TCREUR_Public/161115.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, November 15, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 226


                            Headlines


C Y P R U S

CYPRUS: Moody's Affirms B1 Senior Unsecured Bond Rating


G E R M A N Y

HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG: Moody's Withdraws Ba1 Corp. Family Rating
INEOS STYROLUTION: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B+' CCR Rating


I R E L A N D

ARBOUR CLO IV: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F Notes
ARBOUR CLO IV: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes
RYANAIR: Ordered by EU Commission to Repay "Illegal Subsidies"


K A Z A K H S T A N

ALTYN BANK: Fitch Places 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating on RWP


L U X E M B O U R G

SES SA: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to New Resettable Securities
SES SA: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Proposed Hybrid Securities


M O N T E N E R G R O

MONTENEGRO: S&P Affirms 'B+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


N E T H E R L A N D S

EURO-GALAXY V: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F Notes


R U S S I A

HOME CREDIT: Moody's Changes B2 Deposit Ratings Outlook to Stable
TINKOFF BANK: Fitch Hikes Long Term Issuer Default Ratings to BB-
VEB: To Repay RUR250BB Outstanding Debt Next Year


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AEI CABLES: Unions Call for Parliament to Debate on Future
CARALOT: Confirms it Has Gone Into Liquidation
GRAINGER PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable
LONMIN PLC: Losses Narrow Following Job Cuts and Rights Issue
UNIQUE PUB: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class A Notes

* UK: Bank of England Unveils New Bank Bailout Rules


X X X X X X X X

* EU: Warns 'Delusional' May Over Trade Deals with Trump Admin


                            *********


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C Y P R U S
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CYPRUS: Moody's Affirms B1 Senior Unsecured Bond Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Cyprus' long term issuer
and senior unsecured bond rating at B1.  Moody's has also
affirmed Cyprus' Senior Unsecured MTN Programme at (P)B1, the
short-term rating Commercial Paper at NP and its other short term
rating at (P)NP.  Further, the rating agency has changed the
outlook on the government bond rating to positive from stable.

The key drivers for the outlook change are:

  1. Improvements in economic resilience that have been observed
     over the past year which, if sustained over the next 12-18
     months, would support an upgrade.

  2. Cyprus' consistent fiscal outperformance and favorable
     outlook which indicate a more rapid reversal in the public
     debt ratio than previously expected.

Concurrently, Moody's has today maintained the local-currency and
foreign-currency bond ceilings at Baa1.  The local-currency and
foreign-currency deposit ceilings remain unchanged at Baa1.  The
short-term foreign-currency bond and deposit ceilings remain
unchanged at P-2.

                   RATIONALE FOR POSITIVE OUTLOOK

FIRST DRIVER: IMPROVEMENTS IN ECONOMIC RESILIENCE THAT HAVE BEEN
OBSERVED OVER THE PAST YEAR WHICH, IF SUSTAINED OVER THE NEXT 12-
18 MONTHS, WOULD SUPPORT AN UPGRADE

There has been a strong and balanced economic recovery (after
three years of severe economic contraction), extending beyond
exports to domestic demand, and improving expectations of medium-
term growth.

Growth accelerated in the first half of this year, reaching 2.7%,
driven by an uptick in domestic demand and strong activity in the
tourist and business service sectors.  Moody's expects this
momentum to be sustained over coming years, and project real GDP
growth to be 2.6% on average between 2016 and 2020 -- as compared
with an annualised contraction of -1.7%, on a seasonally adjusted
basis, over the past five years.

Importantly, growth will be broad-based, driven by strong tourist
activity, continued labour market gains, and gradual investment
recovery.  Wage moderation policies in recent years have been
important in restoring price competitiveness to the economy.

The tourist industry, which accounts directly for around 7% of
GVA, retains significant comparative advantages and will remain
one of the main growth drivers.  The sector is resilient to
Brexit and will benefit from strong improvements in
competitiveness seen in recent years as well as significant
geographical diversification in tourist arrivals.

Over the longer time horizon, there are upside risks related to:

  (1) the potential for a restoration of price and non-price
  competitiveness in key export sectors, such as tourism,
  industrial goods and agriculture; (2) increased access to EU
  structural funds and implementation of pro-growth reforms which
  support investment; and (3) growth in the energy sector, the
  long-term gains from which might be significant -- although
  visibility remains limited at this stage.

Until recently, developments pointed to a lack of timeliness and
predictability surrounding policy decisions as a result of (1)
weaknesses in banking regulation and supervision, and (2) lagging
fiscal policy.  However, there have been marked improvements in
these two policy areas in recent years.  The authorities proved
particularly strong at meeting conditions under the ESM/IMF
programme.

The outperformance of the public finance targets allowed Cyprus
to exit the programme in March 2016.  The government drew down
only part of the EUR10 billion available under the programme.  In
addition, the European Council ended the Excessive Deficit
Procedure for Cyprus in June 2016, one year ahead of the
deadline.

With regard to the banking sector, the government has implemented
needed structural reforms, such as new foreclosure and insolvency
laws, which will support a gradual improvement in asset quality
in the banking sector, though the sector remains in a very weak
position.  In addition, the Central Bank of Cyprus has
strengthened its powers of banking oversight.

SECOND DRIVER: CYPRUS' CONSISTENT FISCAL OUTPERFORMANCE AND
FAVOURABLE OUTLOOK WHICH INDICATE A MORE RAPID REVERSAL IN THE
PUBLIC DEBT RATIO THAN PREVIOUSLY EXPECTED

The Cypriot authorities have made significant progress with
regard to fiscal-structural reforms, which will help to ensure
that the public finances remain sustainable.  These include
reforms in three key areas: (1) public financial management; (2)
the pension system; and (3) revenue administration.

The government projects primary surpluses of 2.3% of GDP for 2016
and 2.0% for 2017, as compared with a realized outturn of 1.7% in
2015.  Moreover, the authorities project that the primary balance
will remain in surplus over the medium term, at 2.5% in 2018 and
3.4% in 2019.

As a result, Cyprus' government debt trajectory has improved.
The government's debt burden peaked almost 20 percentage points
lower than anticipated by the Troika in its mid-2014 review.
After reaching 107.5% of GDP in 2015, we believe that the debt
burden will decline modestly this year and maintain a downward
trend thereafter.  Cash reserves of approximately 5% of GDP
provide additional support for Cyprus' financing needs up to the
first quarter of 2018.

               RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMING THE B1 RATING

Whilst acknowledging improvements in Cyprus' economic resilience
and its strong fiscal performance, Cyprus' rating was affirmed at
B1.  The reasons for this include: 1) the country's small and
relatively undiversified economy; 2) the ongoing weakness of its
banking sector; and 3) its very high levels of public and private
debt.

Cyprus has a small and relatively undiversified economy,
dominated by its service sector, which accounts for more than
four-fifths of GDP.  Within the service sector, tourism,
financial services, shipping and real estate have traditionally
predominated.

In spite of actions taken to stabilize and to reduce the size of
the Cypriot banking sector, it remains large and weak.  Banking
sector assets comprise 377% of GDP.  Private non-financial sector
debt remains high, at nearly 350% of GDP.  Cypriot banks have a
high stock of non-performing loans (48.9% as of July 2016), which
hampers their ability to lend and weighs on their profitability
and liquidity profile.  Although Moody's expect asset quality to
improve in 2016, helped by the approved foreclosure and
insolvency framework in 2015, Moody's expects that bank asset
quality metrics will remain weak for years to come.

Cyprus also has high public sector debt levels relative both to
GDP (at 107.5% in 2015) and to revenue (at 275% in 2015).  Whilst
debt trajectory is reversing, the decline in debt is expected to
be slow.

Offsetting that, Cyprus' debt remains highly affordable,
reflecting the very large share of official sector creditors in
the total debt stock (63% as of the third quarter of 2016).
Interest charges took up only 7.2% of general government revenue
in 2015, down from a peak of 8.5% in 2013, and this is expected
to fall further over the coming two years.

Moody's believes that the prevailing low interest rate
environment, and the liquidity buffer that covers debt repayments
for the next year, mitigate liquidity risks effectively.
Moreover, we expect fiscal discipline to be sustained in spite of
the ending of Cyprus' programme with the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
March 2016, which should support investor confidence.

                WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Upward pressure upon Cyprus' government bond rating might result
from further fiscal progress, e.g., if the government's primary
surplus were to be sustained at a high level, leading to what
Moody's expected to be a steady reduction in the debt burden over
coming years.  The expectation that growth would be sustained at
current levels over the coming years and/or a more rapid reversal
in the upward trend for bank NPLs would also be credit positive.

Downward pressure on Cyprus' government bond rating might emerge
if the government's commitment to restoring macro-financial
stability were to weaken; in particular if the return to growth
were not maintained.  Evidence that the banking sector needs
further recapitalisation would also exert downward pressure upon
the rating.  A re-emergence of elevated financial and debt market
stress, which might be triggered in the case of a country leaving
the euro area, for example, would also be credit negative.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 33,183 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

  Real GDP growth (% change): 1.6% (2015 Actual) (also known as
   GDP Growth)
  Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): -1.2% (2015 Actual)
  Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -1.1% (2015 Actual) (also
   known as Fiscal Balance)
  Current Account Balance/GDP: -2.9% (2015 Actual) (also known as
  External Balance)
  External debt/GDP: [not available]
  Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
   resilience
  Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
   loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On Nov. 8, 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Cyprus, Government of.  The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have materially increased.  The
issuer's institutional strength/framework, have materially
increased.  The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including
its debt profile, has materially increased.  The issuer has
become less susceptible to event risks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Bond Ratings published in December 2015.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.


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G E R M A N Y
=============


HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG: Moody's Withdraws Ba1 Corp. Family Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of German-based
building materials company HeidelbergCement AG (HC), assigning a
long-term issuer rating of Baa3. Concurrently Moody's has
upgraded all senior unsecured ratings of HC and its subsidiary
HeidelbergCement Finance Luxembourg S.A. to Baa3 from Ba1 and all
short-term ratings to (P)Prime-3 from (P)Non-Prime. The outlook
on the ratings has been changed to stable from positive.

"The upgrades reflect HeidelbergCement's strong operating
performance and cash flow generation so far this year, which will
reduce rising leverage linked to its acquisition of Italcementi
below previous expectations. The company will continue to de-
lever through 2017, as result of the swift implementation of cost
synergies with Italcementi and a supportive business outlook for
the next 12 to 18 months," said Stanislas Duquesnoy, a Moody's
Vice President -- Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for
HeidelbergCement AG.

Moody's also withdrew HC's corporate family rating (CFR) of Ba1
and probability of default rating (PDR) of Ba1-PD following its
upgrade to Baa3, as per the rating agency's practice for
corporates with investment grade ratings.

In addition Moody's has upgraded all senior unsecured instrument
ratings of Italcementi S.p.A.'s subsidiaries including Ciments
Francais S.A. to Baa3 from Ba1 and withdrawn the Ba1 corporate
family rating of Italcementi S.p.A. and senior unsecured (P)Ba1
MTN ratings of Italcementi S.p.A. and its subsidiary Italcementi
Finance S.A. following the successful closing of the Italcementi
acquisition by HC.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Today's upgrade of HeidelbergCement AG to Baa3 reflects the
group's robust business profile supported by its large scale,
good geographical and product diversification as well as the
protection from very high barriers to entry to the industry HC
operates in. The recently closed acquisition of Italcementi
reinforces HC's business profile adding cement capacity in
emerging markets, eight new geographic markets and a well
invested asset base.

HC's strong operating performance YTD September 2016 has led to a
lower releveraging from the Italcementi acquisition than
anticipated at the announcement of the acquisition. Moody's
expects year-end 2016 adjusted pro-forma debt/EBITDA of 4.1x-4.3x
(3.6x--3.8x excluding one-time restructuring charges) for the
combined group versus 3.3x for HC standalone at year-end 2015.

The swift implementation of cost synergies and a supportive
business outlook for the next 12 to 18 months should enable HC to
bring down debt/EBITDA to around 3.5x - 3.8x by year-end 2017, a
level commensurate with an investment grade rating.

Lastly Moody's highlights that HC's expected financial profile at
year-end 2017 compares well to other investment grade building
materials peers such as LafargeHolcim Ltd and CRH Plc.

Some legacy bonds remain outstanding at Italcementi Finance S.A.
and Ciments Francais S.A. level. The Italcementi Finance S.A.
bonds are maturing respectively in 2018 and 2020. Moody's expects
that HC will provide an irrevocable guarantee for these
instruments, thereby effectively providing credit substitution.
The Ciments Francais S.A. bonds will mature in April 2017 and
will be monitored on a standalone basis until maturity.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on HC's ratings reflects the rating agency's
expectation that HC will continue to focus on deleveraging over
the next 12 to 18 months to bring back its net leverage to its
target corridor of 1.5x-2.5x from 2.7x-2.8x expected at year-end
2016.

LIQUIDITY

The liquidity position of HC is solid. The group had more than
EUR1.7 billion in cash and marketable securities on balance sheet
at 30 September 2016 and full availability under its revolving
credit facility. In addition, the group is set to receive EUR1.1
billion in cash proceeds from asset disposals over the next 12
months and has still access to a bridge facility to fund the
remaining part of the Italcementi acquisition. This should be
more than sufficient to cover all cash requirements over the next
12 months consisting mainly of the remaining 55% stake in
Italcementi, dividend payments, working capital consumption and
capex.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Positive pressure would build on HC's Baa3 rating if retained
cash flow/net debt would be moving towards 25% and debt/EBITDA
towards 3.5x.

Negative pressure would arise if retained cash flow/net debt
would be staying sustainably below 20% and Debt/EBITDA around
4.0x.

List of affected ratings:

Upgrades:

   Issuer: HeidelbergCement AG

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Upgraded
      to (P)P-3 from (P)NP

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Upgraded
      to (P)Baa3 from (P)Ba1

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to
      Baa3 from Ba1

   Issuer: HeidelbergCement Finance Luxembourg S.A.

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Upgraded
      to (P)P-3 from (P)NP

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Upgraded
      to (P)Baa3 from (P)Ba1

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to
      Baa3 from Ba1

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Baa3
      from Ba1

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded
      and Assigned definitive Baa3 from (P)Ba1

   Issuer: Ciments Francais S.A.

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Baa3
      from Ba1

   Issuer: Italcementi Finance S.A.

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to
      Baa3 from Ba1

Assignments:

   Issuer: HeidelbergCement AG

   -- Issuer Rating, Assigned Baa3

Withdrawals:

   Issuer: HeidelbergCement AG

   -- Probability of Default Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated
      Ba1-PD

   -- Corporate Family Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated Ba1

   Issuer: Italcementi S.p.A.

   -- Probability of Default Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated
      Ba1-PD

   -- Corporate Family Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated Ba1

   -- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Withdrawn,
      previously rated (P)NP

   -- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Withdrawn,
      previously rated (P)Ba1

   Issuer: Italcementi Finance S.A.

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Withdrawn,
      previously rated NP

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program,
      Withdrawn, previously rated (P)NP

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program,
      Withdrawn, previously rated (P)Ba1

Outlook Actions:

   Issuer: HeidelbergCement AG

   -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

   Issuer: HeidelbergCement Finance Luxembourg S.A.

   -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

   Issuer: Italcementi S.p.A.

   -- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Positive

   Issuer: Ciments Francais S.A.

   -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

   Issuer: Italcementi Finance S.A.

   -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Building
Materials Industry published in September 2014.


INEOS STYROLUTION: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B+' CCR Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' long-term corporate credit
rating on INEOS Styrolution Group GmbH and then withdrew it at
the issuer's request.  The outlook at the time of withdrawal was
stable.

S&P also withdrew its 'BB-' issue rating on Styrolution's
outstanding first lien term loan of EUR1.1 billion, due Nov.
2019, which was repaid.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' issue rating on
Styrolution's first lien term loan of EUR1.1 billion, due 2021,
which is guaranteed by Ineos Styrolution Holding Ltd.
(B+/Stable/--).  The recovery rating is unchanged at '2'.


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I R E L A N D
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ARBOUR CLO IV: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned these
definitive ratings to notes issued by Arbour CLO IV Designated
Activity Company:

  EUR30,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
   2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  EUR214,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  EUR42,200,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  EUR25,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)
  EUR21,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)
  EUR26,750,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)
  EUR11,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

                       RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2030.  The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure.  Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Oaktree Capital
Management (UK) LLP, has sufficient experience and operational
capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Arbour CLO IV is a managed cash flow CLO.  At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
floating rate notes and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
unsecured loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and
high yield bonds.  The bond bucket gives the flexibility to
Arbour CLO IV to hold bonds.  The portfolio is expected to be
between 50% to 60% ramped up as of the closing date and to be
comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled
in Western Europe.

Oaktree will manage the CLO.  It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer has issued EUR 43.0 mil. of subordinated notes, which will
not be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty.  The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  Oaktree's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
October 2016.  The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders.  Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.  As such,
Moody's encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used these base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR 400,000,000
Diversity Score: 35
  Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2779
  Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.9%
  Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42%
  Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Moody's has analyzed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries.  As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below.  Following the effective date, and given
the portfolio constraints and the current sovereign ratings in
Europe, such exposure may not exceed 10% of the total portfolio.
As a result and in conjunction with the current foreign
government bond ratings of the eligible countries, as a worst
case scenario, a maximum 10% of the pool would be domiciled in
countries with A3 local currency country ceiling.  The remainder
of the pool will be domiciled in countries which currently have a
local or foreign currency country ceiling of Aaa or Aa1 to Aa3.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the definitive rating assigned to the
rated notes.  This sensitivity analysis includes increased
default probability relative to the base case.  Below is a
summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3196 from 2779)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
  Class A-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0
  Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0
  Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2
  Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1
  Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
  Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1
  Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3613 from 2779)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

  Class A-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1
  Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1
  Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3
  Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4
  Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
  Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
  Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Given that the transaction allows for corporate rescue loans
which do not bear a Moody's rating or Credit Estimate, Moody's
has also tested the sensitivity of the ratings of the notes to
changes in the recovery rate assumption for corporate rescue
loans within the portfolio (up to 2.5% in aggregate).  This
analysis includes haircuts to the 50% base recovery rate which we
assume for corporate rescue loans if they satisfy certain
criteria, including having a Moody's rating or Credit Estimate.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.


ARBOUR CLO IV: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Arbour CLO IV Designated Activity
Company's notes final ratings, as follows:

   -- EUR30.00m class A-1 notes due 2030: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR214.00m class A-2 notes due 2030: 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- EUR42.20m class B notes due 2030: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR25.00m class C notes due 2030: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR21.50m class D notes due 2030: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR26.75m class E notes due 2030: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR11.00m class F notes due 2030: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR43.00m subordinated notes due 2030: 'NR'

Arbour CLO IV Designated Activity Company is an arbitrage cash
flow collateralised loan obligation. Net proceeds from the
issuance of the notes will be used to purchase a portfolio of
EUR400m of mostly European leveraged loans and bonds. The
portfolio is actively managed by Oaktree Capital Management (UK)
LLP.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B+'/'B' Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch places the average credit quality of obligors in the
'B+'/'B' range. The agency has public ratings or credit opinions
on all obligors in the identified portfolio. The weighted average
rating factor of the identified portfolio is 30.98.

High Recovery Expectations

At least 90% of the portfolio comprises senior secured
obligations. Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings (RR) to all
assets in the identified portfolio. The weighted average recovery
rating of the indicative portfolio is 73.20%.

Diversified Portfolio

The transaction contains a covenant that limits the top 10
obligors to 21% or 23% of the portfolio balance depending on the
matrix point selected by the collateral manager. In addition,
portfolio profile tests limit exposure to the top one Fitch
industry to 20% and the top three Fitch industries to 40%. This
ensures that the asset portfolio is not exposed to excessive
obligor or industry concentration.

Partial Interest Rate Hedge

Between 5% and 15% of the portfolio may be invested in fixed rate
assets. Fixed rate liabilities account for 7.5% of the target par
amount. However, the collateral manager is allowed to reinvest
into additional obligations, subject to the minimum and maximum
limit to be improved if failing.

Limited FX Risk

The transaction is allowed to invest in non-euro-denominated
assets, provided these are hedged with perfect asset swaps within
six months of purchase. Unhedged non-euro assets may not exceed
2.5% of the portfolio at any time and can only be included if at
their trade date the portfolio balance is above the target par
amount when their principal balance converted into euros at spot
rate is haircut by 50%.

Documentation Amendments

The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation or noteholder approval. Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyse the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings. Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final
maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders
should be aware that the structure considers the confirmation to
be given if Fitch declines to comment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability would lead to a
downgrade of up to three notches for the rated notes. A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of
up to four notches for the rated notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch and/or other
rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis.

   -- Loan-by-loan data provided by the arranger as at 08
      September 2016.

   -- Offering circular provided by the arranger as at 09
      November 2016

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties
and enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the
offering document and which relate to the underlying asset pool
was not prepared for this transaction. Offering documents for
EMEA leveraged finance CLOs transactions do not typically include
RW&Es that are available to investors and that relate to the
asset pool underlying the security. Therefore, Fitch credit
reports for EMEA leveraged finance CLOs transactions will not
typically include descriptions of RW&Es. For further information,
please see Fitch's Special Report titled "Representations,
Warranties and Enforcement Mechanisms in Global Structured
Finance Transactions," dated 31 May 2016.


RYANAIR: Ordered by EU Commission to Repay "Illegal Subsidies"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Mehreen Khan at The Financial Times reports that the European
Commission has ordered Ryanair and Tuifly to repay "illegal
subsidies" the low-cost airlines received from an Austrian
airport.

Brussels has demanded Ireland's Ryanair repay EUR2 million to the
Austrian government while Germany's Tuifly and HLX -- which is
part of the Tuifly brand -- to repay a combined EUR10.7 million
for breaching the rules governing the single market, the FT
relates.

The commission, as cited by the FT, said the judgment comes after
an investigation around marketing arrangements and airport
services provided by Austria's regional Klagenfurt airport which
conferred an "undue advantage which cannot be justified under EU
state aid rules".

Ryanair said it would be appealing the decision, the FT relays.
"We disagree with the findings and have instructed our lawyers to
appeal", the FT quotes a spokesman as saying.

In 2014, the airline was ordered return nearly EUR10 million in
illegal subsidies to the French government, the FT recounts.
Ryanair stopped flying from Klagenfurt in 2013, the FT notes.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


ALTYN BANK: Fitch Places 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating on RWP
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Altyn Bank's (AB) 'BB' Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) on Rating Watch Positive (RWP). The rating
action follows the announcement of AB's parent, Halyk Bank of
Kazakhstan (HB; BB/Stable), that it has signed a memorandum of
understanding with China Citic Bank (BBB/Stable) to sell a 60%
stake in AB.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The RWP on AB's IDRs and Support Rating reflects Fitch's
expectation that should China Citic Bank acquire a majority stake
in AB, the latter's ratings are likely to be upgraded due to
potential support from a higher-rated new majority owner.

Fitch expects the deal to be finalised in 1H17, subject to
regulatory approvals from the authorities of the People's
Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch expects to resolve the Rating Watch on AB's ratings upon
the completion of the transaction. Depending on the timing of the
transaction and the availability of information, the resolution
of the Rating Watches could extend beyond the typical six-month
horizon.

The ratings could be upgraded based on Fitch's evaluation of the
probability of support available from China Citic Bank.

If the transaction does not occur, Fitch will likely affirm the
existing ratings provided HB's ability and propensity to support
AB do not materially change.

The rating actions are as follows:

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs: 'BB'; placed on
      RWP

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR: 'B'; placed on RWP

   -- National Long-Term Rating: 'A+(kaz)'; placed on RWP

   -- Support Rating: '3'; placed on RWP


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


SES SA: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to New Resettable Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba1 long-term rating to
the new perpetual deeply subordinated fixed rate resettable
securities issued by SES S.A. with a guarantee from SES Global
Americas Holdings GP ("SES Global", Baa2 stable).  The hybrid
bond issuance is intended to be a benchmark size transaction.
The Ba1 rating on this hybrid bond is the same as that assigned
to a similar hybrid bond issued by SES S.A. in June 2016.  All
other ratings and the stable outlook on SES, SES Global and their
guaranteed subsidiaries remain unchanged.

The net proceeds of this issuance will be used for general
corporate purposes and the repayment of certain existing debt.

"The Ba1 rating assigned to the hybrid bonds is two notches below
SES's issuer rating of Baa2 primarily because the bonds are
deeply subordinated to other debt and senior only to common
equity," says Alejandro Nunez, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior
Analyst and lead analyst for SES.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba1 rating assigned to the hybrid bonds is two notches below
SES's issuer rating of Baa2.  The two-notch rating differential
reflects the deeply subordinated nature of the hybrid bonds.  The
bonds are perpetual, callable instruments, senior only to common
equity, have optional coupon deferral on a cumulative basis, and
have no step-up prior to year ten and none greater than 100 basis
points over the life of the hybrid.

In Moody's view, the bonds have equity-like features that allow
them to receive basket "C" treatment (i.e., 50% equity and 50%
debt for financial leverage purposes), as assessed using Moody's
cross-sector methodology titled "Hybrid Equity Credit" dated 16
Mar 2015.

The Baa2 issuer rating on SES reflects: (1) SES's strong position
as a global market leader in satellite-based communications
services, with a long-term contract-based franchise that provides
high revenue visibility, (2) the strategic fit and revenue
contribution from O3b's satellite constellation to SES's
geostationary satellite fleet; (3) the cautious approach SES has
taken with respect to increasing its stake in O3b, in line with
its return requirements for infrastructure investments; and (4)
the financing plans announced by SES to fund its own peaking
capex program and the acquisition of O3b's minorities in a manner
consistent with SES's financial policies and within our credit
metric expectations.

                   RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that: (1) increasing
price pressures in certain markets, particularly in Enterprise,
will be managed so as to preserve profitability, and (2) that SES
will continue to manage and fund the peak in its near-term capex
program, including O3b, in a balanced manner and consistent with
Moody's expectations for the rating.  These include adjusted
leverage (Gross Debt/EBITDA as adjusted by Moody's) not
sustainably exceeding 3.5x and Free Cash Flow / Gross Debt (as
adjusted by Moody's) that, while negative during the initial
investment phase, will return to positive by FY 2018.  While
Moody's expects that the company will achieve improved credit
metrics as it moves past the peak investment period, until such
improvement occurs the company will have limited headroom for
further leveraging at the current rating.

                WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Positive rating pressure could develop on the ratings of SES, if
it tightens its current financial policy and achieves a Gross
Debt / EBITDA ratio (as adjusted by Moody's) of well below 3.0x
and a Free Cash Flow (FCF) / Debt ratio (as adjusted by Moody's)
of over 5% on a sustained basis.

Negative pressure could be exerted on the ratings of SES with (1)
a material deterioration in its operating performance; (2) a
sustained increase in its Gross Debt/ EBITDA ratio (as adjusted
by Moody's) to over 3.5x or a deterioration in Free Cash Flow
(FCF) / Debt ratio (as adjusted by Moody's) such that it turns
neutral or negative for a prolonged period; and/ or (3) if the
company were to loosen its financial policy leverage target ratio
(reported net debt/ EBITDA of below 3.3x).

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Assignments:

Issuer: SES S.A.
  Backed Junior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned Ba1

                       PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Communications Infrastructure Rating Methodology published in
June 2011.

Headquartered in Luxembourg, with a fleet of 53 satellites around
the globe, SES provides fixed satellite services for video,
internet and data, and voice applications to a range of media,
enterprise and government customers.  SES also holds strategic
participations in Ciel in Canada (70% economic interest),
Quetzsat in Mexico (100%), YahLive in the Middle East (35%) and
the Ka-band mid Earth orbit project O3b Networks (100%).


SES SA: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Proposed Hybrid Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had assigned its 'BB+' long-term
issue rating to the proposed perpetual subordinated hybrid
securities to be issued by Luxembourg-based fixed satellite
services operator SES S.A. (BBB/Stable/A-2) and guaranteed by SES
Global Americas Holdings G.P.  The first call date is set at more
than five years after issuance.

The issue's completion and size will be subject to market
conditions.  At this stage, S&P anticipates a ratio of
outstanding hybrid securities to adjusted capitalization at
slightly below 15%.

Upon issuance, S&P will classify the proposed hybrid securities
as having intermediate equity content until no later than the
first call date.

Consequently, in S&P's calculation of SES' credit ratios, it will
reclassify 50% of the principal outstanding and accrued interest
under the proposed hybrid securities as debt, and 50% of the
related payments on these securities as an interest expense.
This is based on S&P's understanding that the hybrid instruments
will be recognized as equity on SES S.A.'s balance sheet.

The two-notch difference between S&P's 'BB+' issue rating on the
proposed hybrid notes and its 'BBB' corporate credit rating (CCR)
on SES S.A. reflects:

   -- One notch for the proposed notes' subordination because the
      CCR on SES S.A. is investment grade; and

   -- An additional notch for the optional deferability of
      interest.

The notching of the proposed securities takes into account S&P's
view that there is a relatively low likelihood that SES S.A. will
defer interest payments.  Should S&P's view change, it may
significantly increase the number of downward notches that it
apply to the issue rating, and S&P could do this more quickly
than taking a rating action on the CCR.

S&P understands that the interest to be paid on the proposed
securities will increase by 25 basis points five years after the
first call date, and a further 75 basis points 20 years after the
first call date.  S&P considers the cumulative 100 basis points
as a moderate step-up, which creates an incentive to redeem the
instruments at that time.  Consequently, in accordance with S&P's
criteria, it classifies the proposed hybrid instruments as having
intermediate equity content.  S&P would no longer recognize the
proposed instruments as having intermediate equity content after
the first call date at the latest, because the remaining period
until their economic maturity would, by then, be less than 20
years.

  KEY FACTORS IN S&P's ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTRUMENTS' PERMANENCE

Although the proposed hybrid securities are perpetual, SES S.A.
can redeem them as of the first call date, which is expected to
occur more than five years after issuance, and every year
thereafter.  If this occurs, the company intends to replace the
proposed instruments, although it is not obliged to do so.

Critically, for S&P's assessment of permanence, it believes that
any repurchase, irrespective of the size, could jeopardize the
equity content of the proposed securities, as it would lead S&P
to question management's intentions to maintain and replace such
securities.

KEY FACTORS IN S&P's ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTRUMENTS'
SUBORDINATION

The proposed securities will be deeply subordinated obligations
of SES S.A., ranking junior to all unsubordinated or subordinated
obligations, and only senior to share capital.

  KEY FACTORS IN S&P's ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTRUMENTS'
DEFERABILITY

In S&P's view, the issuer's option to defer payment of interest
on the proposed securities is discretionary, thus it may elect
not to pay accrued interest on an interest payment date because
it has no obligation to do so.  However, any outstanding deferred
interest payment would have to be settled in cash if an equity
dividend or interest on equal-ranking securities is paid or if
common shares or equal-ranking securities are repurchased.

That said, this condition remains acceptable under S&P's rating
methodology because, once the issuer has settled the deferred
amount, it can choose to defer payment on the next interest
payment date.

The issuer retains the option to defer coupons throughout the
proposed instruments' life.  The deferred interest on the
proposed securities is cash cumulative and compounding.


=====================
M O N T E N E R G R O
=====================


MONTENEGRO: S&P Affirms 'B+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+/B' long- and short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Republic of Montenegro.  The outlook is negative.

                             RATIONALE

S&P projects that Montenegro's government debt burden will
continue to rise steadily over the forecast horizon to over 80%
of GDP in 2019 from 67% in 2015, while interest costs will rise
to 9% of general government revenues by 2019 from 6% in 2015.  In
the context of already limited monetary flexibility given the
country's unilateral adoption of the euro, the increased leverage
of the public balance sheet will further restrict authorities'
capacity to respond to domestic and external shocks.

Data available on Montenegro's budgetary performance to date
indicates that the fiscal deficit in 2016 has narrowed and is
likely to turn out lower than S&P's initial expectation.  While
S&P notes some revenue growth, much of the deficit reduction
appears to be driven by lower-than-budgeted spending on the Bar-
Boljare highway.  This appears to have offset increases in public
wages by 16% and higher social outlays ahead of the October
parliamentary elections.  However, S&P believes that this
postponed construction expenditure is likely to catch up over
2017-2019.

The construction of the first phase of the Bar-Boljare highway,
currently in progress, commenced in 2015.  Eighty-five percent of
the financing for this phase will be met through a $1.1 billion
(25% of GDP) loan from the Export-Import Bank of China (Chinese
Eximbank) and the remainder via market issuance.  S&P believes
that highway-related spending will keep the general government
deficit above 7% on average over 2017-2019.  Even after the first
phase of the highway, which is 44 kilometers long, is completed,
it is unlikely that general government deficits will narrow
quickly because:

   -- The other phases of the highway will need to be
      constructed, and S&P expects related costs will again flow
      through the government's budget.

   -- Potential cost overruns related to the highway's
      construction, if they have to be borne by the state, could
      increase the government's financing needs.  Although the
      contract with China Road and Bridge Corporation stipulates
      a maximum cost overrun of 10% of the project's value (which
      works out to about 2% of 2016 GDP), it remains unclear who
      would bear such unexpected costs.

   -- Interest expenses are also likely to be higher, increasing
      to 9% of general government revenues in 2019 from 6% in
      2015, reflecting both Montenegro's rising debt and a higher
      effective interest rate.  A sharp depreciation of the euro
      against the dollar, the currency in which Montenegro must
      service its loan from the Chinese Eximbank and on which
      interest payments started in July 2015, could raise
      interest costs further.  S&P understands that the
      government is currently contemplating ways to hedge its
      exchange rate risk.

   -- Poor oversight over the finances of lower tiers of
      governments, which led to the build-up of arrears in the
      past, could complicate efforts to consolidate public
      finances.

S&P do not consider the bilateral loan from the Chinese Eximbank
to be commercial debt.  However, by potentially receiving
preferential treatment, the liability could, in our opinion,
weaken Montenegro's capacity to pay its stock of commercial debt,
which S&P estimates at just over 50% of total government debt.

In addition to the aforementioned risks, S&P views Montenegro's
external finances as an important credit weakness, with narrow
net external debt estimated at 195% of current account receipts
(CARs) in 2016, while liquidity, as measured by gross external
financing needs, is estimated at about 135% of CARs and usable
reserves. Montenegro's use of the euro prevents the Central Bank
of Montenegro from setting interest rates and controlling the
money supply, and restricts its ability to act as a lender of
last resort.  It also makes the country's income highly sensitive
to cross-border capital movements.

Montenegro runs large, persistent, and positive errors and
omissions (about 8% of GDP on average between 2011 and 2015),
which may reflect unrecorded tourism export revenues and the
underestimation of remittances, among other factors.  This could
mean that the current account deficit may be lower than the
reported data indicate.  Also, S&P has very limited information
on Montenegro's external assets; therefore external ratios are
likely to indicate higher net leverage than is actually the case.
What's more, S&P notes that the large current account deficit is
probably tied closely to foreign direct investment (FDI)-related
projects. If such inflows, particularly in the real estate and
construction sectors, were to fall, imports linked to these
projects would also likely decrease and the current account
deficit would narrow.

Partly mitigating all these risks are policymakers' ongoing
efforts to improve tax compliance and formalize the grey economy-
-an approach that could boost revenue intake.  S&P notes a
significant reduction in contingent liabilities arising from
litigation cases filed against the government after a court
recently ruled in Montenegro's favor in a case filed by the
Central European Aluminum Corp (CEAC) for EUR600 million (16% of
2016 GDP).  CEAC is the former owner of Montenegrin aluminum
producer KAP.  Although the outstanding litigation amount now
stands at a much lower EUR220 million (about 6% of 2016 GDP), an
adverse ruling could weigh further on already-weak fiscal and
debt metrics.

Ongoing projects in the tourism, infrastructure, and energy
sectors will aid real GDP growth of 3.4% per year on average over
2016-2019.  The high import content of many of these projects is
likely to push the current account deficit back over 17% of GDP
over 2017-2019 as activity gains momentum.  Risks to S&P's growth
forecast could materialize if large investment projects were to
stall or if the tourism sector were hit by disruption in key
markets such as Russia.  For the time being, however, S&P notes
that the geopolitical concerns afflicting tourist destinations
such as Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia, among others, are favoring
tourism in Montenegro.  Furthermore, a long period of low oil
prices might translate into lower FDI inflows, since substantial
inflows come from oil-exporting countries such as Russia and the
United Arab Emirates.

S&P also expects that the pace of credit growth, particularly
related to smaller corporate entities, is likely to remain slow.
Despite efforts to reduce the level of nonperforming loans (NPLs)
on banks' books, the NPL ratio remains high, at 10.2% in
September 2016.

S&P believes the implementation of structural reforms, necessary
for Montenegro to achieve its objective of integration with the
EU and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), could have a
positive impact on the country's longer-term growth prospects,
particularly if integration is managed without pronounced
repercussions from major trading and investment partners, notably
Russia.  In December 2015, NATO invited Montenegro to join the
alliance, and accession talks commenced in February this year.

The October parliamentary elections handed a victory to the
ruling Democratic Party of Socialists.  An attempted coup on
election day--viewed by some as an attempt to prevent a pro-
Western cabinet from taking office--was purportedly averted.
Talks related to the formation of a coalition government are
ongoing and S&P's projections do not take into account any major
shifts in economic or foreign policies.

                              OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view of the risk of a further
deterioration in Montenegro's fiscal and debt metrics in the
absence of concrete measures to curtail current expenditures.

S&P could lower the ratings over the next six months if it sees a
further erosion of Montenegro's policy flexibility, most likely
through widening fiscal deficits and rising general government
debt; if S&P views pressures building up on the balance of
payments that translate into weaker growth and higher interest
rates; or if any tensions in the run-up to the country's NATO
accession detract policy focus away from stabilizing public
finances.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if economic growth in
Montenegro picks up faster than S&P anticipates and if it sees an
implementation of measures to achieve a material consolidation of
public finances and a reduction in government and external debt.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and
explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating
factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant
criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were
considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the debt assessment had improved; all
key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                        Rating
                                        To             From
Montenegro (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency            B+/Neg./B      B+/Neg./B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   AAA            AAA
Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency                        B+             B+


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


EURO-GALAXY V: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by Euro-Galaxy V CLO
B.V. (the "Issuer" or "Euro-Galaxy V"):

   -- EUR60,000,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Variable Funding
      Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR184,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR49,200,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- EUR23,200,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- EUR19,200,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

   -- EUR23,300,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

   -- EUR12,300,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2030. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, PineBridge
Investments Europe Limited ("PineBridge"), has sufficient
experience and operational capacity and is capable of managing
this CLO.

Euro-Galaxy V is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and secured senior
bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior obligations, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and
high yield bonds. The portfolio is expected to be approximately
63% ramped up as of the closing date and to be comprised
predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western
Europe.

PineBridge will manage the CLO in collaboration with the Junior
Collateral Manager, Credit Industriel et Commercial SA ("CIC").
They will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading
activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's four-year reinvestment period. Thereafter,
purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from unscheduled
principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit impaired and
credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer has issued EUR39,900,000 of subordinated notes, which are
not rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. PineBridge's and CIC's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
October 2016. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

   -- Par amount: EUR 400,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 37

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2720

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.00%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.25%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.75%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

As part of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential
exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with local a currency
country risk ceiling (LCC) of A1 or below. As per the portfolio
constraints, exposures to countries with a LCC of A1 or below
cannot exceed 10%, with exposures to countries with LCCs of Baa1
to Baa3 further limited to 5%. Following the effective date, and
given these portfolio constraints and the current sovereign
ratings of eligible countries, the total exposure to countries
with a LCC of A1 or below may not exceed 10% of the total
portfolio. As a worst case scenario, a maximum 5% of the pool
would be domiciled in countries with LCCs of Baa1 to Baa3 while
an additional 5% would be domiciled in countries with LCCs of A1
to A3. The remainder of the pool will be domiciled in countries
which currently have a LCC of Aa3 and above. Given this portfolio
composition, the model was run with different target par amounts
depending on the target rating of each class of notes as further
described in the methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a
function of the exposure size to peripheral countries and the
target ratings of the rated notes and amount to 0.75% for the
Class A notes, 0.50% for the Class B notes, 0.38% for the Class C
notes and 0% for Classes D, E and F.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the definitive rating assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3128 from 2720)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

   -- Class A-R Senior Secured Variable Funding Notes: 0

   -- Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

   -- Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

   -- Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

   -- Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

   -- Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

   -- Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3536 from 2720)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

   -- Class A-R Senior Secured Variable Funding Notes: -1

   -- Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

   -- Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

   -- Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

   -- Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

   -- Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

   -- Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


HOME CREDIT: Moody's Changes B2 Deposit Ratings Outlook to Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed its outlook to stable from
negative on Home Credit and Finance Bank's (HCFB) B2 long term
local and foreign-currency deposit ratings, as well as on CB
Renaissance Credit LLC's B3 senior unsecured debt and long-term
local and foreign-currency deposit ratings.

At the same time, the rating agency affirmed HCFB's b2 Baseline
Credit Assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA, the B3 subordinated
debt rating, the B1(cr)/Not-Prime(cr) Counterparty Risk (CR)
Assessment, and the Not-Prime short-term rating , as well as CB
Renaissance Credit's b3 BCA, the B2(cr)/Not-Prime(cr) CR
Assessment, and the Not-Prime short-term rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

HOME CREDIT AND FINANCE BANK

The stable outlook on HCFB's long-term senior unsecured and
deposit ratings reflects the recovery in the bank's profitability
and asset quality metrics. HCFB reported an improved return on
average assets of 1.4% (up from -2.9% at year-end 2015), mainly
driven by lower credit costs and steady recovery of net interest
margin given lower funding costs. The pick of provisioning burden
and asset quality problems has been passed, with annualised cost
of risks reduced to 8% as of mid-2016, down from 13% in 2015 (16%
in 2014).

Asset quality indicators are improving with non-performing loans
(NPLs; loans overdue more than 90 days) decreasing to 9.4% of
gross loans as of mid-2016, from 13% in 2015 (15.6% in 2014) and
declining write offs (17.7% in mid-2016 vs 24.4% in 2015). HCFB
has adopted a more conservative risk-taking approach with
tightened underwriting criteria and doesn't plan aggressive loan
growth in the next 12 months. In addition, the bank has robust
loan loss absorption cushion with good NPLs coverage ratio of
120% and sound capitalization: Tier 1 amounted to 17.9% and total
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) at 26% as of mid-2016 under IFRS.

CB RENAISSANCE CREDIT

The stable outlook on CB Renaissance Credit's 's long-term
deposit ratings largely reflects improvements in the bank's
profitability, as a result of reduced funding and credit costs,
and Moody's expectation of profitable performance in 2016-2017.

The bank's interim profitability metrics have materially improved
over January-June 2016, as the bank returned to profitable
performance with net income of RUB92 million -- translated into a
marginal 1.3% return on equity -- for the six months ending June
30, 2016, following deep losses for 2014-15. Net income has been
bolstered by: (1) the decline in credit costs to 8.5% in January
2016 to June 2016 from 16.3% in 2015 owing to finalised seasoning
of legacy portfolio and tight risk controls over new loans
generation; as well as (2) the recovery of net interest income
amid the declining cost of funds. Moody's said, "We anticipate CB
Renaissance Credit to remain profitable for remaining 2016, with
a full-scale earnings recovery in 2017."

In addition, the bank's capital adequacy levels will likely to
improve on the back of anticipated RUB600 million Tier 1 capital
injection from its shareholder. As at July 1, 2017, CB
Renaissance Credit reported modest capital buffers with a Tier 1
ratio of 6.96% and a total CAR of 10.23% under Basel III. The
rating agency expects the bank's capital adequacy metrics to
improve, as new Tier 1 capital and positive bottom line will
exceed the bank's expected growth of risk-weighted assets.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Positive rating pressure on CB Renaissance Credit and Home Credit
and Finance Bank's would arise upon sustainable and robust
financial results, along with a strong loss-absorption capacity
in line with Moody's expectations in the next 12-18 months.

Negative rating pressure would arise if: (1) both banks lose
control over its credit costs or pre-provision income; (2) their
loss absorption capacity in terms of its Tier 1 capital, or NPL
coverage significantly deteriorates.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: CB Renaissance Credit LLC

Affirmations:

   -- LT Bank Deposits (Local & Foreign Currency), Affirmed B3,
      Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

   -- ST Bank Deposits (Local & Foreign Currency), Affirmed NP

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Local Currency),
      Affirmed B3, Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

   -- Subordinate (Foreign Currency), Affirmed Caa1

   -- Senior Unsecured MTN (Local & Foreign Currency), Affirmed
      (P)B3

   -- Other Short term (Foreign Currency), Affirmed (P)NP

   -- Subordinate MTN (Local & Foreign Currency), Affirmed
      (P)Caa1

   -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b3

   -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b3

   -- LT Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed B2(cr)

   -- ST Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Issuer: Home Credit & Finance Bank

Affirmations:

   -- LT Bank Deposits (Local & Foreign Currency), Affirmed B2,
      Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

   -- ST Bank Deposits (Local & Foreign Currency), Affirmed NP

   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN (Foreign Currency), Affirmed
      (P)B2

   -- Subordiante MTN (Foreign Currency), Affirmed (P)B3

   -- Other Short Term (Foreign Currency), Affirmed (P)NP

   -- Subordinate (Foreign Currency), Affirmed B3

   -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b2

   -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b2

   -- LT Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed B1(cr)

   -- ST Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: CB Renaissance Credit LLC

   -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Home Credit & Finance Bank

   -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


TINKOFF BANK: Fitch Hikes Long Term Issuer Default Ratings to BB-
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Tinkoff Bank's (Tinkoff) Long-Term
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'BB-' from 'B+' and Kazakhstan-
based SB JSC Home Credit and Finance Bank (HCK) Long-Term IDRs to
'B+' from 'B'. The Outlooks are Stable.

Fitch has also affirmed the IDRs of Russia-based OTP Bank (OTP)
at 'BB', Home Credit & Finance Bank (HCFB) at 'B+', and Orient
Express Bank (OEB) at 'B-'. The Outlooks on HCFB and OTP are
Stable and that on OEB is Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

RUSSIAN BANKS

IDRS, VRS, NATIONAL RATINGS

The rating actions reflect the gradual recovery of the Russian
consumer finance market, reflected by moderation of credit
losses, as banks previously tightened their underwriting
standards and reduced loans issuance, and by the reduction of
funding costs due to sector-wide influx of rouble liquidity and
the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) rate cuts. At the same time, the
banks' ratings continue to reflect their focus on a volatile
consumer finance market, with asset quality remaining vulnerable
to continued weak economic conditions and banks' potentially
increased risk appetite, while borrower leverage remains high.

The upgrade of Tinkoff's ratings to 'BB-' reflects the bank's
stronger and more resilient performance through the credit cycle
compared with peers. It also reflects its solid capital position,
significantly reduced wholesale funding dependence and the core
deposit base being very granular and sticky despite the bank no
longer paying a premium to the average market rate.

The affirmation of HCFB's rating at 'B+/Stable' reflects the
bank's improved asset quality and return to profitability in
2H15-1H16, which coupled with moderate planned growth, eliminates
near-term pressure on capital. Conversely, the two-notch lower
rating and Negative Outlook on OEB reflects continued capital
pressure from still negative bottom line results, as its asset
quality is somewhat weaker compared with peers. OEB's ratings
also factor in some potential downside risks to its asset quality
and capitalisation from planned merger with Uniastrum Bank.

The affirmation of OTP's IDRs and Support Rating reflects
potential support in case of need by the bank's parent, Hungarian
OTP Bank Plc. Fitch believes that the parent bank would have a
high propensity to support OTP in light of its majority ownership
(98%), high level of integration, common branding and
reputational damage from a potential default of OTP. The
affirmation of the bank's VR at 'b+' reflects its reasonable
asset quality and performance.

The four banks' average credit losses (defined as the increase in
loans overdue above 90 days, plus write-offs, divided by average
performing loans) declined to 12% in 1H16 from 19% in 2015, due
to tighter underwriting standards, reduced volumes of new loan
production and the gradual seasoning of legacy problem loans
issued in 2012-2013. Credit losses were higher at OEB (16%) but
moderate at Tinkoff (12%), OTP (11%) and HCFB (10%). Fitch
believes that the latter three banks may return to single digit
credit losses in 2H16-2017 absent of any further economic shocks.

The positive trends in the banks' asset quality metrics and lower
funding costs have translated into notable profitability
improvements. Tinkoff reported an impressive annualised 37% ROAE
in 1H16 (9% in 2015), OTP and HCFB showed reasonable returns of
14% and 9%, respectively, (compared with losses of 19% and 20% in
2015). OEB reduced its net loss to 22% of average equity (79% in
2015). Pre-impairment profitability exceeded credit losses at
Tinkoff (by about 10%), OTP (5%) and HCFB (3%), while at OEB
credit losses were still 3 ppts above the breakeven level.

Basel capitalisation is reasonable at OTP (Fitch Core Capital
(FCC) of 21% at end-1H16), HCFB (16%) and Tinkoff (14%), but
weaker at OEB (8%), which also received RUB5.6bn of equity
injections in 2015-2016 (60% of end-2015 equity) to offset losses
and avoid breaching capital requirements. However, in Fitch's
view, HCFB's capitalisation is somewhat weakened by material 1.4x
double leverage at the level of holding company Home Credit BV,
in which HCFB placed RUB9.7bn at end-1H16 (25% of FCC) to finance
the group's growing business in Asia. OEB's weak capitalisation
is further undermined by the sizeable weak related party exposure
(36% of FCC at end-1H16).

Regulatory capitalisation is weaker than Basel due to higher
statutory risk weights applied to high margin retail loans; more
formal provisioning rules; and a higher operating risk charge.
HCFB's regulatory Tier 1 ratio was 7.7% at end-9M16 (compared
with the required level of 7.25% from January 2017, of which 6%
is the minimum capital ratio and 1.25% is the conservation
buffer), but should be supported by reasonable internal capital
generation and only moderate loan growth. Tinkoff's Tier 1 ratio
was 7.3% at end-9M16, but if 9M16 results were audited it would
have been a more comfortable 10.1%. OEB's regulatory Tier 1 ratio
was 7.7% at end-9M16, while OTP reported the highest ratio of
12.1%.

The funding profiles of all banks are reasonable, with strong
deposit collection capacity and low reliance on wholesale debt.
However, OEB's funding base may be more vulnerable given the
bank's weaker profile. All four banks are primarily funded with
retail customers (around 70%-80% of end-1H16 liabilities), of
which the bulk fall under Deposit Insurance protection suggesting
they should be relatively sticky, although potentially price-
sensitive. Near-term wholesale funding repayments are limited for
all four banks. Liquidity cushions at all the banks are
reasonable and cover more than 20% of customer deposits. Banks'
liquidity positions are also strengthened by fast loan book
turnover and proven ability to de-leverage.

SUPPORT RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATING FLOORS

HCFB, Tinkoff and OEB's '5' Support Ratings reflect Fitch's view
that support from the banks' shareholders, although possible,
cannot be relied upon. The Support Ratings and Support Rating
Floors of 'No Floor' also reflect that support from the Russian
authorities, although possible given the banks' considerable
deposit bases, cannot be relied upon due to the banks' still
small sizes and lack of overall systemic importance.

Accordingly, the IDRs of Tinkoff, HCFB and OEB are based on their
intrinsic financial strength, as reflected by their VRs.

SENIOR UNSECURED AND SUBORDINATED DEBT RATINGS

Fitch has assigned Tinkoff's new RUB3bn senior debt issue a 'BB-'
Long-Term rating and 'A+(rus)' National Rating, the same level as
its Long-Term IDRs and National Rating, reflecting Fitch's view
of average recovery prospects, in case of default.

The subordinated debt ratings of HCFB and Tinkoff are notched
down one level from their VRs (the banks' VRs are in line with
their IDRs), including (i) zero notches for additional non-
performance risk relative to the VR, as Fitch believes these
instruments should only absorb losses once a bank reaches, or is
very close to, the point of non-viability; and (ii) one notch for
loss severity, reflecting below-average recoveries in case of
default.

HCK

IDRS, VR and NATIONAL RATING

The upgrade of HCK's ratings reflects a further decrease of
already moderate credit losses, resulting in robust earnings
generation and solid capitalisation, which provide a significant
safety buffer against potential deterioration of asset quality.
The ratings continue to reflect the bank's relatively small size
(less than 1% of banking system assets) and franchise focused on
potentially volatile unsecured lending market in Kazakhstan,
significant wholesale/money-market funding (partly received from
related parties) and moderate liquidity.

HCK's credit losses significantly reduced to 7% in 9M16
(annualised) from 14% in 2015 due to tightening of underwriting
standards in late 2014-early 2015 and improvement in recovery
rates. On balance sheet loans 90 days overdue reduced to 7% (106%
covered with reserves) at end-3Q16 from 10% (101%) at end-2015.
The bank does not provide potentially risky foreign currency
loans, so avoided the hit on credit quality from devaluation.

A recent decline in credit losses boosted the bank's already
robust profitability, as reflected in an increase of annualised
ROAE to 51% in 9M16 from 29% in 2015. High interest margin and
commission income underpin consistently solid pre-impairment
profitability (about 20% of average gross loans in 2014-9M16).

HCK's capitalisation is strong, despite sizeable dividends
(around 70% of net income) paid out to the parent every year
since 2013. HCK's FCC ratio at end-9M16 was a healthy 21% (22% at
end-2015) and fairly close to the bank's total regulatory capital
ratio (k2). The bank's loss absorption capacity is also strong.
At end-9M16 it could potentially reserve extra 20% of gross loans
before breaching regulatory capital adequacy requirements.

HCK has a moderate funding profile, as reflected in high, albeit
decreasing, depositor concentration (the 20 largest customers
accounted for 46% of total customer accounts at end-2Q16 compared
to 59% at end-2Q15) and a high share of wholesale/money-market
funding (39% of total liabilities). The share of group funding
reduced to 9% at end-9M16 from 26% at end-2015 and the remainder
is likely to be repaid by end-2016. The bank's liquidity position
at end-10M16 was sufficient to repay all upcoming (in the next 12
months) market debt repayments, although the remainder would
cover customer accounts by only 8%.

SUPPORT RATING

HCK's Support Rating of '4' reflects the limited probability of
support that the bank may receive from its 100% parent, HCFB. In
Fitch's view, HCFB's propensity to support HCK is high given the
full ownership, the subsidiary's favourable performance to date,
common branding and potential reputational damage for the broader
Home Credit group in case of HCK's default. However, HCFB's
ability to provide support to HCK is constrained by its own
financial strength, as expressed by its 'B+' IDR.

SENIOR UNSECURED DEBT RATINGS

Fitch has upgraded HCK's senior unsecured debt Long-term rating
and National rating to 'B+' and 'BBB(kaz)', respectively, the
same level as its Long-Term IDRs and National Rating, reflecting
Fitch's view of average recovery prospects, in case of default.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

RUSSIAN BANKS

OTP's IDR is sensitive to changes in Fitch's assessment of
Hungarian OTP Bank Plc's propensity and ability to provide
support to its Russian subsidiary.

An extended track record of reasonable performance, while
maintaining adequate asset quality and capitalisation could
result in moderate upside potential for HCFB and OTP's VR. Upside
potential for Tinkoff's ratings is more limited (given its
already one-notch higher rating) and would primarily require
considerable diversification of business and earnings reducing
the bank's exposure to risky Russian consumer finance market and
protecting its performance from potentially significant
volatility through the credit cycle.

OTP's VR and the ratings of HCFB and Tinkoff may come under
pressure from renewed pressure on banks' asset quality,
profitability and capital, but Fitch views this as unlikely in
the near term.

OEB may be downgraded if it is unable to return to profitable
performance and/or if its capital or asset quality becomes
markedly weaker after the anticipated merger with Uniastrum Bank.
Conversely, reasonable capital position of the merged entity, and
moderation of losses from OEB's retail business may stabilise the
ratings.

HCK

Upside potential for the HCK's IDRs is limited given the
difficult operating environment, but the ratings could benefit
from strengthening of the franchise and funding/liquidity
profile, while maintaining reasonable asset quality and
performance. Downgrade could result from a substantial
deterioration of asset quality and/or capitalisation.

The rating actions are as follows:

   Tinkoff

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs: upgraded to
      'BB-' from 'B+'; Outlooks Stable

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- National Long-Term Rating: upgraded to 'A+(rus)' from
      'A(rus)'; Outlook Stable

   -- Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bb-' from 'b+'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- Senior unsecured debt Long-term rating: assigned at 'BB-'

   -- Senior unsecured debt National Long-term Rating: assigned
      at 'A+(rus)'

   -- Subordinated debt (issued by TCS Finance Limited) Long-term
      rating: upgraded to 'B+' from 'B'

   OTP

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs: affirmed at
      'BB', Outlooks Stable

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'AA-(rus)', Outlook
      Stable

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b+'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

   HCFB

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs: affirmed at
      'B+'; Outlooks Stable

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b+'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- Subordinated debt (issued by Eurasia Capital SA) Long-term
      rating: affirmed at 'B', Recovery Rating 'RR5'

   OEB

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs: affirmed at
      'B-'; Outlooks Negative

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'BB-(rus)'; Outlook
      Negative

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   HCK

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs: upgraded to 'B+'
      from 'B'; Outlooks Stable

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- National Long-Term Rating: upgraded to 'BBB (kaz)' from
      'BB+ (kaz)'; Outlook Stable

   -- Viability Rating: upgraded to 'b+' from 'b'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '4'

   -- Senior unsecured debt Long-term rating: upgraded to 'B+'
      from 'B', Recovery Rating 'RR4'

   -- Senior unsecured debt National Long-term rating: upgraded
      to 'BBB (kaz)' from 'BB+ (kaz)'


VEB: To Repay RUR250BB Outstanding Debt Next Year
-------------------------------------------------
Alexander Winning and Kira Zavyalova at Reuters report that
Russian state development bank VEB will manage to pay back
outstanding debt next year though it will be difficult.

According to Reuters, VEB Chairman Sergei Gorkov said on
Nov. 10 VEB had to pay back around RUR250 billion (US$3.9
billion) in outstanding debt next year but Russia's state
spending plan envisages only RUR150 billion for repayment of its
debt.

Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said earlier this year that VEB
would receive RUR150 billion from the state in 2017, the same as
in 2016, Reuters recounts.

Mr. Gorkov, a former top manager at Russia's largest lender
Sberbank, was appointed head of VEB this year to replace Vladimir
Dmitriev, under whose management VEB ended up needing a bailout
of up to US$16 billion, Reuters relates.

It received the RUR150 billion (US$2.35 billion) in immediate
help from the state this year and started restructuring its debt
under the new management, Reuters discloses.

Mr. Gorkov, as cited by Reuters, said VEB will pay back all the
debt due in 2016 and will finish the year with liquidity surplus.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AEI CABLES: Unions Call for Parliament to Debate on Future
----------------------------------------------------------
Graeme Whitfield at ChronicleLive reports that unions
representing 240 people under threat of redundancy at a Tyneside
factory have called for their future to be debated in Parliament.

According to ChronicleLive, the historic AEI Cables plant in
Birtley could close after its Dubai-based owners rejected a
rescue plan from local managers.

Closure is one of three options being considered for the site --
along with its sale and reducing it to a sales and distribution
center -- and unions claim owners Ducab have not committed to
paying redundancies in the event of job losses, ChronicleLive
discloses.

The factory, which can trace its history back 175 years, was
saved two years ago when it was bought out of a Company Voluntary
Arrangement by Ducab, ChronicleLive recounts.

Blaydon MP Dave Anderson, whose constituency includes the
factory, is seeking a meeting with Business Secretary Greg Clark
to see if the Government can offer help to workers, ChronicleLive
relays.

AEI Cables is a North East cable manufacturer.


CARALOT: Confirms it Has Gone Into Liquidation
----------------------------------------------
Andrew Evans at CarDealer Magazine reports that after speculation
surrounded the future of Derbyshire car supermarket Caralot, it's
been confirmed on November 10 that the company has gone into
liquidation.

Caralot director Nick Donald said in an interview with the Derby
Telegraph that he had been forced to shut the business down, as
the firm had expanded too rapidly for him to cope with it,
according to CarDealer Magazine.

More recently, co-founder Jamie Caple had left the company and
the business had been scaled down, the report notes.

In a short interview with the Derby Telegraph he stated:
"Unfortunately I have had to liquidate the business. It has been
six years of hard graft from me and it became something I could
not personally handle. In short, we became too big too soon.

"Someone will be taking over the site but it will be nothing to
do with me or Caralot. Morally, we were a really good business
but we appear to have become victims of our own success."


GRAINGER PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the UK's largest residential landlord
Grainger Plc's (Grainger) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
at 'BB' with a Stable Outlook. The rating of its senior secured
notes is affirmed at 'BB+'.

The ratings reflect Grainger's focus on the London residential
market, a defensive GBP1.9bn property portfolio concentrated on
regulated tenancies, and the company's recent deleveraging driven
by divestments. Unlike investment-grade REIT peers Grainger's
business model relies more on proceeds from portfolio sales than
on recurring rental income, although Fitch recognises
management's plans to increase rental income significantly by
2020.

Fitch expects recent and ongoing improvements to the company's
business risk profile to be positive for the ratings, driven by
the simplification of the corporate structure and the focus on
growing its portfolio of UK market-rented property assets.
Grainger's financial metrics, which have improved by recent asset
sales, are robust for the ratings, but Fitch expects leverage to
increase as proceeds are redeployed into market-rented assets.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

New Strategy Accelerates Transition

Grainger's new strategy announced in January 2016 accelerates the
company's transition to a revenue stream that is more balanced
between recurring rental income and reversionary asset disposals,
which in our view will improve Grainger's business risk profile.
The strategic plan includes a refocus on the UK, expanding its
portfolio of market-rented assets by exiting non-core activities,
and focusing the development business on its own market-rented
property pipeline, and limiting its property fund management
activity. The plan also includes a lower target for group loan-
to-value (LTV) as defined by management of 40%-45% (from 45%-50%)
as well as higher shareholder distributions.

Increasing Market-Rented Assets

Grainger plans to recycle a large proportion of its regulated
assets into market-rented properties to increase recurring rental
income. This will be achieved over three to five years through a
combination of tenanted acquisitions (GBP250m), development of
market-rented properties (GBP250m), forward funding of third-
party developments (GBP250m) and investments into the GRIP joint
venture (Grainger's share: GBP100m).

"We expect Grainger to adopt a conservative approach for its
committed developments and use of third-party capital in the case
of GRIP." Fitch said. A limited supply of housing in the UK will
support rental demand for market rented properties.

Sound First-Half Results

First half results (financial year end-September) were better
than Fitch had expected, showing good progress on the new
strategy. The company secured GBP268m of their GBP850m investment
target for private rented sector (PRS) assets with another
GBP398m identified or in the planning/legal stage. Average rental
increases for PRS assets were positive at 5.4% on new lets and
3.1% on renewals. Prices of vacant property sales were on average
6.8% above the September 2015 valuation.

Modest Leverage Improvement

Fitch expects leverage improvements to be modest as proceeds from
recent disposals are reinvested in Grainger's PRS portfolio.
Fitch-adjusted LTV is higher than management's group LTV as Fitch
calculates it based on investment properties (i.e. excluding
development properties) and does not include joint venture or
associate equity in our core metric. At end-1HFY16, leverage was
robust for its ratings at an adjusted LTV of 39% pro forma for
disposals of German and Equity Release assets.

London-focused Residential Portfolio

While Grainger's portfolio of more than 11,900 units (at end-
1HFY16) is spread across the UK, around half of the portfolio is
in London, where demand for housing is high. The average value
per unit in the total portfolio is GBP277,000, based on vacant
possession. By comparison, the average for London is GBP587,000.
The largest asset type within Grainger's portfolio is subject to
regulated tenancy agreements where the occupiers, who typically
are elderly, pay below-market rent set by local government rent
officers.

Solid Asset Cover

The GBP275m secured notes are rated a notch higher than
Grainger's IDR to reflect above-average recovery expectations.
The secured notes benefit from a guarantor group providing a
floating charge over most of Grainger's UK residential portfolio,
which in turn corresponds to an asset cover of around 1.7x as of
end-March 2016 (asset cover is defined as the market value of
properties held by the secured notes core guarantors over core
gross debt facilities).

The secured notes rank pari-passu with other secured lenders.
According to Fitch's criteria, a decline in asset cover to below
1.5x would lead to an alignment of the secured rating with the
IDR.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- Low single-digit rental growth

   -- Stable EBITDA margins on rental income

   -- Capex in line with the announced plans; GBP500m over three
      to five years and an additional GBP250m of tenanted
      acquisitions.

   -- Lower administrative costs due to cost cutting and reduced
      business complexity

   -- Cost of debt trending to below 4%

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to positive rating action

   -- Significant improvement in business profile, with the
      majority of cash flows coming from recurring rental cash
      flows.

   -- Sustainable recurring trading, rental and fee income
      resulting in EBITDA net interest cover (NIC) above 1.75x on
      a sustained basis.

   -- Fitch-adjusted LTV (excluding development properties and
      equity in joint ventures/associates) sustainably below 50%.

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action

   -- A material reduction in trading, rental and fee income
      resulting in EBITDA NIC below 1.25x on a consistent basis
      and LTV above 65%.

   -- Liquidity score on an 18-month cycle below 1.25x and a
      decline in average debt maturities to below three years.

LIQUIDITY

At end-1HFY16, Grainger had comfortable liquidity with GBP207m in
available liquidity before Fitch adjustments for restricted cash,
whereof GBP65.7m was in cash and short-term investments. It does
not have debt maturities until 2020.

Liquidity is further supported by contracted disposals of its
German and equity release assets, which will increase available
liquidity by GBP172m on a pro forma basis.


LONMIN PLC: Losses Narrow Following Job Cuts and Rights Issue
-------------------------------------------------------------
Henry Sanderson and Nathalie Thomas at The Financial Times report
that Lonmin swung to a narrower loss after a tumultuous year in
which it was forced to cut more than 5,000 jobs and launch a
rights issue to stave off bankruptcy.

The company said it would continue to cut costs and close
inefficient production as platinum prices remained weak, the FT
relates.

Lonmin made a pre-tax loss of US$355 million for the year to
September 30, a major improvement on a near US$2.3 billion loss
the previous year, the FT discloses.

According to the FT, Lonmin said it has US$173 million of cash at
the end of September, an improvement on US$69 million at the end
of the first quarter and ahead of the US$108 million expected by
analysts at Investec.

In November 2015, Lonmin launched a deeply discounted US$400
million rights issue, warning that it could be out of business in
a matter of weeks if shareholders failed to support the
fundraising, the FT recounts.

Lonmin Plc -- http://www.lonmin.com-- is a United Kingdom-based
producer of Platinum Group Metals. Lonmin mines, refines and
markets platinum group metals (PGMS) -- platinum, palladium,
rhodium, iridium, ruthenium and gold.  The Company has productive
operations in South Africa and Canada.  The Company's resources
and operations include: Marikana operations, the Company's
flagship operation; Pandora operations, a joint venture in which
it has a 42.5% interest; Marikana Smelters and Base Metal
Refinery and Brakpan Precious Metal Refinery which has capacity
to process and refine production, offering the potential to smelt
and refine third party and recycling material; Limpopo project,
formerly an operational mine; Akanani project; Canadian projects,
joint ventures with Vale and Wallbridge exploring PGM
mineralisation in the Sudbury Basin in Ontario, and Northern
Ireland project which is an early stage exploration opportunity.


UNIQUE PUB: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class A Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Unique Pub Finance plc's (Unique)
class A notes at 'BB', class M notes at 'B+' and class N notes at
'B'.

The affirmation is driven by a stable operational performance
that is broadly in line with our expectations.  During the 12
months to June 2016, Unique continued pursuing its strategy of
improving the quality of the estate through the sale of weaker
pubs, reinvesting the large part of the disposal proceeds in the
existing portfolio. The ratings are further supported by
projected ongoing deleveraging and strong liquidity in the form
of a GBP65m cash reserve, a GBP190m liquidity facility and the
deferability of the junior notes' debt service.

                     KEY RATING DRIVERS (KRD)

Industry Profile: Midrange

Fitch views the operating environment as 'weaker'.  The pub
sector in the UK has a long history, but trading performance for
some assets has shown significant weakness in the past.  The
sector is highly exposed to discretionary spending, strong
competition (including from the off-trade), and other macro
factors such as minimum wages, rising utility costs and
regulatory changes (with the recent introduction of the mandatory
free-of-tie option). Licencing laws and regulations are
moderately stringent, and managed pubs and tenanted pubs (i.e.
non-full repairing and insuring) are fairly capital-intensive.
However, switching costs are generally viewed as low, although
there may be some captive market effects.

Fitch views the sector as reasonably sustainable and expect the
strong pub culture in the UK to persist, thereby taking a large
portion of the eating-drinking-out market.

Sub-KRDs: operating environment - weaker, barriers to entry -
midrange, sustainability - midrange.

Company Profile: Midrange

Unique is 100% owned by ETI, a listed UK pub company.  In the 12
months to September 2015, ETI achieved like for like net income
growth of 0.8%, increasing to 2.3% in the six months to March
2016, indicating some sustainable stabilization.  Management has
been stable, with low key man risk, and there are no known
corporate governance issues.  ETI is also a large operator within
the pub sector with economies of scale.  However, use of branding
is limited and there are no minimum capex covenants.  As the
estate is fully leased or tenanted, insight into underlying
profitability is weak.  Operator replacement would not be
straightforward but should be possible within a reasonable period
of time.  Centralized management of the estate and common supply
contracts result in close operational ties between the
securitized and non-securitized estates.

Fitch considers the pubs to be reasonably well-maintained and
over 90% of the estate is held on a freehold or long-leasehold
basis. At the latest revaluation in November 2015, the Unique
estate was valued at GBP1,751 mil., resulting in a fairly high
average pub value of GBP748,000.  In the past few years,
management has channelled disposal proceeds into capex for its
existing estate with ETI expecting to spend on average around
GBP16,000 per pub in 2016 (based on the number of pubs as of
March 2016).  There is no capex covenant, but upkeep is largely
contractually outsourced to tenants on full repair and insuring
leases (approximately 60% of the estate).  The secondary market
is reasonably strong and there is also alternative use value
potential (primarily as residential property and mini-
supermarkets).

Sub-KRDs: financial performance - weaker, company operations -
midrange, transparency - weaker, dependence on operator -
midrange, asset quality - midrange

Debt Structure: Class A - Midrange, Class M, N: Weaker
The debt is fully amortizing but there is some concurrent
amortization with the junior tranches.  Debt service is high for
the next seven years and the debt profile is not aligned with the
company's and industry's risk profile, particularly in relation
to the junior class M notes.  Positive factors include fully
fixed-rate debt, which avoids any floating-rate risk and senior-
ranking derivative liabilities.  The security package comprises
comprehensive first ranking fixed and floating charges over
borrower assets.

Prepayments and purchases result in debt service being one year
ahead under the restricted payment condition (RPC) calculation,
making Unique compliant with its RPC, which allows cash up-
streaming.  This is a significant credit negative, although
recently less cash has been up-streamed, possibly as a result of
the very high contractual debt service.  Structural features
include a GBP65m cash reserve and a tranched liquidity facility
covering around 16 months of peak debt service, which help
mitigate the tight debt service coverage ratios (DSCR).  Fitch do
not consider the SPV to be a true orphan SPV as the share capital
is owned by a subsidiary of Unique and the majority of its
directors are not independent.

Sub-KRDs: debt profile: class A - midrange, class M and N -
weaker, security package: class A - stronger, class M and N -
midrange, structural features - weaker

                               PEERS

Unique's closest peer is Punch Taverns Finance plc (Punch).
Punch benefits from lower leverage.  However, this discounts a
marginally weaker debt structure and worse historical performance
in terms of EBITDA growth on a per pub basis.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive - Actual free cash flow (FCF) DSCRs consistently above
1.3x, 1.1x and 1.0x for the class A, M and N notes, respectively
could trigger positive rating action.

Negative - Any deterioration of the forecast FCF DSCRs and/or an
increase in leverage could trigger negative rating action.  In
relation to the recent change in regulation (market rent only
option), there is some uncertainty as to the ultimate impact, and
this could affect the ratings in the medium term (with potential
increased costs, disruption of tenanted model).

                         SUMMARY OF CREDIT

Unique Pub Finance plc is a tap issue closed in 2005 of an
existing securitisation of a portfolio of leased pubs located in
the UK, issued by Unique Pub Finance plc.  It is 100% owned by
ETI, a listed UK pub company.  As of end-June 2016, the
securitised group comprised 2,321 tenanted pubs (representing
around 50% of the estate), down from 3,974 since the tap.

                       TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE

In the year to June 2016 Unique generated reported cash flow of
GBP129.7 mil., representing a 2.5% decline from the previous
year. This was primarily due to a 5.2% decline in the average
number of pubs.  On a per pub basis, revenues grew by 3.5% and
FCF by 2.9%. EBITDA leverage (including the cash reserve) as of
June 2016 stood at 4.6x, 6.2x and 7.7x for the class A, M and N
notes, respectively, down from 5.1x, 6.7x and 8.1x the previous
year.

                            BASE CASE

Under the base case, Fitch forecasts FCF to grow at a CAGR of -
0.9% to legal final maturity of the class N notes in 2032.  The
resulting base case projected FCF DSCRs until 2021 are 1.1x, 1.0x
and 0.9x for the class A, M and N notes respectively, broadly in
line with previous year.  The coverage for the class A notes
after 2021 is expected to significantly improve as senior debt
service reduces following the amortisation of the class A3 notes.
Notably, debt service is expected to be served under Fitch's base
case despite the low DSCRs in relation to the junior class M and
N notes, aided by Unique's cash reserve and liquidity facility.
Fitch also expects the leverage profile to improve as
amortisation continues, to around 4.2x, 6.0x and 7.4x by June
2017 through the class A, M and N notes.


* UK: Bank of England Unveils New Bank Bailout Rules
----------------------------------------------------
Ian Pollock at BBC News reports that the UK's banks should no
longer be "too big to fail", under revised rules announced by the
Bank of England.

According to BBC, the regulations will force banks to hold enough
money from their investors to absorb losses without help from the
taxpayer.

If any bank does face collapse, the funds will be spent to
finance an orderly wind-down, BBC discloses.

The Bank's governor, Mark Carney, as cited by BBC, said the new
rules were a "significant milestone".

"The implementation of [the rules] will ensure that banks that
provide essential economic functions hold sufficient resources to
be resolved in an orderly way, without recourse to public funds,
and whilst allowing households and businesses to continue to
access the services they need," BBC quotes Mr. Carney as saying.

About 400 banks and building societies will have to hold a
collective cushion of GBP223 billion, raised by selling bonds
(glorified IOUs) to investors, but the current shortfall is
estimated at only GBP20 billion, BBC notes.

If an insolvent bank does have to be rescued by being sold off or
broken up, the investors' funds will be used to keep it going in
the interim without taxpayers being asked to dip into their
pockets, according to BBC.

The new UK rules will widen the requirements to all UK banking
institutions and will be introduced in two stages: interim
requirements by 2020 and then final rules by 2022, BBC states.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EU: Warns 'Delusional' May Over Trade Deals with Trump Admin
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jessica Wilkins at Political Home reports that the EU has warned
the Prime Minister against speedily setting up a trade deal with
America after Donald Trump's victory.

One of the most senior German politicians, Axel Schafer, believes
Mr. Trump's victory will leave Britain more isolated and reduce
the chances of a trade deal, according to Political Home.

Speaking to the Times newspaper, the Brexit adviser in Berlin,
accused Theresa May of being delusional: "What changed [with
Trump's election] is the likelihood of a speedy and preferential
trade deal between UK and US," Mr. Schafer said. "Even before
Tuesday the chances were rather low, now the hope for this kind
of deal seems delusional," Mr. Schafer added.

"Regarding foreign and security policy in general, the UK can
withdraw from the European Union, but they cannot withdraw
themselves from the European map.

"With a more inward-looking Trump administration, it is in United
Kingdom's own interest to seek close co-operation with their EU
partners in this field," Mr. Schafer said, the report notes.

The Prime Minister has made her hopes for a pragmatic
relationship with the President-elect clear, the report relays.

However, the EU has also been clear about its shock and fear over
the election of the populist billionaire, the report notes.

The split in approach deepened further when it appeared that
Boris Johnson, the foreign secretary, was unlikely to attend a
European "crisis" meeting to discuss the US election, after
saying that the EU was engaging in a "whinge-o-rama," the report
relays.

The Foreign Office said that a final decision had not been made,
the report adds.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *