a portfolio of well-known product brands.
The notes rank equally with the pension schemes for up to
GBP450 million and are included as a senior obligation in the
debt waterfall within our recovery calculation."

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:
-- Failure to stabilize performance with continued revenue
    decline and EBITDA margin falling below 18%
-- Neutral-to-negative FCF on a sustained basis due to
    profitability erosion, higher or unexpected capex and
    increases in pension contribution or funding costs
-- FFO adjusted net leverage remaining permanently around 6.0x
    (pension deficit contributions are deducted from FFO)
-- FFO fixed charge coverage below 1.8x (FY16: 2.6x) on a
    sustained basis.

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:
-- Trading performance continuing to recover (organic revenue
    growth) and the ability to maintain EBITDA margin above 18%
    after having sufficiently invested in advertising and
    promotions to protect its market position and drive growth
-- FFO adjusted net leverage below 5.0x (pension deficit
    contributions are deducted from FFO)
-- FFO fixed charge coverage above 2.5x on a sustained basis
-- FCF margin in positive territory (FY16: 8.5%) on a sustained
    basis after adequate capital investments.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE
Under the assumption of positive FCF generation of at least GBP15
million per annum, Premier should be able to gradually repay the
drawn portion (GBP55 million reported as of FYE16) of its GBP272
million revolving credit facility due in 2019. Subsequently the
next major debt repayment is the company's GBP175 million notes
due in March 2020. Assuming its trading performance continues to
recover, the company should have GBP50 million accumulated cash
and be able to refinance any outstanding bonds in 2020/2021.


RMAC SECURITIES 2007-NS1: S&P Ups Ratings on 2 Note Classes to B+
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on RMAC Securities
No. 1 PLC's series 2006-NS4 class M1a, M1c, M2a, M2c, B1a, and
B1c notes.  At the same time, S&P has raised its ratings on the
series 2007-NS1 class M1a, M1c, M2c, B1a, and B1c notes.  S&P has
affirmed its ratings on all other classes of notes in these two
transactions.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction information from the June 2016 investor report
and loan-level data.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of
its U.K. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) criteria
and our current counterparty criteria.

Since S&P's previous review, the weighted-average foreclosure
frequency (WAFF) for both transactions has decreased.  The
decrease is primarily due to the transactions' increased
seasoning and a decline in arrears, which has also resulted in
more loans benefitting from a seasoning credit.  The loans'
weighted-average seasoning is 117 months in series 2006-NS4 and
115 months in series 2007-NS1.  Arrears over 90 days represent
7.74% of the pool in series 2006-NS4 and 8.86% of the pool in
series 2007-NS1, down from 15.12% and 17.16%, respectively, in
June 2013.

S&P's weighted-average loss severity (WALS) calculations have
increased at the 'AAA' level, but have decreased at other rating
levels.  Although the transactions have benefitted from the
decrease in the weighted-average current loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios, this has been offset by the increase in S&P's
repossession market value decline assumptions, which are greatest
at the 'AAA' level.

RMAC Securities No. 1 series 2006-NS4

Rating        WAFF      WALS
level          (%)       (%)
AAA          30.41     40.12
AA           25.15     32.23
A            19.77     20.49
BBB          15.96     14.05
BB           12.20      9.85
B            10.31      6.72

RMAC Securities No. 1 series 2007-NS1

Rating        WAFF      WALS
level          (%)       (%)
AAA          30.66     39.93
AA           25.81     32.70
A            20.40     22.07
BBB          16.66     16.13
BB           12.95     12.11
B            10.98      8.78

The reserve funds are at their required levels and the liquidity
facilities have not been drawn for both transactions.  The
portfolios' improved performance and the increase in credit
enhancement as a result of deleveraging have resulted in the
transactions continuing to pay principal pro rata.  In accordance
with S&P's U.K. RMBS criteria, it has applied various cash flow
stress scenarios, including assuming the recession starts at the
end of the third year to test the resilience of the transaction
structures to back-ended defaults.  S&P has also considered the
possibility of triggers being breached and the transactions
switching to paying principal sequentially.

"Using our WAFF and WALS calculations for series 2006-NS4 in our
cash flow model, the class A3a, M1a, M1c, M2a, and M2c notes pass
our cash flow stresses at higher rating levels than those
currently assigned.  Our ratings on these classes of notes are
capped at our 'A-' long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on
Barclays Bank PLC as bank account provider, following its loss of
an 'A-1' short-term rating and failure to take remedy action and
as swap counterparty, following its loss of an 'A-1+' short-term
rating and failure to post collateral.  We have therefore
affirmed our 'A- (sf)' rating on the class A3a notes and raised
to 'A- (sf)' our ratings on the class M1a, M1c, M2a, and M2c
notes," S&P said.

As a result of a reduction in S&P's WAFF calculations and an
increase in the level of credit enhancement, it observes that
S&P's credit enhancement to credit coverage ratio has increased
to 11x from 3x at the 'BB' rating level.  The liquidity facility
can only be drawn to pay interest on the class M2a and M2c notes
if the class M2 principal deficiency ledger (PDL) is lower than
20% of the outstanding notional amount of the class M2 notes.
The lower level of defaults applied in this transaction therefore
means that the class M2 notes now benefit from the greater
ability to draw upon the liquidity facility for interest
shortfalls and are consequently able to pass S&P's cash flow
stresses at much higher rating levels than those currently
assigned.

S&P's analysis shows that the available credit enhancement for
the class B1a and B1c notes is now commensurate with higher
ratings than those currently assigned.  Consequently, S&P has
raised to 'BB- (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its ratings on the class B1a
and B1c notes.

Using S&P's WAFF and WALS calculations for series 2007-NS1 in its
cash flow model, the class A2a, A2b, A2c, M1a, and M1c notes pass
S&P's cash flow stresses at higher rating levels than those
currently assigned.  S&P's ratings on these classes of notes are
also capped at its 'A-' long-term ICR on the bank account
provider, Barclays Bank, following its loss of an 'A-1' short-
term rating and failure to take remedy action.  S&P has therefore
affirmed its 'A- (sf)' ratings on the class A2a, A2b, and A2c
notes, and raised to 'A- (sf)' its ratings on the class M1a and
M1c notes.

S&P's analysis shows that the available credit enhancement for
the class M2c, B1a, and B1c notes is now commensurate with higher
ratings than those currently assigned.  Consequently, S&P has
raised to 'BBB (sf)' from 'B (sf)' its rating on the class M2c
notes and to 'B+ (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' S&P's ratings on the class
B1a and B1c notes.

As for the series 2006-NS4 class M2a and M2c notes, S&P's credit
enhancement to credit coverage ratio has increased for the series
2007-NS1 class M1a, M1c, and M2c notes.  The series 2007-NS1
class M1a, M1c, and M2c notes also benefit from the greater
ability of the issuer to draw upon the liquidity facility to meet
any interest shortfalls as a result of S&P's lower WAFF
assumptions.

S&P's credit stability analysis indicates that the maximum
projected deterioration that it would expect at each rating level
for one- and three-year horizons, under moderate stress
conditions, is in line with S&P's credit stability criteria.

RMAC Securities No. 1's series 2006-NS4 and 2007-NS1 are U.K.
nonconforming RMBS transactions that closed in December 2006 and
June 2007, respectively.  Paratus AMC Ltd. (formerly known as
GMAC-RFC Ltd.) originated the loans.

RATINGS LIST

Class           Rating
           To             From

RMAC Securities No. 1 PLC
EUR263.8 Million, GBP830 Million, $477 Million Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes Series 2006-NS4

Ratings Raised

M1a        A- (sf)        BBB+ (sf)
M1c        A- (sf)        BBB+ (sf)
M2a        A- (sf)        BB+ (sf)
M2c        A- (sf)        BB+ (sf)
B1a        BB- (sf)       B- (sf)
B1c        BB- (sf)       B- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

A3a        A- (sf)

RMAC Securities No. 1 PLC
EUR214 Million, GBP296.8 Million, $168 Million Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes
Series 2007-NS1

Ratings Raised

M1a        A- (sf)        BB (sf)
M1c        A- (sf)        BB (sf)
M2c        BBB (sf)       B (sf)
B1a        B+ (sf)        B- (sf)
B1c        B+ (sf)        B- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A2a        A- (sf)
A2b        A- (sf)
A2c        A- (sf)


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *