TCREUR_Public/160921.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

        Wednesday, September 21, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 187


                            Headlines


A U S T R I A

SBERBANK EUROPE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Ratings


B U L G A R I A

STARA ZAGORA: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Remains Stable


C Y P R U S

CYPRUS: S&P Raises Sovereign Long-Term Credit Ratings to 'BB'


G E R M A N Y

HANSA TREUHAND: Container Ships Slip Into Insolvency


I R E L A N D

IVORY CDO: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class A1 Notes to 'BBsf'


L A T V I A

KVV LIEPAJAS: Assets Should Be Sold as Whole, Administrator Says


N E T H E R L A N D S

GARDA CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class F Notes to CCC+
SINGTEL ADSB: Goes Into Voluntary Liquidation
ZIGGO GROUP: Moody's Affirms Ba3 CFR & Changes Outlook to Neg.
ZIGGO GROUP: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable


P O L A N D

* POLAND: Company Bankruptcies Down 14.1%% in First Half 2016


P O R T U G A L

PORTUGAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


R U S S I A

BANK RCB: Put on Provisional Administration on Sept. 19
BANK URALSKY: Moody's Affirms B3 Deposit Ratings, Outlook Pos.
FINPROMBANK JSCB: Placed Under Provisional Administration
IG SEISMIC: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to B3
KALUGA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings

LIPETSK: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
RUSSIA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
TULA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings


S W E D E N

FLOATEL INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Affirms Caa1 CFR, Outlook Stable


U K R A I N E

KYIV CITY: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings to 'CC'
ODESSA PORT: At Risk of Bankruptcy, Buyer Sought for Plant


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AFREN PLC: SFO to Launch Probe Following Administration
CYBG PLC: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to GBP475MM Tier 2 Notes
NATIONAL VIDEOGAME: Save Out of Administration
SOUTHERN PACIFIC 06-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to B-
ULYSSES NO. 27: S&P Affirms D Ratings on 3 Note Classes

WHERE ARE YOU NOW: Goes Into Administration
* S&P Resolves CreditWatch Placements on 5 UK RMBS Transactions


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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SBERBANK EUROPE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of Sberbank Switzerland at 'BBB-' (SBS) and Sberbank Europe
AG (SBEU) at 'BB+'. The Outlook on both banks is Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS AND SUPPORT RATINGS

Both banks' IDRs and Support ratings reflect Fitch's view that the
banks are likely to be supported by their ultimate parent,
Sberbank of Russia (SBRF, BBB-/Negative/bbb-), in case of need.
The Negative Outlook on the IDRs is driven by that on SBRF's
ratings.

SBRF's Long-Term IDRs are driven by the bank's standalone
strength, reflected in the 'bbb-' Viability Rating (VR), and are
also underpinned by potential support from Russia (BBB-/
Negative). The Negative Outlook on SBRF's ratings mirrors that on
the sovereign and reflects both a potential weakening of support
and the downside pressure for the VR, which is now at the same
level as the sovereign, due to risks relating to a weaker Russian
economic environment.

Fitch's view on the probability of support for SBRF's subsidiaries
is based on: (i) the strategic commitment of SBRF to support its
European subsidiaries in line with its strategy of international
business development, (ii) SBRF's track record of providing
capital and funding support to date (particularly to SBEU); (iii)
full ownership and common branding, (iv) high reputational risks
for SBRF from any potential default of its subsidiaries given the
parent's presence in international markets and (v) the
subsidiaries' small size relative to the parent, limiting the cost
of any potential support.

The equalization of the ratings of SBS with SBRF takes into
account the subsidiary's high integration with the parent; limited
operational independence; and its role in providing complimentary
services to core group clients, in particular commodity exporters,
by providing trade finance services and participating in
structured lending as well as client settlements.

The one-notch differential between the Long-Term IDRs of SBEU and
SBRF reflects SBEU's lower integration, higher operational
independence and lesser reliance on the parent for business
origination compared with SBS.

The recent disposal of Sberbank Slovensko (a Slovak-based
subsidiary of SBEU) and the gradual evolution of SBEU's strategic
focus are unlikely to impair SBRF's propensity to support. Fitch
believes that SBRF is still committed to providing support to the
subsidiaries for as long as they are owned by SBRF.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - VR

The affirmation of SBEU's VR at 'b+' reflects limited changes to
the bank's credit profile over the last 12 months. The VR
continues to reflect SBEU's modest franchise and limited pricing
power; legacy asset quality problems and weak pre-impairment
profitability. Positively, the VR reflects SBEU's sound liquidity
and funding profiles and recently improved core capitalization.

At end-1Q16, non-performing loans (NPLs, 90 days overdue and
impaired loans), most of which are legacy exposures, equalled a
high 11% of gross loans and were only 45% covered by impairment
reserves. The track record of recoveries from the legacy NPLs has
been limited to date, although, positively, the inflow of new NPLs
is low, reflecting the generally reasonable quality of new
lending. Loan concentrations are high, although the 20 largest
exposures (2.5x Fitch Core Capital (FCC) at end-1Q16) are of
adequate quality, in Fitch's view. SBEU's Ukrainian exposure was
limited to 1% of gross loans, and therefore presents limited
additional risk.

Profitability is dampened by weak operating efficiency and thin
margins that are under pressure from a low interest rate
environment and a high portion of low-yielding liquid assets. SBEU
managed to be profitable in 1H16 for the first time since its
acquisition by SBRF in 2012, although pre-impairment profit in
1H16 was still weak and equalled to less than 1% of gross loans
(annualized). Therefore, Fitch continues to view SBEU's
performance as vulnerable and offering limited capacity to absorb
credit losses in a credit downcycle.

After the conversion of EUR370 million of subordinated debt from
the parent in 1Q16, the estimated FCC ratio increased to 14% of
risk-weighted assets at end-1Q16 and further to 15% at end-1H16
following the de-consolidation of the Slovak subsidiary. The
remaining EUR320 million of loss-absorbing subordinated debt from
SBRF is equal to a further 4% of risk-weighted assets. Fitch said,
"We estimate that at end-1H16 SBEU's FCC buffer was sufficient to
increase loan impairment reserves by EUR500 million (around 5% of
gross loans), thereby increasing coverage of existing NPLs by
reserves to 90% (from the current 47% which is fairly modest)
while still maintaining a double-digit FCC ratio."

Funding and liquidity is a rating strength and is supported by the
steady inflow of granular, although price-sensitive, retail
deposits and by contingent access to liquidity from SBRF in case
of need. At end-1Q16 SBEU was 60% customer-funded. Reliance on
parent funding has reduced to 5% of total liabilities over recent
years. The liquidity buffer was substantial at EUR3.5 billion,
which is sufficient to repay all wholesale funding due in 2016 and
2017 and still cover around 18% of customer funding with remaining
liquid assets.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATINGS

The support-driven ratings of both banks are likely to change in
tandem with the parent's IDRs.

The IDRs of SBEU could be upgraded to the level of SBRF, thereby
eliminating the one-notch difference, in the event of (i)
significantly higher integration with the parent, (ii) an increase
in the proportion of business devoted to servicing core group
clients and (iii) an extended track record of profitable
operations, reinforcing the parent's long-term strategic
commitment to its subsidiary.

Both banks' support-driven IDRs are sensitive to a change in
SBRF's support propensity, for example, in case of plans to
dispose of either of the banks. Under this scenario, the notching
between the parent and the subsidiaries may be widened.

VR

An upgrade of SBEU's VR would require an extended track record of
limited inflow of new asset quality problems and profitable
performance. Conversely, a marked deterioration of SBEU's asset
quality resulting in significant bottom-line losses may result in
a downgrade.

Fitch may assign a VR to SBS if it develops a more significant
independent franchise and reduces the reliance on the parent in
terms of funding and new business origination.


The rating actions are as follows:

SBEU

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook Negative

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b+'

SBS

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'



===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


STARA ZAGORA: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Remains Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' long-term issuer credit
rating on the Bulgarian City of Stara Zagora.  The outlook remains
stable.

                             RATIONALE

The long-term rating on Stara Zagora primarily reflects S&P's
'BB+' long-term sovereign credit rating on Bulgaria.  S&P do not
consider that the city meets the criteria under which it would
rate a local or regional government (LRG) higher than the related
sovereign.  S&P consequently caps the long-term rating on Stara
Zagora at the level of S&P's long-term rating on Bulgaria.  In
S&P's opinion, Bulgarian cities, including Stara Zagora, are not
able to maintain more resilient credit characteristics than the
sovereign in a stress scenario.  The cities have limited ability
to oppose reforms to their institutional framework.  Although they
receive a large portion of revenues for state-delegated tasks from
the national budget, they are also bound by the central
government's decisions concerning revenue and expenditure.

S&P continues to assess Stara Zagora's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) at 'bbb-' and considers that it remains burdened by
possible volatility in financial indicators due to the city's
small size.  An SACP assessment is not a rating but a means of
evaluating the intrinsic creditworthiness of an LRG under the
assumption that there is no sovereign rating cap.  The SACP level
results from the combination of our assessment of an LRG's
individual credit profile and the institutional framework in which
it operates.

Stara Zagora's SACP is supported by its very low debt burden and
low contingent liabilities.  S&P also believes that the city has
average budgetary flexibility, reflecting its high autonomy to set
taxes, although this is offset by constrained expenditure
flexibility.  Stara Zagora also reports a strong budgetary
performance.  Benefitting from this development, the city's
liquidity is adequate, in S&P's view.

The SACP is constrained by S&P's view of the evolving and
unbalanced institutional framework in which Bulgarian cities
operate and by the city's weak economy, with low wealth levels in
an international context.  Although S&P acknowledges that the
city's budgeting procedures are strengthening, S&P still regards
its financial management as weak, due to a limited track record of
tight fiscal policy and developing long-term financial planning.
S&P's view of the institutional framework reflects the possibility
of unexpected changes in the distribution of LRGs' revenues and
government-mandated spending.

S&P views Stara Zagora's economy as weak because, although the
city benefits from its proximity to the largest energy complex in
Bulgaria, its economic wealth is relatively low.  S&P estimates
Bulgaria's national GDP per capita at a modest $6,800 in 2016,
partly due to movements in the euro-U.S. dollar exchange rate.  In
S&P's view, real GDP per capita will increase by slightly more
than 2% per year, on average, over 2016-2018.  Stara Zagora's
population is declining, in line with the national trend, but S&P
acknowledges that the trend has slowed over the past few years.
The city also shows good unemployment figures compared with the
national average.

In S&P's opinion, Stara Zagora's budgetary flexibility remains
average.  The city has the ability to adjust the majority of its
own revenues, such as taxes, which it can set independently within
a legally defined range.  In addition, S&P projects the city's
capital expenditures will remain high.  However, S&P still
believes the city is reluctant to raise tax rates over the next
two years.  In addition, Stara Zagora has large infrastructure
needs, which it started to address in 2013, aided by significant
cofinancing from EU funds.  S&P anticipates further strong
investment activity over 2016-2018 during the next round of EU
financing.  These investments will mainly be funded via EU
subsidies, with low municipal cofinancing requirements.

"Taking into account the city's progress in recent years' budget
execution, we project strong budgetary performance in our base
case until year-end 2018.  We expect Stara Zagora will improve its
operating balance to about 14% of operating revenues and achieve a
slightly positive balance after capital accounts of 0.4% of total
revenues on average in 2016-2018.  In 2015, the city's operating
revenues contracted slightly, based on transfers between budgets.
Because some of these transfers are to be returned in the current
year, they appear in the 2016 budget.  We also expect a slight
contraction of capital expenditure over the next few years, owing
to the delayed passing of the EU budget for 2014-2020.  Overall,
we still consider it likely that Stara Zagora will be able to
retain its strong budgetary results.  Nevertheless, the city's
budgetary performance is volatile, in our view, partly because of
the small size of its budget," S&P said.

Debt increased significantly in 2015 to 33% of operating revenues
(from 12% at year-end 2014) because of temporary bridge funding
for the execution of capital expenditures, most of which the city
will be reimbursed for, with a time lag.  However, a large share
of this additional debt was repaid in the first half of 2016, and
S&P expects the city's direct debt will remain below 15% of
operating revenues until 2018.  In S&P's view, contingent
liabilities are low and limited to the obligations of a few health
care institutions and the city's public transportation company.

S&P still considers financial management to be weak in a global
context, due to the city's limited track record of tight fiscal
policy.  But S&P considers that there has been an improvement over
recent years in the city's budgeting, debt, and liquidity
management, and that its long-term financial planning is
developing.

                             LIQUIDITY

S&P continues to assess Stara Zagora's liquidity as adequate.

The city's average free cash and liquid assets in the last 12
months totaled about Bulgarian lev (BGN) 9 million (about EUR4.6
million).  Adjusting for the projected balance after capital
accounts and after applying a haircut, as per S&P's methodology,
it expects Stara Zagora to maintain its exceptional debt-coverage
ratio exceeding 100%.  S&P expects the city's debt service to
amount to BGN3.9 million over the coming 12 months.

Nevertheless, S&P expects the city's liquidity position will
remain volatile because its cash holdings are limited and future
exposure to short-term debt is difficult to predict.

Stara Zagora's access to external liquidity also remains limited
in the context of Bulgaria's relatively weak banking sector and
shallow capital market.  S&P's Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessment places Bulgaria's banking sector in group '7' (group
'1' denotes the lowest-risk banking sectors and group '10' the
highest risk).

                             OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on Stara Zagora reflects that on Bulgaria.

S&P could raise the rating on Stara Zagora in the next 12 months
if S&P raised the rating on Bulgaria to 'BBB-' and the city's
stand-alone credit quality remained in line with S&P's base-case
scenario.

S&P would lower the rating on Stara Zagora in the next 12 months
if it lowered the ratings on Bulgaria.  Alternatively, S&P could
lower the rating on the city, even if the sovereign rating
remained unchanged, if Stara Zagora materially missed its
financial targets and reported persistently high deficits after
capital accounts, leading to increased debt and pressure on
liquidity.  S&P currently sees this scenario as unlikely, however.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

                                 Rating
                                 To              From
Stara Zagora (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency     BB+/Stable/--   BB+/Stable/--



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C Y P R U S
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CYPRUS: S&P Raises Sovereign Long-Term Credit Ratings to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its foreign and local currency long-term
sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of Cyprus to 'BB' from
'BB-'.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' foreign and local
currency short-term sovereign credit ratings on Cyprus.  The
outlook is positive.

                             RATIONALE

The upgrade reflects S&P's views of Cyprus' stronger-than-expected
economic growth and its further debt reduction, as well as steady
improvement in the banking sector's asset quality, in line with
S&P's last sovereign rating action.

S&P estimates that, after a deep three-year recession, and real
economic growth of 1.6% in 2015, the Cypriot economy will expand
by about 2.7% this year, exceeding our March 2016 forecast of 2%.
Cyprus' recovery is supported by resilient business services,
tourism, gradually reviving private consumption, and construction.
The restructuring in the financial sector is advancing, but S&P
expects it will be a few years before the sector contributes to
economic growth.  Although the financial sector is in S&P's view
clouding the investment outlook, a number of ongoing and planned
investment projects -- including investments in the tourism sector
(casino, hotel resorts, and marinas), energy (solar thermal plants
and the hydrocarbon sector), and business services -- will
underpin investment activity and contribute to domestic demand
over the next several years.  S&P also expects the unemployment
rate, 15% at year-end 2015, will drop further to below 12% by
2018, which will support households' disposable incomes and
private consumption.  S&P expects the Cypriot economy will
continue to grow at about 2.5% in real terms in 2017-2019, even
though high levels of nonperforming loans (NPLs; mainly loans past
due for more than 90 days and forborne loans for a minimum
observance period even if they meet the new repayment program)
remain a key concern for financial stability and economic
performance.  In the long run, S&P also factors in the possibility
of a reunification of the island, which would represent an
important positive contribution to the country's growth rate,
despite initial micro- and macroeconomic challenges.

Following Cyprus' strong economic performance and budgetary
consolidation efforts in recent years, S&P expects the
government's budgetary position will be close to balance in 2016,
before gradually moving into a surplus over the ensuing few years.
At the same time, S&P don't anticipate that the government will
continue with discretionary deficit-reducing measures.  Instead,
S&P anticipates the government's budgetary position will continue
strengthening thanks to a gradual reduction in unemployment
benefits and an increase in cyclical revenue items amid the
economic recovery.  Nevertheless, S&P expects the government will
proceed with the implementation of its public administration
reform, related primarily to the wage bill, and its reform of
property tax.

S&P forecasts that net general government debt will decline to
below 85% of GDP in 2019 (including an asset swap with the Central
Bank of Cyprus, which had been delayed until 2016).  S&P projects
that general government interest payments will average about 6.4%
of general government revenues in 2016-2019.

"Approximately 40% of Cypriot general government debt --
EUR7.25 billion -- represents official lending from the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) under the EUR10 billion economic adjustment program
negotiated in May 2013.  This debt (excluding the EUR950 million
loan from the IMF) does not start to mature until December 2025
(with an average maturity of 15 years).  The interest rate Cyprus
pays on the ESM obligations is well below the expected cost of
market financing.  Following the conclusion of the IMF/ESM-
financed program in March 2016, loss of eligibility for the
European Central Bank's (ECB's) Public SectorPurchase Program did
not impair the sovereign's access to funding in the financial
market.  Eventual further easing of borrowing terms by official
lenders would support a decline in net government debt to GDP
beyond what we currently project, assuming that Cyprus' primary
general government budgetary position, at 1.8% of GDP last
year -- making it one of the highest in the eurozone -- stabilizes
at about 2.5% of GDP after 2018," S&P said.

The execution of the privatization plan, which the Cypriot
government committed to in the context of the ESM/IMF financially
supported economic adjustment program, could in S&P's view
generate sale proceeds that could lead to a further decline in
government debt.  S&P's current government debt projection does
not take into account such potential proceeds (for example, from
the planned partial sale of Cyprus Telecom).

"At the same time, we believe that strengthening private
consumption will limit the extent of improvement in the current
account balance.  Although most of Cyprus' current account deficit
for the past several years represents the accounting treatment of
net income payments made on the large stock of inbound equity and
foreign direct investment in the economy, we don't believe this
represents a large domestic savings gap.  Despite the robust
performance in the tourism sector, we believe that the economy's
external vulnerabilities persist, given its large, albeit reduced,
stock of external debt, as well as its high net international
liability position.  We estimate the economy's narrow net external
debt at about 430% of current account receipts on average in 2016-
2019, including a portion of Eurosystem financing of the Bank of
Cyprus, the largest domestic commercial bank.  This financing is,
however, on a discernible declining trend (we have revised the
underlying data in line with the sixth edition of the IMF's
Payments and International Investment Position Manual).  Moreover,
we note that the external statistics are substantially and
negatively affected by a significant presence of special purpose
entities registered in Cyprus that don't have any direct
interaction with the Cypriot economy.  Lastly, we expect foreign
direct investments will be supported by foreign interest in the
tourism sector and energy-related infrastructure, especially in
the hydrocarbon sector," S&P noted.

"We believe that the banking sector is reducing asset quality
concerns, although we still view financial stability as a main
risk.  In our view, the deterioration in the banking sector's
asset quality peaked in early 2015.  The prospects for faster
improvement in 2016-2017 have increased, with nonperforming
exposures declining by about 10% in nominal terms by May 31, 2016.
Banks' reserve coverage is still low, at about 37% as of May 31,
2016 (including provisions made by cooperatives), but up from 33%
in 2014, with the remaining balance covered by tangible
collateral.  We expect the enforcement of the legislation
regarding foreclosures and insolvency procedures, together with a
significant increase in banks' capacity to manage nonperforming
assets, sales of nonperforming exposures, their securitization,
and the swift transfer of title deeds, as well as underlying
economic recovery, will continue to support the improving asset
quality.  The Central Bank of Cyprus introduced incentives for all
the banks to reduce their NPLs, and legislation was adopted that
allows for the creation of a secondary market for nonperforming
assets.  Importantly, we expect the Bank of Cyprus' recourse to
the ECB's emergency liquidity assistance will decline to EUR1.3
billion by the end of this year fromEUR11.4 billion in 2013,
reflecting a sizable restructuring effort.  As a result, the bank
canceled its EUR1 billion in government-guaranteed bonds, which
reduces the stock of outstanding government guarantees to about
EUR2 billion, decreasing the government's related contingent
liabilities," S&P said.

                               OUTLOOK

The positive outlook reflects S&P's view that it could upgrade
Cyprus within thenext 12 months if its reduction of currently high
levels of NPLs accelerates, indicating a conversion of Cyprus'
credit and monetary conditions, including the monetary
transmission mechanism, with those of the eurozone.  Moreover, S&P
could raise the ratings if net government debt declined below 80%
of GDP.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the banking sector's
stability comes under renewed significant pressure, for example
due to unaddressed deterioration in asset quality; if economic
growth deviates substantially and negatively from our current
expectations, including for instance due to a potentially adverse
impact on Cyprus from the U.K.'s June 23 referendum to leave the
EU; or if budgetary performance doesn't reduce government debt to
the extent we currently forecast.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that economic assessment score had improved.
All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

                                        Rating
                                        To            From
Cyprus (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency            BB/Pos./B      BB-/Pos./B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   AAA            AAA
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency            BB             BB-
Short-Term Debt
  Local Currency                        B              B
Commercial Paper
  Local Currency                        B              B



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G E R M A N Y
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HANSA TREUHAND: Container Ships Slip Into Insolvency
----------------------------------------------------
Michael Hollmann at IHS Fairplay reports that Hamburg container
shipowner Hansa Treuhand, led by founding owner and CEO Hermann
Ebel, is facing a major shake-up as many of its vessels slip into
insolvency.

IHS Fairplay relates that the group was forced to seek creditor
protection for 15 container ships at the Hamburg district court on
Sept. 15.

According to IHS Fairplay, none of the vessels are retail KG fund
ships, which represent the majority of the group's managed fleet.
All of them are owned by group founder Hermann Ebel whose private
shipowning holding Hermann Ebel Schiffahrts Holding was also put
into administration.

IHS Fairplay says the court granted a request that insolvency
proceedings be carried out in self-administration given the
liquidity situation of Ebel's shipping companies. Hansa Treuhand's
managed assets and liquidity have been strained by the prolonged
slump in the container ship timecharter market, which only offers
rates at around opex levels for ships in most size classes, IHS
Fairplay states.

Apparently the banks have not been willing to grant further loan
extensions or fresh funding to keep the one-ship companies in
business, says IHS Fairplay.

All of the insolvent tonnage -- including some vessels that had
already been in administration for some time -- are likely going
to be sold off into a very weak secondhand market.

Consequently, the fleet managed by Hansa Treuhand's ship
management arm Hansa Shipping is expected to be halved from around
50 vessels in the near term, the group said in statement on Sept.
15, IHS Fairplay relates.

The report says Hansa Treuhand will also shut down its KG issuing
house to slash costs as a revival in marine equity placing in
Germany is not on the horizon. Both -- the closure of its KG house
activities and the reduction of its managed fleet -- are going to
trigger significant redundancies. Some 36 of 130 employees across
the group are going to leave the company by the end of the year, a
group spokesman told IHS Fairplay.

According to the report, the representative said that CEO Hermann
Ebel will continue in his executive role at Hansa Treuhand and its
subsidiary companies and that the group is looking to consolidate
and rebuild its fleet over time.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


IVORY CDO: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class A1 Notes to 'BBsf'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Ivory CDO Limited's most senior notes
and affirmed the rest, as follows:

   -- EUR10.2m Class A1 (ISIN XS0309311909): upgraded to 'BBsf'
      from 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR6m Class A2 (ISIN XS0309350477): affirmed at 'B-sf';
      Outlook Stable

   -- EUR12m Class B (ISIN XS0309352093): affirmed at 'CCsf'

   -- EUR12.9m Class C (ISIN XS0309353653): affirmed at 'CCsf'

   -- EUR13.7m Class D (ISIN XS0309357050): affirmed at 'Csf'

   -- EUR3.2m Class E (ISIN XS0309358298): affirmed at 'Csf'

Ivory CDO Limited is a managed cash arbitrage securitization of
mezzanine asset-backed securities, primarily RMBS, CMBS and CDOs.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade on the most senior notes reflects improved credit
enhancement (CE) outweighing the negative credit quality migration
in the portfolio over the past 12 months. The class A1 notes were
redeemed by EUR12.1 million during this period, resulting in CE
increasing to 80.2% from 66%. The affirmation on the remaining
tranches reflects the portfolio's low credit quality and increased
portfolio concentration despite the transaction's deleveraging.

Fitch estimates 66.4% of the portfolio are in the 'CCCsf' category
or below, up from 54.6% a year ago. There are two additional
defaulted assets, which increased the current defaults to EUR9.6
million from EUR7 million during the same period. The top 10
obligors' concentration increased to 62.5% from 53% after four
assets were full repaid. The portfolio's exposure to the RMBS
sector has increased to 43.2% from 39.2% as RMBS assets amortize
more slowly than other asset sectors.

All overcollateralization tests were breached since 2009 and the
transaction has been capturing excess spread to repay the class A1
notes. The class A1 notes have amortized by EUR735,000 using
excess spread since September 2015. The weighted average spread
has increased to 1.75% from 1.63% over the past 12 months. The
portfolio's reported weighted average life is 0.4 years, compared
with Fitch's estimates of 7.6 years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A stress test extending the expected maturity date of the
portfolio assets to the assets' legal final maturity date showed
potential negative rating action on the most senior notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that affected the
rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any third
party assessment of the asset portfolio information or conducted a
review of origination files as part of its ongoing monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings from Fitch and
other Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations.
Fitch has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within
Fitch and other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.



===========
L A T V I A
===========


KVV LIEPAJAS: Assets Should Be Sold as Whole, Administrator Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Baltic Course, citing LETA, reports that the core assets of
the insolvent KVV Liepajas Metalurgs metallurgy company should be
sold as a whole, the company's insolvency administrator Guntars
Koris said.

The Baltic Course relates that Mr. Koris said the next step in the
company's insolvency process would be inventory of its fixed
assets and their evaluation. As the Privatization Agency has been
doing that earlier, the administrator will ask the Privatization
Agency to conduct inventory also this time to save resources. The
process might take some two months.

Debtors may submit their claims within one month starting from
September 16 when KVV Liepajas Metalurgs was declared insolvent,
The Baltic Course says.

According to the Baltic Course, Mr. Koris also supports the
government's position that the core assets related with
manufacturing should be sold as a whole so that the plant's
operations can be renewed.

The Baltic Course has reported Liepaja Court on September 16
approved commencing of insolvency proceedings at metallurgical
company KVV Liepajas Metalurgs. Guntars Koris has been appointed
insolvency administrator for the company. The insolvency case
against KVV Liepajas Metalurgs was opened following a complaint
submitted by the joint-stock company G4S Latvia. One more
insolvency claim was filed by TKB Lizings. Both cases have been
combined into a single civil process, explained Kurpa.

Based in the southwestern Latvian port city of Liepaja, Liepajas
Metalurgs used to be Latvia's leading metallurgical company and a
major provider of jobs in Liepaja.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


GARDA CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class F Notes to CCC+
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on Garda CLO B.V.'s
class B, C, D, E, and F notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed
its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 29, 2016 trustee report and
the application of S&P's relevant criteria.

S&P subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class
at each rating level.  The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the
maximum level of gross defaults, based on S&P's stress
assumptions, that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay
the noteholders.  In S&P's analysis, it used the portfolio balance
that it considers to be performing, the weighted-average spread,
and the weighted-average recovery rates calculated in line with
S&P's corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.
S&P applied various cash flow stresses, using its standard default
patterns, in conjunction with different interest rate stress
scenarios.

The class A and E notes have amortized by EUR50.32 million and
EUR0.69 million, respectively, since S&P's previous review.  In
S&P's view, this has increased the available credit enhancement
for all rated classes of notes.  S&P has also observed that both
the weighted-average spread and the concentration of 'CCC'
category ('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-') rated assets has remained
stable since S&P's previous review.

Non-euro-denominated assets comprise 7.92% of the aggregate
collateral balance.  A cross-currency swap agreement hedges these
assets.  In S&P's cash flow analysis, it considered scenarios
where the hedging counterparty does not perform, and where the
transaction is therefore exposed to changes in currency rates.

Taking into account the results of our credit and cash flow
analysis and the application of S&P's current counterparty
criteria, it considers that the available credit enhancement for
the class B, C, D, E, and F notes is commensurate with higher
ratings than those currently assigned.  S&P has therefore raised
its ratings on these classes of notes.

S&P's analysis also indicates that the available credit
enhancement for the class A notes remains commensurate with the
currently assigned rating.  S&P has therefore affirmed its
'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A notes.

Garda CLO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade
corporate firms.  The transaction closed in February 2007 and its
reinvestment period ended in April 2013.  3i Debt Management
Investments Ltd. is the transaction manager.

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To              From

Garda CLO B.V.
EUR358 Million Senior And Deferrable Interest Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

B           AAA (sf)        AA (sf)
C           AA+ (sf)        A+ (sf)
D           BBB- (sf)       BB- (sf)
E           BB+ (sf)        B (sf)
F           CCC+ (sf)       CCC (sf)

Rating Affirmed

A           AAA (sf)


SINGTEL ADSB: Goes Into Voluntary Liquidation
---------------------------------------------
Telecompaper reports that Singapore Telecommunications has
announced that SingTel ADSB (Netherlands), an indirect dormant
subsidiary in which Singtel has a stake of 90%, is in voluntary
liquidation and has appointed Quah Kung Yang as its liquidator.

According to Telecompaper, SingTel says the liquidation of SingTel
ADSB is not expected to have any material impact on the net
tangible assets or earnings per share of Singtel.


ZIGGO GROUP: Moody's Affirms Ba3 CFR & Changes Outlook to Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba3 corporate family
rating of Ziggo Group Holding BV, the largest cable operator in
the Netherlands, and its rated subsidiaries.  At the same time,
the agency has affirmed the ratings of the existing debt issued by
Ziggo Bond Finance BV, Ziggo Secured Finance Partnership, Ziggo
Secured Finance BV, the SPV borrowing vehicles indirectly owned by
a Dutch Foundation that on-lend funds to the ring-fenced group
below Ziggo Group Holding BV.  However, Moody's has changed the
outlooks on all ratings to negative from stable.

Moody's decision to affirm Ziggo's ratings assumes the successful
closing of the 50%-50% joint venture between the company and
Vodafone Netherlands around the end of 2016.  The deal is,
however, subject to Vodafone selling its consumer fixed business
in line with the EU's conditions for approval.  The Ba3 CFR for
Ziggo Group Holding BV regards the joint venture agreement as
strategically positive for the company.  The planned asset
combination will enhance Ziggo's business position in the
Netherlands and eventually strengthen the JV's competitive
position versus Koninklijke KPN N.V. (KPN, Baa3 Stable).

Ziggo is issuing EUR3 billion equivalent of additional debt.  The
recapitalization proceeds (with the exception of $300 million that
will be used at issuance to refinance existing debt) will remain
in an escrow account pending closing of the JV.  The JV will carry
a leverage of 4.75x Total Net Debt to Annualized EBITDA (as
defined in Ziggo's debt documentation) as of 30 June 2016 on a
pro-forma basis.  This leverage maps to a Moody's adjusted gross
leverage ratio of close to 5.5x, which is at the high end of the
Ba3 rating category.

"The negative ratings outlook reflects the high starting leverage
for the JV at a time when there is a risk that Ziggo's operating
performance could continue to remain pressured beyond 2016 given
the tough market conditions," says Gunjan Dixit, a Moody's Vice
President -- Senior Analyst, and lead analyst for Ziggo.
"Notwithstanding the strong industrial logic of the JV and
Vodafone's and Liberty Global's proven track record in achieving
synergies, the negative outlook also captures some execution risks
given the untested nature of the collaboration of the two
companies in a joint control environment," adds Ms. Dixit.

The rating agency has also assigned a provisional (P)Ba3 (LGD3)
rating to the EUR2.575 billion equivalent senior secured notes
being issued by Ziggo Secured Finance BV (due 2027) and (P)B2
(LGD6) rating to the $625 million of senior unsecured notes being
issued by Ziggo Bond Finance BV (due 2027).

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
securities and these reflect Moody's credit opinion regarding the
transaction only.  Upon closing of the JV transaction and a
conclusive review of the final documentation, Moody's will
endeavor to assign definitive ratings to the proposed notes.  A
definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.

                           RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation anticipates the successful closing of the deal
between Ziggo and Vodafone Netherlands (Vodafone NL) to create a
50%-50% joint venture (JV).  In February 2016, Liberty Global and
Vodafone announced the agreement to set up the JV of their local
businesses in the Netherlands (Ziggo and Vodafone NL).

In order to equalize the different equity valuations of the two
Dutch operations, Vodafone will make a EUR1 billion payment to
Liberty Global.  Following completion of the transaction neither
Liberty Global nor Vodafone will consolidate the JV.  The JV is
expected to close around the end of 2016 and has received the go-
ahead from the European Commission on 3rd August 2016, subject to
divestment of Vodafone Netherlands' consumer fixed-line business.
Moody's assumes that once the JV concludes, Ziggo Group Holding BV
will become directly or indirectly 50%-50% owned by Liberty Global
and Vodafone.  Moody's has currently assumed that if any
shareholder loans are issued in executing this ownership
structure, they will meet Moody's criteria of being treated as
100% equity.

To fund the JV, Ziggo is currently raising around EUR3 billion
equivalent of additional debt and its starting leverage will be
4.75x Total Net Debt to Annualized EBITDA (as defined in Ziggo's
debt documentation) as of June 30, 2016, on a pro-forma basis.
Moody's acknowledges that the JV will target a consolidated net
leverage ratio of 4.5x-5.0x at all times.  The company's
calculated leverage is flattered by (1) the exclusion of vendor
loans, (2) the add-back to EBITDA of certain related party fees
and allocations, which Moody's views as ongoing operating costs
for the joint venture and therefore excludes from EBITDA, and (3)
the add-back of future unrealized synergies.  The corresponding
Moody's-adjusted leverage ratio at 5.5x as of June 30, 2016, is
therefore meaningfully higher than the company's reported leverage
and is at the high end of the threshold defined for the Ba3 rating
category.

Moody's regards the JV agreement as strategically positive for
Ziggo.  The combination of Ziggo's and Vodafone's businesses will
create a second strong integrated player in addition to KPN in the
intensely competitive Dutch telecoms market.  More importantly,
the joint venture will allow the two groups to achieve material
cost and capex synergies, estimated at EUR280 million annually by
the end of the fifth year after closing.  Integration costs
required to achieve these synergies are estimated at EUR350
million of which a majority will be incurred over a period of
three years.  In Moody's view, these synergies are at the higher
end of the range when compared to other similar fixed-to-mobile
deals in Europe.  Although Moody's recognizes Vodafone's and
Liberty Global's proven track record in achieving synergies, it
cautiously factors in certain execution risks related to delivery
of the synergies on a timely basis.

Moody's was initially anticipating Ziggo's operating performance
to stabilize in 2016 but this now appears highly unlikely.  After
declining by 2% in 2015 on a rebased basis, Ziggo's revenues have
declined by 3% year-on-year in both Q1 2016 and Q2 2016 as
compared to the corresponding prior-year periods.  While Ziggo has
focused on strengthening its product offerings, it has had to
contend with aggressive competition from KPN.  Vodafone NL's
operating performance has been similarly challenged over the same
period.  The JV should eventually strengthen Ziggo's market
position in the Dutch market but during the time its integration
is in progress, there is a risk that Ziggo's operating performance
could continue to remain pressured due to intense competition.
The negative rating outlook cautiously recognizes the near-term
operating challenges facing the newly combined business while the
leverage of the JV will be at the high end of the Ba3 category.

The company's debt ratings consider that cross guarantee and
collateral sharing arrangements have been put in place that result
in an effective pari-passu position of the claims under the senior
notes at Ziggo Bond Finance B.V. and Ziggo Bond Company B.V. and
the senior secured debt at Ziggo B.V. and the senior secured debt
at Ziggo Secured Finance B.V., respectively.  Moody's notes that
the claims of debt holders of Ziggo Bond Finance, Ziggo Secured
Finance and Ziggo Secured Finance Partnership on Ziggo's
subsidiaries are indirect through senior notes proceeds loans and
secured proceeds loans respectively.  With the JV transaction, the
Vodafone NL assets will eventually be securing the senior secured
debt and the guarantors for the senior secured debt will also be
enhanced to include certain Vodafone NL subsidiaries.

The (P)Ba3 rating for the new senior secured notes is in line with
the Ba3 ratings for the existing senior secured term loans and
senior secured notes issued by Ziggo BV.  This is because the new
notes will enter the ring-fenced group under Ziggo Group Holding
BV in the form of senior secured proceeds loans and effectively
benefit from the same security and guarantee package as for the
senior secured debt at Ziggo BV, an indirect subsidiary of Ziggo
Group Holding BV.  The security position of the senior secured
debt instruments will weaken once the stub of the 2020 notes
(EUR73.5 million as of Dec. 31, 2015,) has been repaid, as direct
all asset security will no longer be granted.  However, Moody's
expects the presence of senior upstream guarantees from asset-
carrying companies (including Vodafone NL subsidiaries)
representing at least 80% of EBITDA as well as share pledges of
the guarantors to leave the first-ranking position of the senior
secured debt in Ziggo's debt waterfall intact.  The first-ranking
position of the senior secured debt is reflected in the Ba3 rating
at the CFR level.  In contrast, the (P)B2 rating for the new
senior notes and B2 ratings of the existing senior notes at Ziggo
Bond Finance and Ziggo Bond Company recognize the deep structural
subordination of these notes, which rank lowest in the claims
hierarchy.

The liquidity position of Ziggo after the completion of the JV
will remain adequate.  There will be an opening cash position of
only EUR5 million as per June 30, 2016 on a pro-forma basis but
the JV will benefit from a EUR800 million revolving credit
facility whose maturity has been recently extended to 2022 from
2020.

                    RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on Ziggo's rating reflects the continued
operational challenges facing the business, the execution risks
associated with the Vodafone NL integration process and the high
leverage after JV consummation.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - DOWN

Downward pressure on the rating is likely if (1) the operating
performance of the combined business weakens meaningfully during
the integration process due to intense competition in the market;
(2) the combined business fails to deliver the promised synergies
on a timely basis; and/ or (3) Moody's adjusted Gross Debt/ EBITDA
ratio moves above 5.5x on a sustained basis.

Should the JV transaction not go through, downward pressure on
Ziggo's rating will be imminent given its high leverage on a
standalone basis (Moody's adjusted EBITDA was around 6.3x at the
end of June 2016 on a last two quarters annualized basis).

                  WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - UP

While positive ratings development is unlikely in the near term,
strong operating performance and solid revenue growth together
with debt reduction, such that leverage, as measured by the Gross
Debt/EBITDA ratio (as adjusted by Moody's) falls sustainably below
4.5x, could lead to a ratings upgrade.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Assignments:

Issuer: Ziggo Bond Finance B.V.
  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned (P)B2
   (LGD6)

Issuer: Ziggo Secured Finance B.V.
  Backed Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned (P)Ba3
   (LGD3)

Affirmations:

Issuer: LGE HoldCo VI B.V.
  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B2

Issuer: Ziggo B.V.
  Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed Ba3
  Backed Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba3

Issuer: Ziggo Bond Finance B.V.
  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B2

Issuer: Ziggo Group Holding B.V.
  Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed Ba3
  Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed Ba3-PD

Issuer: Ziggo Secured Finance B.V.
  Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed Ba3
  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba3

Issuer: Ziggo Secured Finance Partnership
  Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed Ba3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Ziggo B.V.
  Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable

Issuer: Ziggo Bond Finance B.V.
  Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable

Issuer: Ziggo Group Holding B.V.
  Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable

Issuer: Ziggo Secured Finance B.V.
  Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable

Issuer: Ziggo Secured Finance Partnership
  Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable

Ziggo Group Holding B.V., headquartered in Utrecht, The
Netherlands is the largest cable operator in the Netherlands.  In
2015, the group generated EUR2.5 billion in revenue and
EUR1.4 billion in operating cash flow (OCF- as calculated by the
company).  In H12016, revenues were EUR1.4 billion and reported
OCF was EUR0.7 billion.


ZIGGO GROUP: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating on Netherlands-based cable operator Ziggo
Group Holding B.V.  The outlook is stable.

S&P also assigned its 'BB-' issue and '3' recovery ratings to
Ziggo's new senior secured debt, while affirming S&P's 'BB-' issue
rating on Ziggo's existing senior secured debt.  The recovery
rating remains unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's expectation of
meaningful recovery, in the lower half of the 50%-70% range, in
the event of a payment default.

Additionally, S&P assigned its 'B' issue and '6' recovery ratings
to Ziggo's new senior unsecured debt, and affirmed the 'B' issue
rating on Ziggo's existing senior unsecured notes.  The recovery
rating on these notes remains unchanged at '6', indicating S&P's
expectation of negligible recovery (0%-10%) in the event of a
payment default.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Ziggo is a core
subsidiary of Liberty Global PLC (LGP), and after Ziggo is merged
with Vodafone Netherlands into a 50/50 joint venture (JV), the
parents LGP and Vodafone Group will maintain ownership and
moderate support for the JV in the near term to protect their
investments.

While neither party will be a controlling owner, consolidate
Ziggo, or provide guarantees, S&P believes the JV is important to
the strategies of both as it aligns with their quad-play ambitions
in the significant Dutch market.  There are also restrictions on
an IPO for the JV until after the third anniversary of closing,
other transfers of interests in the JV until the fourth
anniversary of closing, and a first right of refusal to either
parent in the event of sales to a third party after the fourth
anniversary.  After the merger, although S&P will no longer
equalize the rating on Ziggo with that on its current owner LGP,
S&P will view it as moderately strategic for LGP and Vodafone
Group.  The rating on Ziggo will still incorporate one notch of
uplift to reflect the stronger credit quality of its owners and
its moderately strategic group status.

S&P views the proposed merger between Ziggo and Vodafone
Netherlands as moderately positive to Ziggo's business, making it
a stronger competitor to the incumbent KPN N.V.  The merged entity
would have over 14.5 million revenue-generating units, including
4.5 million Vodafone Netherlands' mobile subscribers, as well as
greater opportunities for cross-selling and converged quadruple-
play growth.  The JV targets revenue synergies with a net present
value of approximately EUR1.0 billion.  However, the ratings
remain constrained by Ziggo's limited geographical diversification
and fierce competition in the Dutch market.  In S&P's view, there
are also integration risks that limit the potential for a positive
rating action.

S&P assumes the JV will generate annual costs and capital
expenditure (capex) synergies of EUR280 million by the fifth full
year after closing, partly offset by EUR350 million in integration
costs.  Integration costs will mostly be incurred in the first
three years after closing.  Vodafone Netherlands' S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted EBITDA margin of approximately 33% is lower than
Ziggo's margin of 54%.  However, S&P expects the combined entity
to generate above-industry average profitability.

S&P anticipates that the JV will target covenant leverage of 4.5x-
5.0x, excluding shareholder loans, and S&P expects adjusted debt-
to-EBITDA sustainably between 5.0x-5.5x.  S&P expects the JV to
generate adjusted free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt of 3%-4%
in the first two-to-three years of operation.  Both ratios are in
line with S&P's current expectations for Ziggo.  Over time, S&P
expects the JV to raise additional financing, maintaining the
current financial risk profile even if EBITDA grows.  S&P assumes
that the proceeds from the financing and FOCF will be distributed
to the owners.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Ziggo's stabilizing
performance continues to be supported by LGP, and that the
modestly stronger stand-alone creditworthiness of the proposed JV
would also likely benefit from moderate support from the two
owners, LGP and Vodafone.

S&P is unlikely to lower the ratings on Ziggo given S&P's view of
parent support.  Prior to the merger, S&P could downgrade Ziggo if
S&P downgraded LGP.  After the merger closes, S&P could lower the
ratings on Ziggo if the combined parent ownership were to decline,
or if S&P otherwise came to believe parent support had become less
likely.

S&P could revise down Ziggo or the JV's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) if its operating performance deteriorated materially.  This
could happen if the Dutch market becomes even more competitive and
the JV continues to lose customers.

S&P could raise the ratings on Ziggo after the merger closes if
S&P expected stronger support than S&P currently assumes from the
two owners of the JV.  S&P is currently unlikely to revise upward
Ziggo or the JV's SACP owing to strong market competition and the
highly leveraged capital structure.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


* POLAND: Company Bankruptcies Down 14.1%% in First Half 2016
-------------------------------------------------------------
Companies in Poland are continuing to benefit from the positive
macroeconomic environment, with strong domestic and foreign
demand.  The slower growth being experienced this year is caused
by weaker investments (which fell by 3.6% y/y, in the first half
of 2016).  This is partially the result of the slow start to EU
co-financed investments within the new financial budget.  Other
factors have been domestic and external risks, including possible
amendments of law, fluctuations in exchange rates and the eventual
consequences of the Brexit.

LOWER BANKRUPTCY FIGURES DUE TO NEW LEGISLATION

The number of bankruptcies has been decreasing since 2014.  In the
first half of 2016, 328 proceedings were recorded -- a fall of
14.1% compared to the year before.  New legislation, introduced
this year, means that companies now have alternatives to
bankruptcy proceedings.  The new restructuring procedures are
likely to become even more frequently used than has already been
seen in the second quarter of this year.

"The decreasing trend of business bankruptcies will continue over
the next few quarters.  Nevertheless, the framework is
changing -- there are less insolvencies but more restructuring
proceedings, explains Grzegorz Sielewicz, Coface economist for
Central & Eastern Europe.  "The new restructuration procedures,
implemented this year, have been gradually gaining popularity as a
remedy for companies suffering from payment problems. More
companies are now likely to return to business operations, instead
of failing".

Although Coface forecasts an 8.9% decline in insolvencies and
restructuring, by the end of 2016, this estimate could be affected
by stronger-than-anticipated growth in restructuration procedures.
Proceedings are expected to decrease by 4.8% in 2017.

PRIVATE CONSUMPTION IS POLAND'S MAIN GROWTH DRIVER

Poland's solid economic growth is mainly driven by household
consumption.  Although the country is facing a slowdown in EU
funds, the input from private consumption will intensify this year
-- especially with the continued improvements in the labor market.
Poland's unemployment rate has dropped to a level which has not
been seen for 25 years, wages are continuing to record fair growth
and inflation remains low. This environment indicates good
prospects for the retail sector.

Data on Poland's economic structure shows that private consumption
accounts for a higher share of nominal GDP than exports -- with
household consumption creating 58% of GDP last year.  Analysis of
correlations also reveals that domestic consumption has a stronger
impact than exports on the level of company insolvencies in
Poland.  Nevertheless, business profitability is being enhanced by
company operations on foreign markets.   The perspectives are
particularly good for manufacturers of merchandise with high
external demand.  These sectors include the automotive, furniture,
white goods and IT segments.  At the same time, gains are being
experienced by companies, which are directly addressing the rising
demand from domestic households.  The biggest retailers are now
subject to a new fiscal burden, implemented on 1st September 2016.
However, this should be somewhat compensated by the increase in
consumer spending.  Household consumption is expected to be a
crucial growth driver for the Polish economy over the next few
quarters. The insolvency picture should therefore see further
improvements, while the newly introduced restructuring legislation
should help companies suffering from liquidity problems to return
to effective business operations.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


PORTUGAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its unsolicited 'BB+/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Republic of Portugal.  The outlook is stable.

                             RATIONALE

The ratings on Portugal are supported by S&P's view of ongoing
budgetary consolidation, improvements in the government debt
maturity profile, and an accommodative monetary stance,
contributing among other things to maintaining government
borrowing costs at sustainable levels.  At the same time, the
ratings remain constrained by very high public and private sector
indebtedness, fragility in the domestic banking sector, and a weak
monetary transmission mechanism, all of which in S&P's view hinder
Portugal's economic growth potential.

"Despite economic growth during 2014-2015, we expect real GDP
growth in Portugal to weaken to about 1.2% in 2016.  We believe
that the deceleration in economic growth since mid-2015 reflects a
slowdown primarily in export performance and investment activity.
In particular, the decline in external demand from non-EU markets,
the destination for 27% of Portuguese goods exports, contributed
to a lull in export activity, partially offset by the strong
tourist season.  Fragility in the banking sector, as indicated by
highly leveraged private-sector balance sheets, as well as
domestic policy uncertainty, have in our opinion ebbed investment
activity since mid-2015.  Nevertheless, private consumption,
thanks to a rise in real disposable income, has supported economic
growth.  Besides the ongoing fall in unemployment and continuously
low inflation, households' purchasing power has improved due to
the increase in the minimum wage and other household income
support measures the government implemented earlier this year,"
S&P said.

"As a result of less dynamic economic recovery and, to some
extent, the recent increase in the minimum wage -- as well as
potential future ones -- we expect improvements in the labor
market to slow after unemployment dropped to 11.1% in July 2016
from 13.9% at end-2014.  Although we think the Portuguese job
market remains more regulated than most of its peers, we view
positively the government's initial plan to simplify the judicial
process for dismissals and the move toward a single contract to
reduce the segmentation between temporary and permanent labor
contracts.  At the same time, we believe this may not be carried
out due to a lack of legislative support.  We consider that the
failure to tackle shortcomings in the labor market, as well as in
products and services markets, by implementing structural
reforms -- including increasing the efficiency of the public
administration and improving the business environment -- is likely
to weigh on future investment activity and Portuguese economic
performance, particularly in the context of Portugal's eurozone
membership. Moreover, while the abovementioned increase in minimum
wage was partly offset by a decline in employers' social security
contributions and is unlikely to have markedly reduced the
restored price competitiveness of Portuguese goods and services
exports, further substantial increases in the minimum wage could
dim employment prospects.  Finally, we understand that the
government is considering labor market policy measures aimed at
reducing the flexibility in the labor market that we believe would
likely dent or even reverse the improvement in unemployment," S&P
said.

The private-sector debt overhang is in S&P's view a key impediment
to a more dynamic recovery, as resources that would otherwise be
spent on consumption or investment are being used for improving
households' and companies' balance sheets.  A more important
increase in equity financing (especially from external sources and
in particular into the banking sector), which is one of the
government's economic policy priorities, would be positive, in
S&P's view, and would facilitate deleveraging in the economy.  In
S&P's opinion, in the absence of stepped up deleveraging measures
or structural reforms, including improvements in the business
environment, high private-sector debt will continue to strain
growth prospects over the next few years.  This heightens the
fragility of the Portuguese banking system, which is characterized
by weak profitability and a still-high stock of problematic assets
on banks' balance sheets.  To strengthen the banking system, the
government announced in August 2016 its plans to recapitalize the
state-owned bank Caixa Geral de Depositos with EUR5.1 billion, of
which up to EUR2.7 billion are fresh funds from the state,
according to the underlying "agreement in principle" agreed by the
European Commission.  Overall, while S&P regards such steps as
constructive and conducive toward improved credit conditions in
the economy, including strengthening the monetary transmission
mechanism, the restructuring process in the Portuguese banking
system may not cease before the end of 2017.

Data from the Portuguese central bank, Banco de Portugal, indicate
that resident private nonfinancial sector gross debt on a non-
consolidated basis was still at a high 222% of GDP in June 2016,
albeit down from 260% at end-2012.  Portugal continues to have one
of the highest external narrow net external debt-to-current
account receipt ratios (S&P's preferred measure of external
position) among the 131 sovereigns we rate.  S&P estimates this
ratio at about 280% in 2016.  The substantial reduction in
borrowing costs for the economy's private sector eases
deleveraging, but the process is slow and, in S&P's view, hinders
economic recovery, given it implies inefficient allocation of
capital.  The economy is still vulnerable to deterioration in
external borrowing conditions, in S&P's opinion, despite the fall
in interest rates driven by the European Central Bank's (ECB's)
monetary policy measures.

According to S&P's forecast, the government will post a deficit of
about 2.8% of GDP in 2016, down from 3.2% of GDP in 2015 (or 4.4%
of GDP including the December 2015 bail-out of Banif).  S&P's
current budget deficit forecast does not include any additional
costs arising from the upcoming recapitalization of Caixa Geral de
Depositos, which however are included in our gross and net general
government debt projections (up to EUR2.7 billion).  The
difference between S&P's forecast and the government's revised
target of 2.5% of GDP (following the Council of the European
Union's decision in August 2016) is mainly due to S&P's lower
nominal economic growth projections.  Going forward, S&P expects
that general government primary balance (budget balance excluding
interest payments) will strengthen further, exceeding 2% of GDP in
2017, pointing to a significant budgetary consolidation effort
since the start of the decade.

"We believe that the government will remain committed to
preventing any potential significant budgetary deviation, possibly
due to worse-than-currently assumed macroeconomic conditions or a
larger-than-budgeted spending impact of some of its budgetary
measures, among others, reinstating the 35-hour working week in
the public sector or gradual re-instatement of public sector wage
cuts.  We note that these measures are not accompanied by a
comprehensive review or reform of public administration in terms
of its efficiency.  We understand that in order to fulfill its
budgetary targets, the government measures could include
eliminating existing exemptions in social contributions, reducing
intermediate consumption, increasing excise taxes on fuel, or
selling state-owned real estate.  In absence of a more resolute
strategy to reduce budget deficit, which is one indication of the
challenging political environment, we expect only slow budgetary
consolidation," S&P said.

"We expect Portugal's net general government debt will be about
118.7% of GDP in 2016 before slowly declining to about 115.0% of
GDP in 2019, excluding guarantees related to the European
Financial Stability Facility.  At the same time, average general
government interest payments will likely represent slightly more
than 10% of general government revenues in 2016-2019.  We expect
that Portugal's cash buffer, which we estimate at about 9% of GDP
at end-2016, will decline only gradually over the coming years.
Our current government debt projection includes the EUR2.7 billion
recapitalization of Caixa Geral de Depositos.  However, we do not
factor in the future reimbursement of the 2014 government loan to
the deposit guarantee fund for the purpose of the recapitalization
of Novo Banco, nor the government's potential additional fiscal
costs related to the litigation risk associated with state-owned
entities' swap contracts or financial sector support.  In recent
years, Portugal's public debt profile has significantly improved,
with the average maturity of the Portuguese government's debt
stock at end-2015 at 8.7 years, including the extension of the
European Financial Stability Mechanism loans.  Moreover,
Portugal's borrowing conditions have been notably supported by the
sovereign's eligibility for the ECB's Public Sector Purchase
Programme, which is scheduled to run until March 2017," S&P noted.

"We anticipate that the government, led by the Socialist Party and
supported by the Left Block and the Communist Party, will remain
committed to policies that underpin further fiscal consolidation
broadly in line with eurozone policies.  Still, we believe that
the long-term stability of the government will likely be tested in
case of weaker-than-expected economic growth that underlies the
budget plan, the potential implementation of further deficit-
reducing measures, and as it takes up a role in the stabilization
of the banking sector.  We believe that such political reality
explains the lack of growth enhancing the government's structural
reforms so-far and absence of more resolute economic and budgetary
policies that would tackle the remaining significant structural
vulnerabilities in the economy over the medium term.  Moreover,
the ongoing demographic shift, accelerated due to emigration,
exacerbates these challenges further and, over the medium to long
term, low productivity growth, if maintained, would significantly
restrain the economy's growth potential.  If sizable policy
slippages or reversals materialize, they could undermine the
economic recovery and budgetary consolidation, for example, owing
to deterioration in external financing conditions," S&P said.

                             OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on Portugal balances S&P's projections of
gradual budgetary consolidation over the next two years against
the risks of a weakening external growth environment, protracted
private-sector deleveraging, financial sector risks, and potential
significant economic and budgetary policy deviations.

S&P could lower the ratings if it sees:

   -- Continued marked weakening in economic growth, for example
      due to a significant economic policy deviation or absence
      of further growth-enhancing structural reforms; or if the
      government adopts policies that could hurt Portugal's
      access to international financial markets.

   -- The government's budgetary position deviating considerably
      and negatively from S&P's expectations or Portugal's
      external adjustment being reversed.

S&P could raise its ratings on Portugal if S&P observes:

   -- Marked improvement in the economic growth outlook, for
      example thanks to the implementation of additional
      structural reforms;

   -- Continued budgetary consolidation that brings net
      government debt to below 100% of GDP; and

   -- Acceleration in orderly private-sector deleveraging,
      significantly reducing household and corporate debt,
      coupled with a discernible reduction in external debt and
      improvement in the effectiveness of the monetary
      transmission mechanism.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that fiscal score assessment had improved.
All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

                                   Rating
                                   To              From
Portugal (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency|U~    BB+/Stable/B    BB+/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility
  Assessment|U~                    AAA             AAA
Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency [#1]              BB+             BB+

|U~ Unsolicited ratings with no issuer participation and/or no
access to internal documents.

[#1] Issuer: Metropolitano de Lisboa E.P., Guarantor: Portugal
(Republic of)



===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK RCB: Put on Provisional Administration on Sept. 19
-------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3139, dated September 19,
2016, revoked the banking license of credit institution Regional
Commercial Bank, joint-stock company, or JSC BANK RCB from
September 19, 2016, according to the press service of the Central
Bank of Russia.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- due to the credit institution's failure to
comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia regulations,
repeated violations within a year of requirements, stipulated in
Article 7, except for clause 3, Article 7, of the Federal Law "On
Countering the Legalisation (Laundering) of Criminally Obtained
Incomes and the Financing of Terrorism", and the application of
measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the
Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)", considering a real threat to
the creditors' and depositors' interests.

JSC BANK RCB did not comply with the legislative requirements as
regards countering the legalization (laundering) of criminally
obtained incomes and the financing of terrorism in terms of
submitting true and full information on operations subject to
mandatory control to the authorized body.  Besides, the internal
control rules of the credit institution in this field did not meet
the Bank of Russia requirements.  Given unsatisfactory quality of
assets, JSC BANK RCB inadequately assessed the credit risks
assumed.  Management and owners of the credit institution did not
take any effective measures to bring its activities back to
normal.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3140, dated September 19,
2016, has appointed a provisional administration to JSC BANK RCB
for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under
Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".
In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit
institution's executive bodies are suspended.

JSC BANK RCB is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks' in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by legislation.  The said
Federal Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but not more than RUB1.4 million per
depositor.

According to reporting data, as of September 1, 2016, JSC BANK RCB
ranked 404th in terms of assets in the Russian banking system.


BANK URALSKY: Moody's Affirms B3 Deposit Ratings, Outlook Pos.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the long-term local and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of Bank Uralsky Financial House
(UralFD) at B3 and changed the outlook to positive from stable for
these ratings.  The rating agency has also affirmed the bank's
baseline credit assessment (BCA) / adjusted BCA of b3, its short-
term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Not Prime, its
long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment) of B2(cr)
and its short-term CR Assessment of Not Prime(cr).

                       RATINGS RATIONALE

UralFD's B3 deposit ratings' affirmation with the positive outlook
reflects recently improving profitability and Moody's expectation
of lower credit costs in the next 12 to 18 months.  UralFD pre-
provision earnings increased to 3.3% of average assets
(annualized) in H1 2016 from 2.0% in 2015 owing to strict control
over operating expenses, growth of commission income and
optimization of asset-liability structure.  This improvement
indicates UralFD's stronger ability to build-up capital as
historically high credit costs are expected to decline.  The
bank's loan portfolio seasoned, problem loans (retail loans
overdue by 90 days, and all individually impaired corporate loans)
stabilized at RUB2.6 billion (15.5% of UralFD's gross loans), and
coverage of problem loans increased to 87% from 68% at year-end
2014.

Along with the improving profitability, UralFD's equity-to-assets
ratio also increased to 12.1% at end-June 2016 from 10.4% at year-
end 2015, while regulatory Tier 1 Ratio (N1.2) advanced to 10.1%
from 8.9%.

Moody's also observes improving corporate governance as reflected
in the reduced related party exposures.  Loans to related parties
decreased in absolute and relative terms and were below 25% of the
bank's shareholders' equity as of June 30, 2016, compared to 42%
at year-end 2014 and 55% as at year-end 2013.

In addition, UralFD reports a stronger (compared to B3-rated
banks) liquidity profile owing to very low reliance on wholesale
funds, a relatively granulated deposit base and a large liquidity
cushion (includes cash and cash equivalents, liquid securities and
short-term deposits with banks) exceeding 30% of the bank's total
deposits.

                 WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

A longer track record of improving profitability and higher
capital adequacy could lead to upgrade of UralFD's BCA and long-
term ratings, provided there is no significant deterioration of
its asset quality and liquidity from the current levels.

The outlook could be changed to stable if UralFD's asset quality
was to sharply deteriorate, eroding the bank's capital buffers.  A
failure to secure sufficient business volumes in the currently
competitive market environment leading to revenue deterioration
would stabilize the bank's deposit ratings at the current level.


FINPROMBANK JSCB: Placed Under Provisional Administration
---------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No.OD-3144, dated September 19,
2016, revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit
institution FINPROMBANK (Public Joint-Stock Company) or JSCB
FINPROMBANK (PJSC) from September 19, 2016, according to the press
service of the Central Bank of Russia.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's failure
to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, inability to satisfy its creditors' claims on
monetary liabilities, and taking into account the repeated
application within a year of measures envisaged by the Federal Law
'On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)'.

Due to unsatisfactory quality of assets and subsequent
insufficient cash flows, JSCB FINPROMBANK (PJSC) failed to timely
honor its obligations to creditors.  Under the circumstances, the
Bank of Russia performed its duty on the revocation of the banking
license from the credit institution in accordance with Article 20
of the Federal Law 'On Banks and Banking Activities'.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3145, dated September 19,
2016, the Bank of Russia has appointed a provisional
administration to JSCB FINPROMBANK (PJSC) for the period until the
appointment of a receiver pursuant to the Federal Law "On
Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under Article 23.1 of the
Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".  In accordance with
the federal laws, the powers of the credit institution's executive
bodies have been suspended.

JSCB FINPROMBANK (PJSC) is a member of the deposit insurance
system.  The revocation of the banking license is an insured event
as stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than RUB1.4 million per
one depositor.

According to reporting data, as of September 1, 2016, JSCB
FINPROMBANK (PJSC) ranked 94th in the Russian banking system in
terms of assets.


IG SEISMIC: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to B3
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B3 from B2 and B3-PD
from B2-PD, respectively, the corporate family rating (CFR) and
probability of default rating (PDR) of IG Seismic Services Plc
(IGSS), the leading seismic services company in Russia.
Concurrently all the ratings have been placed on review for
further downgrade.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects Moody's expectation of the substantial
weakening of IGSS's operating results in 2016 owing to contracting
demand for seismic services in Russia.  The segment proved to be
vulnerable to the dramatic oil price volatility in Q1 2016,
although it still remained more resilient if compared to global
seismic markets due to overall favorable fundamentals of the
Russian oilfield services industry.

IGSS's revenues will likely drop by around 20% in 2016 as a result
of suspension or cancelation of already signed contracts by a
number of oil companies in Q1 2016.  On the positive side,
however, Moody's notes that the company's increasing focus on
efficiency improvements should allow it to retain healthy
profitability notwithstanding the ongoing pressure from rising
inflation and tight pricing under contracts.

Overall, despite limited investment activity as well as tight cost
controls and working capital optimization efforts, IGSS's
historically elevated leverage (measured as adjusted debt/EBITDA)
should surge to nearly 6.0x (4.1x in 2015) driven by the negative
operating cash flow under the significant reduction in EBITDA and
rising interest expenses coupled with the resulting step up in
debt.

Although the seismic market staged a marginal revival starting in
Q2 2016 as oil prices somewhat stabilized, Moody's expects that
the company's operations and financial metrics will remain weak
through 2017.  Moreover, the rating agency continues to see
downside risks as the industry remains under pressure.

The review for downgrade reflects IGSS's weak liquidity with
significant refinancing risks and in particular those related to
the upcoming Put Date of the RUB3 billion bond in October 2016.
Moody's understands that the company is at the final stage of
negotiations with major bondholders which may potentially result
in IGSS offering a higher coupon rate so that the put option is
not exercised as per the terms of the bond documentation.  The
liquidity is further backed by its strong relationship with its
key creditor, Bank Otkritie Financial Corporation PJSC (Ba3
negative), which continues to demonstrate strong support to the
company.  However, there still remains a degree of uncertainty
over its ability to procure the necessary refinancing in a timely
manner.

IGSS's B3 rating continues to factor in its (1) modest scale by
global standards; and (2) exposure to Russia-related political,
economic and legal risks.  More positively, the rating takes into
account (1) IGSS's dominant position in the Russian seismic
services market, which benefits from still strong longer-term
fundamentals; (2) its significant presence in all major
hydrocarbon-rich basins in Russia and its high level of customer
diversification; and (3) the company's strategic partner,
Schlumberger Ltd (A1 stable), which supports IGSS's strong
technological expertise.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS DOWN/UP

The rating could be downgraded if IGSS fails to secure adequate
funding to meet is pending debt maturities over 12 months which
includes addressing the put option on the bond.  A rating
downgrade could also be triggered by (1) any further negative
developments in the company's operating environment and/or
business profile that leads to the deterioration of its metrics
beyond Moody's current expectations, with adjusted debt/EBITDA
above 6.0x and adjusted EBITDA/interest below 1.0x on a sustained
basis; and (2) any signs of limited access to new funding.

The rating could be confirmed at the current B3 level if the
company successfully addresses the liquidity issues including the
refinancing for the upcoming put option on the bond.  Though
unlikely in the near term, IGSS's rating could be upgraded if the
company is able to achieve on a sustainable basis (1) reduced
leverage measured by adjusted debt/EBITDA at or below 4.0x; (2)
improved interest coverage measured as EBITDA/interest expense at
or above 2.0x; and (3) reduction of near-term refinancing needs.

                       PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Oilfield Services Industry Rating Methodology published in
December 2014.

Domiciled in Cyprus and headquartered in Moscow, Russia, IG
Seismic Services Plc (IGSS) is the Russia's largest seismic
services company.  The company provides high-quality seismic data
acquisition, data processing and interpretation services to a
diversified client base, and has a foothold in all major oil and
gas provinces in the country.  In 2015, IGSS generated sales of
$310 million and adjusted EBITDA of approximately $82 million.


KALUGA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Kaluga Region's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'
with Stable Outlooks, Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B' and
National Long-Term rating at 'AA-(rus)' with a Stable Outlook.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged base line scenario
regarding the region's sound operating performance and our
expectation that the region's direct risk will stabilize in
relative terms on the back of a narrowing fiscal deficit and
growing operating revenue.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'BB' rating reflects the region's high direct risk, which is
mitigated by an increasing proportion of low-cost loans from the
federal budget and strong operating performance driven by the
administration's proactive management. The ratings also factor in
a weak institutional framework for local and regional governments
(LRGs) in Russia and a weak macroeconomic environment.

Fitch expects Kaluga to continue to report a solid operating
performance, supported by its diversified tax base. The agency
expects the operating balance to be close to 14% of operating
revenue in 2016-2018, which is a moderate deterioration from a
high 16.5% in 2015 but in line with the 2011-2014 average. Kaluga
demonstrated a broadly stable budgetary performance during 1H16 in
line with our projections, leaving our base case scenario
unchanged.

Fitch expects the region's deficit before debt variation to shrink
notably to about 5% of total revenue in 2016-2018, from an average
12.3% in 2013-2015. This will be driven by lower capital
expenditure and planned cost control measures. Fitch therefore
forecasts direct risk growth to slow down in absolute terms, while
continued operating revenue growth should allow the overall debt
burden to stabilize at close to 90% of current revenue (2015:
89.3%). A strong current surplus also supports adequate interest
coverage.

As with most Russian regions, Kaluga is exposed to refinancing
pressure over the medium term. It faces repayment of 67% of its
outstanding liabilities in 2016-2018. The region has successfully
substituted part of its bank loans with new loans from the federal
budget (RUB9 billion have been received so far in 2016), providing
immediate relief to refinancing pressure. However, volatile
interest rates in domestic markets could make new debt more
expensive and put pressure on the region's current margin.

Kaluga is focused on local economic development and has
successfully attracted foreign investments and promoted industrial
production. This policy has resulted in the rapid growth of the
tax base, but also led to a high debt burden of the region, albeit
linked to infrastructure development. As of  August 1, 2016,
direct risk increased to RUB39.4 billion from RUB35.6 billion at
the beginning of the year. This is however mitigated by new debt
being in the form of subsidized loans from the federal budget,
limiting interest expenses. Budget loans dominated the region's
direct risk (62%) followed by bank loans (17%), while the
remaining 21% referred to the liabilities of Development
Corporation of Kaluga Region (DCKR).

DCKR was established by the region to finance local investment
projects, namely the development of regional industrial zones. The
region provides subsidies to cover the principal and interest on
DCKR's debt. Consequently, Fitch views DCKR's liabilities as the
region's direct risk. As of January 1, 2016, DCKR's liabilities
amounted to RUB8.4 billion of long-term loans from state
development institution Vnesheconombank (BBB-/Negative/F3).
Positively, DCKR's liabilities have a smooth maturity profile
between 2018 and 2022.

The region's economy has wealth indicators above the national
median due to past rapid, industrially-driven economic growth.
Industrial output growth decelerated in 2013-2015, following the
negative national trend, and the regional administration expects
Kaluga's GRP to fall 1.2% in 2016, after a sharp 7.2% contraction
in 2015, before growing marginally in 2017-2018.

The region's credit profile remains constrained by the weak
institutional framework for Russian LRGs, which has a shorter
record of stable development than many of its international peers.
The predictability of Russian LRGs' budgetary policy is hampered
by frequent reallocation of revenue and expenditure
responsibilities between government tiers

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Sound operating performance with an operating margin close to 15%
stabilization of direct risk (including DCKR's debt) at the
current level (2015: 89.3% of current revenue) and easing
refinancing pressure, all on a sustained basis, could lead to an
upgrade.

Inability to limit direct risk growth and weakening in budgetary
performance leading to permanent deterioration in debt coverage
(direct risk-to-current balance) beyond 12 years (2015: 7.4 years)
would lead to a downgrade.


LIPETSK: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Lipetsk Region's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB',
Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B' and National Long-Term
rating at 'AA-(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long-Term ratings are
Stable. The region's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds
have been affirmed at Long-Term Local Currency 'BB' and National
Long-Term 'AA-(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's expectation that Lipetsk region
will maintain a satisfactory fiscal performance, albeit still
prone to volatility, and a moderate debt level. It also reflects
the region's strengthened liquidity, driven by higher tax proceeds
in 2014-2015.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings reflect the region's moderate direct risk with
manageable refinancing risk, satisfactory budgetary performance
with a sufficient operating balance to cover interest payments and
sound liquidity. They also take into account the high
concentration of the regional economy in ferrous metallurgy, which
makes Lipetsk region vulnerable to steel market fluctuations,
leading to volatile tax revenue.

Fitch's 2016 base case remains unchanged. Fitch said, "We expect
that Lipetsk region will maintain a sound operating balance close
to the historical average at about 8%-10% of operating revenue in
the medium term, supported by strong tax base and administration's
cost-containing approach. In 2015 the operating margin reached a
historical high of 15% as taxes grew 16% yoy due to favorable
conditions on the metallurgy market."

Fitch projects the region will record a moderate budget deficit in
the medium term at about 6% of total revenue, deteriorating
compared with deficit free budgets in 2014-2015, when the fiscal
performance was boosted by tax proceeds from the steel sector. The
region's top taxpayer, export-oriented PJSC Novolipetsk Steel
(BBB-/Negative), benefited from rouble depreciation. The positive
effect wore off in 1H16. Tax proceeds from the steel sector fell
by 14% yoy, leading to a RUB1bn budget deficit during 7M16, which
is within our expectations.

Fitch considers that the volatility of the region's finances is
partly mitigated by the administration's prudent approach, which
sets aside excess tax proceeds during peak years in cash reserves
and keeps expenses under control. This led to Lipetsk's cash
balance growing 5.4x during 2014-2015 to RUB7.3 billion, which
covered 37% of its direct risk as of end-2015.

Fitch projects the region's direct risk will increase in 2017-2018
but stay moderate at below 50% of current revenue. Refinancing
pressure remains manageable as Lipetsk's debt maturity profile is
relatively smooth, stretching until 2020, and evenly split between
bank loans, bond and budget loans. As of  August 1, 2016, the
region had repaid part of this year's maturities with its cash
reserves and has contracted RUB2.1 billion long-term budget loan
at a subsidized interest rate to refinance the remainder.

The region's economy is developed and its wealth metrics are
slightly above the national median. In 2015, gross regional
product grew 0.8%, which is better than the wider Russian economy
(3.7% fall) due to the good performance of the steel sector. The
ferrous metallurgy sector contributed 58% of the region's
industrial output and more than 40% of total tax proceeds in 2015,
making its economy vulnerable to fluctuations in the domestic and
international steel markets.

Russia's institutional framework for sub-nationals is a
constraining factor on the region's ratings. It has a shorter
record of stable development than many of its international peers.
The predictability of Russian LRGs' budgetary policy is hampered
by frequent reallocation of revenue and expenditure
responsibilities within government tiers.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A strong operating balance at about 15% of operating revenue on a
sustained basis accompanied by debt coverage (direct risk to
current balance) below four years could lead to positive rating
action.

Widening deficit before debt variation leading to an increase in
direct risk to above 60% of current revenue could lead to negative
rating action.


RUSSIA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on the Russian Federation
to stable from negative.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
'BB+/B' long- and short-term foreign currency and its 'BBB-/A-3'
long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Russia.  S&P also affirmed the long-term national scale rating on
Russia at 'ruAAA'.

                           RATIONALE

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that external risks have
abated to a significant extent.  S&P expects the Russian economy
and policy making will continue to adjust to the lower oil price
environment and that the country will maintain its strong net
external asset position and moderate net general government debt
burden in 2016-2019.

Private sector net capital outflows on the financial account
averaged US$57 billion annually over 2009-2013 and increased to
US$152 billion in 2014.  However, these outflows fell to
US$58 billion in 2015, in line with the historical average and S&P
expects capital outflows to fall further, averaging about
US$40 billion in 2016.  S&P also expects current account surpluses
will average 3.8% of GDP in 2016-2019, covering the financial
account deficit.  As a result, international reserves are forecast
to increase.  Russian corporations and banks that have foreign
currency debt-service requirements without concomitant foreign
currency revenues may continue to be under stress, but, in S&P's
view, these risks to the broader economy are less acute than
before.  The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) has also been providing
substantial foreign currency liquidity to domestic banks via
repurchase agreements and foreign currency swaps, and the demand
for these operations has largely been decreasing.

S&P estimates Russia's gross external financing requirement for
2016 to be over 60% of current account receipts (CARs) plus usable
reserves.  S&P's figure for the CBR-usable reserves deducts
foreign currency investments made by the CBR on behalf of the
government from the bank's reported foreign currency reserves.
Russia maintains a net external asset position -- S&P expects
liquid external assets held by the public and banking sectors to
exceed the country's external debt by about 60% of CARs, on
average, over 2016-2019.

S&P assumes the sanctions -- imposed upon Russia by the EU and the
U.S. (and by some other countries including Japan) in 2014 in the
wake of the conflict with Ukraine -- will probably remain in place
over the 2016-2019 forecast horizon.  The sanctions were tightened
in September 2016 and will continue to limit foreign direct
investment (FDI) and medium-term external funding for banks and
corporates.  Importantly, the Russian sovereign itself is not
subject to sanctions and was able to issue a US$1.75 billion
Eurobond in late May 2016.

Russia's external debt stock (excluding debt liabilities to direct
investors) declined to US$383 billion as of end-June, 2016, from
US$466 billion at end-2015.  This is in the context of
international capital market financing to Russia remaining limited
following sanctions, and the country's banks and corporates
drawing down external assets and diverting export earnings to
repay foreign debt.  S&P notes that most of the recent external
deleveraging is related to debt repayments by the banking sector
(about half of the total decline in external debt) and corporate
sector (about 40%); banking accounts for around 35% of the
remaining stock of external debt and the corporate sector around
55%.  S&P estimates Russia's external debt service to be about
US$110 billion in 2016 compared with about US$130 billion in 2015.
S&P expects the CBR's foreign currency provision to the domestic
banks via repurchase agreements and swaps to support further
private-sector external debt service, and S&P notes that external
deleveraging is also supported by corporate free cash flow.

The CBR floated the ruble in late 2014 to conserve its foreign
currency reserves and to facilitate the economy's adjustment to
lower oil prices.  Thus the real effective exchange rate fell
about 24% between 2013 and 2015.  The sharp devaluation also
provided a fiscal boost as the largely state-owned oil-and-gas
industry sets its revenues in dollars but its costs are largely in
rubles.

"We expect GDP per capita to rise from US$8,400 in 2016 to
US$10,300 in 2019 (but still well below the 2015 levels of
US$15,600).  We project Russia's real GDP per capita growth will
average less than similarly wealthy economies over our 2016-2019
rating horizon, which is a ratings constraint.  We expect economic
growth will be driven by a modest rise in oil prices and the
expansion of the oil and gas sector in terms of volumes, as well
as by non-oil growth, primarily driven by household consumption.
We assume an average Brent oil price of US$40 per barrel (/bbl) in
2016 rising to US$45/bbl in 2017, and US$50/bbl in 2018 and
thereafter, thereby improving prospects for the oil sector.
However, relatively low household purchasing power, partly due to
the spillover effect of low oil prices, as well as lower external
financing and reduced FDI (partly due to sanctions), will continue
to limit Russia's growth prospects.  Long-term structural
obstacles to stronger economic growth (perceived corruption, the
state's pervasive and often inefficient role in the economy, and
the challenging business and investment climate) will remain over
our 2016-2019 forecast horizon," S&P said.

"While fiscal pressures will remain, the general government
deficit is forecast to narrow in 2016-2019 and the government
should be able to maintain comparatively low general government
(net of liquid assets) debt levels, not exceeding 13% of GDP in
2016-2019.  We expect the general government deficit to widen to
4.1% of GDP in 2016 from 3.5% in 2015.  This incorporates our
forecast that the central government deficit will reach 3.5% of
GDP, the deficit at the local and regional government level will
widen to 0.7% of GDP, and the social security system will largely
return to balance.  Our central government deficit estimate for
2016 includes our expectation that the government will spend 0.3%
of GDP in recapitalizing the government-owned development bank,
Vnesheconombank.  We project that the general government deficit
will average about 3.3% of GDP in 2016-2019, falling steadily as
the government implements its fiscal consolidation plan," S&P
noted.

The ministry of finance aims to cut the budget deficit by one
percentage point of GDP every year up to 2019.  It also aims to
keep expenditure frozen in nominal terms, forcing a sharp
reduction in real terms.  Ruble weakness supports the central
government's fiscal position because its hydrocarbon revenues are
mostly priced in U.S. dollars.  Nevertheless, risks to public
finances remain owing to relatively low oil revenue and continued
expenditure pressures on wages and pensions.  Additional capital
for banks, especially for Vnesheconombank, also poses a contingent
liability on the fiscal picture.  Privatizations of stakes in
large oil companies, Rosneft and Bashneft, have been planned.
Although the privatization of Bashneft was postponed, the
government did realize RUB52.2 billion (US$805 million, 0.06% of
GDP) from the sale of 10.9% of the state-owned diamond firm
Alrosa.

The sovereign's modest overall general government net debt
position is a rating strength, as is the government's low interest
burden as a percentage of revenues.  In 2016-2019, the government
will finance the deficit by continuing to draw down on savings in
its Reserve Fund, and subsequently from its National Wealth Fund,
and by issuing domestically and externally.  The central
government's Reserve Fund and National Wealth Fund together
totaled about 9% of GDP at end-August 2016.  S&P deducts two
percentage points of GDP from fiscal assets to account for those
it considers to be illiquid.  S&P expects these two funds to be
close to being depleted by 2020.

As mentioned above, the federal government itself is not subject
to direct sanctions, although several state-owned companies are.
In May 2016, the Russian federal government was able to issue,
list (on the Irish stock exchange), and sell a US$1.75 billion
bond; in July the bond was listed on the trading platform
Euroclear, thereby significantly widening its potential investor
pool.  S&P expects the sovereign to be able to issue either
domestically or externally in order to finance the deficit, with
ample liquidity available in the domestic market.  S&P projects
the government's net debt position will rise to 13% of GDP by 2019
-- still moderate compared with peers at similar rating levels.

S&P considers that Russia's financial sector will remain under
pressure.  S&P anticipates that the financial performance of the
banking sector will remain poor in 2016-2017, given the economic
recession in 2015 and 2016, a deterioration in asset quality in
the sector, and pressure on funding profiles of banks due to
reduced investor confidence and the restricted access of key areas
of the economy to international capital markets due to sanctions.
S&P expects that credit to the economy will be curtailed, which
will likely limit the rebound in GDP growth. Russia scores '8' (on
a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is the highest) on S&P's latest
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment.  That said, S&P thinks
that pressure on Russian banks' funding profiles is stabilizing
this year, mainly driven by lackluster credit demand, and funding
costs coming down.  S&P also believes that the banking regulator
has been broadly effective in managing problem banks.  Between
January 2014 and September 2016, the CBR withdrew banking
licenses, or placed under financial rehabilitation, more than 200
banking institutions.  S&P expects to see more banking sector
consolidation over the forecast horizon.

The CBR cut rates by 50 basis points in September 2016 to 10%,
following a 50 basis point cut in June.  The central bank expects
inflation to fall to 5%-6% by the end of the year.  Given the
pass-through of more expensive imports to domestic prices
generally, and the inflationary impact of repatriating public
sector external assets and converting them to rubles, S&P expects
annual average inflation to remain elevated, at about 7% in 2016,
but reducing to an average of about 5% in 2017-2019.  With rising
oil prices from 2017, S&P expects the CBR to amass reserves and
stem the appreciation of the ruble to try and maintain newfound
external competiveness.

Parliamentary elections are due on Sept. 18 and most political
observers predict the ruling United Russia party allied to
President Putin to maintain its majority in the Duma.  S&P expects
that President Putin will remain in power until at least 2018.
Political power is highly centralized with limited checks and
balances, in S&P's opinion.

Since September 2015, Russia has stepped up its military support
of the Bashar al-Assad regime, and any comprehensive resolution to
the Syria conflict will need at least Russia's acquiescence.
Given that Syria and its related refugee crisis is now a higher
foreign policy priority of the West, Russia may be able to broker
a peace deal in Syria in exchange for a lifting of Western
sanctions related to Ukraine; however, such an outcome is
uncertain.

                              OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the Russian
economy and policy making will continue to adjust to the lower oil
price environment and the country will maintain its strong net
external asset position and modest net general government debt
burden in 2016-2019.

S&P could raise the ratings if Russia's financial stability and
economic growth prospects improved more significantly than S&P
forecasts, possibly due to a loosening of sanctions or a rise in
the oil price significantly above S&P's current assumptions.

S&P could lower the ratings if geopolitical events were to result
in foreign governments significantly tightening their sanctions on
Russia, or if GDP growth or fiscal or external balances were
materially weaker than S&P's current projections.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the external assessment had improved and
that all other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

Marcello Parravani and Samuel Tilleray provided research
assistance for this report.

RATINGS LIST

                                   Rating           Rating
                                   To               From
Russian Federation
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign Currency                 BB+/Stable/B     BB+/Neg./B
  Local Currency                   BBB-/Stable/A-3  BBB-/Neg./A-3
  Russia National Scale            ruAAA/--/--      ruAAA/--/--
Transfer & Convertibility
Assessment                        BB+              BB+
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign Currency                 BB+              BB+
  Local Currency                   BBB-             BBB-


TULA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Tula Region's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB',
Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B' and National Long-Term
Rating at 'AA-(rus)'. The Outlook on the Long-Term ratings is
Stable.

The region's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds have been
affirmed at 'BB' and 'AA-(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged base line scenario
regarding the region's budgetary performance and our expectation
that the region will maintain a positive current balance and
moderate direct risk in the medium term, as commensurate with the
ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'BB' ratings reflect the region's average-sized economy, a
weak institutional framework for Russian LRGs and deterioration of
the national economic environment, which may put pressure on
Tula's budgetary performance over the medium term. They also
reflect the region's moderate direct risk with limited exposure to
immediate refinancing risk and satisfactory fiscal performance
with a sufficient operating balance to cover interest payments.

Fitch expects the operating balance to be close to the region's
historical average at about 6%-7% of operating revenue in 2016-
2018, and the current margin to remain positive at 4%-5%. Tula's
budgetary performance recovered moderately during 1H16, with a
surplus before debt variation on the back of expenditure
restraint, while revenue proceeds grew as budgeted. Fitch said,
"However, as expenditure is likely to accelerate during 2H16, we
are maintaining our projection of a RUB2.8 billion budget deficit
for the full year. Fitch assumes the region will continue to
record a deficit before debt at about 3%-5% of total revenue in
2016-2018 (2015: 0.9% deficit)."

Fitch expects Tula's direct risk will continue to increase but
remain moderate at below 35% of current revenue in 2016-2018
(2015: 27%). As of August 1, 2016, the region's direct risk was
composed of federal budget loans and domestic bonds and amounted
to RUB15.7 billion, little changed since the beginning of 2015.
Subsidized budget loans constitute 59% of total direct risk, and
their low annual interest rates allow the region to save on
interest payments.

Despite the moderate debt burden, Tula is exposed to refinancing
pressure in the medium term as it has to repay all outstanding
debt over the next three years. Immediate refinancing risk is
moderate as the region's RUB0.5 billion bonds and RUB0.7 billion
budget loans due in 2016 are fully covered by RUB2.4 billion
outstanding cash and standby short-term credit facilities from the
Russian Treasury.

The regional economy has a well-diversified processing industry
and economic growth has outpaced the national average for four
years in a row. According to preliminary data, in 2015 the
regional economy grew 4.7%, in contrast to the national GRP
decline of 3.7% and the administration expects growth to continue
in 2016. Nevertheless, the region's economy remains moderate in
the national context, with GRP per capita at 93% of the national
median in 2014. Fitch forecasts a 0.5% decline of national GDP in
2016, which in turn could weigh on the region's economic and
budgetary performance.

The region's credit profile remains constrained by the weak
institutional framework for Russian LRGs, which has a shorter
record of stable development than many of its international peers.
The predictability of Russian LRGs' budgetary policy is hampered
by frequent reallocation of revenue and expenditure
responsibilities within tiers of government.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A sound budgetary performance with an operating margin above 10%
on a sustained basis, accompanied by moderate direct risk below
40% of current revenue, would lead to an upgrade.

Conversely, deteriorated budgetary performance with an operating
margin consistently below 5%, accompanied by weak debt payback
exceeding 10 years (2015: 3.1years), could lead to a downgrade.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


FLOATEL INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Affirms Caa1 CFR, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Floatel International Ltd's
Corporate Family Rating of Caa1 and Probability of Default Rating
(PDR) of Caa1-PD.  Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the Caa1
rating on the company's $650 million senior secured term loan B
due 2020 borrowed by Floatel.  The outlook on all ratings is
revised to stable from negative.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The revision of Floatel's outlook to stable from negative reflects
Moody's view that the company now has adequate liquidity after it
secured $230 million in new financing for the delivery payment of
its offshore accommodation vessel, the "Floatel Triumph".  It also
reflects the rating agency's view that Floatel will have adequate
covenant headroom for the next 12-18 months after lenders agreed
to loosen covenants until December 2018.

Floatel's Caa1 CFR reflects (1) its exposure to a continued weak
offshore oil and gas market of the highly fragmented oilfield
services industry which is largely price-driven; (2) its small
size and asset concentration risk associated with a fleet of only
four operational vessels, growing to five during by the end of
2016; (3) high adjusted gross debt to EBITDA that Moody's expects
slightly below 7.0x at the end of 2016 before declining to
approximately 5.5x at 2017 year-end; and (4) but then increasing
substantially in 2018 if it does not win many new contracts, which
is largely Moody's assumption.

Floatel's ratings also take into consideration the company's (1)
revenue visibility as evidenced by a backlog of $525 million as of
September 2016 and expected leverage decline in 2017; (2) high
quality assets, operating one of the most modern accommodation
fleets in the industry; (3) currently lower exposure to project
cancellations compared to its offshore drilling counterparts
although two of its projects have been delayed in the last year;
and (4) solid EBITDA margins of above 40% without large
maintenance capex, translating into high cash conversion levels.

For the first half of 2016, the company had a fleet wide
utilization of 86% as the "Floatel Reliance" ended its contract in
Brazil in March and the "Floatel Endurance" finished its in April.
For 2016 as a whole, we expect the fact that the Reliance will be
idle for the remainder of the year and the "Floatel Superior" and
Endurance will both be off contract for part of the third quarter
will lead to EBITDA of approximately $155 million, a decline of
15% compared to 2015.  For 2017, Moody's expects the delivery of
the Triumph as well as the contract for the Superior will lead to
EBITDA increasing 26% to approximately $200 million.  However,
after 2017 there is a risk that the company fails to win many new
contracts and EBITDA declines substantially.

Moody's views Floatel's liquidity as adequate over the next 12-18
months, after it obtained new financing and reset its covenants.
As of June 30, 2016, it had $115 million in cash and $91 million
available under its $100 million revolving credit facility (RCF,
urated) due December 2019.  The rating agency then expects the
company to generate approximately $120 million in free cash flow
in 2017, benefiting from four of its vessels on contract for at
least part of the year and substantially reduced capex of
approximately $10 million.  The company has obtained $230 million
in financing from its shareholder, Keppel Corporation, that in
combination with $30 million in cash on Floatel's balance sheet,
will be used to pay the $260 million delivery payment for the
Floatel Triumph.  The Triumph is being built by Keppel
Corporation. Moody's assumes that Floatel takes delivery of the
Triumph in October 2016 as planned.

The New Vessel Facility (NVF) and the RCF have financial covenants
referencing $50 million minimum free liquidity and also a minimum
book equity.  The NVF and RCF (if more than 25% is drawn) also
have a covenant referencing senior net debt/ EBITDA, which has now
been reset to a maximum of 6.5x up until 31 December 2018,
compared to previous levels of 6.0x for Q4 2016, before stepping
down to 5.5x in Q1 2017.

As a result of the covenant reset, Moody's now expects the company
to have adequate headroom over the next 12-18 months, as it will
be able to pro forma 12 months of earnings of the Triumph when it
is delivered.  This is now expected in October 2016, following a
new contract award from Chevron Australia Pty Ltd for its
Wheatstone Field Development in Australia for a minimum period of
four months from mid-October 2016.

Floatel's new $230 million financing from Keppel is in the form of
a new tranche under the existing NVF -- "The Triumph
Tranche" -- split into two parts; Part 1 of $140 million and Part
2 of $90 million.  With regards to any payments of the NVF from
enforcement of security or otherwise, Part 2 will only be paid out
after Part 1 and the existing NVF "Endurance Tranche".  Moody's
views the whole amount as debt.  However, Part 1 will convert into
Part 2 debt over eight years and only Part 1 is incorporated in
net leverage covenant calculations as Part 2 is seen effectively
as subordinated debt.  Moreover, there is no cash interest or cash
amortization payments on either part, with both having 2% PIK
Interest.

The Caa1-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR), in line with the
CFR, assumes a group recovery rate of 50%, as the capital
structure consists of a first-out RCF and instruments with first
lien and second lien security.  Moreover, the recovery rate
reflects that the TLB is covenant-light, while the NVF has
financial covenants.

The company's debt consists of an undrawn first-out $100 million
RCF maturing in 2019, a $650 million ($635 million outstanding)
TLB maturing in June 2020 and a $480 million ($459 million
outstanding pro forma The Triumph Tranche) NVF maturing in
December 2019.  Although the RCF is first out in right of payment
and is secured on all five vessels, its relatively small size
results in the senior secured TLB being rated Caa1 -- at the same
level as the CFR.  The TLB is secured on a first priority basis by
the rigs Floatel Superior, Floatel Reliance and Floatel Victory as
well as any additional rigs that an incremental facility finances.
The TLB is also secured on a second priority basis on the
remaining vessels financed through the NVF, the Floatel Endurance
and now the Floatel Triumph, which is under construction.  The TLB
has the option to be increased by either $50 million or an
incremental amount which will be secured by and used for the
financing of the Triumph or a sixth vessel.  The additional debt
under the TLB will not be greater than 70% of the value of the rig
to be financed.

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that the fleet will
continue to operate at high levels of utilization supported by a
$525 million contract backlog.  It also assumes that the company
maintains adequate liquidity and covenant headroom.

                 WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The ratings could be upgraded if the conditions for a stable
outlook are met, the fleet operates at high levels of utilization,
Moody's-adjusted leverage is maintained below 6.5x and the company
continues to win new contracts for work in 2018 and the oil and
gas market improves.  Conversely, the rating could be downgraded
if liquidity deteriorates, or Moody's-adjusted leverage is
sustained over 7.5x.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Oilfield Services Industry Rating Methodology published in
December 2014.

Floatel International is an oilfield services company with
management based in Gothenburg, Sweden, that has established a
leading position in the niche offshore accommodation market.  The
company owns five semisubmersible vessels.  Four are currently in
operation and one is under construction, with delivery due in
October 2016.  Offshore accommodation is utilized for maintenance,
commissioning and decommissioning of offshore production
facilities.  Floatel is jointly owned by funds of private equity
company Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. (43% ownership) and
Keppel Corporation (unrated, 50% ownership) a Singaporean
conglomerate.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


KYIV CITY: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings to 'CC'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the City of Kyiv's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'CC' from
'CCC'. The agency has also downgraded the city's National Long-
Term rating to 'BB+(ukr)' from 'BBB(ukr)' with Negative Outlook.
Kyiv's domestic senior debt ratings have been downgraded to
'CC'/'BB+(ukr)' from 'CCC'/'BBB(ukr)'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects the following rating drivers and their
relative weights:

HIGH

The downgrade of Kyiv's IDRs follows the city's decision to extend
the maturities of domestic bonds (series G), scheduled to mature
on December 19, 2016. Kyiv's administration has decided to
postpone the repayment of UAH1.915 billion senior unsecured
domestic bonds for another 360 days. The city remains current on
the bond's interest payments.

Fitch would expect to classify such an extension as a default in
accordance with its distressed debt exchange (DDE) criteria.
According to the city, the proposal does not involve any write-
down of principal, and coupons payable on the bonds will not
decrease.

Fitch said, "The city's decision to extend the bond's maturity is
subject to approval by Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, which we
believe will be most likely granted. Kyiv has previously extended
maturities on domestic bonds."

Additionally, Kyiv treats this bond as part of intergovernmental
relations with the central government, assuming the latter will
likely provide funds to repay the bond. Back in 2012, Kyiv was
forced to issue the UAH1.915 billion bond to compensate for the
losses accumulated by its utility public-sector entities (PSEs),
due to lower tariffs not entirely covering costs. Fitch said,
"Hence, we believe the likelihood that the city will repay the
bonds using its own sources is minimal, making the probability of
default almost inevitable."

Fitch assesses Kyiv's management as weak. Ukraine's fiscal
discipline and long-term financial planning is emerging, while the
city's debt management is lacking sophistication and relies on
short-term policy options. Additionally, overall oversight over
the city's PSEs is weak, leading to reduced control and
accumulation of contingent liabilities, which eventually migrate
to direct risk for the city.

MEDIUM

Fitch continues to expect Kyiv's finances to remain fragile over
the medium term, negatively affecting its financial flexibility.
This is due to the overall weakness of sovereign public finances,
the reduced predictability of fiscal policy and a very short
planning horizon, all exacerbated by the volatile macro-economic
environment in Ukraine.

Kyiv's fiscal performance improved in 2015-1H16, when its
operating margin rose materially to 39% at end-2015 (2014: 21%).
This followed reduced operating expenditure, high national
inflation (CPI assessed by Fitch was 48.5% in 2015) and a change
of fiscal regulation in Ukraine in 2015, which boosted operating
revenue annual growth to an average 38% in 2014-2015, from
negative 22% in 2013.

Recovery prospects for Kyiv's economy remain weak, with minor
growth of 1%-2% projected by Fitch for the country's GDP in 2016-
2017 (2015: contraction 9.9%). Combined with low wealth metrics by
international standards (GPD per capita was USD2,123 in 2015),
this leads us to assess the national economy as weak, constraining
the city's ratings.

At the same time, Kyiv remains one of the country's wealthiest
cities, about 2x outperforming average per capita GRP of the
country's regions. The city benefits from its capital status and
concentrated nature of Ukraine's economy. Historically the city
accounts for more than 20% of the country's GDP.

The city of Kyiv's ratings also reflect the following rating
drivers:

In our view, Kyiv's contingent risk is high, stemming from
liabilities of the city's utility PSEs, which have accumulated
payables to suppliers in 2014-2015. The city has issued several
guarantees to support projects in transport and housing sector,
most of the loans are euro-denominated, exposing the city to forex
risk.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch would expect to downgrade the city's ratings further to 'RD'
(Restricted Default) if the city fails repay the domestic bond at
maturity in December 2016.

Fitch will review the city's ratings once the debt exchanges are
completed and sufficient information is available on Kyiv's credit
profile. However, the rating will likely remain low, given high
country risks and Ukraine's 'CCC' Country Ceiling.

"If the city repays its domestic bond in full at maturity in
December without extension, which is unlikely, we could upgrade
the rating." Fitch said.


ODESSA PORT: At Risk of Bankruptcy, Buyer Sought for Plant
----------------------------------------------------------
bne IntelliNews, citing the head of the State Property Fund (SPF),
Ihor Bilous, reports that the potential buyer of state-owned
Odessa Port Plant (OPP) in any new privatization tender should
repay US$251 million in debt to Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro
Firtash's Ostchem company, US$32 million to banks and traders for
previously supplied natural gas, as well as invest at least US$100
million in restarting operations at the idled plant, which is in
danger of going bankrupt.

Mr. Bilous' statement followed July's aborted tender for a 99.567%
stake in the chemicals plant, which failed due to a lack of bids
from investors, bne IntelliNews notes.  The failure was attributed
to the burden of OPP's debt to Ostchem, and to a conflict with the
company Nortima, allegedly controlled by controversial billionaire
Ihor Kolomoisky, bne IntelliNews discloses.  The authorities also
recognized that the starting price of around US$530 million was
too high for investors, bne IntelliNews states.

According to bne IntelliNews, Mr. Bilous said OPP has been idle
since Aug. 11.  "The situation on the mineral fertilizer market is
the worst in over 15 years.  According to authoritative forecasts,
the negative trend will likely remain until 2019," the official
wrote on his Facebook page on Sept. 19, adding that if OPP is not
put up for sale this autumn, "it will go bankrupt".

"We understand that we need to announce the auction and reduce the
starting price."

On Sept. 13, Mr. Bilous said the SPF must reduce the starting
price of OPP to about US$150 million, bne IntelliNews relays.  He
said the final decision on the starting price should be made by
the government, while outlining some possible extraordinary
measures to recommission OPP, according to bne IntelliNews.  In
particular, the government could rule that state gas monopoly
Naftogaz will supply gas to the plant under special conditions,
bne IntelliNews notes.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AFREN PLC: SFO to Launch Probe Following Administration
-------------------------------------------------------
The Daily Mail reports that failed oil producer Afren is being
investigated by the Serious Fraud Office.

The firm, which counted Tory MP Nadhim Zahawi as an adviser,
collapsed into administration last year with debts of GBP1.3
billion, The Daily Mail recounts.  This came after an internal
investigation alleged former chief executive Osman Shahenshah set
up an offshore vehicle to pay him and other executives millions in
hidden bonuses, The Daily Mail relates.

According to The Daily Mail, administrator AlixPartners said it
was working with "UK law enforcement agencies in their inquiries
into the group's affairs and the past conduct of management".
This is thought to include the SFO, which declined to comment, The
Daily Mail notes.

                        About Afren plc

Afren plc, a London-based company specializing in oil and gas
exploration and production, filed a Chapter 15 bankruptcy
petition (Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 15-11452) on July 2, 2015, in
the United States, to seek recognition of its restructuring
proceedings in England.  Judge Kevin Gross presides over the U.S.
case.  L. John Bird, Esq., and Jeffrey M. Schlerf, Esq., at Fox
Rothschild LLP, serve as counsel to the Debtor in the U.S. case.


CYBG PLC: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to GBP475MM Tier 2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investor Service assigned a Ba1 rating to the
GBP475 million Tier 2 notes due in 2026 issued by CYBG plc (CYBG),
the holding company of Clydesdale Bank plc (Clydesdale; rated Baa2
Stable, baa3), on Feb. 8, 2016.  This instrument was initially
purchased by Clydesdale's former parent, National Australia Bank
Limited (Aa2/Aa2 negative, a1).  Clydesdale is currently in the
process of re-marketing this instrument to third-party investors.
The outlook is stable.

The Tier 2 notes are classified as subordinated obligations of the
issuer and rank junior to the unsubordinated creditors but senior
to junior securities and all classes of share capital of the
issuer.

                          RATING RATIONALE

Moody's considers the UK to have an Operational Resolution Regime,
consistent with the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.
The Ba1 rating assigned to the dated subordinated debt therefore
results from Moody's Advanced Loss Given Failure Analysis, based
upon CYBG's consolidated financial statements.

Moody's believes that CYBG's subordinated debt would be subject to
high loss-given-failure, based on the very limited amount of more
junior instruments that might protect the subordinated debt from
loss in a resolution.  This leads to the notes being positioned
one notch below the bank's adjusted baseline credit assessment
(BCA) of baa3, i.e. at Ba1.  The securities do not benefit from
any uplift from government support, the probability of which the
agency considers to be low.

              WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The ratings of the dated subordinated notes could be upgraded if
Clydesdale's adjusted BCA of baa3 were to be upgraded, or if the
holding company or the bank were to issue a significant amount of
junior debt, reducing its loss-given-failure.

Conversely, the notes would be downgraded if Clydesdale's BCA were
downgraded.

Assignments:

Issuer: CYBG PLC
  Subordinate note (Local), Assigned - Ba1


NATIONAL VIDEOGAME: Save Out of Administration
---------------------------------------------
Business Quarter reports that the National Videogame Arcade (NVA)
in Nottingham, home of the acclaimed GameCity festival, has been
rescued by the eleventh hour investment after running into cash-
flow difficulties despite generating increased footfall.

Andy Wood and Lisa Hogg of Sheffield business turnaround and
insolvency specialist Wilson Field were appointed as joint
administrators August 19, 2016 after the company ran out of cash
following heavy investment into equipment and venue and was
quickly bailed out by a consortium of investors, led by director
Iain Simons, according to Business Quarter.

Andy Wood, an insolvency practitioner at Wilson Field, said: "The
investment story behind the consortium is based on the passion
that Iain Simons and his staff have for the GameCity project, the
report notes.

"We were appointed as administrators after the company fell into
financial difficulties, despite growing in popularity. The
consortium of investors could clearly see the potential to turn
the business around and with support from the staff, GameCity has
a new future," the report quoted as Mr. Wood saying.

The National Videogame Arcade is a unique national centre
dedicated to the history and development of computer and video
games which contains many rare and original videogames and
consoles and the Toast Bar, which serves a whole host of toast-
based snacks, the report says.

The report discloses that Iain Simons, director at GameCity and
investment consortium leader, said: "The NVA is like no other
facility within the UK and is rapidly growing in popularity. It
was devastating to us when we realised that the business was in
financial difficulty, but we knew it could be overcome."

"I have to give all credit to the staff here who volunteered to
work without pay when we announced that the business was in
trouble and this undoubtedly allowed us the time to pull together
a consortium of investors to give the facility a bright new future
and secure those jobs," Mr. Simmons said.

"GameCity is rapidly picking up pace and the Toast Bar, National
Videogame Arcade and our collaborations with new partners in the
UK and beyond are proving to be just as popular as we'd hoped,"
Mr. Simmons added.


SOUTHERN PACIFIC 06-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to B-
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its credit ratings on Southern Pacific
Securities 06-1 PLC's class D1a and D1c notes.  At the same time,
S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class A2a, A2c, B1c, C1a, C1c,
E1c, and FTc notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction, as part of S&P's periodic review of its
performance as of the June 2016 payment date.

"Since our previous review on June 4, 2014, the transaction's
performance has been stable in terms of arrears and net losses.
Total delinquencies have decreased to 40.2% from 43.8%.  The
decrease is due to technical reasons, since the servicer (Acenden
Ltd.) updated how it reports arrears in the December 2012 investor
report to distinguish among amounts outstanding, delinquencies,
and other amounts owed.  The servicer's definition of other
amounts owed includes (among other items), arrears of fees,
charges, costs, ground rent, and insurance.  Delinquencies now
include principal and interest arrears on the mortgages, based on
the borrowers' monthly installments.  Amounts outstanding are
principal and interest arrears, after the servicer first allocates
payments from borrowers to other amounts owed," S&P said.

Under the transaction documents, the servicer first allocates any
arrears payments to other amounts owed, then to interest amounts,
and subsequently to principal.  From a borrowers' perspective, the
servicer first allocates any arrears payments to interest and
principal amounts, and secondly to other amounts owed.  This
difference in the servicer's allocation of payments for the
transaction and the borrower results in amounts outstanding being
greater than delinquencies.  In the past, the servicer based
arrears figures on amounts outstanding, while now they are based
on delinquencies.  Net cumulative principal losses have been
stable at about 3.7%, which is above S&P's index for U.K.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) at 3.0%.

S&P's credit analysis shows a decrease in its current weighted-
average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) assumptions and its weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) assumptions (except at the 'AAA',
'AA', and 'B' levels) since S&P's previous review.  The WAFF shows
the weighted-average probability of default of loans in the
collateral pool, and the WALS shows the weighted-average loss
likely to be experienced on defaulted loans in the collateral
pool, as a proportion of the loan amount.  The main reason for the
decrease in S&P's WAFF assumptions is the greater seasoning and
lower arrears.

S&P's WALS assumptions have decreased primarily thanks to a fall
in the current loan-to-value ratio.

Rating     WAFF    WALS
level       (%)     (%)
AAA       54.52   52.67
AA        49.25   44.19
A         41.75   32.48
BBB       36.36   26.39
BB        29.29   22.26
B         25.55   19.39

The notes are currently amortizing sequentially, as 90+ days
amounts outstanding comprise 51.3% of the pool, which is well
above the transaction's 22.5% pro rata amortization trigger.  As
the ratio is well above the trigger, S&P considers that the
transaction will likely continue to pay principal sequentially.
S&P has incorporated this assumption in its cash flow analysis by
modeling a sequential repayment of the notes.

The liquidity facility was restructured at the end of 2014.  It
was then GBP19.8 million and featured amortization triggers.
Following its restructuring, it has now reduced to GBP6.9 million
(target level) and the triggers have been removed.  This
restructuring has had an adverse effect on the ratings performance
of some of the junior tranches.

The notes benefit from a non-amortizing reserve fund that is at
its target level and represents 3.2% of the notes' current
balance.

Although S&P's cash flow modeling shows that the class A to C
notes pay timely interest and repay principal at rating levels
above 'A-', S&P's current counterparty criteria limit the notes'
maximum achievable ratings at its long-term 'A-' issuer credit
rating on Barclays Bank PLC.

S&P's cash flow analysis shows that the increased available credit
enhancement for the class A2a, A2c, B1c, C1a, and C1c notes has
offset the increase in S&P's credit assumptions at the 'AAA'
stress level.

Taking into account the results of its credit and cash flow
analysis, S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the
class A2a, A2c, B1c, C1a, C1c, and E1c notes to be commensurate
with our currently assigned ratings.  S&P has therefore affirmed
its ratings on these classes of notes.

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class D1a
and D1c notes to be commensurate with lower ratings than those
currently assigned.  Consequently, S&P has lowered its ratings on
these classes of notes.

The class FTc notes repay using excess spread and are deferrable-
interest notes.  Their outstanding balance has decreased by more
than GBP2 million since S&P's previous review and after the class
ETc notes redeemed.  However, in S&P's view there is a still a
one-in-two likelihood of an eventual default, given the overall
uncertainty related to the consequences of a Brexit, among other
things.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'CCC (sf)' rating on the
class FTc notes.

S&P's credit stability analysis indicates that the maximum
projected deterioration that it would expect at each rating level
for time horizons of one year and three years under moderate
stress conditions, are in line with S&P's credit stability
criteria.

Southern Pacific Securities 06-1 securitizes a pool of
nonconforming U.K. residential mortgage loans, which Southern
Pacific Mortgage Ltd. and Southern Pacific Personal Loans Ltd.
originated.

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To               From

Southern Pacific Securities 06-1 PLC
EUR157.85 Million, GBP157.01 Million, US$199.15 Million Mortgage-
Backed Floating-Rate Notes, Plus An Overissuance Of Deferrable
Interest Notes

Ratings Lowered

D1a         B- (sf)          BB (sf)
D1c         B- (sf)          BB (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A2a         A- (sf)
A2c         A- (sf)
B1c         A- (sf)
C1a         A- (sf)
C1c         A- (sf)
E1c         B- (sf)
FTc         CCC (sf)


ULYSSES NO. 27: S&P Affirms D Ratings on 3 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has lowered its credit ratings on the class A
and B notes and affirmed its ratings on all other classes of notes
in Ulysses (European Loan Conduit No. 27) PLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the underlying loan's
credit quality, in light of the transaction's approaching legal
final maturity date in July 2017.

Ulysses (European Loan Conduit No. 27) is a European commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction that closed in July
2007.  At closing, the issuer acquired the senior portion of a
U.K. loan secured by a single office building in London, which is
known as CityPoint.  The senior loan is interest-only and the
current outstanding note balance is GBP429 million (unchanged
since closing).  The final maturity date of the notes is in July
2017.

                          LOAN ANALYSIS

The loan entered special servicing on Feb. 14, 2012 following the
borrower's failure to make sufficient payments to meet all of its
obligations in respect of interest due on the whole loan.  The
special servicer subsequently appointed a receiver, which then
entered into a new asset management agreement with the existing
whole loan sponsor.

In October 2012, the receiver and the sponsor signed a
GBP21.7 million capital expenditure (capex) facility agreement to
implement the new business plan for the asset.  Asset management
initiatives include refurbishment works to the entrance hall, the
plaza, and to refurbish a retail unit.

The loan matured in July 2014 but there is a long-dated swap,
which ranks ahead of the securitized loan, which matures in July
2017.

The property is currently 87.1% occupied, with an annual rental
income of GBP24.5 million.  The weighted-average lease term is 5.6
years.

The reported market value as of December 2014 is GBP498,500,000,
representing a current securitized loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
86.1%.

S&P has assumed principal losses on the loan in its 'B' rating
stress scenario.

                        RATING RATIONALE

S&P's ratings in this transaction address the timely payment of
interest, payable quarterly in arrears, and the payment of
principal no later than the legal final maturity date in July
2017.

The transaction is approaching its legal final maturity date,
which is now less than 12 months.  The potential for a payment
default at legal final maturity has increased, in S&P's opinion.
The class A notes face at least a one-in-three likelihood of
default in S&P's view.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'CCC+ (sf)'
from 'B+ (sf)' its rating on this class of notes in accordance
with S&P's "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published on Oct. 1, 2012.

S&P has lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' its rating on the
class B notes because this class of notes remains vulnerable to
non-payment and its credit characteristics are weaker than the
class A notes.  This is also in line with S&P's criteria for
assigning 'CCC' category ratings.

S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class C, D, and E
notes following their interest shortfalls.  This is in line with
S&P's criteria "Timeliness Of Payments: Grace Periods, Guarantees,
And Use Of 'D' And 'SD' Ratings," published on Oct 24, 2013.

RATINGS LIST

Ulysses (European Loan Conduit No. 27) PLC
GBP429 mil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes

                                   Rating       Rating
Class      Identifier              To           From
A          90406LAA2               CCC+ (sf)    B+ (sf)
B          XS0308838613            CCC- (sf)    CCC (sf)
C          XS0308839009            D (sf)       D (sf)
D          90406LAB0               D (sf)       D (sf)
E          XS0308839694            D (sf)       D (sf)


WHERE ARE YOU NOW: Goes Into Administration
-------------------------------------------
Patrick Whyte at Skift reports that the British company Where Are
You Now? Ltd., which claimed at one time to be the fastest growing
travel and lifestyle social networking community website in the
world, has gone into administration, a process in the UK that is
similar to bankruptcy.

According to the UK's registrar of companies, Companies House,
WAYN, launched in 2002, went into administration on Sept. 5, Skift
relates.

The company's last set of accounts covering the 12 months ending
September 2015 show net liabilities of US$617,322 (GBP473,254),
Skift discloses.

Administrator FRP Advisory could not be reached for comment, Skift
notes.

Skift's Whyte said competing with Facebook for travelers'
attention and a plethora of discovery apps is a struggle for any
company.


* S&P Resolves CreditWatch Placements on 5 UK RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised and removed from CreditWatch positive
its credit ratings on 14 tranches in five residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transactions.  At the same time, S&P
raised its ratings on eight other tranches in these five
transactions as a result of improved performance.

Specifically, S&P has raised and removed from CreditWatch positive
its ratings on:

   -- Gemgarto 2012-1 PLC's class A1, M1, and M2 notes;

   -- Money Partners Securities 1 PLC's class M1, M2a, and M2b
      notes;

   -- Residential Mortgage Securities 23 PLC's class A notes;

   -- Residential Mortgage Securities 25 PLC's class A1, A2, M1-
      Dfrd, and M2-Dfrd notes; and

   -- Residential Mortgage Securities 26 PLC's class A1, M1, and
      M2 notes.

S&P has raised its ratings on:

   -- Gemgarto 2012-1's class B1 and B2 notes;
   -- Money Partners Securities 1's class B1 notes;
   -- Residential Mortgage Securities 25's class B1-Dfrd,
      B2-Dfrd, and B3-Dfrd notes; and
   -- Residential Mortgage Securities 26's B1 and B2 notes.

On June 22, 2016, S&P placed on CreditWatch positive its ratings
on the abovementioned classes of notes following the replacement
of the transaction account and guaranteed investment contract
(GIC) provider in each of the transactions (Barclays Bank PLC)
with HSBC Bank PLC (AA-/Negative/A-1+).  In light of this change,
S&P's current counterparty criteria no longer constrain the
maximum potential rating in these transactions.  Barclays Bank
remains in each of the transactions as the collection account bank
provider and the documented replacement trigger for this role has
been lowered in accordance with S&P's current counterparty
criteria.

Residential Mortgage Securities 23 and Money Partners Securities 1
benefit from a liquidity facility provided by Barclays Bank,
which, following a breach of the documented replacement trigger,
has been drawn to cash and deposited with HSBC Bank.

Given the recent counterparty amendments, we have conducted a full
review of each transaction in order to resolve the CreditWatch
placements.

In terms of performance, each of these transactions has been
improving over the past two years, with 90+ days delinquencies in
the worst performing of the five transactions (Money Partners
Securities 1) decreasing to 14.7% in Q2 2016 from 19.9% in Q1
2015.  This, coupled with the increased seasoning, has resulted in
lower weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) assumptions
since S&P's previous full reviews of each transaction.

Since the most recent full review of each transaction, credit
enhancement for each class of notes has increased.  This is due to
each transaction having a fully funded non-amortizing reserve fund
(except for Residential Mortgage Securities 25, which could
amortize if certain performance conditions are met) and a
sequential payment structure (except for Money Partners Securities
1 which is amortizing pro rata).

S&P's analysis indicates that all classes of notes in each of the
five transactions can pass S&P's cash flow stresses at higher
rating levels than those currently assigned.  S&P has therefore
raised its ratings on all classes of notes listed below and have
resolved S&P's June 22, 2016 CreditWatch placements.

S&P's credit stability analysis indicates that the maximum
projected deterioration that it would expect at each rating level
for the one- and three-year horizons, under moderate stress
conditions, is in line with S&P's credit stability criteria.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Positive

Class             Rating
           To                 From

Gemgarto 2012-1 PLC
GBP246.5 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A1         AAA (sf)           A- (sf)/Watch Pos
M1         AA+ (sf)           A- (sf)/Watch Pos
M2         AA+ (sf)           A- (sf)/Watch Pos

Money Partners Securities 1 PLC
EUR255 Million, GBP199.8 Million, $60 Million Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes

M1         AAA (sf)           A- (sf)/Watch Pos
M2a        AA (sf)            A- (sf)/Watch Pos
M2b        AA (sf)            A- (sf)/Watch Pos

Residential Mortgage Securities 23 PLC
GBP274.2 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes (Including
GBP134.6 Million Further Class A, GBP78.6 Million Further Class B
And GBP0.2 Million Further Class C Issuance)

A          AAA (sf)           A- (sf)/Watch Pos

Residential Mortgage Securities 25 PLC
GBP195.1 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A1         AAA (sf)           A- (sf)/Watch Pos
A2         AAA (sf)           A- (sf)/Watch Pos
M1-Dfrd    AA (sf)            A- (sf)/Watch Pos
M2-Dfrd    AA- (sf)           A- (sf)/Watch Pos

Residential Mortgage Securities 26 PLC
GBP207.5 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes And Non-
Mortgage Backed
Notes

A1         AAA (sf)           A- (sf)/Watch Pos
M1         AA+ (sf)           A- (sf)/Watch Pos
M2         AA (sf)            A- (sf)/Watch Pos

Ratings Raised

Gemgarto 2012-1 PLC
GBP246.5 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

B1         AA (sf)            A- (sf)
B2         A- (sf)            BBB- (sf)

Money Partners Securities 1 PLC
EUR255 Million, GBP199.8 Million, $60 Mil Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes

B1         A+ (sf)            A- (sf)

Residential Mortgage Securities 25 PLC
GBP195.1 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

B1-Dfrd    A+ (sf)            A- (sf)
B2-Dfrd    BBB (sf)           BB+ (sf)
B3-Dfrd    BB+ (sf)           BB (sf)

Residential Mortgage Securities 26 PLC
GBP207.5 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes And Non-
Mortgage Backed
Notes

B1         A (sf)             A-
B2         A- (sf)            BBB (sf)



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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