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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Friday, September 30, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 194


                            Headlines


F R A N C E

CASINO GUICHARD: Egan-Jones Cuts Sr. Unsecured Ratings to BB+
VINCI SA: Egan-Jones Hikes Senior Unsecured Ratings to BB+


G E R M A N Y

HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG: Egan-Jones Hikes Sr. Unsec. Ratings to BB+
SC GERMANY 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating to Class D-Dfrd Notes


G R E E C E

DRYSHIPS INC: Egan-Jones Cuts Sr. Unsecured Ratings to 'D'
GREECE: Lawmakers Approve Bill to Unlock EUR2.8-Bil. Aid Tranche
NAVIOS MARITIME: Egan-Jones Cuts Sr. Unsecured Ratings to CCC-


I R E L A N D

ACA EURO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
CLARINDA PARK: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class E Notes
CLARINDA PARK: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating to Class E Notes
PERRIGO CO: Egan-Jones Cuts Sr. Unsecured Ratings to BB+
* IRELAND: Corporate Insolvencies in Services Sector Up 3%


I T A L Y

BANCA POPOLARE DELL'EMILIA: Moody's Assigns Ba2 LT Issuer Rating
BANCA POPOLARE DI MILANO: Egan-Jones Ups Sr. Unsec. Rating to BB+


N E T H E R L A N D S

ODEON ABS 2007-1: S&P Affirms 'CC' Rating on 3 Note Classes
REGENT'S PARK: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes


P O R T U G A L

CAIXA ECONOMICA MONTEPIO: DBRS Lowers Deposit Rating to 'BB'


R U S S I A

CREDIT BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
MK-HOLDING LLC: S&P Assigns 'B-/B' CCRs, Outlook Stable


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: High Court Probes Chairman Over Severance Payment
* SPAIN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 4 TDA Transactions


T U R K E Y

AKBANK REMITTANCES: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 4 Notes to Ba1
VESTEL ELEKTRONIK: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR, Outlook Stable
* Moody's Concludes Review on Eight Turkish Corporates


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DUKINFIELD II PLC: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
EXTERION MEDIA: Moody's Assigns B1 Long-term Rating
FINSBURY SQUARE 2016-2: Moody's Rates Class X Notes (P)Caa3
MARSHALL GROUP: In Administration, 23 Jobs at Risk
NIELSEN FINANCE: Moody's Retains Ba3 CFR on Term Loan Upsize

PARK REGIS: In Administration, Investors Face Loss
RED HOT: Restaurant Administration Blamed On Sales


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The First Junk Bond


                            *********


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F R A N C E
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CASINO GUICHARD: Egan-Jones Cuts Sr. Unsecured Ratings to BB+
-------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on Sept. 2, 2016, downgraded the
senior unsecured ratings on debt issued by Casino Guichard
Perrachon SA to BB+ from BBB-.

Casino Guichard-Perrachon Et Cie Sa operates as a holding company
of the Casino Group. Its activities consist of defining and
implementing the Group's development strategy and coordinating
the businesses of the various subsidiaries, acting jointly with
their respective management teams. In addition, it manages the
Group cash pool in France and is responsible for overseeing the
proper application of Group legal and accounting rules and
procedures by the subsidiaries. The Company is a limited
liability company and is a major food retailer with a multi-
format of France.


VINCI SA: Egan-Jones Hikes Senior Unsecured Ratings to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on Sept. 6, 2016, upgraded the senior
unsecured ratings on debt issued by Vinci SA to BB+ from BB.

Vinci, corporately styled VINCI, is a French concessions and
construction company founded in 1899 as Societe Generale
d'Enterprises. It employs over 179,000 people and is the largest
construction company in the world by revenue.



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G E R M A N Y
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HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG: Egan-Jones Hikes Sr. Unsec. Ratings to BB+
---------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company on Sept. 14, 2016, raised the senior
unsecured ratings on debt issued by HeidelbergCement AG to BB+
from BB.

HeidelbergCement is a German multinational building materials
company headquartered in Heidelberg, Germany.  It is a large
cement producer and a leader in aggregates with strong market
positions in mature Western European countries, such as Germany,
Scandinavia, Benelux, and the UK, as well as in the emerging
markets of Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Turkey.


SC GERMANY 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating to Class D-Dfrd Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to SC Germany
Consumer 2016-1 UG (haftungsbeschraenkt)'s class A, B-Dfrd, C-
Dfrd, and D-Dfrd notes.  At closing, SC Germany Consumer 2016-1
also issued unrated class E-Dfrd notes.

The securitized portfolio comprises receivables from consumer
loans, which Santander Consumer Bank AG granted to its German
retail client base.  This is Santander Consumer Bank's eight true
sale consumer loan transaction.

During the transaction's revolving period, the issuer can
purchase additional loan receivables.  The revolving period is
scheduled to last for 12 months, followed by sequential note
amortization.  A combination of subordination and excess spread
provides credit enhancement for the rated classes of notes.  A
principal deficiency trigger is in place.  Once hit, it
subordinates the class B-Dfrd, C-Dfrd, D-Dfrd, and E-Dfrd notes'
interest payments to the class A notes' principal payments and
accelerates the repayment of the class A notes.

Santander Consumer Bank is an indirect subsidiary of Spanish
Banco Santander S.A.  It is the largest non-captive provider of
auto loans in Germany and is also a well-known originator in the
European securitization market.

S&P's ratings on the rated classes of notes reflect its
assessment of the underlying asset pool's credit and cash flow
characteristics, as well as S&P's analysis of the transaction's
exposure to counterparty and operational risks.  S&P's analysis
indicates that the available credit enhancement for the class A,
B-Dfrd, C-Dfrd, and D-Dfrd notes would be sufficient to absorb
credit and cash flow losses in 'AA', 'A', 'BBB', and 'BB' rating
scenarios, respectively.

There is no back-up servicer.  The combination of a borrower
notification process, a liquidity reserve, a commingling reserve,
and general availability of substitute servicers mitigates
servicer disruption risk.

                         RATING RATIONALE

Economic Outlook

In S&P's base-case scenario, it forecasts that Germany will
record GDP growth of 1.7% in 2016, 1.5% in 2017, and 1.4% in
2018, compared with 1.5% in 2015.  At the same time, S&P expects
unemployment rates to stabilize at historically low levels.  S&P
forecasts unemployment to be 4.1% in 2016 and 2017, compared with
4.6% in 2015.  In S&P's view, changes in GDP growth and the
unemployment rate are key determinants of portfolio performance.
S&P sets its credit assumptions to reflect its economic outlook.
S&P's near- to medium-term view is that the German economy will
remain resilient and record positive growth.

Credit Risk

S&P has analyzed credit risk under its European consumer finance
criteria using historical loss data from the originator's loan
book since January 2004 until January 2016.  S&P expects to see
6.5% of defaults in the securitized pool, which reflects its
economic outlook for Germany, as well as S&P's view on the
originator's good servicing procedures.  This is in line with its
predecessor, SC Germany Consumer 2015-1 UG (haftungsbeschraenkt).

Payment Structure

S&P's ratings reflect its assessment of the transaction's payment
structure, cash flow mechanics, and the results of S&P's cash
flow analysis to assess whether the notes would be repaid under
stress test scenarios.  Taking into account subordination and the
available excess spread in the transaction, S&P considers the
available credit enhancement for the rated notes to be
commensurate with the ratings that S&P has assigned.
Additionally, the class B-Dfrd to D-Dfrd notes are deferrable-
interest notes and S&P has treated them as such in its analysis.
Under the transaction documents, the issuer can defer interest
payments on these notes.  Consequently, any deferral of interest
on the class B-Dfrd to D-Dfrd notes would not constitute an event
of default.  While S&P's 'AA (sf)' rating on the class A notes
addresses the timely payment of interest and the ultimate payment
of principal, S&P's ratings on the class B-Dfrd to D-Dfrd notes
address the ultimate payment of principal and the ultimate
payment of interest.  Furthermore, S&P notes that there is no
compensation mechanism that would accrue interest on deferred
interest in this transaction.  S&P has nevertheless assumed
accrual of interest on deferred interest in its analysis.

Counterparty Risk

The transaction's documented replacement language is in line with
S&P's current counterparty criteria for all of the relevant
counterparties.  The transaction is exposed to The Bank of New
York Mellon, Frankfurt Branch as bank account provider, to
Santander Consumer Bank as commingling and setoff reserve
provider, to Abbey National Treasury Services PLC as swap
counterparty, and to Santander UK PLC as swap guarantor.  The
swap documentation allows for a maximum achievable rating of 'BB
(sf)' for the class D notes.

Operational risk

Santander Consumer Bank is an indirect subsidiary of Banco
Santander.  It is one of the largest German consumer banks, and
Germany's largest noncaptive car finance bank.  It is also a
well-known originator in the European securitization market.  S&P
believes that the company's origination, underwriting, servicing,
and risk management policies and procedures are in line with
market standards and adequate to support the ratings assigned.
S&P's operational risk criteria focuses on key transaction
parties (KTPs) and the potential effect of a disruption in the
KTP's services on the issuer's cash flows, as well as the ease
with which the KTP could be replaced if needed.  In this
transaction the servicer is the only KTP S&P has assessed under
this framework.  S&P's operational risk criteria do not constrain
its ratings in this transaction based on its view of the
servicer's capabilities.

Legal Risk

The transaction may be exposed to deposit setoff and commingling
risks, in S&P's opinion.  If it were to become ineligible as a
counterparty, Santander Consumer Bank would fund the setoff and
commingling reserves, which would mitigate these risks.  A
reserve partially mitigates commingling risk and S&P has sized
the unmitigated exposure as an additional credit loss.  S&P has
analyzed legal risk, including the special purpose entity's
bankruptcy remoteness, under S&P's European legal criteria.

Ratings Stability

In line with S&P's scenario analysis approach, it has run two
scenarios to test the stability of the assigned rating.  The
results show that under the scenario modeling moderate stress
conditions (scenario 1), the rating on the notes would not suffer
more than the maximum projected deterioration that S&P would
associate with each rating level in the one-year horizon, as
contemplated in S&P's credit stability criteria.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Assigned

SC Germany Consumer 2016-1 UG (haftungsbeschraenkt)
EUR750 Million Asset-Backed Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes

Class        Rating           Amount
                            (mil. EUR)

A            AA (sf)           635.8
B-Dfrd       A (sf)             43.2
C-Dfrd       BBB (sf)           28.2
D-Dfrd       BB (sf)            11.3
E-Dfrd       NR                 31.5

NR--Not rated.



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DRYSHIPS INC: Egan-Jones Cuts Sr. Unsecured Ratings to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on Sept. 12, 2016, downgraded the
senior unsecured ratings on debt issued by DryShips Inc. to D
from C.

DryShips Inc is a dry bulk shipping company based in Athens,
Greece. It is a Marshall Islands corporation, formed in 2004.
The Company transports commodities such as major bulks, which
include iron ore, coal, and grain, and minor bulks such as
bauxite, phosphate and steel products. DryShips also owns Ultra
Deep Water Rigs.


GREECE: Lawmakers Approve Bill to Unlock EUR2.8-Bil. Aid Tranche
----------------------------------------------------------------
Stelios Bouras at The Wall Street Journal reports that Greek
lawmakers approved on Sept. 27 a bill aimed at unlocking EUR2.8
billion (US$3.15 billion) in aid for the country that includes
deeply unpopular plans to transfer state-controlled water
companies to a privatization fund.

Greece, the Journal says, is hoping to meet conditions needed to
be paid the next tranche of aid from its third bailout worth up
to EUR86 billion this week, ahead of an Oct. 10 meeting of
eurozone finance ministers who can sign off on the payment.

The bill passed with the support of the two parties forming the
coalition government-left wing Syriza and small right-wing peer
Independent Greeks, the Journal discloses. In the country's
300-seat legislature, lawmakers voted 152-141 to approve the bill
with seven abstentions, the Journal notes.

According to the Journal, more than half of the aid tranche is
expected to be used by the Greek government to pay money owed to
the private sector reaching some EUR5.5 billion, or 3% of gross
domestic product.

The bill includes amendments on pension reforms and the transfer
of several public holdings into the privatization fund, including
Greece's stake in the country's two water companies, EYDAP and
EYATH, the Journal states.

To overcome opposition to the bill, Greek government officials
argue there is no plan to sell off the water companies and that
they will be moved to the fund as part of a broader overhaul
aimed at improving the management of state assets, the Journal
relays.


NAVIOS MARITIME: Egan-Jones Cuts Sr. Unsecured Ratings to CCC-
--------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on Sept. 16, 2016, downgraded the
senior unsecured ratings on debt issued by Navios Maritime
Holdings Inc. to CCC- from CCC.

Navios Maritime Holdings Inc. operates as a seaborne shipping and
logistics company. Based in Monte Carlo, Monaco, the company
focuses on the transportation and transshipment of dry bulk
commodities, including iron ore, coal, and grains.



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ACA EURO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on these notes
issued by ACA Euro CLO 2007-1 P.L.C.:

  EUR24 mil. Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2024, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 30, 2016,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  EUR32 mil. (current outstanding balance of EUR9 mil.) Class B
   Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on March 30, 2016, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR25.6 mil. Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 30, 2016,
   Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  EUR13.6 mil. Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2024, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on March 30, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

ACA Euro CLO 2007-1 P.L.C., issued in June 2007, is a
collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans.  The portfolio
is managed by Avoca Capital Holdings Limited.  The transaction's
reinvestment period finished in June 2014.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
substantial deleveraging following amortization of the underlying
portfolio since last rating action in March 2016 and the
improvement in the credit quality of the portfolio.

In June 2016 payment date the Class B notes repaid EUR16.3
million outstanding (51.0% of closing balance), as a result of
which over-collateralization (OC) ratios of all classes of rated
notes have increased significantly.  As per the trustee report
dated August 2016, Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E OC
ratios are reported at 917.7%, 239.3%, 141.4% and 114.7% compared
to February 2016 levels of 391.3%, 194.7%, 132.4% and 112.0%
respectively.

The credit quality has improved as reflected in the improvement
in the average credit rating of the portfolio (measured by the
weighted average rating factor, or WARF).  As of the trustee's
August 2016 report, the WARF was 2111, compared with 2152 in
February 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR77.3 million
and GBP3.9 million, defaulted par of EUR1.3 million, a weighted
average default probability of 12.6% over a 4.3 year weighted
average life (consistent with a WARF of 2009), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 42.5% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 10 and a weighted average spread of
3.54%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower weighted average recovery rate for the
portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weighted
average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs that
were unchanged for Class B, C and E and within one notch of the
base-case results for Class D.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
   portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
   conditions and have a significant impact on the notes'
   ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of
   high loan prepayment levels or collateral sales the collateral
   manager or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
   restructurings.  Fast amortization would usually benefit the
   ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the
   highest prepayment priority.

  Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
   have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
   collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
   defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
   the market price or the recovery rate to account for potential
   volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's
   expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'
   ratings.

  Foreign currency exposure: The deal has exposure to one non-EUR
   denominated asset representing approximately 6.5% of the
   performing par.  Volatility in foreign exchange rates will
   have a direct impact on interest and principal proceeds
   available to the transaction, which can affect the expected
   loss of rated tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


CLARINDA PARK: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned these
provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Clarinda Park CLO
Designated Activity Company:

  EUR239,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  EUR52,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  EUR21,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)
  EUR22,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)
  EUR25,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)
  EUR11,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2029.  The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure.  Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Blackstone / GSO
Debt Funds Management Europe Limited, has sufficient experience
and operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Clarinda Park CLO Designated Activity Company is a managed cash
flow CLO.  At least 96% of the portfolio must consist of secured
senior obligations and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist of
unsecured senior loans, second lien loans, mezzanine obligations,
high yield bonds and/or first lien last out loans.  The portfolio
is expected to be 70% ramped up as of the closing date and to be
comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled
in Western Europe.  This initial portfolio will be acquired by
way of participations which are required to be elevated as soon
as reasonably practicable.  The remainder of the portfolio will
be acquired during the three month ramp-up period in compliance
with the portfolio guidelines.

Blackstone / GSO Debt Funds Management Europe Limited will manage
the CLO.  It will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage
in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's four-year reinvestment period.  Thereafter,
purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from unscheduled
principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit impaired
obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the six classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR45,100,000 of subordinated notes.  Moody's
will not assign a rating to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, will divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
December 2015.  The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders.  Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.

Moody's used these base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR 400,000,000
Diversity Score: 38
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.15%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.25%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.0%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Stress Scenarios:
Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the rating assigned to the
rated notes.  This sensitivity analysis includes increased
default probability relative to the base case.  Below is a
summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3278 from 2850)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0
Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3705 from 2850)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3
Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3
Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty.  The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  Blackstone / GSO Debt Funds
Management Europe Limited's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the notes' performance.


CLARINDA PARK: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary credit ratings to
Clarinda Park CLO DAC's class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E senior
secured notes.  At closing, the issuer will also issue unrated
subordinated notes.

The transaction is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO), securitizing a portfolio of primarily senior secured loans
granted to speculative-grade corporates.  Blackstone/GSO Debt
Funds Management Europe Ltd. will manage the transaction.

The issuer expects to purchase more than 50% of the effective
date portfolio from Blackstone/GSO Corporate Funding Designated
Activity Company (BGCF).  The assets from BGCF that can't be
settled on the closing date will be subject to participations.
The transaction documents require that the issuer and BGCF use
commercially reasonable efforts to elevate the participations by
transferring to the issuer the legal and beneficial interests in
such assets as soon as reasonably practicable.

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes will pay
quarterly interest unless a frequency switch event occurs.
Following this, the notes will permanently switch to semiannual
interest payments.

The portfolio's reinvestment period will end four years after
closing, and the portfolio's maximum average maturity date will
be eight years after closing.

On the effective date, S&P understands that the portfolio will
represent a well-diversified pool of corporate credits, with a
fairly uniform exposure to all of the credits.  Therefore, S&P
has conducted its credit and cash flow analysis by applying its
criteria for corporate cash flow collateralized debt obligations.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it has used the portfolio target par
amount of EUR400.0 million, the covenanted weighted-average
spread of 4.15%, the weighted-average coupon of 5.25%, and the
covenanted weighted-average recovery rates at each rating level.

Citibank N.A. (London Branch) will be the bank account provider
and custodian.

The participants' downgrade remedies are in line with S&P's
counterparty criteria.

The issuer is in line with S&P's bankruptcy remoteness criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, S&P believes its preliminary
ratings are commensurate with the available credit enhancement
for each class of notes.

RATINGS LIST

Clarinda Park CLO Designated Activity Company
EUR415.1 mil secured floating- and fixed-rate notes

Prelim Amount
Class            Prelim Rating               (mil, EUR)
A-1              AAA (sf)                    239.0
A-2              AA (sf)                     52.0
B                A (sf)                      21.0
C                BBB (sf)                    22.0
D                BB (sf)                     25.0
E                B- (sf)                     11.0
Sub              NR                          45.1

NR--Not rated


PERRIGO CO: Egan-Jones Cuts Sr. Unsecured Ratings to BB+
--------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on Sept. 13, 2016, downgraded the
senior unsecured ratings on debt issued by Perrigo Co PLC to BB+
from BBB-.

Based in Dublin, Ireland, Perrigo Company PLC is a global
healthcare supplier that develops, manufactures, and distributes
OTC and generic prescription pharmaceuticals, infant formulas,
nutritional products, active pharmaceutical ingredients and
pharmaceutical and medical diagnostic products. The Company's
primary markets and locations of manufacturing and logistics
operations are the US, UK, Mexico, and Australia.


* IRELAND: Corporate Insolvencies in Services Sector Up 3%
----------------------------------------------------------
Charlie Taylor at The Irish Times reports that new figures show
corporate insolvencies in the services sector increased in the
year to the end of September,

The total number of insolvencies recorded during the first nine
months of the year was 765, up 3% on the same period a year
earlier, The Irish Times discloses.

In the third quarter, the number of insolvencies rose by 18% to
255 compared with the equivalent quarter in 2015, The Irish Times
relates.

According to The Irish Times, an analysis of industry sectors
show the services sector accounted for 29% of all insolvencies,
registering 220 for the year to the end of the third quarter.
Insolvencies in the construction sector were up 45% to 133, The
Irish Times states.

The hospitality and retail sectors recorded the third and fourth
largest number of insolvencies with 84 and 76 respectively, The
Irish Times notes.

According to Deloitte, which carried out the analysis, creditors'
voluntary liquidations accounted for the majority of insolvencies
seen so far this year, with 448 recorded in the first nine
months, The Irish Times states. This marks a 10% decline versus
the same period last year, according to The Irish Times.

Receiverships accounted for 274 of the total corporate
insolvencies, up by 79 appointments, The Irish Times discloses.
There were 32 court liquidator appointments in the nine month
period and just 11 examinerships, The Irish Times relays.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA POPOLARE DELL'EMILIA: Moody's Assigns Ba2 LT Issuer Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Baa3 long-term bank
deposit rating, a Ba2 long-term issuer rating, and a ba3
standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) to Banca Popolare
dell'Emilia Romagna s.c.a.r.l. (BPER).  The outlook is stable on
the deposit rating and negative on the issuer rating.

                       RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR BCA

The ba3 BCA reflects BPER's very high asset risk and low
profitability, which are partially mitigated by adequate capital
and a good level of retail funding.

Moody's views BPER's asset risk as a major weakness, with problem
loans equivalent to 24% of the bank's loan portfolio in June
2016, compared to the Italian average of 18%, and a reported
coverage with loan loss provisions of 45%, broadly in line with
the Italian average.  Around 30% of loans are extended to
customers from the economically weaker Sardinia and other
southern Italian regions, which contributes to the high level of
problem loans.

The bank's profitability is low, with net income averaging just
0.2% of tangible assets in the period 2014-June 2016, although it
has been more resilient than peers since 2009.  Moody's considers
the bank's business plan net income target in 2017 as ambitious,
as it factors in a rather optimistic cost of credit at 83 basis
points (compared with 162 basis points in 2015).

In Moody's opinion, BPER's 14.5% transitional Common Equity Tier
1 ratio (CET1) in June 2016, which has increased following
supervisory approval of an Internal Rating Based (IRB) model, is
an important mitigant to the bank's asset risk weakness.

Moody's believes that the bank faces regulatory pressure both to
strengthen the coverage of problem loans and reduce the stock,
for example through a securitization.  This would result in
losses.  In addition, Moody's believes that the bank will
participate actively in the consolidation of the Italian banking
system but expects any acquisition to have a moderate impact on
capital.

As a result, Moody's considers the 12% CET1 indicated by the
bank's business plan for 2017 (which did not take into account
the benefits stemming from the internal models) as more
indicative of the company's future capitalization, after any
problem loan reduction or acquisition.

Moody's notes positively that BPER's funding is predominantly
retail, supporting a good level of liquidity.

                    RATIONALE FOR LONG-TERM RATINGS

Moody's believes that BPER's deposits and senior unsecured debt
are likely to face extremely low and low loss-given-failure
respectively, which results in an uplift from the bank's ba3 BCA
of three notches for deposits and one notch for the issuer
rating.

                      RATIONALE FOR THE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on the long-term deposit rating incorporates
expectations of a gradual reduction of bad loans and rising
levels of provision coverage.  The negative outlook on the long-
term issuer rating reflects the fact that senior unsecured bonds
have been sold to retail clients and if, as expected, this source
of funding is not replaced by new senior debt, the overall volume
of senior unsecured debt will be reduced, thereby increasing
loss-given-failure for the remaining instruments.

                WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's could upgrade BPER's ratings if the bank: (1)
significantly reduces problem loans while maintaining CET1 above
12%; and/or (2) improves net profit on a sustainable basis.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade the bank's ratings if: (1)
problem loans increase ; (2) the CET1 ratio falls below 12%;
and/or (3) net profits fall.  In addition to this, the bank's
issuer rating could also be downgraded owing to a lower volume of
senior debt; for example, following the maturity of retail bonds.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna s.c.a.r.l.

Assignments:
  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, assigned Baa3(cr)
  Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, assigned P-3(cr)
  Long-term Deposit Ratings, assigned Baa3 Stable
  Short-term Deposit Ratings, assigned P-3
  Long-term Issuer Rating, assigned Ba2 Negative
  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, assigned (P)Ba2
  Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, assigned (P)B1
  Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, assigned ba3
  Baseline Credit Assessment, assigned ba3

Outlook Action:
  Outlook assigned Stable(m)


BANCA POPOLARE DI MILANO: Egan-Jones Ups Sr. Unsec. Rating to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on Sept. 8, 2016, upgraded the senior
unsecured rating on debt issued by Banca Popolare di Milano Scarl
to BB+ from BB.

Banca Popolare di Milano Scarl (BPM) attracts deposits and offers
commercial banking services. The Bank offers brokerage, trust,
lease financing, asset management, private banking, and factoring
services, manages mutual funds, and offers insurance services.
BPM serves its customers through a branch network located
primarily in Italy, London, and New York.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ODEON ABS 2007-1: S&P Affirms 'CC' Rating on 3 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its credit ratings on Odeon ABS
2007-1 B.V.'s class A-1, A-2, A-3, and B notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance since its Jan. 24, 2014 review, and the application
of S&P's criteria for collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) of
pooled structured finance assets and criteria for assigning 'CCC'
and 'CC' ratings.

S&P has performed its analysis using the available data at the
time of S&P's analysis from the trustee report dated May 31,
2013.

Since S&P's January 2014 review, it has observed further negative
performance in the transaction.  The available credit enhancement
has decreased for all rated classes of notes and the amount of
cash collateral available to the transaction has decreased
substantially to EUR13.47 million from EUR71.1 million at
closing.

Further capitalization of interest (unpaid interest) on the class
A-3 and B deferrable notes has increased the outstanding balance
on these classes of notes.

The portfolio is concentrated among five industries and eight
countries.  All overcollateralization tests in the transaction
are failing their documented triggers and have worsened since
S&P's previous review.

Due to the undercollateralization, principal on the class A-1
notes can only be fully paid with the help of excess interest
proceeds.  Therefore, the class A-1 notes are highly vulnerable
to a loss of principal at maturity.  S&P has therefore affirmed
its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class A-1 notes.  The other rated
classes of notes are subordinated to the class A-1 notes and are
extremely vulnerable to the loss of principal at maturity.  S&P
has therefore affirmed its 'CC (sf)' ratings on the class A-2,
A-3, and B notes.

Odeon ABS 2007-1 is a hybrid CDO of asset-backed securities (ABS)
transaction that closed in July 2007.  At closing, the issuer
entered into a credit default swap selling protection on a
reference portfolio of primarily European corporate CDOs, and
commercial and prime residential mortgage-backed securities
(MBS). It invested the issuance proceeds of the class X to C
(Sub) notes in collateral bonds held by the custodian.

At the same time, the issuer entered into a total return swap
whereby the market-value risk on the collateral bonds is borne by
the total return swap counterparty.  Following the notification
of a credit event under the credit default swap, the issuer funds
any protection payments by selling a required portion of the
collateral bonds at its face value to the TRS counterparty,
thereby reducing the available collateral for the repayment of
the notes.

RATINGS LIST

Odeon ABS 2007-1 B.V.
EUR76.805 Million Floating-Rate And Deferrable Floating-Rate
Notes

Class              Rating

Ratings Affirmed

A-1                CCC- (sf)
A-2                CC (sf)
A-3                CC (sf)
B                  CC (sf)


REGENT'S PARK: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
actions on these classes of notes issued by Regent's Park CDO
B.V.:

  EUR393 mil. (current balance EUR95.1 mil.) Class A Senior
   Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on Nov. 26, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR40.2 mil. Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 26, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  EUR12 mil. Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2023,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 26, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  EUR51 mil. Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 26,
   2015, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  EUR24 mil. Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2023, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov. 26,
   2015, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  EUR13.8 mil. Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2023, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov. 26,
  2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Regent's Park CDO B.V., issued in October 2006, is a
collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans managed by
Blackstone Debt Advisors L.P.  The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in January 2013.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of the deleveraging of the Class A notes
following amortization of the underlying portfolio since the last
rating action in November 2015.

On the last two payment dates in January 2016 and July 2016,
Class A notes have paid down by a total of EUR69.4 million, as a
result of which over-collateralization (OC) ratios of all classes
of rated notes have increased.  As per the trustee report dated
August 2016, Class A/B, Class C, Class D, and Class E OC ratios
are reported at 178.65%, 132.71%, 118.38%, and 111.46% compared
to September 2015 levels of 155.0%, 125.47%, 115.15%, and
109.95%, respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds of EUR 262.27 million,
defaulted par of EUR 8.39 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.26% (consistent with a WARF of 2594 over a
weighted average life of 4.48 years), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 47.07% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 25 and a weighted average spread of 3.70%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery rates
for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF
CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be
considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these default and
recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash
flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were unchanged for Classes A, B-1 and B-2, and within one to
two notches of the base-case results for Classes C, D and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
     this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
     underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending
     on market conditions and have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Amortization could accelerate as a
     consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral
     sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase
     in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.  Fast amortization
     would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning
     with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

  2) Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
     trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
     have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
     collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
     and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
     defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
     the market price or the recovery rate to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Recoveries higher
     than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
     the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


CAIXA ECONOMICA MONTEPIO: DBRS Lowers Deposit Rating to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has downgraded the Senior Long Term Debt &
Deposit Rating of Caixa Economica Montepio Geral (Montepio or the
Bank) to BB from BB (high). The Short-Term Debt & Deposit Rating
was downgraded to R-4 from R-3 and the Subordinated Debt Rating
was downgraded to BB (low) from BB. The Intrinsic assessment of
the Bank is now BB. The trend on all ratings is Stable.

The downgrade of the Senior Long-Term Debt & Deposit Rating of
Montepio reflects the challenges that the Bank is facing to
reinforce its weak capital levels in the context of the ongoing
low interest rate environment, the sluggish economic recovery in
Portugal, and a complex regulatory environment. DBRS considers
that the combination of low capital levels and weak profitability
prospects provides the Bank with little financial flexibility to
organically reinforce capital levels in the short to medium-term.

At the same time, the ratings continue to reflect the long track
record of consistent support from its main shareholder Montepio
Geral Associacao Mutualista (MGAM). This has been supported by a
number of capital injections, the last of which took place in
March 2016 comprising EUR270 million and EUR31 million from
Unidades de Participacao. The capital support provided by MGAM
over the last two years has compensated for the significant
annual losses, but these have only reinforced capital levels to
just above the minimum regulatory levels (at end-June 2016
Montepio reported a CET1 ratio of 10.3% under the phased-in
criteria, and 8.3% under the fully loaded criteria). DBRS
considers that the willingness of MGAM to continue providing
support to Montepio remains consistent, but that the challenging
economic environment in Portugal could affect the ability of MGAM
to continue to provide further support in the future.

The BB senior ratings continue to reflect the Bank's strong,
albeit relatively small, franchise in Portugal, its large and
loyal mutual customer base and its relatively resilient
fundamentals, which has enabled it to avoid having to access
State capital support. The ratings also consider Montepio's high
exposure to real estate and construction exposures, which
primarily drives the bank's weak asset quality.

The Bank has reported losses since 2013 and DBRS expects Montepio
will likely report operating losses in 2016, albeit lower than in
the past, and this could further pressure the already weak
capital ratios. Nonetheless, DBRS views positively the progress
the bank has been making since the appointment of a new CEO and
expects that this progress should lead to a gradual improvement
of profitability over the medium-term. In particular, a cost
reduction program has been implemented and asset quality
deterioration is showing some signs of stabilization, helped by
active management, and this is leading to lower provision
charges. These factors are incorporated in the BB senior ratings.

Montepio also reported a further net loss in 1H16 of EUR67.6
million, compared to a EUR28.9 million loss in 1H15, due
primarily to impairments on some financial investments and the
annual contributions to the European Resolution Fund, which were
recorded in 2Q rather than in 4Q as in 2015. Results were also
affected by higher operating expenses as a result of one-off
costs associated with the rationalization of the branch network
and headcount in 1H16. DBRS notes, however, that loan impairment
charges were substantially lower year-on-year (YoY). Core
operating revenues (net interest income and commissions) were
flat YoY.

The Bank's asset quality continues to remain a key challenge
given the high level of credit-at-risk loans and foreclosed
assets. DBRS sees that whilst there were some signs of
stabilization in 2Q16, asset quality remains very vulnerable to
economic conditions, which remain challenging in Portugal.
Concurrently DBRS has also withdrawn the ratings of Montepio's
Cayman Island branch as the branch has been closed.

RATING DRIVERS

Given the recent downgrade upward rating pressure is unlikely in
the medium-term, however this could arise from a significant
strengthening of capital levels, a reduction in the bank's risk
profile and material improvement of asset quality. It would also
need to be accompanied by a consistent improvement in
profitability.

Further downward pressure to the senior long term debt and
deposits ratings could arise if Montepio fails to improve its
profitability, asset quality and capital position. It could also
arise if there are signs that Montepio's franchise is weakening,
as evidenced by a potential reduction of its retail deposit base.

Notes: All figures are in Euros unless otherwise noted.

RATINGS

Issuer             Debt Rated         Rating Action     Rating
------             ----------         -------------     ------
Caixa Economica    Senior Long-Term    Downgraded       BB
Montepio Geral     Debt & Deposit

Caixa Economica    Short-Term Debt     Downgraded       R-4
Montepio Geral     & Deposit

Caixa Economica    Subordinated        Downgraded       BB(low)
Montepio Geral     Debt



===========
R U S S I A
===========


CREDIT BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has affirmed its 'BB-/B' long-
and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Credit Bank Of
Moscow (CBoM).  The outlook remains negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B-/C' long- and short-term
counterparty credit ratings on CBoM's nonoperating holding
company Concern Rossium LLC, and S&P's 'B+/C' long- and short-
term counterparty credit ratings on core subsidiary MKB-Leasing.
The outlooks on both entities are negative.

The rating affirmations follow the revision of S&P's outlook on
Russia to stable from negative on Sept. 16, 2016.  In S&P's view,
banks in Russia still operate in a tough environment, however.

CBoM's share of nonperforming loans (NPLs; loans overdue by more
than 90 days and restructured loans) totaled 6.2% as of June 30,
2016.  S&P notes that NPLs represented primarily corporate loans,
which constituted 82% of the total gross loans as of June 30,
2016.  S&P also notes that CBoM's portfolio quality deteriorated
in 2015, with NPLs having increased to Russian ruble
(RUB)22 billion (about $300 million) at the end of the year from
RUB1 billion as of year-end 2014.  In S&P's view, this indicates
that CBoM's corporate borrowers have riskier financial profiles
than those of larger banks.

At the same time, S&P considers that CBoM still demonstrates
stronger internal capital generation than peers.  It has received
several capital injections from its owner over recent years, and
demonstrated the ability to raise capital in the market.  S&P
forecasts its risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio for the bank at
about 5.5%-5.7% in 2016-2017.  S&P do not expect CBoM to make any
dividend payments in 2016-2018.  However, S&P considers that
capital and earnings indicators can deteriorate in the event of
additional provisions.

Concentration risk in the bank's funding profile has heightened.
Customer deposits, CBoM's major funding source, increased by 168%
in 2015 to about RUB900 billion, mainly due to RUB494 billion
attracted from two corporate clients.  These two depositors
accounted for 20% of the bank's total deposits and current
accounts as of Dec. 31, 2015.  Such concentration makes the bank
vulnerable to potential large client withdrawals and volatility
of the funding profile.

S&P classifies Rossium as a nonoperating holding company because
it does not perform any operating activity and serves solely as a
holding company, and S&P thinks this will continue.  Therefore
S&P rates it two notches below the unsupported group credit
profile (GCP; or three notches below CBoM).  S&P views CBoM as a
core entity of Concern Rossium.

S&P considers MKB-Leasing to be a core subsidiary of CBoM due to
its close integration and funding ties with its parent.  S&P
aligns the rating on MKB-Leasing with S&P's 'b+' unsupported GCP
for CBoM because S&P don't expect the company will receive
extraordinary government support.  That said, S&P believes CBoM
is moderately systemically important and might receive such
support, as reflected in S&P's long-term rating on CBoM being one
notch above the unsupported GCP.

The negative outlook on CBoM primarily reflects S&P's view that,
in Russia's challenging and volatile operating environment, rapid
loan portfolio growth could put pressure on the bank's asset
quality, capital, and funding profile.

S&P could take a negative rating action in the next 12 months if
CBoM's capital weakens more than S&P expects, with its projected
RAC ratio falling below 5%; or if customer deposits become
increasingly volatile or concentrated, posing a risk to CBoM's
funding profile.

S&P could revise the outlook on CBoM to stable in the next 12
months if the bank's asset quality indicators improved
sustainably above the industry average, its funding profile
became more stable, and pressure on capital diminished.

The negative outlook on Concern Rossium mirrors that on CBoM.
The ratings and outlook on Concern Rossium will move in tandem
with those on CBoM owing to increased double leverage and S&P's
view of significant influence from the parent.  Even if S&P
revised its outlook on CBoM to stable, S&P would maintain the
three-notch difference between its long-term rating on Rossium
and that on CBoM.

The negative outlook on MKB-Leasing mirrors that on CBoM,
indicating S&P's assumption that the company will remain a core
subsidiary of the bank at least for the next 12 months, while
preserving close funding and operational ties that support this
status.  As such, the ratings on the leasing company will move in
tandem with S&P's ratings on CBoM.


MK-HOLDING LLC: S&P Assigns 'B-/B' CCRs, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B-/B' long- and short-term
corporate credit ratings to Russian flour and baked goods
producer LLC MK-Holding.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'ruBBB' Russia national scale
ratings to MK-Holding.

The ratings are constrained by the company's reliance on short-
term uncommitted lines to roll over its short-term debt used for
working capital needs, as well as by its substantial debt burden,
owing to acquisition debt at the parent holding company level.
S&P's business risk assessment also reflects geographic
concentration on the Russian market, where country risk is high.
MK-Holding's credit quality benefits from its well-located
production base in one of Russia's major grain-producing regions,
which has helped it to position itself as one of the largest
producers in the country's fragmented flour and bakery industry.
At the same time, the rating is constrained by an 80% revenue
share of unbranded commodity-type products in the revenue mix,
which is exposed to grain price volatility.  This might hinder
the company's ability to pass on increases in raw material prices
to customers, in S&P's view.

S&P's assessment of the company's business risk profile is
supported by the proximity of its production base to its
suppliers and customers.  MK-Holding operates three grain
processing plants and 13 baked good plants in Russia's Central
and Volga federal districts and sells its production in 58
regions of Russia.  The company managed to increase its sales by
24% to Russian ruble (RUB) 17 billion in 2015 and improve its
EBITDA margin to 13% from 9% in 2014.  The company has been owned
by a family-owned holding company Troika-Invest since the
beginning of 2014.

MK-Holding's bakery division accounted for 62% of the company's
RUB2.2 billion EBITDA in 2015 and generates higher profitability
than its grain processing division.  The company's market share
in the fragmented Russian flour and bakery markets was less than
5% at end-2015.

The company is increasing its focus on branded retail products,
but currently a large share of its sales lack sufficient brand
differentiation and are therefore exposed to risks of input cost
inflation and price competition.

S&P's assessment of MK-Holding's financial risk profile as
aggressive is underpinned by the company's financial policy of
debt to EBITDA of less than 3.0x (2.36x in 2015) and S&P's
expectation of funds from operations (FFO) interest coverage in
the range of 2.0x-3.0x in 2016-2017 (2.6x in 2015), calculated on
a gross interest basis.  S&P's financial risk profile assessment
is also constrained by risks to free cash flow generation related
to the company's increasing capital expenditures (capex)
estimated at about RUB450 million-RUB500 million in 2016 versus
RUB150 million in 2015, as well its investments in working
capital driven by its growing scale of business.  The company's
management is focused on modernizing its existing production
lines and increasing their production capacity.

MK-Holding benefits from interest subsidies provided by the
government to agribusiness and agricultural commodities-
processing companies.  These subsidies reduce the net effective
interest rate by two-thirds of the key refinancing rate (10.0%
currently) for short-term working capital facilities, which
represented about one-quarter of the company's debt.  S&P
believes that any change in such regulation might reduce the
affordability of credit to the company and put pressure on its
cash flows.

MK-Holding's public disclosure is limited due its status as a
private company.  MK-Holding reports annually under International
Financial Reporting Standards.  The company's 2015 annual
financials were audited by Ernst and Young, which issued a
qualified audit opinion in conjunction with RUB1.2 billion of
loans given by MK-Holding to its parent company Troika-Invest.
Both companies are ultimately owned by the same beneficiary.  S&P
understands that this loan was provided to service debt at
Troika-Invest (which S&P adds to reported debt), borrowed at the
time of the company's acquisition in 2014.  S&P believes that its
financial assessment already factors in all relevant debt service
requirements for the group.  S&P understands that management is
working on changes to the consolidation perimeter of the group
accounts to report cash flows used to service acquisition debt at
the parent company level in a more transparent way.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that the company's sound
operating performance, with a track record of positive free cash
flow generation, and its position as of one of Russia's large
players in the industry should help it roll over its short-term
debt in the next 12 months.  Ongoing government support for
agribusiness and food production in the form of interest
subsidies, owing to the sector's social importance, will also
positively impact the company's refinancing prospects.

S&P could lower the ratings if MK-Holding's ability to roll over
its short-term debt weakens due to contracting free operating
cash flows and deteriorating credit standing in the bank market.
This would likely stem from a material decline in the company's
operating performance due to an unexpected spike in grain prices
that it cannot pass through to the end customer through price
increases.  Additional liquidity risks might come from higher-
than-expected capex absorbing the company's internal cash flows
at a time of operational setbacks, or if there is an accelerated
absorption of cash into working capital due to inflation in the
price of raw materials.

S&P could raise the ratings if the company's ongoing liquidity
provision materially improved and committed liquidity sources
exceeded liquidity uses by more than 1x.  This might be the
result of increasing free cash flow generation and decreasing
ongoing debt service, as the parent company loan at the Troika-
Invest level is gradually paid down.  Additionally, rating upside
is contingent on the company's ability to sustainably maintain
its FFO interest coverage at more than 2.0x.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: High Court Probes Chairman Over Severance Payment
-------------------------------------------------------------
Angus Berwick and Rodrigo Miguel at Reuters report that Spain's
High Court will investigate the chairman of troubled energy firm
Abengoa, Antonio Fornieles, for handing out a EUR11.5 million
(US$12.90 million) severance payment to his predecessor,
according to a court ruling.

Mr. Fornieles formed part of the commission that approved the
payment for Felipe Benjumea last September when he stepped down
as problems spiralled at Abengoa, which is trying avoid becoming
Spain's biggest-ever bankruptcy, Reuters discloses.

According to Reuters, the document said the court would also
investigate two other employees from the commission along with
Fornieles, who became chairman of the Seville-based company in
March.  The judge ordered all three to appear in court on Oct. 6,
Reuters relays.

Mr. Benjumea, whose family founded Abengoa, is also under
investigation in a separate case for allegations of mismanagement
at the firm, which accumulated over EUR9 billion of debt after a
rapid expansion into the clean energy business, Reuters notes.

Abengoa, Reuters says, expects to win the support of its
creditors for a restructuring plan by Sept. 30.  Abengoa must
reach the 75% level of creditor support by the end of October
under a court decision earlier this year, Reuters states.

In the restructuring deal, Abengoa has offered creditors to
convert 70 percent of outstanding debt into equity, and refinance
the remaining debt over six years, in return for 40 percent
ownership of the restructured company, Reuters relays.

                       About Abengoa S.A.

Spanish energy giant Abengoa S.A. is an engineering and
clean technology company with operations in more than 50
countries worldwide that provides innovative solutions for a
diverse range of customers in the energy and environmental
sectors.  Abengoa is one of the world's top builders of power
lines transporting energy across Latin America and a top
engineering and construction business, making massive renewable-
energy power plants worldwide.

As of the end of 2015, Abengoa, S.A. was the parent company of
687 other companies around the world, including 577 subsidiaries,
78 associates, 31 joint ventures, and 211 Spanish partnerships.
Additionally, the Abengoa Group held a number of other interests
of less than 20% in other entities.

On Nov. 25, 2015 in Spain, Abengoa S.A. announced its intention
to seek protection under Article 5bis of Spanish insolvency law,
a pre-insolvency statute that permits a company to enter into
negotiations with certain creditors for restricting of its
financial affairs.  The Spanish company is facing a March 28,
2016, deadline to agree on a viability plan or restructuring plan
with its banks and bondholders, without which it could be forced
to declare bankruptcy.

On March 16, 2016, Abengoa presented its Business Plan and
Financial Restructuring Plan in Madrid to all of its
stakeholders.

                        U.S. Bankruptcies

Abengoa, S.A., and 24 of its subsidiaries filed Chapter 15
petitions (Bankr. D. Del. Case Nos. 16-10754 to 16-10778) on
March 28, 2016, to seek U.S. recognition of its restructuring
proceedings in Spain.  Christopher Morris signed the petitions as
foreign representative.  DLA Piper LLP (US) represents the
Debtors as counsel.

Gavilon Grain, LLC, et al., on Feb. 1, 2016, filed an involuntary
Chapter 7 petition for Abengoa Bioenergy of Nebraska, LLC
("ABNE") and on Feb. 11, 2016, filed an involuntary Chapter 7
petition for Abengoa Bioenergy Company, LLC ("ABC").  ABC's
involuntary Chapter 7 case is Bankr. D. Kan. Case No. 16-20178.
ABNE's involuntary case is Bankr. D. Neb. Case No. 16-80141.  An
order for relief has not been entered, and no interim Chapter 7
trustee has been appointed in the Involuntary Cases.  The
petitioning creditors are represented by McGrath, North, Mullin &
Kratz, P.C.

On Feb. 24, 2016, Abengoa Bioenergy US Holding, LLC and 5 five
other U.S. units of Abengoa S.A., which collectively own,
operate, and/or service four ethanol plants in Ravenna, York,
Colwich, and Portales, each filed a voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of

Missouri.  The cases are pending before the Honorable Kathy A.
Surratt-States and are jointly administered under Case No. 16-
41161.

Abeinsa Holding Inc., and 12 other affiliates, which are energy,
engineering and environmental companies and indirect subsidiaries
of Abengoa, filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions (Bankr. D. Del.
Proposed Lead Case No. 16-10790) on March 29, 2016.


* SPAIN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 4 TDA Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 14 tranches and affirmed 16 tranches
of 4 TDA transactions, non-conforming RMBS transactions
originated and serviced by multiple banks, and FTA, Santander
Hipotecario 3, a prime transaction originated and serviced by
Santander.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Deteriorated Asset Performance

The underlying pools of the TDA transactions are partially backed
by loans originated by Credifimo, a specialized lender targeting
mainly non-prime low income borrowers. Exposure to these loans
constitutes the main driver for the weak performance of the
transactions. As of the latest reporting dates, cumulative gross
defaults range from 8.0% (Santander Hipotecario 3 as of July
2016) to 28.8% (TDA 28 as of June 2016), up from between 7.6%
(Santander Hipotecario 3 as of July 2015) and 28.0% (TDA 28 as of
June 2016). These numbers are above Fitch's Index of 5.6%. Fitch
said, "We expect cumulative defaults to continue to rise as
further loans roll to default."

Fitch believes that the larger exposure to Credifimo loans in TDA
25 and 28, at 82% and 37% of the respective current pool balance,
suggests that the performance will remain particularly weak as
reflected by the downgrades.

Large Deficiency Ledgers

The outstanding principal deficiency ledgers (PDL) remain high,
at between EUR23.2m (TDA 24 as of June 2016) and EUR180m
(Santander Hipotecario 3 as of July 2016), compared with EUR23.4m
(TDA 24 as of June 2015) and EUR186.9m (Santander Hipotecario 3
as of July 2015). As a result, available excess spread and
enforcement proceeds are key elements for the repayment of the
notes. This is reflected in the affirmation of the 16 tranches
and the downgrade of the junior notes of TDA 24, TDA 27 and
Santander Hipotecario 3 as well as the downward revision of the
Recovery Estimate (RE) of TDA 27.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Given the growing dependency to the recovery inflows, any change
to the recovery income below that of Fitch's stresses would
trigger negative rating action or revision of the Recovery
Estimates.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Investor and servicer reports provided by Titulizacion de Activos
since close and until:

   -- June 2016 for TDA 24, 25 and 27

   -- July 2016 for TDA 28

Investor and servicer reports provided by Banco Santander since
close and until:

   -- July 2016 for Santander Hipotecario 3

Loan-by-loan data provided by Banco Santander and sourced from
the European Data Warehouse with a cut-off date of July 2016 for
Santander Hipotecario 3

Loan-by-loan data provided by Titulizacion de Activos with a cut-
off date of:

   -- May 2016 for TDA 24, 25 and 27

   -- March 2016 for TDA 28

MODELS

   -- ResiEMEA.

   -- EMEA RMBS Surveillance Model.

   -- EMEA

   -- Cash Flow Model.

The rating actions are as follows

   TDA 24:

   -- Class A1 (ISIN ES0377952009) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Class A2 (ISIN ES0377952017) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Class B (ISIN ES0377952025) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 0%

   -- Class C (ISIN ES0377952033) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 0%

   -- Class D (ISIN ES0377952041) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

   TDA 25:

   -- Class A (ISIN ES0377929007) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 45%

   -- Class B (ISIN ES0377929015) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

   -- Class C (ISIN ES0377929023) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

   -- Class D (ISIN ES0377929031) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

   TDA 27:

   -- Class A2 (ISIN ES0377954013) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 65%

   -- Class A3 (ISIN ES0377954021) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 65%

   -- Class B (ISIN ES0377954039) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 0%

   -- Class C (ISIN ES0377954047) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 0%

   -- Class D (ISIN ES0377954054) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 0%

   -- Class E (ISIN ES0377954062) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

   -- Class F (ISIN ES0377954070) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

   TDA 28:

   -- Class A (ISIN ES0377930005) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 55%

   -- Class B (ISIN ES0377930013) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

   -- Class C (ISIN ES0377930021) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

   -- Class D (ISIN ES0377930039) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

   -- Class E (ISIN ES0377930047) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

   -- Class F (ISIN ES0377930054) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

   FTA, Santander Hipotecario 3

   -- Class A1 (ISIN ES0338093000) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 90%

   -- Class A2 (ISIN ES0338093018) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 90%

   -- Class A3 (ISIN ES0338093026) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 90%

   -- Class B (ISIN ES0338093034) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 0%

   -- Class C (ISIN ES0338093042) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate 0%

   -- Class D (ISIN ES0338093059) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

   -- Class E (ISIN ES0338093067) downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%


   -- Class F (ISIN ES0338093075) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery
      Estimate 0%



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


AKBANK REMITTANCES: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 4 Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of 4 notes in
Garanti Diversified Payment Rights Finance Company (2007-A to
2007-D) and Garanti Diversified Payment Rights Finance Company
(2008-A) transactions.  In addition, Moody's downgraded the
ratings of 4 notes issued by Akbank Remittances Trust
Securitisation Limited (A.R.T.S. Ltd.).  The rating action is
prompted by the series of rating actions on the originator banks'
Counterparty Risk assessment (CR assessment).

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of CR assessment of Akbank TAS from Baa3(cr) to
Ba1(cr) triggered the rating action to downgrade the ratings of
the 4 tranches issued by Akbank Remittances Trust Securitisation
Limited (A.R.T.S. Ltd.). Akbank TAS acts as the originator of
A.R.T.S. Ltd and the ratings of the outstanding notes in the
transaction are directly linked to the CR assessment of the bank.

The outstanding notes in A.R.T.S. Ltd are backed by future
diversified payments receivables denominated in Euro, Swiss
Francs, Sterling and US dollars generated when a sender makes an
electronic transfer of funds through Akbank TAS to a beneficiary
other than Akbank.  This payment order is communicated in the
case of a bank, via an MT103 instruction through the SWIFT system
or similar message.

In addition, the confirmation of the CR assessment of Turkiye
Garanti Bankasi A.S. at Baa3(cr) prompted the confirmation of
Baa3 rating of 4 notes in Garanti Diversified Payment Rights
Finance Company (2007-A to 2007-D) and Garanti Diversified
Payment Rights Finance Company (2008-A).  Turkiye Garanti Bankasi
A.S. acts as the originator in these two transactions.

The notes of Garanti Diversified Payment Rights Finance Company
(2007-A to 2007-D) and Garanti Diversified Payment Rights Finance
Company (2008-A) are backed by rights to receive and/or retain
payments made in connection with all the existing and future US-
dollar, Euro and Sterling-denominated payment orders received by
Garanti instructing it to pay identified recipients (diversified
payment rights).

As per the Moody's methodology, the ratings of the future
receivables-backed securities are linked to the rating of the CR
Assessment of the Originator.  Therefore, any action on the CR
Assessment of these banks will have an effect on the Diversified
Payment Rights through their ability to generate the receivables
backing the securities.

                      RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Future Receivables Transactions" published in
June 2015.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) improvements in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties (2) performance of the underlying
collateral that is better than Moody's expected.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) any further deterioration in the
creditworthiness of these banks (2) performance of the underlying
collateral that is worse than Moody's expected.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Akbank Remittances Trust Securitisation Limited

  US$164.7 mil. Tranche 27 Notes, Downgraded to Ba1; previously
   on July 20, 2016, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade
  US$100 mil. Tranche 30 Notes, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
   July 20, 2016, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  US$125 mil. Tranche 31 Notes, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
   July 20, 2016, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  US$60 mil. Tranche 32 Notes, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
   Jul 20, 2016, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Garanti Diversified Payment Rights Finance Company (2007-
A to 2007-D)

  US$350 mil. Class 2007 A Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously
   on July 20, 2016, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade
  Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Baa3; previously on July 20,
   2016, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  US$100 mil. Class 2007 B Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously
   on July 20, 2016, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade
  Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Baa3; previously on July 20,
   2016, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  US$100 mil. Class 2007 C Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously
  on July 20, 2016, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
  Downgrade Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
  July 20, 2016, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Garanti Diversified Payment Rights Finance Company
(2008-A)

  EUR200 mil. Class 2008-A Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously
   on July 20, 2016, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade


VESTEL ELEKTRONIK: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' long-term corporate credit
rating on Turkey-based brown and white goods manufacturer Vestel
Elektronik Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S.  The outlook is stable.

The affirmation reflects Vestel's solid operating performance
over the past 12 months, driven by strong revenue growth in both
its TV and white goods markets, combined with an expected EBITDA
margin (as adjusted by S&P Global Ratings) of about 6.0% for
2016, up from 5.4% in 2015.  However, this is offset by Vestel's
continued reliance on short-term debt financing, in part due to
sizeable intragroup lending (Turkish lira [TRY] 900 million
[about USD310 million] as of June 30, 2016,) to its parent Zorlu
Holding. About 82% of Vestel's gross financial debt of TRY3.1
billion was due within one year as of June 30, 2016, which
exposes the company to refinancing risks.  Although S&P expects
Vestel's short-term debt will decline over the next 12 months,
primarily due to working capital inflows and debt refinancing,
S&P expects that its cash balances and operating cash flow will
not fully cover short-term debt and capital expenditures (capex).
As a result, S&P has revised its liquidity assessment to weak
from less than adequate.

"Our assessment of Vestel's business risk profile continues to
reflect its volatile operating margins and cash flow generation,
largely because of fierce competition and uneven demand in the
consumer electronics sector.  It also incorporates our view of
high country risks in Turkey, such as economic, institutional,
financial market, and legal risks that arise from doing business
in or with Turkey.  That said, Vestel's market share in liquid
crystal display (LCD) TV sales in Europe has increased over the
past several years, and the company has become the largest B-
brand producer of LCD TVs in Europe.  Vestel has gradually
increased its market share in the domestic white goods market, As
of June 30, 2016, its market share stood at 15%, up from 13% in
2014.  However, the company still largely depends on its key
suppliers, which S&P sees as another main weakness in Vestel's
business risk profile.

S&P's assessment of Vestel's financial risk profile primarily
incorporates its high S&P Global Ratings' adjusted gross debt to
EBITDA and strong reliance on various forms of short-term
financing.  In addition, S&P expects the company's credit ratios
and cash flow generation will remain highly volatile because it
is exposed to demand swings and its margins and revenues are
vulnerable to currency fluctuations.  This is partly offset by
S&P's expectations of modest positive free operating cash flow
(FOCF) and solid cash interest coverage ratios of between 2.5x
and 3.0x in 2016-2017.

The stable outlook on Vestel reflects S&P's view that the company
is likely to reduce its short-term debt over time, primarily
following working capital improvements, active refinancing of
short-term domestic bank loans, and reduced lending to Zorlu
Holding.  In addition, S&P expects Vestel will generate at least
break even FOCF in 2016-2017.

S&P could lower the rating if Vestel experienced declining
revenues and margin prospects due to weaker demand or tighter
availability of consumer financing in Turkey, adverse currency
swings, or heightened competition.  In particular, S&P Global
Ratings' adjusted EBITDA margins sustainably below 4% and
significantly negative FOCF for more than 12 months, coupled with
a continued weak liquidity, could trigger a downgrade.

A positive rating action on Vestel would hinge on an EBITDA
margin consistently above 6%-7%, an adjusted debt leverage ratio
of below 5x at year-end, and sustainably positive FOCF of more
than TRY100 million per year.  S&P do not see adequate liquidity
as an absolute requirement for a one-notch upgrade, but the
likely full coverage of liquidity uses, such as capex and short-
term debt, throughout the fiscal year would be a key
consideration for raising the rating.


* Moody's Concludes Review on Eight Turkish Corporates
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has concluded its rating reviews on
eight Turkish corporates.

The rating agency has confirmed the Baa3 issuer ratings of Koc
Holding A.S., Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu (OYAK), Coca-Cola Icecek
A.S. (CCI), and Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S.  The outlook on
all ratings is stable.

The rating agency also confirmed the Baa3 issuer rating of
Anadolu Efes Biracilik ve Malt Sanayii A.S. (Efes).  The outlook
on all ratings is negative.

Concurrently, Moody's confirmed the Ba1 corporate family ratings
(CFR) and Ba1-PD probability of default ratings (PDR) of Turkiye
Sise ve Cam Fabrikalari A.S. (Sisecam) and Turkiye Petrol
Rafinerileri A.S. (Tupras). The outlook on all ratings is stable.

The rating agency also confirmed the Ba1 CFR and Ba1-PD PDR of
Dogus Holding A.S.  The outlook on all ratings is negative.

The action follows the downgrade of Turkish government's debt
rating to Ba1, with a stable outlook, from Baa3, under review for
downgrade, on Sept. 23, 2016.  It concludes the review on the 8
Turkish corporates started on July 20.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

  -- CONFIRMATION OF Baa3 ISSUER RATINGS OF KOC HOLDING, OYAK,
CCI AND TURKCELL WITH A STABLE OUTLOOK; AND EFES WITH A NEGATIVE
OUTLOOK

Moody's has confirmed the ratings of Koc Holding, OYAK, CCI,
Turkcell and Efes, which are now rated one notch above the
sovereign of Turkey's bond rating of Ba1 and one notch below
Turkey's foreign currency bond ceiling of Baa2.  While these
companies have strong financial profiles, they also have a high
dependence on their Turkish operations for revenue and cash flow
generation and as such their ratings cannot be rated by more than
one notch above the sovereign rating of Turkey.  Moody's notes
that some of these corporates have international operations that
materially contribute to cash flow generation, but the majority
of these operations are in countries rated at or below the
sovereign bond rating of Turkey.

KOC Holding and OYAK

Moody's has confirmed the Baa3 issuer ratings of Koc Holding and
OYAK and has assigned stable outlooks while maintaining their
ratings one notch above Turkey's government bond rating.

Koc Holding and OYAK are two investment holding companies, both
with credit linkages and high exposure to the domestic operating
environment in Turkey.  However, Koc Holding and OYAK have
diversified investment portfolios with a number of mature,
dividend generating investments as well as exposure to export
revenues.  Examples of dividend paying investments include Ford
Otosan (unrated) and Arcelik (unrated) for Koc Holding and Adana
Cimento (unrated) and Aslan Cimento (unrated) for OYAK.

In addition, both these companies maintain strong financial
flexibility and have a net cash position as of end-June 2016.
Koc Holding at the holding level has about $2.1 billion of cash
and $1.5 billion of borrowings while its intermediate holding
company (EYAS) which owns shares in Tupras has only about TRY322
million ($110 million) of debt remaining.  OYAK has about $3
billion of cash with no borrowings at the holding level but has
$1.3 billion of debt at an intermediate holding company (ATAER)
which holds the steel, chemical and automotive investments.  In
addition, Moody's anticipates that the forced retirement of a
small portion of Turkey's military personnel will have a minimal
strain on OYAK's liquidity, and we estimate that OYAK may have to
pay retirement benefit rights to forced retirees an amount which
is less than 5% of its cash balances.

CCI

Moody's has confirmed CCI's Baa3 rating, stable outlook, which is
a combination of the company's standalone credit profile and one
notch of rating uplift for bottler support.  The one notch of
rating uplift for bottler support is underpinned by the 20.1%
equity stake in CCI held by The Coca-Cola Company (TCCC, Aa3
stable), the appointment of the Vice Chairman of the board and a
bottler's agreement between the two entities.  This agreement
influences and impacts key items such as (1) the approval process
for CCI's annual business plan; (2) concentrate purchases; and
(3) consent solicitation for expansion.  Moody's views CCI as a
vehicle for TCCC to expand into emerging markets.

CCI's standalone rating factors CCI's (1) strong position in its
domestic and international markets with a leading position in
Turkey and across Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan) and a number two position in Iraq and Pakistan; (2)
improving financial profile with leverage (debt/EBITDA)
decreasing to 3.4x in the 12-month period ending June 2016 from
4.7x in December 2015, and interest coverage (EBIT/interest
expense) increasing to 3.4x from 2.1x in the same period; and (3)
strong liquidity profile underpinned by the company's strong cash
balances and long-term maturity profile and its ability to
generate positive FCF for the first time since 2012.

                             TURKCELL

Moody's confirmed Turkcell's Baa3 issuer rating, stable outlook,
to reflect its very strong financial and liquidity profiles and
the track record that the company has built over the last few
years in running the business with a conservative financial
profile.  It also reflects (1) Turkcell's leadership position in
the Turkish mobile telephony market, which Moody's expects will
strengthen further following the award of 47% of total
frequencies available as part of the 4.5G spectrum auction; (2)
the strong fundamentals of the mobile sector in Turkey, driven by
Turkey's young population and low smartphone penetration relative
to other European peers; (3) Turkcell's conservative financial
policies that the company continues to adhere to with a target of
a net debt/EBITDA in the range of 1.0x-1.5x; and (4) Turkcell's
ability to tap the debt capital markets and its strong
relationships with international banks.  Turkcell issued a 10-
year $500 million bond in October 2015.  The company also signed
a number of bank facilities a number of international banks.

Turkcell's leverage remains very low despite the debt-funded 4.5G
license (paid over the 2015-17 period) with a peak debt/EBITDA
expected to remain below 1.6x in 2017, following which a
deleveraging trend will occur.

Turkcell's liquidity profile is also very strong.  The company
has high cash balances of TRY3.8 billion (78% of which in USD and
Euro) as of Q2 2016 and has a committed lines of Euro750 million.

                             EFES

Moody's confirmed Efes' Baa3 issuer rating, negative outlook, to
reflect the company's strong liquidity profile and its ability to
maintain positive free cash flow generation despite the adverse
market conditions of its beer operations in both Turkey and
Russia, the company's main areas of operations.  Efes has a long
debt maturity profile with the bulk of the debt maturing in 2022
(a $500 million bond) and substantial cash balances, mainly in
hard currencies.  Efes has also built a track record of
successfully tapping the capital markets in 2012 and having
strong banking relationships with local and international banks.

Furthermore, Efes' rating benefits from the 50.3% ownership stake
in Coca-Cola Icecek (CCI), which as of June 2016 covered 2.1x of
gross debt and 3.2x of net debt of Efes' beer operations.
Moody's expects that improvements at CCI will support higher
dividend payments to Efes and further strengthen Efes' free cash
flow generation.  Improvements at CCI will largely be the result
of lower capex over the next two or three years after a period of
higher spending between 2013-15 to expand production capacity.
This will result in positive free cash flow (FCF) generation in
2016 for the first time since 2012.

The negative outlook reflects the pressures the company has been
experiencing in its Turkish and Russian operations, given the
continued decrease in volumes.

  -- CONFIRMATION OF Ba1 CFR OF SISECAM AND TUPRAS; STABLE
OUTLOOK SISECAM

Moody's confirmed Sisecam's Ba1 CFR with a stable outlook to
reflect its strong financial profile, with net debt/EBITDA
averaging about 1.1x over the past five years.  Sisecam has a
strong competitive position in Turkey and also generates about
half of its revenues from a mixture of exports and international
operations.

While slower economic growth in Turkey will limit Sisecam's
organic revenue and earnings growth in the next 1-2 years,
Moody's expects that the company's credit profile will remain
resilient in the current operating environment, given its
leadership position in the domestic market, as well as its strong
financial and liquidity positions.

                              TUPRAS

Moody's confirmed Turpas's Ba1 rating, stable outlook, to reflect
the significant improvement in the company's financial profile,
in line with Moody's assumptions for a Ba1 CFR, following the
completion of its Residual Upgrade Program (RUP) in March 2015
and after a full year of operation.  Debt/EBITDA decreased to
4.1x for the 12-month period to June 2016 from 10.2x as of
December 2014, while retained cash flow (RCF)/debt increased to
16% from 0% in the same period.

Tupras' liquidity has also strengthened significantly following
the completion of RUP and after benefitting from positive
refining margins over the last 12 months.  Funds from operations
(FFO) increased more than nine-fold to TRY3.6 billion for the 12-
month period ending June 2016 from TRY0.4 billion in 2014.  While
Moody's expects FFO generation to normalize to levels around
TRY2.0 billion in 2016, the company's cash position as of June
2016 of TRY3.7 billion, along with the expected FFO will be more
than sufficient to cover Turpras' debt maturities over the next
12 months, as well as its capex and dividend payments.

Tupras' Ba1 ratings also reflect the company's dominant position
in the Turkish market, given that Tupras is the sole refinery in
the country and secures domestic production and distribution of
refined products.

   -- CONFIRMATION OF Ba1 CFR OF DOGUS; NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

DOGUS

Moody's confirmed Dogus' Ba1 ratings with a negative outlook to
reflects the rating agency's assessment that the company's credit
profile is sensitive to slower economic growth in Turkey,
particularly from the contraction in the country's tourism
sector. This is in part because the company has in recent years
made significant investments in expanding its tourism, restaurant
and retail businesses through a mix of equity and debt funding.
Moreover, while the company has been increasing its revenues and
cash flows from international operations through investments in
the hospitality and tourism sectors in Europe and the GCC, those
investments are relatively smaller in scale compared to Dogus'
operations in Turkey and hence do not yet contribute materially
to Dogus cash flows.

The negative outlook also reflects the risk that the company's
investment portfolio matures at a slower pace than originally
anticipated when Moody's upgraded Dogus' ratings to Ba1 with a
stable outlook in October 2015.

                WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

                           Koc Holding

Given the credit linkages between the Koc group and the operating
environment in Turkey, an upgrade of Koc Holding's rating is
constrained by the government of Turkey's Ba1 rating.  The
company's rating could be upgraded if Turkey's sovereign rating
is upgraded in combination with the Koc group continuing to
display a strong financial profile including market value-based
leverage (MVL) remaining below 25%.

Koc Holding's rating could come under negative pressure if
Moody's expects that MVL will exceed 30% on a forward-looking
basis, for instance as a result of a structural decline in the
value of investments during a period of increased leverage and a
weaker liquidity position.

Negative pressure on Turkey's sovereign rating could place
downward pressure on Koc Holding's ratings.

                              OYAK

Given OYAK's close links with the Turkish economy and dependency
on the economic base from which the investments generate income,
OYAK's rating is constrained by the government of Turkey's Ba1
rating.  There could be positive pressure on Oyak's rating if
Turkey's sovereign bond rating is upgraded.

A weakening of the Turkish economy could impact the ability of
its holdings to pay dividends in line with previous years.  This
could have implications for OYAK's FFO interest coverage ratio
and, were the ratio to be sustained below 3.0x, Moody's could
downgrade the rating.  OYAK's rating could also come under
pressure should cash flow distributions to members increase
significantly and therefore weaken OYAK's liquidity profile.

Negative pressure on Turkey's sovereign rating could put downward
pressure on OYAK's ratings.

                              CCI

An upgrade of CCI's standalone rating would require a reduction
of credit metric volatility, which has been caused predominantly
(but not exclusively) by foreign currency swings.  Before
considering upgrading the rating to investment grade on a
standalone basis, Moody's would require evidence that CCI's
refinancing risks were manageable (e.g., having access to
committed facilities).  A rating upgrade would also be dependent
on (1) EBITA margins trending towards 15% on a sustainable basis;
(2) RCF/net debt approaching 35%; and (3) debt/EBITDA remaining
consistently below 2.8x.

Conversely, the rating agency could downgrade the rating if the
company were to increase its pace of expansion and/or shareholder
returns such that (1) EBITA margins were to fall below 10% for
two consecutive fiscal years; (2) RCF/net debt were to fall to
below the high 20s in percentage terms on a sustained basis; and
(3) debt/EBITDA were sustained at above 3.5x.  A reassessment of
bottler support assumptions could also affect the rating and
result in a downgrade.

                             TURKCELL

Given that more than 90% of Turkcell's cash flows are generated
in Turkey, upward pressure will depend on an upgrade of Turkey's
bond rating combined with Turkcell's strong financial profile
including debt/EBITDA below 1.5x.

Turkcell's rating could come under negative pressure if the
rating of the government of Turkey were to be downgraded, given
the strong credit inter-linkages between Turkcell and the Turkish
economy.

There could be also be negative pressure on Turkcell's rating if
it increased its investment and acquisition plans or shareholder
returns such that (1) RCF/debt ratio were to fall below 35%; (2)
debt/EBITDA were to move above 2.0x (taking into account the
company's liquidity profile); and (3) the (EBITDA -
capex)/interest expense ratio were to fall below 5.0x on an
persistent basis.

                             EFES

The outlook can be changed to stable should Efes' operating
environment improve over the next 12 to 18 months, while the
company continues to generate free cash flows.

Efes' ratings could be downgraded if, over the course of the next
12 months, the company's financial profile fails to improve --
such that the EBITA margin for its core beer operations (i.e.,
excluding the impact from consolidating CCI's financials, which
Moody's deconsolidates) reaches double digit (%) levels,
Debt/EBITDA is below 2.5x and EBIT/interest expense improves to
above 4x.  Any assessment at that time would also take into
account the benefits of Efes' ownership stake in CCI as a
counterbalancing factor.

Negative pressure on Turkey's and Russia's sovereign ratings
could put downward pressure on Efes' ratings.

                         SISECAM

Positive rating pressure could build if Sisecam is able to
improve its profitability with EBITDA margin above 20% and its
cash flow coverage (as measured by free cash flow to debt) above
10% on a sustainable basis.  Additionally, an upgrade would also
require Sisecam to diversify and strengthen its geographical
footprint so as to mitigate against event risks while maintaining
debt/EBITDA below 2.5x.

Conversely, Sisecam could come under negative rating pressure if
the group faces a structural decline in profitability with EBITDA
margin below 15% while debt/EBITDA rises above 3.5x.  Negative
rating pressure could also occur should the group's liquidity
deteriorate substantially, as an example, through a large
acquisition.

                             TUPRAS

Upward pressure on the rating is likely if the company
sustainably improves RCF/debt levels above 20%, EBIT/interest
cover above 5.0x whilst maintaining debt/EBITDA below 2.5x.

Ratings could be downgraded if the company fails to maintain
debt/EBITDA below 4.0x.

                               DOGUS

Given the negative outlook on Dogus' rating, an upgrade is
unlikely.  The rating is also constrained by an investment
portfolio that has yet to mature to a level where Dogus regularly
receives a diversified dividend income stream through its
investments and subsidiaries.  In addition, Moody's expectation
would be for MVL to be below 20% and FFO interest coverage above
3.5x on a sustained basis.

The rating could be downgraded if MVL were to increase above 30%
and FFO interest coverage were to remain below 2.5x.  Weaker
liquidity, particularly if holding level cash is less than
upcoming debt maturities (assessed over a rolling 12-18 months
forward-looking view) could also create negative rating pressure.

                        PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in rating Koc Holding A.S., Dogus
Holding A.S. and Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu (OYAK) was Investment
Holding Companies and Conglomerates published in December 2015.

The principal methodology used in rating Turkiye Petrol
Rafinerileri A.S. (Tupras) was Refining and Marketing Industry
published in August 2015.

The principal methodology used in rating Coca-Cola Icecek A.S.
was Global Soft Beverage Industry published in May 2013.

The principal methodology used in rating Turkcell Iletisim
Hizmetleri A.S. was Global Telecommunications Industry published
in December 2010.

The principal methodology used in rating Turkiye Sise ve Cam
Fabrikalari A.S. was Global Manufacturing Companies published in
July 2014.

The principal methodology used in rating Anadolu Efes Biracilik
ve Malt Sanayii A.S. was Global Alcoholic Beverage Industry
published in October 2013.

Koc Holding

Founded in 1926, Koc group is one of Turkey's most prominent
business groups, with investments in various sectors including
energy, automotive, consumer durables and finance.  Koc Holding
A.S. was established in 1963 to house and centrally manage the
group's diverse investment portfolio.  The Koc family members
directly and indirectly own 68.5% of the holding company while
another 22.2% is listed on Borsa Istanbul.

As of the 12-month period ended June 30, 2016, Koc Holding
reported consolidated revenues of TRY68.5 billion ($23.7 billion)
and an operating profit of TRY6.9 billion ($2.4 billion).

                               OYAK

OYAK, based in Ankara/Turkey, is the private top-up pension fund
for Turkish military personnel, and is governed by its own laws
and run by professionals.  As a mutual assistance organization,
its purpose is to provide permanent members with retirement,
death and pension benefits, and to make personal loans.  OYAK
functions as an additional pillar to the state pension system.
OYAK's investments cover a broad range of industries including
iron and steel, cement and concrete, automotive and logistics,
energy, financial services, and chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
As of fiscal year-end (FYE) 2015, OYAK reported total
consolidated assets of TRY51.6 billion.

                               CCI

CCI, headquartered in Istanbul, Turkey, is the fifth-largest
independent bottler in the Coca-Cola system as measured by sales
volume.  The company has 25 production facilities, of which 10
are based throughout Turkey and the remainder in Central Asia,
Pakistan and the Middle East.  CCI is listed on the Borsa
Istanbul and has a market capitalization of TRY9.8 billion ($3.3
billion) as of Sept. 23, 2016.  The group generated sales of
TRY6.9 billion ($2.4 billion) for the 12-month period ended June
30, 2016.  50.3% of CCI's capital is owned by Efes and 20.1% by
The Coca Cola Company (TCCC, Aa3 stable).  Efes and TCCC hold
Class A and B shares in CCI respectively.  These shares provide
Efes and TCCC with special rights, such as nominating a Chairman
and Vice Chairman, as well as certain share put rights in
conjunction with changes of control or the termination of the
bottler's agreement between CCI and TCCC.

                             TURKCELL

Turkcell, headquartered in Istanbul, Turkey and established in
1993, started operations as a mobile telephony service provider
in Turkey in 1994 and acquired a 25-year GSM license in 1998; a
20-year 3G license granted in April 2009; and a 4.5G license
effective for 13 years until April 30, 2029.  Turkcell is an
integrated communication and technology service provider in
Turkey.  The company shares its domestic market with two other
players and captures 36% of the total telephony market and close
to half (47% as of December 2015) of the mobile subscribers.
Over the years it has expanded into Eastern European and Central
Asian countries where it is active in eight countries, plus
Northern Cyprus.

In 2015, the company reported revenues of TRY12.8 billion,
adjusted EBITDA of TRY5.4 billion, total reported debt of TRY4.2
billion and cash and cash equivalents of TRY2.9 billion.  Major
shareholders (directly and indirectly) are TeliaSonera (38.0%;
Baa1 stable), Cukurova Holdings (13.8%) and Alfa Telecom (13.2%)
with the remainder being the free float.

                                EFES

Efes is Turkey's leading beer producer with close to 70% market
share.  Russia is Efes' largest market in terms of volume, with
the percentage of volumes from Russian operations increasing
substantially following the acquisition of SABMiller Plc's (A3
downgrade review) operations in Russia.  Efes' remaining
international operations are based in Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
Moldova and Georgia.  Efes also owns 50.3% of the capital of CCI,
Turkey's leading soft drink producer whose geographical reach
includes other Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries.

Efes, headquartered in Istanbul/Turkey, for the 12-month period
ended 30 June 2016 reported consolidated group sales of
TRY10.2 billion (around $3.5 billion), including TRY3.2 billion
around $1.1 billion) in beer sales.

                              SISECAM

Founded in 1935, Sisecam is a Turkish industrial manufacturer of
glass products as well as soda ash and chromium-based chemicals.
Sisecam has four business segments operating through its core
subsidiaries, namely Trakya Cam Sanayii A.S. (flat glass),
Pasabahce Cam Sanayii ve Tic A.S. (glassware), Anadolu Cam
Sanayii A.S. (glass packaging) and Soda Sanayii A.S. (chemicals).
Over the past decade, the group has been increasing its
geographical footprint in Eastern Europe and CIS as part of its
growth strategy.  Sisecam is 72% owned by Turkiye Is Bankasi
A.S., with an additional 28% listed on Borsa Istanbul.

As of the 12-month period ended June 30, 2016, Sisecam reported
consolidated revenues of TRY7.9 billion and an operating profit
of TRY898 million with sales from its international manufacturing
facilities constituting about a quarter of total revenues.

                               TUPRAS

Tupras is the sole refiner in Turkey, with a dominant position in
the domestic petroleum product market.  The refining business
consists of one very high complexity refinery in Izmit, two
medium complexity refineries located in Izmir and Kirikkale and
one simple refinery in Batman, with a combined annual crude
processing capacity of 28.1 million tonnes.  Other core companies
include (1) a 40% effective ownership stake in Opet, Turkey's
second-largest oil-products distribution company as of July 2016,
with 1,480 stations operating under the Opet and Sunpet brands;
and (2) an 80% stake in Ditas, a shipping company which primarily
serves Tupras's logistic needs.

The company was established in 1983 when various state-owned
refineries were combined under the Tupras name.  As part of the
privatisation process, 2.5% of its shares were publicly floated
in 1991, which had increased to 49% by 2005.  The company was
fully privatised on 26 January 2006 when the remaining 51% stake
was bought by EYAS, a special purpose vehicle owned by a
consortium led by Koc Holding, one of the largest business groups
in Turkey.

Headquartered in Korfez/Turkey, Tupras generated sales of TRY34.0
billion and had a Moody's adjusted operating profit of TRY2.6
billion for the last twelve months ending June 30, 2016.

                              DOGUS

Headquartered in Istanbul, Turkey, Dogus Holding A.S. is an
investment holding company owned by the Sahenk family.  It
comprises more than 200 companies, which are active in eight
sectors: financial services, automotive, construction, media,
tourism & services, real estate, food & entertainment and energy.
The company's main activities are tied to the Turkish economy,
but Dogus is aiming to create regional leaders in their
respective industries.  As of year-end 2015, Dogus Holding
reported consolidated assets of TRY29.4 billion and revenue of
TRY14.8 billion.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS:

Confirmations:

Issuer: Anadolu Efes Biracilik ve Malt Sanayii A.S.
  Issuer Rating, Confirmed at Baa3
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa3

Issuer: Coca-Cola Icecek A.S.
  Issuer Rating, Confirmed at Baa3
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa3

Issuer: Dogus Holding A.S.
  Corporate Family Rating, Confirmed at Ba1
  Probability of Default Rating, Confirmed at Ba1-PD

Issuer: Koc Holding A.S.
  Issuer Rating, Confirmed at Baa3
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa3

Issuer: Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu (OYAK)
  Issuer Rating, Confirmed at Baa3

Issuer: Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S.
  Issuer Rating, Confirmed at Baa3
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa3

Issuer: Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri A.S. (Tupras)
  Corporate Family Rating, Confirmed at Ba1
  Probability of Default Rating, Confirmed at Ba1-PD
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Ba1

Issuer: Turkiye Sise ve Cam Fabrikalari A.S.
  Corporate Family Rating, Confirmed at Ba1
  Probability of Default Rating, Confirmed at Ba1-PD
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Ba1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Anadolu Efes Biracilik ve Malt Sanayii A.S.
  Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Coca-Cola Icecek A.S.
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Dogus Holding A.S.
  Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Koc Holding A.S.
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu (OYAK)
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S.
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri A.S. (Tupras)
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Turkiye Sise ve Cam Fabrikalari A.S.
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review

The local market analyst for Koc Holding A.S. and Turkiye Sise ve
Cam Fabrikalari A.S. ratings is Rehan Akbar, AVP-Analyst,
Corporate Finance Group, Telephone: 9714-237-9565.

The local market analyst for Coca-Cola Icecek A.S., Anadolu Efes
Biracilik ve Malt Sanayii A.S., Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S.
and Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri A.S. (Tupras) ratings is Julien
Haddad, Analyst, Corporate Finance Group, Telephone: 9714-237-
9539.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

DUKINFIELD II PLC: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive long-term
credit ratings to Notes issued by Dukinfield II PLC:

  GBP212.36 mil. Class A Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
   Dec. 2052, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  GBP27.73 mil. Class B Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
   Dec. 2052, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)
  GBP17.43 mil. Class C Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
   Dec. 2052, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)
  GBP18.23 mil. Class D Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
   December 2052, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  GBP 11.09 mil. Class E Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
   Dec. 2052, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Moody's has not assigned ratings to the GBP30.11 mil. Class F
Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due December 2052 and Class Z
Certificates due Dec. 2052.

The portfolio backing this transaction consists of UK non-
conforming residential loans originated by multiple lenders:
GMAC-RFC Limited (currently known as Paratus AMC Limited, 65.7%
of the loans), Dukinfield Mortgages Limited (not rated, formerly
known as Future Mortgages Limited, 14.1% of the loans), Mortgages
1 Limited (not rated, 11.3% of the loans), Edeus Mortgage
Creators Limited (not rated, 2.8% of the loans), Wave Lending
Limited (not rated, 2.4% of the loans), Rooftop Mortgages Limited
(not rated, 2.0% of the loans), Southern Pacific Mortgages
Limited (not rated, 0.7% of the loans), Amber Homeloans Limited
(not rated, 0.5% of the loans), Platform Funding Limited (not
rated, 0.4% of the loans , Citibank Trust Limited (not rated),
Citibank International Limited (A1, formerly known as Citibank
International Plc) and Citifinancial Europe Plc (not rated,
formerly known as Associates Capital Corporation plc).

On the closing date Drake Recoveries Sarl will sell the portfolio
to Dukinfield II PLC.

                       RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings take into account the credit quality of the
underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined the
MILAN Credit Enhancement (CE) and the portfolio expected loss, as
well as the transaction structure and legal considerations.  The
expected portfolio loss of 7.0% and the MILAN CE of 30% serve as
input parameters for Moody's cash flow model, which is based on a
probabilistic lognormal distribution.

The portfolio expected loss of 7.0%: this is higher than other
recent UK non-conforming securitizations and is based on Moody's
assessment of the lifetime loss expectation taking into account:
(i) the number of loans in arrears at closing including the
performance of the pool since January 2011 (29.6% of the pool is
in arrears as of the end of August 2016, of which 14.0% is more
than 30 days in arrears), (ii) the weighted average current LTV
of 84.7% , (iii) the originator limited historical performance
information, (iv) the current macroeconomic environment and our
view of the future macroeconomic environment in the UK, and (v)
benchmarking with similar transactions in the UK non-conforming
sector.

The MILAN CE for this pool is 30%: this is higher than the UK
non-conforming sector average and follows Moody's assessment of
the loan-by-loan information taking into account the historical
performance and the following key drivers: (i) the high weighted
average current LTV of 84.7%, (ii) relatively high balance of
loans to self-certified borrowers (45.8% of the pool), (iii) the
presence of borrowers with bad credit history (22.0% of the pool
containing borrowers with CCJ's); (iv) the exposure to interest
only loans (89.9% of the pool), (v) the weighted average
seasoning of the pool of 9.2 years and (vi) the level of arrears
(around 29.6% as of the end of August 2016).

At closing, the mortgage pool balance consists of GBP 317.0
million of loans.  The reserve fund is funded to 2.5% of the
initial mortgage pool balance and will build up to 3.0% of the
initial mortgage pool balance through the accumulation of excess
spread. The general reserve fund will be split into a liquidity
ledger (the Class A Note Liquidity Reserve Sub-Ledger) and a
credit ledger.  At closing, the liquidity ledger will be sized at
1.0% of the Class A notes and will amortize with the Class A
notes.  As the Class A notes amortize the credit ledger will be
sized as the difference between the general reserve fund and the
liquidity ledger.

Operational Risk Analysis: Pepper (UK) Limited is acting as
servicer and is not rated by Moody's.  In order to mitigate the
operational risk, the transaction has a back-up servicer
facilitator (Structured Finance Management Limited (Not rated));
Homeloan Management Limited (Not rated) is acting as back-up
servicer and Elavon Financial Services DAC (UK Branch), is acting
as an independent cash manager from close.  To ensure payment
continuity over the transaction's lifetime the transaction
documents incorporate estimation language whereby the cash
manager can use the three most recent servicer reports to
determine the cash allocation in case no servicer report is
available.  Class A notes benefit from principal to pay interest,
a dedicated Class A Liquidity Reserve Fund and the Reserve Fund.
Together both reserves provide the Class A notes with the
equivalent of 2 quarters of liquidity assuming a LIBOR rate of
5.7%.

Interest Rate Risk Analysis: The transaction is unhedged with
46.4% of the pool balance linked to Bank of England Base Rate
(BBR), 44.4% linked to three-month LIBOR, 7.0% SVR-linked loans,
2.0% linked to one month-LIBOR.  Moody's has taken the absence of
basis swap into account in its cashflow modeling.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the Notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest with respect to
Class A Notes, ultimate payment of interest to Class B to E Notes
and ultimate payment of principal with respect to Class A to E
Notes by legal final maturity.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the portfolio expected loss
was increased from 7.0% to 10.5% of current balance, and the
MILAN CE was increased from 30% to 36%, the model output
indicates that the Class A notes would still achieve Aaa (sf)
assuming that all other factors remained equal.  Moody's
Parameter Sensitivities quantify the potential rating impact on a
structured finance security from changing certain input
parameters used in the initial rating.  The analysis assumes that
the deal has not aged and is not intended to measure how the
rating of the security might change over time, but instead what
the initial rating of the security might have been under
different key rating inputs.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2016.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with our
expectations at close due to either a change in economic
conditions from our central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic
performance factors would lead to rating actions.  For instance,
should economic conditions be worse than forecast, the higher
defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in downgrade of the ratings.
Deleveraging of the capital structure or conversely a
deterioration in the notes available credit enhancement could
result in an upgrade or a downgrade of the ratings, respectively.


EXTERION MEDIA: Moody's Assigns B1 Long-term Rating
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's, on Sept. 22, 2016, assigned a B1 Long Term Rating to
Exterion Media Holdings Ltd.


FINSBURY SQUARE 2016-2: Moody's Rates Class X Notes (P)Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional long-term
credit ratings to Notes to be issued by Finsbury Square 2016-2:

  GBP mil. Class A mortgage backed floating rate notes due August
   2058, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  GBP mil. Class B mortgage backed floating rate notes due August
   2058, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)
  GBP mil. Class C mortgage backed floating rate notes due August
   2058, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)
  GBP mil. Class D mortgage backed floating rate notes due August
   2058, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)
  GBP mil. Class E mortgage backed floating rate notes due August
   2058, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)
  GBP mil. Class X floating rate notes due August 2058, Assigned
   (P)Caa3 (sf)

Moody's has not assigned ratings to the GBP mil. Class Z.

The portfolio backing this transaction consists of UK prime
residential loans originated by Kensington Mortgage Company
Limited ("KMC", not rated).  The loans were sold by KMC to Koala
Warehouse Limited (the "Seller", not rated) at the time of each
loan origination date.  On the closing date the Seller will sell
the portfolio to Finsbury Square 2016-2.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of the notes take into account, among other factors:

  (1) the performance of the previous transactions launched by
      KMC;

  (2) the credit quality of the underlying mortgage loan pool,

  (3) legal considerations and (4) the initial credit enhancement
      provided to the senior notes by the junior notes and the
      reserve fund.

    -- Expected Loss and MILAN CE Analysis

Moody's determined the MILAN credit enhancement (MILAN CE) and
the portfolio's expected loss (EL) based on the pool's credit
quality. The MILAN CE reflects the loss Moody's expects the
portfolio to suffer in the event of a severe recession scenario.
The expected portfolio loss of [2]% and the MILAN CE of [11]%
serve as input parameters for Moody's cash flow model and
tranching model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal
distribution.

Portfolio expected loss of [2]%: this is higher than the UK Prime
RMBS sector average and was evaluated by assessing the
originator's limited historical performance data and benchmarking
with other UK prime RMBS transactions.  It also takes into
account Moody's stable UK Prime RMBS outlook and the UK economic
environment.

MILAN CE of [11]%: this is higher than the UK Prime RMBS sector
average and follows Moody's assessment of the loan-by-loan
information taking into account the historical performance
available and the following key drivers: (i) although Moody's
have classified the loans as prime, it believes that borrowers in
the portfolio often have characteristics which could lead to them
being declined from a high street lender; (ii) the weighted
average CLTV of [71.13]%, (iii) the very low seasoning of [0.28]
years, (iv) the proportion of interest-only loans ([17.66]%); (v)
the proportion of buy-to-let loans ([14.9]%); and (vi) the
absence of any right-to-buy, shared equity, fast track or self-
certified loans.

   -- Transaction structure

At closing the mortgage pool balance will consist of GBP million
of loans.  The General Reserve Fund will be equal to 2.0% of the
principal amount outstanding of Class A and E notes.  This amount
will only be available to pay senior expenses, Class A, Class B,
Class C and Class D notes interest and to cover losses.  The
Reserve Fund will be not amortizing as long as the Class D notes
are outstanding.  After Class D has been fully amortized, the
Reserve Fund will be equal to 0%.  The Reserve fund will be
released to the revenue waterfall on the final legal maturity or
after the full repayment of Class D notes.  If the Reserve fund
is less than 1.5% of the principal outstanding of class A to E, a
liquidity reserve fund will be funded with principal proceeds up
to an amount equal to 2% of the Classes A and B.

   -- Operational risk analysis

KMC will be acting as servicer.  KMC will sub-delegate certain
primary servicing obligations to Home Loan Management Limited
(HML, not rated) and Acenden Limited (Acenden, not rated).  All
loans originated from 17th March 2016 are serviced by Acenden.
The loans originated prior to 17th March 2016 are serviced by HML
with possibility to transfer servicing of this sub-pool to
Acenden.  In order to mitigate the operational risk, there will
be a back-up servicer facilitator (Structured Finance Management
Limited, not rated, also acting as corporate services provider),
and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Aa2/P-1/Aa1(cr)) will be acting as a
back-up cash manager from close.

All of the payments under the loans in the securitized pool will
be paid into the collection account in the name of KMC at
Barclays Bank plc ("Barclays", A2/P-1 and A1(cr)/P-1(cr)).  There
is a daily sweep of the funds held in the collection account into
the issuer account.  In the event Barclays rating falls below
Baa3 the collection account will be transferred to an entity
rated at least Baa3.  There will be a declaration of trust over
the collection account held with Barclays in favor of the Issuer.
The issuer account is held in the name of the SPV at Citibank
N.A., London Branch (A1/(P)P-1 and A1(cr)/P-1(cr)) with a
transfer requirement if the rating of the account bank falls
below A3.  Moody's has taken into account the commingling risk
associated with the collection account within its cash flow
modeling.

To ensure payment continuity over the transaction's lifetime the
transaction documents including the swap agreement incorporate
estimation language whereby the cash manager can use the three
most recent servicer reports to determine the cash allocation in
case no servicer report is available.  The transaction also
benefits from principal to pay interest for Class A to D notes,
subject to certain conditions being met.

   -- Interest rate risk analysis

At closing [100%] of the loans in the pool are fixed-rate
mortgage, which will revert to three-month sterling Libor plus
margin between January 2018 and May 2021.  The note coupons are
linked to three-month sterling Libor, which leads to a fixed-
floating rate mismatch in the transaction.  To mitigate the
fixed-floating rate mismatch the structure benefits from a fixed-
floating swap.  The swap will mature the earlier of the date on
which floating rating notes have redeemed in full or the date on
which the swap notional is reduced to zero.  BNP Paribas (A1/P-
1/Aa3(cr)/P-1(cr)) is expected to act as the swap counterparty
for the fixed-floating swap in the transaction.

After the fixed rate loans revert to floating rate, there is a
basis risk mismatch in the transaction, which results from the
mismatch between the reset dates of the three-month Libor of the
loans in the pool and the three-month Libor used to calculate the
interest payments on the notes.  Moody's has taken into
consideration the absence of basis swap in its cash flow
modeling.

   -- Stress Scenarios

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: At the time the ratings were
assigned, the model output indicates that the Class A Notes would
still achieve Aaa(sf), even if the portfolio expected loss was
increased from 2% to 6% and the MILAN CE was increased from 11%
to 17.6%, assuming that all other factors remained the same.  The
Class B Notes would have achieved Aa1(sf), even if MILAN CE was
increased to 13.2% from 11.0% and the portfolio expected loss was
increased to 4% from 2% and all other factors remained the same.
The Class C Notes would have achieved A1(sf), even if MILAN CE
was increased to 13.2% from 11.0% and the portfolio expected loss
was increased to 3% from 2% and all other factors remained the
same. The Class D Notes would have achieved Baa1(sf) if the
expected loss remained at 2% assuming MILAN CE increased to 17.6%
and all other factors remained the same.  The Class E Notes would
have achieved Ba3(sf) if the expected loss remained at 2%
assuming MILAN CE increased to 17.6% and all other factors
remained the same.  The Class X Notes would have achieved
Caa3(sf) if the expected loss remained at 2% assuming MILAN CE
increased to 17.6% and all other factors remained the same.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities quantify the potential rating
impact on a structured finance security from changing certain
input parameters used in the initial rating.  The analysis
assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might change over time, but
instead what the initial rating of the security might have been
under different key rating inputs.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with our
expectations at close due to either a change in economic
conditions from our central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic
performance factors would lead to rating actions.  For instance,
should economic conditions be worse than forecast, the higher
defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in downgrade of the ratings.
Deleveraging of the capital structure or conversely a
deterioration in the notes available credit enhancement could
result in an upgrade or a downgrade of the rating, respectively.

The provisional ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the Notes.  In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal with respect to the Class A, Class
B, Class C and Class D Notes by the legal final maturity.  In
Moody's opinion, the structure allows for ultimate payment of
interest and principal with respect to the Class E and Class X
Notes by the legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings only address
the credit risk associated with the transaction.  Other non-
credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant
effect on yield to investors.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion.  Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavour
to assign definitive ratings to the Notes.  A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating.


MARSHALL GROUP: In Administration, 23 Jobs at Risk
--------------------------------------------------
Owen Hughes at Daily Post reports that Marshall Group has gone
into administration due to bad weather and the Brexit vote.

Jason Bell -- jason.bell@uk.gt.com -- and Christopher Petts --
chris.petts@uk.gt.com -- of Grant Thornton UK LLP have been
appointed administrators to the Marshall Group, an importer of
beach goods and novelty items, Daily Post relates.

The company had suffered losses after two bad summers and was set
to be hit by rising import prices after the Brexit vote saw the
pound devalued, Daily Post discloses.

Marshall Group has annual sales of around GBP4 million and
supplies more than 3,000 product lines, including buckets &
spades and windbreakers, to shops in seaside resorts all over the
UK, Daily Post states.

All 23 staff have been paid until the end of the month, Daily
Post notes.

According to Daily Post, there will be some redundancies at the
month end with a number of staff retained in the short term to
assist with the realisation of assets for the benefit of the
creditors.

Mr. Bell, as cited by Daily Post, said: "The recent losses and
import price rises on the horizon for next year have been the
final straw for the business and the directors have reluctantly
taken steps to protect the creditors of the company."

"Whilst we will explore all options, the timing of the failure
will make the company unattractive to purchasers with an ongoing
cost base and limited sales opportunities until the 2017 season.

"The job losses are sadly unavoidable.  We will be retaining a
skeleton staff to wind the business down."

Marshall Group is a seaside goods supplier.


NIELSEN FINANCE: Moody's Retains Ba3 CFR on Term Loan Upsize
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said Nielsen Finance LLC's, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Nielsen Holdings plc, upsize of the new term
loan B-3 to $1.9 billion from $500 million will not change the
Ba1 facility rating, Nielsen's Ba3 corporate family rating, or
any other existing ratings.  The outlook remains positive.

The proceeds from the new term loan B-3 are expected to be used
to repay the existing term loan B-1, the US$ tranche of the term
loan B-2, and the $385 million outstanding revolver balance.  The
transaction is expected to increase the maturity profile of the
company, as 2017 and 2021 term loans are refinanced with loans
maturing in 2023, as well as lower interest expense.  Leverage is
unchanged at 4.6x as of Q2 2016 pro-forma for the proposed
transaction, but the issuance of long term debt to repay the
revolving credit facility during a period of significant stock
repurchase activity is aggressive.  Moody's will withdrawal the
ratings of the term loan B-1 and US$ term loan B-2 after
repayment.  The Euro term loan B-2 is expected to remain
outstanding.

Nielsen Holdings plc, founded in 1923 and headquartered in
Oxford, England and New York, NY, is a global provider of
consumer information and measurement that operates in more than
100 countries.  Nielsen's Buy segment (54% of LTM 6/30/2016
reported revenue) provides retail measurement and consumer panel
measurement services as well as consumer intelligence and
analytical services for clients.  The Watch segment (46%)
provides viewership and listenership data and analytics across
television, radio, online and mobile devices for the media and
advertising industries.  Nielsen is publicly traded and shares
are widely-held. Net revenue totaled $6.2 billion for the 12
months ended June 30, 2016.


PARK REGIS: In Administration, Investors Face Loss
--------------------------------------------------
Belfast Telegraph reports that Park Regis Birmingham Limited
Liability Partnership (LLP), a GBP48 million hotel investment
scheme that promised lucrative tax breaks and which won backing
from sports stars like Rory McIlroy and Graeme McDowell, has
ended up in administration.

The partnership created to execute the scheme raised GBP27
million of loans and GBP21.5 million of investor capital,
including an average individual investment of around GBP137,820,
Belfast Telegraph relates.  But it is understood the scheme ended
up in administration because not all of the signed up investors
put their promised capital in on time, causing it to default on
the debt, Belfast Telegraph relays.

The scheme was taken into administration on Aug. 17 this year,
with Paul Stanley of Begbies Traynor appointed as administrator,
Belfast Telegraph recounts.

He has since sold the Park Regis Hotel for GBP23 million to
Staywell Hospitality, the company that operates it -- and which
had provided the original loans to the LLP, Belfast Telegraph
notes.  The sale left the LLP investors who funded the
redevelopment nursing a loss, Belfast Telegraph states.

According to Belfast Telegraph, the final sale price came in at
GBP3 million above the valuation put on the hotel by real estate
firm CBRE.


RED HOT: Restaurant Administration Blamed On Sales
--------------------------------------------------
Insider Media reports that Red Hot World Buffet fell into
administration after suffering from declining sales and negative
PR attention due to employment tribunal claims brought by former
employees as well as court proceedings arising from the discovery
of rodents during an inspection, new documents have revealed.

Administrators have also shed light on efforts to find buyers for
the chain's all-you-can-eat restaurants in Manchester, Liverpool,
Leeds, Leicester and Cardiff, according to Insider Media.

The report says Bolton-headquartered Buffet Restaurants, the
group holding company of the Red Hot World Buffet business,
appointed insolvency specialists to its subsidiaries in the
summer of 2016. Buffet Restaurants' subsidiaries Passepartout's
and Helen's Cuisines both entered administration on July 26,
2016, with Russell Cash and Ben Woolrych of FRP Advisory
appointed joint administrators.

The report discloses that Passepartout's traded from premises in
Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and Leicester, while Helen's
Cuisines traded from premises in Cardiff.  The two companies,
which underwent a management buyout led by private equity firm
Risk Capital Partners in 2013, collectively employed
approximately 370 members of staff, the report relays.

In audited accounts to January 31, 2015, Passepartout's posted a
turnover of GBP13.3 million and pre-tax losses of GBP27,000,
while Helen's Cuisines reported a turnover of GBP8.3 million and
pre-tax losses of GBP1.3 million, the report relays.

According to documents contained in a newly published statement
of administrator's proposals, there were several reasons why the
business ran into financial difficulties, the report relays.

It said: "Red Hot World Buffet began to suffer from declining
sales in FY2015. In addition to this, the Liverpool premises
suffered negative PR attention due to exceptional events such as
employment tribunals claims brought by former employees and court
proceedings as a result of an environmental health organisation
visit to the Liverpool restaurant during which rodents were
found," the report notes.

"The subsequent reduction in sales significantly impacted the
companies' cash flow, which ultimately resulted in a build-up of
rent arrears and breaches of suppliers' credit terms."

In addition, the documents reveal that the trading performance at
all five restaurants was below the levels achieved in previous
years.  And they indicate that while the sites in Manchester,
Leeds and Cardiff were generating an acceptable level of sales,
the performance in Liverpool and Leicester was significantly
worse, the report relates.

Insider Media notes that FRP Advisory reported that a number of
offers were made for the Liverpool restaurant but all were
subsequently withdrawn, while no offers were forthcoming for the
Leicester restaurant.  As a result, the administrators closed
both the Liverpool and Leicester sites and made all employees
redundant on July 26, 2016, the day that they were appointed, the
report relays.

However, buyers were found for the other three restaurants.  The
Cardiff restaurant was sold to Bluewood Investment trading as JRC
for a total of GBP227,000 on July 26, the Leeds restaurant was
sold to Chopstix Middlesbrough for a total of GBP300,000 on July
29, and the Manchester restaurant was sold to Mighty Rhino for a
total of GBP434,328 on August 5, the report relays.

Fresh information has also come to light about the multimillion-
pound shortfall facing Red Hot World Buffet's creditors, the
report notes.

The report discloses that Barclays and Risk Capital Partners are
the secured creditors of Passepartout's and Helen's Cuisines.
Barclays is owed GBP1.7 million and there is expected to be a
distribution made under its fixed charge, although the bank is
still likely to suffer a significant shortfall, the report
relays.  And Risk Capital Partners is owed GBP9.9 million, but
the documents suggest that there are insufficient funds to enable
a distribution to the private equity firm, the report discloses.

Meanwhile, preferential creditor claims are estimated at
GBP150,000 relating to pay arrears, pension contributions and
holiday pay.  The administrators expect that there will not be
enough funds available to make a distribution to these creditors,
the report relays.

And the value of claims from unsecured creditors in
Passepartout's and Helen's Cuisines is set at GBP1.2 million and
GBP108,863 respectively, the report notes.  It is not expected
that there will be sufficient funds to make a distribution to
unsecured creditors, the report adds.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: The First Junk Bond
----------------------------------
Author: Harlan D. Platt
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 236 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher

Order your personal copy today and one for a colleague at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/the_first_junk_bond.html
Only one in ten failed businesses is equal to the task of
reorganizing itself and satisfying its prior debts in some
fashion. This engrossing book follows the extraordinary journey
of Texas International, Inc (known by its New York Stock
Exchange stock symbol, TEI), through its corporate growth and
decline, debt exchange offers, and corporate renaissance as
Phoenix Resource Companies, Inc. As Harlan Platt puts it, TEI
"flourished for a brief luminous moment but then crashed to
earth and was consumed." TEI's story features attention-grabbing
characters, petroleum exploration innovations, financial
innovations, and lots of risk taking.

The First Junk Bond was originally published in 1994 and
received solidly favorable reviews. The then-managing director
of High Yield Securities Research and Economics for Merrill
Lynch said that the book "is a richly detailed case study. Platt
integrates corporate history, industry fundamentals, financial
analysis and bankruptcy law on a scale that has rarely, if ever,
been attempted." A retired U.S. Bankruptcy Court judge noted,
"(i)t should appeal as supplementary reading to students in both
business schools and law schools. Even those who practice in the
areas of business law, accounting and investments can obtain a
greater understanding and perspective of their professional
expertise."

"TEI's saga is noteworthy because of the company's resilience
and ingenuity in coping with the changing environment of the
1980s, its execution of innovative corporate strategies that
were widely imitated and its extraordinary trading history,"
says the author. TEI issued the first junk bond. In 1986 it
achieved the largest percentage gain on the NYSE, and in 1987
suffered the largest percentage loss. It issued one of the first
bonds secured by a physical commodity and then later issued one
of the first PIK (payment in kind) bonds. It was one of the
first vulture investors, to be targeted by vulture investors
later on. Its president was involved in an insider trading
scandal. It innovated strip financing. It engaged in several
workouts to sell off operations and raise cash to reduce debt.
It completed three exchange offers that converted debt in to
equity.

In 1977, TEI, primarily an oil production outfit, had had a
reprieve from bankruptcy through Michael Milken's first ever
junk bond. The fresh capital had allowed TEI to acquire a
controlling interest of Phoenix Resources Company, a part of
King Resources Company. TEI purchased creditors' claims against
King that were subsequently converted into stock under the terms
of King's reorganization plan. Only two years later, cash
deficiencies forced Phoenix to sell off its nonenergy
businesses. Vulture investors tried to buy up outstanding TEI
stock. TEI sold off its own nonenergy businesses, and focused on
oil and gas exploration. An enormous oil discovery in Egypt made
the future look grand. The value of TEI stock soared. Somehow,
however, less than two years later, TEI was in bankruptcy. What
a ride! All told, the book has 63 tables and 32 figures on all
aspects of TEI's rise, fall, and renaissance. Businesspeople will
find especially absorbing the details of how the company's
bankruptcy filing affected various stakeholders, the bankruptcy
negotiation process, and the alternative post-bankruptcy
financial structures that were considered. Those interested in
the oil and gas industry will find the book a primer on the
subject, with an appendix devoted to exploration and drilling,
and another on oil and gas accounting.

Harlan Platt is professor of Finance at Northeastern University.
He is president of 911RISK, Inc., which specializes in
developing analytical models to predict corporate distress.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *