TCREUR_Public/160826.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, August 26, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 169


                            Headlines


A R M E N I A

UNIBANK OJSC: Moody's Affirms B3 Long-Term Deposit Ratings


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO IV: S&P Raises Rating on Class N Combo Notes to B-


I T A L Y

ANDROMEDA FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'B' Ratings on Cl. A1 & A2 Notes


K A Z A K H S T A N

SALEM INSURANCE: A.M. Best Assigns C++ Fin'l. Strength Rating


R U S S I A

CB PULS STOLITSY: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
EVRAZ GROUP: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Remains Negative
FINANCIAL STANDARD: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Inspection Shows
NOVOROSSIYSK COMMERCIAL: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable
RUSSIAN REINSURANCE: A.M. Best Lowers Fin. Strength Rating to B


S E R B I A

NISKA PIVARA: To Resume Operations After Court Ends Liquidation


U K R A I N E

UKRAINE: Deposit Fund to Sell Assets of 25 Insolvent Banks


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AMEC FOSTER: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Negative
LOGLECDISSOL LTD: Leonard Curtis Report Sheds Light on Finances
OYSTERWORLD: In Administration, Owes More Than GBP2 Million
PARAGON GROUP: Fitch Assigns 'BB+(EXP)' Rating to Tier 2 Notes

* UK: 4 in 10 Small Businesses Survive Within 5 Years of Trading


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The First Junk Bond


                            *********


=============
A R M E N I A
=============


UNIBANK OJSC: Moody's Affirms B3 Long-Term Deposit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the long-term local and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of Armenia's Unibank OJSC
(Unibank) at B3 and changed the outlook to positive from stable
for these ratings. The rating agency has also affirmed the bank's
baseline credit assessment (BCA) / adjusted BCA of caa1, its
short-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Not-
Prime, its long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment)
of B2(cr) and its short-term CR Assessment of Not-Prime(cr).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The positive outlook on Unibank's B3 deposit ratings acknowledges
the recent strengthening of Unibank's capital position and is
driven by Moody's expectation of further capital injections
before year-end 2016. Following three capital injections
completed in the last 12 months, Unibank plans to raise another
AMD4 billion of equity in October 2016, in order to meet the
Central Bank's revised minimum requirement for regulatory
capital, effective in 2017. The requirement is AMD30 billion,
compared to Unibank's approximately AMD25.5 billion after its
July SPO.

With all the recent and planned capital injections, Moody's
expects that Unibank's regulatory capital will increase by more
than 50% compared to year-end 2015, which will strengthen its
cushion against potential credit losses. Moody's expects the
ratio of problem loans to the sum of tangible common equity and
loan loss reserves to dip under 70% by year-end 2016, compared to
99.7% as of year-end 2015.

Moody's affirmation of Unibank's BCA at caa1 reflects: (1) its
high level of problem loans at 20% of the loan book, with only
20% loan-loss reserves coverage; (2) the risk of significant
impairment of the bank's enhanced capital base amid potential
credit losses and high exposure to currency risk (more than 60%
of gross loans are denominated in foreign currency); and (3) the
challenging operating environment in Armenia, which complicates
the recovery of Unibank's problem loans in the next 12-18 months
and pressures the bank's earnings.

Moody's also assesses the likelihood of government support to
Unibank as moderate. As a result, the bank's B3 deposit ratings
incorporate one notch of government support uplift from its BCA
of caa1.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Material improvements to the bank's loss-absorption capacity as a
result of further capital injections would be credit positive for
Unibank's BCA, provided no significant deterioration of its asset
quality from the current levels.

A downgrade of Unibank's deposit ratings is unlikely in the next
12-18 months, given the positive outlook on its ratings. However,
negative pressure on the ratings could develop if Unibank's asset
quality continues to deteriorate, eroding the bank's capital
cushion. A failure to reach the new minimum regulatory capital
requirement by the time it becomes effective, or a material
weakening of the bank's market positions, would also negatively
affect the bank's deposit ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


AVOCA CLO IV: S&P Raises Rating on Class N Combo Notes to B-
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on Avoca CLO IV
PLC's class C1, C2, and N Combo notes.  At the same time, S&P has
affirmed its ratings on the class D Def and E Def notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance and the application of its current counterparty
criteria.  Since February 2012, when the transaction entered its
amortization period, the class A and B notes have fully
amortized. This has resulted in increased available credit
enhancement for all classes of notes, except for the class E Def
notes.

Since S&P's previous review in November 2015, the transaction has
deleveraged, leading to a reduction in the outstanding notes'
balance of approximately EUR32.7 million.  The current principal
balance in the transaction is EUR47.2 million, which S&P
considers to have led to a general increase in credit enhancement
for all tranches of notes.

Obligor concentration has also increased, with the portfolio down
to 10 obligors from 20 at our previous review.  The largest
single obligor makes up 25% of the portfolio and the top five
assets contribute 75% of the balance.  In addition, S&P has
observed a general improvement in ratings in the underlying
portfolio, in particular, a decrease in the assets rated in the
'CCC' category (rated 'CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') to 4.89% from
9.70%.

Despite the improved portfolio performance, S&P notes that the
class E Def notes' overcollateralization and interest coverage
tests continue to fail.  This performance was exacerbated by a
one-off legal expense incurred on the February payment date,
which led to interest shortfalls at the class D Def and class E
Def level.  However, S&P notes that the deferred interest balance
on the class D notes was paid at the August 2016 payment date.

S&P has considered counterparty risk in the transaction by
applying its current counterparty criteria.  Under these
criteria, the maximum potential rating on the notes in this
transaction remains at 'A+', based on the downgrade provisions
documented for the account bank and custodian.

S&P has subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate for each
rated class of notes at each rating level.  S&P used the
portfolio balance that it considers to be performing, the
reported weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average
recovery rates that S&P considers to be appropriate.  S&P
incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using its
standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each rating
category assumed for each class of notes, in conjunction with
different interest rate stress scenarios.

With increased available credit enhancement for the class C1 to D
Def notes, S&P's credit and cash flow analysis results suggest
higher ratings than those previously assigned.

However, the upgrades of the class C1 and C2 notes are capped by
the downgrade provisions documented for the account bank and
custodian.  The maximum potential rating on any class of notes in
Avoca CLO IV is 'A+ (sf)'.  S&P has therefore raised to 'A+ (sf)'
from 'BBB+ (sf)' its ratings on the class C1 and C2 notes.

As well as the maximum rating of 'A+ (sf)' due to counterparty
risk, S&P's ratings on the class D Def notes are constrained by
the application of the largest obligor default test, a
supplemental stress test that S&P outlines in its corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.  This assesses
whether a CDO tranche has sufficient credit enhancement to
withstand specified combinations of underlying asset defaults,
based on the ratings on the underlying assets.  The test assumes
a flat recovery of 5%.

S&P's cash flow analysis indicates that the class D Def notes can
support a higher rating than that currently assigned (due to the
increased available credit enhancement).  However, the largest
obligor default test is failing at the current rating level,
albeit by, in S&P's view, a non-material amount.  Taking into
account the non-material size of this failure of the supplemental
tests, and the improvement in cash flow results, S&P has affirmed
its 'B+ (sf)' rating on the class D Def notes.

Based on S&P's cash flow results, it has affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)'
rating on the class E Def notes.

Due to reductions in the rated principal balance and improved
credit enhancement for the class D Def notes, S&P's cash flow
analysis shows that the class N Combo notes can support ratings
that are significantly higher than the currently assigned rating.
However, the application of S&Ps supplemental tests implies a
rating of 'CCC+ (sf)', even after giving benefit to excess spread
in the transaction.  Following the application of S&P's criteria
for assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', and 'CC' ratings, S&P has
raised to 'B- (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on the class N
Combo notes.

Avoca CLO IV is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction, backed primarily by leveraged loans to speculative-
grade corporate firms.  Avoca CLO IV closed in January 2006 and
is managed by KKR Credit Advisors (Ireland).

RATINGS LIST

Avoca CLO IV PLC
EUR494.1 Million Floating- and Fixed-Rate Notes


Ratings Raised

Class                Rating
           To                  From

C1         A+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
C2         A+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
N Combo    B- (sf)             CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

D Def      B+ (sf)
E Def      CCC- (sf)


=========
I T A L Y
=========


ANDROMEDA FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'B' Ratings on Cl. A1 & A2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Andromeda Finance S.r.l.'s Class A1
notes' underlying rating and class A2 notes at 'B' and revised
their Outlooks to Positive from Stable.  Fitch has also affirmed
class A1 notes' at 'A-'/Stable.  This rating indirectly benefits
from SACE's (A-/Stable) unconditional and irrevocable guarantee.

The ratings and Outlooks reflect Andromeda's lower dependence on
14% merchant exposure and the project's current ability to
service its debt service commitments solely based on EUR318/MWh
feed-in-tariffs (FIT) under Fitch's base case.  An updated
independently confirmed production forecast based on six years of
P50 outperformance has led to stronger financial metrics.  The
average/median/minimum rating case debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) has improved to 1.15x/1.13x/1.05x relative to the average
DSCR of 1.00x and minimum of 0.92x in the previous review.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Minimal Exposure To Merchant Risk.  Revenue Risk (Price) -
Midrange: Fitch has revised the assessment to Midrange from
Weaker as result of the project's resilience to low market
prices.  Under our updated base case assumptions, the project
breaks even relying only on payments from fixed FIT.
Approximately 86% of total project revenues under Fitch's base
case stem from the EUR318/MWh FIT under the Italian regulatory
framework for solar plants (Conto Energia).  The remaining
revenue is generated from electricity sales at market prices,
which averaged EUR43.3/MWh during the 12 months ending June 2016.
Both revenue streams are received from the Italian public
authority Gestore Dei Servizi Energeticci.

P50 Outperfomance Independently Confirmed.  Revenue Risk
(Volume) - Midrange: In July 2015, management commissioned an
update on energy production levels based on Andromeda's actual
operating data.  As a result, Fitch has revised its production
estimates upwards.  The new P50 production curve is closely
aligned with measured average yearly production to date, while
the new 1YP90 is around 2.5% below the historical minimum on an
annual basis.  The difference between new P50 and 1YP90 has
decreased to 6% from 9% due to increased certainty on the solar
resources.

Established and Straightforward Technology.  Operating Risk -
Midrange: The monocrystalline photovoltaic (PV) panel technology
is well established and operating requirements for the PV plants
are straightforward.  SunPower is the equipment manufacturer and
the operator.  SunPower is regarded as a sub-investment grade
counterparty, but it is a reputable and experienced contractor.
Despite the company's continuous efforts to optimize costs in
order to achieve greater savings over the long term, costs over
the 12 months ending March 2016 exceeded management's initial
expectations by 5%.  Fitch understands that the increase was
driven by higher administrative costs, which represent a one-off
item and are largely associated with consultant and legal fees
post-retroactive actions taken on the project.

Securitization Distances Debt Holders from Cash Flows.  Debt
Structure - Midrange: The transaction is a project finance
structure with some elements of a securitization, which positions
the noteholders further away from the cash flows generated at the
project company level.  The debt terms are relatively
straightforward, with two fixed rate fully-amortizing senior
tranches ranking pari-passu, no floating interest rate risk and
no refinancing risk.

Improved Coverage.  Debt Service: The company reported an average
DSCR of 1.08x as of September 2015 and 1.10x as of March 2016,
which are above Fitch's base case expectations of 1.02x -
September 2015 and 1.06x - March 2016.

Under Fitch's rating case projections, Andromeda's DSCR profile
is 1.13x (median) and 1.05x (minimum).  The projected debt
metrics have improved in comparison to the last review, where the
average DSCR under Fitch's rating case was 1.00x and minimum
0.92x.  This improvement has mainly been driven by the updated
production estimates for 1YP90 and lower opex projections.  Fitch
expects a further improvement in cash flows following the
considerable reduction in Italian property tax (Imposta
Municipale Propria), retroactively applied from January 2016.

The transaction has been in distributions lock-up since 30
September 2014.  Fitch expects average DSCR metrics to be
restored above the covenanted levels in September 2016.

Peers:
Solar Star (BBB-/RWN) is a US-based mono-crystalline PV plant
with total capacity of 579MW.  Unlike Andromeda Solar Star does
not bear price risk, which is mitigated by fixed-price, 20-year
power purchase agreements with Southern California Edison
(SCE, A-/Stable).  Solar Star's DSCR under the rating case is
1.32x.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: A projected rating case DSCR consistently below 1.05x,
possibly resulting from low power prices, low energy production,
higher costs or material adverse changes in the regulatory
framework affecting PV installations may lead to negative rating
action.

Positive: A projected rating case profile DSCR around 1.15x,
equivalent to an actual of approximately 1.25x DSCR, may result
in an upgrade.

                         SUMMARY OF CREDIT

The transaction is a securitization of two project loans
(Facility A1 and Facility A2) under law 130/99 (the Italian
securitization law).  The loan facilities were extended by BNP
Paribas and Societe Generale to Andromeda PV S.r.l. (the project
company) to build and operate two PV plants of 45.1MW and 6.1 MW
in Montalto di Castro, Italy.  The terms of the loans effectively
mirror those of the rated notes, with payments under Facility A1
and Facility A2 servicing the class A1 notes and class A2 notes,
respectively. The class A1 notes' rating and Outlook reflect the
first-demand, irrevocable and unconditional guarantee provided by
SACE.  The guarantee provided by SACE to the issuer is in respect
of the project company's obligations under Facility A1 and not on
the class A1 notes directly.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


SALEM INSURANCE: A.M. Best Assigns C++ Fin'l. Strength Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. Best has assigned a financial strength rating of C++
(Marginal) and an issuer credit rating of "b" to JSC Salem
Insurance Company (Salem) (Kazakhstan). The outlook assigned to
each rating is stable.

The ratings reflect Salem's developing business profile, weak
operating results and thin level of risk-adjusted capitalization.
The ratings also consider Salem's exposure to the heightened
country risk within its domestic market of Kazakhstan.

Salem is a non-life insurer that reported gross written premium
of KZT6.0 billion (approximately USD17.4 million) for the six
months ending July 1, 2016, which represented approximately 3% of
market premium. Following the changes to the management and
shareholder structure in 2015, Salem is operating under a new
strategy that is focused on developing its retail portfolio, with
the aim to reduce the reliance on the expensive agency and broker
route to the market and develop a larger direct sales channel.
The company has grown rapidly, ranking 10th at June 1, 2016 (up
from 15th in 2015). The Kazakh insurance sector consists of a
total of 33 non-life and life participants. Salem's rapid
expansion creates uncertainty regarding the quality of risks
written and impact on the company's prospective performance,
given the softened pricing environment and intense competitive
conditions of the Kazakh market.

Salem's operating earnings are weak and subject to volatility,
mainly due to the wide variation in its technical results, as per
the combined ratio of between 103% and 189% reported over the
past five years. Performance is constrained by its high expenses,
largely owing to the company's substantial investments in
infrastructure to support its expansion. Salem has yet to achieve
the necessary critical mass to support its technical
profitability. Salem is also growing its motor third-party
liability (MTPL) portfolio; however, the performance of this
class of business is diminishing as competition intensifies. The
MTPL portfolio accounts for 29% of gross written premiums in
2015.

Salem's risk-adjusted capitalization is maintained at a thin
level, owing to the rapid growth in premiums written.
Additionally, retained losses have eroded the company's
shareholder equity in recent years. However, Salem's shareholders
have demonstrated a willingness to provide financial support
through a KZT240 million capital injection in 2016, which has
increased the regulatory solvency margin to 1.25 at July 1, 2016,
from 1.01 in April 2016. Nonetheless, A.M. Best expects Salem's
risk-adjusted capitalization to remain at a marginal level
underpinned by an inadequate capital management strategy.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


CB PULS STOLITSY: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
-------------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of LLC CB Puls Stolitsy appointed
by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-1217, dated April 13, 2016,
following revocation of its banking license detected in the
course of examination of the bank's financial standing
transactions carried out by LLC CB Puls Stolitsy former
management which bear the evidence of moving out assets worth
over RUR550 million through extending loans to dummy companies
not involved in any real business operations, transactions to
replace liquid assets with claims on companies with dubious
solvency worth over RUR200 million, as well as transactions to
alienate property to third parties worth over RUR130 million,
according to the Central Bank of Russia's Press Service.

According to estimates by the provisional administration, the
asset value of LLC CB Puls Stolitsy does not exceed RUR366
million rubles, while its liabilities to creditors amount to
RUR848 million including liabilities to households worth RUR751.8
million.

On June 27, 2016, the Court of Arbitration of the city of Moscow
took a decision to recognize LLC CB Puls Stolitsy insolvent
(bankrupt) and initiate bankruptcy proceedings with the state
corporation Deposit Insurance Agency appointed as a receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on the financial
transactions bearing the evidence of criminal offences conducted
by the former management and owners of LLC CB Puls Stolitsy to
the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation for consideration and
procedural decision making.


EVRAZ GROUP: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Remains Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-' long-term corporate credit
and 'ruAA-' Russia national scale ratings on Russia-based
integrated steel producer Evraz Group S.A.  S&P has also affirmed
its 'BB-' long-term corporate credit rating on Evraz's financial
subsidiary EvrazHolding Finance LLC and S&P's 'B+' senior
unsecured debt ratings on the notes issued by Evraz and
EvrazHolding Finance LLC.  The outlook remains negative.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Evraz will have stronger
operating and financial performance in the second half of 2016
than in the first half and will report metrics that are adequate
for the rating for the full-year 2016, notably funds from
operations (FFO) to debt sustainably above 12%.  The affirmation
also reflects S&P's expectation that, in 2017, Evraz's metrics
will show further improvement on the back of some market and
demand recovery, positive free operating cash flow (FOCF)
generation, and deleveraging, with the group's FFO to debt
approaching 20%.

Evraz's performance in the 12 months ended June 30, 2016,
suffered from weak industry conditions, highlighted by sluggish
demand and falling prices for steel products.  Notably, adjusted
EBITDA for that period declined to as low as $1,146 million (with
margins of about 15.5%), while FFO was just $563 million
(including S&P's adjustments).  EBITDA from the steel segment
contracted to $382 million (excluding S&P's adjustments) in the
first half of 2016 (compared with $740 million for the same
period of 2015) as a result of significant average price declines
for construction steel (down 18%) and semi-finished steel
products (down 29%), exacerbated by demand dwindling in these
segments--by 6% and 8%, respectively.

Devaluation of the Russian ruble helped Evraz to mitigate these
negatives to some extent, bringing the average cash cost of
producing slab steel at Evraz's Russian plants to $162 per ton in
the first half of 2016 (versus $196 per ton in the first half of
2015).  As a result, EBITDA margins fell only slightly, to 16.4%
(1H2016) from 17.5% (1H2015).  At the same time, weak performance
and EBITDA contraction brought metrics slightly below S&P's
expectations: FFO to debt was 9.8% and debt to EBITDA was 5.0x
(including our adjustments) in the 12 months ended June 30, 2016.

However, S&P has observed moderate steel price recovery since
April 2016, which supported Evraz in the second quarter of 2016.
S&P also assumes that some revival on the domestic construction
market this summer, aligned with positive price dynamics, will
result in the group's continued stronger performance in the third
quarter and to a lesser extent in the fourth quarter of 2016
(which usually suffers from a seasonality factor).  The rail
manufacturing segment, where Evraz is the No. 1 global producer,
will also provide some support to Evraz's performance, given its
solid market position, the more stable nature of this segment,
and the increasing needs of Russian Railways.

S&P also views positively the proactive refinancing approach
Evraz has demonstrated, which allowed it to reduce substantially
its debt maturities coming due in the rest of 2016 and 2017.
Evraz has also ensured covenant holidays with its main creditors
until the end of next year, with the first testing to be made for
full-year 2017 results.  As part of the agreement with creditors,
Evraz will have to refrain from paying dividends during this
period, diverting all free cash flows to deleveraging.

S&P continues to assess Evraz's business risk as fair, based on
the combination of the moderately high risk S&P sees in the
volatile and cyclical steel industry and S&P's view of high
country risk in Russia, where Evraz's key operations are
concentrated.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that weak and volatile
steel prices will result in pressured credit metrics in 2016,
notably FFO to debt of below 20%, which reduces headroom for the
current rating.

S&P would consider a downgrade if Evraz fails to reduce debt and
its FFO to debt therefore fails to improve to about 20% in 2017
from about 12%-15% in 2016.  Such an improvement is dependent
upon Evraz maintaining its strong free cash flow generation
profile, with expected minimum annual FOCF of $300 million in
2016 and improving thereafter.  S&P might also lower its rating
on Evraz if the company does not refinance its 2017-2018 debt
maturities well in advance (typically 12 months), leading to
weaker liquidity. That said, S&P expects that Evraz will continue
managing its refinancing risks in a proactive manner.

S&P may revise the outlook to stable if Evraz reports materially
stronger EBITDA and free cash flow than S&P currently
anticipates, which improves FFO to debt to about 20%.


FINANCIAL STANDARD: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Inspection Shows
---------------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of Financial Standard Commercial
Bank Limited appointed by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-1798, dated
June 8, 2016, following revocation of its banking license
detected in the course of examination of the credit institution's
financial standing operations carried out by the bank's former
management which bear the evidence of moving out assets worth at
least RUR8.1 billion through extending loans to borrowers known
to be unable to fulfill their liabilities and also bearing the
evidence of dummy companies, according to the Central Bank of
Russia's Press Service.

Besides, the provisional administration revealed operations the
bank carried out prior to the revocation of its license
indicating an intentional replacement of liquid assets with
unrecoverable and unrealizable assets, and also showing a
preferential settlement of claims from certain creditors to the
detriment of other creditors worth RUR1.4 billion when the bank
experienced solvency problems.

According to estimates by the provisional administration, the
total asset value of Financial Standard Commercial Bank Limited
does not exceed RUR1.2 billion rubles, while its liabilities to
creditors amount to RUR9.5 billion.

On July 21, 2016, the Court of Arbitration of the city of Moscow
took a decision to recognize Financial Standard Commercial Bank
Limited insolvent (bankrupt) and initiate bankruptcy proceedings
with the state corporation Deposit Insurance Agency appointed as
a receiver.

The Bank of Russia has submitted the information on the financial
transactions bearing the evidence of criminal offences conducted
by the former management and owners of Financial Standard
Commercial Bank Limited to the Prosecutor General's Office of the
Russian Federation, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and
the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for
consideration and procedural decision making.


NOVOROSSIYSK COMMERCIAL: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating on Russia-based stevedoring company
Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port PJSC (NCSP).  The outlook is
stable.

At the same time, the 'ruAA-' Russia national scale rating was
affirmed.

The affirmation primarily reflects the fact that NCSP has
successfully refinanced its US$1.5 billion loan from Sberbank
with a new one from VTB Bank, which has had a positive impact on
its liquidity.  The company has also concluded a memorandum of
understanding with Rosmorport, Russia's port authority, to
receive a controlling share in the port of Taman in exchange for
investing up to Russian ruble (RUB) 35 billion (about US$543
million) into the development of the port over the next few
years.  Given NCSP's appetite for dividends, S&P believes that
the company may primarily finance its Taman port investments with
debt, leading to higher leverage.

"We believe that NCSP's liquidity has improved since it
refinanced its Sberbank loan in July, and that its liquidity is
now adequate. This primarily stems from the much more comfortable
maturity profile, which decreased from US$350 million per year to
US$200 million.  Lower debt payments leave the company with
higher cash flows and provide a cushion against underperformance
or unexpected cash outflows.  Additionally, we calculate that the
covenant headroom under the new loan is much greater, with a
lower risk of covenant breach than was the case under the
previous loan. We therefore have revised our liquidity assessment
for NCSP to adequate from less than adequate," S&P said.

At the same time, S&P believes that NCSP's commitment to
participating in the development of Taman port could result in
increased leverage for the company.  NCSP plans to have Taman
port specialize in bulk cargoes, and leave Novorossiysk port a
hub for containers, grains, and liquid cargoes.  In June 2016,
NCSP signed a memorandum of understanding with Rosmorport to
proportionately invest up to RUB35 billion (about US$543 million)
in exchange for the controlling share in the project, which is
estimated to fully cost about RUB65 billion (about US$1 billion).

S&P estimates NCSP's current investment plans at about US$100
million per year or about US$500 million over the next five
years. Participating in the Taman project could drive this number
to more than $1 billion over the next five years and may require
debt financing, despite the company's strong cash flow generation
capacity.

In S&P's view, most of the free cash flows could be paid out as
dividends and NCSP's target for dividends of up to US$100 million
per year can be exceeded, as the recent announcement of
US$140 million (RUB9 billion) in interim dividends for the second
quarter of 2016 suggests.  Reflecting the risk of higher leverage
at NCSP, S&P is revising its assessment of its financial policy
to negative.

On top of NCSP's strong operating performance over the past two
years, its cash flow generation has been bolstered by favorable
foreign exchange rate dynamics, because the Russian ruble has
depreciated against the U.S. dollar since 2014 on the back of the
decline in oil prices.  NCSP generates revenues in U.S. dollars
(its tariffs are set in this currency) and its operating costs
are in rubles, given that all of its operations are in Russia.
This allowed the company to grow its reported EBITDA margins to
above 80% and meaningfully improve its financial metrics to
levels S&P sees as commensurate with a significant financial risk
profile.

The Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) has recently
proposed bringing back tariff regulations -- or at least some
form of tariff control -- for the Russian stevedoring industry
from as early as 2017.  The proposals currently in discussion
include conversion of tariffs at ports into rubles and
controlling margins for stevedoring companies.  S&P is not
currently factoring into its forecast on NCSP any potential
effects of regulatory changes for the industry, since the timing
and the magnitude of such changes are still uncertain.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that NCSP will be
able to manage its debt amortization by controlling its
development program and dividend distributions.  S&P also expects
that the company will continue to benefit from its favorable cost
position and maintain its reported EBITDA margins above 60%.  S&P
sees NCSP's ratio of FFO to debt in the range of 20%-30% as
commensurate with the current rating.  The stable outlook does
not incorporate any potential effects of tariff regulation
currently being discussed by the Russian government.

S&P could lower the rating on NCSP if our adjusted FFO-to-debt
ratio were to fall to less than 20%.  This could be driven by a
meaningful decline in the group's cargo turnover or negative
tariff adjustments, in particular resulting from the government's
potential decision to restrict margins at Russian ports or any
other form of regulation.  S&P could also lower the rating if it
sees the company's liquidity position weakening due to less cash
being available for debt repayment than we anticipate.
Unexpected dividend distributions, higher development expenses,
or weaker performance could be among the reasons for revising
down the liquidity assessment. Insufficient covenant headroom
would also have a negative effect on our assessment of liquidity.

S&P could raise the rating if the group maintained an adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA ratio below 3x and an adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio
above 30% on a sustainable basis.  An upgrade could be possible
after the government finalizes its view on tariff regulation in
Russian ports and S&P can estimate the impact of regulation on
NCSP's operations.  Better visibility on NCSP's future ownership
and business structure, particularly regarding the government's
longstanding plan to sell its 20% direct stake, is an additional
factor S&P would consider before raising the rating.


RUSSIAN REINSURANCE: A.M. Best Lowers Fin. Strength Rating to B
---------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. Best has downgraded the financial strength rating (FSR) to B
(Fair) from B+ (Good) and the issuer credit rating (ICR) to "bb+"
from "bbb-" of Russian Reinsurance Company JSC (Russian Re)
(Russia). The outlook for the FSR has been revised to stable from
negative, while the outlook for the ICR remains negative.

The rating actions reflect a material deterioration in Russian
Re's risk-adjusted capitalization at year-end 2015. The reduction
in capital adequacy stems from the weak underwriting performance
of the company during the year, primarily a result of a change in
reserving practices enforced by regulation, coupled with higher
asset risk created from the elevated economic and financial
system instability inherent in its domestic market. In 2015,
Russian Re reported a RUB174 million underwriting loss for the
year driven by a high frequency of losses, combined with
strengthening of reserves for existing and incurred but not
reported (IBNR) claims. This translated into a combined ratio
above 125% for 2015, making the five-year average combined ratio
above 100% for the period between 2011 and 2015. Although the
company's invested assets produced positive investment income in
2015, Russian Re reported a net loss of RUB39.9 million during
the year. A.M. Best believes Russian Re currently maintains a
fair level of risk-adjusted surplus, as measured by Best's
Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR); however, considers that
prospective capital adequacy is expected to be driven by the
company's ability to generate strong earnings in a very
challenging market environment.

During the first half of 2016, Russian Re has shown improved
underwriting performance and the company is on track to return to
operating profitability by year end. Russian Re has taken
corrective measures on underperforming business lines and
territories, in addition to adopting tighter underwriting
guidelines to enhance the selection of risks. However, A.M. Best
maintains concerns regarding the sustainability of the company's
medium term performance prospects and its ability to restore its
balance sheet strength to a stronger position. This reflects the
high asset risk exposure to Russia, uncertainty associated with
the rouble and its effect on premium growth and the impact of
inflationary pressures on reserve adequacy.

Russian Re's competitive standing is hindered by its small size
(by international standards), with gross written premiums of
around RUB825 million (approximately USD10 million) in 2015.
Russian Re is expected to target growth in selected domestic
market segments. In addition, the company plans to expand outside
of Russia, mainly in former Soviet Union countries and the Asia
Pacific region. A.M. Best believes that Russian Re will likely
continue to face significant challenges in growing profitably
both in its domestic and foreign markets as a result of increased
competition.


===========
S E R B I A
===========


NISKA PIVARA: To Resume Operations After Court Ends Liquidation
---------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Serbian brewery Niska Pivara will be able to
resume operations after the commercial court in Nis has ended its
liquidation procedure.

The 130-year old brewery in southern Nis has been undergoing
bankruptcy proceedings since 2013, SeeNews relates.

The company was bought in August 2015 by Bulgarian businessman
Stefan Stefanov through his company Grupa Kapitalni Projekt for
RSD130 million (US$1.16 million/EUR1.05 million), SeeNews
recounts.

The new owner invested in the recovery of the business and the
overhaul of its production lines, SeeNews discloses.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRAINE: Deposit Fund to Sell Assets of 25 Insolvent Banks
----------------------------------------------------------
Ukrainian News Agency reports that the Deposit Guarantee Fund is
going to sell assets of 25 insolvent banks for UAH3.1 billion
from August 22-August 26.

According to Ukrainian News, from UAH3.1 billion, the Fund
expects to obtain over UAH2.64 billion from the sale of
receivables, and also UAH0.47 billion on the sale of fixed assets
of the under-liquidation banks.

Besides, the receivables owed to Forum Bank will be sold at
UAH1,275.14 million, to BrokBusinessBank at UAH77.9 million,
Imexbank at UAH47.57 million, Ukrainian News discloses.

Also, they are offering for sale receivables of Zlatobank for a
starting price of UAH733.94 million, Ukrprofbank -- of UAH235.65
million, Ukrainian News notes.

The Deposit Guarantee Fund sold assets of 28 under-liquidation
banks for UAH10.7 million August 15-19, Ukrainian News relays.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AMEC FOSTER: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' long-term corporate credit
rating on U.K.-based engineering, project management, and
consultancy company Amec Foster Wheeler PLC (AFW).  The outlook
is negative.

The affirmation mainly reflects the company's intention to
materially reduce its debt to EBITDA (leverage) in the coming
quarters, mainly from disposals of GBP500 million (including its
Global Power Group [GPG] business).  Once completed, S&P believes
its ratio of adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt will be
in the upper end of its threshold for the current rating (12%-
20%).

S&P also takes into consideration the company's sizable backlog,
which represents more than one year of operations and provides
some visibility on the company's medium-term performance.  S&P
notes that the backlog declined in the first half of 2016 to
GBP6.2 billion at end-June 2016 (from GBP6.6 billion at year-end
2015).  Excluding the contracts related to GPG that could be
sold, the company expects no material changes in the backlog in
the rest of the year.  Moreover, approximately 70%-80% of the
backlog is "cost plus," which should mitigate potential cost
overruns. Further major declines in the backlog or an increase in
fixed-price contracts in its portfolio could, however, put
pressure on the rating.

S&P's satisfactory assessment of AFW's business risk profile
reflects the company's strong geographic and customer
diversification as well as its backlog of GBP6.2 billion at end-
June 2016, mostly comprised of cost-plus contracts.

S&P's business risk assessment also reflects the company's
exposure to mostly volatile end markets.  In particular, S&P
foresees that a meaningful share of AFW's clients will likely
continue to cancel or postpone their capital expenditure (capex)
investments because of low oil prices.  S&P factors into its
forecasts a relatively modest margin of 7%-10%, affected by
stiffened competition in AFW's major markets, including oil and
gas and mining (the company generates about one-half of its
revenues in oil and gas).

S&P's aggressive financial risk assessment reflects its view that
AFW's is capable and committed to reducing net debt in future
years largely thanks to planned large asset disposals.  S&P
thinks this should help AFW to maintain its credit measures over
the next couple of years amid persistent difficult market
conditions.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, it expects adjusted EBITDA of
close to GBP400 million annually on average in 2016-2017 (S&P
anticipates reported EBITDA to be approximately GBP300 million-
GBP350 million during the same period).

The rating incorporates a one-notch positive adjustment for AFW's
positive discretionary cash flow (DCF; free operating cash flows
after capex and dividends) and the large proportion of cost-plus
contracts in its backlog compared with peers'.  S&P reflects this
adjustment under its comparable ratings analysis modifier.

The negative outlook predominantly reflects the possibility of
downside to AFW's profits amid the persistent difficult
conditions in most of its end markets.  While the backlog and
cost-reduction initiatives might protect revenues and margins
over the short term, downside could emerge if market conditions
remained depressed through 2017 and 2018.

S&P could downgrade AFW by one notch if credit metrics weakened
such that FFO to debt deteriorated to below 12% or if reported
DCF was negative for more than a year.  This could come from a
combination of factors, including:

   -- A further decline in the size of the backlog or a
      deterioration of its quality, reflecting a more pronounced
      or longer downturn than S&P currently anticipates.

   -- An inability to reduce net debt using the proceeds of asset
      disposals.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if AFW's FFO to debt
increases to about 20% sustainably while DCF remains positive.
This could occur due to a faster recovery of market conditions
than S&P currently anticipate, notably in the oil and gas sector,
or better cash flow generation visibility, which could stem from
a marked improvement in the backlog of orders with a high
proportion of reimbursable contracts.


LOGLECDISSOL LTD: Leonard Curtis Report Sheds Light on Finances
---------------------------------------------------------------
Storm Rannard at Insider Media reports that the loss of
profitable contracts and an aborted sales process contributed to
the administration of Loglecdissol Ltd. before a pre-pack deal
was struck safeguarding hundreds of jobs.

However, unsecured creditors look set to miss out on more than
GBP12 million, Insider Media says.

The company, formerly known as AM Widdowson & Son, called in
insolvency specialists from Leonard Curtis on July 6, 2016, a
year after entering into a company voluntary arrangement (CVA)
with its creditors, Insider Media relates.

On the day of the appointment, the 220-strong business was sold
to connected company Widdowson Logistics for GBP2.5 million,
safeguarding the future of its workforce, Insider Media relays.

According to Insider Media, a new report has revealed the company
had run into difficulties prior to the CVA following the loss of
two profitable contracts which accounted for GBP5 million of its
turnover.

A change in regulations for driver qualifications in 2014 also
impacted Loglecdissol along with "significant losses" that were
incurred due to problems associated with a new IT system, Insider
Media notes.

The CVA, agreed on July 3, 2015, came after HM Revenue & Customs
(HMRC) lodged a winding-up petition against the business, Insider
Media recounts.

The documents published by Leonard Curtis also shed light on
Loglecdissol's financial situation in the years leading up to the
administration, Insider Media states.

From April 1, 2014 to August 31, 2015, it incurred a pre-tax loss
of GBP3.5 million on revenues of GBP32.2 million and in the six
months from September 1 to March 31, 2016 pre-tax losses were
GBP1.5 million while turnover was GBP10.8 million, Insider Media
discloses.

Unsecured creditors are estimated to be owed about GBP12.6
million, Insider Media states.  These include trade and CVA
creditors owed GBP8.7 million, with the remainder owed to HMRC by
way of VAT, National Insurance contributions and PAYE, according
to Insider Media.

Loglecdissol Ltd. is a Leicester logistics business.


OYSTERWORLD: In Administration, Owes More Than GBP2 Million
-----------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that OysterWorld, which received more than
GBP1.4 million from the Welsh Government, has gone into
administration with large debts.

According to BBC, around 50 people have lost jobs at OysterWorld,
based in Treforest, near Pontypridd, which owed more than GBP2
million.

Andrew Tate of administrators Kreston Reeves said the company was
placed into administration on Aug. 22, BBC relates.

Mr. Tate said employees were owed wages by the company for July
and part of June, and that the company had debts of more than
GBP2 million, BBC relays.

A former senior manager, as cited by BBC, said OysterWorld staff
were called into a meeting and told the company was going into
administration after private creditors "pulled the plug".

OysterWorld is a computer games company.  The firm made games
based on films and TV programs.


PARAGON GROUP: Fitch Assigns 'BB+(EXP)' Rating to Tier 2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned The Paragon Group of Companies PLC's
(Paragon; BBB-/Stable) fixed rate reset callable subordinated
tier 2 notes an expected rating of 'BB+(EXP)'.

The final rating assignment is contingent on the receipt of final
documentation conforming to information already received by
Fitch.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The notes are rated one notch below Paragon's Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) of 'BBB-', reflecting their higher loss
severity due to below-average recovery prospects for the
subordinated obligations in case of a winding-up event of
Paragon. Fitch has applied one notch, rather than two, for loss
severity, because the notes do not include a full write-down
provision and a partial, and not solely full, write-down of the
notes is, in our view, possible.

Fitch has not applied any notches for incremental non-performance
risk because non-payment of either principal or interest is
defined as an event of default of Paragon and there is no coupon
flexibility in a going concern scenario.

Paragon is rated under Fitch's "Global Non-Bank Financial
Institutions Rating Criteria".  As the consolidated group is
subject to Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) capital
supervision, the notes themselves have been rated in accordance
with Fitch's "Global Bank Rating Criteria", as required by the
Global Non-Bank Financial Institutions Rating Criteria in respect
of subordinated instruments issued by prudentially regulated non-
bank financial institutions.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The notes' rating is primarily sensitive to a change in the Long-
Term IDR of Paragon.

The notes' rating is also sensitive to a change in notching due
to a revision in Fitch's assessment of the probability of the
notes' non-performance risk relative to the risk captured in
Paragon's Long-Term IDR, or in its assessment of loss severity in
case of non-performance.


* UK: 4 in 10 Small Businesses Survive Within 5 Years of Trading
----------------------------------------------------------------
Health and education businesses are the best bet for long-term
survival as Ormsby Street analysis reveals the types of small
businesses most likely to succeed . . . and most likely to fail.

Small business survival rates are as high as 91% after one year
of trading, but after five years just four in 10 small businesses
will still be trading, according to Ormsby Street analysis of ONS
data.

Information and communication based businesses and retailers have
the highest new business survival rates after one year, but for
longer-term survival, businesses in the health and education
sectors fare the best.  They were the only two sectors in which
more than half of businesses launched were still trading after
five years.

Ormsby Street is the fintech firm behind CreditHQ, the digital
tool that puts small businesses in control of their cash.  The
analysis was carried out as Ormsby Street launches its business
survival calculator, a new tool which uses ONS data to reveal the
best and worst survival rates over one to five years for a
variety of business types.

"The UK is becoming increasingly entrepreneurial, with people
viewing working for themselves or launching a small business or
startup as a viable and rewarding career option," said
Martin Campbell, MD, Ormsby Street.  "But it is tough running a
business and we've launched the business survival calculator for
small businesses to understand more clearly the challenges ahead
of them and to be aware of the survival rates for businesses in
their sector."

Property-based businesses were one of the most likely to fail
after one year of trading, but proved a much better long-term
option when looking at survival rates over five years.

Accommodation and food services, and business administration were
the two industries most likely to fail in the long-term, with
both types of business filling the bottom two places after three,
four and five years.

"A small business can fail for many reasons of course, but poor
cash-flow remains one of the main causes of problems," said
Martin Campbell.  "Poor cash-flow is mostly caused by late
payment of invoices and this is certainly something that can be
addressed by any small business.  Measures include being strict
and upfront about payment terms initially and using the right
tools to provide insight into how they should trade with
customers and what action to take to reduce risk of non-payment."

Ormsby Street data analysis in 2015 revealed that on average, UK
small businesses that regularly credit check their customers are
around 30% less likely to go out of business in their first 12
months than businesses which don't credit check.

"There is no shame in a business failing -- in the US it is
almost seen a badge of honor to so and if it does happen then it
should be used as valuable experience for the next venture,"
continued Martin Campbell.  "But small businesses can certainly
improve their prospects by protecting themselves against some
elements that might threaten their existence."


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: The First Junk Bond
----------------------------------
Author: Harlan D. Platt
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 236 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher

Order your personal copy today and one for a colleague at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/the_first_junk_bond.html

Only one in ten failed businesses is equal to the task of
reorganizing itself and satisfying its prior debts in some
fashion. This engrossing book follows the extraordinary journey
of Texas International, Inc (known by its New York Stock
Exchange stock symbol, TEI), through its corporate growth and
decline, debt exchange offers, and corporate renaissance as
Phoenix Resource Companies, Inc. As Harlan Platt puts it, TEI
"flourished for a brief luminous moment but then crashed to
earth and was consumed." TEI's story features attention-grabbing
characters, petroleum exploration innovations, financial
innovations, and lots of risk taking.

The First Junk Bond was originally published in 1994 and
received solidly favorable reviews. The then-managing director
of High Yield Securities Research and Economics for Merrill
Lynch said that the book "is a richly detailed case study. Platt
integrates corporate history, industry fundamentals, financial
analysis and bankruptcy law on a scale that has rarely, if ever,
been attempted." A retired U.S. Bankruptcy Court judge noted,
"(i)t should appeal as supplementary reading to students in both
business schools and law schools. Even those who practice.in the
areas of business law, accounting and investments can obtain a
greater understanding and perspective of their professional
expertise."

"TEI's saga is noteworthy because of the company's resilience
and ingenuity in coping with the changing environment of the
1980s, its execution of innovative corporate strategies that
were widely imitated and its extraordinary trading history,"
says the author. TEI issued the first junk bond. In 1986 it
achieved the largest percentage gain on the NYSE, and in 1987
suffered the largest percentage loss. It issued one of the first
bonds secured by a physical commodity and then later issued one
of the first PIK (payment in kind) bonds. It was one of the
first vulture investors, to be targeted by vulture investors
later on. Its president was involved in an insider trading
scandal. It innovated strip financing. It engaged in several
workouts to sell off operations and raise cash to reduce debt.
It completed three exchange offers that converted debt in to
equity.

In 1977, TEI, primarily an oil production outfit, had had a
reprieve from bankruptcy through Michael Milken's first ever
junk bond. The fresh capital had allowed TEI to acquire a
controlling interest of Phoenix Resources Company, a part of
King Resources Company. TEI purchased creditors' claims against
King that were subsequently converted into stock under the terms
of King's reorganization plan. Only two years later, cash
deficiencies forced Phoenix to sell off its nonenergy
businesses. Vulture investors tried to buy up outstanding TEI
stock. TEI sold off its own nonenergy businesses, and focused on
oil and gas exploration. An enormous oil discovery in Egypt made
the future look grand. The value of TEI stock soared. Somehow,
however, less than two years later, TEI was in bankruptcy. What
a ride!

All told, the book has 63 tables and 32 figures on all aspects
of TEI's rise, fall, and renaissance. Businesspeople will find
especially absorbing the details of how the company's bankruptcy
filing affected various stakeholders, the bankruptcy negotiation
process, and the alternative post-bankruptcy financial
structures that were considered. Those interested in the oil and
gas industry will find the book a primer on the subject, with an
appendix devoted to exploration and drilling, and another on oil
and gas accounting.

Harlan Platt is professor of Finance at Northeastern University.
He is president of 911RISK, Inc., which specializes in
developing analytical models to predict corporate distress.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Ann L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *