TCREUR_Public/161109.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

         Wednesday, November 9, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 222


                            Headlines


F R A N C E

SGD GROUP: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating


L U X E M B O U R G

BREEZE FINANCE: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR84MM Bonds to Ca
LEYNE STRAUSS-KAHN: Ex-IMF Chief Ordered to Pay Back Taxes


N E T H E R L A N D S

KETER GROUP: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Sr. Sec. Facilities


R U S S I A

DELOPORTS LLC: S&P Raises Long-Term CCR to 'BB-', Outlook Stable
PIK GROUP: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative


S P A I N

INSTITUT CATALA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating


S W E D E N

PERSTORP HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' CCR, Outlook Stable


S W I T Z E R L A N D

HYDRA DUTCH: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corporate Family Rating


T U R K E Y

EREGLI DEMIR: S&P Affirms 'BB' CCR & Revises Outlook to Stable


U K R A I N E

BANK NADRA: Deposit Guarantee Fund Extends Liquidation
NATIONAL BANK: Deposit Guarantee Fund Extends Liquidation


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AMERICAN APPAREL: Appoints Administrators to Wind Down Business
ARES EUROPEAN VIII: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating to Cl. F Notes
ASHCRAFT FURNITURE: Faces Insolvency for Second Time
MANSARD MORTGAGES 2006-1: S&P Lifts Rating on Cl. B2a Notes to B
MAZARIN FUNDING: S&P Affirms CCC- Ratings on Various Notes

TOWD POINT 2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating to Class E Notes


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F R A N C E
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SGD GROUP: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on SGD Group SAS, a France-based
manufacturer of glass packaging for the pharmaceutical industry,
and its subsidiaries SGD S.A. and SGD Kipfenberg GMBH.

At the same time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where
it placed them with developing implications on May 26, 2016, and
assigned a stable outlook.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that, following its
acquisition by JIC Firmiana SAS (JIC), a subsidiary of China
Jianyin Investment Ltd, SGD Group's business strategy will not
change, and its capital structure will remain highly leveraged
due to what S&P views as an aggressive financial policy from the
new owner.

China Jianyin Investment Ltd., the ultimate parent which owns 99%
of JIC, is an integrated investment group focusing on equity and
industrial management.  It has about $57 billion in assets under
management in finance, manufacturing, real estate and other
sectors.  S&P understands that SGD Group will be one of its key
Europe-based assets, and that currently the new owners do not
plan to significantly alter the company's business development
strategy.  Therefore, S&P's view of SGD Group's business risk
remains unchanged, and continues to reflect the company's small
scale and scope compared with international peers and its sole
focus on glass packaging for the pharmaceutical industry.  S&P
forecasts that the group's revenues will be just below
EUR300 million in 2016 and S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA
will be about EUR65 million-EUR70 million.  At the same time, the
group benefits from its leading position in the niche market,
which in our view is fairly stable and consolidated, its
above-average profitability, and its relatively diverse customer
base and longstanding relationships with blue-chip customers.

"The ratings are constrained by our view of SGD Group's financial
risk profile as highly leveraged.  This assessment is based on
our view that the acquirer, China Jianyin Investment Ltd., is
effectively acting as a financial sponsor, because it follows an
aggressive financial strategy using debt to maximize shareholder
returns.  At the closing of the acquisition, JIC raised EUR460
million in new debt, including EUR350 million medium-term bank
loans from China Construction Bank and EUR109 million shareholder
loans from the new owner.  We treat these shareholder loans as
debt, because they will rank pari passu with the group's other
unsecured debt and because the group will pay cash interest on
them.  We forecast that SGD Group's credit ratios will be highly
leveraged in 2016-2018, with adjusted debt to EBITDA remaining
above 8.8x and FFO to debt of about 6%," S&P said.

Unless there is evidence of a material shift in the new owner's
financial policy and commitment to materially lower leverage,
with adjusted debt to EBITDA of 5x or less, S&P's view of SGD
Group's financial risk profile will remain highly leveraged.

"We continue to expect that SGD Group's profitability will
gradually improve in 2016-2018 compared with 2015 levels,
although performance in 2016 will likely be somewhat weaker than
we previously forecast.  In the first half of 2016, a rapid
increase in sales and EBITDA generated by the group's India-based
subsidiary Cogent Glass Ltd. were partly offset by softer type I
and type II pharmaceutical glass markets in Western Europe,
especially in France.  The high base effect of 2015, when orders
increased in anticipation of a ramp-up in production at the St
Quentin plant, weighs on 2016 performance, as do negative foreign
currency exchange rate effects from China and India," S&P noted.

Nevertheless, S&P expects that over the next two-to-three years
SGD Group will generate higher EBITDA margins compared with peers
in the packaging industry.  Margins will benefit from the
company's sole focus on high-value-added pharma glass production
and the EBITDA contribution from Indian glass company Cogent,
which SGD Group acquired last year, as well as from higher
efficiency at its new plant in Saint Quentin La Motte, which
started production in February 2016.

S&P forecasts that in 2016 SGD Group's free cash flow (FOCF)
generation will be just breakeven, turning negative in 2017-2018
because the group plans to invest in expanding capacity and
upgrading its plant in Sucy.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Revenue growth of about 3%-4% in 2016-2018, mainly driven
      by increasing production of conversion glass by Cogent,
      robust performance in China, and S&P's expectation of
      resumed growth in output of type I glass from 2017 onward.
   -- Adjusted EBITDA margin improving to about 22%-23% in 2016-
      2018 from 21% in 2015.
   -- Modest working capital outflows of EUR5 million-EUR10
      million per year.
   -- Capital expenditure (capex) of about 12%-15% of revenues in
      2016-2018 (about EUR35 million-EUR45 million per year).
   -- No dividends.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these weighted average
credit measures in 2016-2018:

   -- Adjusted ratio debt to EBITDA of about 8.8x.
   -- Adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 6%.
   -- Adjusted FFO cash interest coverage of about 2.7x.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that SGD Group's
profitability will gradually improve in 2016-2018, despite softer
demand in Western European markets and negative foreign currency
exchange rate effects in 2016, but that the group's credit
metrics will remain highly leveraged, with adjusted debt to
EBITDA exceeding 8.5x and FFO to debt of about 6%.  The stable
outlook also assumes that the group's liquidity sources will be
broadly sufficient to cover liquidity uses over the next 12
months.

S&P could take a negative rating action over the next 12 months
if SGD Group's interest coverage deteriorated, with FFO to cash
interest decreasing to less than 2x, or if liquidity became weak
due to a deficit of liquidity sources over uses, for example as a
result of larger-than-forecast capital spending outlays or
working capital variations.

In S&P's view, an upgrade is currently unlikely, given its view
of the financial sponsor's aggressive financial strategy and the
group's highly leveraged credit metrics.  Over the longer term,
S&P could take a positive rating action if the group's financial
policy became less aggressive and leverage metrics were set to
reduce significantly, with adjusted debt to EBITDA decreasing to
less than 5x on a consistent basis.  An upgrade would also
require liquidity to improve to an adequate level, with sources
exceeding uses by at least 1.2x.


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L U X E M B O U R G
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BREEZE FINANCE: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR84MM Bonds to Ca
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken these rating actions for the
respective debt facilities raised by Breeze Finance S.A.:

  Downgraded to B2 from B1 the rating of the EUR287 million,
   4.524% Class A Senior Secured Bonds due in 2027 (the Class A
   Bonds) and

  Downgraded to Ca from Caa2 the rating of the EUR84 million,
   6.708% Class B Subordinated Bonds due in 2027 (the Class B
   Bonds and, together with the Class A Bonds, the Bonds).

The outlook on the ratings is stable.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades are primarily driven by wind resource and
therefore production continuing to remain materially below the
initial forecasts whilst operating costs have increased.  As a
result, (1) our expectations of future financial metrics have
deteriorated somewhat and (2) our recovery expectation on the
Class B Bonds has diminished given the continued deferral of
principal and interest (as allowed under the finance
documentation), which we expect to increase.  Further, on the
Oct. 19, 2016, payment date, the Issuer needed to draw EUR600,000
from the debt service reserve account (DSRA) to pay principal and
interest due on the Class A Bonds.

"Breeze Finance continues to experience a lower than expected
wind resource, and is susceptible to liquidity risks," explains
Christopher Bredholt, a Vice President -- Senior Analyst in
Moody's Infrastructure Finance Group, and lead analyst for the
Issuer.  "Whilst we do not expect the Class A Bonds to exhaust
available liquidity before maturity, our assessment of lender
recovery on the Class B Bonds has diminished," Mr. Bredholt
added.

The ratings of the Bonds are constrained by weak credit metrics
as a consequence of (1) low wind levels experienced across the
portfolio of wind farms, resulting in energy production levels
that since 2009 have largely been substantially below the
original forecasts; and (2) higher-than-budgeted operating costs
due to the aging portfolio, with the average turbine being over
12 years old. We forecast minimum and average debt service
coverage ratios of 0.93x and 1.14x respectively for the Class A
Bonds, but do not expect available liquidity to be exhausted.
For the Class B Bonds, Moody's forecasts an average debt service
coverage ratio less than 1.00x, indicating continued deferral of
principal and interest.

However the ratings of the Bonds are supported by (1)
satisfactory availability; and (2) a supportive legal framework
both in Germany and France, underpinning guaranteed electricity
feed-in tariffs for all wind-farms in the portfolio.

The B2 rating of the Class A Bonds takes into account the senior
position of the debt but also, as negatives, (1) that the Class A
Bonds DSRA, once drawn, is subordinated to repayments of
principal and interest on the Class B Bonds; and (2) that the
Class A Bonds are subject to heightened liquidity risk around the
October semi-annual payment date, as this follows the seasonally
low wind summer period.  Given the continued deferral of
principal and interest on the Class B Bonds, it is highly
unlikely that withdrawals from the DSRA will be replenished.

The Ca rating of the Class B Bonds reflects (1) their
subordinated position relative to the Class A Bonds; (2) our
expectation that the Class B Bonds will not be repaid in full --
even under a sustained improvement in wind conditions -- in light
of continued deferral of principal and interest which we expect
to increase, and deterioration in our recovery assessment to the
lower end of the 35% - 65% range implied by the Ca rating level;
and (3) lack of external liquidity following the full utilisation
of the DSRA for the Class B Bonds in 2010.

                         RATING OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects (1) that whilst Moody's anticipates
some minor draws on the Class A DSRA, it do not expect a material
depletion of available liquidity before maturity; (2) Moody's
expectation that production will remain in line with the updated
long-term P90 production forecast of 530 gigawatt hours per annum
with portfolio turbine availability above 95%.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Downward pressure would likely be exerted on the ratings
following (1) wind levels consistently below the updated "P90"
projections; (2) a material decrease in the availability of the
portfolio below 95%; or (3) a sharp increase in operating costs
for a sustained period of time.  Additionally, for the Class A
Bonds, downward rating pressure could develop if future
withdrawals from the DSRA materially impair the liquidity
available for scheduled debt service.

Moody's do not expect future upward rating movements. However,
upward pressure could be exerted as a result of a sustained
increase in revenues or reduction in costs resulting in (1) for
the Class A Bonds, a material improvement in the debt service
cover ratios above 1.30x and (2) for the Class B Bonds, a more
rapid repayment of deferred principal and interest such that our
recovery assessment improves to greater than 65%.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Power
Generation Projects published in December 2012.

Breeze Finance S.A. is a Luxembourg-based special purpose company
ultimately owned by Renewable Energies RE Beteiligungs GmbH (5%)
and Appleby Trust (Cayman) Ltd. (95%).


LEYNE STRAUSS-KAHN: Ex-IMF Chief Ordered to Pay Back Taxes
----------------------------------------------------------
Stephanie Bodoni and Hugo Miller at Bloomberg News report that
former International Monetary Fund chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn
was ordered to pay EUR74,792 (US$82,600) in back taxes and
interest in a Luxembourg court ruling over his role at a bankrupt
hedge fund he co-founded.

Mr. Strauss-Kahn couldn't escape personal responsibility for
Leyne Strauss-Kahn & Partners' tax obligations dating back to
2014, a Luxembourg court ruled Nov. 2, Bloomberg relays, citing a
statement from the tribunal published on Nov. 8.  Mr. Strauss-
Kahn had appealed a decision by the nation's tax administration,
Bloomberg discloses.

The court said in the statement Mr. Strauss-Kahn's role as
director meant he "was responsible" and that he had to "watch
over the execution of fiscal obligations" of the firm he
represented, Bloomberg relates.



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N E T H E R L A N D S
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KETER GROUP: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Sr. Sec. Facilities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive B2 ratings to
the senior secured credit facilities issued by Keter Group B.V.,
an Israel based manufacturer of resin plastic consumer goods
including outdoor furniture and home storage products.  The
senior secured credit facilities consist of a EUR 690 million
Term Loan B and a EUR 100 million revolving credit facility which
together rank pari passu.  The outlook on all the ratings is
stable.

                       RATINGS RATIONALE

"Moody's assigned definitive ratings to the instruments following
the successful execution of the financing transaction which was
closed on October 31, and a comprehensive review of the final
documentation," says Scott Phillips, a Moody's Vice President --
Senior Analyst and Lead Analyst for Keter.

The B2 corporate family rating reflects Keter's strength as a top
3 player in the market for resin plastic consumer goods, high
margins, a credible growth plan and expectations for greater
stability under a new ownership structure balanced by relatively
high initial leverage.

The B2 CFR reflects Keter's: (1) significant presence in the
global consumer plastic industry where it occupies top 3
positions in each of the product segments within which it
competes; (2) strong diversification across a number of wealthy
consumer end markets, including in North America, Western Europe
and Southern Europe; (3) long-standing relationships with major
DIY retailers underpinned by both its brand strength and its
track record for innovation; (4) well-regarded product portfolio
with limited concentration in any one segment; (5) an increasing
online presence; and (6) above average profitability with EBIT
margins of 13-15% reflecting a manufacturing bias towards Israel
which reduces labour costs compared with peers.

At the same time, the rating is constrained by: (1) the
competitiveness of the consumer durables sector which faces
significant pricing pressure from a small number of relatively
large customers, which have high bargaining power; (2) relatively
high customer concentration in North America; (3) exposure to the
volatility of polypropylene prices (linked to oil prices) which
accounts for around 50% of total cash costs albeit mitigated by
the company's track record of passing through cost inflation; (4)
a limited operating history for the group as a stand-alone
entity; (5) concentration of manufacturing production in Israel,
which could in the short-term following any disruption, threaten
future orders and customer relationships; (6) substitution risks
from other materials such as wood, which is also limiting pricing
dynamics to some extent; and (7) high financial leverage, which
Moody's estimates will be around 5x (gross debt / EBITDA) in 2016
and around 4.5x in 2017.

              WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP / DOWN

Given the limited track record of the group in its current form,
as well as the absence of audited financial statements for the
combined group, Moody's believes that an upgrade of the ratings
is unlikely at the current time.  Nevertheless, and following the
publication of a fully audited financial report, the ratings
could be upgraded if leverage were to fall sustainably below 4x
gross debt / EBITDA and if free cash flow (FCF) / debt is above
5%.  In contrast, if leverage were to remain above 5x there would
likely be negative pressure on the rating.  Similarly, negative
FCF generation or a deterioration in liquidity would also put
downwards pressure on the rating.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Consumer
Durables Industry published in September 2014.

Keter Group B.V. is a holding company, based in The Netherlands,
for a group of entities involved in the manufacturing and
distribution of a variety of resin plastic consumer goods.
Keter's key products include garden furniture and home storage
solutions. Keter is majority owned by funds advised by Private
Equity firm BC Partners while minority shareholders include the
Public Sector Pension Investment Board ("PSP Investments"), one
of Canada's largest pension investment managers, and the original
founders, the Sagol family.  The Keter group reported revenue of
EUR770 million in 2015.


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R U S S I A
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DELOPORTS LLC: S&P Raises Long-Term CCR to 'BB-', Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised to 'BB-' from 'B+' its long-term
corporate credit rating on DeloPorts LLC, a Russian holding
company for container handling, grain terminals, and bunkering
services businesses in the port of Novorossiysk.  The outlook is
stable.

The upgrade reflects S&P's view that the container handling
market in Russia's Black Sea Basin will continue to recover in
the next two-to-three years.  As a result, S&P expects DeloPorts
will benefit further from the more favorable market conditions.
By S&P's estimate, it will deliver container handling volume
growth of 12%-15% by the end of 2016 and then 2%-5% annually in
2017-2018.  Such an improvement should fuel the group's operating
performance and cash flow generation, despite its sizable
investment program.

The group's operating performance remained relatively resilient
during the market decline of 2014-2015, when volumes fell by 4.4%
in 2014 and 23.4% in 2015, in part because of the natural hedge
its operating model benefits from generating revenues in U.S.
dollars while having operating costs in Russian rubles.  That
said, DeloPorts' costs have reduced in U.S. dollar terms
following the recent ruble depreciation, partly offsetting EBITDA
decline through a higher EBITDA margin.

Despite volume losses in 2014-2015, the share of laden export
(loaded containers) has since increased.  This could make
container volumes more stable by bringing in export goods which,
in S&P's view, tend to be more competitive when the ruble is
cheap.  This contrasts with imports, and works as a balancing
factor for the market.  S&P therefore thinks that DeloPorts'
future cash flows could be less volatile in the event of another
dip in container volumes.

S&P expects that improvements in operating performance will
result in increasing future dividends at DeloPorts, compared with
the moderate payout S&P expects this year.  Capital expenditures
(capex) will in S&P's view remain meaningful in the next two-to-
three years, owing to continued expansion of both grain and
container terminals.  Therefore, S&P forecasts the DeloPorts'
leverage will increase, resulting in S&P Global Ratings-adjusted
FFO to debt at 39%-43% in 2017 and 33%-37% in 2018, versus 48%-
52% in 2016.  Still, these cash flow metrics would remain
commensurate with S&P's assessment of DeloPort's financial risk
profile.

S&P understands that Deloports is in talks to sell 49% of its
shares in the Novorossiysk container terminal NUTEP to DP World
(DPW), a container terminal operator based in the United Arab
Emirates.  At this stage, S&P is not including this transaction,
which is currently undergoing various regulatory checks, in S&P's
base-case forecast.

Under Russian regulation, a port's asset class is considered
strategic and cannot be controlled by investors with foreign
government ownership.  If the NUTEP deal goes through, S&P
expects DeloPorts will maintain operating control of the terminal
and continue to consolidate it in its financial statements.  S&P
believes NUTEP could benefit from having DPW as a strategic
minority shareholder from an operational point of view, given its
expertise as one of the largest container port operators
globally. Conversely, S&P views a potential risk that the final
structure could impair DeloPorts' ability and flexibility to
access NUTEP's future cash flows to support servicing of its
Russian ruble
(RUB) 3 billion bonds issued at DeloPorts' level.  The
bondholders have a put option on these bonds in November 2018 and
DeloPorts' accumulation of cash for the potential bond repayment
is a critical credit consideration for S&P.  S&P also expects
that post-transaction, NUTEP's financial policy would not become
excessively aggressive, allowing leverage at the consolidated
level to remain moderate, namely with FFO to debt remaining above
30% and debt to EBITDA below 2.0x.

S&P continues to incorporate into its rating on DeloPorts a
negative adjustment under S&P's comparable ratings analysis,
under which S&P reviews an issuer's credit characteristics in
aggregate. The one-notch downward adjustment reflects the group's
ambitious expansion plans over the next two years, including the
construction of an additional berth with the capacity to
accommodate a 10,000 TEU ship, which no other port in Russia has
at present.  S&P understands that the group may raise debt to
finance this capex, although it could defer these plans if
needed. In addition, if DeloPorts were to make an aggressive,
perhaps debt-funded, dividend distribution in excess of S&P's
base case forecast, its financial ratios could meaningfully
weaken and its liquidity could deteriorate.

S&P's assessment of DeloPorts continues to be constrained by its
reliance on just two major cargoes -- containers and grains --
which account for over 82% of the group's revenues.  Both cargoes
are prone to significant volume fluctuations, owing to the
macroeconomic environment for containers, and the risk of export
restrictions, in the event of poor harvests, for grains.
Additional constraints include DeloPorts' high country risk in
Russia, fierce competition, and lower diversification in terms of
cargo mix and customers, compared with its major peer,
Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port, operating in the same harbor.

On the upside, DeloPorts operates in one of the most important
maritime gateways in Russia, the Black Sea Basin, and has a
strengthening competitive position in a market with high barriers
to entry.  DeloPorts' fairly new asset base supports its cost-
efficient business model.  The deregulation of the ports industry
in Russia since 2013 has given DeloPorts flexibility to adjust
tariffs in response to market conditions. A proposal by the
Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) in 2016 to return to tariff
regulation beginning in 2017, on the basis that the market
probably was not able to balance tariffs due to insufficient
competition, created a risk of dismantling the system of non-
regulated tariffs, which could have lowered the tariffs with
negative consequences to the group's operating performance.
Although not completely eliminated, the risk of the regulation
comeback now seems to be lower as following the FAS' admission
that the market is competitive.

The stable outlook on DeloPorts reflects S&P's view that the
group will continue to gradually improve its operating
performance, on the back of recovery in the container market and
its favorable grain market position.  S&P expects the group will
maintain adjusted FFO to debt above 30% and debt to EBITDA of no
more than 2.0x in the next 12-24 months, despite S&P's
anticipation of meaningful dividends following the start of the
container market recovery, combined with sizable investments.
S&P also assumes that, if the sale of 49% of NUTEP to DPW goes
through, the group would maintain operating control of the
terminal and the ability to access NUTEP's cash flows to extract
dividends to support its debt service and maintain financial
metrics commensurate with the current rating level.

S&P could lower its rating on DeloPorts if S&P considered that
after the sale of 49% of NUTEP, the group had lost operating
control, its financial policy would lead to FFO to debt of less
than 30%, or its access to dividends from NUTEP had diminished,
consequently weakening the group's ability to service the
RUB3billion bonds issued at DeloPorts' level.  A downgrade could
also be triggered by an unexpected, aggressive, debt-funded
acquisition or shareholder returns, an unforeseen significant
setback in operating performance, materially weakening credit
measures, or deteriorating liquidity.

S&P considers a positive rating action on DeloPorts as unlikely
in the near term.  It could primarily follow significant
improvement in DeloPorts' business risk, owing to broader
diversity of its business, markedly stronger market positions,
and increased market share in container and grain markets.


PIK GROUP: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had placed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit and 'ruA-' Russia national scale ratings on
Russia-based residential developer JSC PIK Group on CreditWatch
with negative implications.

The CreditWatch placement follows the announcement by JSC PIK
Group of its acquisition of all of the Morton Group's shares from
Horus Real Estate Fund I B.V., which is owned by Sergei Gordeev,
PIK's largest shareholder and CEO, who bought Morton in a private
deal earlier in 2016.  The acquisition might result in weakening
of PIK's liquidity because a substantial part of Morton's debt is
short term.  Additionally, there is uncertainty about the quality
of Morton's assets and their cash flow generation potential.

Morton is a large housing developer in the greater Moscow region.
The transaction, if completed, would create the largest
residential developer in Russia.  According to management
estimates, by 2018 the combined entity's revenues could reach
Russian ruble (RUB) 190 billion (about US$3 billion), with annual
sales volumes of around 1.8 million square meters.  The combined
entity's land bank will amount to 10 million square meters, while
production capacities for industrial construction will exceed 1.5
million square meters.

The transaction is expected to be completed before the end of
2016, if the Russian antitrust regulator approves it.

S&P understands that PIK plans to fully finance the deal with
cash and debt, and that its ratio of gross debt-to-EBITDA ratio
will be less than 3x pro forma the transaction and on a net basis
the ratio will be about 2x.

The CreditWatch is based on S&P's view that the combination with
Morton could weaken PIK's overall credit quality.  S&P will
resolve the CreditWatch placement when the transaction is
finalized and PIK begins integrating Morton and restructuring its
short-term debt.  S&P expects it to happen in late 2016 or early
2017.

S&P could consider downgrading PIK by up to one notch if the
transaction with Morton leads to weakening of the company's
liquidity or free cash flow generation capacity.

"We would likely affirm our 'B' rating on PIK if the announced
merger with Morton falls through, for example, if the antitrust
regulator did not approve the transaction.  We could also affirm
the rating if the transaction is completed and we gain enough
confidence that the integration of Morton will not absorb a
significant part of PIK's cash flows and pressure PIK's liquidity
position.  We would need greater transparency regarding the
transaction and its arm's length basis, as well as company's
future financial and operational strategy and the quality of the
acquired assets," S&P noted.


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S P A I N
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INSTITUT CATALA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Institut Catala de Finances' (ICF)
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB', with a Negative
Outlook, and its Short-Term IDR at 'B'. The Negative Outlook
reflects that on the Autonomous Community of Catalonia
(BB/Negative/B). Fitch has also assigned ICF's EUR200m Pagares
programme a long-term rating of 'BB' and a short-term rating of
'B'. The long- and short-term ratings on the senior unsecured
outstanding bonds have been affirmed at 'BB' and 'B'
respectively.

The affirmation reflects the unchanged guarantee for ICF's
financial obligations from Catalonia, whose ratings were affirmed
on July 15, 2016.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Legal Status Attributed as Stronger: IFC's ratings mirror those
of Catalonia, following the enhancement of Catalonia's support
for ICF via a statutory guarantee as a result of the 29 July 2011
amendment to the regional Decree Law 4/2002. ICF is a public law
entity wholly owned by the regional government of Catalonia.

Control also Stronger: Catalonia's government has a minority
representation on ICF's Board of Directors. However, ICF is
gaining autonomy and the majority of its directors have been
independent since 2015, nominated by its internal Appointment and
Remuneration Committee, which enhances ICF's self-governance. The
maximum outstanding debt level ICF may reach, set yearly in the
regional budget, was EUR6,000m at 31 December 2015, far higher
than ICF's total debt of EUR2,184m on the same date.

Strategic Importance Midrange: ICF plays a key role in promoting
regional development, particularly in supporting access to
funding for SMEs in Catalonia. It was created to channel public
credit and foster the economic and social development of
Catalonia, in line with the region's financial policies.

Integration Midrange: Eurostat classifies ICF as a non-
administrative body of the regional government of Catalonia.
ICF's results and debt are therefore not included in the accounts
of the regional government. ICF has not received capital
injections from the regional government since 2011, and it posted
positive net income throughout 2011-2015, amounting to a
cumulative EUR32m.

ICF's interest margin has grown steadily to close to 62% in 2015,
from 39% in 2011, compensating for a decline in its lending as
market liquidity has recovered. In 2015, ICF lent EUR695m, or 5%
less than in 2014, for total outstanding risk of EUR3,026m, of
which EU726m corresponded to the public sector. ICF displays
strong capitalisation, as equity equals roughly 30% of risk-
weighted assets. Likewise, provisions cover more than three-
quarters of doubtful loans of EUR391m as of end-2015. Liquidity
is also strong, with liquid assets totalling close to 1.4x short-
term liabilities at end-2015.

In line with Fitch's criteria, the Pagares programme is rated at
the same level as ICF's Long-Term IDR of 'BB' and Short-Term IDR
of 'B'. The programme was launched in 2016 for the fourth
consecutive year and has a 12-month validity. Issues under the
programme may have maturities of 90 to 730 days, and are issued
at a discount.

Apart from the statutory guarantee, Fitch views ICF's liquidity
as sufficient for the redemption of the programme, at close to
2.6x its maximum EUR200m authorised principal amount at end-2015.
The outstanding amount at 31 December 2015 was EUR40.4m.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Changes to the ratings of Catalonia would be mirrored in those of
ICF. Furthermore, ICF's ratings would be reassessed in case of a
change in its statutory guarantee, although this is currently
unlikely.

A significant deterioration in ICF's structural liquidity could
also result in a negative rating action on the Pagares programme.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


PERSTORP HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' CCR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'CCC+' long-term corporate credit
rating on Sweden-headquartered specialty chemicals producer
Perstorp Holding AB.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time S&P assigned a 'CCC+' issue rating and '3'
recovery rating to the proposed US$800 million-equivalent senior
secured notes due in June 2021.  S&P expects recovery for
noteholders in the higher half of the 50%-70% range in the case
of a payment default.

S&P also assigned a 'CCC-' issue rating and '6' recovery rating
to the proposed US$420 million second-lien secured notes due in
September 2021.  S&P expects recovery in for noteholders 0%-10%
range in the case of a payment default.

S&P affirmed its 'CCC+' rating on the existing senior secured
notes and its 'CCC-' rating on the existing second-lien secured
notes.  S&P will withdraw the ratings on both these instruments
upon their repayment with the proceeds of the newly issued
instruments.

"The affirmation reflects Perstorp's extended maturity profile as
a result of the proposed refinancing, with the revolving credit
facility (RCF) coming due in 2021 and the senior and second-lien
secured notes coming due only in 2021 as well.  This addresses
the near-term liquidity risks and refinancing needs associated
with the sizable maturities in May and August 2017 under the
existing capital structure.  We also note the decreased average
interest costs under the proposed capital structure.  At the same
time, we forecast continued very significant leverage, with S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 8.0x-8.5x in 2016
and 2017, compared with 8.3x at year-end 2015, and limited
deleveraging under our base case, given our forecast of neutral
free operating cash flow (FOCF) generation over the same period.
We continue to factor in the pronounced exposure of the overall
debt amount to changes in foreign exchange rates, which are
difficult to predict (notably the Swedish krona [SEK] to the euro
and the krona to the U.S. dollar).  This is somewhat mitigated,
however, because the company's EBITDA generation in euro and U.S.
dollar provides a natural hedge versus the foreign exchange rate
effect on the debt," S&P said.

"Our assessment of Perstorp's business risk profile as weak takes
into account the company's exposure to the cyclical, capital-
intensive, and competitive nature of the chemicals industry.  We
also factor in its exposure to volatile feedstock prices and
cyclical end markets, such as construction, automotive, and
industrial, for most of its sales. About 75%-80% of its raw
materials are based on oil (notably propylene) and natural gas.
The assessment also takes into account high EBITDA sensitivity to
changes in foreign exchange rates, notably SEK/euro and SEK/U.S.
dollar, with a high proportion of Perstorp's costs denominated in
SEK.  This is partly offset by the company's U.S. dollar- and
euro-denominated debt structure. Perstorp's reliance on Borealis'
cracker for the supply of propylene, ethylene, and butylene for
its Swedish Stenungsund plant is a secondary constraint, as we
recognize the viability of Borealis' cracker, the stability of
the arrangement in the past, the mutual dependency of both
companies, and the benefits of lower transportation costs for
Perstorp," S&P noted.

At the same time, Perstorp has improved its EBITDA, as evidenced
by SEK1.6 billion reported year-to-date in 2016, compared with
SEK1.3 billion in 2014.  S&P also takes into account Perstorp's
strong market positions in 2-EHA (2-Ethylhexanoic Acid), penta,
and oxoaldehydes products; its healthy customer base, which is
active in a diverse range of end markets; and its operating
efficiency, which is supported by vertical integration along
Perstorp's production chain.

The stable outlook factors in the extended maturity profile, as a
result of successful refinancing.  The outlook also assumes
steady EBITDA of SEK1.6 billion-SEK1.8 billion in 2016 and 2017.

S&P would lower the rating if Perstorp did not complete the
refinancing as announced, or if its FOCF turned materially
negative, most likely as a result of EBITDA decline, possibly to
SEK1.3 billion-SEK1.4 billion.  Risk factors in this respect are
strengthening of the krona, higher costs of feedstock if combined
with the inability to pass them on to customers in a timely
manner, or lower-than-anticipated EBITDA contribution from the
Valerox project, the company's plasticizer plant commissioned in
2015.

S&P could raise the rating if it gains further confidence that
Perstorp's EBITDA could reach about SEK2 billion.  S&P considers
that, at such a level, the company would be able to generate
positive FOCF.  In turn, this would reduce adjusted debt to
EBITDA to about 7.0x-7.5x, which S&P sees as commensurate with a
'B-' rating.


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


HYDRA DUTCH: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corporate Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service withdrew Hydra Dutch Holdings 2 B.V.'s
(Eden Springs) B2 corporate family rating and the B1-PD
probability of default rating.  At the time of withdrawal, there
was no instrument rating outstanding.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings of Eden Springs for
reorganization reasons following the acquisition of Eden Springs
by Cott Corporation (B2 stable) which completed on Aug. 2, 2016.

Headquartered in Switzerland, Eden Springs, with EUR356 million
in sales in 2015, is a leading provider of water and coffee
delivery services to homes and offices in a variety of European
countries, Israel and Russia.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


EREGLI DEMIR: S&P Affirms 'BB' CCR & Revises Outlook to Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' long-term corporate credit
rating on Turkish flat steel producer Eregli Demir ve Celik
Fabrikalari T.A.S. (Erdemir).  S&P revised the outlook on the
rating to stable from negative.

"The affirmation and outlook revision follow our revision of the
outlook on our sovereign rating on Turkey to stable from
negative. Although our economic growth projections for Turkey
have marginally worsened by 0.2% in 2016 and 2017, largely in
relation to the decline in economic activity following the
attempted coup, we do not see this as having a material negative
impact on Erdemir's operating performance.  In fact, we have seen
continued robust operating performance in 2016, with the third
quarter being particularly strong, following increases in steel
prices during the year.  Erdemir continues to benefit from the
Turkish flat steel industry's supportive supply and demand
balance, as well as the company's high capacity utilization rates
and a leading domestic market position.  Furthermore, Turkey
remains a net importer of flat steel.  Although we expect margins
to contract in 2017 as the impact of higher iron ore and coking
coal prices is reflected in the cost of goods sold, we expect
them to remain at healthy levels," S&P said.

Because of the increase in year-to-date steel prices, S&P
continues to believe that Erdemir can maintain an adjusted debt-
to-EBITDA ratio of 2x-3x over the cycle.  This includes S&P's
debt adjustments, including debt at Ataer, a special-purpose
vehicle owned by Oyak (Turkish Armed Forces Assistance) pension
fund, which is Erdemir's largest shareholder.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Erdemir will
maintain profitability above the industry average, supported by
its strong domestic market position.  S&P also incorporates its
assumption that Erdemir will maintain credit metrics in line with
S&P's intermediate financial risk category, including adjusted
debt to EBITDA below 3x and FFO to debt above 30% (including
Ataer's debt), and that it will generate strong positive free
operating cash flow (FOCF).

S&P could consider an upgrade if Erdemir maintained a track
record of significantly lower leverage than historically has been
the case, with FFO to debt above 45%, together with prudent
liquidity management and healthy FOCF.  S&P would also be mindful
of country risk factors in any upgrade scenario, given that S&P
now rates the company at the same level as Turkey.

S&P could lower the rating if credit metrics weakened, such that
debt to EBITDA increased above 3x and FFO to debt dropped below
30%, if FOCF turned negative, or if capex or acquisitions were to
increase above forecast levels.  This could be driven by, for
example, a deterioration of market conditions (such as if the
industry is unable to push through steel price increases to
compensate for the recent spike in coking coal prices) or
Erdemir's market position, an increase in shareholder
distributions, or overruns and delays on growth projects.  A
downgrade could also be driven by a weakening of the company's
liquidity position.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


BANK NADRA: Deposit Guarantee Fund Extends Liquidation
------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the Individuals' Deposit Guarantee
Fund has extended the liquidation of Bank Nadra for two years,
until June 3, 2020.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, the power of Bank Nadra's
liquidator Iryna Striukova was extended for the corresponding
period.

The National Bank of Ukraine, continuing the withdrawal of
insolvent Bank Nadra from the market, on June 4, 2015, decided to
revoke its banking license and liquidate the bank, Interfax-
Ukraine relates.


NATIONAL BANK: Deposit Guarantee Fund Extends Liquidation
---------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the Individuals' Deposit Guarantee
Fund has extended the liquidation of National Bank for
Development (VBR) for two years, until December 24 2019.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, the power of VBR's liquidator
Serhiy Mykhno was extended for the corresponding period.

The temporary administration was introduced in VBR from
November 28, 2014, while the procedure of liquidation started on
December 23, 2015, Interfax-Ukraine relates.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, the fund said the estimated value
of the liquidation estate of VBR is UAH6.1 billion.

VBR was declared insolvent in connection with the application of
EU sanctions against its shareholder, Interfax-Ukraine notes.

VBR was registered in 2009.  It is part of MAKO company.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AMERICAN APPAREL: Appoints Administrators to Wind Down Business
---------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Hardy at Retail Week reports that US fashion retailer
American Apparel has appointed administrators to wind down its UK
operations.

The struggling retailer, which has 183 UK staff, has brought in
KPMG to sell off its 13-strong UK store estate, Retail Week
relates.

According to Retail Week, KPMG joint administrator and
restructuring partner Jim Tucker -- jim.tucker@kpmg.co.uk --
said: "The American Apparel group has been experiencing strong
retail headwinds, which has culminated in the US parent deciding
to stop inventory shipments to the UK.

"The UK business has experienced similar trading difficulties,
resulting in the appointment of administrators."

KPMG said the UK stores are "well stocked" and will "continue to
trade as usual in the lead up to the peak Christmas trading
period", Retail Week notes.

The US business is in the process of being sold, but the UK
operations and "certain" European divisions will not be part of
the sale, Retail Week relays.

KPMG stressed that "no redundancies" have yet to be made, Retail
Week discloses.


ARES EUROPEAN VIII: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating to Cl. F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned preliminary credit ratings to Ares
European CLO VIII B.V.'s class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, and F notes.
At closing the issuer will also issue unrated subordinated notes.

The preliminary ratings assigned to Ares European CLO VIII's
notes reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily
      of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans and bonds.  The credit enhancement provided through
      the subordination of cash flows, excess spread, and
      overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

S&P considers that the transaction's documented counterparty
replacement and remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate its
exposure to counterparty risk under S&P's current counterparty
criteria.

Following the application of S&P's structured finance ratings
above the sovereign criteria, it considers the transaction's
exposure to country risk to be limited at the assigned
preliminary rating levels, as the exposure to individual
sovereigns does not exceed the diversification thresholds
outlined in S&P's criteria.

At closing, S&P considers that the transaction's legal structure
will be bankruptcy remote, in line with S&P's European legal
criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, it believes its preliminary ratings
are commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each
class of notes.

RATINGS LIST

Preliminary Ratings Assigned

Ares European CLO VIII B.V.
EUR416.50 Million Floating And Fixed-Rate Notes (Including
Subordinated Notes)

Class            Prelim.         Prelim.
                 rating          amount
                                (mil. EUR)

A-1              AAA (sf)        213.00
A-2              AAA (sf)         25.00
B                AA (sf)          52.80
C                A (sf)           26.00
D                BBB (sf)         21.20
E                BB (sf)          20.00
F                B- (sf)          11.20
Sub.             NR               47.30

NR--Not rated.
Sub.--Subordinated.


ASHCRAFT FURNITURE: Faces Insolvency for Second Time
----------------------------------------------------
Cabinet Maker reports that Ashcraft Furniture Limited has entered
insolvency for the second time.

James Martin -- james.martin@crowecw.co.uk -- and Mark Newman --
mark.newman@crowecw.co.uk -- of CCW Recovery Solutions, were
appointed as joint liquidators on Oct. 13 after the company,
formerly known as AFL International Ltd., racked up a creditor
bill over GBP460,000, Cabinet Maker relates.

Details of the insolvency has been revealed by the practitioner's
filed report on Companies House, highlighting that the former
Argos supplier, Ashcraft owed more than GBP218,000 to trade
creditors, as well as a HMRC bill of over GBP29,000,
Cabinet Maker discloses.

Also included within unsecured creditor claims is a GBP115,000
employees redundancy and notice pay shortfall, Cabinet Maker
states.

The latest insolvency marks the company's second since it went
into administration back in July 2015 after it failed to satisfy
a payment plan to creditors agreed in a company voluntary
arrangement (CVA) struck in the prior year, Cabinet Maker notes.

Ashcraft Furniture Limited is a West Midlands-based furniture
manufacturer.


MANSARD MORTGAGES 2006-1: S&P Lifts Rating on Cl. B2a Notes to B
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on Mansard Mortgages
2006-1 PLC's class M2a, B1a, and B2a notes.  At the same time,
S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class A2a and M1a notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction information from the October 2016 investor report
and loan-level data.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of
its U.K. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) criteria
and S&P's current counterparty criteria.

Since S&P's previous review, the weighted-average foreclosure
frequency (WAFF) has decreased.  The decrease is primarily due to
the transaction's increased seasoning.  The loans' weighted-
average seasoning has increased to 122 months from 89 months at
S&P's previous review.  Arrears over 30 days have remained
stable, representing 16.6% of the pool, compared with 16.75% in
October 2013.

S&P's weighted-average loss severity (WALS) calculations have
increased at the 'AAA' level, but have decreased at other rating
levels.  Although the transaction has benefitted from the
decrease in the weighted-average current loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios, this has been offset by the increase in S&P's
repossession market value decline assumptions, which are greatest
at the 'AAA' level.

Rating        WAFF      WALS
level          (%)       (%)
AAA          43.29     47.34
AA           34.26     38.04
A            26.93     24.03
BBB          20.85     15.74
BB           14.33      9.92
B            11.62      6.05

The reserve fund is at its required level and the liquidity
facility has not been drawn.  The portfolio's improved
performance and the increase in credit enhancement as a result of
deleveraging have resulted in the transaction currently paying
principal pro rata.  In accordance with S&P's U.K. RMBS criteria,
it has applied various cash flow stress scenarios, including
assuming the recession starts at the end of the third year to
test the resilience of the transaction structures to back-ended
defaults. S&P has also considered the possibility of triggers
being breached and the transactions switching to paying principal
sequentially.

Using S&P's WAFF and WALS calculations in its cash flow model,
the class A2a and M1a notes pass S&P's cash flow stresses at
higher rating levels than those currently assigned.  That said,
S&P's ratings on these classes of notes are capped at S&P's 'A'
long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on Danske Bank A/S as the
guaranteed investment contract (GIC) account provider, following
its loss of an 'A-1' short-term rating and failure to take remedy
action.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'A (sf)' ratings on the
class A2a and M1a notes.

As a result of a reduction in S&P's WAFF calculations and an
increase in the level of credit enhancement, the class M2a, B1a,
and B2a notes are able to pass S&P's cash flow stresses at higher
rating levels than those currently assigned.  Consequently, S&P
has raised its ratings on the class M2a, B1a, and B2a notes.

S&P's credit stability analysis indicates that the maximum
projected deterioration that S&P would expect at each rating
level for one- and three-year horizons, under moderate stress
conditions, is in line with S&P's credit stability criteria.

Mansard Mortgages 2006-1 is a U.K. nonconforming RMBS transaction
that closed in October 2006. Rooftop Mortgages Ltd. originated
the loans.

RATINGS LIST

Class           Rating
           To             From

Mansard Mortgages 2006-1 PLC
GBP500 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

M2a        BBB (sf)       BB+ (sf)
B1a        BB (sf)        B+ (sf)
B2a        B (sf)         B- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A2a        A (sf)
M1a        A (sf)


MAZARIN FUNDING: S&P Affirms CCC- Ratings on Various Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings took various credit rating actions in Mazarin
Funding Ltd.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Affirmed its ratings on the slow and fast pay income notes;
   -- Affirmed and withdrawn its 'A-1+ (sf)' short-term ratings
      on the euro and U.S. dollar commercial paper (CP) programs
      and repurchase agreement notes; and
   -- Raised its ratings on all other classes of notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using the latest available data, in addition to S&P's
cash flow analysis.  S&P has taken into account recent
developments in the transaction and reviewed the transaction
under S&P's relevant criteria.

S&P subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis based
on the methodology and assumptions as outlined by S&P's corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria, to determine the
break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes at
each rating level.  The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the
maximum level of gross defaults, based on its stress assumptions,
that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay interest and
principal on notes.  At the same time, S&P conducted a credit
analysis based on its assumptions, to determine the scenario
default rate (SDR) at each rating level, which S&P then compared
against its respective BDR.  The SDR is the minimum level of
portfolio defaults S&P expects each CDO tranche to be able to
support at the specific rating level using Standard & Poor's CDO
Evaluator.

In S&P's analysis, it used the reported portfolio balance that it
considered to be performing, the weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that we considered to be
appropriate.  S&P applied various cash flow stress scenarios
using its standard default patterns and timings for each rating
category assumed for all classes of notes, in conjunction with
different interest rate stress scenarios.

The Mazarin portfolio comprises predominantly structured finance
securities, of which nearly 45% of the performing balance
comprises European and U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities.  The remaining portion of the structured finance
securities mainly comprises a diversified mix of high-grade
commercial mortgage-backed securities, collateralized loan
obligations, and student loans.  The rest of the portfolio is
mainly exposed to subordinated debt issued by financial
institutions, with a small exposure to European corporate
securitizations.

Since S&P's Dec. 18, 2014 review, the repurchase agreement notes
have amortized to $189 million from $1.829 billion.

This amounts to a nearly 90% reduction in the notional
outstanding amount and is the primary driver behind the upgrades.
Due to this amortization, the available credit enhancement for
all classes of notes has significantly increased over the same
period, and therefore, the structure can now withstand higher
losses.  S&P has therefore raised its ratings on all classes of
notes, except for the slow and fast pay income notes.

S&P's credit analysis of the transaction highlights that the
underlying portfolio's overall credit quality has not changed
since S&P's previous review.  For example, the portfolio's
percentage of investment-grade assets has increased to 74.54% of
the total balance, from 71.75% as of S&P's previous review.

Mazarin Funding is a vehicle resulting from the restructuring of
a structured investment vehicle (SIV).  Similar to traditional
SIVs, the super senior liabilities comprise commercial paper
issued from euro and U.S. dollar programs.

Earlier this year S&P received confirmation from the issuer that
it intended to fully repay and sequentially cancel all CP
facilities and the short-term repurchase agreement, which would
be replaced by a long-term repurchase facility.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its 'A-1+ (sf)' short-term ratings on the euro
and U.S. dollar CP programs and repurchase agreement notes.  S&P
has subsequently withdrawn its ratings at the issuer's request.

S&P's cash flow results indicate that the fast and slow pay
income notes cannot withstand its credit and cash flow stresses
at rating levels above 'CCC-'.  In addition, S&P's supplemental
stress tests constrain its ratings on these classes of notes at
'CCC- (sf)'.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' ratings
on the slow and fast pay income notes.

Mazarin Funding is an HSBC-sponsored vehicle that securitizes a
portfolio of predominantly structured finance securities.

RATINGS LIST

Class                    Rating
                  To               From

Mazarin Funding Corp.

Ratings Affirmed And Withdrawn

Up To $50 Billion U.S. Dollar Commercial Paper

                  A-1+ (sf)
                  NR               A-1+ (sf)

Mazarin Funding Ltd.

Ratings Affirmed And Withdrawn

Up To $50 Billion U.S. Dollar Commercial Paper

                  A-1+ (sf)
                  NR               A-1+ (sf)

Up To $50 billion Euro Commercial Paper

                  A-1+ (sf)
                  NR               A-1+ (sf)

Up To $8,318 Million Repurchase Agreement

                  A-1+ (sf)
                  NR               A-1+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

EUR83.959 Million Tier 1 Fast Pay Income Notes

                  CCC- (sf)

$11.301 Million Tier 1 Fast Pay Income Notes

                  CCC- (sf)

GBP17.165 Million Tier 1 Fast Pay Income Notes

                  CCC- (sf)

$98.63 Million Tier 1 Fast Pay Income Notes

                  CCC- (sf)

$642.342 Million Tier 1 Slow Pay Income Notes

                  CCC- (sf)

EUR58.988 Million Tier 1 Slow Pay Income Notes

                  CCC- (sf)

GBP49.001 Million Tier 1 Slow Pay Income Notes

                  CCC- (sf)

YEN3.533 Billion Tier 1 Slow Pay Income Notes

                  CCC- (sf)

Ratings Raised

$200 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 4
Series 2010-1

                  AAA (sf)         AA- (sf)

$320 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 6
Series 2010-2

                  AAA (sf)         AA- (sf)

$270 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 8
Series 2010-3

                  AAA (sf)         AA- (sf)

$320 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 10
Series 2010-4

                  AAA (sf)         AA- (sf)

$320 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 12
Series 2010-5

                  AAA (sf)         AA-(sf)

$180 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 14
Series 2010-6

                  AAA (sf)         AA- (sf)

$320 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 16
Series 2010-7

                  AA+ (sf)         A+ (sf)

$160 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 18
Series 2010-8

                  AA+ (sf)         A (sf)

$160 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 20
Series 2010-9

                  AA (sf)          A- (sf)

$160 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 22
Series 2010-10

                  AA- (sf)         BBB+ (sf)

$80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 24
Series 2010-11

                  A+ (sf)          BBB+ (sf)

$80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 26
Series 2010-12

                  A+ (sf)          BBB (sf)

$80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 28
Series 2010-13

                  A- (sf)          BBB- (sf)
$80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 30
Series 2010-14

                  BBB+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)

$80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 32
Series 2010-15

                  BBB+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)

$80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 34
Series 2010-16

                  BBB (sf)         BB (sf)

$80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 36
Series 2010-17

                  BB+ (sf)         BB- (sf)

$80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 38
Series 2010-18

                  BB+ (sf)         B+ (sf)

$45 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 40
Series 2010-19

                  BB- (sf)         B+ (sf)

$40 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 42
Series 2010-20

                  B+ (sf)          B (sf)

$15 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 44
Series 2010-21

                  B+ (sf)          B- (sf)


TOWD POINT 2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional credit rating
to these notes to be issued by Towd Point Mortgage Funding 2016-
Granite 2 plc:

  GBP Class A Floating Rate Note due [August 2051], Assigned
   (P)Aaa (sf)
  GBP Class B Floating Rate Note due [August 2051], Assigned
   (P)Aa2 (sf)
  GBP Class C Floating Rate Note due [August 2051], Assigned
   (P)A3 (sf)
GBP Class D Floating Rate Note due [August 2051], Assigned
   (P)Baa3 (sf)
  GBP Class E Floating Rate Note due [August 2051], Assigned
   (P)Ba2 (sf)

The GBP Class Z Subordinated Note due [August 2051], the GBP
Class X Note due [August 2051] and the SDC Certificates, DC1
Certificates and DC2 Certificates have not been rated by Moody's.

The loans are backed by a pool of prime UK residential mortgages
terms and conditions loans originated by Landmark Mortgages
Limited.  The assets are currently held in the Neptune T&C
Warehouse (definitive ratings assigned by Moody's on May 5,
2016,).  The assets were previously securitized assets within
Granite Master Trust.  T&C loans are loans with assignability
restrictions or the transfer of which would limit the ability to
vary the rate of interest payable.  Landmark, as the Legal Title
Holder of the T&C loans, will declare a trust over the T&C loans
in favor of Cerberus European Residential Holdings B.V., which
will further nominate Towd Point Mortgage Funding 2016-Granite 2
plc as the beneficiary of the Legal Title Holder Trust.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of the notes are based on an analysis of the
characteristics of the underlying mortgage pool, sector wide and
originator specific performance data, protection provided by
credit enhancement, the roles of external counterparties
including the backup servicer and the structural features of the
transaction.

   -- Expected Loss and MILAN CE Analysis

Moody's determined the MILAN CE of [12.5]% and the portfolio
expected loss of [2.1]% as input parameters for Moody's cash flow
model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution.

Portfolio expected loss of [2.1]%: This is higher than the UK
Prime sector average of [1]% and is based on Moody's assessment
of the lifetime loss expectation for the pool taking into account
(i) the collateral performance of Landmark originated loans to
date, as provided by Landmark (formerly NRAM). [7.4]% of the pool
(as of 31st August 2016) are three months or more in arrears
(calculated on loan part level); (ii) the current macroeconomic
environment in the UK and the potential impact of future interest
rate rises on the performance of the mortgage loans and (iii)
benchmarking with comparable transactions in the UK market.

MILAN Credit Enhancement of [12.5]%: This is higher than the UK
Prime sector average of [9]% and follows Moody's assessment of
the loan-by-loan information taking into account the following
key drivers (i) the historic collateral performance described
above; (ii) the loan characteristics including [10.8]% of the
pool being Together loans for which an unsecured loan balance is
outstanding and [36.8]% being flexible loans.  Together loans are
loans where the borrower obtained a secured and an unsecured loan
and the unsecured loan balance is still outstanding; (iii) the
weighted average current loan-to-value of [52.9]% (weighted
average current loan-to-indexed value of [42.9]%), which is
slightly lower than the average seen in the sector mainly due to
the high seasoning (over 15 years) of the T&C pool; (iv) the
historical performance of the loans with [63]% of the loans in
the pool having been current over the last five years; and (v)
the relatively high concentration of interest-only loans in the
pool ([54.8]%).

Moody's notes that the expected loss is the same for this
transaction compared to the rated Neptune T&C Warehouse and is in
line with the assumption previously in place for Granite Master
Trust.  Prior to the asset sale to the Neptune T&C Warehouse the
expected loss in Granite Master Trust was 2.1%.

The MILAN Credit Enhancement is slightly lower for this
transaction compared to Granite and is similar to the Neptune T&C
Warehouse (13%).  The reduction in the MILAN Credit Enhancement
from 13.0% to [12.5]% is largely driven by positive house price
developments over the past 12 months.

   -- Operational Risk Analysis

Landmark is the contractual servicer delegating all its servicing
to Computershare Mortgage Services Limited ("Computershare", Not
rated).  A back up servicer Topaz Finance Limited ("Topaz", Not
rated), back up delegated servicer Western Mortgage Services
Limited ("WMS", Not rated, part of Capita) and back up servicer
facilitator (Wilmington Trust SP Services (London) Ltd) will be
appointed at closing.  Topaz and Computershare are both owned by
Computershare Investments (No3) Limited.  If Computershare is
insolvent or defaults on its obligations under the back-up
delegated servicing agreement WMS will step in as delegated
replacement servicer and execute a delegated replacement
servicing agreement.  If the back up servicer Topaz is insolvent
or defaults a replacement back-up servicer will be appointed.  In
case Topaz already acts in the role of replacement servicer, the
back-up servicer facilitator will on a reasonable endeavours
basis select a replacement within 30 days (to be appointed by the
Issuer).  The relevant backup servicer is required to step in
within 90 days and perform the duties of the servicer or
delegated servicer (as applicable) if, amongst other things, the
servicer and/ or delegated servicer is insolvent or defaults on
its obligations under the servicing agreement or delegated
servicing agreement.

Elavon Financial Services DAC, UK Branch (subsidiary of Elavon
Financial Services DAC (Aa2/P-1)) is appointed as cash manager.
There will be no back up cash manager in place at closing.  To
help ensure continuity of payments the deal contains estimation
language whereby the cash flows will be estimated from the three
most recent servicer reports should the servicer report not be
available.

The collection account is held at National Westminster Bank PLC
("NATWEST") (A3/P-2/A3(cr)).  There is a daily sweep of the funds
held in the collection account into the issuer account bank.  In
the event NATWEST rating is below Baa3 the collection account
will be transferred to an entity rated at least Baa3.  The issuer
account bank provider is Elavon Financial Services DAC, UK Branch
(subsidiary of Elavon Financial Services DAC (Aa2/P-1)) with a
transfer requirement if the rating of the account bank falls
below A3.

   -- Transaction structure

There is no liquidity reserve fund in place at closing.  On and
from the step-up date (2.5 years from closing) the liquidity
reserve fund will be credited with amounts up to 1.7% of the
total class A and class B outstanding balance and can be used to
pay senior fees and interest on class A and class B.  Prior to
the step up date and until that liquidity reserve fund target is
reached liquidity is provided via a 365 day revolving liquidity
facility equal to 1.7% of the total class A and class B
outstanding balance provided by Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association, London Branch (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A (Aa1/P-
1/Aa1(cr)).  On and from step-up date the liquidity facility
commitment reduces as amounts are credited to the liquidity
reserve fund.  At closing, the liquidity facility provides
approx. [three] months of liquidity to the class A assuming Libor
of [5.0]%.  Principal can be used as an additional source of
liquidity to meet shortfall on senior fees and interest on the
most senior outstanding class.  In addition, Moody's notes that
unpaid interest on the class B, C, D and E is deferrable.  Non-
payment of interest on the class A notes constitutes an event of
default.

Interest on the notes (excluding Class A) is subject to a Net
Weighted Average Coupon (Net WAC) Cap.  Net WAC additional
amounts are paid junior in the revenue waterfall being the
difference between the class B, C, D and E coupon and the Net WAC
Cap.  Net WAC additional amounts occur if interest payments to
the respective notes are greater than the Net WAC Cap.  Moody's
notes that the Net WAC additional amounts are not part of the
interest payment promise to the referenced Classes and as such
Moody's ratings assigned to the Class B, C, D and E do not
address the timely and/ or ultimate payment of such payments.

   --Interest Rate Risk Analysis

As there are no swaps in the transaction, Moody's has modelled
the spread taking into account the minimum margin covenant of
Libor plus 2.4%.  Due to uncertainty on enforceability of this
covenant, Moody's has taken the view not to give full credit to
this covenant.  Instead, Moody's has stressed the interest rate
of the pool by assuming that loans revert to SVR yield equal to
Libor + 2.0%.

   -- Parameter Sensitivities

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model. If the portfolio expected loss was increased from
[2.1]% of current balance to [4.2]% of current balance, and the
MILAN Credit Enhancement remained at [12.5]%, the model output
indicates that the class A would still achieve Aaa assuming that
all other factors remained equal.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors that would lead to a downgrade of the ratings include
economic conditions being worse than forecast resulting in worse-
than-expected performance of the underlying collateral,
deterioration in the credit quality of the counterparties and
unforeseen legal or regulatory changes.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade of the ratings include
economic conditions being better than forecast resulting in
better-than-expected performance of the underlying collateral.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  Moody's ratings only address
the credit risk associated with the transaction.  Other non-
credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant
effect on yield to investors.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2016.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion.  Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavour
to assign definitive ratings to the Notes.  A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating.  Moody's will disseminate
the assignment of any definitive ratings through its Client
Service Desk. Moody's will monitor this transaction on an ongoing
basis.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
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                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
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Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
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Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *