TCREUR_Public/161110.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, November 10, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 223


                            Headlines


A U S T R I A

UNICREDIT BANK: Moody's Raises Subordinated Debt Ratings to Ba1


G E R M A N Y

DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA: Moody's Affirms Ba1 CFR, Outlook Stable
METRIC MOBILITY: Court Approves Termination of Administration


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO VII: Fitch Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'B+sf'
GLG EURO CLO II: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)sf' Rating to Cl. F Notes
JJW HOTELS: Liquidators Appoint Agents to Sell Scotsman Hotel


L U X E M B O U R G

4FINANCE HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'B+' CCR, Outlook Negative


N E T H E R L A N D S

DCDML 2016-1: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating to Class E Notes
HARBOURMASTER CLO 2: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. B2 Notes


P O R T U G A L

SAGRES NO. 3: DBRS Assigns B Rating to EUR62.7MM Class C Notes


R U S S I A

BALTLITSTROJ OOO: Creditors File Bankruptcy Application
DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Credit Ratings


S P A I N

BANCO DE CREDITO: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating to EUR100M Sub. Notes


S W I T Z E R L A N D

VAT LUX II: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3, Outlook Stable


T U R K E Y

BANK ASYA: Fails to Pay Coupon on US$250-Mil. Bond

* S&P Revises Outlook on 5 Turkish Institutions to Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BAR GROUP: Paradise Roadworks Caused Administration
BETTA LIVING: In Administration, 300 Jobs at Risk
BRACKEN MIDCO1: Fitch Assigns 'B-' Rating to GBP220MM PIK Notes
FERGUSSON: CPL Industries Buys Business Out of Administration
MARCUS COOPER: NAMA Taps Receivers to Sell London Home Project

MURRAY AND BURRELLIN: In Administration, 38 Jobs Affected


                            *********



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A U S T R I A
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UNICREDIT BANK: Moody's Raises Subordinated Debt Ratings to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of UniCredit
Bank Austria AG (UBA), specifically the bank's long-term debt and
deposit ratings to Baa1 from Baa2, the subordinated debt ratings
to Ba1 from Ba2, and the hybrid ratings assigned to UBA's non-
cumulative trust preferred securities to Ba3(hyb) from B1(hyb).
Moody's also upgraded the bank's Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA)
to baa3 from ba2 and its Adjusted BCA to baa3 from ba1.  UBA's
long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment was upgraded to A3(cr)
from Baa1(cr) and the short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment
confirmed at Prime-2(cr).  The bank's Prime-2 short-term deposit
and (P)Prime-2 program ratings were affirmed. The outlook on the
banks' long-term debt and deposit ratings is now stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the material benefits of the
fundamental restructuring of UBA, which entailed the carve-out
and transfer on Oct. 1, 2016, of its operations in Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEE) to its Italian parent bank,
UniCredit SpA (deposits Baa1 stable, debt Baa1 stable, BCA ba1).
The higher ratings take into account the positive effects of the
CEE business carve-out on UBA's asset risk, regulatory capital
ratios and funding profile, in particular against the change of
UBA's Macro Profile to Strong + from Moderate +.  The latter
reflects the bank's mostly Austria-based asset profile and is
considerably more supportive for UBA's BCA.  Moody's said that
these benefits outweigh the adverse effects of the bank's
weakened return prospects and the limited predictability of its
future profits.

Prompted by the upgrade of UBA's BCA, Moody's has also upgraded
to Baa1 from Baa3 and to Prime-2 from Prime-3 the long- and
short-term deposit ratings of card complete Service Bank AG (card
complete), an Austrian credit card issuer which is majority-owned
by UBA.  Card complete's BCA was upgraded to ba1 from ba2, and
its Adjusted BCA to baa3 from ba2.  The Adjusted BCA now includes
one notch of rating uplift for affiliate support from its
Austrian parent.  The outlook on the banks' long-term deposit
rating is now stable.

Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded UBA's ratings for guaranteed
senior obligations to A2 from A3, and for guaranteed subordinated
debt obligations to Baa2 from Baa3, which benefit from the
creditworthiness of the guarantor, the City of Vienna (Aa1
stable).  Moody's positions the ratings for "backed" senior
unsecured debt at a level two notches above that of UBA's non-
guaranteed debt in order to reflect uncertainty about the value
of such guarantees to bondholders.

This rating action concludes the review for upgrade on UBA's and
card complete's ratings and various rating input factors
initiated on June 27, 2016.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

    -- BENEFITS OF UBA's RESTRUCTURING ON ITS CREDIT PROFILE

The upgrade to Baa1 of UBA's long-term debt and deposit ratings
reflects the BCA upgrade by two notches to baa3, which was partly
offset by the removal of one notch of affiliate support uplift.
The Baa1 ratings now include 1) the baa3 BCA; 2) Moody's
unchanged assumptions of a very high probability of support
available from its Italian parent bank which, however, no longer
translates into rating uplift, because UBA's BCA is already
higher than that of UniCredit SpA; and 3) unchanged two notches
of rating uplift from Moody's Advance Loss Given Failure (LGF)
analysis reflecting a very low loss-given failure for senior
creditors.  Moody's Advanced LGF analysis takes into account the
severity of loss faced by the different liability classes in
resolution.

The two-notch upgrade of UBA's BCA to baa3 reflects the material
improvement to the bank's risk profile, in particular better
asset quality and lower risks to capital, following the transfer
of its CEE operations to UniCredit SpA.  Moody's said that UBA
will henceforth report considerably lower non-performing loan
(NPL) ratios, based on the 4.7% it reported for its domestic
lending business as of June 2016, which compares with a 7.8% NPL
ratio for the group including the CEE business.  Moody's further
expects UBA to achieve a Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of ca.
14.0% at the end of 2016, which benefits from a capital injection
from UniCredit SpA that was part of the agreement concerning the
CEE carve-out.  The ratio compares with a 11.7% CET1 ratio
reported as of June 2016.  In addition, the transfer of the CEE
business has resulted in reduced market risk that was linked to
its stakes in and cross-border lending to subsidiaries in non-
euro countries as well as related political intervention risk.

Moody's expects further benefits for UBA's credit profile from
the ongoing overhaul and streamlining of its domestic operations,
in particular from a reduction in its branch network and related
staff costs, which could show in UBA's financials starting from
2017.  However, the rating agency pointed out that UBA faces
risks that such efforts will be counteracted by the increasingly
challenging operating environment in Austria, which remains a
rating constraint.  Respective pressures are a result of the
persistently low interest environment which continues to erode
net interest margins, and the fact that several domestic
competitors have already undergone material streamlining
exercises, thereby improving their respective competitive
positions at the expense of UBA and other, less proactive
players.

Notwithstanding these headwinds, Moody's said that UBA's reduced
business scope is now positioned in a more stable operating
environment which is no longer influenced by the weak Macro
Profiles of several higher-risk Eastern European markets.
Following the transfer of the CEE operations on Oct. 1, 2016, the
bank's Weighted Macro Profile score has improved to Strong+, in
line with the Macro Profile for Austria.  Moody's notes that
remaining intragroup funding to CEE entities will gradually
decline over time as current funding arrangements fall due.

Moody's notes that the baa3 BCA is partly based on certain
assumptions that imply a level of downside risk for the BCA.
These assumptions include that the continued restructuring
efforts at the Italian UniCredit group will not have any
detrimental impact on UBA, and that UBA will duly restrict its
intragroup lending exposures, in particular its lending to
UniCredit SpA.  The latter is an important factor in the rating
agency's assessment of the extent to which UBA's BCA can exceed
the ba1 BCA of its parent bank.

   -- CARD COMPLETE'S RATINGS UPGRADE REFLECTS UBA'S RELATIVE
      STRENGTH AND SUPPORT

The upgrade of the long- and short-term deposit ratings of card
complete was prompted by the upgrade of UBA's BCA, which serves
as an anchor point for card complete's deposit ratings.

The upgrade of UBA's BCA to baa3 prompted the upgrade of card
complete's ratings because 1) it effectively lifted the earlier
constraint at ba2, i.e., UBA's BCA level, for card complete's own
BCA; with this constraint now removed, Moody's said card
complete's satisfactory financial profile warrants a higher BCA
at ba1; and 2) the improved financial strength of the parent bank
triggered rating uplift for affiliate support, raising card
complete's Adjusted BCA to baa3, from its ba1 BCA.  The latter is
based on Moody's assumption of a "high" probability that UBA
would support its subsidiary if required.

   RATING OUTLOOKS ARE STABLE FOR BOTH BANKS' LONG TERM RATINGS

The outlook on UBA's Baa1 long-term debt and deposit ratings is
stable, reflecting Moody's expectation that the Austrian group
will maintain its improved capital levels, successfully execute
the restructuring of its domestic franchise, and that these
efforts will gradually lead to improved earnings and therefore
loss absorption capacity.

The outlook on card complete's Baa1 long-term deposit rating is
also stable, mirroring the stable outlook on UBA's long-term
ratings and additionally reflecting Moody's expectations of
continuity of 1) the bank's relatively stable operating
performance; 2) its ownership structure; and 3) its integration
into UBA group, in particular in UBA's treasury and funding
activities.

               WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

  -- UNICREDIT BANK AUSTRIA

Upward rating pressure on UBA's long-term ratings could be
triggered by a higher BCA, and/or a material improvement in
UniCredit SpA's credit profile, which could lead Moody's to
include affiliate support in UBA's ratings.  Conversely, a lower
BCA and /or a weakening in UniCredit SpA's credit profile could
exert downward pressure on UBA's rating.

An upgrade of UBA's BCA would be subject to 1) a successful
execution of the initiated restructuring; 2) a sustainable
improvement in its profitability without compromising its asset
risk profile; 3) higher capitalisation; and 4) the management of
intra-group exposures within prudent limits relative to its
capital.  UBA's failure to improve its operational performance
and retain profits could lead to a BCA downgrade, especially if
this were accompanied by weakening asset quality and/or capital
levels.

In addition, materially higher subordinated capital instruments
relative to the bank's total assets could result in one
additional notch of rating uplift from Moody's Advanced LGF
analysis. Conversely, a change in UBA's liability structure that
results in a lower volume of subordinated and/or senior debt
instruments and junior deposits could reduce the rating uplift
from Moody's Advanced LGF analysis.

   -- CARD COMPLETE

Upward pressure on card complete's deposit ratings could
principally be triggered by a 1) BCA upgrade by more than one
notch (as a single notch upgrade would prompt Moody's to remove
the current one notch of affiliate support uplift and therefore
be rating neutral), and/or 2) an upgrade of UBA's baa3 BCA which
could prompt Moody's to factor higher affiliate support into card
complete's deposit ratings.  Conversely, a lower BCA and/or a
downgrade of UBA's BCA (and the resulting removal of affiliate
support) would prompt a downgrade of its deposit ratings.

A further upgrade of card complete's BCA is unlikely, given its
highly-specialised business profile and its dependence on group
funding.

In addition, the same factors that drive the result of the
Advanced LGF analysis for deposits at UBA also drive card
complete's deposit ratings, because Moody's believes that both
banks would share a common perimeter and treatment in resolution.
A change in Moody's expectation of the loss-given-failure for
deposits at UBA would therefore equally affect card complete's
deposit ratings.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

ISSUER: UniCredit Bank Austria AG:

  Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to baa3 from ba2
  Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to baa3 from ba1
  Long Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to A3(cr) from
   Baa1(cr)
  Short Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, confirmed at P-2(cr)
  Long Term Bank Deposit Ratings, upgraded to Baa1 from Baa2,
   outlook stable (previously Rating Under Review)
  Short Term Bank Deposit Ratings, affirmed at P-2
  Senior Unsecured Debt Rating, upgraded to Baa1 from Baa2,
   outlook stable (previously Rating Under Review)
  Senior Unsecured MTN Rating, upgraded to (P)Baa1 from (P)Baa2
  Short Term Deposit Note / CD Program, affirmed at P-2
  Other Short Term Rating, affirmed at (P)P-2
  Subordinated Debt Rating, upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2
  Subordinate MTN Rating, upgraded to (P)Ba1 from (P)Ba2
  Backed Senior Unsecured Rating, upgraded to A2 from A3, outlook
   stable (previously Rating Under Review)
  Backed Senior Unsecured MTN Rating, upgraded to (P)A2
   from (P)A3
  Backed Subordinate Rating, upgraded to Baa2 from Baa3
  Backed Subordinate MTN Rating, upgraded to (P)Baa2 from (P)Baa3

ISSUER: Creditanstalt AG:

  Backed Subordinate Rating, upgraded to Baa2 from Baa3

ISSUER: BA-CA Finance (Cayman Island) Ltd:

  Backed Pref. Stock Non-cumulative Rating, upgraded to Ba3(hyb)
   from B1(hyb)

ISSUER: BA-CA Finance (Cayman Island) 2 Ltd:

  Backed Pref. Stock Non-cumulative Rating, upgraded to Ba3(hyb)
   from B1(hyb)

ISSUER: card complete Service Bank AG:

  Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to ba1 from ba2
  Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to baa3 from ba2
  Long Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to A3(cr) from
   Baa2(cr)
  Short Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, confirmed at P-2(cr)
  Long Term Bank Deposit Ratings, upgraded to Baa1 from Baa3,
   outlook stable (previously Rating Under Review)
  Short Term Bank Deposit Ratings, upgraded to P-2 from P-3

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


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G E R M A N Y
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DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA: Moody's Affirms Ba1 CFR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on Deutsche
Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft's ratings to stable from positive.
Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the Ba1 corporate family
rating of Lufthansa, the Ba1-PD probability of default rating
(PDR), the NP short term rating, the (P)Ba1/(P)NP senior
unsecured rating of the company's MTN programme and the Ba1
(LGD4) rating of the senior unsecured notes.

"We have changed the rating outlook to stable on Lufthansa's
ratings because we don't expect a material improvement in its
2017 operating profit, limiting upward pressure on the rating,
despite solid results during the first nine months of 2016." says
Sven Reinke, a Moody's Vice President - Senior Credit Officer and
lead analyst for Lufthansa.  "However, affirming Lufthansa's
ratings recognizes its progress in expanding the Eurowings's
footprint as well as progress made with the unions as evidenced
by the recent agreement with the flight attendants union UFO."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects Moody's expectation that Lufthansa's
financial profile is unlikely to improve sufficiently over the
next 12-18 months to meet the rating agency's requirements for a
Baa3 rating, a notch above its current Ba1 rating.  While
Lufthansa currently guides for an adjusted EBIT generation in
2016 at approximately the improved level of 2015, Moody's views
it as unlikely that the company will be able to achieve material
profit growth in 2017.

Lufthansa's key credit metrics improved over the last 18 months,
driven by a substantial improvement in adjusted EBIT generation
to EUR1,817 million in 2015 from EUR1,171 million in 2014, and a
stable performance during the first nine months of 2016 with an
adjusted EBIT of EUR1,677 million, largely in line with the
EUR1,693 million generated during the first nine months of 2015.
Accordingly, Lufthansa's Moody's-adjusted gross leverage improved
to 4.0x in Q3 2016, from 5.6x at FYE2014 and its retained cash
flow/net debt ratio increased to 27.8% in Q3 2016 from 18.9% at
FYE2014.  The airline's key credit metrics are close to the
guidance for a Baa3 rating.  However, the further improvements
needed to consider Lufthansa's financial profile sufficiently
strong for an investment grade rating are unlikely to materialize
over the next 12 -- 18 months based on Moody's assumption of a
challenging market environment for the company in 2017.

In addition, Lufthansa's higher pension deficit -- which Moody's
only updates annually based on audited financial accounts -- will
negatively impact its key credit metrics in 2017.  The pension
deficit has increased from EUR6.6 billion at the end of 2015 to
EUR10.5 billion at the end of Q3 2016, and is a large component
of the company's adjusted debt.  Moody's notes that the magnitude
of Lufthansa's pension deficit is strongly correlated to the
material decline in the discount rates and does not overemphasize
the currently high levels of the discounted pension obligations.
This is illustrated by the fact that Moody's consider Lufthansa's
Ba1 rating to be well positioned despite the agency's expectation
that the higher pension deficit could lead to Moody's adjusted
gross leverage of more than 5.0x in 2017.

In Moody's view, the European airline sector and in particular
the German market could suffer from capacity growth which might
exceed growth in demand resulting in further yield and profit
margin pressures.  European low cost carriers such as easyJet Plc
(Baa1 stable) and Ryanair (not rated) have a large number of
aircraft deliveries scheduled for next year and they might
allocate more of these additional aircraft in Germany due to
Brexit related uncertainties and softer demand in the UK.  In
addition, while Lufthansa was so far able to offset the decline
in yields with savings from lower fuel cost, Moody's expect that
additional fuel cost benefits will diminish over the course of
2017 resulting in profit margin pressures should yields not
stabilize.

Nevertheless, Moody's decision to affirm the ratings recognizes
the substantial progress Lufthansa has made in its strategy to
improve the cost competitiveness of its point-to-point short-haul
business with the transition to Eurowings.  Eurowings has a more
competitive cost base as its employees are not part of the
Lufthansa's group-wide labour agreement and from 2017 will
operate a homogenous short-haul fleet of Airbus 320 aircraft,
resulting in a cost base comparable to other low-cost airlines.
Moody's views the announced acquisition of Brussels Airlines and
the potential wet lease agreement with Air Berlin as
strategically positive as it will enable Eurowings to materially
upsize its capacity and positions it as the third largest low
cost airline in Europe.

Lufthansa continues to address its cost disadvantage in other
areas as well.  For example, Lufthansa and the union ver.di
agreed in November 2015 to the gradual phase-out of the defined
benefit pension scheme for the ground staff.  In August 2016, a
similar agreement was reached with the union UFO for the cabin
staff.  One key obstacle remains the ongoing dispute with the
pilots which has so far prevented Lufthansa from achieving more
sustainable progress towards its goal of becoming more cost
competitive.

Lufthansa's Ba1 ratings also reflect its leading position in the
European airline sector, its diversified route network, its
varied business segments and its strong liquidity position.  In
particular, Lufthansa's maintenance and catering segments --
which generate the majority of their revenues from third party
customers
   - provide diversification to the group, which distinguishes it
from other airlines.  These segments partially mitigate the
exposure to the more volatile passenger airlines and logistics
(cargo) segments.  However, the rating also reflects the exposure
to external shock events that are characteristic for the
passenger airlines industry.

Moody's considers that Lufthansa has strong liquidity, with a
balance of cash and equivalents of EUR3.6 billion, undrawn
committed short-term credit lines of EUR780 million and
short-term debt of EUR0.8 billion as at the end of Q3 2016.
Moody's notes that Lufthansa retains a minimum liquidity target
of EUR2.3 billion.

                  RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable rating outlook reflects Lufthansa's solid positioning
in the Ba1 rating category owing to its improved profitability
over the last 2 years despite the negative impact of the larger
pension deficit as a result of lower interest rates.  However,
the stable outlook also indicates Moody's view that an upgrade of
Lufthansa's ratings over the next 12-18 months has become less
likely in the light of a potentially challenging year ahead.

              WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Lufthansa's ratings could be upgraded if operating profits
continue to improve (as indicated, for example, by the Moody's
adjusted EBITDA margin trending towards 15%) so that:

  1) gross adjusted leverage at 4.0x or below; and
  2) a retained cash flow (RCF)/net debt metric of at least 25%

A successful conclusion of the negotiations with key stakeholders
such as the pilot union leading to an improving cost
competitiveness would also support a higher rating.

The rating could come under negative pressure if gross adjusted
leverage were to trend back to above 5.0x on a continued basis or
if Lufthansa's market position were to materially deteriorate.
Moody's would tolerate a temporary spike of the company's gross
adjusted leverage above 5.0x if this was driven by a higher
pension deficit due to low discount rates rather than a
significant decline in EBITDA generation.

                       PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Passenger Airlines published in May 2012.

Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, headquartered in Cologne,
Germany, is the leading European airline in terms of revenues.
In FY2015 it reported revenues and an EBIT of EUR32.1 billion and
EUR1,676, respectively.


METRIC MOBILITY: Court Approves Termination of Administration
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Local Court of Hanover on Nov. 8 approved the application by
METRIC mobility solutions AG i. I. for termination of the
company's own administration and transfer to regular
administration and management.  Likewise in response to the
Company's application, the past solicitor and creditor trustee
Dr Rainer Eckert was appointed insolvency administrator of METRIC
mobility solutions AG i.I.

With the support of the law firm Brinkmann & Partner, the Board
of Management continued to manage the Company's operations
comprehensively within the scope of its own administration.
Following the sale of the Company's material assets to companies
of DUTECH HOLDINGS LIMITED from Singapore at the end of
September, the company's own administration was
successfully concluded by a restructuring by merger.

The Public Transport and Retail & Logistics business units will
continue to be operated and managed by ALMEX GmbH within the
scope of an operational transfer.  The Parking Systems business
unit will continue to be managed under the Company's past name,
i.e. METRIC Group Ltd.

METRIC mobility solutions AG is an IT and engineering technology
Group for ticketing, parking and mobile solutions in Germany and
Great Britain.


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I R E L A N D
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AVOCA CLO VII: Fitch Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'B+sf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken multiple rating actions on Avoca CLO
VII's notes as follows:

   -- Class A-2 (ISIN XS0289563396): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Class A-3 (ISIN XS0289564014): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Class B (ISIN XS0289565763): upgraded to 'AAAsf' from
      'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class C1 (ISIN XS0289566571): upgraded to 'A+sf' from
      'Asf'; Outlook Positive

   -- Class C2 (ISIN XS0290383412): upgraded to 'A+sf' from
      'Asf'; Outlook Positive

   -- Class D1 (ISIN XS0289566902): upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from
      'BBBsf'; Outlook Positive

   -- Class D2 (ISIN XS0290383768): upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from
      'BBBsf'; Outlook Positive

   -- Class E1 (ISIN XS0289567546): upgraded to 'B+sf' from
      'Bsf'; Outlook Positive

   -- Class E2 (ISIN XS0290384493): upgraded to 'B+sf' from
      'Bsf'; Outlook Positive

   -- Class F (ISIN XS0289568437): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
      Estimate revised to 50% from 0%

   -- Class V (ISIN XS0290386431): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable

Avoca CLO VII plc is a securitisation of mainly European senior
secured loans, with a total note issuance of EUR711m invested in
a portfolio of EUR700m. The portfolio, which is now EUR232m, is
actively managed by KKR Credit Advisors.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating actions reflect the increase in credit enhancement
(CE) across the capital structure due to deleveraging of the
transaction since November 2015. The deleveraging was mainly
driven by the repayment in full of EUR39.9m class A1 notes and
the partial amortisation of class A-2 and A-3 of EUR55m. CE for
the class A notes has increased to 79% from 56% over the past 12
months, while CE for the class E notes has increased to 11% from
8.5%.

The Positive Outlook on the mezzanine and junior notes reflects
the possibility of a further upgrade if the deleveraging
continues at the current pace.

As the portfolio deleverages the transaction is, however,
becoming more exposed to obligor concentration. The top 10
obligors currently represent 59.4% compared with 51% a year ago
and the largest obligor now represents 9.2%, compared with 7.3%
previously. For this review a sensitivity analysis was performed
to assess near-term performance volatility if large obligors
default.

The transaction currently benefits from significant excess
spread. The weighted average spread of the portfolio is 3.55%
while the spread on the most senior notes is only 0.26%. The
portfolio presents some industry concentration, as the largest
industry represents 18.7%, above the current limit of 17.5%. One
defaulted obligor in the portfolio represents 71bps. Assets rated
'CCC' or below are 6.38%, above the 5% limit. The weighted-
average rating of the portfolio is 'B'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A reduction in expected recovery rates by 25% may lead to a
downgrade of up to three notches for the rated notes. An increase
in the obligor default probability by 25% may lead to a downgrade
of up to two notches for the rated notes.

CORRECTION

Fitch has found that as part of the analysis performed for the
previous surveillance review (rating action commentary dated 12
November 2015), the portfolio evaluation date used was different
to the actual evaluation date in the Portfolio Credit Model
(PCM). When this is corrected, the PCM output would have been
different and the model-implied rating would have been higher by
one notch for class B, C and F and two notches for class E. This
was not a key rating driver for today's rating actions as the
current ratings are based on the correct model.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch and/or other
rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis:

   -- Loan-by-loan data provided by Deutsche Bank as of 30
      September 2016.

   -- Trustee report provided by Deutsche Bank as of 30 September
      2016.


GLG EURO CLO II: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)sf' Rating to Cl. F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned GLG Euro CLO II D.A.C's notes expected
ratings, as follows:

   -- EUR207m class A-1 notes due 2030: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- EUR10m class A-2 notes due 2030: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- EUR43.9m class B notes due 2030: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- EUR17.7m class C notes due 2030: 'A(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR17.3m class D notes due 2030: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- EUR19.2m class E notes due 2030: 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- EUR7.7m class F notes due 2030: 'B-(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

The assignment of final ratings is contingent on the receipt of
final documents conforming to information already reviewed.

GLG Euro CLO II D.A.C. is an arbitrage cash flow collateralised
loan obligation. Net proceeds from the issue of the notes will be
used to purchase a portfolio of EUR350m of mostly European
leveraged loans and bonds. The portfolio is actively managed by
GLG Partners LP.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the
'B' category. Fitch has credit opinions or public ratings on 87
of the 88 assets in the identified portfolio. The weighted
average rating factor (WARF) of the identified portfolio is 28.2,
below the covenanted maximum Fitch WARF of 33.

High Recovery Expectations

At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations. Recovery prospects for these assets are typically
more favourable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets. Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to 87 of the 88
assets in the identified portfolio. The weighted average recovery
rating (WARR) of the identified portfolio is 68.7%, above the
covenanted minimum Fitch WARR of 66%.

Diversified Asset Portfolio

The transaction contains a covenant that limits the top 10
obligors in the portfolio to 20% of the portfolio balance. This
ensures that the asset portfolio will not be exposed to excessive
obligor concentration.

Partial Interest Rate Hedge

Between 0% and 10% of the portfolio can be invested in fixed-rate
assets while fixed rate liabilities represent 3.1% of the rated
note balance. At closing the issuer will enter into interest rate
caps to hedge the transaction against rising interest rates. The
notional of the caps is EUR21.3m, representing 6.1% of the target
par amount, and the strike rate is fixed at 4%. The caps will
expire 6.5 years after the closing date.

Unhedged Non-Euro Assets Exposure

The manager can invest up to 2.5% of the portfolio in unhedged
non-euro assets, which are purchased in the primary market. Any
unhedged asset in excess of the allowed limits or held for longer
than 180 days will receive a zero balance for the calculation of
the overcollateralisation tests. Unhedged assets will be held at
50% of their par value amount after settlement and the
transaction may only purchase unhedged assets if the portfolio
notional amount is above the target par.

Hedged Non-Euro Assets Exposure

The transaction is permitted to invest up to 30% of the portfolio
in non-euro assets, provided perfect asset swaps can be entered
into.

Documentation Amendments

The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation or noteholder approval. Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyse the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings. Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final
maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders
should be aware that the structure considers the confirmation to
be given if Fitch declines to comment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability would lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes. A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of
up to two notches for the rated notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch and/or other
rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis.

   -- Loan-by-loan data provided by the arranger as at 15
      September 2016.

   -- Offering circular provided by the arranger as at 4 November
      2016

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties
and enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the
offering document and which relate to the underlying asset pool
was not prepared for this transaction. Offering documents for
EMEA leveraged finance CLOs transactions do not typically include
RW&Es that are available to investors and that relate to the
asset pool underlying the security. Therefore, Fitch credit
reports for EMEA leveraged finance CLOs transactions will not
typically include descriptions of RW&Es. For further information,
see Fitch's Special Report titled "Representations, Warranties
and Enforcement Mechanisms in Global Structured Finance
Transactions," dated May 31, 2016.


JJW HOTELS: Liquidators Appoint Agents to Sell Scotsman Hotel
-------------------------------------------------------------
Scott McCulloch at Daily Record reports that property agents JLL
Hotels & Hospitality Group and CBRE Hotels have been appointed by
the liquidators to market the Scotsman Hotel in Edinburgh.

The five-star hotel, which employs 150 staff, was placed into
liquidation in July after HM Revenue & Customs filed a winding up
order against owners JJW Hotels in May, Daily Record recounts.

JW Hotels has insisted in early July it has resolved its issues
with HM Revenue & Customs, putting the liquidation notice down to
an "unfortunate miscommunication", Daily Record notes.

Appointed liquidators French Duncan have been running the hotel
as a going concern while the owners made efforts to bring the
hotel back under their ownership, Daily Record relays.

According to Daily Record, Kerr Young, director of hotels and
hospitality at JLL, said: "The Scotsman Hotel was placed into
liquidation on June 9, 2016, and Eileen Blackburn of French
Duncan was appointed by the court.

"Since this time the hotel has continued to trade under the
Liquidator's supervision while efforts were made to reach
agreement to return the company and its trading to its owners.

"Unfortunately this has not yet proved possible.

"In light of the buoyant nature of the Edinburgh hotel market we
are confident that our marketing process will attract credible
buyers with a track record in operating high quality hotel assets
of this nature."

JJW Hotels & Resorts Ltd. is a subsidiary of British Virgin
Islands-based MBI International Holdings, owned by Saudi tycoon
Sheikh Mohamed bin Issa al Jaber.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


4FINANCE HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'B+' CCR, Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' long-term corporate credit
rating on Luxembourg-based 4finance Holding S.A.  The outlook is
negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+' issue rating on the
company's senior unsecured notes.  The '4' recovery rating
indicates that S&P now expects recovery for shareholders in the
higher half of the 30%-50% range in the event of a payment
default.

S&P removed the corporate credit and issue ratings from
CreditWatch with developing implications, where they were placed
on July 8, 2016.

The affirmation reflects S&P's analysis of the impact of
4finance's acquisition of Bulgaria-based TBI Bank EAD, which was
finalized following receipt of all regulatory approvals and
announced on Aug. 11, 2016. 4finance paid a total consideration
price of EUR82 million.

TBI's primary focus is on providing high-margin unsecured lending
products in Bulgaria and Romania, where the lending portfolio is
split almost evenly across the two countries.  Approximately 60%
of the bank's net loan book is focused on retail customers,
providing point-of-sale and cash loans, in addition to credit
cards in small ticket sizes with short-term maturities (average
two to three years).  The remaining 40% of the bank's loan book
targets smaller loans for small to midsized enterprises, which
includes secured loans such as leasing products (with an average
maturity of four to five years).  TBI is a regulated entity under
the Bulgarian National Bank, which subjects the bank to capital
requirements and a deposit guarantee scheme.  While the bank's
business profile and reliance on cash flows fit well with
4finance's own strategy, and could provide a broader product
scope over time, 4finance is likely to face operational
challenges integrating the bank.  We regard this acquisition as
transformational because of its size, representing 34% of the
group's consolidated balance sheet, as well as 4finance's limited
track record in managing and integrating regulated businesses,
such as a fully-fledged bank, given that 4finance is a nonbank
financial institution.  Furthermore, S&P recognizes the
prevailing industry risks in TBI's banking markets.

4finance's current product scope includes single-payment and
installment loans with an average loan size of EUR309 and EUR777,
respectively.  The company's scope also provides small lines of
credit averaging EUR2,164. As of June 30, 2016, single-payment
loans made up 68% of the gross performing lending book, with
installment loans making up most of the remaining balance.  Lines
of credit remain below 1% of the gross loan book.  Through
organic growth and acquisitions, 4finance now operates across 16
countries.

While 4finance enjoys a wide geographic presence and has adapted
proactively to regulatory changes, regulators remain focused on
consumer protection rules, which expose the company to both
regulatory and legislative risks.  This is the case for other
unsecured consumer loan providers that we consider as peers to
the company.  In addition, 4finance's rapid rate of expansion
could make the company vulnerable to operational risks.
Furthermore, with the accelerated rate of lending growth, credit
losses are likely to increase, leading to some profit volatility.
However, S&P believes revenues should continue to be supportive.

At June 30, 2016, the company's balance sheet was about
EUR590 million, and the pro-forma figures at the same date show
that TBI will add approximately EUR272 million worth of assets.
On top of the growth via TBI's lending book, S&P anticipates that
4finance will continue to expand its balance sheet.  Although
much of 4finance's growth has been funded by debt issuance, the
company's strong earnings profile has helped maintain fairly
stable leverage metrics.  S&P's current base-case metrics
incorporate the impact that TBI will have on the consolidated
figures, which includes a revenue increase and the bank's deposit
as debt (net of cash).  While the TBI acquisition results in a
one-off deterioration of debt metrics in 2016, S&P considers the
financial risk profile to remain in line with its significant
category, as S&P expects the leverage trend to reverse in 2017.
As such, S&P anticipates that gross debt to adjusted EBITDA will
increase to about 3x-4x over 2017-2018.  Adjusted EBITDA to
interest expense has remained fairly stable near 3.6x and is
expected to remain between 3.0x and 6.0x. EBITDA is adjusted for
impairments, which S&P treats as a recurring expense for this
type of company.

The negative outlook represents a one-in-three possibility that
S&P could downgrade 4finance over the next 12 months, reflecting
S&P's view that the transformational acquisition of TBI could
present additional operational risks.  Furthermore, managing the
integration of a regulated bank is likely to be more demanding
and costly than previous acquisitions.  While S&P generally
assumes that 4finance will continue to improve internal control
functions as it expands, its fast pace of growth implies risks if
not managed effectively over time.  Still, S&P believes 4finance
will maintain strong profit growth, supporting the company's
credit metrics, however credit losses are likely to increase as
the loan portfolio expands, leading to some profit volatility.
Regulatory developments continue to pose obstacles for 4finance
as it continues to broaden its geographical scope.

S&P could lower the ratings on 4finance if incorporating TBI into
the company increases operational costs and logistical
difficulties that weigh on 4finance's profitability.  S&P could
also lower its ratings if asset quality deterioration and
increasing regulatory costs impeded EBITDA growth, such that
S&P's credit metrics for 4finance weakened, or if additional
leverage was taken on to finance continued volume growth or other
acquisitions.

S&P could consider revising the outlook to stable over the next
12 months if 4finance's integration of TBI proceeds smoothly and
cash flow metrics are not burdened by additional acquisition-
related costs.  S&P would also need clarity on developments in
the company's debt metrics and acquisition strategy before taking
a positive rating action.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DCDML 2016-1: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned DCDML 2016-1 B.V.'s notes final
ratings as follows:

   -- EUR250.2m Class A mortgage-backed floating-rate notes:
      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR6.9m Class B mortgage-backed floating-rate notes:
      'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR6.7m Class C mortgage-backed floating-rate notes:
      'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR3.7m Class D mortgage-backed floating-rate notes: 'Asf';
      Outlook Stable

   -- EUR4.4m Class E mortgage-backed floating-rate notes:
      'BB- sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR3.6m Class F mortgage-backed floating-rate notes: not
      rated

   -- EUR20m Class RS excess spread notes: not rated

This is the first securitisation of loans by Dynamic Credit
Woninghypotheken B.V. (DCW), a new lender in operation since June
2015. The portfolio consists of prime Dutch residential mortgage
loans, originated under an umbrella license of Quion. The
mortgage loans are distributed and marketed under the Hypotrust
label (Quion's multi-lender origination platform) under the
product name "Elan mortgage". Quion conducts the underwriting and
servicing of the loans while the lending criteria are set by DCW
(in consultation with Quion) and follow the Dutch Mortgage Code
of Conduct.

Credit enhancement (CE) for the class A notes is 10.3% at
closing, provided by the subordination of the junior notes and a
EUR3m cash reserve (1.09%), fully funded at closing through part
of the proceeds of the class RS notes.

Certain features in this deal are atypical for Dutch RMBS. The
class A to E notes each have an allocated reserve fund, funded
through the RS notes and only the class A allocated reserve fund
can amortise, subject to certain conditions. In addition, step-up
margins are subordinated to the repayment of the rated notes,
interest shortfalls are deferred once a principal deficiency is
recorded on the respective class of notes and interest shortfalls
on the most senior notes outstanding can be cleared with
principal funds.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

New Originations, High LTV

This portfolio contains recent originations without an NHG
guarantee. The weighted average (WA) original loan to market
value (OLTMV) is 99.1%, higher than market average. However, the
WA debt to income (DTI) of 21.3% is low. Of the loans, 69.7% are
annuity and linear products, and 30.3% are interest only loans
(IO); IO loans are limited to 50% of the property's market value,
as per the Dutch Mortgage Code of Conduct.

Established Origination Channel

Although DCW is a new originator in the Dutch market, the
origination, underwriting and servicing platforms of Quion
support the lending operations, which are deemed by Fitch to be
of a robust standard. While performance data available from
DCW-originated collateral was limited, the availability of proxy
data, reliance on Quion's underwriting and management experience
and the robust regulatory regime in the Netherlands constitute
mitigating factors.

Unrated Originator and Seller

DCW (seller) and Quion (servicer, originator) are not credit-
rated and as such may have limited resources to repurchase any
loans in the event of a breach of the representations and
warranties (RW) given to the issuer. While this is a weakness,
there are a number of mitigating factors that make the likelihood
of an RW breach sufficiently remote. These mitigants include a
satisfactory loan file review and third-party pool audit, as well
as the alignment and experience of Quion's origination and
servicing practices.

Interest Rate Risk

Mismatches between the fixed rate loans (99.4%) and the notes
(linked to 3M Euribor) are hedged through a swap with BNP
Paribas. While the issuer faces the reset risk on the loans,
Fitch has taken the interest rate reset policy into account when
modelling the loans' all-in reset rate, assuming that the
implicit margin over the fixed swap rate payable in respect of
the loans that reset covers senior fees and financing costs on
the notes at closing.

Fitch has therefore assumed that borrowers will revert to an all-
in fixed rate maintaining an implicit margin of 1.1% at their
reset date, compared with the current post swap margin of 1.6% in
the transaction. In low or high interest rate environments, this
assumption constitutes a variation from the Criteria Addendum:
Netherlands - Residential Mortgage Loss and Cash Flow Assumptions
where an assumed compression in fixed rates to 3%-4.5% is stated.

For about 60% of the pool, resets occur 20 years from closing. By
then scheduled amortisation will have improved the risk profile
of the rated bonds in a scenario where a substantial number of
performing borrowers reset. Sensitivity analysis around the
margin assumption at reset has shown that the classes B, D and E
could be subject to at least a one notch downgrade if the
transaction is not able to maintain higher margins in line with
the prescribed interest rate reset policy.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A material increase in the frequency of defaults and loss
severities experienced on defaulted receivables could produce
losses larger than Fitch's base case expectations, which in turn
may result in negative rating action on the notes. Fitch's
analysis revealed that a 30% increase in the WA foreclosure
frequency, along with a 30% decrease in the WA recovery rate,
would result in a model-implied-downgrade of the class A notes to
'AA+sf', the class B notes to 'A+ sf, the class C notes to
'BBB+sf', the class D notes to 'BBsf', the class E notes to below
'Bsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch reviewed the results of a third party assessment conducted
on the asset portfolio information, and concluded that there were
no findings that affected the rating analysis.

Fitch conducted a review of a small targeted sample of Quion's
origination files and found the information contained in the
reviewed files to be adequately consistent with the originator's
policies and practices and the other information provided to the
agency about the asset portfolio.

Overall and together with the assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis:

   -- Loan-by-loan data tape in Fitch's ResiEMEA template as of
      31 May 2016 provided by DCW;

   -- Static vintage defaults, loss figures and dynamic
      performance data, including comparable proxy data on DCW's
      and Hypotrust's mortgage loan book;

   -- A portfolio of foreclosed properties on Quion's loan book
      between 2001 and 2014 and a proxy sample of 34 loans on
      Hypotrust's portfolio.

MODELS

The models below were used in the analysis.

ResiEMEA
ResiEMEA.

EMEA Cash Flow Model
EMEA Cash Flow Model.

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties
and enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the
offering document and which relate to the underlying asset pool
is available by accessing the appendix referenced under "Related
Research" below. The appendix also contains a comparison of these
RW&Es to those Fitch considers typical for the asset class as
detailed in the Special Report titled "Representations,
Warranties and Enforcement Mechanisms in Global Structured
Finance Transactions," dated 31 May 2016.


HARBOURMASTER CLO 2: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. B2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 2 B.V as
follows:

   -- Class A2: upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class A3: upgraded to 'Asf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class A4E: upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Class A4F: upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Class B1E: affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class B1F: affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class B2: affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative

Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 2 B.V. is a securitisation of mainly
European senior secured loans with the total EUR602m note
issuance invested in a target portfolio of EUR587.5m. The
portfolio is actively managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Europe
Limited.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect the increase in credit enhancement (CE)
across the capital structure due to the deleveraging of the
transaction. The Negative Outlook on the class B2 notes reflects
the increasing obligor concentration, which may adversely affect
the rating of the class B2 note if a few large obligor default.

The senior class A1 notes have paid down by EUR121m over the past
12 months and are now repaid in full. In addition, the class A2
notes have paid down by EUR8.9m. CE has increased for all rated
notes: for the class A2 notes to 54% from 30.9%, for the class A3
notes to 31.3% from 18.4%, for the A4 notes to 24.7% from 14.7%,
for the class B1 notes to 16.1% from 10% and for the class C
notes to 6.9% from 5%.

The transaction is increasingly exposed to high obligor
concentration risk, with the largest obligors representing 7.1%
of the aggregate principal balance and the top 10 obligors 53.4%
of the aggregate principal balance as of the October 2016
investor report, up from 4.4% and 38.2%, respectively, 12 months
ago. The senior notes benefit from large CE and are able to
withstand the default of the top obligors in the portfolio.
However, the mezzanine and junior notes may be adversely affected
by a few assets that may underperform.

Following the deleveraging of the transaction, the portfolio
credit quality has slightly deteriorated and assets rated 'CCC'
and below by Fitch increased to 7.16%, from 1.66% 12 months ago.
As of the October 2016 investor report, all coverage tests,
portfolio profile tests and collateral quality tests were
passing.

The manager sold approximatively EUR51m worth of assets over the
last 12 months. All sale proceeds were used to redeem the notes,
as the transaction cannot reinvest. The transaction exited its
reinvestment period in October 2013 and unscheduled proceeds were
only able to be reinvested until October 2015.

The transaction is scheduled to mature in October 2022 and the
weighted average life (WAL) of the portfolio decreased to 3.3
years, from four years one year ago. Fitch's Global Rating
Criteria for CLOs and Corporate CDOs does not describe default
patterns for portfolios with a WAL lower than 3.5 years. As such,
the agency adjusted its default patterns to account for the short
tenor of the transaction. In the front-loaded scenario, the
agency assumed 50% of the defaults occurred in year one and 25%
in years two and three. In the mid-default timing, the agency
assumed 50% of the default occurred in year two and 25% in years
one and three. In the back-default timing, the agency assumed 50%
of the default occurred in year three and 25% in years one and
two.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability may lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes. A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates may lead to a downgrade of
up to two notches for the rated notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch and/or other
rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis:

   -- Investor report as of 10 October 2016 provided by Deutsche
      Bank

   -- Loan-by-loan data of 10 October 2016 provided by Deutsche
      Bank


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


SAGRES NO. 3: DBRS Assigns B Rating to EUR62.7MM Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings to the
following notes issued by SAGRES - Sociedade de Titularizacao de
Creditos, S.A. (Lusitano SME No. 3) (the Issuer):

   -- EUR385,600,000 Class A asset backed securitisation Notes,
      due 2037: AA (low) (sf)

   -- EUR62,700,000 Class B asset backed securitisation Notes,
      due 2037: BBB (high) (sf)

   -- EUR62,700,000 Class C asset backed securitisation Notes,
      due 2037: B (high) (sf)

The Issuer is a limited liability company incorporated under the
laws of Portugal. The transaction is a cash flow securitisation
collateralised by a portfolio of bank loans originated by NOVO
BANCO, S.A. (Novo Banco or the Originator) to Portuguese
corporates, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and self-
employed individuals.

The rating on the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal payable on or
before the Final Legal Maturity Date in 2037. The ratings on the
Class B Notes and Class C Notes address the ultimate payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal payable on or
before the Final Legal Maturity Date in 2037.

As of September 9, 2016 (the Collateral Determination Date), the
transaction portfolio consisted of 4,545 loans extended to 3,321
borrower groups, with an outstanding principal balance equal to
EUR627 million. As of the Collateral Determination Date, all of
the portfolio was fully performing.

The portfolio exhibits significant borrower concentration, with
the top ten obligor groups each representing more than 1.00% of
the total portfolio balance. The largest obligor group represents
2.3% of the portfolio balance, and the top ten and top 20
borrowers represent 20.5% and 31.1% of the outstanding pool
balance, respectively. As per DBRS's industry classification, the
pool exhibits a high industry concentration in the Building &
Development sector, which represents 20.8% of the pool balance,
followed by the Lodging & Casinos and Clothing & Textiles
sectors, representing 8.6% and 8.3%, respectively. The exposure
to the Building & Development sector remains a source of concern,
considering the challenging economic situation in Portugal. DBRS
has assumed a conservative probability of default (PD) for the
obligors in the sector.

These ratings are based upon DBRS's review of the following
items:

   -- The transaction structure, the form and sufficiency of
      available credit enhancement and the portfolio
      characteristics.

   -- At closing, the Class A Notes benefit from a total credit
      enhancement of 40%, which DBRS considers to be sufficient
      to support the AA (low) (sf) rating. The Class B Notes
      benefit from a credit enhancement of 30.0%, which DBRS
      considers to be sufficient to support the BBB (high) (sf)
      rating.  The Class C Notes benefit from a total credit
      enhancement of 20% which DBRS considers to be sufficient to
      support a B (high) (sf) rating. Credit enhancement is
      provided by subordination and the Reserve Fund.

   -- The Cash Reserve Account will be funded at closing with
      EUR9.5 million, corresponding to 1.5% of the initial
      aggregate balance of the Floating Rate Notes. The Cash
      Reserve Account will be available to cover interest
      shortfalls of the Class A Notes and expenses senior to the
      replenishment of the Cash Reserve Account. The Cash Reserve
      Account will also support the Class B Notes and Class C
      Notes once the Class A Notes have been redeemed in full.
      The Cash Reserve Account is allowed to amortise if certain
      conditions relating to the performance of the portfolio and
      deleveraging of the transaction are met.

DBRS determined these ratings as follows, as per the principal
methodology specified below:

   -- The PD for the portfolio was determined using the
      historical performance information supplied. However, the
      data provided was not detailed enough to determine the
      historical performance for all the four different segments
      included in the portfolio: SME, Small Business, Corporates
      and Real Estate. From the data provided, DBRS was able to
      determine a base case PD for SME and Small Business
      segments of 3.53%. For the Corporates and Real Estate
      segments, DBRS assumed a conservative PD of 18.79%
     (equivalent to the PD for CCC (high) rated loans). The
      weighted-average PD assumed for the portfolio was 7.9%.

   -- The assumed weighted-average life (WAL) of the portfolio
      was 2.51 years.

   -- The PD and WAL were used in the DBRS Diversity Model to
      generate the hurdle rates for the target ratings.

   -- The recovery rate was determined considering the market
      value declines for Portugal, the security level and type of
      the collateral. For the Class A Notes, recovery rates of
      42.96% and 15.75% were used for the secured and unsecured
      loans, respectively, at the AA (low) (sf) rating level. For
      the Class B Notes, recovery rates of 50.70% and 17.00% were
      used for the secured and unsecured loans, respectively, at
      the BBB (high) (sf) rating level. For the Class C Notes,
      recovery rates of 57.35% and 21.50% were used for the
      secured and unsecured loans, respectively, at the B (high)
      (sf) rating level.

   -- The break-even rates for the interest rate stresses and
      default timings were determined using the DBRS cash flow
      model.

Notes:

All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodology applicable is Rating CLOs Backed by
Loans to European SMEs. DBRS has applied the principal
methodology consistently and conducted a review of the
transaction in accordance with the principal methodology.

Other methodologies and criteria referenced in this transaction
are listed at the end of this press release.

The sources of information used for these ratings include the
parties involved in the ratings, including, but not limited to,
the Originator (NOVO BANCO, S.A.) and provider via the co-
arrangers (on behalf of the originator): J.P. Morgan Securities
Plc and Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch.

DBRS does not rely upon third-party due diligence in order to
conduct its analysis; DBRS was supplied with third party
assessments. However, this did not impact the rating analysis.

DBRS determined key inputs used in its analysis based on
historical performance data provided for the Originator and
Servicer as well as analysis of the current economic environment.
The PD for the portfolio was determined using the historical
performance information supplied. However, the data provided was
not detailed enough to determine the historical performance for
all the four different segments included in the portfolio: SME,
Small Business, Corporates and Real Estate. From the data
provided, DBRS determined a base case PD for SME and Small
Business segments of 3.53%. For the Corporates and Real Estate
segments, where granular vintage data was not available, DBRS
assumed a conservative PD of 18.79% (equivalent to the PD for CCC
(high) rated loans). Despite the above, DBRS considers the
information available to it for the purposes of providing this
rating to be of satisfactory quality.

DBRS does not audit the information it receives in connection
with the rating process, and it does not and cannot independently
verify that information in every instance.

These ratings concern newly issued financial instruments. This is
the first DBRS rating on this financial instrument.

To assess the impact a change of the transaction parameters would
have on the ratings, DBRS considered the following stress
scenarios as compared with the parameters used to determine the
rating (the Base Case):

   -- Probability of Default Rates Used: Base Case PD of 7.91%, a
      10% increase of the base case and a 20% increase of the
      base case PD.

   -- Recovery Rates Used: Base Case Recovery Rates of 26.20% at
      AA (low) (sf), 29.76% at BBB (high) (sf) and 35.27% at B
      (high) (sf) stress levels and a 10% and 20% decrease in the
      respective base case Recovery Rates.

With respect to the Class A Notes, DBRS concludes that a
hypothetical increase of the Base Case PD by 20% or a decrease of
the recovery rate by 20%, ceteris paribus, would each lead to a
downgrade of the Class A Notes to A (high) (sf). A scenario
combining both an increase in the PD by 10% and a decrease in the
recovery rate by 10% would lead to a downgrade of the Class A
Notes to A (high) (sf).

With respect to the Class B Notes, DBRS concludes that a
hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 20% would lead to a
downgrade of the Class B Notes to BBB (low) (sf). A hypothetical
decrease of the recovery rate by 20% would lead to a downgrade of
the Class B Notes to BBB (sf). A scenario combining both an
increase in the PD by 10% and a decrease in the recovery rate by
10% would lead to a downgrade of the Class B Notes to BBB (low)
(sf).

With respect to the Class C Notes, DBRS concludes that a
hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 20% would lead to a
downgrade of the Class C Notes to CCC (high) (sf). A hypothetical
decrease of the recovery rate by 20%, ceteris paribus, would lead
to a downgrade of the Class C Notes to B (sf). A scenario
combining both an increase in the PD by 10% and a decrease in the
recovery rate by 10% would lead to a downgrade of the Class C
Notes to B (low) (sf).

It should be noted that the interest rates and other parameters
that would normally vary with the rating level, including the
recovery rates, were allowed to change as per the DBRS
methodologies and criteria.

Ratings assigned by DBRS Ratings Limited are subject to EU
regulations only.

Lead Analyst: Carlos Silva
Rating Committee Chair: Jerry van Koolbergen
Initial Rating Date: 7 November 2016

DBRS Ratings Limited
20 Fenchurch Street, 31st Floor
London EC3M 3BY
United Kingdom
Registered in England and Wales: No. 7139960

   -- Rating CLOs Backed by Loans to European SMEs

   -- Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions

   -- Master European Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
      Rating Methodology and Jurisdictional Addenda

   -- Unified Interest Rate Model for European Securitisations

   -- Rating CLOs and CDOs of Large Corporate Credit

   -- Cash Flow Assumptions for Corporate Credit Securitizations

   -- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance
      Servicers

   -- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance
      Originators

RATINGS

Issuer           Debt Rated          Rating Action       Rating
------           ----------          -------------       ------
SAGRES -         Class A Asset-       Provis.-New
AA(low)(sf)
Sociedade de     Backed Floating
Titularizacao    Rate Notes
de Creditos,
S.A (Lusitano
SME No. 3)

SAGRES -         Class B Asset-       Provis.-New
BB(high)(sf)
Sociedade de     Backed Floating
Titularizacao    Rate Notes
de Creditos,
S.A (Lusitano
SME No. 3)

SAGRES -         Class C Asset-       Provis.-New
B(high)(sf)
Sociedade de     Backed Floating
Titularizacao    Rate Notes
de Creditos,
S.A (Lusitano
SME No. 3)


===========
R U S S I A
===========


BALTLITSTROJ OOO: Creditors File Bankruptcy Application
-------------------------------------------------------
Panevezio statybos trestas AB disclosed that the creditor's
application for initiation of bankruptcy proceedings to
BALTLITSTROJ OOO, the subsidiary company of Panevezio statybos
trestas AB, has been filed at the Arbitration Court of
Kaliningrad Oblast, Russian Federation.


DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Credit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-/C' long- and short-term
counterparty credit ratings on Russia-based Development Capital
Bank OJSC.  The outlook remains negative.

S&P also affirmed its 'ruBBB-' Russia national scale rating on
the bank.

The affirmation reflects that, despite DCB's stronger capital
position, S&P still considers DCB to be significantly exposed to
downside pressure from the low diversity of the bank's business
model, as well as the bank's focus on its narrow customer base
that has close ties with the owners.  S&P views the bank as
vulnerable to the current poor economic conditions, given the
potentially fragile creditworthiness of DCB's largest borrowers.
Despite DCB's proven track record of positive financial results,
S&P considers the bank's earnings to be of low quality due to the
high share of market-sensitive sources of income in operating
revenues, potentially adding business instability.

The bank's highly concentrated operations are the main rating
constraint, in S&P's opinion.  The bank's 20-largest borrowers
represent about 90% of total loans as of Oct. 1, 2016.  The two
largest counterparties are real estate companies that have direct
business relations with the bank's majority shareholder.
Overall, DCB's loans are materially exposed to the income-
generating real estate sector (about 50% of the loan book as of
Oct. 1, 2016), making the bank vulnerable to real estate prices.
S&P also notes that almost 50% of the loans have bullet
repayments with average term of 3.8 years as of Oct. 1, 2016,
which is another negative factor when assessing the bank's credit
risk.  Additionally, the bank's deposit base concentrations (top-
20 depositors bring about 57% of total deposits as of Oct. 1,
2016,) could weaken liquidity, although it is not S&P's base
case, thanks to their close customer relationships with the
bank's owners.

At the same time, S&P revised up its assessment of capital and
earnings of DCB to very strong from strong.  S&P's risk-adjusted
capital (RAC) ratio for the bank stood at 17.6% at year-end 2015,
and S&P assumes that it should remain above 15.0% in the next 12-
18 months.  S&P's base-case forecast implies a 7.5% drop in gross
customer loans in 2016 alongside flat dynamics in 2017.
Furthermore, S&P incorporates in its projections a slightly
positive to breakeven financial result in 2016 and about 5%
return on average equity in 2017.

However, potential downside risk, stemming from the credit
quality of the bank's highly concentrated loans, may result in
materially greater-than-currently-expected credit losses, at
4.5%-5.0% in 2016-2017.  Additionally, S&P views negatively that
the high share of revenues (40%-45% of operating revenues) stems
from foreign currency revaluation of financial assets in 2014-
2015.  This source of income is hardly predictable, in S&P's
view, and therefore of low quality, demonstrated by the losses of
approximately Russian ruble (RUB) 440 million (US$7 million) as
of Sept. 30, 2016, from the foreign currency revaluation and
operations in the first nine months of 2016 under the Russian
general accounting principles.

The negative outlook on DCB reflects the bank's high business
concentrations that, alongside adverse market conditions, could
result in higher credit losses and weaker profitability than
anticipated in the next 12 months.

S&P could lower the ratings on DCB if, contrary to its
expectations, S&P observes that the bank's top borrowers
experience significant financial problems, sparking asset quality
and profitability pressure.  S&P would also consider a negative
rating action if it sees deterioration in the bank's liquidity
position or weakened funding, the latter potentially leading to
increased reliance on short-term interbank funding to finance
lending operations.  Both could occur if the economic slowdown
intensifies in the next 12-18 months.  Signs that DCB might
breach regulatory requirements relating to concentration or
related parties' exposures could also prompt us to lower the
ratings.

An outlook revision to stable could occur if DCB continues to
maintain capitalization and liquidity at current levels while
displaying a marked and steady improvement in diversifying its
business activity and loan portfolio, for example, by an increase
in the granularity of its lending, revenue, and funding profiles.


=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCO DE CREDITO: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating to EUR100M Sub. Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Banco de Credito Social Cooperativo's
(BCC) issue of EUR100m subordinated notes due 2026 a final rating
of 'B+'.

The final rating is in line with the expected rating Fitch
assigned to the notes on October 12, 2016.

BCC is part of Grupo Cooperativo Cajamar (GCC), which also
comprises 19 credit cooperatives, and is subject to a mutual
support mechanism under which members mutualise 100% of profits
and have a cross-support mechanism for solvency and liquidity. On
this basis, Fitch assigns the same Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
to the group members and uses GCC's Viability Rating (VR) from
which BCC's subordinated debt rating is notched down.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The subordinated notes are notched down once from GCC's VR of
'bb-' for loss severity because of lower recovery expectations
relative to senior unsecured debt. These securities are
subordinated to all senior unsecured creditors.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The subordinated notes' rating is sensitive to changes to GCC's
VR, which drives BCC's Long-Term IDR. The rating is also
sensitive to a widening of notching if Fitch's view of the
probability of non-performance on the bank's subordinated debt
relative to the probability of the group failing, as measured by
its VR, increases or if Fitch's view of likely recovery changes.

The rating is also sensitive to changes in the mutual support
mechanism within the group that would result in us concluding
that BCC subordinated debt's non-performance risk is no longer
best reflected by GCC's VR.


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


VAT LUX II: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded to Ba3 from B1 the corporate
family rating and to Ba3-PD from B1-PD the probability of default
rating (PDR) of VAT Lux II S.a.r.l.  The outlook on the ratings
is stable.

Concurrently, Moody's has withdrawn all B1 senior secured bank
credit facility ratings of VAT Lux III S.a r.l. and the stable
outlook following prepayment of its term loan, and assigned a Ba3
CFR, Ba3-PD PDR and a stable outlook to VAT Group AG, the
ultimate parent of the VAT Group following its recent IPO and
refinancing. Subsequently to this rating action, Moody's will
withdraw the Ba3 CFR, Ba3-PD PDR and stable outlook of VAT Lux II
S.a.r.l.

The upgrade of VAT's ratings reflects Moody's expectation that
leverage measured as adjusted debt/EBITDA will remain below 2.0x
on a sustainable basis.  Furthermore Moody's forecasts that VAT
will be able to generate positive FCF through the volatile cycle
of the semiconductor capital equipment industry, despite Moody's
expectation of increasing dividend distributions in a scenario
where the company is able to increase its free cash flow
generation.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Since the acquisition of VAT through Partners Group and Capvis
Equity Partners in early 2014, VAT has consistently applied FCF
generation to debt reduction, allowing the company to reduce
leverage from 3.7x in 2014 to around 1.6x forecasted for 2016.
Moody's envisages that favourable demand fundamentals will allow
the company to further expand EBITDA and reduce leverage slightly
in 2017.  At the same time, we do not expect further absolute
debt reduction as the company now operates close to its stated
net debt /EBITDA (company definition) target of 1x.

VAT's dividend policy foresees that up to 100% of FCF to Equity
(the company's definition of cash available to shareholders)
generated in a fiscal year can be distributed as dividend in the
following year.  This implies that Moody's adjusted FCF after
dividends could be negative in a scenario where the company fails
to expand FCF to equity.  However, Moody's do not expect that
this negative FCF generation would result in a meaningful
increase of leverage or a deterioration of the company's
liquidity profile.

VAT's rating is furthermore constrained by the company's small
scale as well a concentrated customer base, reflecting its rather
small addressable market where it holds strong market positions
but faces significantly larger OEM customers.  This is to some
extent mitigated by VAT's high quality product offering and long
customer relationships, which also serve as a barrier to entry.
VAT's leading niche market position is also evidenced by strong
operating margins consistently around 30%.  Moody's rating also
takes into consideration the cyclicality the company can be
exposed to but to some extent mitigated by a flexible cost
structure with around 2/3 of its cost base being variable.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on VAT's rating reflects our expectation that
the company's leverage will remain below 2.5x on a sustainable
basis and will continue to generate positive FCF through the
cycle.  The outlook furthermore reflects our expectations that
the company's will credit metrics will rapidly recover following
a cyclical downturn.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING

UP:

  Positive rating action would be supported by an increased scale
   and reduced revenue concentration.

  Continued market share gains as well as closer collaboration
   with VATs customers would in our view further fortify VAT's
   position within the overall semiconductor capital equipment
   supply chain and thus support positive rating action.

  Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA is expected to remain sustainably
   below 1.5x and not to materially exceed 3.5x in case of a
   cyclical Downturn.

  Continued positive FCF, as a result of a balanced financial
   policy, resulting in a further strengthening of the company's
   balance sheet and an extension of the track record of
   maintaining a good liquidity profile.

DOWN:

  Negative rating pressure could develop, if the company would
   lose market share or price pressure would result in operating
   margin below 20% for a prolonged period time.

  If debt/EBITDA is expected to sustainably remain in excess of
   2.5x.

  Negative FCF as a result of an unbalanced financial policy as
   well as a deterioration of the company's liquidity profile
   would also be negative for the rating.

Company profile

VAT Group AG, headquartered in Haag, Switzerland, is a
specialised manufacturer of vacuum valves, serving a range of
customers in the semiconductor, flat panel display (FPD),
industrial vacuum and photovoltaic industries.  Additionally, the
company also produces multi-valve modules, provides aftermarket
sales and related services.  In 2015, VAT reported revenues of
CHF411 million.  VAT Group AG was listed in April 2016.  The free
float amounts to 54.3% with around 37.4% managed and/or advised
by Partners Group and Capvis Equity Partners.  Management and
others hold the remainder.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Semiconductor
Industry Methodology published in December 2015.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


BANK ASYA: Fails to Pay Coupon on US$250-Mil. Bond
--------------------------------------------------
Ercan Ersoy, Lyubov Pronina and Isobel Finkel at Bloomberg News
report that Turkey's Bank Asya, which was seized by the
government last year, failed to pay a coupon on its US$250
million bond last month.

According to Bloomberg, two people with knowledge of the matter
said creditors went unpaid on Sept. 28, and a 30-day grace period
also expired without any payment being made, putting the bond in
technical default.

On Nov. 4, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Nurettin Canikli had
said that Bank Asya creditors were being paid, Bloomberg relates.

The Islamic lender was seized in May 2015 by the Savings Deposit
Insurance Fund, or TMSF, a state fund for resolving failed
companies, which cited opacity in Asya's ownership structure for
the takeover, Bloomberg recounts.  The lender was founded by
followers of Fethullah Gulen, a U.S.-based cleric that President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan blamed for a corruption probe against his
government in 2013, and then for the failed coup attempt against
him in July of this year, Bloomberg discloses.

After the takeover, government-appointed executives at the bank
assured foreign investors that they would be paid back, according
to a person who was part of those discussions, Bloomberg relays.

The fund, as cited by Bloomberg, said in July that it had started
a liquidation process for Bank Asya, which had earlier had its
banking license canceled and operations terminated by the banking
regulator.

Bank Asya was established in October 24, 1996 with its head
office in Istanbul, as the sixth private finance house of Turkey.


* S&P Revises Outlook on 5 Turkish Institutions to Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it revised its outlook to stable from
negative on the following five Turkish financial institutions:

   -- Turkiye Is Bankasi A.S. (Isbank);
   -- Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S. (Garanti);
   -- Garanti Finansal Kiralama A.S. (Garanti Leasing);
   -- Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi A.S. (YapiKredi); and
   -- Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi TAO (VakifBank).

At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'BB' long-term counterparty
credit ratings on all five financial institutions and the 'B'
short-term ratings on Isbank, Garanti Leasing, YapiKredi, and
VakifBank.  S&P also raised its long-term Turkey national scale
ratings on Isbank, VakifBank, and YapiKredi to 'trAA' from
'trAA-'.  S&P affirmed its 'trA-1' short-term Turkey national
scale ratings on these entities.

The stand-alone credit profiles (SACPs) of Garanti, Isbank,
VakifBank, and YapiKredi remain unchanged at 'bb+'.

The outlook revision follows that on the Republic of Turkey.  The
outlook revision on Turkey reflects S&P's view that policymakers
will continue to move toward implementing key economic reforms,
as originally communicated more than two years ago in Turkey's
Tenth Development Plan, and that these efforts, while subject to
risks, will help underpin economic stability, despite remaining
domestic and external risks.

Although Turkish banks operate in a relatively high risk
operating environment, their sound asset quality, earnings, and
capitalization provide a good buffer to absorb any potential
moderate volatility, without dramatically damaging the banks'
financial profiles.

Decelerating credit growth -- to an estimated 9% for 2016 and
2017 -- has eased the further build-up of pressure on systemwide
funding. Yet, Turkish banks remain vulnerable to potential shifts
in global debt and capital markets, notably in terms of the cost
of their external debt, which still funds a comparatively higher
share of assets than most peers.  The deceleration of credit
growth has also partially alleviated our concerns over asset
quality vulnerability, particularly the high level of corporate
foreign currency-denominated loans.  Despite the significant
weakening of local currency in the last two years, asset quality
deterioration has been modest and from a strong base, as
evidenced by a nonperforming loan ratio (over 90 days delinquent)
of 3.4% as of end-September 2016.  However, in S&P's opinion,
asset quality remains exposed to a weakening of the Turkish lira,
which could damage domestic corporate borrowers' repayment
ability owing to their large open position in foreign currency.

The stable outlook on these entities reflects the stable outlook
on Turkey.  In S&P's opinion, Turkish banks' financial profiles
and performance will remain highly correlated with the
sovereign's creditworthiness, owing to their significant holdings
of government securities and exposure to the domestic
environment. Therefore, although S&P's SACP on Garanti, Isbank,
VakifBank, and YapiKredi is at 'bb+', S&P do not rate any Turkish
bank above its foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Turkey.

Bank-specific factors that might lead S&P to revise its ratings
on these five financial institutions are limited at their current
rating level given the higher 'bb+' SACPs on Garanti, Isbank,
VakifBank, and YapiKredi, and rating actions on these entities
will mainly be contingent on rating actions on Turkey.

Therefore, S&P expects its long-term ratings on the five
institutions to remain at 'BB' over the next 12 months.  Although
S&P views it as unlikely at this stage, a positive rating action
on these entities would occur if S&P was to raise its ratings on
Turkey, all else being equal.  Similarly, a negative rating
action on Turkey would result in a similar action on the banks.

RATINGS LIST

                      Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S.

Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                 To                 From
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BB/Stable/--      BB/Negative/--

Garanti Finansal Kiralama A.S.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BB/Stable/B       BB/Negative/B

                         Turkiye Is Bankasi AS

Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                 To                 From
Turkiye Is Bankasi AS
Counterparty Credit Rating      BB/Stable/B       BB/Negative/B

Upgraded; Ratings Affirmed
                                 To                 From
Turkiye Is Bankasi AS
Counterparty Credit Rating
Turkey National Scale           trAA/--/trA-1    trAA-/--/trA-1

                       Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi TAO

Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                  To                 From
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi TAO
Counterparty Credit Rating       BB/Stable/B
BB/Negative/B

Upgraded; Ratings Affirmed
                                  To                 From
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi TAO
Counterparty Credit Rating
Turkey National Scale           trAA/--/trA-1    trAA-/--/trA-1

                         Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi A.S.

Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                 To                 From
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi A.S.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BB/Stable/B       BB/Negative/B

Upgraded; Ratings Affirmed
                                 To                 From
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi A.S.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Turkey National Scale           trAA/--/trA-1     trAA-/--/trA-1


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BAR GROUP: Paradise Roadworks Caused Administration
---------------------------------------------------
thebusinessdesk.com reports that the The Bar Group which warned
of the dramatic impact of the roadworks around the Paradise
development on its business has collapsed.

Town and Country Inns has five sites but three of those are on
Summer Row and Fleet Street, which join the A457 in Birmingham
city center that has been a mass of traffic cones and diversions
since the major redevelopment work began, according to
thebusinessdesk.com.

The group, which operates under the brands Fleet Street Kitchen,
Mechu, Apres and Lexicon, also has sites in Sutton Coldfield and
Cheltenham.

Joanne Hammond -- joanne.hammond@begbies-traynor.com -- and
Gareth Rusling -- gareth.rusling@begbies-traynor.com -- of
Begbies Traynor have been appointed administrators.

Last year then-managing director Keith Williams warned the group
was "weeks away" from appointing an administrator after revenues
dropped by GBP400,000 in a four-month period, the report notes.
He had called on Birmingham City Council and its landlords to
review its rates and rent bills to enable the group to continue,
the report relays.

Mr. Williams retired in summer 2015, with the business continuing
to be run by his co-founder Mark Jones, the report adds.


BETTA LIVING: In Administration, 300 Jobs at Risk
-------------------------------------------------
Press Association reports that Dean House Limited, which trades
as Betta Living, appointed FRP Advisory as administrators after
struggling with the costs of rapid expansion in recent years.

FRP said Betta Living -- headquartered in Oldham, Greater
Manchester -- closed all of its 24 stores nationwide and sent
staff home as it prepared to appoint administrators, according to
Press Association.

FRP is now looking at options to sell the group for ongoing
trading.

The report notes Anthony Collier --
anthony.collier@frpadvisory.com -- joint administrator and
partner at FRP Advisory, said: "We are currently working with all
stakeholders to see if we can find a solution that rescues the
business and would ask any parties interested in any aspect of
the business to make contact as soon as possible.

"Betta Living is a business with a strong brand and is well-known
up and down the country.

"At present the business has however ceased to trade and orders
are not currently being despatched.  We will be reviewing the
order book and writing to individual customers," the report
quoted Mr. Collier as saying.

FRP said Betta Living had expanded its store chain in the past
few years, with revenues of around GBP16 million rising to around
GBP50 million more recently, the report relays.

But FRP said "rising occupational costs from newer space" had
pushed the company into a loss and left it with no option but to
call in administrators, the report adds.


BRACKEN MIDCO1: Fitch Assigns 'B-' Rating to GBP220MM PIK Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Bracken MidCo1's (MidCo1) GBP220
million subordinated senior payment in kind (PIK) toggle notes
due 2021 a final rating of 'B-'/Recovery Rating 'RR6'. The rating
is in line with the expected rating assigned on October 27, 2016.

The notes require cash interest payment at a rate of 10.5%,
unless conditions pre-defined in their documentation are
satisfied, in which case MidCo1 is entitled to accrue PIK
interest at a rate of 11.25%.

MidCo1 (B+/Stable) is a holding company of Jerrold Holdings Ltd
(JHL), a UK specialist mortgage provider, established in
connection with the buyout of JHL's minority shareholders by the
principal owner.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

SENIOR PIK TOGGLE NOTES

The notching between MidCo1's Issuer Default Rating and the
senior PIK toggle notes' rating reflects Fitch's view of the
likely recoveries in the event of MidCo1 defaulting. While
sensitive to a number of assumptions, a default scenario would
only be likely to occur in a situation where JHL is also in much
weakened financial condition, as otherwise its upstreaming of
dividends for MidCo1 debt service would have been maintained. The
subordinated rank of the senior PIK toggle notes would then place
their holders in a weaker position than JHL's senior secured
creditors for available recoveries from the group's assets.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

SENIOR PIK TOGGLE NOTES

The rating of the senior PIK toggle notes is sensitive primarily
to changes to MidCo1's IDR, from which it is notched, as well as
to Fitch's assumptions regarding recoveries in a default
scenario. Lower asset encumbrance by senior secured creditors of
JHL could lead to higher recovery assumptions and therefore
narrower notching from MidCo1's IDR.


FERGUSSON: CPL Industries Buys Business Out of Administration
-------------------------------------------------------------
Martin Flanagan at The Scotsman reports that Fergusson, the
90-year-old family coal merchants business based in Stirling, has
been acquired by CPL Industries after problems with the group's
expansion into coal power generation plunged it into
administration.

According to The Scotsman, the acquisition of the coal supply
assets from administrators KPMG protects 67 jobs across
Fergusson's eight depots in Scotland, three staff at a site in
Larne, and nine staff at the wholesale business in Carlisle.

KPMG said that "unfortunately" the remainder of the Fergusson
business, mainly focused on supplying power stations, has been
closed with immediate effect, with the loss of 22 jobs, including
13 from the group's main site at Hunterston in Ayrshire, The
Scotsman relates.

The other nine redundancies are at the Stirling HQ, The Scotsman
discloses.  Confirming the appointment of Blair Nimmo, Tony Friar
and Neil Gostelow as joint administrators, KPMG, as cited by The
Scotsman, said the business founded by Thomas Henry Fergusson in
1926 was one of the UK's largest providers of coal to consumers,
retailers and other coal merchants.


MARCUS COOPER: NAMA Taps Receivers to Sell London Home Project
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jack Sidders and Neil Callanan at Bloomberg News report that
Ireland's National Asset Management Agency has appointed
receivers to a company that owns a luxury-home project in
London's St. John's Wood district after the development stalled
under its current management.

"Over the last two to three years, attempts have been made to
move forward with developing the site and have reached various
stages, only to fall at the final hurdle," Bloomberg quotes
David Oprey -- doprey@cvr.global -- one of the two
administrators, as saying by e-mail on Nov. 8.  "Our appointments
have come as a result of the asset managers deciding to take a
new approach."

The site, which has approval for about 80 luxury homes with a
rooftop swimming pool and views over Lord's cricket ground, is
held by companies linked to developer Marcus Cooper, Bloomberg
relates.

Mr. Oprey and Richard Toone -- rtoone@cvr.global -- of CVR Global
LLP were appointed as fixed-charge receivers to the companies
that own the site, Bloomberg discloses.

Under that arrangement, lenders can quickly secure control of an
asset, Bloomberg relays, citing the industry's lobby group.


MURRAY AND BURRELLIN: In Administration, 38 Jobs Affected
---------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that dozens of jobs have been lost after efforts
to save Murray and Burrellin failed.

According to BBC, administrators confirmed the redundancies
affecting 38 staff at the company.

The business, established in 1928, went into administration last
week citing "adverse trading conditions", BBC relates.

Thomson Cooper partner Richard Gardiner --
rgardiner@thomsoncooper.com -- was appointed as administrator at
Murray and Burrell on Nov. 7, BBC discloses.

Murray and Burrell is a Galashiels-based building firm.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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