TCREUR_Public/160812.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, August 12, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 159


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

NEW WORLD: Ostrava Court Rejects Citigroup's OKD Bond Claims
NEW WORLD: Creditors Committee Backs OKD Unit's Reorganization


MONTE DEI PASCHI: Moody's Reviews Bonds With Direction Uncertain
OFFICINE MACCAFERRI: Moody's Lowers CFR to B3, Outlook Negative


AURORUS 2016: S&P Assigns B Rating to EUR9.5MM Class E Notes
AVOCA CLO II: S&P Withdraws 'D (sf)' Ratings on 5 Note Classes


LSR GROUP: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to B1


ABENGOA SA: Enters Into Debt Restructuring Deal with Creditors

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

IMES: Seanamic Group Buys Business Out of Administration
LB RE FINANCING: August 31 Claims Filing Deadline Set
LEHMAN COMMERCIAL: August 31 Proofs of Debt Filing Deadline Set
STANDARD CHARTERED: S&P Assigns BB- LT Rating to Tier 1 Notes


* BOOK REVIEW: The Money Wars


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

NEW WORLD: Ostrava Court Rejects Citigroup's OKD Bond Claims
bne IntelliNews reports that the Ostrava Regional Court rejected
claims related to bonds issued by insolvent OKD and former parent
New World Resources.

According to bne IntelliNews, the bulk of the claims were put
forward by Citigroup as the lead agent for Ad Hoc Group (AHG),
the trio of creditors that until the insolvency had controlled
the miner via a conversion of bonds to equity.

The Czech government, which has approved limited loans to OKD
since it became insolvent, has said it hopes the creditors will
decide to restructure the company, bne IntelliNews relates.
While the government has long accepted that OKD is a lost cause
in the long run, it is keen to avoid a sudden shutdown of its
mines in the east of the country, which employ around 13,000, bne
IntelliNews notes.

The report says the court ruling did little to alleviate the
bitter atmosphere that has grown between AHG -- which features
funds Grammercy, M&G, and Ashmore -- and the Czech state. "The
statements and arguments made in the effort to deny Citibank's
claims directly contradict all available evidence and
documentation," an AHG spokesman said ahead of the ruling, bne
IntelliNews relates. "The insolvency filings as well as the
statements made by Citibank which are available in the insolvency
register are clear proof of that."

The rejected claims relate to bonds worth EUR352 million and a
EUR35 million super-senior credit facility, bne IntelliNews
discloses.  Around CZK10 billion of the rejected claims were put
forward by Citigroup, bne IntelliNews states.

Citibank can still go to court to get its claims recognized and
can also launch an international arbitration against the Czech
state, something which it has strongly hinted it is more than
willing to do, bne IntelliNews says.

New World Resources Plc is the largest Czech producer of coking

NEW WORLD: Creditors Committee Backs OKD Unit's Reorganization
Reuters reports that the creditors committee of OKD agrees to
pursue the reorganization of the New World Resources coal mining

"This is very positive news for OKD, for employees and hard coal
mining in the Ostrava region," Reuters quotes OKD spokesman Ivo
Celechovsky as saying.

According to Reuters, news agency CTK quoted Judge Petr Kula as
saying the court will approve the reorganization shortly.

New World Resources Plc is the largest Czech producer of coking


MONTE DEI PASCHI: Moody's Reviews Bonds With Direction Uncertain
Moody's Investors Service placed on review with direction
uncertain the A2 ratings assigned to the covered bonds issued by
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. (the issuer/"BMPS";
deposits B2, on review with direction uncertain, adjusted
baseline credit assessment ca on review with direction uncertain;
counterparty risk (CR) assessment B2(cr), on review with
direction uncertain.)


The rating action was prompted by Moodys' decision to place the
issuer's B2(cr) CR assessment on review with direction uncertain
on 8 August 2016

The TPI assigned to this transaction is Very High. This TPI
framework does constrain the ratings of the covered bonds at
their current level.


Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) to
determine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond. COBOL
determines expected loss as (1) a function of the probability
that the issuer will cease making payments under the covered
bonds (a CB anchor event); and (2) the stressed losses on the
cover pool assets following a CB anchor event.

The CB anchor for this program is CR assessment plus 1 notch.
Moody's may use a CB anchor of CR assessment plus one notch in
the European Union or otherwise where an operational resolution
regime is particularly likely to ensure continuity of covered
bond payments.

The cover pool losses for BMPS' mortgage covered bonds are 15.6%.
This is an estimate of the losses Moody's currently models
following a CB anchor event. Moody's splits cover pool losses
between market risk of 10.6% and collateral risk of 5.0%. Market
risk measures losses stemming from refinancing risk and risks
related to interest-rate and currency mismatches (these losses
may also include certain legal risks). Collateral risk measures
losses resulting directly from cover pool assets' credit quality.
Moody's derives collateral risk from the collateral score, which
for this program is currently 7.5%.

The over-collateralization in the cover pool is 41.3%, of which
BMPS provides 20.5% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level
consistent with the A2 rating is 8.5%, of which the issuer should
provide 8.5% in a "committed" form. These numbers show that
Moody's is not relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expected loss

For further details on cover pool losses, collateral risk, market
risk, collateral score and TPI Leeway across covered bond
programs rated by Moody's please refer to "Moody's Global Covered
Bonds Monitoring Overview", published quarterly. All numbers in
this section are based on the most recent Performance Overview /
Moody's most recent modelling (based on data, as per 31 March

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator"
(TPI), which measures the likelihood of timely payments to
covered bondholders following a CB anchor event. The TPI
framework limits the covered bond rating to a certain number of
notches above the CB anchor.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the

   -- The CB anchor is the main determinant of a covered bond
      program's rating robustness. A change in the level of the
      CB anchor could lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
      covered bonds. The TPI Leeway measures the number of
      notches by which Moody's might lower the CB anchor before
      the rating agency downgrades the covered bonds because of
      TPI framework constraints.

   -- The TPI assigned to BMPS mortgage covered bonds is Very
      High. The TPI Leeway for this program is limited, and thus
      any reduction of the CB anchor may lead to a downgrade of
      the covered bonds.

   -- A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur
      in certain circumstances, such as (1) a country ceiling or
      sovereign downgrade capping a covered bond rating or
      negatively affecting the CB Anchor and the TPI; (2) a
      multiple-notch downgrade of the CB Anchor; or (3) a
      material reduction of the value of the cover pool.

OFFICINE MACCAFERRI: Moody's Lowers CFR to B3, Outlook Negative
Moody's Investors Service downgraded global environment
engineering company Officine Maccaferri S.p.A.'s (Officine
Maccaferri) corporate family rating (CFR) to B3 from B2 and its
probability of default rating to B2-PD from B1-PD. Concurrently
Moody's has downgraded to B3 from B2 the senior unsecured rating
assigned to the EUR190 million notes issued by Officine
Maccaferri due in 2021, with a loss given default (LGD)
assessment of LGD5. Moody's has changed the outlook on the
ratings to negative from stable.

"The downgrade of Officine Maccaferri's ratings reflects our
expectation that soft trading conditions will continue to
pressure the company's top-line and margins in the next 12 to 18
months, resulting in credit metrics deteriorating to a level not
compatible with a B2 rating" says Paolo Leschiutta, a Vice
President -- Senior Credit Officer at Moody's and the lead
analyst for Officine Maccaferri.

The downgrade and negative outlook reflect the company's weak
operating performance in the first half of 2016 that was far
below Moody's expectation, as well as the rating agency's view
that the company's business profile has proven to be more
volatile than originally built into the B2 CFR.


The rating action reflects Officine Maccaferri's weak operating
results in H1 2016, which were far below Moody's expectations
owing to soft market conditions in almost all its markets.
Moody's expects that, absent a material recovery in trading
conditions in H2 2016, Officine Maccaferri's leverage will exceed
the maximum level commensurate with the guidance for a B2 rating,
with debt/EBITDA exceeding 6.0x at end-2016.

The company's revenue declined by 12.6% in H1 2016 and its
reported EBITDA almost halved to EUR11.1 million, down from
EUR22.1 million in H1 2015. In particular, the company was not
able to compensate for the expected deterioration in some
emerging markets, such as Brazil and Russia, as it did in 2015.
Indeed, results were poor also in Europe, North America and Asia
Pacific, where the anticipated increase in infrastructure
expenses failed to materialize. Moody's expects that soft trading
conditions will continue to pressure Officine Maccaferri's
operating performance and profitability over the next 12-18

Officine Maccaferri's B3 CFR recognizes (1) the fairly low
barriers to entry to the market, particularly in some of the
company's largest cash contributing activities, such as its
Double Twist Mesh division; and (2) the company's small size
compared with similarly rated companies. Although its exposure to
emerging markets offers some long-term growth opportunities, the
company's revenues remain exposed to volatile infrastructure
spending and prevailing macroeconomic conditions. The B3 CFR also
factors in the company's exposure to short-term orders, which
results in modest revenue visibility.

More positively, the rating also reflects the group's track
record in niche products, its market leadership position and
Moody's expectation that a reduction in capital expenditure and
costs control will help preserve cash generation.

Officine Maccaferri's liquidity profile remains adequate,
supported by EUR29 million cash at June 2016 and a EUR35 million
factoring facility maturing in 2017. In addition, the company
upstreamed EUR20 million cash to its parent company, SECI Holding
S.p.A. (unrated), pursuant to cash management arrangements.
Moody's understands that this cash remains immediately available
to the company. Short-term debt totalled EUR45 million at June
2016, but Moody's expects that this will be largely paid down in
the next six months, owing to the seasonal unwinding of working

Moody's notes that the company reduced its financial indebtedness
through a buyback of EUR10 million of senior notes at end-2015,
using EUR9.4 million of cash. This represented a relatively small
amount of the bond and Moody's views the buyback as an
opportunistic use of liquidity at that stage. In light of the
weak performance during the first half of the year, any
additional open market purchases in the future might be seen by
the rating agency as distressed exchange in line with its
definition of default.


The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectations that soft
trading conditions will continue to pressure Officine
Maccaferri's operating performance and profitability over the
next 12-18 months.


A reduction in financial leverage towards 5.0x, together with a
track record of stability in operating performances on the back
of greater business diversification and solid liquidity could
result in a rating upgrade over time. Conversely, a further
deterioration in the company's profitability or cash generation
leading to a weakening of the liquidity profile, or a financial
leverage ratio above 6.5x or an EBIT interest cover ratio below
1.0x on an ongoing basis, could lead to a rating downgrade.


The principal methodology used in these ratings was Building
Materials Industry published in September 2014.

Officine Maccaferri S.p.A. (Officine Maccaferri), incorporated in
Bologna, Italy, is a leading designer and manufacturer of
environmental engineering products and solutions, with a global
presence. It reports four divisions: the Double Twist Mesh
products, the Geosynthetics polymer material, the Rockfall and
snow protections nets and the Other Products division, which
includes a range of tunnelling and wall reinforcing products, as
well as engineering solution services and wire products. During
2015, the company generated revenues of EUR503 million and a
reported EBITDA of EUR50.5 million.


AURORUS 2016: S&P Assigns B Rating to EUR9.5MM Class E Notes
S&P Global Ratings has assigned its 'AA- (sf)' 'A (sf)', 'BBB+
(sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'B (sf)' credit ratings to AURORUS 2016
B.V.'s asset-backed floating-rate class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
respectively.  At closing, AURORUS 2016 also issued unrated class
F and G notes, and subordinated variable funding notes (VFN).

At closing, AURORUS 2016 used the issuance proceeds to purchase
receivables from the originator on a true sale basis.  On each
monthly payment date, AURORUS 2016 will issue the class A notes
up to their target amount.  Under the transaction documents, the
senior notes' target amount equals 68% of the borrowing base.
Additionally, the maximum amount of the class A notes is capped
at EUR240 million and the mezzanine notes are issued at a fixed
amount.  Consequently, the credit enhancement at closing exceeds
the minimum required credit enhancement.

S&P's ratings on the class A, B, C, D, and E notes reflect its
assessment of the underlying asset pool's credit and cash flow
characteristics, as well as S&P's analysis of the transaction's
exposure to counterparty, legal, and operational risks.  S&P's
analysis indicates that the class A, B, C, D, and E notes'
available credit enhancement is sufficient to mitigate
noteholders' exposure to credit and cash flow risks at the
assigned ratings.

                         RATING RATIONALE

Economic Outlook
S&P expects GDP growth of 1.8% for 2016 and 1.4% in 2017 in the
Netherlands, compared with 2.0% in 2015.  S&P estimates
unemployment to decrease to 6.2% in 2016 and 6.0% in 2017, from
6.9% in 2015.  Against this backdrop, S&P expects stable
collateral performance for Dutch securitizations in the next few
years.  S&P has considered this outlook when determining its
base-case assumptions.  However, S&P has also taken into account
the potential long life of the assets which, due to the
relatively long timeframes for which the notes will be
outstanding, results in a greater potential for the economy to

Credit Risk
S&P has analyzed credit risk for the non-credit card loans by
applying its European consumer finance criteria.  S&P has used
the originator's historical performance data to size its base-
case gross loss and recovery rate assumptions for the consumer
loans. S&P has analyzed credit risk for the credit card loans by
applying its global consumer finance criteria to size base-case
charge-off, yield, and payment rates for the credit card loans.

Borrowers can obtain further advances for 57% of the loans in the
portfolio, which have a revolving feature.  The portfolio's
weighted-average borrowers' age is 50 years.  The loan
accelerated amortization period begins once the borrowers have
reached the age of 65.  From that date the loan amortizes fully
until the borrower reaches 73 (with the exception of full balance
revolving credits, which can be originated without age limit, but
the credit limit decreases to EUR2,500 from the age of 75).  S&P
has set its base-case assumptions by considering the long loan
terms, the revolving period, and the further advance feature,
which could extend the transaction's life, thereby exposing it to
external shocks arising from any further deterioration in the
Dutch economy.  After the end of the revolving period, the
initial purchase price related to further advance receivables is
either funded by the subordinated notes or its payment is
subordinated in the priority of payments.

Following S&P's view of the increased uncertainty associated with
the transaction's potentially longer life, S&P has applied high
rating level loss multiples and recovery rate haircuts
(discounts) for the assigned ratings.

Payment Structure
S&P has analyzed the payment structure and other structural
features of the transaction under its European consumer finance
criteria for the consumer loans and S&P's global consumer finance
criteria for the credit card loans.  The transaction has a
combined principal and interest waterfall.  A principal
deficiency test is in place for each set of notes to ensure that
interest on any junior note is not paid if a principal deficiency
exists at a senior level.

The principal deficiency test is defined as the difference, if
positive, between:

   -- The outstanding principal amount of the notes and
      subordinated drawings, and

   -- The sum of the outstanding amount of the receivables held
      by the issuer on the previous cut-off date minus the amount
      of initial purchase price and additional purchase price due
      but unpaid on the previous cut-off date, the available
      amounts remaining on such monthly payment date after
      application of the priority of payments, the cash reserve,
      and the amount of collections on the receivables held by
      the issuer on the previous cut-off date standing to the
      credit of the collection foundation account on the previous
      cut-off date.

The results of S&P's cash flow runs are in line with its
'AA- (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'BBB+ (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'B (sf)'
ratings on the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively.

The issuer can use collections and any of the notes proceeds to
purchase additional loan receivables and further advance
receivables.  The transaction has a reserve account that was
initially sized at 3.0% of the net present value of the portfolio
and that is funded by the subordinated notes facility.  The
reserve amortizes in line with the portfolio, subject to a floor
(minimum level) of EUR600,000. Once the class A, B, C, D, E, F,
and G notes are fully repaid, or once the portfolio has fully
amortized, the reserve amortizes to zero.

The interest on the notes is based on floating-rate one-month
Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR).  The loans bear both fixed
and variable rates and the borrowing base excludes loans with an
interest rate lower than 6.25% if the weighted-average interest
rate of all receivables is lower than 8.00%.  An interest rate
swap is also in place.  This covers 100% of the net present value
of the fixed rate amortizing loans and 80% of the outstanding
amount of the revolving and amortizing loans held by the issuer
on the previous cut-off date.

Under S&P's European consumer finance criteria, it ran a high and
low prepayment scenario, as well as up, flat, and down interest
rate vectors and an equal default curves.  S&P's cash flow runs
at the assigned rating levels show that the rated notes pay
timely interest and ultimate principal.

Counterparty Risk
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. is the issuer account bank, ING Bank N.V. is
the collection account bank, and BNP Paribas is the swap
counterparty.  S&P's long- and short-term issuer credit ratings
on the bank and swap counterparty, and the documented replacement
triggers support its ratings on the class A, B, C, D, and E notes
under S&P's current counterparty criteria.

Legal Risk
S&P considers that the issuer is bankruptcy remote under its
European legal criteria.

Set-Off Risk
If a borrower cannot obtain a further advance due to the
originator's insolvency, the borrower may have the right to set
off the cost of a substitute loan during the two-month notice
period to terminate the loan.  S&P has sized a stressed set-off
amount, which it deducted from its cash flow run at closing.

The pool does not contain loans granted to the originator's
employees and the originator is a not deposit-taking institution,
so set-off risk does not occur from these sources.

Rating Stability
S&P has analyzed the effect of a moderate stress on its credit
assumptions and their ultimate effect on the ratings assigned to
the class A, B, C, D, and E notes.  S&P ran two scenarios and the
results are in line with its credit stability criteria.


Ratings Assigned

Up to EUR335 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes (Including
EUR34.3 Million Unrated Mezzanine Notes And A Dynamically Sized
Subordinated VFN)

Class               Rating         Amount
                               (mil. EUR)

A                   AA- (sf)       240.00[1]
B                   A (sf)           14.2
C                   BBB+ (sf)       19.90
D                   BBB (sf)         17.1
E                   B (sf)            9.5
F                   NR               17.1
G                   NR               17.2
Sub. VFN            NR               14.7

[1]Maximum amount. NR--Not rated.

AVOCA CLO II: S&P Withdraws 'D (sf)' Ratings on 5 Note Classes
S&P Global Ratings withdrew its credit ratings on Avoca CLO II
B.V.'s class B, C-1, C-2, and D notes, and class R combo and T
combo notes following the transaction's early termination.
Before the withdrawals, S&P lowered to 'D (sf)' its ratings on
class C-1, C-2, and D notes, and class R combo and T combo notes.

S&P has withdrawn its 'BBB+ (sf)' rating on the class B notes as
the notes repaid their outstanding principal.

The notes' legal final maturity date is Jan. 15, 2020.  However,
the transaction was terminated early pursuant to a deed of
amendment whereby the class C-1, C-2, and D noteholders passed an
extraordinary resolution to terminate the transaction on the
July 15, 2016 payment date and write down any principal amount
outstanding on the notes to the amount available for distribution
on the final redemption date (or, if no amounts are available for
distribution, to zero).

Under the amended terms of the transaction documents, no legal
default has occurred for the rated notes.

However, S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)' its ratings on the class C-
1, C-2, and D notes, and the class R combo and T combo notes
because the existing terms have been amended regarding the
payment of interest and principal amounts outstanding.

S&P applied its exchange offer criteria and determined that the
offer to the noteholders was distressed, rather than
opportunistic.  Furthermore, the offer resulted in the
noteholders receiving less value than under the original terms of
the securities.

Avoca CLO II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to speculative-grade corporate
firms.  The transaction closed on Nov. 30, 2004 and Avoca Capital
manages it.  Its reinvestment period ended in January 2010.


Class             Rating
            To             From

Avoca CLO II B.V.
EUR368.2 Million Floating- And Fixed-Rate Notes

Rating Withdrawn

B           NR             BBB+ (sf)

Ratings Lowered To 'D (sf)' and Withdrawn

C-1         D (sf)         CCC- (sf)
            NR             D (sf)

C-2         D (sf)         CCC- (sf)
            NR             D (sf)

D           D (sf)         CC (sf)
            NR             D (sf)

R Combo     D (sf)         CCC- (sf)
            NR             D (sf)

T Combo     D (sf)         CCC- (sf)
            NR             D (sf)

NR--Not rated.


LSR GROUP: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to B1
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the corporate family rating
(CFR) of LSR Group PJSC (LSR), Russia's leading residential real
estate developer and building materials supplier, to B1 from B2
and its probability of default rating to B1-PD from B2-PD. The
outlook on all ratings is stable.

"We have upgraded LSR Group's ratings to B1 to reflect our
expectation that the company's strong market position, coupled
with a healthy financial and liquidity profile, will allow it to
weather the challenging market environment and accommodate
substantial investment requirements in 2016," says
Ekaterina Lipatova, an Assistant Vice President -- Analyst at

The main factors driving the upgrade to B1 are the company's:

   -- strong business profile and leading market position, which
      enhance its resilience to industry cycles

   -- sustainably strong financial and liquidity profile.


The upgrade of LSR's ratings to B1 reflects the company's proven
track record of successfully weathering the industry cycle, while
preserving adequate operating performance and a healthy financial
and liquidity profile. This is supported by (1) the substantial
financial flexibility LSR built up during the record strong
market in 2014 and its prudent financial policy; (2) its leading
market position, with an established track record and brand
recognition, which secures more stable demand than its smaller
competitors and sustained access to banks, land owners, and state
orders; (3) its vertically integrated business model, which
allows for better control over supplies and a natural hedge
against input price volatility; and (4) its strong land bank
position, with the focus on the two most stable and lucrative
markets of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

As such, in 2015, despite a very challenging market that was
pressured by the contracting economy and the hike of the key
interest rate by the Central Bank of Russia, LSR managed to
sustain its strong financial profile. The company's adjusted
debt/book capitalization reduced to 36% (43% in 2014) and its
adjusted EBIT/interest coverage increased to 3.5x (3.3x in 2014),
while it preserved its cash balance at a very healthy level of
RUB20.4 billion (RUB25.3 billion in 2014).

The achieved financial flexibility will allow LSR to accommodate
rising investment requirements in 2016. The company aims to seize
arising growth opportunities under the ongoing market
consolidation trend and the first signs of the market recovery,
leveraging its comfortable borrowing capacity created in 2014-15.
Despite materially strengthened operating results in H1 2016,
this step-up in investments will likely lead to some weakening of
the company's financial metrics. However, Moody's expects that
LSR will remain within the guidance for a B1 rating, with its
adjusted debt/book capitalization remaining below 45% and its
adjusted EBIT/interest coverage above 2.5x.

There remains a degree of concern regarding the sustainability of
the market recovery under the still challenging economic
environment in the country, which could lead to weaker than
expected financial results for LSR. However, Moody's expects that
the company will continue to adhere to a conservative financial
policy and will adjust its investment program to preserve a
healthy financial profile. Some additional support to the metrics
could come from the planned sale of the concrete business and
other non-core assets, as well as the potential structuring of
some new land purchases on a barter-based system.

LSR's ratings remain constrained by the company's (1) small size
by international standards; (2) exposure to the highly cyclical
real estate and building materials markets; and (3) its single
market concentration, largely focused on St. Petersburg and
Moscow, which increases local economic and regulatory risks. The
rating also factors in execution risks related to the company's
aggressive development strategy, with the focus on large-scale
projects, and in particular the major ZILART project for
redevelopment of industrial areas of the former automobile
factory site in Moscow.


The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that LSR's strong
market position, coupled with its healthy financial profile and
comfortable cash cushion, will allow LSR to weather the
challenging market environment and accommodate substantial
investment requirements, while remaining within the guidance for
a B1 rating.


Moody's could upgrade the rating if LSR were to (1) grow its
revenue generation and sustain healthy operating performance
throughout the cycle with a track-record of smooth execution of
large-scale projects; (2) adhere to a conservative financial
policy, while pursuing its extensive investment program with
adjusted debt/book capitalization at or below 40%, adjusted
debt/EBITDA at below 3.0x, and an adjusted EBIT/interest ratio at
or above 4.0x, all on a sustained basis; and (3) preserve solid
liquidity to ensure sustainable operations over at least the next
12 months.

Negative pressure could be exerted on the rating if weak market
conditions or LSR's development and financial strategies were to
lead to (1) a material deterioration of liquidity; and/or (2) an
increase in leverage with adjusted debt/book capitalization
moving above 55%, adjusted debt/EBITDA above 4.0x and adjusted
EBIT/interest trending below 2.5x, all on a sustained basis.


The principal methodology used in these ratings was Homebuilding
And Property Development Industry published in April 2015.

Headquartered in St. Petersburg, Russia, LSR Group PJSC (LSR) is
the leading real estate developer, construction company and
building materials supplier in Russia. Its operations are
concentrated in the northwest, Moscow and the Urals regions, with
a particularly strong position in St. Petersburg and an actively
growing presence in Moscow. At year-end 2015, LSR achieved sales
of RUB87 billion, provided by its real estate development and
construction operations (81%), and its building materials and
aggregates business (19%).


ABENGOA SA: Enters Into Debt Restructuring Deal with Creditors
Tobias Buck at The Financial Times reports that Abengoa SA has
struck a EUR1.17 billion restructuring deal with its creditors,
ensuring the survival of the debt-laden company after a year of
financial turbulence that pushed it to the brink of bankruptcy.

In a regulatory statement issued on Aug. 11, Abengoa outlined the
details of the restructuring, which included a debt-for-equity
swap for creditors who otherwise face a 97% haircut on their
loans, the FT relates.  Under the terms of the deal, 70% of pre-
existing debt will convert into 40% of Abengoa's new share
capital, the FT discloses.

At the end of the restructuring process, the current shareholders
in the company would hold around 5% of the share capital," the FT
quotes Abengoa as saying in a statement.

Once hailed as a standard bearer for Spain's high-flying
renewables industry, Abengoa was forced to launch insolvency
proceedings last November, raising the possibility that it could
become one of the country's largest ever bankruptcies, the FT
recounts.  After years of expansion, the group had built up an
EUR8.9 billion debt load, which it was no longer able to service,
the FT notes.

In April, a Spanish bankruptcy court gave Abengoa until the end
of October to come to a deal with its creditors, the FT relates.
The Aug. 11 announcement outlined the terms of an agreement,
although it has not yet been signed and still has to be accepted
by 75% of creditors, as required by Spanish law, the FT

Under the terms of the deal, Abengoa will receive EUR1.17 billion
in funds, made up of fresh investment as well as the rollover of
existing credit facilities, the FT states.  In addition, Abengoa
will be able to call on a new credit facility worth EUR307
million, the FT relays.

                        About Abengoa S.A.

Spanish energy giant Abengoa S.A. is an engineering and
clean technology company with operations in more than 50
countries worldwide that provides innovative solutions for a
diverse range of customers in the energy and environmental
sectors.  Abengoa is one of the world's top builders of power
lines transporting energy across Latin America and a top
engineering and construction business, making massive renewable-
energy power plants worldwide.

As of the end of 2015, Abengoa, S.A. was the parent company of
687 other companies around the world, including 577 subsidiaries,
78 associates, 31 joint ventures, and 211 Spanish partnerships.
Additionally, the Abengoa Group held a number of other interests
of less than 20% in other entities.

On Nov. 25, 2015 in Spain, Abengoa S.A. announced its intention
to seek protection under Article 5bis of Spanish insolvency law,
a pre-insolvency statute that permits a company to enter into
negotiations with certain creditors for restricting of its
financial affairs.  The Spanish company is facing a March 28,
2016, deadline to agree on a viability plan or restructuring plan
with its banks and bondholders, without which it could be forced
to declare bankruptcy.

On March 16, 2016, Abengoa presented its Business Plan and
Financial Restructuring Plan in Madrid to all of its

                        U.S. Bankruptcies

Abengoa, S.A., and 24 of its subsidiaries filed Chapter 15
petitions (Bankr. D. Del. Case Nos. 16-10754 to 16-10778) on
March 28, 2016, to seek U.S. recognition of its restructuring
proceedings in Spain.  Christopher Morris signed the petitions as
foreign representative.  DLA Piper LLP (US) represents the
Debtors as counsel.

Gavilon Grain, LLC, et al., on Feb. 1, 2016, filed an involuntary
Chapter 7 petition for Abengoa Bioenergy of Nebraska, LLC
("ABNE") and on Feb. 11, 2016, filed an involuntary Chapter 7
petition for Abengoa Bioenergy Company, LLC ("ABC").  ABC's
involuntary Chapter 7 case is Bankr. D. Kan. Case No. 16-20178.
ABNE's involuntary case is Bankr. D. Neb. Case No. 16-80141.  An
order for relief has not been entered, and no interim Chapter 7
trustee has been appointed in the Involuntary Cases.  The
petitioning creditors are represented by McGrath, North, Mullin &
Kratz, P.C.

On Feb. 24, 2016, Abengoa Bioenergy US Holding, LLC and 5 five
other U.S. units of Abengoa S.A., which collectively own,
operate, and/or service four ethanol plants in Ravenna, York,
Colwich, and Portales, each filed a voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri.  The cases are pending before the Honorable Kathy A.
Surratt-States and are jointly administered under Case No. 16-

Abeinsa Holding Inc., and 12 other affiliates, which are energy,
engineering and environmental companies and indirect subsidiaries
of Abengoa, filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions (Bankr. D. Del.
Proposed Lead Case No. 16-10790) on March 29, 2016.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

IMES: Seanamic Group Buys Business Out of Administration
Gareth Mackie at The Scotsman reports that almost 50 jobs have
been secured after administrators for subsea engineer IMES found
a buyer for the company.

IMES called in Blair Nimmo and Geoff Jacobs -- -- of KPMG as joint administrators
after suffering cash flow problems linked to the oil sector
downturn, The Scotsman relates.  It has now been acquired by
Glasgow-based Seanamic Group, The Scotsman discloses.

The company had a turnover of about GBP5 million and was cash
generative in 2014 before suffering a drop in client orders last
year as the oil and gas sector began to cut costs in response to
plunging crude prices, The Scotsman recounts.

Following their appointment, which came after an attempt by
IMES's directors to secure new investment, the administrators
agreed the sale of the firm's trading business and certain assets
to Seanamic, which was formed in 2014 through a tie-up between
Glasgow-based offshore handling specialist Caley Ocean Systems
and Texas-headquartered cable and umbilical manufacturer
Umbilicals International, The Scotsman relays.  All 49 staff, 23
of whom are based in Aberdeen, have transferred to the new owner
under the deal, The Scotsman notes.

Aberdeen-based IMES provides inspection, examination and
engineering services.

LB RE FINANCING: August 31 Claims Filing Deadline Set
Pursuant to Rule 2.95 of the Insolvency Rules 1986 that G.E.
Bruce, J.G. Parr and A.V. Lomas, the Joint Liquidators of LB Re
Financing No. 3 Limited, in Creditors' Voluntary Liquidation,
intend to declare a first interim dividend to the unsecured
creditors within a period of two months from the last date for

Creditors must send their full names and addresses (and those of
their Solicitors, if any), together with full particulars of
their debts or claims to the Joint Liquidators at
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 7 More London Riverside, London, SE1 2RT
by August 31, 2016 ("the last date for proving").  If so required
by notice from the Joint Liquidators, either personally or by
their Solicitors, Creditors must come in and prove their debts at
such time and place as shall be specified in such notice.  If
they default in providing such proof, they will be excluded from
the benefit of any distribution made before such debts are

Office Holder Details: G.E. Bruce, J.G. Parr and A.V. Lomas (IP
numbers 9120, 8003 and 7240) of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 7
More London Riverside, London SE1 2RT.  Date of Appointment:
July 23, 2012.  Further information about this case is available
from Diane Adebowale, + 44(0) 20 7212 3515 or Harmeet Harish +44
(0) 20 7213 8137.

LEHMAN COMMERCIAL: August 31 Proofs of Debt Filing Deadline Set
Pursuant to Rule 2.95 of the Insolvency Rules 1986 that D.A.
Howell, A.V. Lomas, S.A. Pearson, G.E. Bruce and J.G. Parr, the
Joint Administrators of Lehman Commercial Mortgage Conduit
Limited ("LCMC"), in Administration, intend to make a
distribution (by way of paying an interim dividend) to the
preferential creditors (if any) and to the unsecured, non-
preferential creditors of LCMC.

Proofs of debt may be lodged at any point up to (and including)
August 31 2016, the last date for proving claims, however,
creditors are requested to lodge their proofs of debt at the
earliest possible opportunity.

Persons so proving are required, if so requested, to provide such
further details or produce such documents or other evidence as
may appear to the Joint Administrators to be necessary.

The Joint Administrators will not be obliged to deal with proofs
lodged after the last date for proving but they may do so if they
think fit.

The Joint Administrators intend to make such distribution within
the period of two months from the last date for proving claims.

For further information, contact details, and proof of debt
forms, please visit

Please complete and return a proof of debt form, together with
relevant supporting documents, to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 7
More London Riverside, London SE1 2RT marked for the attention of
Harmeet Harish.  Alternatively, you can email a completed proof
of debt form to

Rule 2.95(2)(c) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 requires the Joint
Administrators to state in this notice the value of the
prescribed part of LCMC's net property which is required to be
made available for the satisfaction of LCMC's unsecured debts
pursuant to section 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986.  There are
no floating charges over the assets of LCMC and accordingly,
there shall be no prescribed part.  All of LCMC's net property
will be available for the satisfaction of LCMC's unsecured debts.

STANDARD CHARTERED: S&P Assigns BB- LT Rating to Tier 1 Notes
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB-' long-term issue rating to
the proposed additional Tier 1 notes by Standard Chartered PLC
(SCPLC; BBB+/Stable/A-2).  The issue rating is subject to S&P's
review of the final issuance documentation.

S&P is assigning an issue rating to these notes in accordance
with its criteria for hybrid capital instruments.  The rating
reflects S&P's assessment of SCPLC's unsupported group credit
profile of 'a-' and our approach, which involves deducting:

   -- One notch because the notes are contractually subordinated;
   -- Two notches because S&P expects the notes to have Tier 1
      regulatory capital status;
   -- One notch because the notes contain a contractual write-
      down clause;
   -- One notch because the notes contain a mandatory, going-
      concern conversion feature and we expect the bank will
      maintain a common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio (calculated on
      a fully loaded Basel III basis) that is 300-700 basis
      points above the 7% conversion trigger.  At the end of June
      2016, SCPLC reported a 13.1% CET1 ratio; and
   -- One notch because the notes are issued by a non-operating
      holding company (NOHC), where S&P sees potential structural
      subordination and consider it unclear that the NOHC would
      avoid defaulting on this instrument if SCPLC was to default
      on an equivalent hybrid instrument.

S&P's view of these notes as having "intermediate" equity content
is based on several factors.  In particular, S&P expects that
they will be regulatory Tier 1 capital instruments and will have
no coupon step-up.  In addition, the notes can absorb losses on a
going-concern basis through the principal conversion feature and
the non-payment of coupons, which are fully discretionary.


* BOOK REVIEW: The Money Wars
Author: Roy C. Smith
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 370 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by David Henderson
Get your own personal today at

Business is war by civilized means. It won't get you a tailhook
landing on an n aircraft carrier docked in San Diego, but the
spoils of war can be glorious to behold.

Most executives do not approach business this way. They are
content to nudge along their behemoths, cash their options, and
pillage their workers. This author calls those managers "inertia
ridden." He quotes Carl Icahn describing their companies as run
by "gross and widespread incompetent management."

In cycles though, the U.S. economy generates a few business
warriors with the drive, or hubris, to treat the market as a
battlefield. The 1980s saw the last great spectacle of business
titans clashing. (The '90s, by contrast, was an era of the
investment banks waging war on the gullible.) The Money Wars is
the story of the last great buyout boom. Between 1982 and 1988,
more than ten thousand transactions were completed within the
U.S. alone, aggregating more than $1 trillion of capitalization.
Roy Smith has written a breezy read, traversing the reader
through an important piece of U.S. history, not just business
history. Two thirds of the way through the book, after covering
early twentieth century business history, the growth of financial
engineering after WWII, the conglomerate era, the RJR-Nabisco
story, and the financial machinations of KKR, we finally meet the
star of the show, Michael Milken. The picture painted by the
author leads the reader to observe that, every now and then, an
individual comes along at the right time and place in history who
knows exactly where he or she is in that history, and leaves a
world-historical footprint as a result. Whatever one may think of
Milken's ethics or his priorities, the reader will conclude that
he is the greatest financial genius this country has produced
since J.P. Morgan.

No high-flying financial era has ever happened in this country
without the frothy market attracting common criminals, or in some
cases making criminals out of weak, but previously honest men
(and it always seems to be men). Something there is about
testosterone and money. With so many deals being done, insider
trading was inevitable. Was Michael Milken guilty of insider
trading? Probably, but in all likelihood, everybody who attended
his lavish parties, called "Predators' Balls," shared the same

Why did the Justice Department go after Milken and his firm,
Drexel Burnham Lambert with such raw enthusiasm? That history has
not yet been written, but Drexel had created a lot of envy and
enemies on the Street.

When a better history of the period is written, it will be a
study in the confluence of forces that made Michael Milken's
genius possible: the sclerotic management of irrational
conglomerates, a ready market for the junk bonds Milken was
selling, and a few malcontent capitalist like Carl Icahn and Ted
Turner, who were ready and able to wage their own financial

This book is a must read for any student of business who did not
live through any of these fascination financial eras.
Roy C. Smith is a professor of entrepreneurship, finance and
international business at NYU, and teaches on the faculty there
of the Stern School of Business. Prior to 1987, he was a partner
at Goldman Sachs. He received a B.S. from the Naval Academy in
1960 and an M.B.A. from Harvard in 1966.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *