TCREUR_Public/160922.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

         Thursday, September 22, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 188


                            Headlines


C Y P R U S

PRIMORSK SHIPPING: Judge Approves Ch. 11 Liquidation Plan


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

NEW WORLD: Citibank Files CZK10.BB Suit Over OKD Insolvency


F I N L A N D

TALVIVAARA MINING: Provides Update on Restructuring Program


F R A N C E

DARTY PLC: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB', Outlook Stable
GROUPE FNAC: S&P Assigns 'BB' CCR & Rates EUR650MM Sr. Notes 'BB'
PROMONTORIA MCS: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Counterparty Credit Rating


I R E L A N D

DEPFA ACS: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating on Review for Upgrade
HARVEST CLO XVI: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F Notes
MERCATOR CLO II: Moody's Hikes Class B-2 Debt Rating to 'Ba1'


I T A L Y

MISYS NEWCO: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Positive


R U S S I A

ROSINTERBANK JSC: Bank of Russia Revokes Banking License


S P A I N

EDREAMS ODIGEO: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Sr. Secured Notes


S W I T Z E R L A N D

EUROCHEM GROUP: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating


U K R A I N E

MYKOLAIV: Creditors, Liquidator Want to Unblock Shipyard Sale


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BERNARD MATTHEWS: Suppliers to Suffer From Any Pre-Pack Deal
GHA COACHES: Directors Had Prior Management Failures, Probe Shows
HMV: Workers Left High and Dry In "Conspiracy Of Lies"
INDUSTRY RE: Sole Owner Gets 15 Years Disqualification
INMARSAT FINANCE: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Sr. Unsec. Bond

MOCA 2016-1: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EX)sf' Rating to Class D Notes
NATIONAL VIDEOGAME: Didn't Make a Profit, Administrators Say
ROADCHEF FINANCE: Fitch Withdraws 'B' Rating on Class B Notes
SANTO MONTANA: High Court Winds Up Gold Mines Investment Scheme
* UK: 672 Construction Firms Enter Insolvency in Q1 2016


                            *********


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C Y P R U S
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PRIMORSK SHIPPING: Judge Approves Ch. 11 Liquidation Plan
---------------------------------------------------------
Tom Corrigan, writing for The Wall Street Journal Pro Bankruptcy,
reported that Primorsk International Shipping Ltd. won final
bankruptcy-court approval of a liquidation plan that divvies up
proceeds from the sale of its oil tanker fleet to Russia's
Sovcomflot.

According to the report, Primorsk's chapter 11 case got off to a
rough start after a fight with lenders but, during a hearing in
Manhattan on Sept. 20, a lawyer for Primorsk told Judge Martin
Glenn that its debt-repayment plan had been unanimously approved
by creditors in a polling process it began in late August.

"Even with the hiccups, I think you got to a good result," Judge
Glenn said, WSJ cited.

The Troubled Company Reporter previously reported that General
Unsecured Creditors in Class 4 are out of the money.  Each Holder
of an allowed claim under the Debtors' senior secured term loan
facility (Senior Loan Claim) in Class 3A will be paid in full in
Cash in accordance with the order approving the sale of the
Debtors' assets.

Each Holder of an allowed claim under the Debtors' junior
revolving credit facility (Junior Loan Claim) in Class 3B will
receive (i) its Pro Rata share of remaining Encumbered Cash,
following the provision of a reserve for line items in the Wind-
Down Budget and the distributions made to the Holders of Senior
Loan Claims, and (ii) its Pro Rata share of the Liquidating Trust
Distributable Cash, in each of cases (i) and (ii) until such time
as such Holder has received Cash distributions equal to the
Allowed amount of such Allowed Junior Loan Claim.  Class 3B claims
total $51,625,000 and are projected to recoup 35% under the Plan.

Each Holder of an allowed claim under the Debtors' third ranking
term loan facility, which was taken to refinance certain swap
liabilities, (Swap Claim) in Class 3C will get nothing under the
Plan.  Swap Claims total $16,400,988.

Equity Interests in Class 5 also get nothing.

The WSJ recalled that when the company filed for chapter 11
protection in January, it initially sought court approval for a
restructuring plan that would have set aside nearly half of the
company for its two owners and senior executives.  But the initial
plan was quickly torpedoed by the senior lenders, who eventually
succeeded in steering the case toward a sale, the report said.

Primorsk initially defended the restructuring plan as "110%
confirmable" by the court but bowed to Nordea after the bank
sought to block the proposal, alleging it had been engineered to
benefit the company's insiders and affiliates, the report added.

                  About Primorsk International

Headquartered in Nicosia, Cyprus, Primorsk International Shipping
Limited (Prisco) aka PISL operates a fleet of ice-class oil
tankers in the Arctic.  It was founded in 2004 and is owned by
Apington Investments, a British Virgin Islands holding company,
which is controlled by Russian native Alexander Kirilichev.

Primorsk sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Case No. 16-10073) in New York, in the U.S., on Jan. 15, 2016.
Affiliates Boussol Shipping Limited, Malthus Navigati on Limited,
Jixandra Shipping Limited, Levaser Navigation Limited, Hermine
Shipping Limited, Laperouse Shipping Limited (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case
No. 16-10079), Prylotina Shipping Limited, Baikal Shipping Ltd,
and Vostok Navigation Ltd. also filed separate Chapter 11
bankruptcy petitions.  The bankruptcy petitions were signed by
Holly Felder Etlin, chief restructuring officer.  Judge Martin
Glenn presides over the cases.

The Debtor disclosed total assets of $6,018,821 and total
liabilities of $351,352,076 as of the Chapter 11 filing.

Andrew G. Dietderich, Esq., at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP serves as
the Debtors' bankruptcy counsel.  AlixPartners, LLP, is the
Debtors' financial and restructuring advisor.



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NEW WORLD: Citibank Files CZK10.BB Suit Over OKD Insolvency
-----------------------------------------------------------
According to Bloomberg News' Ladka Bauerova, E15 newspaper, citing
court documents, reports that Citibank filed a CZK10.1-billion
lawsuit against New World Resources miner with the regional court
in Ostrava relating to OKD's insolvency.

                    About New World Resources

New World Resources N.V. is owned and controlled by New World
Resources Plc, an English public limited company domiciled in the
Netherlands that is admitted for trading on the London Stock
Exchange, where it maintains a Premium Listing, along with the
Warsaw Stock Exchange and the Prague Stock Exchange.

The ultimate parent and indirect majority owner of NWR is CERCL
Mining B.V., a privately-held Dutch company, which owns a
controlling majority of the shares of NWR Plc.

NWR's primary role in its corporate group has been to issue debt
(primarily in the form of secured and unsecured notes) and to
loan the corresponding proceeds to its wholly-owned operating
subsidiaries.  These operating subsidiaries conduct coal mining
and exploration operations in the Czech Republic and Poland.  The
operating subsidiary conducting mining operations in the Czech
Republic is critical to the local economy in that country.
Collectively, these operating subsidiaries employee over 11,500
workers (and utilize an additional 3,000 contractors), and many
major steel groups -- including some operating in the U.S. -- are
reliant on their coal.

As of July 15, 2014, NWR had outstanding gross external debt of
approximately EUR825 million (exclusive of amounts it owes under
certain intercompany obligations).  Of this debt, EUR500 million
in principal amount plus accrued interest is owed to the
beneficial holders of the 7.875% Senior Secured Notes due May 1,
2018.  NWR also owes EUR275 million in principal amount plus
accrued interest to the beneficial holders of its 7.875% Senior
Unsecured Notes due January 15, 2021.

NWR applied to the Chancery Division (Companies Court) of the
High Court of Justice of England and Wales, on July 28, 2014, for
an order directing it to convene separate meetings for two
classes of creditors only, namely, the existing senior secured
noteholders on the one hand, and the existing senior unsecured
noteholders.

NWR filed a Chapter 15 bankruptcy petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case
No. 14-12226) in Manhattan, New York on July 30, 2014, to seek
recognition of the UK proceeding.

Neither the Debtor's parent nor any of its operating subsidiaries
have commenced insolvency proceedings in the UK Court or any
other court within any jurisdiction.

The U.S. case is assigned to Judge Stuart M. Bernstein.



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TALVIVAARA MINING: Provides Update on Restructuring Program
-----------------------------------------------------------
Talvivaara Mining Company Plc on Sept. 20 disclosed that it has
received a statement from the Administrator of its corporate
reorganization proceedings in which the Administrator gives his
view on the status of the fulfillment of the special conditions in
the corporate restructuring program.  As part of fulfilling the
special conditions of the restructuring program the Company has
started preparations for the conversion issue as set out in the
restructuring program.

The Administrator filed the final draft restructuring program with
the District Court of Espoo on April 10, 2015.  The confirmation
and entry into force of the draft restructuring program requires
the fulfillment of all of the following special conditions:

   a. Talvivaara succeeds in negotiating an agreement with the
      party that purchases Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd's mining
      operations from the bankruptcy estate based on which:

     1. Talvivaara can obtain sufficient cash flow to cover the
        costs of its business operations if the Company's other
        assets or other cash flows are not sufficient to cover
        said costs; and

     2. Talvivaara has the right to make an investment sufficient
        to acquire a significant minority stake in the company
        engaging in the mining operations, or the parties complete
        a different financial and/or operative arrangement that
        will secure the continuance of the Company's eligible
        business;

   b. The general meeting of shareholders of Talvivaara:

      1. approves the opportunity to be offered to all holders of
         unsecured restructuring debts to convert the full amount
         (but not a part thereof) of their unsecured restructuring
         debt into shares in the Company with due regard to any
         limitations of prohibitions set by foreign securities
         laws that would make the offering of the conversion right
         to certain foreign creditors either illegal or
         unreasonably difficult to implement.  If all unsecured
         restructuring creditors exercise said opportunity, the
         percentage of holdings of the Company's current
         shareholders would be diluted by 70%.  The conversion
         rate would be EUR0.1144 per share; and

      2. executes or authorizes the Company's board of directors
         to execute a financial arrangement (e.g. issuance of
         shares or bonds or execution of other financing
         instrument) to raise the funds needed to execute an
         arrangement referred to in section a) 2. and/or for
         paying the remaining restructuring debts and for covering
         other possible liabilities to the extent the Company's
         other funds are not sufficient for such purpose;

   c. The proceedings for converting the restructuring debts into
      shares in the Company have been completed in accordance with
      the section b) 1 above, and the new shares have been
      registered in the Trade Register.

In addition to the special conditions, the confirmation of the
program also requires that other requirements set forth in law are
fulfilled and that no obstacles for the entry into force of the
program provided for in the Restructuring of Enterprises Act are
at hand.  The Administrator shall oversee the fulfillment of the
special conditions set for the restructuring program and once the
conditions have been fulfilled inform the District Court therof.
The District Court will decide on the approval of the final
restructuring program.

On Sept. 20, the Administrator has stated that special conditions
(b)(2) and (c) of the restructuring program are currently still to
be fulfilled. In addition, according to the Administrator, the
fulfillment of all the special conditions and purpose of the
Restructuring Act will require that the Company's new business
opportunities are sufficiently developed so as to provide more
tangible prospects for future viable business operations.

As part of the fulfillment of the special condition of the
restructuring program (special condition (c)) the Company has
started preparations for the share issue, whereby the holders of
unsecured restructuring debts as defined in the restructuring
program would be offered an opportunity to convert the full amount
of their unsecured restructuring debt into shares of the Company
("Conversion Issue").  According to the restructuring program, the
conversion rate of the Conversion Issue shall be EUR 0.1144 per
share. The Company continues the preparations and will update the
market in due course with regard to the progress of the Conversion
Issue.

During the current year, the Company has explored a number of new
business ideas and projects, which, if materialized, could create
the Company's new core business or part thereof.  The Company
continues to investigate and develop selected projects. The new
business opportunities currently being explored are not limited to
the mining industry, but also include amongst others projects from
the recycling and energy saving sectors.  At this point it is too
early for the Company to take a view on the details of the
projects or their likelihood to be successfully realized.  The
Company will update the market in due course, should the viability
of one or more of the projects ultimately be demonstrated.

                   About Talvivaara Mining

Talvivaara Mining Co. Ltd. is a Finnish nickel producer.  It
filed for a corporate reorganization on Nov. 15, 2013, to raise
funds and avoid bankruptcy.  The company suffered from falling
nickel prices and a slow ramp-up at its mine in northern Finland,
forcing it to seek fundraising help from investors and creditors.



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DARTY PLC: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB', Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term corporate credit rating on
France-based consumer electronics retailer Darty PLC to 'BB' from
'BB-'.  The outlook is stable.

S&P subsequently withdrew the long-term rating at Darty's request.

S&P also withdrew its 'BB-' issue rating on Darty's senior
unsecured revolving credit facility due 2019 and senior unsecured
notes due 2021, as these debt instruments have been redeemed in
the context of the acquisition of the company.

The upgrade follows editorial products and consumer electronics
retailer GROUPE FNAC SA's (Fnac's) acquisition of Darty PLC in
August 2016.

S&P has assigned its 'BB' long-term rating to the enlarged Fnac,
with a stable outlook.

The rating on Darty reflects S&P's view that the acquisition will
strengthen its business risk and financial risk profiles.  S&P has
consequently aligned its rating on Darty with that on Fnac, given
its core status with the enlarged Fnac group.

Darty's request to withdraw the ratings follows the full
redemption of all its outstanding debt as a result of the
transaction.


GROUPE FNAC: S&P Assigns 'BB' CCR & Rates EUR650MM Sr. Notes 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB' long-term corporate credit
rating to France-based consumer electronics and editorial products
retailer GROUPE FNAC SA (Fnac).  The outlook is stable.

S&P assigned its 'BB' rating to the group's recently launched
EUR650 million senior unsecured notes.  The recovery rating on the
proposed debt is '4', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful
recovery prospects in the higher half of the 30%-50% range.

"We assess Fnac's business risk profile in the lower end of our
fair category.  Fnac operates in the highly competitive consumer
electronics and editorial products business.  It faces intense
competition from internet-based retailers, discounters, and
specialty retailers in segments -- which combined equate to a
sizable portion of its sales and product categories.  In addition,
the industry has witnessed the rapid obsolescence of certain
product categories because of technological innovation, changing
consumer preferences, and brisk growth of new product segments,"
S&P said.

The group differentiates itself by providing speedy delivery
times, emphasizing service capabilities that S&P thinks complement
product sales in many categories, and matching its selling prices
to other retailers' online and offline listings.  The group has
also found new levers of growth to balance the erosion of sales in
declining business lines.  These initiatives, along with cost
reductions, have enhanced sales and margins, a trend S&P expects
will prevail.

Moreover, S&P considers that acquiring Darty enables Fnac to
become a strong market leader in France, with a fairly diversified
business risk profile and lower seasonality in sales.  The merger
will also allow the enlarged group to have an online presence in
the French market comparable to that of online retailer Amazon.
Fnac will be able to generate merger-related synergies and pave
the way for Fnac and Darty to share best practices across the
wider group.

S&P views Fnac as a key retail channel for products of consumer
electronics manufacturers such as Apple, Sony, Samsung, and LG
Electronics.  This is because, with the exception of Apple, they
do not have a marked store presence in Europe.  They consequently
depend on Fnac's and other retailers' sales channels and consumer
expertise.

S&P thinks that Fnac's strong French retail network, very well-
known brand image in France, growing online presence, and focus on
the store-within-a-store concept are some of the key factors that
should enable the group to maintain good vendor relationships.

On the downside, S&P views the group's international footprint as
still-limited despite the merger.  In addition, Fnac's modest
like-for-like growth and relatively low operating margin are still
under pressure due to a highly competitive market environment.
S&P also takes into consideration potential merger execution risk,
which could weigh further on current operating margins.

S&P's assessment of Fnac's financial risk profile reflects S&P's
view of the group's conservatively leveraged capital structure.

Under S&P's base-case operating scenario, it forecasts that the
group's adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt will be 35%-
40% and adjusted debt to EBITDA will about 2x over the next two
years.

In addition, S&P forecasts that the group will maintain an
adequate liquidity position at all times.  This reflects Fnac's
lack of material debt amortization requirements and S&P's forecast
of positive free cash flow generation, thanks to improved working
capital management.

S&P's rating incorporates its view of Fnac's relatively weak
position compared with other companies with similar business and
financial risk profiles.  In particular, compared with larger
European peers including Mediamarkt Saturn, the consumer
electronics division of Metro AG, and Dixons Carphone, and Bestbuy
in the U.S., the group's size and scale are relatively limited.
In addition, S&P takes into account the group's lack of track
record, potential merger execution risk, and relatively meaningful
leverage for a group operating in such a fast changing
environment.  As a result, S&P has assigned a negative qualifier
for its comparable ratings analysis for Fnac.  S&P nonetheless
acknowledges that the 30% share component of the deal limits the
company's leverage post-acquisition.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation of moderate but
sustained improvement in revenues and earnings, underpinned by the
recent strengthening in operating margins at both Fnac and Darty.
S&P anticipates 1%-2% growth in same-store sales in the next year,
albeit with the possibility of some volatility.  S&P thinks the
group will gain some upside from merger-related synergies,
partially offset by the impact of restructuring costs and still-
challenging trading conditions.

In the coming months, S&P will monitor the EBITDA margin
particularly closely.  However, S&P foresees satisfactory sales
performance in 2016, along with healthy free cash flow.  As a
result of the group's planned limited dividend distribution in the
next few years, S&P forecasts a slight improvement in cash on the
balance sheet, taking into account our projection that the group
should generate about EUR50 million of discretionary cash flow in
2017, post transaction.

In S&P's base-case assumptions, it forecasts S&P Global Ratings-
adjusted FFO to debt in the 35%-40% range and adjusted debt to
EBITDA of about 2x.

S&P could consider a downgrade if the group's credit metrics
weaken over the next 12 months, specifically if Fnac's FFO-to-debt
ratio approaches 30%.  In S&P's view, this could occur if Fnac's
like-for-like sales decline amid tough trading conditions, and if
integrating Darty results in higher-than-initially-expected
restructuring costs and unrealized synergies, leading to
deterioration of operating margins. Negative rating pressure would
also arise if liquidity weakened, including tightening covenant
headroom.  Lastly, a weaker-than-anticipated profitability (due to
a marked deterioration of the competitive landscape, for example)
would lead to a negative rating action as it could affect both
S&P's business risk profile assessment and the company's credit
metrics.

In the near term, a positive rating action is unlikely as any
upgrade would depend on material and tangible positive effects of
the merger on the combined entity's business risk profile.  S&P
could take a positive rating action if it sees business risk
profile strengthening, on the back of a marked improvement in
trading and margins and if Fnac strengthens its free cash flow
generation, causing adjusted FFO to debt to move closer to 45%,
with adjusted debt to EBITDA decreasing toward 1.5x on a
consistent basis.  Any upgrade would hinge on S&P's view that the
risk of releveraging is low, based on our assessment of the
group's financial policy.


PROMONTORIA MCS: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Counterparty Credit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB-' long-term counterparty
credit rating to French debt purchaser Promontoria MCS SAS (MCS).
The outlook is stable.

S&P also assigned its 'BB-' issue rating to the company's proposed
EUR200 million senior secured notes maturing in 2021.  The
recovery rating on the proposed notes is '3', reflecting S&P's
view of recovery prospects in the higher half of the
50%-70% range.  It incorporates S&P's view that the larger portion
of the remaining proceeds of the notes issuance will be used to
purchase portfolios.

S&P's 'BB-' rating on MCS reflects the creditworthiness of the
consolidated group.

S&P's assessment of MCS' business risk profile balances the
company's leading position in the French distressed debt purchase
market against its niche positioning and concentrated focus on
collections from owned portfolios in France.  MCS is the main debt
purchaser in France, focused mostly on large ticket claims, with
most competitors handling claims below EUR10,000.  S&P believes
that MCS benefits from solid barriers to entry because:

   -- The absence of credit bureau data protects incumbents such
      as MCS from new players and makes MCS' data generation on
      French debtors over 30 years a distinctive competitive
      asset.

   -- The focus on large claims implies a strong and legally
      skilled workforce that takes time to build up.

S&P believes that MCS will likely consolidate its position as the
French distressed debt purchase market matures.

S&P assesses MCS' revenue diversification as low because the
company operates in a niche market, both in terms of industry and
geography. MCS focuses mostly on the French market and to a far
lesser extent on the Belgian, Swiss, and Luxembourg markets (it
generates approximately 1% of revenues outside of France).  S&P
understands MCS has no plans to aggressively grow its activities
outside of France.

MCS' revenues are highly concentrated because 93% of its revenues
are derived from asset purchasing, while 7% come from asset
servicing.  S&P believes that a greater balance between asset
purchasing and asset servicing can enhance the resiliency of a
revenue profile given the potential changes in the pricing or
supply of debt portfolios.  MCS also focuses on two claims
categories, performing and nonperforming; however, 96% of its
revenues come from the latter.

S&P considers the company's risk control framework to be sound,
evidenced by a long track record of disciplined underwriting
policy through cycles.

S&P does not consider regulatory risk to be as high as in the
U.K., for example.  While the "light-touch" regulation in France
remains effective, S&P believes that MCS' future business
prospects and operating model will continue to be relatively
predictable.

S&P's assessment of MCS' financial risk profile reflects the
company's increasing leverage and debt-service metrics in 2016,
even if its debt ratios are highly influenced by the proposed
point-in-time issuance of the EUR200 million senior secured notes.
S&P believes that MCS' organic growth will increase the company's
earnings capacity over the next year.  S&P therefore expects these
metrics will improve from 2017, after the proposed EUR200 million
bond issuance.  S&P's central expectation is a decrease in
leverage in 2017.

Despite this projected deleveraging trend, S&P believes that its
weighted-average leverage and credit metrics will remain in line
with the current significant financial risk profile, and S&P sees
little upside to this assessment.

In S&P's base case, it expects these credit metrics for MCS:

   -- A ratio of gross debt to adjusted EBITDA in the range of
      3x-4x;
   -- A ratio of funds from operations to debt evolving around
      20%; and
   -- A ratio of adjusted EBITDA to interest in the range of
      4x-5x.

When calculating S&P's weighted-average ratios for MCS, S&P
applies a 20% weight to our projections for year-end 2015 and 40%
weights to both year-end 2016 and year-end 2017 projections.

S&P's projections are based on these assumptions:

   -- S&P anticipates a steady increase in the company's earnings
      capacity through a growing back book of debt portfolios and
      new initiatives.

   -- S&P expects no significant rise in capital expenditures or
      working capital in 2016, relative to previous years.

S&P's current base-case forecast incorporates its expectation that
MCS' organic growth of its back book of debt portfolios and
acquisition by Cerberus PE fund will translate into an increase in
the company's earnings capacity.

S&P applies a one-notch negative adjustment to its 'bb' anchor as
a combination of three factors.  First, S&P takes into account MCS
relative to its peers, including U.K.-based Cabot, Arrow Global,
or Garfunkelux, which enjoy a larger size and a more diversified
portfolio/earnings base.  Second, despite a good track record of
two years since the Cerberus acquisition, S&P reflects the
uncertainty related to Cerberus' private equity ownership, namely
in terms of leverage and future financial policy as MCS continues
to grow.  Third, S&P incorporates in its adjustment its perception
of the maturing trend of the French debt purchasing industry,
which might affect competitive dynamics and future pricing of debt
portfolios.

The stable outlook on MCS reflects S&P's view that the company's
leverage and debt-service metrics will remain within the current
financial risk profile category over the outlook horizon of one
year.  It also reflects S&P's opinion that although MCS may
continue to consolidate its strong position in the French market,
upside to its business risk profile will remain constrained by its
concentrated revenue profile relative to rated peers and that debt
metrics will not deteriorate in 2017 compared with 2016.

S&P could lower the ratings if it saw a material increase in
shareholders' leverage tolerance, a failure in MCS' control
framework, or adverse changes in the French regulatory environment
for debt purchasers that leads to negative changes in its business
model or an erosion in the company's high-margin earnings.  S&P
believes the room to absorb further leverage at the current rating
levels, which is not S&P's central scenario, is limited.

S&P considers an upgrade unlikely within the next year.  S&P could
raise its ratings on MCS if the company appears set to sustainably
lower its debt metrics, which will spike in 2016 as a result of
the proposed EUR200 million bond issuance.  Although less likely
at this stage, S&P could also raise the ratings if it saw greater
diversification in the franchise supporting the future stability
of earnings, for instance with a material increase in fee income
generated in collection services for third parties.



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DEPFA ACS: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating on Review for Upgrade
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for downgrade the Aa2
rating assigned to the public sector covered bonds issued by Depfa
ACS Bank ("the issuer"; deposits Ba1 on review for upgrade;
adjusted baseline credit assessment b2 on review for upgrade;
counterparty risk (CR) assessment Baa3(cr) on review for upgrade).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is prompted by a shortfall in the level of over-
collateralization (OC) in the program. As of June 30, 2016, the
program's OC is 7.6%, while the minimum level of OC consistent
with the Aa2 rating is 9.5%. At the same time, the issuer's CR
assessment is on review for upgrade.

During the review of the rating assigned to the issuer's covered
bonds, Moody's will consider the impact of both any change in the
issuer's CR assessment and any further changes to the level of OC
in the program and/or its credit and market risks as the wind-down
of the issuer and its parent, Depfa Bank, accelerates.

KEY RATING ASSUMPTIONS/FACTORS

Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) to
determine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond. COBOL
determines expected loss as (1) a function of the probability that
the issuer will cease making payments under the covered bonds (a
CB anchor event); and (2) the stressed losses on the cover pool
assets following a CB anchor event.

The CB anchor for this program is CR assessment plus 1 notch. The
CR assessment reflects an issuer's ability to avoid defaulting on
certain senior bank operating obligations and contractual
commitments, including covered bonds. Moody's may use a CB anchor
of CR assessment plus one notch in the European Union or otherwise
where an operational resolution regime is particularly likely to
ensure continuity of covered bond payments.

The cover pool losses for this program are 16.5%. This is an
estimate of the losses Moody's currently models following a CB
anchor event. Moody's splits cover pool losses between market risk
of 12.4% and collateral risk of 4.0%. Market risk measures losses
stemming from refinancing risk and risks related to interest-rate
and currency mismatches (these losses may also include certain
legal risks). Collateral risk measures losses resulting directly
from cover pool assets' credit quality. Moody's derives collateral
risk from the collateral score, which for this program is
currently 8.1%.

The over-collateralization (OC) in the cover pool is 7.6%, of
which the issuer provides 5% in a "committed" form. The minimum OC
level consistent with the Aa2 rating is 9.5%, of which the issuer
should provide 2.5% in a "committed" form. These numbers, which
are in nominal value terms and calculated using exchange rates as
of June 30, 2016, rather than the exchange rates under the cover
pool's currency swaps, show that Moody's is relying on
"uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on Moody's most recent
modelling (based on data provided by the issuer as of June 30,
2016).

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator" (TPI),
which measures the likelihood of timely payments to covered
bondholders following a CB anchor event. The TPI framework limits
the covered bond rating to a certain number of notches above the
CB anchor.

For the issuer's public sector covered bonds, Moody's has assigned
a TPI of "Probable-High".

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The CB anchor is the main determinant of a covered bond program's
rating robustness. A change in the level of the CB anchor could
lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the covered bonds. The TPI
Leeway measures the number of notches by which Moody's might lower
the CB anchor before the rating agency downgrades the covered
bonds because of TPI framework constraints.

Based on the current TPI of "Probable-High", the TPI Leeway for
this program is 0 notches. This implies that Moody's might
downgrade the covered bonds because of a TPI cap if it lowers the
CB anchor by 1 notch, all other variables being equal.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain circumstances, such as (1) a country ceiling or sovereign
downgrade capping a covered bond rating or negatively affecting
the CB Anchor and the TPI; (2) a multiple-notch downgrade of the
CB Anchor; or (3) a material reduction of the value of the cover
pool.

RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds" published in August 2015.


HARVEST CLO XVI: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by Harvest CLO XVI
DAC (the "Issuer"):

   -- EUR258,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR66,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- EUR25,300,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- EUR23,100,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

   -- EUR23,100,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

   -- EUR11,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's rating of the rated notes addresses the expected loss
posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the notes in 2029.
The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying
portfolio of loans given the characteristics and eligibility
criteria of the constituent assets, the relevant portfolio tests
and covenants as well as the transaction's capital and legal
structure. Furthermore, Moody's is of the opinion that the
collateral manager, 3i Debt Management Investments Limited ("3i
DM"), has sufficient experience and operational capacity and is
capable of managing this CLO.

Harvest CLO XVI DAC is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 96% of
the portfolio must consist of secured senior obligations and up to
4% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured senior loans, second
lien loans, mezzanine obligations, high yield bonds and/or partial
PIK obligations. The portfolio is expected to be approximately 65%
ramped up as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly
of corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe. The
remainder of the portfolio will be acquired during the six month
ramp-up period in compliance with the portfolio guidelines.

3i DM will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
impaired obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the six classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR 45,000,000 of subordinated notes. Moody's
will not assign a rating to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, will divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section
2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015. The
cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore,
the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

   -- Par Amount: EUR 440,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 39

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.20%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.25%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the rating assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3163 from 2750)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

   -- Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

   -- Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

   -- Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

   -- Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

   -- Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

   -- Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3575 from 2750)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

   -- Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -0

   -- Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

   -- Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

   -- Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

   -- Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

   -- Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. 3i DM's investment decisions and management of
the transaction will also affect the notes' performance.


MERCATOR CLO II: Moody's Hikes Class B-2 Debt Rating to 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Mercator CLO II Plc:

   -- EUR25.5M Class B-1 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24,
      2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- EUR19.5M Class B-2 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 24,
      2016 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued by
Mercator CLO II Plc:

   -- EUR274M (current outstanding balance: EUR13.9M) Class A-1
      Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa
      (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR25.5M Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR25M Class A-3 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24,
      2016 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Mercator CLO II Plc, issued in January 2007, is a Collateralised
Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly senior
secured high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by NAC
Management (Cayman) Limited, and this transaction ended its
reinvestment period in February 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action on the Class B notes is primarily a result of
the deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes following amortization of
the underlying portfolio since the last rating action in March
2016.

Class A-1 notes have paid down by EUR14.9M on the last two
quarterly payment dates, as a result of which over-
collateralization (OC) ratios of senior classes of rated notes
have increased. As per the latest trustee report dated August
2016, Classes A-2, A-3,B-1 and B-2 overcollateralization ratios
are reported at 301.80%, 194.36%, 142.59% and 118.46%
respectively, compared to 263.49%, 180.35%, 136.43% and 115.02% in
the February 2016 report.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR102.8 million and GBP18.3 million, a weighted
average default probability of 20.45% (consistent with a WARF of
2831 and a WAL of 4.56 years), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 46.03% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 19 and a weighted average spread of 3.77%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the
CLO transaction. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in the
portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weighted
average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs were
unchanged compared to the base-case results for Classes A and
within two notches of the base-case results for Classes B.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

   -- Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
      this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
      underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly
      depending on market conditions and have a significant
      impact on the notes' ratings. Amortization could accelerate
      as a consequence of high loan prepayment levels or
      collateral sales by the liquidation agent/the collateral
      manager or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-
      extend restructurings. Fast amortization would usually
      benefit the ratings of the notes beginning with the notes
      having the highest prepayment priority.

   -- Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature
      beyond the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
      liquidation risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at
      transaction maturity, the liquidation value of such an
      asset will depend on the nature of the asset as well as the
      extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
      liabilities. Liquidation values higher than Moody's
      expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'
      ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



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I T A L Y
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MISYS NEWCO: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it placed its 'B' long-term corporate
credit rating on U.K.-based software company Misys Newco 2 S.a.r.l
on CreditWatch with positive implications.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating to its subsidiary Turaz Global S.a.r.l, as well as Magic
Newco 5 S.a.r.l, Magic Newco LLC, and Magic Bidco Ltd. -- all of
which S&P views as core subsidiaries within the Misys Group
because they serve as the group's financing entities.  S&P also
placed the ratings on CreditWatch with positive implications.

In addition, S&P assigned its 'BB' issue rating to Misys' proposed
senior secured term loans.  The recovery rating on these
facilities is '3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful
(50%-70%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment default.

The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's expectation of a
significant event at Misys, which should lead to a meaningful
improvement in the company's S&P Global Ratings-adjusted credit
metrics.

Specifically, S&P anticipates that Misys' adjusted debt to EBITDA
will decline to below 4x by financial 2018 (ending May 31) and
that FOCF to debt will improve to more than 10% in the same
period.  S&P also expects meaningful improvement in the company's
interest coverage as it plans to refinance its existing term loans
-- which should result in a material reduction in the company's
cost of debt.  This is mainly because the company's second-lien
debt, which will be repaid, bears a very high margin of 12%.
S&P's adjusted EBITDA figure treats Misys' capitalized development
costs as an expense.

"Our assessment of Misys' business risk profile reflects our view
of its solid positioning in the financial services software
solutions market, including the fragmented treasury and risk
management software solutions, and its focus on mission critical
software to financial institutions, resulting in very high
retention rates of about 94%.  Our assessment is also supported by
our anticipation of continued outsourcing trends for financial
institutions, notably as they strive to create cost efficiencies.
This trend reflected Misys' strong performance in financial 2016,
with growth in initial license fees of more than 20%.  We
currently see the U.K.'s decision to leave the EU as having a
limited potential impact on Misys' existing client base, as the
software remains mission critical to these customers and will
remain so under all reasonable scenarios.  However, we see some
potential risks to continued high growth in Misys' initial license
fees in financial 2017, mainly as some financial institutions may
delay the initial investment required in the face of
uncertainties.  Over the longer term, we think this may also
create opportunities for Misys to generate additional revenues
from the potential movement of customers or changes in
regulations," S&P said.

Misys' operations in a niche market and its reliance on financial
institutions as end-customers constrain S&P's assessment of its
business risk profile.  S&P's assessment is further constrained by
a relatively meaningful portion of Misys' revenues coming from the
sale of new licenses which, in S&P's view, will correlate very
closely with market conditions and could fluctuate significantly
during the economic cycle.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Mid-single-digit revenue growth in the financial years
      ending 2017 and 2018, resulting from growth in initial
      license fees in Europe and emerging markets, as well as
      maintenance fees related to the high growth in new licenses
      in financial 2016.

   -- A marginal decline in EBITDA margins due to increased sales
      and marketing as the company is focused on cross-selling
      products, as well as lower margins for cloud-based
      subscriptions.

   -- Annual capital expenditure (capex) of about 2.0% of
      revenues excluding capitalized development costs.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 4x in financial 2017 and 3.7x-3.9x
      in financial 2018;
   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 20%; and
   -- FOCF to debt of 13%-15%.

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch subject to completion of the
significant deleveraging event in line with S&P's base case.

Raising S&P's long-term rating on Misys by three notches would
depend on:

   -- The potential debt reduction and the terms of the proposed
      refinancing, and the consequent impact on Misys' credit
      metrics; and

   -- S&P's assessment of the company's financial policy.



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ROSINTERBANK JSC: Bank of Russia Revokes Banking License
--------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order AD-3141, dated September 19,
2016, revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit
institution Joint-stock Company Commercial Bank RosinterBank,
according to the press service of the Central Bank of Russia.

The Bank of Russia took the extreme measure of license revocation
because of the credit institution's failure to comply with federal
banking legislation and Bank of Russia regulatory acts, as well as
multiple violations, within one year, of requirements under
Articles 6 and 7 (except for Paragraph 3, Article 7) of the
Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation (Laundering) of
Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of Terrorism",
requirements of Bank of Russia regulatory acts issued in
accordance with this Federal Law, and due to the capital adequacy
ratio falling below 2 percent, capital decrease below the minimal
value of the authorized capital established as of the date of the
state registration of the credit institution, and repeated
applications, within one year, of measures envisaged by the
Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank
of Russia)".

Given the unsatisfactory quality of assets, RosinterBank
inadequately assessed the risks assumed.  The appropriate
assessment of its credit exposure, unbiased accounting of asset
values in the credit institution's statements reveals a total loss
of bank capital.  Also, the credit institution failed to comply
with Bank of Russia regulations as regards countering the
legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained incomes and the
financing of terrorism in terms of submitting true and full
information to the authorized body.  The internal bank rules to
counter the legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained
incomes and the financing of terrorism were misaligned with Bank
of Russia regulations.

The provisional administration to manage the Bank -- the State
Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency -- as appointed under Bank of
Russia Order AD-3080, dated September 15, 2016 -- from day one of
its operations has faced severe obstruction from the Bank
management, including the failure to submit electronic databases
and documents of entitlement as regards the Bank assets.

In consideration of the foregoing, a financial turnaround of the
Bank involving the State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency was
deemed impossible.  In the current circumstances, guided by
Article 20 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activity", the
Bank of Russia acted to revoke the credit institution's banking
license.

Following revocation of the banking license, the operations of the
provisional administration (whose powers were entrusted to the
State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency, Bank of Russia Order
No. AD-3080, dated September 15, 2016) were terminated by force of
Bank of Russia AD-3142, dated September 19, 2016.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3143, dated September 19,
2016, appointed a provisional administration to RosinterBank for
the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under
Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".
In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit
institution's executive bodies are suspended.

RosinterBank is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by legislation.  The said
Federal Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but not more than 1.4 million rubles
per depositor.

According to reporting data, as of September 1, 2016, RosinterBank
(JSC CB) ranked 68th in the Russian banking system in terms of
assets.



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EDREAMS ODIGEO: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Sr. Secured Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a provisional (P) B3 rating to
the proposed EUR425 million senior secured notes due 2021 to be
issued by eDreams ODIGEO S.A. (ODIGEO or the company).
Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a B2 corporate family rating
(CFR) and B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to ODIGEO, and
withdrawn the B2 CFR and B2-PD PDR on Geo Travel Finance SCA
Luxembourg, a subsidiary of ODIGEO. The outlook on all ratings is
stable.

The rating action follows the announcement on September 14, 2016,
that the company proposes to refinance the existing facilities of
the ODIGEO group, currently issued by the company's subsidiaries
Geo Travel Finance S.C.A. Luxembourg and Geo Debt Finance S.C.A.
The proceeds from the transaction will be used to refinance in
full ODIGEO group's outstanding debts and to pay related fees.

Moody's will withdraw the ratings on the existing Senior Secured
Notes due 2018 and Senior Unsecured Notes due 2019 upon
consummation of the transaction and repayment of the existing
debt.

The ratings have been assigned on the basis of Moody's
expectations that the transaction will close as expected. Moody's
issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary credit
opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive review
of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings to the senior secured notes. Definitive ratings
may differ from provisional ratings.

The ratings reflect:

   -- ODIGEO's strong recovery in trading performance and
      deleveraging in the year ended 31 March (FY) 2016 and in
      the current financial year

   -- Expectations of a continuation of conservative financial
      policies supporting further deleveraging

   -- Continued growth in the European on line travel agency
     (OTA) sector supported by increasing travel volumes, the
      shift to on line and market share gains for larger players

   -- The company's low exposure to the UK and Moody's
      expectations of a limited impact on ODIGEO from
      uncertainties caused by Brexit

   -- Extended maturities of the company's financing to 2021 from
      2018 and 2019, and reduction in interest costs

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings reflect the company's strong trading performance and
reduction in leverage in FY2016. Booking volumes and revenue
margin grew by 9.8% and 6.4% respectively, with strong growth in
mobile (bookings up 51%) and in non-flight revenue margin (up
9.6%). The company's core markets of France, Spain and Italy were
stable with growth in the rest of the business (bookings up 20%).
The company has reduced its exposure to paid search contributing
to a reduction in variable costs per booking of 6.1%, leading to
underlying EBITDA growth (before staff bonuses which were withheld
in FY2015) of approximately 12%. Strong performance in revenue
growth and EBITDA margin has continued in the first quarter ended
30 June 2016, and leverage has reduced to 4.6x debt to EBITDA on a
Moody's-adjusted basis at 30 June 2016, compared to 5.0x at 30
June 2015. Leverage will be unchanged following the proposed
refinancing and Moody's expects conservative financial policies to
continue which will support further deleveraging.

The European OTA sector is expected to grow as air passenger
volumes increase, as more customers seek to make purchases on
line, and as the larger OTAs gain share at the expense of smaller
players. ODIGEO is the #1 OTA in flights in some of its largest
European markets (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal), #2
OTA in flights in the rest of its European markets (UK, Norway,
Sweden, Finland and Switzerland) and the #3 OTA overall in Europe
across flight and non-flight products. It has grown revenue margin
at 7.2% per annum on average over FY2012-16 and despite the
potential uncertainties over the pace of market growth following
Brexit, the company remains well placed to deliver solid single
digit growth in the medium term. In addition the company has a low
exposure to UK generated business and to sterling.

The B2 CFR reflects (1) ODIGEO's continued high leverage; (2) a
geographic concentration in Southern Europe and France; and (3)
industry risks, including value chain disintermediation from
airlines or other intermediaries, exposure to paid search costs
and risks of exogenous shocks.

More positively, the ratings are supported by: (1) ODIGEO's
competitive positioning within the OTA industry in Europe,
particularly within the flight segment and in its key markets of
France, Spain, Italy and Germany; (2) Moody's expectation that the
on line travel market will continue to benefit from migration from
high-street travel agencies, although at a slower rate than in the
past; (3) Moody's expectation of general growth in the airline
passenger market; and (4) conservative financial policies expected
to drive further deleveraging.

Rating Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the company
will continue to generate solid single-digit growth in revenue
margin and with a stable cost environment. It also assumes that
conservative financial policies will continue with no material
debt-funded acquisitions or dividends in the near to medium term,
and that liquidity will remain satisfactory.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

Upward pressure on the rating could occur if Moody's-adjusted
debt/EBITDA were to trend substantially below 4.0x on a
sustainable basis, with Moody's-adjusted free cash flow (FCF) to
debt above 10%. Moody's would in such a scenario also expect
ODIGEO to display solid growth in revenue margin and stable EBITDA
margins, with liquidity remaining satisfactory.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

Negative rating pressure could develop if Moody's-adjusted
debt/EBITDA were to exceed 5.0x, if Moody's-adjusted FCF to debt
were to trend towards zero, or if the company's liquidity profile
was to weaken. Negative pressure could also develop if there is
significant disruption to the market or distribution chain
resulting in reducing revenue margin or profitability.

List of Affected Ratings

Assignments:

   Issuer: eDreams ODIGEO S.A.

   -- Corporate Family Rating, Assigned B2

   -- Probability of Default Rating, Assigned B2-PD

   -- Backed Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned
     (P)B3 (LGD 5)

Withdrawals:

   Issuer: Geo Travel Finance SCA Luxembourg

   -- Corporate Family Rating, Withdrawn , previously rated B2

   -- Probability of Default Rating, Withdrawn , previously rated
      B2-PD

Outlook Actions:

   Issuer: eDreams ODIGEO S.A..

   -- Outlook, Assigned Stable

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in December 2014.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


EUROCHEM GROUP: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Swiss-based holding company Eurochem
Group AG's (EuroChem) and Russia-based JSC MCC EuroChem's Long-
Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB'. The Outlook on both
ratings is Negative.

The Negative Outlook is driven by Fitch's expectation that the
company's leverage will remain well above Fitch's negative rating
guidelines in 2016-17 before gradually moderating to a level more
commensurate with the current rating level. Higher leverage is
largely due to the company implementing capex for its potash and
ammonia projects at a time of low fertilizer prices. However, the
company's completion risks under these projects have reduced over
the past year, which mitigates the temporary deterioration of
projected credit metrics and supports the rating affirmation.

"We expect EuroChem to comply with its financial covenants (net
debt/EBITDA below 3x), which at June 30, 2016, remained at 2.4x.
Headroom is limited but remains manageable as the company will, in
case of need, reduce its covenanted debt through more loans from
the shareholder or working capital optimization, such as
receivables factoring. Unless the company manages to receive
substantial shareholder loans with equity-like features, its
leverage is likely to come under additional pressure and may
prompt a downgrade." Fitch said.

EuroChem is Russia's large fertilizer producer with robust
diversification across products. Its business profile will be
further enhanced by upcoming potash projects, which are forecast
to come on stream from late 2017 to 2018 and be within the first
quartile of the global potash cost curve.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Leverage under Pressure from Capex

Management is committed to the VolgaKaliy and Usolskiy potash
projects, which aim to commence operations in late 2017 to early
2018, targeting at 2.3mtpa of potash capacity each once they ramp
up during the next several years. These are estimated to have a
first-quartile position on the global potash cost curve, will more
than cover EuroChem's internal potash needs and provide it with
diversification into all three major nutrients (nitrogen,
phosphates and potash).

EuroChem's high capital intensity and low fertilizer prices are
pushing the company's leverage above our negative rating action
triggers. Fitch said, "We expect the company's fund from
operations (FFO)-adjusted net leverage to exceed 4x in 2016,
before gradually declining to 3.5x in 2018 and to just below 3x by
2019. This is worse than our expectations behind our previous
rating action in January 2016 (2.8x in 2016; 3.1x in 2018), mainly
on lower projected fertilizer prices. However, the company's
improving business profile, to an extent, offsets the higher debt
burden."

Low Prices Hit 2016 Results

In 1H16 EuroChem's reported EBITDA fell 26% to USD586m, as
realized fertilizer prices fell 30% yoy. To some extent lower
prices were offset by the rouble weakening by 18% over the same
period, as the company's costs are predominantly rouble-pegged.
Fitch said, "We expect EuroChem's EBITDA to be around USD1bn in
2016 (-29% yoy), before increasing to USD1.2bn in 2018 and
USD1.5bn in 2019 on the start-up and ramp-up of its new potash
projects, and aided by fertilizer price recovery in the single-
digits."

Strong Business Fundamentals

EuroChem has a strong presence in European and CIS fertilizer
markets (58% of 2015 sales) and ranks as the seventh-largest
fertilizer player by total nutrient capacity in EMEA. EuroChem's
Russian-based self-sufficient nitrogen and phosphate production
assets have moved to the first quartile of the global cash cost
curves following the recent depreciation of the rouble.

The company has access to the premium European compound fertilizer
market with its own production capacities in Antwerp (Belgium),
trademarks and distribution network. This, as well as strong
EBITDA margins of around 30%, gives EuroChem a rating of 'BBB-',
before typically applying the two-notch corporate governance
discount to Russian corporates that results in the current 'BB'.

Weak Fertiliser Pricing

Pricing across all nutrients came under pressure during 2015-16
and is being impacted by cheaper gas and energy, high fertilizer
stocks, weak demand on the back of a low grain price environment,
and new capacity entering the markets. Fitch forecasts this weak
pricing environment will remain over the next three years with
potash being the last to see a recovery, in turn placing pressure
on earnings of EuroChem and its forthcoming projects. Rouble
depreciation has, however, helped maintain margins as revenues are
dollar-denominated while costs are mainly rouble-linked.

Project Financing Facilities Consolidated

EuroChem has successfully procured project financing for its
Usolskiy Potash project and its Baltic ammonia project. Even
though the financing is specific to the projects and has non-
recourse features that separate it from EuroChem's other
outstanding debt, Fitch continues to consolidate the projects and
the financing within EuroChem's overall leverage metrics. This is
due to the strategic importance of the projects to the company's
future operational profile and the inclusion of a cross default
clause within the group's financing agreements. If the projects
were de-consolidated, EuroChem's projected leverage would be
lower, at 3.4x in 2016, and falling to around 2x by 2018-19.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Fertilizer prices to fall 25%-35% in 2016, with nitrogen
      and phosphate fertilizers recovering in single-digit levels
      from 2017 and potash remaining flat over the next two
      years;

   -- Post-2016 sales volumes up, starting from 2018-2019 as
      Baltic ammonia and potash capacities commence and ramp up;

   -- USD/RUB to rise towards 57 in 2019 from 69 in 2016;

   -- Capex/sales to peak at around 30% in 2016-2017 before
      normalizing towards nearly 20%;

   -- No dividends over the next three years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

   -- Successful completion of one of the ongoing potash projects
      resulting in an enhanced operational profile, coupled with
      FFO adjusted net leverage falling below 3x.

"In case the projects are delayed and the company's business
profile does not improve, we expect EuroChem to maintain its FFO
adjusted net leverage at below 2.5x through the cycle to be in
line with the 'BB' rating" Fitch said;

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

   -- Continued aggressive capex or shareholder distributions
      translating into FFO adjusted net leverage not trending
      towards 3x (assuming enhanced business profile as evidenced
      by the start-up of at least one potash project), or towards
      2.5x (assuming project delays and lack of further business
      diversification) by 2019

   -- Protracted pricing pressure or double-digit cost inflation
      in 2016 leading to an EBITDAR margin being sustained below
      20% (2016E: 28%)

LIQUIDITY

Liquidity Manageable

At end-1H16, EuroChem's cash and short-term deposits (USD326m),
and committed credit lines (around USD320m) were not enough to
cover short-term debt, including derivatives (USD853m). Fitch
said, "In addition, we expect EuroChem to generate negative free
cash flow in 2016-17, which are, however, fully covered by
EuroChem's further utilization of committed project finance
facilities."

"Despite tightened liquidity we see the refinancing risk as
manageable as the company has a number of options to finance the
liquidity gap, such as raising a subordinated shareholder loan (up
to USD1bn is available according to the framework facility
agreement signed with AIM Capital SE in September 2016), accessing
Russian banks that continue to be supportive of large corporate
borrowers, or issuing bonds." Fitch said.

Limited Subordination Risk

"We expect EuroChem's ratio of prior-ranking debt (including bank
debt guaranteed by operating subsidiaries, secured debt and,
potentially, factored receivables)-to-EBITDA to fall to below 2.2x
by end-2016 and well below 2x by end-2017 from the current peak of
2.3x. This will be driven by project financing debt substituting
maturing prior-ranking debt and alongside EBITDA growth." Fitch
said.

"We normally consider notching down the senior unsecured rating
relative to the IDR when the ratio of prior-ranking debt to EBITDA
exceeds 2x-2.5x. We do not notch down EuroChem's senior unsecured
rating at present, based on our projection of a falling share of
prior-ranking debt in its capital structure. However, we may
consider subordination in future if the capital structure does not
change in line with our expectations." Fitch said.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

JSC MCC EuroChem:

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs: affirmed at
      'BB'; Outlook Negative

   -- National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'AA-(rus)'; Outlook
      Negative

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Local currency senior unsecured rating (domestic bonds):
      affirmed at 'BB'

   -- National long-term unsecured rating (domestic bonds):
      affirmed at 'AA-(rus)'

EuroChem Group AG:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
      Negative

EuroChem Global Investments Limited:

   -- Foreign currency senior unsecured rating on loan
      participation notes: affirmed at 'BB'



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


MYKOLAIV: Creditors, Liquidator Want to Unblock Shipyard Sale
-------------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the committee of creditors and
liquidator of PJSC Mykolaiv Shipyard Okean are convinced in the
legal invalidity of the court ruling to arrest property of the
enterprise under liquidation.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, they are waiting for the quick
unblocking of the shipyard by the appeal court.  The shipyard is
being prepared for sale, Interfax-Ukraine discloses.

Okean Shipyard liquidator Iryna Serbin said at a press conference
at Interfax-Ukraine on Sept. 20 that she learned about the
decision of Kyiv's Pechersky District Court to arrest the
shipyard's property and transfer it for secure storage by chance
and she was shocked, Interfax-Ukraine relays.

"No law and the criminal and procedural code do not foresee secure
storage. The property under bankruptcy procedure has a special
legal status.  It is not permitted to arrest it or impose
encumbrance. Any actions with property are possible only under the
decision of the court that hears the bankruptcy case.  In our case
this is the business court of Mykolaiv region,"
Interfax-Ukraine quotes Ms. Serbin as saying.

Ms. Serbin, as cited by Interfax-Ukraine, said that by its
decision Pechersky District Court placed all the parties into a
collision: according to Ukrainian law, the liquidator is
responsible for the property of the bankrupt company.  She said it
is shocking that the property was transferred to secure storage to
a person who forced bankruptcy of the shipyard, Interfax-Ukraine
notes.

"I believe that this decision is invalid and not meeting the law
on restoring solvency of debtors or declaring them bankrupt,"
Interfax-Ukraine quotes the liquidator as saying.

Ms. Serbin said that the decision of Kyiv's Pechersky District
Court has been challenged in Kyiv's appeal court, Interfax-Ukraine
relates.  She is waiting for the quick annulment of the decision
by the appeal court to sell the property of Okean Shipyard at an
open auction, according to Interfax-Ukraine.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BERNARD MATTHEWS: Suppliers to Suffer From Any Pre-Pack Deal
------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Shields at Eastern Daily Press reports that smaller suppliers
are likely to bear the brunt if the sale of Bernard Matthews can
only be completed through a pre-pack administration deal, an
insolvency expert has warned.

But staff relying on the company's pension fund should be well
protected if the government-backed pensions lifeboat has to take
on responsibility for it to smooth the sale of the troubled turkey
producer, the report says.

According to the report, speculation has linked 2 Sisters Food
Group with a bid for Bernard Matthews, which has been up for sale
since June, but a stumbling block is understood to be the GBP16
million deficit in the company's pension scheme, which could be
transferred to the Pension Protection Fund.

Eastern Daily Press relates that Andrew McTear, a partner at
McTear, Williams and Wood in Norwich, said negotiations were
likely to have been going on behind the scenes for months to find
a way forward for the company -- possibly a pre-pack
administration in which the company's assets, but not its
liabilities, are transferred to the new owner.

"Those who are in the pension scheme are quite well protected. The
people who are going to lose the most if the company goes into
administration are the unsecured creditors, which will include
trade suppliers," the report quotes Mr. McTear as saying.  "One
thing that can happen when a big company goes into administration
is that smaller companies can get big, bad debts, and there can be
a domino effect."

He said any buyer would be keener on Bernard Matthews if it could
shift the company's pension liability -- but said the PPF was a
"sophisticated creditor -- they know what they want and how to get
it".

"What will be going on is a deal will be being done between the
triangle of the PPF, the pension scheme trustees and the
purchaser. It's likely that the PPF will get some shares in the
purchaser, or the vehicle they use to buy the business and its
assets," Mr. McTear, as cited by Eastern Daily Press, said.

Bernard Matthews employs more than 2,000 people in Norfolk and
Suffolk, and the potential changes to the pension scheme are
understood to affect around 750 people, the report notes.

The PPF said anyone currently drawing their pension will be
unaffected, but future pensioners could receive only 90% of the
payments they are due, up to a maximum of around GBP33,680, adds
Eastern Daily Press.

Bernard Matthews is Europe's biggest turkey producer.


GHA COACHES: Directors Had Prior Management Failures, Probe Shows
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Shropshire Star reports that the brothers behind the firm, Gareth
and Arwyn Lloyd-Davies, were found to have had a "catalogue of
management failures" before the firm collapsed in July.

The coach company, which had routes across Shropshire and in Mid
and North Wales, went into administration with the loss of 320
jobs, Shropshire Star recounts.  A total of 11 routes were left
without service, Shropshire Star discloses.

The inquiry, held on Sept. 20, heard the state of the fleet was so
bad that a wheel fell off a bus carrying schoolchildren that
hadn't been serviced or maintained for 14 weeks, Shropshire Star
relates.

According to Shropshire Star, the Lloyd-Davies brothers told the
inquiry they were in no position to challenge allegations because
company paperwork had been handed over to the administrators.

Nick Jones, traffic commissioner for Wales and the West Midlands,
opened the inquiry into the public service vehicle operator
licenses held by the company, Shropshire Star relays.  He told the
inquiry there were a number of issues that led to the appearance
of there being "no control", Shropshire Star notes.

Mr. Jones, Shropshire Star says, will look at the running of the
company, and decide whether any further action needs to be taken
following its collapse.

The company held two licenses authorizing the use of 146 vehicles
in Wales and 80 in the north west of England, Shropshire Star
states.

More than 300 employees were told the firm was closing by text
message, according to Shropshire Star.

GHA Coaches is a Wrexham bus company.


HMV: Workers Left High and Dry In "Conspiracy Of Lies"
------------------------------------------------------
Limerick Post reports that former staff of HMV in the Crescent
Shopping Centre have been left without redundancy payments as the
company entered liquidation just hours before their severance
packages were due.

Four HMV stores were closed at the end of August, three in Dublin
and one in Limerick, according to Limerick Post.

Last week, the company reneged on their redundancy commitments to
workers as it entered into liquidation, the report notes.

Former HMV Limerick employee Robyn Long said the workers were
promised they would receive their full redundancy on September 9,
the report calls.

However, Larry Howard, the managing director of Hilco, the HMV
owners, put the company into liquidation on the night of September
8, the report relays.

"This was a premeditated act, a calculated and despicable move to
deny us our dues. Now, we will receive nothing from the company.
The staff of HMV have been let down once again," the report quoted
Mr. Long as saying.

Limerick Fianna Fail TD Niall Collins described the company's move
to use the protection of liquidation to evade its redundancy
commitments as "unfair and unjust", the report notes.

"What happened is nothing short of scandalous. The State will now
have to step in and provide basic statutory redundancy which, in
some cases, may be considerably less than what they would have
received if the company had paid them their redundancy," said
Deputy Collins, who is the party spokesman on jobs, the report
discloses.

"The company made a commitment to their former staff, and simply
decided to renege on it. This is setting a very bad precedent,
which cannot be allowed to take hold. It's clearly unfair and
places a larger burden on the State," the report quoted Deputy
Collins as saying.

The report notes that Social Protection Minister Leo Varadkar has
promised that his department will deal promptly with redundancy
and insolvency applications from former employees of HMV when they
are received from the liquidator, the report notes.

"Employees who lose their jobs because of the liquidation of their
company are entitled to statutory redundancy payments and to wage
related payments due at the time of the liquidation," the report
quoted Mr. Varadkar as saying.

The report relays that Anti Austerity Alliance councillor Cian
Prendiville condemned the owners of HMV, describing their actions
as "pure gangster capitalism".

"It seems Larry Howard and Hilco connived and conspired to lie to
the workers to get them out the door, and then stabbed them in the
back, the report relays.  The lesson for other workers is that
they must be organized, and take action, like the HMV workers did
when they occupied the store in a previous shutdown. We must
demand changes in the law to prevent bosses treating their workers
like this," he declared, the report adds.


INDUSTRY RE: Sole Owner Gets 15 Years Disqualification
------------------------------------------------------
Ian James Hamilton, aged 37, the director of Industry RE Ltd
(IRE), has been disqualified from being a company director for 15
years following a hearing at the High Court, according to the
Insolvency Service.

Under Mr Hamilton's sole control IRE operated a number of
'alternative investment' scams between 2009 and 2013 that have
caused losses of at least GBP13.3 million to members of the
public. The main scams were a money circulation scheme and selling
interests in land in Dominica that the company never owned.

This disqualification follows investigation by the Official
Receiver at Public Interest Unit, a specialist team of the
Insolvency Service. The Official Receiver's involvement commenced
with the winding up of the company by HM Revenue & Customs.

The investigation found that Mr. Hamilton caused IRE to operate
with a want of commercial probity, systematically taking money
from consumers on the basis of misleading statements made to
consumers.

IRE traded in a number of business areas, all of which involved a
subcontracted telesales operation to "cold call" members of the
public, selling "alternative investments" in a variety of
projects. There were two principal schemes sold to members of the
public by the company, both of which were dishonest.

In the first scheme, IRE received money from consumers by
guaranteeing a return on their investments, which was actually a
money circulation scheme. Most investors believed they were
purchasing carbon credits, which IRE said that it would repurchase
within 12 months for 30% more than investors had paid, and sell
the credits onwards to a connected company in Dubai.

IRE made payments totalling more than GBP8.6 million to customers
that included what were claimed to be investment returns. However,
the investigation found that IRE had not made any of the claimed
investments and did not receive any profits that it could use to
pay investment returns to investors. Instead, IRE had made
payments using deposits from other, newer, investors. This is the
key characteristic of a money circulation scheme. Investors in the
scheme have lost in excess of GBP5.7 million.

Some investors in 2009 had paid IRE for "solar bonds" that were to
pay a return of 10% per annum for 5 years, and then investors
would receive their capital back. IRE did not invest in any such
solar scheme and did not receive any profits from which it could
make payments to its investors.

Instead, payments claimed to be "interest" were made from the
deposits of newer investors. This was a smaller scheme than the
purported carbon credit scheme.

The other principal scheme operated by IRE was the sale of
interests in an "Eco Resort" that it claimed would be built in
Dominica. Consumers were persuaded to pay GBP25,000 for an
interest in the supposed resort, and were promised a return of 80%
on their investment within 2 years. However, IRE never told
investors that it had not acquired the land on which the resort
was to be built. On the current information, IRE received sums
totaling GBP7.6 million from investors to buy interests in the
"eco resort", none of whom have received any return.

A number of 'customer updates' have been circulated by the company
between December 2012 and August 3, 2013. In these documents, Mr.
Hamilton stated that the company had relocated to Dubai, and there
then followed a serious of purported explanations of why the
company was delayed in being able to make payments due to
customers.

In December 2012, sums totaling more than GBP1.1 million were
transferred from the company's bank account in a single day. In
his very limited contact with the Official Receiver, Mr. Hamilton
has suggested that IRE's monies were being held by a connected
company in Dubai, but he has failed to provide any information or
company records to support his version of events, or to cooperate
in any way with the Official Receiver or the liquidator.

Tony Hanon, Official Receiver at Public Interest Unit, said: "The
company persuaded members of the public to part with substantial
sums by falsely promising investors extremely high rates of
return. In reality, the scheme operated only for the benefit of
those running the company, principally the director, Ian Hamilton.

"As is so often the case, if an investment scheme appears too good
to be true, it probably is."

Ian James Hamilton's last known address was in Newbury, Berkshire
in 2013, but it appears that he subsequently lived in Dubai and
possibly in Spain. His date of birth is July 19, 1978.

Industry RE Ltd was incorporated on July 28, 2009 (registered
number 06974538). IRE's registered office was at Tower 42, 25 Old
Broad Street, in London EC2N 1HN. Ian James Hamilton was the only
director, shareholder and company secretary throughout the
company's life.


INMARSAT FINANCE: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Sr. Unsec. Bond
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba2 rating to Inmarsat
Finance plc's ("Inmarsat Finance") new USD400 million senior
unsecured bond due 2024 and guaranteed by Inmarsat Group Limited.
The Ba2 rating on Inmarsat Finance's new bond is at the same level
as Inmarsat Finance's existing USD1 billion senior unsecured
4.875% bonds due 2022.

All other ratings remain unchanged, including the Ba1 Corporate
Family Rating ("CFR") and the Ba1-PD Probability of Default Rating
(PDR) assigned at Inmarsat plc as well as the existing instrument
rating assigned at Inmarsat Finance. The outlook on all the
ratings remains negative.

The proceeds of this new bond will be used to repay the amount
outstanding (USD 106.9 million) under the company's term facility
from the European Investment Bank ("EIB") and the remainder is to
be used for general corporate purposes.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba2 rating on the new notes reflects the fact that they are
being issued by the same corporate entity as the existing senior
notes due 2022 (Inmarsat Finance plc), sharing the same guarantor
(Inmarsat Group Limited) and a substantially similar covenant
package. The syndicated Revolving Credit Facility, EIB and Ex-Im
Bank senior credit facilities (unrated) at Inmarsat Investments
Limited all rank pari passu with first ranking claims reflecting
the benefits of upstream guarantees from Inmarsat's operating
companies. The new notes as well as the USD1 billion of senior
unsecured notes due 2022 at Inmarsat Finance plc are the next
highest ranking debt instruments and are therefore rated Ba2, one-
notch below the CFR. Inmarsat's capital structure is complemented
by a USD650 million convertible bond (unrated) recently issued by
Inmarsat plc in order to repurchase USD $390 million of an
existing convertible from the same issuer and to support the
company's investment plans.

Inmarsat's ratings reflect: (1) increased capex over 2016-2018
will place further pressure on already negative free cash flow
(post-dividends); (2) an expectation that rising dividends,
coupled with increased capex during a time of slowing growth will
result in rising leverage over the next twelve months toward the
limit indicated for the rating of 3.5x (gross leverage as adjusted
by Moody's); (3) an expected continuation of the decline in global
shipping volumes and in oil & gas services over the next 18 months
to dampen growth prospects in the Maritime segment; (4) notable
price pressure in data / enterprise markets observed across the
sector which is likely to adversely impact Enterprise segment
growth over at least 2016-2018; and (5) an expectation of further
competitive encroachment in the Mobility market, particularly for
aviation connectivity, from established competitors which could
curb potential for Inmarsat's Aviation revenue growth.

Inmarsat's ratings also continue to reflect numerous positive
aspects, including: (1) a leading global market position in mobile
satellite communication services ("MSS") with a large installed
customer base; (2) the successful launch and entry into commercial
service of GX program's I-5 F2 and F3 satellites, with the
program's final satellite (I-5 F4) due to launch by the end of
2016, which should contribute to MSS growth; (3) opportunities for
solid revenue growth over the next three years in the Aviation
connectivity segment, although in its early stages of growth; and
(4) improved visibility and likelihood of timely payment over
2016-2018 for the revenue stream from Ligado.

RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook indicates our expectations that Inmarsat will
manage its capital expenditure and shareholder return policies
over the next three years such that its gross leverage (gross
debt/EBITDA, as adjusted by Moody's) will approach the 3.5x
leverage ceiling appropriate for the rating level. The outlook
also reflects our view that the company will continue to be free
cash flow negative (after dividends) over the course of 2016 to
2018 and particularly in 2016-2017.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN/UP

Downward rating pressure would materialize if Inmarsat's debt load
increases such that gross leverage (gross debt/EBITDA, as adjusted
by Moody's) materially and persistently exceeds 3.5x and/or
adjusted free cash flow/gross debt fails to improve toward a level
of at least negative 5% over the 2016-2018 period. There could
also be pressure on the rating if liquidity were to significantly
deteriorate.

Positive pressure on the rating could develop should Inmarsat's
adjusted gross debt/EBITDA decrease sustainably below 3.0x and its
adjusted free cash flow/gross debt (post-dividends) be sustainably
and substantively above 0%.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Communications Infrastructure Rating Methodology published in June
2011.

Headquartered in London, U.K., Inmarsat plc (Inmarsat) is a market
leader in global mobile satellite communication services ("MSS").
The company owns and operates a satellite communications network
comprising a fleet of nine satellites using the L-band spectrum.
Inmarsat provides a range of voice and data services to customers,
including telephony, fax, video, e-mail and Internet access.
Additionally, Inmarsat has launched a fleet of three GX Ka-band
satellites (the Inmarsat-5 constellation), with a fourth to be
launched in 2016, providing high speeds of up to 50Mbps for
broadband services to customers on land, at sea and in the air.
For its fiscal year ended 31 December 2015, Inmarsat generated
$1,274 million and $726 million of revenues and EBITDA,
respectively.


MOCA 2016-1: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EX)sf' Rating to Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Marketplace Originated Consumer Assets
2016-1 Plc's (MOCA 2016-1) notes expected ratings, as follows:

   -- Class A: 'AA-(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class B: 'A(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class C: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class D: 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class Z: 'NR(EXP)sf'

MOCA 2016-1 is a true-sale securitization of a static pool of UK
unsecured consumer loans, originated through the marketplace
lending platform of Zopa Limited and sold by P2P Global
Investments (P2PGI). This transaction is the first marketplace
lending securitization to be rated by Fitch in EMEA.

The assignment of the final ratings is contingent on the receipt
of final documents conforming to information already received.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'AAsf' Rating Cap

MOCA 2016-1 is the first securitization of unsecured consumer
loans originated through a marketplace lending platform in EMEA.
Zopa has been in business since 2004, but originations have only
grown to a significant volume in recent years, with dramatic
growth since 2011. The 'AAsf' rating cap reflects the short
performance history for most of the origination volume and the
untested operational platform.

The 'AAsf' cap is the highest assigned to a marketplace lending
transaction globally by Fitch to date. Fitch believes the high
transparency of Zopa's data, the longer history than peers
globally and the robust origination and underwriting standards
support the high rating.

Strong Historical Performance

Based on the data provided, Fitch has assigned a default base case
of 4.7% and a recovery base case of 20%, with a base case loss of
3.8%. These base cases compare favorably with the performance of
other unsecured consumer loans. However, this performance was
mainly in a favorable economic environment and against a backdrop
of strong growth in origination volumes combined with development
in the underwriting criteria. Fitch therefore applied a very high
default multiple of 5.5x at 'AA-sf'.

Steady Portfolio Migration

Zopa's appetite for risk has increased in recent years. It has
moved into lower-credit quality borrowers while increasing loan
terms across the board. The risk is actively managed with Zopa's
proprietary scorecard. However, Fitch has factored this migration
into the analysis of Zopa's past performance.

Strong Back-Up Servicer

Target Financial Services acts as back-up servicer and has a
strong track record as a servicer of consumer products. Target
receives periodic pool information and has specified an invocation
plan with a readiness level of 60 days. Fitch therefore views
exposure to Zopa as servicer to be adequately addressed.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Expected impact upon the note rating of increased defaults
(class A):

   -- Current rating: 'AA-sf'

   -- Increase base case defaults by 10%: 'A+sf'

   -- Increase base case defaults by 25%: 'Asf'

   -- Increase base case defaults by 50%: 'BBB+sf'

Expected impact upon the note rating of decreased recoveries
(class A):

   -- Current rating: 'AA-sf'

   -- Reduce base case recovery by 10%: 'AA-sf'

   -- Reduce base case recovery by 25%: 'AA-sf'

   -- Reduce base case recovery by 50%: 'AA-sf'

Expected impact upon the note rating of increased defaults and
decreased recoveries (class A):

   -- Current rating: 'AA-sf'

   -- Increase default base case by 10%; reduce recovery base
      case by 10%: 'A+sf'

   -- Increase default base case by 25%; reduce recovery base
      case by 25%: 'Asf'

   -- Increase default base case by 50%; reduce recovery base
      case by 50%: 'BBB+sf'

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch reviewed the results of a third party assessment conducted
on the asset portfolio information, and concluded that there were
no findings that affected the rating analysis.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis.

   -- Loan-by-loan data for the preliminary pool provided by Zopa
      as at 31 August 2016

   -- Historical performance provided by Zopa for January 2005 to
      August 2016.


NATIONAL VIDEOGAME: Didn't Make a Profit, Administrators Say
------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Norton at Nottingham Post reports that bosses at the National
Videogame Arcade were spending a "significant" five figure sum on
staff every month without turning a profit, a new interview has
revealed.

According to the report, the GBP2.5 million Nottingham attraction
was put into administration last month after running costs and
refurbishments drove it into the ground.

Nottingham Post relates that the insolvency firm that helped save
from it financial ruin has now revealed the company had to delay
staff wages as they negotiated with investors.

About 40 members of staff were at risk of unemployment at the
landmark venue in Carlton Street, the report says.

According to Nottingham Post, Andy Wood, an Insolvency
Practitioner at business turnaround and insolvency specialist
Wilson Field, confirmed the business was spending "a significant
five figure sum" on staff every month in addition to an
undisclosed overall operational cost.

"I don't even think it's even made a profit in the time it's been
open," the report quotes Mr. Wood as saying.  "Most businesses
expect there to be a set-up cost and most businesses expect a loss
while in the market place."

Wilson Field was approached by the directors to find a way to save
the NVA. During this time, staff were asked to wait three to four
days for wages while additional investment was sought to keep the
museum open, the report relates.

Nottingham Post says the "consortium" of partners are said to
include a number of senior figures in the video game industry.

Its creditors will be sent a report over the coming weeks
outlining the position the business is now in, adds Nottingham
Post.

The NVA opened in March last year, set up in partnership with
organisations including Nottingham City Council and Nottingham
Trent University.


ROADCHEF FINANCE: Fitch Withdraws 'B' Rating on Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn its ratings on RoadChef Finance
Limited's notes as follows:

   -- GBP133 million 7.418% class A2 secured notes due 2023:
      'BB-'; Outlook Stable

   -- GBP42 million 8.015% class B secured notes due 2026: 'B';
      Outlook Stable

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch has withdrawn RoadChef Finance Limited's ratings as the
notes were repaid early.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Not applicable

SUMMARY OF CREDIT

RoadChef Finance Limited was a securitization of cash flows from
UK motorways service areas (MSA) operated by RoadChef, the
third-largest UK MSA operator with around a 20% market share.


SANTO MONTANA: High Court Winds Up Gold Mines Investment Scheme
---------------------------------------------------------------
Five companies, who collectively offered and provided an
investment vehicle for partnerships in gold mining projects in
South America, were wound up by the High Court on August 17, 2016
following an investigation by the Insolvency Service.

The group of connected companies -- Santo Montana LLP, Lorem Ipsum
Trade Services Limited (Lorem Ipsum), Cedar Trade Services Limited
(Cedar), McKinley & Grant Ltd (McKinley) and Evolution Trade
Services Limited (Evolution) -- have been operating an
unauthorised, fraudulent goldmine investment scheme, with the
companies between them banking over GBP330,000 in respect of the
gold mining scheme.

The companies are connected by one individual who has exercised
control over those companies, Mr. Harvey Bennett.

The petitions to wind up the companies were presented in the High
Court on July 4, 2016, following confidential enquiries by Company
Investigations, part of the Insolvency Service.

Lorem Ipsum, Cedar, McKinley and Evolution all acted as sales
agents for the gold mining scheme, in which partnership rights
were sold in the investment vehicle Santo Montana LLP, which was
said to hold rights to gold mining concessions in Peru.

Those agents, none of whom were authorized by the Financial
Conduct Authority, cold called unsuspecting members of the public,
whose names had been acquired from database leads, offering them
the opportunity to invest in three existing gold mining
concessions in South America via Santo Montana LLP.

Prospective investors were enticed by offers of an initial
dividend of 20% to 50% of their investments, i.e. GBP3,000 per
share, and further dividends every six months for a period of 6
years. No such returns were ever paid. Prospective investors were
told that they could expect, 'on a conservative basis', to receive
returns of between 206% and 457% over their 6 year investment
term.

The investigation found that prospective investors were informed
that Santo Montana LLP had a joint venture stake in unspecified
mines in South America, with at least one of those located in
Peru, the joint venture partner being a company called Montana de
Oro S.A. Not only could that company not be traced but Santo
Montana LLP failed entirely to cooperate with the investigation,
its registered office location having been vacated without notice
and the last of its designated members having resigned by January
2016, leaving the investment vehicle essentially rudderless since
that time.

The investigation found no evidence that any of the funds paid by
the investors had been used to acquire or to finance Santo Montana
LLP's investment in any gold mines or that Santo Montana LLP had
any genuine interest in any gold mines, whether in Peru or
otherwise. In the absence of cooperation from any of the
companies, the limited accounting records obtained appear to show
the main beneficiaries of the fraudulent scheme being sales agents
and Mr Bennett.

The selling companies appear to have been abandoned or to have
ceased trading by late 2015 save for Evolution, who had agreed to
take over all administrative services for Santo Montana LLP as of
January 2016. However, the only contact information made available
to Santo Montana LLP investors, including those who had made
carbon credit purchases, is a website address,
www.evolutiontradeservices.net, a website not currently
accessible.

With Santo Montana LLP having abandoned its trading premises Santo
Montana LLP investors have no means to contact any of the scheme
companies.

The petitions to wind up the companies were presented in the High
Court on July 4, 2016, under the provisions of section 124A of the
Insolvency Act 1986 following confidential enquiries by Company
Investigations under section 447 of the Companies Act 1985, as
amended.


* UK: 672 Construction Firms Enter Insolvency in Q1 2016
--------------------------------------------------------
Tom Belger at Development Finance Today reports that the
Insolvency Service has revealed that during the first quarter of
2016 the construction industry saw the highest number of new
company insolvencies compared to any other industry.

Development Finance Today relates that in total, 672 construction
firms in England and Wales were found to have become insolvent
during Q1 2016, significantly higher than the second-place
industry, wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and
motorcycles, which suffered 537 new company insolvencies.

However, the Insolvency Service data showed that in 2015 new
company insolvencies within the construction industry were at its
lowest level for the period under review with 2,469 insolvencies,
compared with 2,885 in 2014, 3,233 in 2013 and 3,688 in 2012, the
report says.

Of the 672 construction insolvencies during Q1, 216 were for the
construction of new buildings, 42 centered around civil
engineering, while 414 were for specialised construction
activities, according to Development Finance Today.

Of the 414 specialised construction insolvencies, electrical,
plumbing and other construction installation activities was the
highest with 148, while building completion and finishing totaled
138.

The figures also revealed that of the 672 insolvencies, 156 were
compulsory liquidations, the report adds.

Again, specialised construction activities saw the most with 86,
while firms which specialised in the construction of buildings
reported 58 compulsory liquidations.

Development Finance Today relates that the majority of
insolvencies within the construction industry were voluntary
liquidations with 444 firms reporting this in Q1.  This was the
highest number for a single quarter since Q1 2014 (488).

In July, Begbies Traynor revealed that almost 50,000 property and
construction firms had been put at risk as a result of the
decision to leave the European Union, Development Finance Today
adds.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *