TCREUR_Public/161025.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, October 25, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 211


                            Headlines


D E N M A R K

NASSA FINCO: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to Ba2


F R A N C E

SAPPHIREONE MORTGAGES: DBRS Assigns BB Rating to Class E Notes


G E R M A N Y

HANJIN SHIPPING: To Close Regional Headquarters in Germany
K+S AG: S&P Lowers CCRs to 'BB+/B', Outlook Negative


G R E E C E

GREECE: Labor Minister Disagrees with Creditors Over Reforms


I T A L Y

BANCO POPOLARE: Moody's Hikes Long Term Deposit Ratings to Ba1


N E T H E R L A N D S

ACISION BV: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corporate Family Rating
HEMA BV: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC+', Outlook Stable
LYONDELL CHEMICAL: Len Blavatnik Defends Boom-Era Merger
VTR FINANCE: S&P Affirms 'B+' CCR, Outlook Stable


N O R W A Y

LOCK LOWER: S&P Affirms 'B+' LT Counterparty Credit Ratings


R U S S I A

CREDIT BANK: S&P Rates Proposed US$-Denom. Sr. Unsec. LPNs 'BB-'


S P A I N

CODERE SA: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR & Rates EUR775MM Sr. Notes 'B'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

LION/GLORIA: Moody's Places B3 CFR on Review for Upgrade
PREMIER MOTOR: In Legal Fight with Lloyds Bank Over Takeover

* UK: Smaller Construction Firms Face "Severe" Cash-Flow Issues
* UK: SMEs Owed GBP586 Billion in Unpaid Invoices, Report Shows


                            *********


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D E N M A R K
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NASSA FINCO: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, ("Moody's") has upgraded Nassa Finco
AS' (Nets or the company) corporate family rating (CFR) to Ba2
from B2 and probability of default rating (PDR) to Ba2-PD from
B2-PD. Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded to Ba2 from B2 the
instrument ratings on the senior secured bank facilities issued
by Nassa Midco AS and Nets Holding A/S, both subsidiaries of the
company. The outlook on all ratings is stable. This rating action
concludes the review for upgrade initiated on September 15, 2016.

Moody's will subsequently withdraw the ratings of the senior
secured bank facilities. These facilities were repaid on
September 27, 2016, following the successful completion of the
initial public offering (IPO) of Nets A/S and the listing of its
shares on Nasdaq Copenhagen on September 23, 2016. The
approximately DKK5.5 billion of proceeds from the issuance of new
shares alongside cash on balance sheet and drawings under new
banking facilities were used to (1) repay DKK4.2 billion of
payment-in-kind (PIK) loan outstanding as of June 30, 2016, and
its make whole premium issued by Nassa Holdco AS, Nets' parent
company, (2) repay the company's outstanding senior secured bank
facilities, and (3) pay transaction fees.

Based on the new banking facilities agreement, Moody's notes that
Nets A/S is the top entity of the banking group and will report
audited consolidated accounts going forward. The new banking
facilities consist of a EUR485 million Term Loan 1 maturing in
2019, a EUR485 million Term Loan 2 maturing in 2021, and a EUR475
million Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) maturing in 2021 raised
by Nassa Midco AS.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The 3-notch upgrade of Nets' CFR to Ba2 from B2 reflects (1) the
significant decrease in the company's pro-forma adjusted leverage
(pro-forma for the IPO and debt refinancing and adjusted by
Moody's mainly for operating leases and capitalized development
costs) towards 5.0x from close to 6.0x as projected by Moody's as
of the end of 2016, (2) the expectation of continued de-
leveraging beyond 2016 supported by positive revenue and margin
fundamentals and the strong position of the company within the
Nordic payments value chain, (3) the repayment of the PIK loan,
issued by Nassa Holdco AS, which removes the risk of this
facility being repaid through a re-leveraging of the banking
group of which Nets was the top entity, and (4) the adequate
liquidity position supported by strong free cash flow (FCF)
generation (excluding changes in clearing working capital) that
Moody's projects at well above DKK1.0 billion per annum from 2017
and EUR215 million availability under the new EUR475 million RCF.

However, the rating remains constrained by (1) the company's
revenue concentration in the Nordic region, (2) its limited scale
compared to peers with the prospect of rising competition from
international players, and (3) the relatively high starting
leverage at the closing of the IPO.

The lower pro-forma projected leverage is driven by the net
reduction in Nets' outstanding debt -- with the repayment of
DKK10.4 billion of senior secured bank facilities with DKK9.0
billion of drawings under the new banking facilities as of 30
June 2016. Further deleveraging beyond 2016 will be supported by
the continued improvement in operating performance driven by
revenue growth projected by Moody's at 3-5% per annum and
increase in EBITDA margin beyond 35% (as reported by the company)
over the medium-term and a significant reduction in special
items, which include costs related to the company's multi-year
transformation plan and reorganization and restructuring costs.

Moody's notes that availability under the long-term RCF will be
complemented by short-term clearing and overdraft facilities
totaling approximately EUR210 million available for the members
of the group which are responsible for clearing activities.
Together, these lines will offset the low cash balance of DKK100
million pro-forma for the IPO.

The outlook on all ratings is stable. This reflects Moody's
expectation that Nets will continue to report revenue growth and
EBITDA margin improvement while maintaining a prudent financial
strategy based on its dividend policy of distributing 20%-30% of
net income to be paid from 2018 and limiting the scale of its
acquisitions.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

While unlikely in the short-term due to the relatively weak
positioning of the company within the Ba2 rating category,
positive pressure on the ratings could arise if (1) the company
experiences continued revenue growth such that the company
increases its scale and geographic diversity while further
enhancing its profitability; (2) adjusted leverage trends towards
3.0x; (3) FCF-to-debt (excluding changes in clearing working
capital) increases above 20% on a sustained basis; and (4) the
company maintains a good liquidity position and a conservative
financial policy.

On the other hand, negative pressure could arise if (1) Nets
experiences pressure on its revenues or margins; (2) the company
fails to reduce its adjusted leverage to below 4.5x in the next
18 months; (2) FCF-to-debt (excluding changes in clearing working
capital) remains below 10% on a sustained basis; (3) the
liquidity position deteriorates; and/or (4) the company adopts a
more aggressive financial policy.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

Headquartered in Copenhagen, Denmark, Nets is the largest pan-
Nordic payments processor focusing on Norway, Denmark, and
Finland, and second largest in Europe. Nets generated net
revenues of DKK6,836 million and EBITDA of DKK2,248 million (as
reported by the company) in 2015. Nets splits its activities
between three divisions: Merchant Services (27% of 2015 net
revenues), Financial & Network Services (32%), and Corporate
Services (41%).


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SAPPHIREONE MORTGAGES: DBRS Assigns BB Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned the following provisional ratings
to the securitisation notes to be issued by SapphireOne Mortgages
FCT 2016-2 (the Issuer or SapphireOne):

   -- Class A Notes: AAA (sf)

   -- Class B Notes: AA (sf)

   -- Class C Notes: A (sf)

   -- Class D Notes: BBB (sf)

   -- Class E Notes: BB (sf)

The Issuer is a French fonds commun de titrisation established
jointly by EuroTitrisation S.A., the management company, and
Societe Generale, the custodian. The issued notes will be used to
fund the purchase of residential mortgage loans secured
effectively by first lien over properties located in France which
have been originated by GE Money Bank S.C.A. (GEMB or the Bank).
However, the sellers of the mortgage loans, in addition to GEMB,
will be GE SCF, the covered bond vehicle/legal entity of GEMB.
GEMB will also be the servicer of the portfolio.

The provisional mortgage portfolio aggregates EUR1.559 billion
(as of August 31, 2016) and consists exclusively of loans
provided to borrowers for the purposes of refinancing an existing
financing for the acquisition of, construction or works on,
residential real estate property(ies) and/or to refinance
existing consumer credits, bank overdrafts or other indebtedness
(including personal debts) and, as the case may be, for the
purpose of other personal consumption needs, provided that all
mortgage loans to a borrower which are secured on the same
property are included in the provisional mortgage portfolio.
Among the loans in the provisional mortgage portfolio, 17.67% are
sold by GE SCF, with the remaining sold by GEMB.

The ratings are based on the following analytical considerations:

Historical performance of the mortgage product: Approximately
20.87% of the provisional portfolio was originated in 2006, 2007
and 2008. These origination vintages have performed worse
relative to other GEMB origination vintages. Since 2008, GEMB has
tightened the origination criteria on loan-to-value (LTV) and
debt-to-income, which has resulted in better performance of
origination vintages from 2009 onward. Among the loans in the
provisional mortgage portfolio, 26.80% are recent originations
(from the years 2015 and 2016). DBRS has considered the
historical performance of the loans in the assessment of the
credit risk of the provisional mortgage portfolio.

Loan instalment protection mechanism: Approximately 65% of the
provisional mortgage portfolio has monthly repayment instalments
protected, where the full extent of any increases in interest
rates is not passed on to the borrower through an increase in the
instalments. The increase in instalments amount is annual, with
the instalment protection linked to inflation. DBRS has
considered the potential increase in instalments in a rising
interest rate scenario in the cash flow analysis of the
transaction.

Potential negative amortization of loans: Any change in interest
rates may also result in a change to the interest versus
principal repayment portions of the monthly instalment. In a
rising interest rate scenario, the interest repayment portion of
the instalment will increase, resulting in slower amortization of
the loan. If the interest rates rise is such that the entire
instalment is not enough to pay the interest on the loans, the
excess amount of interest unpaid will be capitalized, thus
resulting in negative amortization. A structural feature of the
transaction enables the amortization of the notes based on an
amortization schedule defined at closing of the transaction. The
targeted amortization of the notes is based on the calculated
amortization of the loan using the principal outstanding of the
loan, the interest rate of the loan and the instalment of the
loan at closing of the transaction. Thus, irrespective of the
share of interest and principal repayments of the loans' monthly
instalment, the monthly instalment amount will be split into
interest and principal receipts and will reference the scheduled
amortization of the loan at closing of the transaction. The
interest amount of the instalment will be calculated based on the
lesser of the current interest rate of the loan and the one at
closing. As a result, the amortization of the notes is not
expected to be adversely affected on account of slower or
negative amortization of the loan. DBRS has adjusted the default
probability of the loans to account for the potential balloon
principal repayment risk in the rising interest rate scenario.

Legal title and servicing of loans: On the closing date, the
legal and beneficial title of the mortgage loans will be
transferred to the Issuer by GEMB and GE SCF, respectively.
However, the representations and warranties on the entire
mortgage portfolio will be provided only by GEMB. GEMB will
service the mortgage portfolio during the life of the
transaction. A backup servicer is not expected to be appointed;
however, the management company, EuroTitrisation S.A., is
expected to facilitate the process to find a suitable replacement
in the event of a servicer termination event. GEMB's servicing
capabilities are considered appropriate to be able to monitor and
manage the performance of its mortgage book and securitized
mortgage portfolios.

On June 23, 2016, GE Inc. received a binding offer from an
affiliate of Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. for the potential
sale of GEMB and its operations in the French Overseas
Territories. DBRS believes that GEMB's current financial
condition mitigates the risk of a potential disruption in
servicing following a servicer event of default, including
insolvency. Moreover, the rated notes will have necessary
liquidity support from the reserve fund on account of any
temporary servicing disruption.

Loans in dispute, arrears, default or restructured loans: 5.45%
of the loans in the provisional mortgage portfolio, are either in
default (1.22%), disputed or subject to litigation (1.37%), or in
arrears for more than 30 days (1.53%). Additionally, 4.46% of the
loans are either subject to a restructuring plan with Banque de
France (3.26%) or on a restructuring plan with GEMB. DBRS has
stressed these loans appropriately in the estimation of defaults
for the provisional mortgage portfolio.

Credit Enhancement and liquidity support for the notes: At
closing, the credit enhancement (CE) for the rated Class A notes
is expected to comprise subordination of 17.22% by the
collateralized junior notes and a non-liquidity reserve fund of
0.42% of the aggregate mortgage portfolio balance. The liquidity
of the rated notes is supported by a liquidity reserve fund (LRF)
(2.50% of the balance of the Class A notes). The LRF supports any
shortfalls in payment of interest on the Class A notes without
any conditions. However, the use of the LRF for the payment of
any shortfall in interest payments for the junior notes is
allowed only if the principal deficiency ledger (PDL) outstanding
for a class of notes does not exceed 10% of the outstanding
amount of respective classes of notes. As the liquidity reserve
amortizes, the released amounts would add to the non-liquidity
reserve amount (NLRF). The credit enhancement of the rated junior
notes is expected to be: Class B, 13.57%; Class C, 10.62%; Class
D, 8.57%; and Class E, 6.77%. Principal receipts may also be used
for shortfall in payments of senior fees and interest on the
rated notes, subject to the same PDL triggers as those for the
use of LRF to support liquidity of the rated notes.

Fixed- to floating-rate and basis risk hedged: The rated notes
pay interest linked to the three-month Euribor rate. The
mortgages pay floating-rate interest linked to the one-month
Euribor rate (52.95%) or the three-month Euribor rate (7.99%),
fixed-rate interest with periodic resets (5.33%) and fixed-rate
interest (for life) with no resets (33.65%) The basis risk is
hedged with an interest rate swap with notional balance equal to
the outstanding principal balance of the rated notes. The swap
notional will exclude the balance of a rated class of notes if
the PDL for the class of notes immediately senior is more than
50% of the size of that class of notes. The Issuer will pay a
fixed rate to the swap provider and will receive the notes'
three-month Euribor rate.

Three-month Euribor rate under the Swap: The three-month Euribor
rate paid under the swap to the Issuer will match that paid on
the notes. The three-month Euribor rate as of 14 October 2016 is
negative, at -0.31%. The Issuer will pay this negative interest
rate in addition to the fixed rate payable to the swap provider.
Although the Issuer may not have an interest liability under the
notes (floored at zero percent), its liability under the swap may
increase if the three-month Euribor rate declines further into
negative territory. The swap includes a floor on the three-month
Euribor rate at -1.50%, applicable in the period upto the margin
step-up date on the notes, which partially mitigates this risk.
DBRS has applied a declining interest rate stress wherein the
three-month Euribor declines to -0.50%.

The transaction was modeled in Intex to perform the cash flow
analysis using DBRS stresses.

Notes:

All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodology applicable is Master European
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Rating Methodology and
Jurisdictional Addenda (May 2016).

DBRS has applied the principal methodology consistently and
conducted a review of the transaction in accordance with the
principal methodology.

Other methodologies referenced in this transaction are listed at
the end of this press release.

For a more detailed discussion of the sovereign risk impact on
Structured Finance ratings, please refer to DBRS commentary "The
Effect of Sovereign Risk on Securitisations in the Euro Area".

The sources of information used for this rating include GEMB,
INSEE France and Banque de France.

DBRS does not rely upon third-party due diligence in order to
conduct its analysis.

DBRS was supplied with third party assessments. However, this did
not impact the rating analysis.

DBRS considers the information available to it for the purposes
of providing this rating was of satisfactory quality.

DBRS does not audit the information it receives in connection
with the rating process, and it does not and cannot independently
verify that information in every instance.

This rating concerns a newly issued financial instrument. This is
the first DBRS rating on this financial instrument.

Information regarding DBRS ratings, including definitions,
policies and methodologies are available on www.dbrs.com.

To assess the impact of the changing the transaction parameters
on the rating, DBRS considered the following stress scenarios, as
compared to the parameters used to determine the rating (the Base
Case):

Probability of Default (PD) and Loss Given Default (LGD) and
Expected Loss (EL):

   -- For the AAA rating stress scenario: PD estimate was 35.84%,
      LGD estimate was 24.71% and EL was 8.86%;

   -- For the AA rating stress scenario: PD estimate was 29.80%,
      LGD estimate was 16.90% and EL was 5.04%;

   -- For the "A" rating stress scenario: PD estimate was 25.76%,
      LGD estimate was 13.44% and EL was 3.46%;

   -- For the BBB rating stress scenario: PD estimate was 21.12%,
      LGD estimate was 9.36% and EL was 1.98%;

   -- For the BB rating stress scenario: PD estimate was 15.05%,
      LGD estimate was 5.46% and EL was 0.82%; and

   -- For the B rating stress scenario: PD estimate was 9.97%,
      LGD estimate was 3.13% and EL was 0.31%.

DBRS concludes that a hypothetical increase of the base case PD
by 25% or 50% alone or combined with an increase in the LGD by
25% or 50% does not affect the ratings on the notes.

Ratings assigned by DBRS Ratings Limited are subject to EU
regulations only.

Initial Lead Analyst: Kali Sirugudi, Vice President
Initial Rating Date: 20 October 2016
Initial Rating Committee Chair: Quincy Tang, Managing Director

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Kevin Ma, Assistant Vice President

DBRS Ratings Limited
20 Fenchurch Street, 31st Floor, London EC3M 3BY United Kingdom

Registered in England and Wales: No. 7139960

   -- Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions

   -- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance
      Servicers

   -- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance
      Originators

   -- Master European Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
      Rating Methodology and Jurisdictional Addenda

   -- Unified Interest Rate Model for European Securitisations

   -- Derivative Criteria for European Structured Finance
      Transactions

RATINGS

http://www.dbrs.com/research/300933/dbrs-assigns-provisional-
ratings-to-sapphireone-mortgages-fct-2016-2.html


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HANJIN SHIPPING: To Close Regional Headquarters in Germany
----------------------------------------------------------
Kyunghee Park at Bloomberg News reports that Hanjin Shipping Co.,
South Korea's largest container line that has put its Asia-U.S.
business on sale after filing for bankruptcy protection late
August, won approval from a court to wind down its European
operations as demand for its services to the continent slumped.

According to Bloomberg, a court spokesman said the judge
overseeing Hanjin's receivership at the Seoul Central District
Court approved the firm's request.  Hanjin's spokeswoman said
separately on Oct. 24 the container line will close all its 10
branches in Europe, including its regional headquarters in
Germany.  She said the Seoul-based company expects to start the
process as early as this week, Bloomberg relays.

The decision to shut down its Europe business is part of the
breakup process of Hanjin kicked off by the Seoul court, which
earlier said it would consider selling the company entirely,
Bloomberg relates.

Hanjin had about 4.3% market share on the Asia-Europe trade last
year, according to the company, Bloomberg states.  The company's
representative declined to say how many employees Hanjin had at
its Europe business, and how many of them would lose their jobs,
Bloomberg notes.

                     About Hanjin Shipping

Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd., is mainly engaged in the
transportation business through containerships, transportation
business through bulk carriers and terminal operation business.
The Debtor is a stock-listed corporation with a total of
245,269,947 issued shares (common shares, KRW 5000 per share) and
paid-in capital totaling KRW 1,226,349,735,000.  Of these shares
33.23% is owned by Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 3.08% by Debtor
and 0.34% by employee shareholders' association.

The Company operates approximately 60 regular lines worldwide,
with 140 container or bulk vessels transporting over 100 million
tons of cargo per year.  It also operates 13 terminals
specialized for containers, two distribution centers and six Off
Dock Container Yards in major ports and inland areas around the
world.  The Company is a member of "CKYHE," a global shipping
conference and also a partner of "The Alliance," another global
shipping conference to be launched in April 2017.

Hanjin Shipping listed total current liabilities of KRW 6,028,543
million and total current assets of KRW 6,624,326 million as of
June 30, 2016.

As a result of the severe lack of liquidity, Hanjin applied to
the Seoul Central District Court 6th Bench of Bankruptcy Division
for the commencement of rehabilitation under the Debtor
Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act on Aug. 31, 2016.  On the same
day, it requested and was granted a general injunction and the
preservation of disposition of the Company's assets.  The Korean
Court's decision to commence the rehabilitation was made on
Sept. 1, 2016.  Tai-Soo Suk was appointed as the Debtor's
custodian.

The Chapter 15 case is pending in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of New Jersey (Bankr. D.N.J. Case No. 16-27041)
before Judge John K. Sherwood.

Cole Schotz P.C. serves as counsel to Tai-Soo Suk, the Chapter 15
petitioner and the duly appointed foreign representative of
Hanjin Shipping.


K+S AG: S&P Lowers CCRs to 'BB+/B', Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long- and short-term corporate
credit ratings on German potash and salt producer K+S AG to
'BB+/B' from 'BBB-/A-3'.  The outlook is negative.

S&P also lowered its issue ratings on its senior unsecured debt
to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.

At the same time, S&P removed all the ratings from CreditWatch,
where it placed them with negative implications on Aug. 8, 2016.

The rating action results from continued weak selling prices on
international potash markets, combined with operational
constraints at K+S' German operations and our expectation of a
somewhat delayed ramp-up for the company's Canadian greenfield
project Legacy in 2017. So far this year, potash prices have been
$30-$40 below S&P's projections -- with K+S' competitor JSC
Belaruskali signing key benchmark contracts with major customers
from India and China at $227 and $219 per metric ton,
respectively.  This price contraction stems from weakened supply-
demand equilibrium and expectation of further capacity start-ups
in 2017-2018.

S&P believes that prices are unlikely to recover significantly
from current spot levels through 2018, due to a likely continued
weak supply-demand balance.  S&P believes this will be the case,
given that capacity additions in 2017 will likely overcompensate
currently announced production curtailments and outages of about
5 million metric tons. Furthermore, 2018 and 2019 capacity
additions could add even more pressure on prices.

In addition to lower average selling prices in K+S' potash and
magnesium business unit than S&P previously anticipated, the
company's overall performance is constrained because of
unexpectedly high production outages, due to the limitation of
saline wastewater disposal at K+S' Werra plant.  The outage
resulted in a decrease in sales volumes by 400,000 metric tons
year on year, as of June 2016.  This decline is well beyond S&P's
previous forecast of a 300,000 metric ton decrease for the whole
year.  Furthermore, the salt business unit faces significantly
lower sales volumes in North America. K+S' operating results in
the second quarter of 2016 were substantially below those from
the previous year.

K+S' credit metrics in coming years will be highly dependent on
the timely commissioning and ramp-up of the Legacy greenfield
project.  Following the recently reported collapse of the holding
structure of a crystallizer unit, S&P now expects a delayed
ramp-up of Legacy, some limited additional capital expenditure
(capex) requirements, and the company's free operating cash flow
generation to remain negative, also in 2017.

The negative outlook reflects risks to S&P's base-case scenario,
under which it expects a gradual improvement of the company's
ratio of adjusted FFO to debt to above 20%-25% over the next 12
months and an improvement to 25%-30% by end-2018, the level S&P
views as commensurate with the 'BB+' rating.  Those risks relate
to the prevailing weakness in global potash fertilizer prices,
potential delays in the ramp-up of the Legacy project, a solution
to the operational issues in the company's German plants, and
lower-than-expected contribution from the salt segment.

S&P could lower the ratings over the next 12 months if it
believed that industry conditions or operational issues would
prevent the company from improving its ratio of adjusted FFO to
debt to 20%-25% in 2017 and to 25%-30% by end-2018.  Rating
pressure could also arise from continued negative free cash flow
generation beyond 2017 despite the completion of the Legacy
project and the corresponding strong reduction in capex in 2017
and 2018.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it observed a more
sustainable supply-demand equilibrium in 2017.  This could be
indicated by steadier price levels and K+S' ratio of adjusted FFO
to debt improving to 20%-25% in 2017.  At the same time, an
outlook revision to stable would be dependent on a timely ramp-up
of the legacy project and our expectation of positive free cash
flow generation by 2018.


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GREECE: Labor Minister Disagrees with Creditors Over Reforms
------------------------------------------------------------
Philip Chrysopoulos at Greek Reporter reports that Greek Labor
Minister Giorgos Katrougalos on Oct. 23 disagreed with creditors
over bailout program prerequisites regarding labor reforms.

The creditors representatives argued for the changes in labor
laws that were agreed in the previous two bailout programs, Greek
Reporter relates.  The Greek side highlighted the importance of
compliance to European court decisions -- such as the Council of
Europe, European Court, Council of State, on labor laws -- and
kept the stance in favor of existing laws, Greek Reporter notes.

According to Greek Reporter, Mr. Katrougalos spoke of compliance
with Greek and European legislation for mass layoffs, collective
bargaining, labor union laws and wages.

The discussion on labor laws will continue with the technical
cadres of the two sides, Greek Reporter states.

Meanwhile, the two sides agreed in principle for the creation of
a legislative framework for out-of-court settlement of debts
accumulated by businesses and the self-employed, Greek Reporter
relays.

The two sides will meet again on Oct. 26 to discuss the issue,
Greek Reporter discloses.

At the same time, creditors did not back down from the 3.5%
primary surplus target for the 2018 budget, Greek Reporter
states.


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BANCO POPOLARE: Moody's Hikes Long Term Deposit Ratings to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the following ratings and
assessments of Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa (Banco
Popolare) and Banca Popolare di Milano S.C.a r.l. (BPM): (1) the
long-term deposit ratings to Ba1 from Ba2; (2) the long-term
senior debt ratings to Ba2 from Ba3; (3) the subordinated debt
ratings to B2 from B3; (4) the preference stock to Caa1(hyb) from
Caa2(hyb); (5) the banks' standalone baseline credit assessments
(BCAs) and adjusted BCAs to b1 from b2; and (6) their long-term
Counterparty Risk Assessments (CRAs) to Ba1(cr) from Ba2(cr). The
outlook on the long-term deposit ratings is stable whilst the
outlook on the senior unsecured debt ratings is negative. Ratings
of Banco Popolare and BPM are aligned, as they have been prior to
this action.

This rating action follows the announcement made on October 15,
2016, by Banco Popolare and BPM that their respective
shareholders meetings have approved the merger of the two groups,
which is expected to be completed on January 1, 2017. The new
bank will be called Banco BPM SpA, to which both banks will
transfer all of their assets and liabilities. The aforementioned
upgrades reflect Moody's assessment of the credit profile of the
combined Banco BPM group, which is driven by the new bank's
adequate solvency levels when balanced against its credit risk
profile and adequate liquidity position. The b1 BCAs of Banco
Popolare and BPM also reflect the challenges the new bank will be
facing given its large stock of problem loans and expected weak
profitability. Moody's considers that in the next few years Banco
BPM will need to continue cleaning up its balance sheet, in an
environment where interest rates are expected to remain low.

The rating action concludes the review for upgrade on the banks'
ratings that was initiated on April 13, 2016.

Banco Popolare and BPM's short-term deposit ratings of Not Prime
and their short-term CRAs of Not Prime(cr) have been affirmed as
part of today's rating action.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR UPGRADING THE BCA

The upgrade of the BCAs of Banco Popolare (total assets of
EUR123.7 billion at end-June 2016) and BPM (total assets of
EUR49.7 billion at end-June 2016) to b1 from b2 follows Moody's
assessment of the credit profile of the new banking group, Banco
BPM SpA, which will become the third largest Italian credit
institution. This new banking group is expected to be created on
1 January 2017, and it will host all of the assets and
liabilities of Banco Popolare and BPM. This in line with what the
shareholders of both banks approved on 15 October 2016 and
previously the relevant regulatory authorities.

In upgrading the BCAs of Banco Popolare and BPM, Moody's has
taken into consideration the benefits stemming from the merger,
namely (1) the EUR1 billion capital increase made by Banco
Popolare in June 2016 and earmarked to increase provisions on
problem loans; (2) significant cost synergies and broader revenue
diversification; (3) adequate capital levels, with the fully-
loaded Common Equity Tier 1 ratio expected to reach 12.9% by
year-end 2019; and (4) an adequate liquidity position, with a
combined liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) well above 100%.

The b1 BCA of the new Banco BPM group will nevertheless be
constrained by its (1) high stock of problem loans mostly in
respect of legacy issues at Banco Popolare, with a combined gross
problem loan ratio of around 21% (based on Banco Popolare's and
BPM's aggregated H1 2016 financials), comparing unfavorably with
the system average of 18% at end-December 2015; and (2) weak
profitability, as Banco BPM is likely to continue cleaning up its
balance sheet in the years to come, while interest rates are
expected to remain low.

Moody's considers that as a joint-stock company, the new bank's
corporate governance will not be the constraint that it has
historically been for BPM. However, the rating agency believes
that some aspects of the merger will likely be challenging,
potentially resulting in a more protracted integration process
and delaying synergies.

RATIONALE FOR UPGRADING THE DEPOSIT AND SENIOR DEBT RATINGS

The upgrade of Banco Popolare's and BPM's long-term deposits to
Ba1 and their senior debt ratings to Ba2 reflects: (1) the
upgrade of the banks' BCAs and adjusted BCAs to b1 from b2; (2)
the rating agency's Advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis,
which results in three notches of uplift for the deposit ratings
and two notches of uplift for the senior debt ratings; and (3)
Moody's assessment of a low probability of government support for
the new Banco BPM group, which results in no uplift for both the
deposit and the senior debt ratings.

RATIONALE FOR UPGRADING THE COUNTERPARTY RISK ASSESSMENT

As part of today's rating action, Moody's has also upgraded to
Ba1(cr) from Ba2(cr) the long-term CR Assessments of Banco
Popolare and BPM, three notches above their adjusted BCAs of b1.

The upgrade of the CR Assessments follows the upgrade of the BCAs
of Banco Popolare and BPM to b1 from b2. The CR Assessment is
driven by standalone assessment of the combined Banco BPM group
and by the considerable amount of bail-in-able debt and junior
deposits likely to shield operating liabilities from losses,
accounting for three notches of uplift relative to the BCA.

RATIONALE FOR THE OUTLOOKS

The outlook on the deposit ratings of Banco Popolare and BPM is
stable as we anticipate that the credit profile of the combined
Banco BPM group will remain resilient over the next 12-18 months.
Despite the near-term challenges stemming from the integration of
both banks, Moody's considers that the new group's solvency and
liquidity will support its creditworthiness, mitigating pressures
on both asset risk and profitability.

The outlook on the senior debt ratings of Banco Popolare and BPM
is negative, however, because the stock of bail-in-able senior
debt is likely to dwindle in the next 12-18 months, given the
banks' funding plans and the likely maturities of retail bonds in
particular. This would result in a higher loss-given-failure for
this class of debt.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE

The BCAs of Banco Popolare and BPM could be upgraded if the new
Banco BPM group were to meet the financial targets set out in its
integration plan, which assumes an improving trend in its asset
risk metrics (mostly through problem loan disposals) while
preserving profit generation capacity and capital. The BCAs could
also be upgraded if the Banco BPM group reduces the stock of
problem loans faster than anticipated whilst preserving its
capital. An upgrade in the BCA would likely result in upgrades to
all ratings.

A downgrade in the BCAs would drive a downgrade in all ratings.
This in turn could be triggered by the group's failure to meet
the group's targeted cost savings and synergies, or if there were
a deterioration in the asset risk or capital.

The senior debt ratings would likely be downgraded following a
reduction in the volume of senior debt outstanding.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa

Upgrades:

   -- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to Ba1(cr)
      from Ba2(cr)

   -- Long-term Deposit Ratings, upgraded to Ba1 Stable from Ba2
      Rating under Review

   -- Long-term Issuer Rating, upgraded to Ba2 Negative from Ba3
      Rating under Review

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to Ba2
      Negative from Ba3 Rating under Review

   -- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, upgraded to
      (P)Ba2 from (P)Ba3

   -- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to B2 from B3

   -- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, upgraded to (P)B2
      from (P)B3

   -- Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, upgraded to Caa1(hyb) from
      Caa2(hyb)

   -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to b1 from b2

   -- Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to b1 from b2

Affirmations:

   -- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed NP(cr)

   -- Short-term Deposit Ratings, affirmed NP

Outlook Actions:

   -- Outlook changed to Stable(m) from Rating Under Review

Issuer: Banca Italease S.p.A.

Upgrades:

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to
      Ba2 Negative from Ba3 Rating under Review

Outlook Actions:

   -- Outlook changed to Negative from Rating Under Review

Issuer: Banca Popolare di Milano S.C. a r.l.

Upgrades:

   -- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to Ba1(cr)
      from Ba2(cr)

   -- Long-term Deposit Ratings, upgraded to Ba1 Stable from Ba2
      Rating under Review

   -- Long-term Issuer Rating, upgraded to Ba2 Negative from Ba3
      Rating Under Review

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to Ba2
      Negative from Ba3 Rating Under Review

   -- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, upgraded to
      (P)Ba2 from (P)Ba3

   -- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to B2 from B3

   -- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, upgraded to (P)B2
      from (P)B3

   -- Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, upgraded to Caa1(hyb) from
      Caa2(hyb)

   -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to b1 from b2

   -- Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to b1 from b2

Affirmations:

   -- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed NP(cr)

   -- Short-term Deposit Ratings, affirmed NP

   -- Other Short Term, affirmed (P)NP

Outlook Actions:

   -- Outlook changed to Stable(m) from Rating Under Review

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ACISION BV: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corporate Family Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service withdrawn Acision B.V.'s (Xura B.V.) B2
Corporate Family Rating (CFR) and Probability of Default Rating
(PDR) of B3-PD as well as the B2 rating on the $160 million term
loan B borrowed by Fortissimo Holding B.V.. At the time of the
withdrawal, the companies' ratings carried a stable outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings following the acquisition of
its parent company, Xura Inc. (unrated), by affiliates of Siris
Capital Group LLC (unrated) in August 2016, which resulted in
repayment of the company's existing debt.

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.


HEMA BV: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC+', Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term corporate credit rating
on Netherlands-based general merchandise and food retailer Hema
B.V. to 'CCC+' from 'B'.  The outlook is stable.

"At the same time, we lowered the issue rating to 'CCC+' from 'B'
on the senior secured notes issued by Hema Bondco I B.V. and
revised the recovery rating to '4' from '3'.  These comprise
EUR250 million floating rate notes and EUR315 million fixed rate
notes.  We also lowered the rating on the EUR80 million senior
secured revolving credit facility issued by Hema to 'B' from 'BB'
and revised the recovery rating to '1' from '1+'," S&P said.

In addition, S&P lowered its ratings on the EUR150 million
unsecured senior notes issued by Hema Bondco II B.V. to 'CCC-'
from 'CCC+'.  The recovery rating on these notes is unchanged at
'6'.

"The downgrade reflects our view that despite reporting an
operating profit in the second quarter of fiscal 2016 (ending
July 31, 2016,), Hema's profitability remains very low in
relation to its very high debt levels.  The moderate operating
profits reported in the second quarter follows a steep decline in
fiscal 2015 when reported EBITDA for the year more than halved to
EUR41.8 million from EUR85.5 million.  In comparison, Hema
reported EBITDA of EUR30.6 million for the first half of 2016,
representing an improvement which, in our view, indicates that
the new management's turnaround plan is in the early stages of
bearing fruit," S&P said.

However, considering substantial debts that are maturing from
December 2018 starting with the fully drawn revolving credit
facility (RCF) and the notes in June 2019 and Dec 2019, there is
a risk that the turnaround of operations is somewhat late and
leaves practically no headroom for any future underperformance,
especially given the challenging retail market.

While S&P forecasts an improvement in the group's profitability,
management's plans to continue to invest in the business will not
result in meaningful free cash generation.  As a result, S&P
expects Hema's adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will be above 13x
(including S&P's operating-lease adjustment, shareholder loan,
and a payment-in-kind [PIK] facility) in fiscal 2016 (ending Jan.
29, 2017).  Therefore, combined with limited deleveraging
prospects, we view HEMA's high debt levels as unsustainable in
the long term. Over the coming 12 months, however, in S&P's base-
case scenario, the company does not face a credit or payment
crisis.

S&P includes in its debt adjustments the loans provided by the
private equity shareholder, Lion Capital, which have a principal
amount of EUR269.6 million.  In addition, S&P includes senior PIK
notes due 2020 with a principal amount of EUR85 million, issued
by Dutch Lion B.V., in S&P's adjusted debt calculation.

Although S&P considers that these facilities have certain equity
characteristics, are non-cash-paying, and subordinated, S&P
treats them as debt-like under its criteria.  Excluding these
debt-like instruments, Hema's leverage would be around 7.5x at
the end of fiscal 2016.

"We recognize that some of Hema's S&P Global Ratings-adjusted
credit ratios are better than its unadjusted ratios.  In
particular, our lease adjustments tend to inflate adjusted funds
from operations (FFO) to cash interest coverage, given Hema's
operating lease structure.  We therefore complement our analysis
with other ratios, such as EBITDAR coverage, which measures an
issuer's cash-interest and lease-related obligations (defined as
reported EBITDA including rent cost coverage of cash interest
plus rent).  That said, Hema's unadjusted EBITDAR coverage, which
is around 1.2x, also indicates a highly leveraged financial risk
profile," S&P said.

"Hema's business risk profile, which we now view as weak,
benefits somewhat from its strong brand recognition and niche
market positions in its core markets in The Netherlands, Belgium,
and Luxembourg.  The company sells almost all products under the
Hema brand.  On the one hand, this supports the company's
bargaining power with suppliers, resulting in a high gross
margin.  On the other hand, it exposes Hema to adverse trends in
currency or raw materials prices, or potential adverse brand
perception.  The major factors constraining Hema's business risk
profile are its operations in highly fragmented and competitive
retail markets and still-limited geographic diversification, as
it generates over 70% of EBITDA in The Netherlands, which is
showing lukewarm economic recovery.  In addition, we consider
that the nonfood retail segment faces strong price competition
from discounters and online retailers, as well as high
seasonality and volatility based on the discretionary nature of
purchases," S&P said.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Declining GDP growth in both Belgium and the Netherlands,
      with S&P's forecast GDP of 1.7% in 2016 and 1.5% in 2017
      for the Netherlands; and

   -- 1.5% in 2016 and 1.3% in 2017 for Belgium.

   -- Top line growth of around 4% annually over the next two
      years, driven by 20-25 new store openings a year as well
      like-for-like growth in region of 2%.

   -- After a sharp drop of 340 basis points (bps) in gross
      margin in 2015, improvement of around 130 basis points in
      2016. This, together with cost control, could result in the
      adjusted EBITDA margin growth above 150 bps in fiscal 2016.
      While operations will likely continue to improve in 2017,
      S&P believes that the pace of turnaround could slow down
      somewhat but will still result in EBITDA margin growth of
      around 120 bps in 2017.

   -- Although improving moderately, free cash flow generation
      will be still constrained due to increasing capital
      expenditure (capex) to above EUR40 million next year.
      Prudent cash management and cost control, which should
      enable the group to maintain adequate liquidity.

Based on these assumptions, S&P forecasts these credit metrics
for 2016 and 2017:

   -- An adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of above 13.0x in 2016
      improving marginally to 12.5x in 2017.  Leverage ratios of
      7.5x and 6.7x when excluding shareholder loans and PIK
      notes, and of 9.6x and 7.8x in reported gross debt terms in
      2016 and 2017, respectively.

   -- Very low adjusted free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt
      of around 3% in both years.

   -- EBITDAR coverage ratio (which S&P uses as the key
      supplementary ratio) of around 1.2x in both years.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Hema's
management will continue to turn around the operations and
like-for-like sales and profitability will continue to improve
moderately.  It also reflects S&P's view that the company will
maintain adequate liquidity over the next 12 months.

S&P could consider a negative rating action if it views that a
breach of financial covenants, a debt restructuring, or an
exchange offer appears inevitable.  S&P would see such events as
distressed and tantamount to a default.  However, as far as S&P
know, the group is currently not taking any tangible steps in
this direction.  S&P would also likely take a negative action if
liquidity pressures emerge or if refinancing risks are further
elevated.

S&P could consider a positive rating action if Hema substantially
improved its operating performance over several quarters,
demonstrating that management's strategic initiatives can
sustainably turn around performance and sustain its capital
structure.  In such a scenario -- and on the back of a sustained
improvement in trading and margins -- Hema will likely begin to
generate meaningful FOCF on a consistent basis, sustainably
improve the headroom under its EBITDAR coverage ratio such that
it approaches 1.5x, and refinance its 2018 and 2019 debt
maturities on a timely basis.


LYONDELL CHEMICAL: Len Blavatnik Defends Boom-Era Merger
--------------------------------------------------------
Patrick Fitzgerald, writing for The Wall Street Journal Pro
Bankruptcy, reported that billionaire deal maker Len Blavatnik
defended his merger of Lyondell Chemical and Basell AF as he took
the witness stand on Oct. 21, 2016, in a $1.5 billion clawback
lawsuit brought for the benefit of the chemical giant's
creditors.

According to the report, Mr. Blavatnik, one of the richest people
in America, told a New York courtroom that he combined Lyondell
with Basell "for the long term" and not to turn a quick profit.

The Troubled Company Reporter, on Oct. 19, 2016, citing Bloomberg
News, reported that almost a decade after the ill-fated deal that
created chemical giant LyondellBasell Industries, creditors
headed to court to try to recover billions of dollars that they
say Len Blavatnik extracted before the company went bankrupt.

WSJ related that Mr. Blavatnik's Basell paid $48 a share for
Lyondell, what the creditors call a "blowout price" that allowed
the Houston-based chemical company's shareholders to collect
$12.5 billion from the merger.  The boom-era deal loaded the
company up with more than $20 billion in debt just before global
commodity markets tumbled amid the global financial crisis, WSJ
said.  A little more than a year after the merger, LyondellBasell
filed for bankruptcy, WSJ pointed out.

The creditors' lawsuit, filed more than seven years ago by a
trust created as part of the bankruptcy case, seeks to hold Mr.
Blavatnik and others accountable for a deal they claim
essentially doomed the combined company to failure by using
unrealistic financial projections and loading it up with too much
debt, the WSJ report related.

The TCR previously reported that, at a trial that began Oct. 17,
2016, in Manhattan bankruptcy court, the creditors will seek to
claw back more than $1.7 billion from Blavatnik, his firm Access
Industries Holdings LLC and other affiliates.  They're also
seeking about $2 billion more from Blavatnik and other executives
for alleged mismanagement of LyondellBasell, which filed for
bankruptcy in 2009, the TCR report related.

                About Lyondell Chemical

Rotterdam, Netherlands-based LyondellBasell Industries is one of
the world's largest polymers, petrochemicals and fuels companies.
Luxembourg-based Basell AF and Lyondell Chemical Company merged
operations in 2007 to form LyondellBasell Industries, the world's
third largest independent chemical company.  LyondellBasell
became saddled with debt as part of the US$12.7 billion merger.
Len Blavatnik's Access Industries owned the Company prior to its
bankruptcy filing.

On Jan. 6, 2009, LyondellBasell Industries' U.S. operations,
led by Lyondell Chemical Co., and one of its European holding
companies -- Basell Germany Holdings GmbH -- filed voluntary
petitions to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code to facilitate a restructuring of the company's debts.  The
case is In re Lyondell Chemical Company, et al., Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Lead Case No. 09-10023).  Seventy-nine Lyondell entities filed
for Chapter 11.  Luxembourg-based LyondellBasell Industries AF
S.C.A. and another affiliate were voluntarily added to Lyondell
Chemical's reorganization filing under Chapter 11 protection on
April 24, 2009.

Deryck A. Palmer, Esq., at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, in
New York, served as the Debtors' bankruptcy counsel.  Evercore
Partners served as financial advisors, and Alix Partners and its
subsidiary AP Services LLC, served as restructuring advisors.
AlixPartners' Kevin M. McShea acted as the Debtors' Chief
Restructuring Officer.  Clifford Chance LLP served as
restructuring advisors to the European entities.

LyondellBasell emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in
May 2010, with a plan that provides the Company with US$3 billion
of opening liquidity.  A new parent company, LyondellBasell
Industries N.V., incorporated in the Netherlands, is the
successor of the former parent company, LyondellBasell Industries
AF S.C.A., a Luxembourg company that is no longer part of
LyondellBasell.  LyondellBasell Industries N.V. owns and operates
substantially the same businesses as the previous parent company,
including subsidiaries that were not involved in the bankruptcy
cases.  LyondellBasell's corporate seat is Rotterdam,
Netherlands, with administrative offices in Houston and
Rotterdam.


VTR FINANCE: S&P Affirms 'B+' CCR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' corporate credit rating on
VTR Finance B.V.  The outlook is stable.  S&P also affirmed its
'B+' issue-level rating on VTR's $1.4 billion senior notes due
2024.

The ratings affirmation reflects S&P's expectation that VTR will
remain an important player in the cable and telecommunication
market in Chile, especially in the pay-TV and internet segment.
S&P expects it to maintain consistent subscription growth and
stable operating efficiency, leading to predictable revenue and
cash flow generation despite the increasing competition in Chile.
S&P expects VTR's adjusted debt to EBITDA to drop to less than
4.0x in 2017 and remain below that threshold in 2018.  But the
company will still post weaker free operating cash flow to debt,
averaging 5%-6% in 2016-2018 due to significant capital
expenditures to support growth.

The rating on VTR's senior notes is the same as the corporate
credit rating.  S&P currently believes that the investors in the
company's senior notes don't face a material disadvantage as
creditors of the non-operating holding company.  The investors
have a junior claim; they would only receive the residual value
of the subsidiaries' assets -- after the subsidiaries' direct
liabilities have been satisfied in case of a default.  S&P
currently estimates priority liabilities of slightly above 15% of
net tangible assets.  However, if VTR's operating subsidiaries
make use of their revolving credit facility or incur any other
material priority liabilities -- leading to a ratio of priority
obligations to net tangible assets significantly above 15% -- S&P
would view the notes as structurally subordinated and would lower
the issue-level rating by one notch.

The company has narrow geographic diversity and a smaller scale
than those of its peers that also have a consolidated market
position in the mobile segment in the competitive Chilean market.
However, S&P expects VTR to maintain a leading market position in
the pay-TV segment (34.3% as of June 2016) and an overall solid
position in the fixed voice and broadband segments due to its
investments in the network to maintain quality and support
customer growth.  S&P expects VTR's market share in the mobile
segment to remain below 5% in the near to medium term despite its
gradual expansion of this business.  S&P expects VTR to continue
to post adjusted EBITDA margins slightly above those of its
telecom peers in the region.

S&P expects VTR to use most of its operating cash flow to finance
capital expenditures (capex), resulting in a weak FOCF in the
next two years.  However, S&P believes VTR benefits from its
long-term debt maturity profile with no meaningful debt
maturities until 2024, and its use of derivative instruments to
hedge interest payments.

S&P assess comparable rating analysis as negative, based on its
view of VTR's smaller scale and lower free cash flow generation
than those of its rated Chilean peers, which limits its overall
credit profile.


===========
N O R W A Y
===========


LOCK LOWER: S&P Affirms 'B+' LT Counterparty Credit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has revised its outlook on
Norway-based credit management services provider Lock Lower
Holdings AS (Lindorff) and its subsidiary Lock AS to developing
from stable. The 'B+' long-term counterparty credit ratings on
both entities were affirmed.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB' rating on Lindorff's
super senior revolving credit facility (RCF).  The recovery
rating of '1' indicates S&P's expectation of very high recovery
(90%-100%) in the event of a payment default.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB-' rating on the group's senior secured
notes.  The recovery rating of '2' reflects S&P's expectation of
recovery in the lower half of the 70%-90% range in the event of a
default.

Similarly, S&P has affirmed its 'B-' rating on the senior
unsecured notes.  The recovery rating of '6' indicates S&P's
expectation of negligible recovery (0%-10%) in the event of a
default.

The outlook revision follows Lindorff's announcement in September
2016 that its board of directors has decided to assess options to
raise equity in the public markets.  This includes preparations
to ensure readiness for a potential listing of the company,
subject to further decisions by the board.

"In our base-case scenario for Lindorff, we forecast pre-IPO
ratios of gross debt to adjusted EBITDA and funds from operations
(FFO) to debt at 5.0x-6.0x and 10%-12% respectively, at year-end
2016 (adjusted EBITDA is gross of portfolio amortization).  We
require further details of the potential IPO to assess its impact
on our metrics for Lindorff over the next two years.  If the
transaction proceeds, we believe there will likely be some
improvement in the ratios.  If not, leverage may not decline to a
level consistent with our current financial risk profile
assessment.  At this stage, we are maintaining our view under our
comparable ratings analysis that Lindorff's financial metrics
will strengthen only over the medium term and be more in line
with those of its peers," S&P said.

As a credit management services provider active in collection
services and debt-portfolio purchasing, Lindorff has been
successively broadening the geographic scope of both business
lines.  It has done this through various acquisitions in 2015-
2016, including that of other credit management services
providers in Poland and Italy as well as several sizable debt
portfolios. Moreover, the company has recently acquired a
majority stake in the Spanish mortgage-loan servicer Aktua, which
it believes will provide a platform for servicing nonperforming
and foreclosed secured residential loans.  Lindorff is now active
in the Nordics, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and
Eastern Europe. Despite this geographic diversification, various
regulatory and legislative risks associated with debt purchasing
and collections remain.  In addition, although such
diversification can enhance Lindorff's diversity and scale, it
could also carry risks, in S&P's view, if not managed well over
time.

Lindorff has financed much of its expansion with debt, which
means that its leverage metrics have been higher than peers'.
This is particularly relevant in view of Lindorff's ownership by
private equity firm Nordic Capital, which in S&P's view has shown
a strategic propensity toward higher leverage.

The developing outlook indicates that S&P could raise, affirm, or
lower its ratings on Lindorff over the next 12-24 months.  If
Lindorff decides on an IPO and there is full clarity on the
ultimate use of the proceeds, S&P will reassess the company's
ownership, capital structure, and financial policies.

S&P could lower the ratings if Lindorff's leverage profile failed
to strengthen meaningfully after a potential IPO.  This would be
indicated by the debt-to-adjusted-EBITDA and FFO-to-debt ratios
remaining above 5x and below 12% respectively.

S&P could consider a positive rating action if it observed a
material reduction in leverage, underpinned by a more
conservative financial policy.  This would likely coincide with
the reduced presence of the private-equity owner, Nordic Capital.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


CREDIT BANK: S&P Rates Proposed US$-Denom. Sr. Unsec. LPNs 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB-' long-term issue rating to
the proposed U.S. dollar-denominated senior unsecured loan
participation notes (LPNs) to be issued by Russia-based CREDIT
BANK OF MOSCOW (BB-/Negative/B) via its financial vehicle, CBOM
Finance PLC.  The rating is subject to S&P's analysis of the
notes' final documentation.

S&P rates the proposed LPNs 'BB-', at the same level as S&P's
long-term counterparty credit rating on CREDIT BANK OF MOSCOW
because the notes meet certain conditions regarding issuance by
special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) set out in our group rating
methodology.

Specifically, S&P rates LPNs issued by an SPV at the same level
as S&P would rate equivalent-ranking debt of the underlying
borrower (the sponsor) and treat the contractual obligations of
the SPV as financial obligations of the sponsor if these
conditions are met:

   -- All of the SPV's debt obligations are backed by equivalent-
      ranking obligations with equivalent payment terms issued by
      the sponsor;

   -- The SPV is a strategic financing entity for the sponsor set
      up solely to raise debt on behalf of the sponsor's group;
      and

   -- S&P believes the sponsor is willing and able to support the
      SPV to ensure full and timely payment of interest and
      principal on the debt issued by the SPV when it is due,
      including payment of any of the SPV's expenses.

The purpose of the proposed LPN is to finance a loan to CREDIT
BANK OF MOSCOW.  The maturity of the issue is to be above one
year.  The final terms of the issue will be defined at the time
of the placement of notes.

Following S&P's review, it concludes that CREDIT BANK OF MOSCOW's
proposed U.S. dollar-denominated LPNs meet all the conditions set
out by S&P's criteria.


=========
S P A I N
=========


CODERE SA: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR & Rates EUR775MM Sr. Notes 'B'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating on Spain-based gaming company Codere S.A.  The outlook
remains stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to the
group's proposed EUR775 million senior secured notes.  S&P
assigned a recovery rating of '3' to the proposed notes,
indicating its expectation of meaningful recovery prospects in
the higher half of the 50%-70% range in the event of a payment
default.

The affirmation follows Codere's launch of EUR775 million senior
secured notes to refinance existing debt.  At the same time, S&P
understands Codere is putting in place a new EUR95 million super
senior revolving credit facility (RCF), which enhances its
liquidity and funding flexibility, especially as S&P understands
that it will use about EUR100 million at hand to help fully
redeem outstanding first-, second-, and third-lien notes.  S&P
continues to assess the group's liquidity as adequate.  Overall,
the transaction will marginally reduce debt from current levels,
as S&P looks at gross credit metrics for Codere.  With the
removal of the accruing payment-in-kind (PIK) debt from the
structure, cash interest will increase, but overall interest
expense should decrease from current levels as Codere strives to
reduce its cost of funding.  S&P also acknowledges the currency
diversification because it understands that the proposed notes
will be split into both euros and U.S. dollars (whereas current
debt is all in dollars).

The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that Codere will
continue to focus on improving its operating performance, while
controlling capital expenditures, cost management, and liquidity.
S&P expects Codere's credit metrics will likely remain
comfortably at the current rating level over the next 12 months,
with adjusted debt to EBITDA below 5.0x and EBITDA interest cover
above 2.0x.

S&P could consider lowering the ratings if the group's operating
performance deteriorates and it is unable to rein in capital
spending accordingly, leading to weakening liquidity, which could
occur if covenant headroom reduced to less than 15%.  S&P could
also lower the ratings if the new owners materially increase
leverage by adopting a more aggressive financial policy with
respect to growth, investments, or shareholder returns.

S&P could consider raising the ratings if, given the potential
volatility of cash flows linked to Latin America, we continue to
see positive revenue and EBITDA growth leading adjusted debt to
EBITDA towards 3.5x and FFO to debt well above 20%, which S&P
considers comfortably sit in our significant financial risk
profile category.  An upgrade is contingent on management and
owners demonstrating a track record of their commitment to a
conservative financial policy following a period of an aggressive
strategy.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


LION/GLORIA: Moody's Places B3 CFR on Review for Upgrade
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, ("Moody's") has placed the B3
Corporate Family Rating ("CFR") and B3-PD probability of default
rating ("PDR") of Lion/Gloria Holdco Limited ("ghd") on review
for upgrade.

The rating action follows the announcement, on October 17, 2016,
that Lion Capital LLP has entered into a definitive agreement to
sell ghd to Coty Inc. ("Coty" -- Ba1 stable).

Concurrently, the B3 (LGD 4) rating assigned to the GBP165
million worth of senior secured notes issued by ghd Bondco plc
has also been placed on review for upgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating review was prompted by Coty's announcement that it
reached a definitive agreement to acquire ghd for approximately
GBP420 million ($510 million). The purchase consideration is
expected to be funded by a mix of cash on hand and available debt
facilities. The transaction is subject to regulatory approval and
is expected to close by year end.

Moody's views the outlined transaction as positive for ghd. The
new parent's large scale and worldwide leading position in the
professional hair category are expected to support significant
growth opportunities and address ghd's niche positioning and
limited geographic diversification through Coty's channel and
categories capabilities. Moody's also believes that the proposed
acquisition will alleviate ghd's limited liquidity headroom,
given Coty's stronger liquidity profile supported by positive and
recurring free cash flow generation.

Moody's review for upgrade of ghd Bondco plc's outstanding senior
secured notes was also prompted by the high likelihood of a
mandatory repayment as a result of the acquisition and the
exercise of change of control provision. The senior secured notes
indentures contain portability features, which allow for a one-
off change in ownership of ghd without triggering change of
control provisions subject to meeting a 4.75x gross leverage test
ratio, which, according to Moody's estimates are currently not
satisfied. Moody's estimates ghd's consolidated gross debt to
EBITDA (as adjusted by the company) at approximately 5.2x as of
June 30, 2016.

Moody's expects the review to be completed shortly after
completion of the transaction, which, as detailed, is expected to
close towards the end of the calendar year 2016, subject to
regulatory approval and closing conditions.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Prior to placing the ratings on review, Moody's stated that
upward pressure on the rating could develop if (1) the company
improves its adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio (as adjusted by Moody's)
below 5.5x on a sustained basis; (2) it continues to grow and
diversify its revenues across geographies, channels and products;
and (3) it increases its free cash flow generation sustainably.

At the same, Moody's stated that downward pressure could be
exerted on the rating if (1) ghd's operating performance weakens
on a last twelve month basis; (2) the company fails to reduce its
gross debt/EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's) below 7.0x; or (iii)
its interest cover ratio (defined as Moody's adjusted
EBIT/interest expenses) falls below 1.0x. A weakening in the
company's liquidity profile could also exert downward pressure on
the rating.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Consumer
Durables Industry published in September 2014.

Lion/Gloria Holdco Limited, the ultimate parent of the Jemella
Group, operates under the commercial name "ghd" and offers high-
end hair styling tools and salon quality hair dryers complemented
by a range of accessories. In the 12 months to March 31, 2016,
ghd reported revenues of GBP168 million (GBP168 million in 12
months to March 31, 2015) and EBITDA (as adjusted by the company)
of GBP29 million (GBP26.9 million in the 12 months to March 31,
2015).


PREMIER MOTOR: In Legal Fight with Lloyds Bank Over Takeover
------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Farmer at Press Association reports that Lloyds Bank bosses
are preparing for the next stage of a High Court fight with an
insolvent car auction firm in the wake of conspiracy allegations.

Liquidators have complained that Lloyds gained effective control
over Premier Motor Auctions after conspiring with accounting firm
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Press Association relates.

Lloyds and PwC deny the allegations, Press Association notes.
They say former managing director Keith Elliott ran the company
into the ground after drawing heavily on funds to support an
extravagant lifestyle, Press Association relays.

A judge has published a preliminary ruling relating to legal
costs outlining allegations and counter allegations after a High
Court hearing in London, Press Association discloses.

Mr. Justice Snowden explained how before going into liquidation
in 2010 Premier Motor Auctions had two arms -- a car auction
business based in Leeds and a unique registration plate
operation, Press Association notes.

Lloyds had introduced Mr. Elliott to a PwC representative
following discussions about financial arrangements, Press
Association recounts.

Premier Motor Auctions' liquidators had subsequently taken legal
action claiming the PwC representative had been introduced to
Mr. Elliott on false pretenses, Press Association states.

According to Press Association, the judge indicated that Premier
Motor Auctions' liquidators wanted compensation for losses they
estimated at around GBP50 million.


* UK: Smaller Construction Firms Face "Severe" Cash-Flow Issues
---------------------------------------------------------------
A report from online finance firm Funding Options reveals that
smaller construction firms are suffering "severe" cash-flow
problems because of delays in being paid by property developers.

The research shows that developers are taking 56 days on average
to pay subcontractors, two days longer than a year ago.  This,
the report warns, is hitting growth prospects for subcontractors
and is increasing the chances of them going bankrupt.

Conrad Ford, chief executive of Funding Options, said: "Major
developers feel they have a lot to gain from delaying payments,
knowing that their subcontractors would be hesitant to raise
their issues for fear of losing out on future work.  There seems
to be only two choices for the suppliers: accept these slow
payments or lose the business going forward."


* UK: SMEs Owed GBP586 Billion in Unpaid Invoices, Report Shows
---------------------------------------------------------------
British SMEs are owed more than GBP586 billion in outstanding
invoices, according to the latest Business in Britain report from
Lloyds Bank Commercial Banking.

The average small business is owed more than GBP108,000 in unpaid
invoices, an increase of 8 per cent since the last Business in
Britain report in January 2016, with almost a third of firms (29
per cent) citing late payments as the biggest cause of cashflow
problems.

The Business in Britain report, which gathers the views of more
than 1,500 UK companies, found that more than 1.5 million SMEs
(29 per cent) are currently owed more than GBP200,000 in
outstanding invoices, up from 1.3 million (25 per cent) in
January.

The issue of late payments is likely to persist into 2017, with
nearly a third (30 per cent) of businesses expecting more
customers to require deferred payment terms in the next six
months.

Assets and investment

Meanwhile, British small businesses own a combined total of
GBP2.6tn of assets outright, an average of almost GBP490,000
each. This is an increase of GBP18,000 per business (or 4 per
cent) since the start of the year.

Businesses said they were expecting to invest an average of
GBP1.5m into their business over the next six months, up
marginally from January, suggesting they remain undeterred by
recent political and economic shocks.

Awareness of finance

However, these investment plans could be being held back by
relatively poor awareness of different forms of financial support
available.

Only two in five (40 per cent) of firms surveyed for the report
said they aware of invoice finance, and only a third (34 per
cent) of SMEs were aware of asset-based lending.

Adrian Walker, managing director, head of Global Transaction
Banking at Lloyds Bank, said: "If businesses are issuing more
invoices and investing in more assets, then this is very positive
for them and the economy.

"But if companies are having to wait longer to be paid, and are
reporting that they expect to face an even longer wait in the
future, this slowing of payments could be holding businesses back
from releasing critical cash to drive future growth.

"The amount of money that firms have tied up in unpaid bills and
other assets is significant, and this report suggests that these
sums could be unlocked if businesses were more aware of the
funding options that are open to them."

Finance solutions

Invoice finance allows businesses to access the money they are
owed in unpaid client bills very quickly, often within 24 hours,
freeing up cash that can then be used to help catalyze growth and
to help invest into capital expenditure.

Asset-based lending, meanwhile, can help protect working capital
by unlocking the value tied up in stock, plant machinery or
property to give access to working capital that can help finance
business growth.

Designed for businesses with a turnover of more than GBP1million,
it works alongside invoice financing to provide a cost-effective,
scalable and flexible way of increasing working capital,
supporting business growth.

Asset finance could also help businesses to invest in critical
business assets without draining their working capital.  Through
hire purchase or leasing, firms can purchase machinery, vehicles
and other equipment and avoid paying for them outright. Paying
for the asset with regular payments over an agreed period, easing
cash flow and enabling that money to be used to support other
business needs.

Regional variations

The report highlights significant differences in outstanding
invoices across the UK.  Businesses on the south coast (Kent,
Sussex, Surrey, Hampshire and Dorset) were owed the least on
average in outstanding invoices, valuing at GBP80,000 each.  In
January, the same areas were owed the most, with outstanding
invoices worth an average GBP109,000 per business.

They also owned the least in assets, with each business owning
less than GBP420,000 in assets outright.

Businesses in Wales, however, were owed almost twice as much,
with the average Welsh SME owed GBP150,000 in outstanding
invoices. Two in five (41 per cent) of Welsh businesses were also
reported to be owed more than GBP200,000 in unpaid invoices.
Welsh businesses' assets were also the most valuable in the
country, owning on average GBP682,000 in assets outright.

Walker added: "Small and medium-sized businesses are the
lifeblood of the British economy but we continue to see too many
of them whose growth is being held back due to a lack of
awareness of the multitude of funding options available to them.

"There is a huge opportunity for them to accelerate their
prosperity if they speak to a trusted adviser or bank manager to
learn more about how they can unlock cash in their business,
which will allow their business to grow and invest in growth for
the future.

"At Lloyds our relationship managers are trained to have working
capital conversations with their clients and, with our market
leading digital tools, we can help provide valuable insight to
support businesses in their growth aspirations."


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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